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
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
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ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA

Back from the Market?

Jan S. Prybyla

"Capitalist Measures"

Dorothy J. Solinger

Power to the Soviets?

Jeffrey W. Hahn

Problems of Communism

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1989 VOL XXXVIII

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Cover: A share certificate issued by the famous China Gold Cup Automobile Co. Ltd., the largest Chinese firm to issue capital shares to the public. Photo from *The New York Times*.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

China's Economic Experiment: Back from the Market?

Jan S. Prybyla

China's economic reforms have proceeded from an initially successful effort in agriculture, to a much less successful effort in the urban industrial economy, to a third stage of retrenchment in the face of an overheated industrial economy, inflation, and widening income differentials. The Chinese leadership has failed to apply marketization and privatization with sufficient vigor and consistency and finds itself with the worst of both worlds—inadequate play of market forces and a diminished capability of the center to apply old administrative means to correct economic maladjustments. By reinstituting centralized controls rather than boldly pushing ahead with the application of market mechanisms and the privatization of economic relationships, the regime almost certainly will bring on economic stagnation.

Capitalist Measures With Chinese Characteristics

Dorothy J. Solinger

In the mid-1980's, China appeared to be undertaking measures that augured a startling reshaping of the structure of the urban economy: industrial firms began selling off their state-owned assets as shares; bigger, more successful, enterprises started taking over failing ones in a manner suggestive of mergers in the West; a tiny handful of hapless plants even went bankrupt, a virtually unprecedented phenomenon in a socialist economy. These most capitalist of practices have not, however, been sanctioned by the Chinese leadership out of an urge to reorient the economy away from state ownership and toward privatization. In the eyes of China's leaders, these reforms are a way to manage the state's macro-finances, while preserving state/public ownership—the impulses behind them have a statist rationale and a statist organization. What might be mistaken for a Chinese lurch toward capitalism is actually a fleshing out of the vague concept of "socialism with Chinese characteristics."

Power to the Soviets?

Jeffrey W. Hahn

As part of his program of *perestroika*, and as a means of ousting officials opposed to it, Mikhail Gorbachev targeted the local soviets for reform. Until recently, these local councils had been largely powerless bodies elected from a single slate of candidates nominated by local party and government officials. To reinvigorate the soviets, Gorbachev and other reformers propose multicandidate elections and the institutionalization of controls by the soviets over their executive committees and local administrative departments. Reformers also seek to regulate and in some ways limit party control over the soviets and to systematize relations between the soviets and the enterprises operating on their respective territories. The outcome of these efforts is not yet known, but the success of the reform depends upon the party's willingness to restrict its power over local government and, ultimately, the emergence of a democratic political culture in the USSR.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

Checklist of Communist Parties in 1988

Richard F. Staar

The world revolutionary movement as perceived by Moscow was alive in 1988, but no longer well, according to the latest version of the checklist published by *Problems of Communism* in conjunction with The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (Stanford, CA). Reform in the Soviet Union has stimulated division in communist parties, especially ruling ones, with some opposed to emulating Moscow. The communist parties of China, the USSR, Romania, and Poland reported substantial membership increases, but significant losses were noted in Yugoslavia and Hungary. Several nonruling parties claimed gains, but the once strong Italian party showed membership falling far below previous levels. During the year, the leadership of a number of parties changed as a result of retirement, factional struggle, or unification of disparate movements.

Soviet-Line Fronts in 1988

Wallace Spaulding

In 1988, the USSR eased controls over Soviet-line trade-union and journalist organizations, while strengthening controls over the Soviet-line peace movement. As in previous years, these and other Soviet-line fronts orchestrated support for the USSR's foreign policies. Thus, dominant front themes were peace, security, and disarmament; socio-economic development; human rights; the environment; and culture and education for peace. The Asia-Pacific region was an important focus of front activity, again reflecting a major Soviet foreign policy concern. Finally, India and East Germany—a Soviet ally and a Soviet client respectively—were the sites of important front meetings.

Essay-Review

The Chinese Revolution Reevaluated

Stephen C. Averill

Most of the early studies of the Chinese Revolution made an implicit assumption that the Revolution's success was largely a matter of correct high-level political decision-making and organization. Recent scholarship has, however, begun to consider the numerous specific ambiguities involved in the Revolution's course, rather than continuing to debate the overall causes of its ultimate success. In both their complementary and corrective roles, the authors whose books are reviewed in this essay have succeeded in documenting regional variation in processes assumed to be nationwide, in showing that presumably sharp social dividing lines were actually blurred, and in exploding conceptions that assume groups such as "peasants" or their motivations to be unitary, uniformly generalizable categories.

China's Economic Experiment: Back from the Market?

Jan S. Prybyla

In a major article reviewing changes in China's economy from 1979 through 1988, economist Liu Guoguang, a vice-president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, aptly refers to the period as a "sweet and sour decade." Liu divides the decade into three stages: (a) from December 1978 (the 3rd plenum of the 11th Central Committee [CC] of the Communist Party of China [CCP]) to October 1984 (the 3rd plenum of the 12th CC); (b) from October 1984 to October 1987 (the 13th National CCP Congress); and (c) from October 1987 to the present day.¹ According to his analysis, the first period was "sweet" in terms of the surge in food output, labor productivity, and rural per capita income that attended major agricultural reforms. Things began to turn "sour" in the second period as reform efforts turned to the urban-industrial sector and one-time gains in the rural sector ran out of steam, particularly with regard to grain production. In this period, China also began to encounter accelerating inflation, sharpening divergence in income distribution, and increased evidence of corruption. In the third stage, this sourness grew progressively worse, and Chinese officials and specialists initiated a still-inconclusive debate regarding economic policy, the outcome of which could determine whether reform would hold its gains, regain its momentum, or be rolled back.

What lies behind this economic downturn? As I shall argue below, the current sourness of the Chinese econ-

omy, as defined by Liu, stems from the ambivalence of reform policy. This has produced a situation in which demand exceeds supply at presently irrational prices, and where neither the old administrative nor the newly emergent market-type of control levers work. If these problems are not properly resolved, they could undo the reform effort, and the material benefits gained so far could be lost.

The Sweet

In the midst of China's current troubles, it is important to recall the considerable achievements of the reforms. The most important of these came about as a response to policy adjustments and structural reforms in agriculture. Property rights were restructured in a way that amounted to far-reaching (if not complete) decollectivization of the farm sector and the emergence of a system of family tenant farming, under which a family was vested with extensive rights to the use of land (through 15-year leases) and de jure rights to own productive factors such as draft animals and small tractors. State prices for various farm products were raised to levels at which they began to exert a positive incentive effect on farmers, and—more important and lastingly—the agricultural price system was significantly marketized (that is, made more allocatively rational). By 1984, the number of agricultural commodities subject to compulsory state procurement had been reduced from 29 to 10. Subsequently, compulsory procurement quotas for grains and cotton were replaced by contractual purchases, although the state still set the prices for these transactions. By 1987, according to Liu, 65 percent of

*Jan S. Prybyla is Professor of Economics at the Pennsylvania State University (University Park). He is author of *Market and Plan Under Socialism: The Bird in the Cage* (1987). He is a contributing editor of *Current History*, and a member of the editorial advisory board of *Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies*, published by the School of Law, University of Maryland (Baltimore).*

¹Liu Guoguan (sic—the author's name is usually rendered in English as Liu Guoguang), "A Sweet and Sour Decade," *Beijing Review*, Jan. 2–8, 1989, pp. 22–29.

the prices of all farm and sideline products were determined "to varying degrees" by market forces. Finally, there was a considerable expansion of local and inter-regional trade.²

The resulting increase in the quantity and quality of work effort, better farm organization, and improved custody of farm assets brought impressive growth in the gross value of agricultural output: 6.5 percent per annum over the 1978–87 period, compared to an average annual growth of 2.6 percent in the 26 years preceding 1978. During the decade 1978–87, the output of meat more than doubled, that of oil-bearing crops increased more than 1 1/2 times, cotton production rose by 75 percent, aquatic products grew by 84 percent, and grain output increased 19 percent. Gross agricultural output per capita in 1987 (at 2,400 yuan) represented a real increase of 2.5 times over 1978. Per acre output of grain during the period increased 43 percent; that of cotton, 93 percent; and that of oil-bearing crops, 63 percent. There was a modest shift away from grain production (80 percent of farm output in 1978 and 77 percent in 1987) toward more profitable cash crops (10 percent in 1978 and 14 percent in 1987), with a parallel shift toward the production of higher-quality grains.

Some 80 million peasants were relocated to higher value-added employment in rural industries. The value of nonagricultural output produced in the countryside increased 6.5 times, an average annual increase of more than 23 percent in real terms. Whereas in 1978, the value of nonagricultural rural output (rural industries, construction, transportation, and commerce) comprised 30 percent of China's gross national product (GNP), in 1987, it contributed 50 percent.

There was a notable increase in the monetization and marketization of the rural economy ("commoditization" is the official term). Whereas in 1978, 45 percent of farm and sideline products were sold "as commodities," in 1987, the figure was nearly 60 percent (65 percent according to Liu). Peasant per capita net income (in current prices) rose from 134 yuan in 1978 to 463 yuan in 1987. The average annual increase in peasant consumption from 1979 through 1986 was 8.7 percent (it was 5.8 percent for the nonagricultural population). Per capita grain consumption, at more than 391 kilograms (in 1986), exceeded the 1979–81 annual average of 213 kilograms for developing countries by a comfortable margin. By 1987, peasant households owned 70 percent of all large and medium-sized tractors in Chi-

na, 94 percent of walking and small tractors, and 61 percent of the generators used for irrigation and drainage.

The gratifying results of measures taken in the rural sector brought a good press for market-related reforms and contributed, no doubt, to the October 20, 1984, CC decision to use a similar approach in the industrial and, more generally, urban sectors.³ The results in industry were also substantial, although not nearly as impressive as in agriculture. In the 1978–87 decade, total industrial output—measured in real terms—grew at an average annual rate of 11.8 percent (compared to 11.3 percent a year during 1952–77). The gross output of state industry doubled, although its share in total industrial output dropped from 80 to 60 percent (70 percent according to Liu). The gross output of collectively-run, i.e., cooperative, industry increased four-fold, bringing its share of industrial output from 19 percent to 27 percent. The share of private industry rose from zero to a still very modest 2.4 percent. In the process, a major imbalance of Chinese industry was partly corrected. Whereas in 1978, the ratio of heavy to light industrial output was 57:43, by 1987, it had decreased to 50:50. Labor productivity in state industries, according to official sources, increased during the decade by almost 50 percent.

Whereas in 1978, 40 percent of the industrial output (in value terms) was produced under mandatory planning, by 1987, only 20 percent was. The number of industrial products whose output was planned and managed directly by the state under the system of material balances decreased from 120 to 60. The number of materials subject to "unified" distribution by centralized state physical allocation fell from 246 to 26, but the state material-technical supply network in 1988 still distributed 47 percent of steel products, 44 percent of coal, 14 percent of cement, and 26 percent of timber. During the decade, energy consumption for every 100 million yuan of output fell by 30 percent, and the amount of steel products consumed, by 23 percent. The share of fixed investment handled through the state budget (in effect, through budgetary grants) fell from 77 percent to 32 percent, and there was a concurrent increase in the share of investment financed by bank loans.⁴

Between 1978 and 1987, industrial products valued at US\$145.5 billion were exported, accounting for 83 percent of China's total exports. The value of industrial exports was 5.5 times that of the period 1973–77. The

²For statistics on the results of Chinese rural reforms see *ibid.*; State Statistical Bureau, "Rural Reform," *ibid.*, Sept. 26–Oct. 2, 1988, pp. 31–32; and Ding Shengjun, "Projected Changes in Chinese Consumption," *ibid.*, Oct. 3–9, 1988, pp. 24–25.

³Decision of CC of CCP on Reform of the Economic Structure, Adopted by the 12th CC of the CCP at its 3rd Planning Session, on October 20, 1984, in *ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1984, pp. i–xvi.

⁴Liu, *loc. cit.*; and State Statistical Bureau, "The Industrial Economy," *Beijing Review*, Oct. 3–9, 1988, pp. 27–30.

volume of foreign trade tripled. From 1978 through 1987, more than 10,000 foreign joint ventures were established, involving about \$30 billion in contracts (\$9 billion actually spent). Foreign loan contracts came to almost \$40 billion (\$27 billion spent), and various other agreements on barter trade and assembly operations amounted to \$3 billion (\$2 billion spent).⁵

The Sour

The sourness that began to afflict the Chinese economy shortly after the expansion of reform to the urban-industrial sector in October 1984 reflected in part a leveling-off of farm production, particularly of the politically sensitive grain output. Grain output peaked in 1984 at 407 million tons. Rationing had to be reinstated in 1987-88 for formerly deregulated commodities (e.g., pork) in the larger cities.⁶ The one-time motivational upswing in response to marketizing-privatizing reforms in the countryside thus appeared to have spent its energy, and further gains seemed problematic.

Moreover, replication of the rural reforms and their positive impact proved much more difficult in the more socialized and bureaucratized cities.⁷ Indeed, the ur-

ban-industrial economy, particularly the large, highly bureaucratized, demonetized, privileged state sector, has proved extremely resistant to structural change in the two areas that really matter: prices and property relationships. At the same time, there has been a weakening of the instrumentalities of central administrative command planning (accomplished in part through what appears to be excessive administrative decentralization of decision-making to provincial bureaucracies) without adequate strengthening of market instrumentalities of information, coordination, and incentive. All this has contributed to the overheating of the economy, inflation, widening income differentials, and corruption.

Overheating of the economy. Symptomatic of overheating, industrial production (rural industrial output

⁵"High-Pressured, But Out of Steam," *The Economist* (London), Nov. 12, 1988, p. 38.

⁶Rather than elaborate here on the many factors contributing to the topping-out of grain output increases, I refer the reader to Joseph Fewsmith, "Agricultural Crisis in the PRC," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1988, pp. 78-93.

⁷Jan S. Prybyla, "China's Economic Experiment: From Mao to Market," *ibid.*, January-February 1986, p. 29.



A private home built by a peasant in 1980 on the outskirts of Luda city in Liaoning province, a sign of rural affluence spurred by reforms in the Chinese countryside.

—Eastfoto.

excluded) expanded by 18 percent in 1988, more than double the government's goal, a situation close to being out of control. In August 1988, some 11 provinces and municipalities registered industrial growth rates of more than 20 percent over the same month in 1987, with Fujian chalking up 32 percent and Guangdong 36 percent. Consumer goods led the way, with the output of refrigerators up 82 percent from the previous year, and the output of color television sets up 65 percent.⁸

This expansion has been stimulated by a seemingly uncontrollable industrial investment hunger, a phenomenon common to all socialist economies. This hunger is particularly true of fixed investment by local government authorities (at the province or lower level) and enterprises, which in China account for roughly two-fifths of total fixed investment. The plan for 1988 called for a 14 percent decrease in state-sector fixed investment, but in fact such investment rose by 17 percent for the year.⁹ Without coordination either by a central plan or by a genuine market, there is haphazard investment by localities, which wastes resources through unwarranted duplication of industrial capacities. The technological level of many locally constructed plants is low, the rates of utilization of materials are high, and managerial expertise is poor.

This surge in economic activity places enormous strain on scarce raw material and energy supplies and on the badly overburdened and bottlenecked transportation system. It also contributes to an already thriving black market and the concurrent corruption.

Inflation. Most important, the overheated economy has triggered a serious price inflation. Officially, urban retail prices in 1988 rose 21 percent over 1987, compared to 7.3 percent in 1987. Unofficially, and more realistically, the inflation rate was close to 40 percent. Even at official rates, the inflation (which began in 1985) has been the longest since 1949 and the most severe since Mao's Great Leap Forward (1959–61). Vegetable prices in large cities in the first half of 1988 rose by about 50 percent. In September 1988, the prices of meat, poultry, and eggs were 46 percent higher than in August 1987, and prices of Chinese traditional medicines rose 52 percent over the same period.¹⁰ Some prices doubled, others (e.g., machinery prices in some large cities like Guangzhou) even tripled. Rumors of further sharp price increases and projected bank restrictions on personal savings withdrawals precipitated panic buying and runs on banks in some cities, most notably Shanghai, in late July 1988.¹¹

Price inflation was accompanied and in part stimulated by wage inflation. The wage fund in the state sector grew by 20.1 percent in the first three quarters of 1988

(it had risen 19 percent, 22 percent, and 22 percent respectively for the whole of 1984, 1985, and 1986), with the bonus component rising 46.6 percent. Increases in money wages exceeded by a large margin increases in labor productivity. Already between 1981 and 1985, industrial money wages rose nearly twice as fast as labor productivity.¹²

To maintain social peace in the face of surging retail prices for food and industrial consumer goods, the government paid out liberal subsidies to urban dwellers. In Beijing, the subsidy in the first half of 1988 was 60 percent higher than in the first half of 1987.¹³ Moreover, officially recorded wage increases probably understate the actual situation because a good part of compensation takes the form of in-kind fringe benefits, e.g., free lunches and clothing allocations. Although some of these benefits are not strictly legal, they have been growing rapidly of late. The official wage increases also fail to take into account earnings from moonlighting in the "second" (legal, semilegal, illegal) economy on government time, often with the aid of "borrowed" government-owned tools. It is reasonable to speculate that such additional income equals or exceeds the wage incomes captured in the official statistics.

Despite rising wages and subsidies, many urban dwellers have found their real incomes declining. In Guangdong province, half the urban population was officially estimated to have experienced erosion of real income in the first half of 1988; in Shanghai, the figure was 40 percent. Nationwide, in 1987, the share of urban and rural households whose real income had been lowered by inflation was 40 percent, up from 20 percent in 1986.¹⁴ This situation has led to work slowdowns and strikes; some 200 strikes, each involving more than 1,000 workers, are believed to have occurred in the first half of 1988 alone.¹⁵

The state's subsidy burden is heavy and rising. At

⁸Ellen Salem, "What Price Reform?" *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Sept. 22, 1988, p. 71.

⁹State Statistical Bureau, "Statistics for 1988 Socio-Economic Development," *Beijing Review*, Mar. 6–12, 1989, pp. i–viii.

¹⁰*China's Latest Statistics* (Shenzhen and Hong Kong), China's Statistics Consulting Service Centre & CITIC Research International Branch, October 1988, Part 2, p. 28.

¹¹Adi Ignatius, "China Is Moving to Hold Down Wild Inflation," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Sept. 1, 1988, p. 14.

¹²"Sliding Into Recession," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Nov. 10, 1988, p. 95; *Liaowang Zhoukan* (Beijing), No. 23, June 26, 1988, pp. 6–10, trans. in *Inside China Mainland* (Taipei), November 1988, p. 15; "Inflation Takes Its Toll," *China Trade Report* (Hong Kong), June, 1988, pp. 4–7.

¹³Robert Delfs, "Shifting Economic Gears," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Sept. 25, 1988, p. 17.

¹⁴Li Yungi, "Freeing the Banks From Beijing's Grip," *The Asian Wall Street Journal* (Hong Kong), Nov. 7, 1988, p. 13.

¹⁵"Try to Keep the Lid On," *Asiaweek* (Hong Kong), Sept. 30, 1988, p. 29.

present, it accounts for about one-seventh of total state budgetary expenditures.¹⁶ The subsidies are paid, as we have seen, partly to assuage the dissatisfaction of urban workers with rising prices for food and other goods on the free market. Retail food prices in state food stores are not only below free market prices for comparable goods, but also below the purchase prices paid by the state to peasants under the system of contract deliveries. In 1988, the agricultural subsidy came to about 32 billion yuan, up from 3.6 billion yuan in 1978.¹⁷ Subsidies are also employed to keep rents and the prices of utilities and transportation paid by urban users well under market-clearing levels.

Subsidies contribute to inflationary pressures. Spent largely on food, they drive up food prices on the free market. In the currently unsatisfactory state of the price system and of marketing, and in the presence of various contractual and other constraints (e.g., the small size of family land plots) on farmers' decision-making power, the rising prices are either not transmitted to the producers or reach them in distorted form. Whatever the reasons, the upward movement of urban food prices has not been translated into sufficient increases in food supply to moderate or halt the price rise.

Another contributor to the inflationary surge has been the rapid increase in consumption by "social groups" (mass organizations, offices, bureaus, and corporations). This was supposed to decrease by 20 percent in 1988 compared with the preceding year, but increased instead by roughly that same proportion (by more than 30 percent in some provinces).

While increased monetization of the economy is a necessary and welcome ingredient of China's economic modernization, China's central authorities have lost control over the money supply. In 1988, according to the government's plan, the money supply was to have increased by 17 percent. Instead, it jumped more than 40 percent. The money supply rose at an estimated yearly rate of 30 percent between 1984 and 1986. The problem seems to lie in an excessive administrative-territorial decentralization of economic management and the lack of independence of the banking system from governmental authority at all levels.¹⁸ According to Li Yungi, an economist with the People's Bank,

[China] has no independent central bank and no banks operating as independent entities. . . . [In the

*absence of such independence] monetary policy. . . completely reflects the behavior of the government. Consequently, almost every year the Chinese government has covered its budget deficits through bank overdrafts. . . . [G]overnment at all levels often forces banks to finance pet projects and meet excessive working capital requirements regardless of economic results. . . . Compounding the problem is the fact that specialized . . . banks also do not operate as independent entities.*¹⁹

The banks are not responsible for their own profits and losses—i.e., they operate under a mushy budget constraint with no economic penalties to speak of. Consequently, they have no incentive to refuse to lend money for questionable ventures, and every incentive to accommodate their customers, who also happen to be the banks' political bosses. Li is quite right when he says that "the expectation that decentralized decision-making will lead to more efficient investment decisions depends heavily on the efficiency with which the financial system mobilizes and channels resources." Such efficiency, one should add, is crucially dependent upon the existence of an allocatively rational price system for funds—in other words, market-determined interest rates.

Widening income differentials. Socialist societies have traditionally been concerned with "fairness" in the distribution of income, in particular money income (less attention is paid to the "income" inherent in political power, which—given the chronic scarcities in socialist economies—is the income that really matters). Wide income disparities have political consequences everywhere. The consequences are particularly important and explosive in an economy, such as China's, where they are perceived by people to be organically linked to a highly elitist distribution of political power.

Consequently, it is doubtless with great trepidation that official China has acknowledged (it still occasionally denies) the existence of large and expanding income disparities among various groups of citizens. First, there is the disparity between incomes earned by people on fixed wages and salaries—who under the existing system cannot, as a rule, change jobs without government permission—and the new entrepreneurs in the private sector. The average annual income of the urban resident is equivalent to just over US\$300 plus some \$130 in bonuses, or about \$430 a year. A private businessman, say in construction, can earn \$10,000 or

¹⁶State Statistical Bureau, *Statistical Yearbook of China 1986*, Beijing, p. 309.

¹⁷Fewsmith, loc. cit., p. 81.

¹⁸Nicholas D. Kristof, "Beijing Authority Being Challenged by Local Powers," *The New York Times*, Dec. 11, 1988.

¹⁹Li Yungi, loc. cit.

more a year.²⁰ (For reference, a color television set retails for about \$700.) These "private" entrepreneurs include not just rural folk (specialized householders in the vicinity of large cities), but officials who set up "briefcase companies" benefiting from politically facilitated access to scarce materials, information, and necessary permissions and authorizations.

Second, urban workers differ in their ability to obtain bonuses, in the size of the bonuses they obtain, in their access to the second economy, and, connected with this, in the opportunities they have to informally "privatize" (i.e., steal) socially-owned assets. The existence and size of bonuses depend on whether the employing state enterprise is profitable or unprofitable. The profitability of an enterprise in present-day China depends, in turn, to a very significant extent on the firm's access to extrabudgetary funds, which hinges more on personal/political connections than on efficient management, given the monstrous distortions of the prices by which profitability is measured.

One group that appears to be particularly underprivileged in terms of monetary income, access to political influence, and opportunity to appropriate state assets for personal purposes, consists of rank-and-file academics (those not affiliated with official research institutes and commissions), although they do have some limited opportunities to engage in consulting and crypto-commercial activities. The academic community has been the principal beneficiary of the relaxation of the intellectual climate after Mao, but its status, as measured both by social prestige and the ability to purchase worldly goods, remains low. In 1978, state workers in knowledge-intensive occupations earned on average 2 percent more than manual workers; by 1986, manual workers earned on average 10 percent more than brain workers, and the disparity has grown since then. The long-term implications for China's modernization of this continuing neglect and disparagement of its intellectuals promise to be very serious. The great hope of the brightest young people is to go abroad. Of the 40,000 or so Chinese students who have gone to the United States since 1979, reportedly only one-fourth have returned to China.²¹

Finally, although numerous peasants living on China's eastern "gold coast," particularly those living near the large coastal cities, have prospered as never be-



Black market currency exchange in Guangdong province.

—Patrick Zachmann/MAGNUM.

fore, other Chinese citizens—100 million of them, or one-tenth of the population—remain, by official admission, malnourished. Interprovincial income disparities are large and growing: Guangdong with 63 million people has an income twice that of Hunan with 57 million people; wage rates in Guangdong are 20–30 percent higher than in Hunan.²²

Aggravating the economic differentiation is the emergence of open unemployment. It is thought that there are 20 million unnecessary workers in the cities out of a total urban industrial labor force of about 150 million. Despite the rapid growth of rural industries, the "surplus" population of unemployed or underemployed peasants is put at 100 million. According to government sources, the floating population of uprooted peasants is 50 million. Despite legal prohibitions, they drift into and out of the cities, consume subsidized food, do casual work, and add to urban crime. Half of them stay in the cities for at least three months.²³

Corruption. By official admission, corruption is rampant at all levels of the party and state administration. Repeated anticorruption campaigns, clean-up investigations, and harsh punishment (including the death penalty) have done little to stem the tide of graft and

²⁰State Statistical Bureau, "Statistics for 1988 Socio-Economic Development," p. viii. "Per capita income on living expenses" was given as 1,119 yuan, or US\$302 at the official exchange rate of 3.7 yuan to the dollar. See Adi Ignatius, "China's Restructuring Is Enriching Peasants But Not City Dwellers," *The Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 10, 1988.

²¹"Chicken Feed," *The Economist*, Nov. 26, 1988, p. 38.

²²"Straining at Beijing's Tether," *The Economist*, Dec. 10, 1988, p. 31.

²³"City Lights," *The Economist*, Feb. 18, 1989.

bribery. Corruption has been defined as "abusing positions of power for personal gain, extortion and blackmail, graft and bribery, squandering public money, and indulging in luxury and extravagance."²⁴

Perception of Crisis

China's leaders evidently debated the sourness of the economy during their annual retreat at Beidahe in the summer of 1988. The outcome was a dramatic cooling down of reformist zeal and a decision to "retreat into caution" under the rubric: "Improve the economic environment and adjust the economic order." This shift could turn into a defeat for the reformists unless the nature and extent of the problems are put into true perspective and the systemic repercussions of the proposed (and by now partly implemented) remedies are clearly understood.²⁵

Part of the challenge to China's leaders is to avoid exaggerating these economic ills or attributing them all to the reforms. The Chinese economy, like other socialist, centrally planned economies, has persistently suffered from chronic excess demand for both producer and consumer goods (what Hungarian economist János Kornai calls the "economics of shortage"), inflation, sharp income disparities, unemployment, corruption, and the generally low quality of goods, services, and human relations. The difference is that under the reforms, these ills are no longer suppressed or disguised by administrative commands, but have come to the surface, as happens when market forces come into play.

For example, there has always been inflation, but because of the almost universal price controls imposed administratively by the state, it manifested itself not in price increases, but rather in lines outside stores, in shortages or unavailability of wanted goods, and in corruption (under-the-counter payments, bribes, and the rest). As for differentials in money income, even when these were narrowed sharply (as during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution), there existed enormous inequalities in actual access to goods, such access having been and remaining to this day (though marginally less so) primarily a function of a person's or group's position on the political power ladder and of

bureaucratic connections. Indeed, one of the reasons for the resistance of party-state bureaucrats to the marketization and concurrent monetization of the economy is that this "privilegentsia" is concerned about the possible loss of the private "rents" that they have drawn from public property under the system of monopolistic party-state power.²⁶

There was unemployment under the old system, but it, too, was hidden—behind the guarantee to everyone of a job, irrespective of personal preferences between work and leisure and regardless of how marginal the job-holder's contribution to production might be. The result was chronic overstaffing in most branches of the economy, low labor productivity, and massive loitering on the job—which took the place of pounding the pavement in search of work. In effect, under the old system, a good part of the worker's wage was an unemployment compensation payment made on the job (or "on-the-job unemployment").

The visibility of the many problems stemming from the still partial and modest marketization of the Chinese economy is intensified by China's increased interaction with the outside world and the availability of more timely, more reliable information.

The first reaction of many upon confronting these problems has been shock. Reformers are shocked by rising prices, emergent unemployment, widening income disparities, eroding living standards of some key social groups, the lean and mean way in which wealth is pursued, and most of all, by their own apparent inability to bring these problems under control through the use of such market instrumentalities as they have managed to put in place. The opponents of structural reform are shocked by the nakedness of the phenomena, but even more by what they believe is the grievous damage being done to the institutional foundations and guiding ideas of Leninist socialism. They are disturbed by spontaneity under the changed system, interpreting it as "chaos," "anarchy," and erosion of the party's "leading role." The confidence of ordinary people in marketizing-privatizing reform is also undermined by these many adverse economic phenomena.²⁷

Given these real problems and their increased publicity, China's reformers are faced with the challenge of devising a coherent and forward-looking analysis

²⁴Yang Xiaobing, "China's Battle Against Corruption," *Beijing Review*, Jan. 16–22, 1989, p. 20. According to the *People's Daily*, peasants in Jiangsu province in the first half of 1988 spent 1.5 billion yuan on "sympathy gifts" for officials. For China as a whole, such bribes increased by 30 percent compared with the same period of 1987. (How these figures are arrived at is a good question—JP.) *China News Analysis* (Hong Kong), No. 1371, Nov. 1, 1988, p. 4.

²⁵"Rolling Back the Years," *Asiaweek*, Nov. 18, 1988, p. 26.

²⁶Jan Winiecki, "Why Economic Reforms Fail in the Soviet-Type System: A Property Rights-Based Approach," Seminar Paper No. 374.(1986), Institute of International Economic Studies, University of Stockholm.

²⁷"Facing so many problems, people, including many young people, almost lose their confidence in our reform," was how a young Chinese economist described the situation to the author in a private communication in Beijing, Dec. 20, 1988.

which can help offset a built-in tendency to revert to the old administrative command remedies. Any restructuring of a complex economic system will involve disruption, some of it very painful. If the general direction of the reformist changes is judged to be correct—and China's improved economic condition today (the "sweet" side of the experiment) compared with 1978 would suggest that it is—several questions need to be addressed. They are: which of the problems linked to the reforms are avoidable, i.e., reflect policy mistakes; which are structurally necessary and unavoidable and must be accepted as part of the price of change; and what is the minimum critical mass of reforms (and their attendant disruptions) that have to be introduced if the objectives of reform (elimination of chronic shortages, increased static and dynamic efficiency, improved quality) are to be achieved? Reasoned answers to these questions, shared with the population at large, could help reduce the propensity of officials to panic at the first encounter with serious difficulties and to take shelter in pseudo-remedies that invite the Brezhnevite stagflation.²⁸ Assessment of the causes of China's economic sourness is a critical starting point in such an analysis.

Causes of Sourness

China's major economic problem today is that changes in supply and demand are not translated into prompt reallocation of resources. Part of the reason is technical—advanced degradation of soil, neglect of irrigation and drainage facilities, a critical shortage of trained personnel, scarcity of residential housing and the existence of locally administered rationing (which add to the administrative impediments to labor mobility), obsolete industrial equipment, and deficient transportation. But the most important causes are systemic. They have to do with the limited nature and extent of the structural changes made so far.

Like Czechoslovakia's marketizers before 1968, many Chinese reformers see marketization and privatization of the economy as a way to banish the problems inherent in central administrative planning without acquiring too many troublesome new ones, and to grow rich quickly and painlessly in the bargain. But the market, even at its best, is not a panacea. As John Stuart

Mill outlined in his *Principles of Political Economy* (1848), markets are subject to failure. They also raise delicate ethical problems, some of which can be addressed only through the judicial agencies of the state. "Normal" market disabilities (business cycles, inflation, unemployment, politically or ethically unacceptable patterns of income and wealth distribution, balance-of-payments disequilibria) can be addressed with varying degrees of success by resort to macroeconomic monetary and fiscal instruments—e.g., manipulation of the money supply via interest rates, and tax policy. Such market control levers are just as indispensable a component of the market/price system as are legal rules for contract and tort—and, more generally, observance of the rule of law. In their absence, the market system dissolves into a stateless and lawless society or libertarian anarcho-capitalism.²⁹ Laissez-faire does not mandate the absence of state intervention in the market, but merely the limitation of such intrusion.

The trouble is that the Chinese system after 10 years of policy and structural changes (adjustments and reform) is not a market system, nor is it any longer a coherent, centrally planned system. It is, as many Chinese economists recognize, neither fish nor fowl, neither plan nor market. Even if this in-between construct were equipped with market-type macroeconomic instrumentalities of control (an independent banking system and a system of taxation capable of having an impact on the market), the ability of such instruments to deal effectively with the economy's present problems would be questionable. For China's economy is not a market economy but a dismantled planned economy with uncoordinated, unlinked, and imperfect markets existing here and there for individual goods. Similarly, one can question the ability of administrative levers to deal with problems that are partly administrative in origin, partly market-related, and partly the result of the uncomfortable coexistence of markets and administrative command.

Liu Guoguang graphically describes the current state of reform in China:

China has proceeded in a piecemeal fashion, so at present the old and new systems coexist alongside each other. The aim of introducing reforms gradually was to avoid massive social and economic upheaval. However, this blending of two systems has undoubt-

²⁸"China, arthritic after 40 years of central planning, still finds the idea of market prices hard to understand. Some of its leaders, the collective rhetoric notwithstanding, would prefer to return to the old ways, when prices were controlled, supply fixed, and demand ignored." See "Freeze a Bit, Melt a Bit, Stir," *The Economist*, July 30, 1988, p. 34.

²⁹James Buchanan, "Man and State," in Svetozar Pejovich, Ed., *Socialism: Institutional, Philosophical, and Economic Issues*, Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1987, pp. 3–9. On market failures, see Andrew Schotter, *Free Market Economics: A Critical Appraisal*, New York, St. Martin's, 1985, Ch. 4.

edly generated a series of thorny problems. For example, with neither the old mandatory system nor the new market system effectively dominating the distribution of resources, the defects of both systems have been magnified. Confusion has arisen in production, circulation, and management, creating much leeway for speculation and racketeering. This has led many Chinese and foreign economists to suggest putting an early end to the coexistence of the two systems and establishing the dominant position of the new system as soon as possible. However, such a transformation is no easy job.³⁰

China's economic changes, like Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika*, have so far proceeded in a conceptual vacuum rationalized as "pragmatism," which the leadership describes as "crossing the river while groping for the stones." There is no coherent blueprint for change, no theory of systemic transition; instead there is the fuzzy and fairly meaningless goal of "socialism with Chinese characteristics," which presumably involves a shift of emphasis from mandatory to "guidance" planning with market transplants here and there, and some diversification of property forms.

The only definite statement of objectives is a negative one. Despite a good deal of revisionist thinking on the meaning of socialism (what Marx really meant, how far Marxism is relevant to present-day conditions, whether and/or how much Mao and others distorted the essence of socialism), China's leaders seem determined not to go all the way to the market system.³¹ This is true despite the graphic demonstration by the newly industrializing countries of Asia—on China's very doorstep—of the ability of a market system in which private property rights dominate to supply people with increasing quantities of the desired goods at prices they are prepared to pay.

Unless thoroughly rethought, this half-way approach could prove fatal to the Chinese (and Soviet) reform efforts. A system is a logically consistent whole of mutually compatible, supporting, and interacting ideas and institutions (agreed-on ways of doing things). It must be accepted as a whole, as a package, or not at all. Half-measures accentuate the basic incompatibilities of market and plan philosophies and institutions and psychologically compromise the reform movement. They give rise to disillusionment, make for loss of momentum, and encourage recidivism. A slow and graduated pace, while it may lessen the pain of systemic transition, also enables those adversely affected by the changes (e.g., the formerly privileged bureaucrats and coddled state-sector workers) to organize powerful political opposition to reform. Lack of synchronization and

comprehensiveness disrupts the logical institutional linkages of the old system without creating workable new ones.³²

Conditions for a successful market system. To be successful, a market system must have the following attributes:

1. There must be free markets for goods and factors (land, labor, capital, entrepreneurship). This means free access and exit for buyers and sellers, and no physical rationing of inputs and outputs. Voluntariness of transactions is the operational principle.

2. Prices must reflect relative scarcities, i.e., marginal social (private and external) costs to producers and marginal social utilities (use values) to users. Market prices must be the core device providing information, coordination, and incentives.

3. There must be workable competition among and between buyers and sellers, that is, alternatives should exist. With a few, strictly circumscribed exceptions, there should be no monopolies, central or local, private or public.

4. There must be maximizing (rational) economic behavior by sellers and buyers. Sellers must want to make profits by responding to buyer demands expressed in competitive prices, and buyers must seek to maximize their satisfaction.

5. Private property rights must be dominant. Private property rights require the vesting in individuals or freely constituted associations of individuals of very broad rights as to the use and transfer of property and the drawing of income from it.

6. Macroeconomic (monetary and fiscal) instrumentalities of (indicative) intervention in the market process must be in place, as must institutionalized arrangements (e.g., social security and unemployment insurance) to deal with market disturbances and structural market faults.

³⁰Liu Guoguang, loc. cit., p. 25. One suggestion for moving to a full market system may be found in my "China's Economic Reforms," published in *Journal of Comparative Social and Economic Studies* (Beijing), No. 3, 1988, pp. 36–40.

³¹E.g., "China's state-owned enterprises will never be privatized." Zhao Ziyang, "Report to the 3rd Plenary Session of the 13th CPC Central Committee (September 26, 1988), *Beijing Review*, Nov. 14–20, 1988, p. v. On systemic transition, see Jan S. Prybyla, "The Chinese Economy: Adjustment of the System or Systemic Reform?" *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), May 1985, pp. 553–86.

³²"The right solution was prescribed long ago by the logical economists who brought about the great postwar economic miracles in West Germany and Japan: instantly free all prices, mercilessly control the money supply, and keep the currency undervalued." See "High Pressured, But Out of Steam," loc. cit., p. 38.

As we shall see below, China's economy today fails to meet most of these criteria.

China's Current Economic "System"

In contemporary China, marketization and privatization are more advanced in agriculture than in industry, and they apply more to the movement of goods than of factors. In fact, there is practically no market for land, with the exception of a rudimentary market for a small segment of urban real estate. There exists a partial and very imperfect market for labor: rural labor can move from the land to rural industry, but not (at least not legally) to urban industry. Contract industrial workers are more mobile than those—the majority—assigned to workplaces by state labor bureaus. And there is a residual market of sorts for capital goods (market sales of above-plan producer goods). Despite the publicity given them by Western media, financial markets are very underdeveloped, and Chinese stock exchanges are rather pathetic affairs at present.³³

The continued, extremely limited mobility of factors violates the first condition of a successful market system. It makes it impossible for resources to be reallocated quickly (if at all) in response to shifts in demand, perpetuates the demand-supply disequilibrium that has long plagued the economy, promotes inflation, and contributes to hidden unemployment and low labor productivity.

The free market condition is also violated by the continued presence of central physical rationing of key inputs and outputs. Although fewer goods are subject to such rationing than before 1978, the number and strategic significance of the items still rationed distort the functioning of both the residual "free" markets for such goods and the markets for other goods. At present, 40 percent of the capital goods requirements of Chinese industrial firms are supplied through commercial (albeit politicized) channels; the rest are supplied through centrally planned allocations.³⁴

Although some freeing of individual prices has taken place (again, more in agriculture than in industry), the process has been staggered and uncoordinated. The notion of price interrelationships, including interrelationships of prices for goods and factors, is not well understood, or if understood, is ignored. Liberation of the price system—as distinct from prices of one or another individual item—is not in sight.³⁵

To ease the transition to a freer price system, a two-track price arrangement has been implemented, under which some prices for a particular commodity or factor are set by the planners (with little or no attention to sup-

ply and demand), while others are determined by imperfectly articulated market forces. This unsatisfactory compromise does little to improve the allocative rationality of China's price system, and probably makes the old system's formidable behavioral distortions worse.

The arrangement certainly encourages "corruption" (some would call it "arbitrage") as entrepreneurs with the right political connections obtain scarce inputs earmarked for planned production at low state-set prices and resell them to input-hungry firms at higher quasi-market prices. The seller has inputs to sell because he has secured excess supplies of them from the state by overstating his needs (a fact overlooked with the help of his ministerial connections), or simply because he has failed to fulfill his state production contract. "As the government has control over all fixed-price raw materials, factory managers find any way they can to 'get to the mayor' rather than 'get to the market'."³⁶ This schizophrenic arrangement applies to prices of agricultural as well as industrial goods, to payments for labor (contract wages versus planned wages, basic wages versus income from moonlighting), to currency values (*renminbi* versus foreign-exchange certificates), and to other exchange activities. The ramifications are succinctly summed up by Western economist Bela Balassa:

*The two-tier system of sales and prices increases the freedom of decision-making for the firm, but may have adverse effects on the national economy. Since raising the quota allocation of inputs and reducing that of output may affect the firm's profits to a much greater extent than any improvements in production, bargaining and influence-peddling are at a premium. Nor should it be assumed that profitability at the prices of above-quota sales represents social profitability, in part because these prices differ from equilibrium prices that would be obtained in the absence of quotas, and in part because the prices of capital and labor do not reflect scarcity relationships.*³⁷

Thus, under existing conditions, even the so-called markets in China (on which above-contract goods are

³³See Dorothy Solinger, "Capitalist Measures with Chinese Characteristics," in this issue of *Problems of Communism*, pp. 19–33.

³⁴Jin Qi, "Factory Directors' Worries," *Beijing Review*, Oct. 3–9, 1988, p. 7.

³⁵"China's Seriously Distorted Pricing System Has Not Been Fundamentally Changed," *Beijing Review*, Sept. 26–Oct. 2, 1988, p. 7.

³⁶"I used my money to buy his power, and then used his power to make myself more money," said a "business operator" caught bribing a supply official. See *Liaowang* (Beijing), Sept. 12, 1988, pp. 10–12, trans. in *Inside China's Mainland*, January 1989, p. 22.

³⁷Bela Balassa, "China's Economic Reform in a Comparative Perspective," *Journal of Comparative Economics* (San Diego, CA), No. 3, 1987, pp. 410–26.

sold) are to a critical extent markets in favors, and buyer-seller "bargaining" is often soaked through with politics. This is not the sort of "higgling and bargaining" Adam Smith had in mind.

Most Chinese economists and many officials are aware that "the key to reforming the economy is price reform. Until China's distorted pricing system is straightened out, it will remain impossible to lay a proper foundation for the establishment of a socialist commodity economic system."³⁸ This awareness is qualified (there is a fairly widespread unwillingness to admit that prices must be flexible upward as well as downward and that they should move up and down by themselves), and tempered by fears of social upheaval if prices were to be freed overnight in the context of excess demand for almost everything usable. In the words of one observer: "Price reform must not be carried out impatiently or in isolation. It requires favorable conditions and coordination with other reforms."³⁹ There is circular reasoning involved in this assessment: "favorable conditions" (demand-supply equilibrium) will not be achieved so long as the price system remains irrational, rigid, and schizophrenic.

The fourth condition—economically rational buyer and seller behavior—is also not satisfied. The behavior of Chinese buyers and sellers is, of course, rational within the context of allocatively irrational price signals. It involves considerable political bargaining, a running self-accounting of favors received from and rendered to one's hierarchical bureaucratic superiors or otherwise well-connected persons—what one might call "socialist feudalism." This behavior breaks the indispensable link between private and social interest brought about by a depoliticized competitive market mechanism, and thereby gives private profit and utility maximizing a bad name.

Because of the difficulties involved in completely marketizing the price system, attention has shifted (perhaps by design of some reformers intent on keeping the reform momentum going) to what appears at first sight to be the less politically explosive, although ideologically sensitive, issue of property reform—i.e., privatization. The problem of excessive nationalization has long been recognized in China, and some conversion of state property to cooperative ownership has been carried out since 1978 alongside the expansion of private property and of various mixed property forms.

Some Chinese economists rationalize the reversion to private ownership in terms of expanding the autono-

my of enterprises—giving them greater right to use, transfer, invest, and draw income from the assets they employ. Shareholding in firms can be advocated as "reestablishing the individual rights of workers," a "legitimate" socialist operation if the shares are sold to the firms' workers, and even if they are purchased by the general public, since everyone in China today is by definition a worker. Additionally, since most of the stock floated to date resembles bonds more than equity shares, this can serve to explain away the delicate question of private ownership.

Enterprise issuance of stock and bonds can also be defended on anti-inflationary grounds, as drawing purchasing power out of the pockets of would-be consumers and channeling it to productive use. Moreover, it is argued, worker-proprietors will have an incentive to work harder and better, and to take good care of production plant and equipment. Labor productivity and output will rise, market equilibrium will be achieved, and, at that point, the price system can be freed without fear of social disturbances.

The best-known of the Chinese economists making this case is Li Yining, professor of economic management at Peking University, whose report recommending postponement of reform of the price system for two years and a resolute push on the property liberalization front (justified as necessary for increasing enterprise autonomy) was released in May 1988. This report seems to have served as a fallback position for the reformists during the debates at the Beidahe meetings in the summer. Li included agriculture in his property privatization argument:

*Farmers must feel that they have control over the land. Nowadays farmers use their lands carelessly and make little effort to improve soil fertility. They act as if they don't expect to live off the land too long.*⁴⁰


Li argues that peasant families should even be granted by law the right to sell and sublet family allotments.

Others, like Wu Jinglian, director of the Technological and Social Development Research Center under the State Council, argue that to postpone liberalization of the price system and to retain for any length of time the two-track price arrangement poses the risk of an indefinite shelving of all meaningful economic decentralization reform. So long as prices are distorted to the point of being useless—indeed, inimical—for purposes of rational resource allocation, the granting of greater

³⁸Ge Wu, "Policy of Reform and Openness Remains Unchanged," *Beijing Review*, Oct. 31–Nov. 6, 1988, p. 7.

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁴⁰Cited by Adi Ignatius, "Chinese Policies Run at Cross Purposes in Fumbled Attempt to End Farm Crisis," *The Wall Street Journal*, Feb. 1, 1989; see also, Robert Delfs, "Property to the People!" *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Dec. 22, 1988, pp. 12–13.



Traditional heavy industrial production, as at this Wuhan mill, remains under highly centralized control in China.

—Guy le Querrec/MAGNUM.

decision-making powers to firms will only mean that it is the firms, not the central planners, that will make allocatively irrational decisions. There is going to be more waste, which will reinforce the position of those unhappy with the reform. "I worry," says Wu, "that China's problems may strengthen the hand of our most cautious economic thinkers. If the next few years go badly, China will wind up like the countries of East Europe, saddled with an inefficient, half-reformed economy."⁴¹

Competition, another condition of a successful market, also is inoperative, or operates in twisted ways. Giving directors of firms greater powers over procurement of inputs, the disposal of output, the hiring/payment/firing of manpower, and the retention of profits does little if anything to advance the cause of market efficiency if the newly autonomous firms are monopolies, on a nation-wide or regional scale.

At first glance, the distribution of Chinese industrial enterprises by size does not seem to be a problem, es-

pecially when compared to the distribution in other socialist economies, including those (e.g., Hungary) farthest along on the reformist road. In number of employees, for example, the proportion of large firms (those employing more than 243 persons) is 0.6 percent in China compared to 65 percent in Hungary, and the proportion of small firms (5–33 employees) is 59 percent in China, compared to 2 percent in Hungary. Such a comparison, however, is deceptive. Chinese firms in key industries (coal, petroleum, steel, nonferrous metals, timber, cement, electricity, chemicals, synthetic fibers, newsprint, cigarettes, machinery, and munitions) remain under the jurisdiction of central or provincial ministries, industrial departments, and "corporations." As a result, a still significant, if reduced, portion of their supplies is directly controlled by these fiefdoms, as is the distribution of a portion of their output (with corresponding state price controls). These governmental supervisory bodies interpret their legal ownership of firms broadly and in an exclusivist spirit. They protect "their" firms from the competition of enterprises under rival jurisdictions and dispense favors among their favorites irrespective of performance or any notion of social utility. Frequently, the favored firms happen to be big, with large assets, many workers, and good networks of social connections. Under this neomercantilist arrangement, enterprises compete not to maximize profits (which, given the chaotic state of China's prices, may be just as well), but to maximize costs and resources under their control—a phenomenon common to centrally planned and half-reformed socialist economies. Some Chinese economists argue that "under the current structure [of property rights tied to administrative hierarchies] so-called decontrol [of prices] merely means that state monopolies would become enterprise monopolies."⁴²

This tendency toward monopoly has been aggravated of late by the tendency of provincial authorities in China to put up all kinds of institutional (and, on occasion, physical) barriers to interprovincial trade and the movement of production factors (labor, capital) to protect local enterprises and economies. Such actions create decentralized monopolies and promote regional autarkies. In the absence of a market mechanism or central plan to coordinate matters, such barriers to interregional trade, together with locally-financed and locally-directed, overlapping investment, seriously inhibit competition and make it difficult for China to reap possible efficiency benefits from interregional special-

⁴¹Adi Ignatius, "Beijing's Two Top Economic Thinkers Reflect Leadership's Broader Divisions," *The Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 26, 1988. Liu Guoguang observes (loc. cit., p. 26) that reforms in property ownership and pricing "are interrelated" and "should be carried out in close coordination".

⁴²Hua Sheng, Zhang Xuejun, and Luo Xiaopeng, as cited in Delfs, loc. cit., p. 12.

ization.⁴³ What "competition" there is in these circumstances is rivalry among speculator-bureaucrats out to make a quick killing from the combination of regional monopoly (including monopoly of political power and information), two-track prices, and the already-mentioned absence of any automatic mechanisms for reconciling individual and social interests.

This devolution of many decision-making powers from the center to the provinces and lower-level authorities would not have the serious anti-efficiency effects that it does if the power were devolved from central plan to market and from socialized-bureaucratic to private property. In that case, the government could use macroeconomic fiscal and monetary instruments to cushion market breakdowns and correct market failures. Alternatively, purely administrative decentralization of the central planning apparatus, without the introduction of market and private property elements, would permit the central government, if it wished, to reverse gears quickly (as the Soviet government has done many times), because such bureaucratic decentralization would simply deactivate, not eliminate, the administrative controls available to the central planners.

Where, as in China, economic changes are at an in-between, neither-this-nor-that stage, there are no effective institutional levers for the center to use when things go sour. Matters are not made easier by the propensity of the central state to use such infant macroeconomic market-type levers as have been created in heavy-handed commandist, political, and administrative ways—as, for example, when the Ministry of Finance is used by central authorities to order the banks to freeze or re-allocate credit, thus destroying the substance and subverting the purpose of the expanded banking system and financial markets.

Matters are aggravated by the inadequacy or absence in the plan of social infrastructures. Like other socialist countries, China lacks a comprehensive unemployment insurance system to handle open joblessness—the very existence of unemployment is officially denied under the system of central planning. This encourages the bailing out of firms by the government, irrespective of the firms' performance, to prevent the eruption of social disturbances consequent on the dismissal of millions of redundant workers. In effect, each working unit (*danwei*) is, in addition to being a workplace, a social security cell that provides its members

not only with wages and bonuses (still largely tied to seniority) but also with the unemployment compensation component of the wage; subsidized housing and meals; recreational, health, and day-care facilities; public assistance; public surveillance; and so on. Whatever the merits of this cocoon-like arrangement, it has the economic cost of reducing labor mobility—even if workers could legally change jobs, they would be reluctant to do so because they would have to part with extremely scarce *danwei*-supplied housing. It is not surprising that Chinese firms—with these broad social-welfare responsibilities, no threat of bankruptcy, little if any competition, and a chronic sellers' market—are no paragons of efficiency.

In the days of Mao and the early days of Deng Xiaoping, weaknesses of the institutional structure could be overcome to a degree by the sheer will, personal power, and prestige of the leader, and, before 1958, of the party. But today, Deng is old and semi-retired (perhaps physically and mentally weakened), the leadership is divided, and the prestige of the party has been squandered. The economic changes carried out so far are neither fully institutionalized nor any longer personalized. What was described a few years ago as rational economic pragmatism and was contrasted with the mad spasmodic development of the Maoist era (and hence accepted by the people and most cadres who had suffered from the Maoist madness) now gives the impression of a thrashing about in a conceptual void. In sum, the sixth condition of a successful market system—the presence of effective market-oriented control levers—remains unfulfilled in present-day China.

Official Outlook on Remedies

The reaction of the central authorities to the latest spate of difficulties—like its response to problems in 1985–86, only more so—has been to dust off the levers of administrative control and apply them to an economy which can no longer respond to this type of intervention without serious, perhaps irreparable, damage being inflicted on the economy's fragile market component. The "Soviet syndrome," say some reform-minded Chinese economists, is making its appearance in China.⁴⁴

A foretaste of things to come was given by party leader Zhao Ziyang in his report to the Central Committee in September 1988.⁴⁵ The emphasis, he said, would be on keeping the reform's risks to a minimum. This

⁴³"Farmers sneak out at night to bypass the authorities. Regional protectionist measures, such as internal tariffs seemingly similar to the *likin* transit taxes of the last century, are fragmenting China into a country of warring economic fiefdoms." See Louise do Rosario, "China's Price Pirates," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Oct. 13, 1988, p. 96.

⁴⁴E.g., Wu Jinglian, cited in Adi Ignatius, "Beijing's Two Top Economic Thinkers...", loc. cit.

⁴⁵Zhao Ziyang, loc. cit., pp. i–iii.

means, according to Zhao—once one of the more enthusiastic proponents and practitioners of bold marketizing and privatizing reforms—improving administration and central control (“unified guidance of the central government”) and strengthening the supervisory role of planning organs. Instead of getting the party out of the business of running the economy, provincial party secretaries are to be held responsible to the central government for unified economic guidance. Thus, concludes Zhao, “the party’s leading, supervisory, central role should be strengthened.” That is bad news for reform and economic efficiency.

How to put an end to bank runs and panic buying? asks Zhao. Issue a circular from the Central Committee, pass it out to party organizations, and “mobilize the whole party to play a major role” in ridding people of their bad habits. Problems of “price hikes . . . socially unfair distribution of wealth, and . . . corruption” are to be cured through a mass “educational drive . . . the most practical and welcome part of our political and ideological work.” Zhao continues:

*To exercise macro control, it is necessary to make comprehensive use of economic, administrative, legal, and disciplinary means, as well as to conduct extensive political and ideological work. In the transitional phase, in particular, it will be unwise to abandon administrative means prematurely or off-handedly. Otherwise, economic chaos will ensue.*⁴⁶

Although Zhao asserts that “the purpose of strengthening administrative means is to better promote the reforms, not to return to the old system,” the degree of the latest turn suggests a high probability of precisely such a return to a command economic system.

Specific Measures

How is this official viewpoint being translated into action? Let us examine some of the specific areas affected by this perspective.

With regard to price reform, the current euphemism is that it has been “temporarily moderated, not canceled.” What this means in practical terms is that liberalization of the price system has been postponed for “five or so” years.⁴⁷ Instead, prices of key commodities (food grains, edible oils, cotton, some other farm goods, steel) are to be frozen by administrative order, or are to rise only at government-sanctioned rates. If, however, the marketization of the price system is put off for five, or even two years—a delay that would probably be accompanied by a rollback of free agricultural

prices—the Chinese reform is likely to go into a coma from which it might not recover in the lifetime of the present leaders. The Soviets, it might be recalled, have been postponing comprehensive price decontrol for “five years or so” since the 1950’s.

Indicative of the prevailing trend is Zhao Ziyang’s statement that “the double-track pricing system . . . cannot and shall not be abolished in the near future.”⁴⁸ The property-reform-first economists like Li Yining, to whom the reform bureaucrats seem to be turning out of frustration with the recalcitrant price system, are willing to put up with two-track prices until the year 2000, maybe longer. Their reasoning is that half a reform is better than none, and that the second track, of relatively free prices, is an outpost of reform in increasingly hostile territory, and that it must be defended despite all its drawbacks.

To combat inflation and cool the economy down, the central authorities have applied a combination of austerity economics and recentralizing politics, of policy adjustments and reform “destructuring.” They include the reintroduction of rationing for grain, pork, some nonstaple foods, chemical fertilizer, herbal medicines, and most raw materials. To conserve scarce resources, they have ordered manufacturers of soft drinks to cease production (an order that was been widely defied, at least during the hot summer).

In order to slow industrial growth to 8 percent in 1989, the government plans to reduce investment in fixed assets by 19 percent.⁴⁹ These “plans” are, of course, just projections, and hence may not materialize. Moreover, they apply to investment *within* the plan, whereas the major problem in the last decade has been with run-away industrial and “nonproductive” investment *outside* the plan, financed by enterprise retained earnings, bank credits, and peasant savings. To take care of such unruly investment, the central government has ordered the central bank, and through it, the banking system at large, to hold credit issuance to government-set limits. In effect, new bank loans, other than those specifically approved by the state plan, have been temporarily forbidden.⁵⁰

This freeze does not directly affect loans denominat-

⁴⁶Ibid., p. vii.

⁴⁷Ge Wu, loc. cit., p. 7.

⁴⁸Zhao Ziyang, loc. cit., p. iv.

⁴⁹See Li Peng’s report to the National People’s Congress on Mar. 20, 1989, in Beijing Xinhua, Mar. 20, 1989, transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), Mar. 20, 1989, p. 34. Li made some rather imprecise references to plans of central financial authorities to “put more money into agriculture,” which suggests a greater than 19 percent cut in state industrial investment.

⁵⁰Louise do Rosario, “Peking’s Growing Pains,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Jan. 5, 1989, pp. 54–55.

ed in foreign currencies, loans made to foreign investment projects, or loans to finance foreign trade, but lending in such areas feels the ripple effect of such credit tightening. To conform to the central bank's austere monetary restrictions, local and specialized banks have not only reduced their lending activities, but have blocked enterprise withdrawal of deposits. This has produced a severe temporary cash shortage affecting, among others, state agricultural procurement agencies, which are now compelled to pay for their purchases with IOU's to the tune of \$1 billion. The peasants reacted promptly within the decision-making space that the reform affords them, by withholding contractual deliveries of commodities to the state and turning to the production of cash crops for the profitable, higher-priced free market. This development forced the People's Bank of China (the central bank) to relax its squeeze on lending to the Agricultural Bank of China—the principal source of credit for the farm sector.⁵¹

All of this has led anti-reform elements to call for the elimination of urban markets for food, and to attempt to teach the peasants a lesson by threatening them with re-collectivization. Rumors of collectivization under a different name have been rife in China for some years and have contributed to the reluctance of many family farmers to make long-term investments in their plots of land. There is talk of merging family land parcels under a collective umbrella. The talk has been translated into action in some places, but such actions were subsequently reversed under pressure from the dispossessed peasants who, when they did not beat up the offending cadres, took the re-collectivization zealots to court and won, in a rare display of socialist legality.⁵²

Measures are also under consideration to compel farmers to switch from cash crops to grain production. This has happened in a number of places—albeit informally, under the leadership of local cadres eager to set their sails to what they think are the prevailing political winds. However isolated, such instances of socialist recidivism in what is the bastion of the marketization and privatization experiment—the countryside—should give pause to those Western observers who argue that the changes made since 1978 in the structure of agricultural property are by now irreversible because the peasants favor them, the World Bank advocates them, and prominent Chinese economists support them.

Curbs have been imposed administratively on the purchasing power of various "social groups"—e.g., government departments, schools, hospitals, enterprises, "companies," "corporations," and army units. Investigators have fanned out over the country, poring over account books and slapping on heavy penalties whenever an organization's frozen bank deposit shows signs of melting (usually under the heat of political influence). Big-ticket items on the spending list of these groups include "luxury" products (e.g., limousines), banquets, extensive and feverish travel on what purports to be official business, and "nonproductive" (in Marxist terminology) investment in hotels, rest homes for cadres, convention halls, and other places of proletarian entertainment. Special investigative ire has been reserved for trading companies that have proliferated in recent years, some under provincial sponsorship, others fronting for all sorts of "social groups."

Interest rates on personal long-term savings deposits have been raised, being loosely linked to the retail price index—so loosely, in fact, that the real interest rate remains negative. The interest rate increase was carried out in order to halt runs on savings deposits in anticipation of what the depositors thought would be reform-connected massive price increases. Even with the runs, the volume and rates of personal savings in China (as in the Soviet Union) remain relatively great, in large part forced by the absence or shortage of goods and services in the quantities, quality, and assortments desired by consumers. Interest rates on investment loans have also been raised, but remain too low to discourage institutions from borrowing (rather than utilize retained earnings) for purposes of investment outside the state plan. When, as in China today, manipulation of the essentially nonmarket interest rate fails to produce the intended results, the state simply resorts to administrative compulsion.

The so-called gold-coast strategy of pushing ahead with marketization and privatization of the already relatively prosperous coastal provinces and municipalities and turning them, in effect, into large, special economic zones (SEZ's), is being reconsidered and might be abandoned, at least for the time being ("five years or so"?). The gold-coast strategy, associated with Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping, is based on the "trickle-down theory." According to this theory, the riches that 14 open cities and five SEZ's in the coastal region have acquired through relatively open and autonomous contacts with capitalist world commodity and financial markets are supposed to spread to the poorer inland provinces. It would appear, however, that the powers granted to the gold coast's provincial, municipal, and SEZ authorities have been used for autarkic provincial,

⁵¹Adi Ignatius, "Chinese Policies . . .," loc. cit.

⁵²Ibid. On the re-collectivization threat, see "China's General Agricultural Policy," *Nongye jingji wenti yuekan* (Beijing), No. 12, 1988, pp. 3–9, excerpted in *Inside China's Mainland*, February 1989, pp. 16–18; speech by Li Peng to the closing session of the National Conference on Work in Agriculture, *Nongmin ribao* (Beijing), Nov. 8, 1988, p. 1, excerpted in ibid., pp. 18–20.



The Bank of China, in Beijing.

—Allison Finn/*Far Eastern Economic Review*.

municipal, and SEZ development and have not trickled down at all to the poorer provinces. And so, instead of further gold-coast liberalization—that is, closer association of this huge area with the world market—the intent now seems to be to make the gold coast march to the centralizing beat of the drummers in Beijing.

One of the objectives of the gold-coast strategy was to introduce competition into an important segment of the Chinese economy by opening up the coastal area to world trade and finance (letting in competition through the open back door, so to speak). This stratagem hinged on the willingness of the authorities to establish realistic exchange rates for the yuan and to let inefficient state firms go out of business. It is not at all certain that such willingness existed even before the gold-coast strategy was put on hold.

Wage reform—the scheduled phasing out of the Soviet-type, labor grade, basic wage system and a shift to flexible contractual wages—has been put on hold.

Finally, reform of the political system, which has never been high on the agenda but was being toyed with in 1987 and the first half of 1988 in the fairly innocuous guise of a shift from totalitarianism to hard authoritarian-

ism, has also been put on the back burner, at least in part a victim of the economic retrenchment.

Fears of the possible adverse effect of this economic retrenchment on employment have been expressed. The official estimate is that the unemployment rate in 1989 will rise to 3 percent from 2 percent in 1988. Unofficial estimates are that the real jobless rate in 1988 was closer to 10 percent, with hidden unemployment in the urban state sector at 20 percent.⁵³ Because of the clampdown on investment, as much as a quarter of the construction workforce could be out of a job by mid-1989. It is possible that small and medium-sized labor-intensive enterprises will be most affected, particularly the hundreds of thousands of rural ones. These firms, employing millions of peasants displaced from the land by the early improvements in labor productivity and yields consequent to agricultural decollectivization, do not have nearly the political clout needed in China's semi-reformed system to obtain regular supplies of scarce raw materials, equipment, and access to transportation facilities and bank credit.

The crackdown by the center, and the center's resort to both administrative-command and "economic" levers to make its preferences stick, is being resisted tooth and nail by provincial bureaucrats and enterprise managers in the more economically successful provinces and regions, including the SEZ's on the gold coast. In this resistance, Guangdong province leads the way, followed closely by the Shenzhen SEZ, and places like Shenyang. This resistance is not necessarily pro-market; it is pro-oneself, which—in the currently gelatinous structure of China's economy—means protecting what one has irrespective of considerations of systemic logic.

The effectiveness of the resistance to central intervention will have an important influence on the direction that economic experimentation in China takes in the future. It could lead to greater relaxation of central controls or—more likely—induce the central authorities to deploy the full array of repressive administrative weapons still available to them, including the public security apparatus. Preserving unity will remain the top priority, even at a high cost in economic efficiency.

Concluding Remarks

This review of China's economic problems and the remedial measures taken to deal with them raises an interesting question. China's economic difficulties since

⁵³Adi Ignatius, "Millions Are Expected to Lose Jobs as China Implements its Austerity Plan," *The Wall Street Journal*, Jan. 27, 1989.

1978 are not all that different from those experienced by most other developing, and several industrialized, countries in a world that is undergoing rapid change and is in a state of systemic confusion. Chinese inflation, while in the double-digit range, is not as bad as Israel's, Argentina's, Yugoslavia's, or Nicaragua's (35,000 percent for Nicaragua in 1988). China's poverty, although still severe, is not so grinding as that of numerous other countries throughout the world. At least there is in China an awareness of it, and steps have been taken to combat it. Much the same is true of unemployment and underemployment; overheating of the economy; the relative ineffectiveness of fiscal, monetary, and administrative instruments of intervention; corruption (from which even prim and prosperous Japan is not immune); and most other disabilities. So what's all the fuss concerning China?

Part of the answer is that China is at a crossroads of choice between two very different, arguably incompatible, economic systems. The systemic choice is between plan and market, with nothing that is theoretically coherent and practicable in between.⁵⁴ True, all economies are "in-between" in the sense that they combine either dominant plan and public property institutions with subsidiary market and private property elements, or dominant market and private property with subsidiary elements of plan and public property. As systemic arrangements, the first represents a system of central administrative command planning; the second a competitive market system. The first system (plan) has structural defects (chronic shortages of consumer and producer goods, monstrous static inefficiencies, low quality, and technological backwardness in the civilian sector) which are now considered to be intolerable by both people and leaders alike. The remedy agreed on, albeit reluctantly, by the communist leadership is economic decentralization, which means movement toward the market system.

This agreement, however, does not mean that China's leaders have agreed on a complete transition to the market system, that is, to a system in which markets and private property are the dominant institutions of the reformed economy, and in which administrative-type instruments and socialized property rights play a secondary role of correcting market breakdowns and compensating for market failures. Such systemic transition would not only transform economic institutions, and socialist economic theory and ethics, but would require a concurrent transformation of the political order and its philosophical underpinnings. It would necessitate the

renunciation of Marxism-Leninism at every level of human experience, not just the denunciation of Stalinism and Maoism—which are organic manifestations of Marxism-Leninism rather than errors of "work style," as some would argue. Notwithstanding pockets of optimism on this subject in the West, such a revolutionary change of concepts in China is at present and in the foreseeable future out of the question.

Thus, as China attempts to cope with the difficulties encountered by everyone on the road to modernization, it runs into the issue of systemic transformation and fundamental ideological-political change. What would normally be a debate on technical means, quickly turns into a dispute about ultimate ends—about socialism versus the capitalist order. The debate is secularly theologized, so to speak, if not always in the terminology used, at least in insinuations of moral error. This inhibits the analysis of all relevant facts, perpetuates the stifling presence of intellectually taboo areas, and prevents the emergence of a comprehensive and internally consistent reform blueprint.

The second element of the Chinese problem—a feature that distinguishes it from those of other socialist economies that over the last 30 years have tinkered with systemic reform—is that in post-1978 China, marketization and privatization have gone as far as they can without raising questions of radical systemic transformation. China is, roughly speaking, at a midway point where crucial decisions about the nature of the economic system have to be made without postponement. More precisely, this point was reached in the latter part of 1987 and the early months of 1988. At that time, the newly established market relations could not perform their efficiency-promoting functions without further expansion and coordination of market institutions. Such expansion was intuitively, and rightly I believe, seen by both the reformers and their critics as a crossing of the systemic border that separates plan from market. Concurrently, the institutions of central administrative command planning and socialized property had been weakened, their cohesiveness undermined by regional administrative decentralization, so that they, too, lost much of their former influence.

In the summer of 1988, the decision (still contested) appears to have been taken to put an end to further movement in the direction of the market system. The focus of the retrenchment measures taken since then has been on administrative compulsion. The resurgence of command is inflicting considerable damage on the frail and increasingly isolated market instrumentalities that had been created over the previous 10 years. In the name of protecting urban workers from the scourge of inflation, unemployment, unfair income distribution,

⁵⁴Jan S. Prybyla, *Market and Plan Under Socialism: The Bird in the Cage*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1987.

and corruption, forces antipathetic to reform have been beating up on market institutions and disparaging the market idea, while concurrently tightening up political-administrative controls.

Under this onslaught, and lacking unequivocal support from Deng Xiaoping, the marketizers have fallen back to writing articles about the need to push ahead with the privatization of apartment space in the cities and on the need for greater enterprise autonomy. They give the impression of theoretical disarray in the face of the simplicities propagated by the administrative centralizers. China, some say, is on its way back from the market again, heading for another socialist dead end.

The trip back from the market can still be halted, and the economy can resume its course toward modernization. But to do this, China will have to make up its mind about systemic transition. It will have to discard the illusion that chronic shortages, inefficiency, and shoddy quality of goods and services can be cured by the application of half-remedies. It will have to go all the way to the market system—no ifs, no buts. This requires the prompt freeing of the price system (including factor prices and exchange rates), a breakup of monopolies, the dissolution of physical input rationing, significant enlargement of the sphere of private property, and the acceptance of pain. While economic in form and substance, these are also, perhaps mainly, matters of political nerve and will.

Discussing China's future possibilities, Liu Guoguang considers three courses of action advocated by different groups of Chinese economists at a "heated discussion" held not long ago. The first is that given China's "confused economic order," it is difficult if not impossible to move ahead with reform, and that it is therefore preferable to "exercise strict macroeconomic control by administrative means." According to Liu, there is wide fear that such an approach would lead to "economic deflation" and would not necessarily yield "a free economic environment" as claimed by its advocates, who assert that they are merely cautious, and not against reform.

The second course discussed is "stabilization of the economy . . . by deepening the reform," specifically by restructuring enterprise management and developing the contract responsibility system, followed in two or three years by price reform. According to Liu, economists who support this solution argue that "the new system would occupy a dominant position in approximately eight years."

The final course is an in-between approach, one nearer to the administrative retrenchment school. It combines retrenchment with "well-devised reforms to promote stable, sustained economic growth" and aims at improving the instrumentalities of macroeconomic control, strengthening the enterprise contract responsibility system "in preparation for a transition to a joint stock system," and clarifying property relations "so as to switch macroeconomic management from direct [administrative command] to indirect [indicative market-type] control and regulation."

Liu opts for the third alternative, the one that in present circumstances is politically most feasible and which would perhaps enable the reformers to hold onto some of their past gains.⁵⁵ Reasonable as it appears, this solution carries with it great danger because it proposes to remedy the present systemic confusion by using the ineffective administrative and "economic" control levers of the current half-way non-system. I would suggest that the only effective solution is continued and accelerated marketization of the price system and privatization of property rights combined with concurrent expansion of market-type instrumentalities of macroeconomic intervention. This course, however, has only a slim chance of being followed. The third alternative seems more likely to be adopted. If it is, the system will slide back into administrative command—its shortages, waste, and technological slough not overcome; the goal of modernization unattained.

⁵⁵Liu Guoguang, *loc. cit.*, pp. 26–28.

Capitalist Measures With Chinese Characteristics

Dorothy J. Solinger

China's experiment in economic reform caught the world by surprise a decade ago. Observers had not expected the sudden shift away from doctrinaire Maoism and the breaking up of the nation's massive communes or China's experimentation with entrepreneurship. But as the sidewalks of its cities became dotted with petty peddlers' stalls, and a few of its factories got the right to retain a portion of their profits and to market a measure of their output (after they had fulfilled mandatory deliveries to the state), many became convinced that China was moving quite deliberately in a new direction.

By the mid-1980's, some seemingly even more drastic measures were undertaken and they appeared to augur a far more startling reshaping of the structure of the urban economy: industrial firms began selling off their state-owned assets as shares; bigger, more successful enterprises started taking over failing ones in a manner suggestive of mergers in the West; and a tiny handful of hapless plants even went bankrupt, a virtually unprecedented phenomenon in a socialist country.¹

But a paradox lurks behind these dramatic developments. In reality, these most capitalistic of practices have *not* been sanctioned by the Chinese leadership out of an urge to reorient the economy away from state ownership and toward privatization. The political lead-

ership, while ready to borrow the *idea* of a change in property rights, is far from prepared to take the concept to its logical conclusion. The reforms, in the eyes of the politicians, amount to a means of managing the state's macro-finances, while preserving state/public ownership. In fact, the impulse behind this second stage of reform, as I will show, has a statist rationale and a statist organization.

The reforms are state-centered in two senses. First, the new reforms were inspired by the need to recoup the losses sustained by the central budget when the first, heady stage of reform simply went out of control. Although a variety of interpretations exist about just where the roots of China's current fiscal crisis lie, at this writing (early 1989), Chinese analysts nearly unanimously trace them back to some aspect of the first stage of reform, which devolved control over profits, taxes, and many industrial raw materials to local administrations.² As early as the end of 1986, the proportion of funds in the national income that was controlled by localities, departments, and enterprises outside the state budget had jumped from 13.5 percent (in 1979) to 21.4 percent; as a result, the proportion of state revenues in the national income dropped from 31.9 percent (in 1979) to only 25 percent.³

Even as the revenues under its direct control were slipping away, another component of the reforms add-

Dorothy J. Solinger is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics and Society in the School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine. Her research interests include Chinese economic policies and economic reforms; she is author of Chinese Business under Socialism (1984) and editor of Three Visions of Chinese Socialism (1984). The author wishes to thank the Wuhan Foreign Affairs Office and the US Consulate in Shenyang for their enormous help in arranging interviews for her during the summers of 1987 and 1988.

¹China was the second socialist country, after Hungary, to pass a bankruptcy law.

²For example, in October 1988, the progressive Shanghai *World Economic Herald* noted the problems facing China and tied their solution to a genuine revolution in property rights: "... the serious problems resulting from the pursuit of this policy [the policy of 'decentralization and the concession of profits' to lower administrative levels and enterprises] are making more and more people realize that China must make some real and thorough structural changes in the economic field . . ." Trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-CHI*), Nov. 16, 1988, p. 40.

³*Ibid.*, July 30, 1987, p. K/2.

ed to the financial burdens of the central government: beginning in 1979 the state began to finance increasingly larger subsidies to both farmers and urban workers in the hope of stimulating productivity. By 1987, the draft state budget allocated over a quarter of state expenditures for enterprise losses (in part a function of new expenses for the firms as their wage bill expanded and as the prices of their inputs rose) and for compensation to consumers for price increases.⁴ As of mid-1988, subsidies for state enterprises for the year were expected to amount to more than 40 billion yuan (US \$11 billion), or almost one-half of the total industrial profit nationwide.⁵

The second dimension of this state-centeredness of the second stage of reform is managerial. Bureaucrats have been inserted as middlemen into the new markets. Indeed, in response to every innovation, a corresponding office has been designated or a new one created within the state bureaucracy to act as a sort of broker. As a consequence, the pre-existing power of state bureaucratic organs and their cadres is readily being translated into market power.⁶

The market power of the state bureaucratic organs and their cadres rests on control over key supplies and large facilities and especially on *guanxi*, or personal relationships, formed over many years of maneuvering within the state-planned economy. A key question for the future is whether—by multiplying the amount of exchange going on within the economy—the activities of the bureaucrats will eventually promote genuine marketization,⁷ or, alternatively, whether the cadres will simply utilize the opportunities presented by the new environment to perpetuate their own power.

The material below considers this question, as well as others, with reference to the present-day Chinese version of stock markets and shareholding, enterprise mergers and takeovers, and bankruptcies. "Horizontal exchange," which redirects commerce and investment

from the vertical pathways designed by bureaucratic planning to exchanges that cross administrative borders will also be discussed in this context. So, too, will markets for the means of production, which replace the administrative allocation of supplies that obtained under state planning. Another topic is the economic cooperation regions, which encourage division of labor and specialization among areas across the country in place of the localized self-sufficiency enforced in the days of Mao Zedong.

The measures undertaken in this second stage of reform, in an attempt to rationalize the national industrial structure and utilize its assets more efficiently, are so far turning out to be handy solutions to urgent problems. The Chinese leadership hopes that, if successful, these ostensibly capitalist-like programs will lighten the burden on the state budget, which by Chinese standards, is currently experiencing a serious deficit;⁸ sop up some of the excess currency that has been issued in recent years,⁹ to which many have attributed the uncharacteristic double-digit inflation now plaguing the country;¹⁰ and, finally, direct the relatively massive funds in consumers' hands into accumulation for state concerns.¹¹ The need to save state funds and check inflation are crucial spurs for the new programs. Thus what can easily be mistaken for a Chinese lurch toward capitalism is actually a fleshing out of that vague concept of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" that

⁸Between 1977 and 1987, China accumulated a 59.2 billion yuan financial deficit. This figure appeared in *Liaowang Overseas Edition*, No. 48, Nov. 28, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 6, 1988, p. 36.

⁹In 1987, an additional 20 billion yuan in banknotes were issued to cope with rising demands for loans for construction projects and for wage and bonus funds in the enterprises. See *ibid.*, Dec. 16, 1988, p. 26. Also, the volume of paper money issued in 1983 represented an increase of more than 30 billion yuan over 1978, having grown about 150 percent in five years; compared to 1983, the paper money issued in 1987 again increased over 900 billion yuan or 170 percent. Another report predicted that the amount of currency in circulation could rise by 35 percent in 1988. It also stated that the purchasing power generated by the currency increase had exceeded the supply capacity by more than 20 percent. See *Renmin ribao* (Beijing), Dec. 8, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Dec. 20, 1988, p. 32.

¹⁰As of the end of November 1988, the officially recorded inflation rate had reached 17 percent, shockingly high by the norms by which the Chinese population had been living for most of the preceding four decades. See *ibid.*, Dec. 27, 1988, p. 38. According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Jan. 5, 1989, p. 54, the year-end figure was estimated at 17 to 18 percent on a year-to-year basis, compared to 7.3 percent for 1987.

¹¹Since the implementation of reform, the per capita income for living expenses of both urban and rural residents has doubled; the ratio of residents' income in gross domestic product expanded from 38.3 percent in 1978 to 58.6 percent in 1987. As of the end of 1988, workers' total wages had increased 22 percent over the same period a year earlier, and their bonuses had risen 31.5 percent in the same time. Moreover, in 1987, funds under the control of state factories and local governments that were not a part of the state budget amounted approximately to a whopping 200 billion yuan. See *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 20, 1988, p. 34 (translated from *Liaowang Overseas Edition*, No. 50, Dec. 12, 1988); and *ibid.*, Dec. 20, 1988, p. 31.

⁴Out of the 245.946 billion yuan of expenditures projected in the budget, 35.972 billion were to go for subsidizing enterprise losses and 33.723 billion to consumers for price hikes; together, these two categories amounted to 28.34 percent of the state budget. *Ibid.*, Apr. 15, 1987, p. K/14.

⁵*Ibid.*, Aug. 18, 1988, p. 39.

⁶According to the October 1988 issue of the *World Economic Herald* cited in footnote 2, "... the government organs' administrative functions have turned into the monopolization of the market." See *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 16, 1988, p. 40.

⁷Mark Granovetter, in "The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited," in Peter V. Marsden and Nan Lin, Eds., *Social Support and Network Analysis*, Beverly Hills, CA, SAGE Publications, 1982, pp. 105-30, implies that the multiplication of connections in a social system spawns yet more connections. For instance, on p. 113, he states that "... the number of weak ties is increased by the development of the communications system, bureaucratization, population density, and the spread of market mechanisms."



Accountants of the Mingxing Pharmaceutical Factory in Guangzhou—an enterprise that introduced shareholding in 1986—sorting out share certificates.

—Eastfoto.

Deng Xiaoping has been using to justify his reforms for the past several years: a bureaucratically arranged regrouping of state-owned assets.

Saving the State Budget by “Capitalist Measures”

The adoption in still socialist China of a set of measures widely practiced in capitalist contexts—namely, enterprise bankruptcy, enterprise takeovers, and shareholding and stock markets—must be understood as a response to China's critical lack of funds, which has been called “the biggest problem facing China's economic development.”¹² For late in the year, when rapidly rising inflation and a new sense of urgency about the deficit caused leaders to halt experiments in price reform, these reforms were allowed to go forward.¹³ Designed to correct the scarcity of funds in the national treasury as well as the misallocation of assets in the industrial economy, these reforms address the problem of “backward” firms which waste equipment, energy, capital, land, personnel, and material supplies —“all resources for which many well-managed enter-

prises are starved.”¹⁴ In late 1988, Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, one of the chief initiators of the industrial reform program in 1978, placed his justification of these reforms squarely within the framework of saving and even building up the store of capital for the state when he delivered his speech to the Third Plenary Session of the Party's 13th Central Committee:

The public sale in a planned way, and under organized leadership, of the property rights of small state-owned enterprises and the encouragement given to large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises to issue their own stocks will turn a portion of consumption funds into accumulation funds, curtail the rise in market commodity prices, promote the flow of productive factors toward areas with better economic results and optimize the allocation of resources . . . these reforms will never pose a threat to the dominant role of public ownership. On the contrary, they will enable us to

¹²FBIS-CHI, July 18, 1988, p. 40.

¹³Ibid., Dec. 27, 1988, p. 39.

¹⁴See, for instance, two articles among many making this argument in FBIS-CHI, Jan. 25, 1988, pp. 27–28 and *ibid.*, Sept. 2, 1988, p. 40.

*make good use of idle funds in society to reduce the state's financial burden.*¹⁵

Clearly, in spite of an enormous mass of journalistic comment and some academic advocacy in China over the past year or so about a revamping of the Chinese ownership system, the official goal in the promotion of these reforms is far more limited. Basically, top leaders simply intend to shift around state assets by eliminating state subsidies to failing firms and to earn new profits from expanding the holdings of the winners. For the time being, there is no privatization of any significance going on. A brief look at the content of these reforms will bear this out.

Bankruptcy. Allowing firms to go bankrupt goes against the grain of the most fundamental assumptions of existing socialist societies: state ownership of productive assets and thus state responsibility for their management and maintenance, and the right of all workers to employment plus provision for their welfare. And yet, in a 1983 study prepared by the Technology and Economics Research Center of the State Council, some economists in China concluded that a bankruptcy law was necessary to purge the economy of technologically obsolete enterprises and allow modernization to get under way.¹⁶ The following year, Cao Siyan, later made chairman of a bankruptcy law drafting task force, published a draft of a law on enterprise bankruptcy in the Chinese journal *Democracy and the Legal System*.

Early in 1985, the northeastern industrial capital of Shenyang issued the first bankruptcy law in post-1949 China in the form of trial provisions for collectively- as opposed to state-owned enterprises within the municipality to apply for bankruptcy. Over the next two years, two national-level drafts followed, accompanied by opinion polls, conferences, and propaganda seminars. In December 1986, the members of the Standing Committee of the National Peoples' Congress finally hammered out a law entitled the "Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China (Tentative)" after months of inconclusive debates and disagreements. By the time the law went into effect on November 1, 1988, some 30 foundering firms had already been issued yellow warning cards by the city government, but only a trifling few had actually gone bankrupt.¹⁷

The law defines an enterprise as bankrupt if "be-

cause of a deficit caused by mismanagement, [it] cannot repay debts which are due."¹⁸ This is different, of course, from bankruptcy in capitalist economies where companies simply fail when their owners run out of funds; in China, the state generally subsidizes deficit-ridden firms. The new law, then, essays to differentiate between enterprises suffering losses because of poor management and those whose losses result from state actions, such as state pricing or procurement policies or state allocation of inferior equipment or insufficient supplies.¹⁹ Indeed, some of the literature argues that the actual aim of the law is to prevent enterprise failure by compelling firms in danger of going under to shape up, not to force unprofitable firms to go bankrupt.²⁰

Another special feature of this socialist bankruptcy law—one which underlines the continuing dependent status of state-owned firms—is the heavy responsibility placed on the official department (industrial bureau) that is in charge of managing the firm. The law decrees that the officials in that department (in addition to the enterprise's own management) must submit to administrative sanctions if it can be shown that, through departmental interference in enterprise affairs, these officials have had primary responsibility for the firm's losses. In addition, it is the department's leaders that must petition for the right to initiate the two-year reconciliation and reorganization program that the court permits failing firms to undertake. They are also charged with carrying out this program.

A third provision of the law that, again, stamps it as socialist is its attention to the fate of the former employees of the defunct firm. Article Four demands that their basic livelihood needs be met during their time of unemployment. To fulfill these promises, the State Council passed two sets of regulations: (1) "Temporary Regulations On the Adoption of a Contractual Employment System for State-Owned Enterprises," and (2) "Temporary Regulations on Security Provided for Unemployed Former Employees of State-Owned Enterprises."

By mid-1988, in spite of these attempts to adjust standard bankruptcy practice to accommodate socialist sensitivities, the bankruptcy law clearly was not

¹⁵Ibid., Nov. 17, 1988, p. 27.

¹⁶The chronology presented draws on Ta-kuang Chang, "The Making of the Chinese Bankruptcy Law: A Study in the Chinese Legislative Process," *Harvard International Law Journal* (Cambridge, MA), Spring 1987, pp. 333–72.

¹⁷As of November 1987, in the six cities of Shenyang, Wuhan, Chongqing, Taiyuan, Nanchang, and Xian, 28 enterprises had been made "trial points" for the reform; 15 were state-operated firms and 13 were collectives. At that point, only two of these had been declared bankrupt, 22 had already revived after being warned, and four were still undergoing "readjustment." See *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 6, 1987. *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 4, 1988, p. 44, states that Shenyang city had recently closed down two more enterprises that could not be made profitable.

¹⁸As translated in Peng Xiaohua, "Characteristics of China's First Bankruptcy Law," *Harvard International Law Journal*, Spring 1987, p. 377.

¹⁹See Chang, loc. cit., p. 357.

²⁰*Guangming ribao* (Beijing), May 2, 1987.

working as intended. One report referred to a group of over 7,000 firms, which it said amounted to 20 percent of the total number of firms within the state budget, that were experiencing losses and collectively sustaining a debt of 2.6 billion yuan a year.²¹ Another mentioned 6,364 state firms which had suffered from economic losses totalling 3.6 billion yuan, an alarming 27 percent increase over the figures for the same period in 1987.²² A third report counted over 400,000 enterprises (including collectively- as well as state-run firms) running in the red. The report suggested that three quarters of these should be taken over by other firms or declared bankrupt.²³

One of the problems of relying solely on bankruptcy to solve these financial problems is that obtaining the funds necessary to provide for the social welfare of all the employees who would lose their jobs is virtually impossible. In Shenyang, for example, the city government ordered the 5,000 collective firms under the jurisdiction of its district administrations to pay five percent of their workers' regular wages into relief funds to compensate the retired and jobless workers of bankrupt enterprises. But the city was able to collect only 100,000 yuan a month, just enough to help out a thousand people. Thus, if any more enterprises had gone bankrupt, there would have been no way to handle the unemployed workers.²⁴

On a national basis, the staff and workers in losing enterprises have been estimated to number several million. If their firms were all permitted to go under, the housing, rations, social security, and social services for these people, not to mention the work of finding them new jobs, would surely overwhelm the state.²⁵

A second problem has grown out of the provision of the bankruptcy law that requires administrative departments to assume responsibility for failing firms. One famous case is that of the Shenyang Anti-Explosion Devices Plant, the first firm to declare bankruptcy in China. It had possessed fixed assets worth 300,000 yuan and debts of 500,000 yuan when it went bankrupt in August 1986. But it died only after eating up more than 200,000 yuan worth of assistance arranged for it by its departmental supervisor during its probation period.²⁶ The

knowledge that such aid—in the form of tax reduction and exemption, low interest loans, and temporary forgiveness of debt repayment—would quickly be proffered by bureaucratic superiors if a firm were declared to be on the brink of bankruptcy has transformed the yellow warning card, meant to be an ominous portent, into a coveted item.²⁷

Thus, the effort to devise a bankruptcy law that meets socialist expectations has foundered on its own internal contradictions. Obviously, under its provisions, instituting bankruptcy on a large scale would eventually mean more, not fewer, state budgetary losses. That the experiment seems to be in the midst of quietly being shelved bears out the point that bankruptcy was undertaken primarily for the sake of bolstering the state treasury, and not for enhancing enterprise autonomy.

Enterprise Takeovers. One attempt to solve the dilemma of how to enable the state to rid itself of the burden of foundering firms, without having at the same time to sustain their staff and workers, is the experiment in enterprise takeover, sometimes translated by the Chinese as annexing or merging enterprises. In Wuhan, for instance, where 32 firms were taken over by others, 9,803 workers and 3,719 retired persons were put on the payroll of the new plant. In one case, the absorption of an electrical machinery equipment factory, in which work had been suspended for nearly four years, into a solvent firm meant that its employees—who had not been paid in two years, and had frequently appeared at the offices of the city government appealing for help—could finally count on their monthly pay.²⁸ Another story comes from Shenyang, where two collective firms recently failed. When the 26 employees of one of these firms, a chemical plant, threatened a sit-in strike if their plant were declared bankrupt, the city agreed to allow a profitable carpentry machinery firm, which needed extra workshops, to assume responsibility for the chemical plant—its employees, debts, and all. The decision to allow them to merge “achieved a better result” than implementing bankruptcy procedures would have, according to the official Chinese press.²⁹

In the Chinese context, mergers of state enterprises amount to the transfer of management power and the right to benefit away from firms in trouble to stronger firms better positioned to use the assets. By the end of 1988, more than 1,800 factories had been merged to

²¹FBIS-CHI, July 27, 1988, p. 38.

²²Ibid., Oct. 25, 1988, p. 35.

²³Ibid., Aug. 18, 1988, p. 39. I do not know how to reconcile these figures. Probably the larger figure applies to firms both inside and outside the state budget.

²⁴Ibid., Nov. 4, 1988, p. 44.

²⁵Ibid., Sept. 2, 1988, p. 40.

²⁶See *Summary of World Broadcasts* (London), FE/8331/BI/6, Aug. 7, 1986, for the value of the firm's assets and debts; for the figure on assistance see FBIS-CHI, Nov. 4, 1988, p. 44.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Liu Xuede, Fan Rubing, and Jiang Aiyang, “Enterprise Mergers—A New Road in the Development of Industrial and Commercial Enterprises,” *Zhongguo jingji tizhi gaige*, No. 11, 1988, p. 47.

²⁹FBIS-CHI, Nov. 16, 1988, p. 69.

form 1,779 new enterprises.³⁰ According to the press, mergers should resolve the dilemma, noted above, posed by bankruptcy under conditions of state ownership and socialist principles, and at the same time ease the burdens of the state treasury.

According to one commentary, "economists believe that mergers will help avoid the social shocks that would follow bankruptcies." At the same time, mergers should "also pave the way for the further development of profitable enterprises."³¹ Vice Minister of the State Commission for Restructuring the Economy, Zhang Yanning, put it rather more bluntly. He admitted that merging enterprises that might otherwise face bankruptcy with profitable firms would help avoid social unrest, the threat of which has always terrorized the Chinese leadership.³²

Those in favor of mergers emphasize the economic gains that can be realized from them, echoing the same statist bias. They point to the more than 200 billion yuan of fixed assets in the Chinese industrial economy that were lying idle as of late 1988.³³ The noted economist Dong Furen, head of the Institute of Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, has advanced the startlingly bold estimate that mergers could help China save in its total investment an amount equivalent to that scheduled for the Seventh Five-Year Plan. For, he reasoned, mergers encourage the more effective use of existing fixed assets.³⁴ Figures to show that he may be correct are to date hard to come by, at least on a national scale.³⁵ But in the 13 mergers that took place in the city of Baoding, a balance of 10.3 million yuan was recovered after offsetting the total deficits of merged enterprises with the profits made by the mergers.³⁶

Aside from making possible the more effective deployment of assets, mergers can help shore up the state budget in the following ways: directing the flow of state investment into more marketable, even internationally competitive products and industries, thereby raising the returns on investment; allowing stronger concerns to expand production while lowering their costs; furthering an industrial structural arrangement in accord with economies of scale and macro-economic

industrial policy and, ideally, slowing down the essentially duplicative investment that has been encouraged by separate localities.³⁷ On a smaller, but by no means insignificant scale, the responsibility for buying new equipment and reinvesting in the involved firms is shifted from the central financial departments to the stronger and more successful enterprise in the merger.³⁸ Evidence that mergers strengthen the state treasury is found in the appreciation state banks show for this measure. Loans on which failing enterprises had defaulted in past are finally being repaid.³⁹

That the government is heavily involved in this reform is clear from the frequent reports of city leaders "proposing" mergers,⁴⁰ or even "forcibly ordering" profit-making enterprises to absorb others that are incurring losses.⁴¹ Critics charge that in extreme cases merging—supposedly part of a "revolution in property rights"—actually amounts to the state using old administrative means to allocate the property of one enterprise to another. Ironically, this is possible precisely because there has been no change in the overall system of ownership.⁴²

There is especially strong interest in enterprise takeovers at the municipal level. As an article on Baoding explains, inasmuch as cities are responsible for maintaining and adding to the value of the state's assets, as represented by firms located in their jurisdictions, it is up to the urban governments to guide and coordinate the mergers.⁴³ In Wuhan such guidance has entailed encouraging the merger of firms through favorable tax and credit policies designed to foster the growth of particular trades, and by inundating the candidates for mergers with relevant information on the potential partners with whom they should connect.⁴⁴

The city's role in mergers became even more crucial after 1984. In the autumn of that year, management of many large-scale firms was delegated to urban administrations and the burden of subsidizing the losses of these firms fell on the cities' budgets. In Wuhan, for in-

³⁰Ibid., Dec. 7, 1988, p. 36.

³¹Ibid., p. 37.

³²Ibid., Nov. 30, 1988, p. 37.

³³Ibid., Oct. 25, 1988, p. 35. Another source noted that of China's more than 700 billion yuan of fixed assets, one-third of the total was accounted for by business losses and assets lying idle. See *ibid.*, July 18, 1988, p. 40.

³⁴Ibid., Jan. 28, 1988, p. 13.

³⁵A survey of eight provinces and cities revealed, simply, that of 557 merged enterprises, 405 of the 470 losing enterprises had "already begun making money." *Ibid.*, Oct. 25, 1988, p. 35.

³⁶*Ibid.*

³⁷*Ibid.*, Mar. 25, 1988, p. 56; Apr. 7, 1988, p. 27; June 23, 1988, p. 38; and Sept. 29, 1988, p. 55. See also *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 18, 1988, p. 1.

³⁸This is the situation at the Shenyang Cable Works, the city's largest tax and profit contributor, which was urged by the municipal government to take over the three failing firms. Author's interview with the manager of the Shenyang Cable Works, July 10, 1988.

³⁹Author's interview with Wuhan University Economics Department Professor Wu Xinmu, June 30, 1988.

⁴⁰One report notes that in Baoding city, all of the mergers were proposed by the city's leaders. See *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 6, 1988, p. 46.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, Mar. 25, 1988, p. 58.

⁴²*Ibid.*, Feb. 29, 1988, p. 31.

⁴³Wang Bingyi and Shi Zhishun, "Reflections on Baoding City's Enterprise Mergers," *Jingji guanli* (Beijing), No. 7, 1988, p. 43.

⁴⁴Author's interview with the Municipal Commission for Restructuring the Economic System, June 30, 1988.

stance, the cost of subsidies to the city's financial administration in 1986 amounted to 4,440,000 yuan; in 1987 it shot up to 20,000,000 yuan.⁴⁵ Obviously, it is in the interest of cities to have losing firms annexed; indeed, it can save a city millions of yuan in subsidies.⁴⁶ Not surprisingly, mayors have generally supported firm annexation. Zhao Baojiang, the mayor of Wuhan, has reportedly expressed satisfaction with the program in these words:

*Enterprise annexation has benefited enterprises, the bank, and the mayor. It will help boost production, pay back debts, and rationalize our social production structure.*⁴⁷

Sometimes the rewards to the municipality can be so great that city leaders struggle against the central government on behalf of particularly mammoth mergers. For instance, in Shenyang, local officials courted a cable works plant—already the biggest contributor of taxes and profits in the city—with special “economic levers” to encourage its merger with three smaller firms, in the hope that the merged firm would bring even greater returns to local coffers. This move was opposed by officials in the central government, who, according to the plant's manager, complained that the firm was already too large.⁴⁸ The opposition was probably a reflection of the battle between different administrative jurisdictions over those funds that have been rapidly accumulated in recent years by localities and have escaped the reach of central control.

Shareholding. Despite the evident success of the policy to promote mergers in order to save investment and generate new revenue for the state—at both national and local levels—commentators have pointed out that it potentially has an important political pitfall. The problem, as we shall see below, is that it can lead to worker unease. As a consequence, in 1988, shareholding and stock markets began to receive more and more attention as the ideal way to collect capital and at the same time avoid worker discontent.

Shareholding began in post-revolutionary China in Shenyang in 1982, but the selling of shares outside a firm itself did not get under way until 1984, when equity markets were first opened.⁴⁹ However, the real turning

point occurred in August 1986, when the Shenyang Trust Investment Company sponsored a securities exchange with a national reach. Following this, Shanghai, Beijing, Harbin, and other cities set up fixed sites for the transfer of shares and bonds.⁵⁰ By the fall of 1988, nearly 80 cities were said to be engaged in the business of negotiable securities transfer.⁵¹

Economists favoring the shareholding system hoped that it would, in the words of one of them, “provide the necessary conditions for enterprises to truly operate independently, to assume sole responsibility for their profits and losses, and to exercise self-control.”⁵² Others saw it as a way of facilitating the flow of funds, absorbing idle capital, distributing risk, and promoting the rational movement of production factors.

Given the current fiscal crisis in China, top politicians seized on this particular reform as the safest way of stabilizing the economy (without upsetting the workers) while maintaining some sense of momentum behind the reform program. They hope to return to promoting reform in a more comprehensive manner, once economic stability has been achieved. The rationale behind the preference for shareholding over other efforts aimed at easing the state's fiscal crisis comes across clearly in the following quotation from an essay by three economists printed in the party newspaper, the *People's Daily*, in the summer of 1988:

*In terms of the need for reorganizing production elements and improving the structure, asset unification [i.e., via takeovers] is superior to management unification [via contracting out or leasing firms], but considering people's current mentality and ability to withstand strains, it is not necessary to insist on striving for the unification of assets and it may be more practical to regard the unification of management as a transitional step Ideologically, only when we admit that some enterprises will “survive” and others “die” or some enterprises will develop and others perish can we support superior enterprises in “swallowing up” inferior ones.*⁵³

Soliciting investment through the sale of shares to employees or even to the public or by permitting firms

⁴⁹Author's interview with the Shenyang City Commission for Restructuring the Economic System, July 5, 1988; and *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 16, 1988, p. 50.

⁵⁰*Renmin ribao*, Sept. 14, 1988, p. 2.

⁵¹*FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 16, 1988, p. 50.

⁵²These are the words of Zhou Shulian, director of the Institute of Industrial Economy of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, as reported in *ibid.*, Jan. 3, 1989, p. 53.

⁵³*Renmin ribao*, Aug. 12, 1988, p. 5, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 23, 1988, pp. 29 and 30.

⁴⁵This data comes from Liu, Fan, and Jiang, loc. cit., p. 47. The authors note that these sums are increased by the several million yuan in “loans” that the city's financial administration in recent years has had to hand out to the firms at New Year's time to issue as wages.

⁴⁶*Beijing Review*, Oct. 17–23, 1988, p. 9.

⁴⁷*FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 30, 1988, p. 34.

⁴⁸Author's interview at the Shenyang Cable Works, July 10, 1988.



Li Guixian, President of the People's Bank of China.

—Eastfoto.

with surplus funds to buy into other firms is inherently less threatening to employees than a merger because joint stockholding, unlike enterprise merging, does not entail the transfer of asset rights. Shareholding allows the existing structure of the enterprise to remain intact and thus, presumably, protects the jobs of the staff and workers. At the same time, shareholding appeared to be an efficacious way of staving off the state's fiscal crisis. According to the president of the People's Bank of China, Li Guixian:

*We can sell a number of enterprises or the stocks of some large state enterprises to reduce state investment and loans and lessen the burdens of the state and the enterprises.*⁵⁴

Published figures suggest that shareholding may be changing the shape of the Chinese industrial structure: the total volume of bonds and shares issued reached 90 billion yuan by September 1988. Of this total, howev-

er, shares accounted for a mere 2.2 percent, and enterprise bonds, which require repayment of the principal, amounted to 22 percent.⁵⁵ Moreover, the majority of the firms selling shares offer them internally to their own employees, rather than putting them on the market.⁵⁶ The other types of securities involved include state treasury bonds and bonds for keypoint projects—especially important state-sponsored infrastructure and construction projects funded out of the central governmental budget. Both of these issues are not voluntarily purchased but, rather, are apportioned by fiat by the state.⁵⁷ Furthermore, while more than 6,000 medium and small-sized enterprises had offered shares to the public, as of late 1988, only a dozen large enterprises had done so.⁵⁸

The turn to an emphasis on issuing securities had two primary purposes. The first was to accumulate funds for the construction projects designated by the central government, and to relieve the state financial organs and banks from their burden of finding investment funds for all the firms asking for them. The second was to sop up the excess currency in the hands of the population, a function that took on heightened significance as inflation mounted. As people invested in enterprise shares, it was widely assumed that this would “shift social consumption capital to social accumulation capital.”⁵⁹

Regardless of the novelty of selling state assets, the primacy of state needs is always stressed when shareholding is discussed. For example, an account in the pro-reform *Economic Daily* categorically states, “China’s state enterprises must not be privatized and the adoption of a share-holding system with the predominance of public ownership is by no means privatization.”⁶⁰ One guarantee against privatization is a governmental stipulation that stocks issued by a state enterprise cannot represent more than 30 percent of the value of its total capital stock.⁶¹ The commitment not to let enterprises become privatized is also reflected in an analysis, cast in the mode of supply-side economics theory, published in the journal *Economic Management*. Its author states that the share system is being implemented in order to invigorate the enter-

⁵⁴FBIS-CHI, Aug. 30, 1988, p. 36.

⁵⁵Renmin ribao (Beijing), Sept. 14, 1988, p. 2.

⁵⁶Ibid., Nov. 3, 1988, p. 2.

⁵⁷According to a report published in FBIS-CHI on Jan. 15, 1988, p. 15, the value of these two types of securities constituted 63 percent of the total value of stocks and bonds issued nationally as of that date.

⁵⁸FBIS-CHI, Oct. 21, 1988, p. 26.

⁵⁹These arguments can be found in Renmin ribao, July 3, 1988, p. 2; Sept. 14, 1988, p. 2; and Sept. 26, 1988, p. 1. See also FBIS-CHI, Aug. 30, 1988, p. 36, and Oct. 21, 1988, p. 26.

⁶⁰Jingji ribao, Oct. 19, 1988, trans. in FBIS-CHI, Oct. 21, 1988, p. 26.

⁶¹As reported in Beijing Review, Oct. 5, 1987, p. 22.

prises and, he reasons, as this occurs, the state will be able to collect more revenues from them.⁶²

In a number of crucial ways, shareholding in socialist, state-owned China can be distinguished from the institution that goes by that name in capitalist economies, just as "bankruptcy" in China differs from what is meant by that term in capitalist states. Most fundamentally, the Chinese concept of the "enterprise share" does not exist in capitalist economies. The effort—which is linked to this concept—to define just what portion of the firm's assets separately belong to the (state-owned) firm as distinguished from that amorphous entity, the state itself, has resulted in endless debate.⁶³

Another serious point of difference between shareholding in China and in capitalist economies is that in China, even stock dividend rates are determined in advance and the interest on dividends is covered in the

firm's production costs. As a result, the shareholder bears no risk. Also, the claim in the press that the shareholders' selection of a board of directors to manage the enterprise eliminates governmental interference in the affairs of the firm⁶⁴ is often not borne out in practice. For instance, one candid report admits that although local financial departments are entrusted with representing the state's shares in a firm, these organs turn around and delegate the task to the enterprise's own management bureau. This practice, in effect, serves to reinstate

⁶²Xiang Dong, "Smooth out Distribution and Relationships in the Assets of Share-System Enterprises," *Jingji guanli*, No. 7, 1988, p. 34.

⁶³See, for instance, *FBIS-CHI*, June 23, 1988, p. 42; and *Beijing Review*, Oct. 5, 1987, p. 22.

⁶⁴This claim appears, for example, in *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 23, 1988, p. 1; Oct. 24, 1988, p. 2; and Nov. 3, 1988, p. 2.



Workers assembling a vehicle at the famous Jinbei (Gold Cup) Automobile Joint Stock Company, Limited.

—The New York Times.

the old management system, despite the fact that the firm is drawing investment funds from new sources.⁶⁵

Clearly, the efforts to create a stockholding system in China are still very preliminary. In an interview last summer in Shenyang, where the whole experiment began, members of the city's Commission for Restructuring the Economic System frankly acknowledged that there was no change in the old relationship between enterprises employing the share system and their original management departments.⁶⁶ Even at the famous Jinbei (Gold Cup) Automobile Joint Stock Company, Limited, the first large industrial enterprise in the country to turn all its assets into shares for sale to the public,⁶⁷ an official explained that the company's production was still dictated by a three-year contract with the City Economic and Planning Commission. Indeed, the content of this contract closely resembles the company's old state plan, replete as it is with targets for product varieties and quality that are fixed for the term of the contract.⁶⁸

It has been noted that China lacks many of the preconditions for a genuine stock market, including an enterprise's ability to operate truly independently, a stable taxation system, and a well-developed financial market. Belying the publicized statistics, Chinese sources have acknowledged that of the 36 enterprises selected to try out the joint-stock system in Sichuan province in early 1988, seven withdrew from the experiment by the end of the year, a dozen were still engaged in "marathon" negotiations with the city government a year later, and another dozen had their plans for implementation approved only at year's end.⁶⁹

One last, but very common problem is that many firms use the share system as a means of providing extra welfare supplements or bonuses to their own workers. As economist Dong Furen explained: "They understate state-owned assets and fix the dividends and bonuses. After that, they distribute the shares among workers and staff members."⁷⁰ In effect, then, selling shares only increases the pressure of consumption funds on the market—the very problem this reform was expressly intended to alleviate.⁷¹ Indeed, by early March 1989, official reports suddenly called for a slowdown in the extension of this reform, for this very reason.⁷²

In the main, then, much skepticism must attend the analysis of capitalist-like reforms in the Chinese urban economy. Nonetheless, isolated data do indicate that in some ways they may be initiating a certain, if very incipient, alteration in the shape of the Chinese economy. In the city of Qingdao, for instance, some sort of bankruptcy caused 10,800 workers to lose their jobs after 500 of the municipality's firms were reorganized; in Shanghai, 30,000 workers were "made redundant" in 1988 and were said to be living on social security.

There are similar, scattered reports from other places in the country.⁷³

As for mergers, some may be occurring without any pressure from the bureaucracy. In Wuhan, officials from the Municipal Commission for the Restructuring of the Economic System claimed that "there are some mergers we don't even know about until they are done."⁷⁴ And, in the case of the share system, enterprise bonds sold to staff and corporate investors can be freely traded,⁷⁵ even if conditions are not yet ripe for the creation of companies specializing in the transfer of stock ownership.⁷⁶ In addition, the tiny stock market of Shanghai actually bears a stock index that fluctuates.⁷⁷

It is important to keep in mind, however, the intention behind the current promotion of these reforms by the top leadership. The justifications that are being offered for their use, as well as the effort to contain their application, all bespeak a continuing statist orientation.

Mediation of Marketing Through State Bureaucracies

I have indicated above how "capitalist measures" are netting new income for the state treasury. Not only do bankruptcies and mergers make it possible for governmental budgets to cut back on the disbursement of subsidies to failing firms, thus permitting savings for the state treasury at both central and local levels; they also generate new funds through the larger profits and extra sales from the better products that mergers and stock solicitation make possible. These same measures, moreover, strengthen the already successful and well-endowed state enterprises by letting them take over the assets of the weaker enterprises and by permitting

⁶⁵*Beijing Review*, Oct. 5, 1987, p. 22.

⁶⁶Author's interview, July 5, 1988.

⁶⁷*Renmin ribao*, Aug. 5, 1988, p. 1.

⁶⁸Author's interview, July 11, 1988.

⁶⁹*Jingji ribao*, Nov. 30, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 6, 1989, p. 32.

⁷⁰*Renmin ribao*, Dec. 12, 1988, p. 5, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 30, 1988, p. 32.

⁷¹This is reminiscent of the dilemma noted above in which caring for workers dismissed from bankrupt firms increases rather than lessens the state's financial burden, thereby achieving just the opposite of what the reform was intended to accomplish.

⁷²Ellen Salem, "Peking Ducks the Issue," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 9, 1989, p. 72; *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 22, 1988, pp. 15–16..

⁷³*FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 14, 1988, p. 36, and Sept. 28, 1988, pp. 52–53.

⁷⁴Author's interview, June 30, 1988. On the other hand, it is quite possible that those mergers were arranged by the firms' industrial bureaus and not by the enterprises themselves.

⁷⁵*FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 15, 1988, p. 15.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, Aug. 19, 1988, p. 46.

⁷⁷Nicholas D. Kristof, "Selling China on a 'Public' Privatization," *The New York Times*, Jan. 8, 1989.

them to absorb new funds as they turn their own assets into shares.⁷⁸

These "capitalist measures" and related market-like reforms are enhancing the power of the state-run economy in yet one more way: they bestow new functions on its old bureaucracies, and they encourage the design of new public agencies to serve as intermediaries and expeditors both between the state enterprises and in their service as the enterprises venture into new arenas. Like local brokers in eighteenth-century China, the middlemen working in state agencies manage the new regroupings and novel modes of exchange that make up the reforms by providing information, advice, and emergency assistance; by locating customers; by guaranteeing credit; and by reducing risk.⁷⁹

Since organizational restructuring is being built on the foundation of prior bureaucratic power, those who assume the existence of bureaucratic opposition to reform may not have analyzed the situation closely enough.⁸⁰ Certain old bureaucracies, most notably the material supply bureaus and industrial companies, have taken on new roles in the changing environment. In addition, an array of new state-directed agencies have recently been established to enforce the various reforms. There now exist property transfer markets for arranging mergers; city offices for overseeing enterprises under threat of bankruptcy; management stations for bidding on construction projects; trade associations; trust investment companies; and vast and intricate networks of local bureaucracies which shape the new horizontally-articulated economic cooperation regions.

⁷⁸Large enterprises have been favored over the years and especially recently in that they have been granted the right to import equipment and technology at or near internationally progressive levels. For instance, the 153 large and medium enterprises in Wuhan, whose fixed assets equal 73.6 percent of the assets in the more than 3,000 industrial firms in the city, had a total of 537 computers in early 1987, and many of them used automatic production lines. In these enterprises there are seven engineers and other specialists for every 100 staff members and workers; in the small plants there are only two per 100 on the average. See Zhang Dingfang, "A Preliminary Analysis of the Technical Progress in Wuhan City's Large and Medium-Scale Industrial Enterprises," *Zhongnan caijing daxue xuebao* (Wuhan), May 1987, p. 83.

⁷⁹See Susan Mann, *Local Merchants and the Chinese Bureaucracy, 1750-1950*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1987, p. 63, and *idem.*, "Brokers as Entrepreneurs in Presocialist China," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (Cambridge, England), Vol. 26, No. 4, 1984, p. 626, for a description of the roles brokers played in pre-1949 China.

⁸⁰For instance, see Marshall I. Goldman and Merle Goldman, "Soviet and Chinese Economic Reform," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Vol. 66, No. 3, 1988, which states on p. 558 that "China's urban and industrial reforms have encountered more ideological and bureaucratic resistance than the rural reforms. As opposed to the party cadres in the countryside, who benefited from the reforms . . . the party cadres in the urban industries gain little. If anything, they are likely to lose power . . ." and on p. 559, "... party resistance in China today comes more from inertia and opposition at the individual enterprise and local levels."

Material supply bureaus. In late 1988, official statistics revealed that in the first three quarters of the year, 73 percent of the sales volume in the goods and materials system had been contributed by sources not included in the state plan.⁸¹ Not only does this indicate that a great deal of marketing is going on outside the scope of the planning system, it also shows that the material supply bureaucracy, formerly located at the hub of the command economy, remains heavily involved in transactions in the industrial sector even though these transactions are not laid out in advance in the central government's plans.

There are scattered reports of individual cities installing officially approved material exchange markets.⁸² These markets can corner, or at least heavily influence, the trade in raw materials that goes on outside the state plan.⁸³ Interviews in Wuhan revealed that the steel market in that city operates under the supervision of the city's Material Supply Bureau. The bureau has, however, set up a new company to do this job.⁸⁴ Since the cadres in the new company earn commissions for their work, they should in no way feel undermined by the market reforms—and presumably the same situation obtains elsewhere.⁸⁵

⁸¹See *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 1, 1988, p. 2, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 8, 1988, p. 55.

⁸²For the background on the Shanghai municipal materials exchange market and its mode of operation, see William Byrd, "The Shanghai Market for the Means of Production: A Case Study of Reform in China's Material Supply System," *Comparative Economic Studies* (Tempe, AZ), Winter 1985, pp. 1-29. Byrd states that the first such markets appeared in 1979; by 1981, there were already 64 of them across the nation, dealing in a range of materials.

⁸³Suzhou's exchange market was reportedly handling 40 percent of the extra-plan trade as of mid-1988, according to *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 30, 1988, p. 2; Beijing's was charged with locating materials for firms in need, and with buying up their unwanted stocks and finding outlets for them. It also was allowed to engage in business on a commission basis for township enterprises outside the city. *Ibid.*, Jan. 3, 1989, p. 2. In Shenyang, a nationally famous materials trade center is directing massive and complicated barter deals among large firms in major industrial cities. For example, in exchange for a loan of funds, the Anyang Steel Company sold its surplus steel to the center, which traded it to Hubei's No. 2 Automobile Company, in exchange for cars not procured by the planners. Author's interview at the trade center, July 8, 1988. There is a report on this center in *Shenyang ribao*, June 8, 1988, p. 1. The manager, Dong Shijie, also published an article on his center entitled, "Seek to Go Forward in Reform," in *Jingji guanli*, No. 6, 1987, pp. 40-41. See also Feng Xuesong, "Seek Results in Union," in *ibid.*, pp. 42-44.

⁸⁴Author's interviews with the City Commission for Restructuring the Economic System, June 22, 1987, and June 30, 1988, and at the Wuhan General Machinery Plant, June 24, 1987.

⁸⁵Officially approved material exchange markets are especially active in serving the smaller firms; the larger firms continue to deal directly with the same stable supplier with whom they trafficked under the state plan. Author's interview with Wuhan's Commission for Restructuring the Economic System, June 30, 1988, and with the No. 3 Machine Tools Factory of Shenyang, July 9, 1988. According to management at the machine tools plant, the same small firms that used to go to the material supply bureau now go to the material exchange markets in the city, underlining the continuity between organs.

In Changchun in the northeast, the material supply bureaus are actually *supposed to* "pull strings" for the firms under their supervision to guarantee the stable economic development of their corporate manager, the city government. The bureaus have enjoyed expanded profits from the heightened sales activity: in 1987, the increase was over 20 percent. The bureau's brokering saves the firms from searches: "If only the material supply bureaus find sources for supplies, we needn't go outside [the city] to procure," a local paper quotes "many enterprise" personnel as avowing.⁸⁶

In the past few years, the press has with increasing frequency accused personnel in the material supply bureaus of using their control over scarce supplies to engage in profiteering.⁸⁷ The year 1988 saw repeated, and apparently vain, official efforts to counter this abuse of power.⁸⁸ The various regulations instituted to correct the problem pointed to arbitrary fee collections, to the practice of raising prices at every level up the administrative hierarchy, and to the cadres' habit of forming "relationship networks" through which they trade favors to benefit relatives and acquaintances. A colorful article in the *People's Daily* in the fall of 1988 alleged: "The worst offenders in the illegal sales of the means of production are the various levels of state material supply bureaus and the work units underneath them."⁸⁹

Thus, material supply bureaus, through their long-term participation in well-established exchange networks under the reign of the state plan—with all the information and personal connections that this participation afforded—and through their command over supplies are excellently situated to profit from the reforms. Obviously this arm of the bureaucracy has no quarrel with the new measures.

⁸⁶*Dongbei jingjibao*, Mar. 22, 1988, p. 1.

⁸⁷Party Politburo member Yao Yilin advocated strict measures for dealing with "excessive intermediate links and profiteering in materials circulation . . . The problem is not caused by small businessmen and traders, nor by speculators," he averred. "It is linked to corrupt phenomena inside the party and [obviously referring to the material supply bureaus] to the many enterprises which are essentially the production and commercial organs of the party and government organs." Trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 9, 1988, p. 33.

⁸⁸See "Temporary Management Methods for the National Unified Highest Price Limit for Extra-Plan Means of Production," in *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan gongbao*, (Beijing), Jan. 30, 1988, pp. 10–12. Also, *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 2, 1988, p. 1, carried the news that the State Council had decided to strengthen the management over the trade in steel products; *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 5, 1988, p. 1, reported that the Ministry of Materials Supply had promulgated ten measures to correct the situation.

⁸⁹*Renmin ribao*, Oct. 8, 1988, p. 1. One of the examples in the article shows how vehicles costing 115,000 yuan (about US \$32,200), which should have had a fixed price, finally sold for 152,000 yuan after passing through four different materials service companies and trade centers. In another case, a certain factory in Wuhan colluded with the Hubei provincial metal materials company and, by falsifying accounts, netted over 220,000 yuan in illegal income.

Industrial companies. The industrial bureaus that manage production and sales in particular trades in the urban economies are subdivided into specialized industrial companies that, in turn, are responsible for directing individual firms. Like the material supply bureaus, rather than losing power in the reforms, many of these agencies are benefiting handsomely. According to the tenets of the reform program, they are now operating as business enterprises, instead of as administrative offices.

Accordingly, their officials interpose themselves between their own firms and "the market." By relying on their original suppliers and procurers, they are becoming wholesale salesmen and sources of market information. Since they—like the Soviet *tolkachi*—played a similar role in the days when the generally inaccurate state plans left firms in need of extra scouting, the companies' cadres can utilize long-standing relationships and buy cheaply in large quantity. Then, drawing profits from price differentials and from taking fees in exchange for information, cadres in the companies can garner incomes that are greater than ever before. It is the small firms (ironically enough, those often labeled most lively in the reform era), which become their captives, because they have fewer personnel to spare, more frequently shifting product structures, and a need for smaller and less fixed quantities of supplies.⁹⁰

New Bureaucratic Organs

In the two examples above, it is clear that material supply bureaus and industrial companies have simply widened the arena of their wonted activities and, because of new policies, have earned new recompense in the reform era. But in the course of implementing other economic reforms, old offices have been regrouped, or, in some instances, brand-new ones have been fashioned in an effort to guide the course of the experiments.

Property rights markets. For instance, in early 1988, Wuhan was the first city to create a property rights market. But that "market" seems in reality to be more like a substation of the city government. In March of that year, the city government formulated the policies that were to guide that market's activities. In the next month it issued a document entitled "Provisional Ideas of the City Government on Realizing the Rational Transfer of Property Rights Through Encouraging Enterprise Mergers" along with an "Implementation Program for the Wuhan

⁹⁰Author's interview, July 1, 1988.

City Enterprise Merger Market." These rulings spelled out the principles of exchange and the organs that would guide the market.⁹¹ The city government's involvement was said to lead to "greater initiatives in and an obvious strengthening of the mergers." Also, in a third of the cases, both of the firms in the pair being merged were managed by the same industrial bureau; and the bureau served as the intermediary that encouraged the merger.⁹²

In other cities, where special markets had not yet been established, enterprise takeovers were "mostly organized [directly] through the competent government department acting as a go-between." The purpose has often been to ensure that the localities fulfill their urban *guihua*, which specify a long-range direction for development, a sort of municipal mini-industrial policy. Thus mergers serve to focus urban investment on high-priority industries and products and to help cities readjust their productive forces to suit their own natural resource endowments.⁹³

Enterprise bankruptcy offices. In the cities that have experimented with enterprise bankruptcies, such as Shenyang, the city government has installed a new office expressly to handle the bankruptcies. Its function is to arrange tax reduction and exemption, as well as low-interest loans from banks and insurance companies, and to permit the temporary suspension of debt-payments by firms warned of imminent bankruptcy.⁹⁴ A high official from the Enterprise Bankruptcy Office of the Shenyang city government proudly recounted how hard his office had worked to rescue the nationally notorious Hardware Casting Factory, which had been tagged as on the brink of bankruptcy in August 1985. It was fully recovered two years later.⁹⁵

In addition to the kinds of assistance noted in the press, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Office quietly provid-

ed a wide array of other services to the Hardware Casting Factory. Staff members drew on a special "bankruptcy fund" to provide a temporary loan. They also arranged for publicity for the firm, which prompted a research and design academy in Beijing to develop new products for the plant to produce. They then followed up by helping the factory's management to obtain permits for new product development, forestalling likely interference and opposition from the tax, industry, and commercial management departments. Finally, and perhaps most crucially, they were able, as an office just under the city government, to procure for the factory key raw materials that it would have found impossible to acquire on its own from producers or suppliers.

Most of this behind-the-scenes relief extended by the bankruptcy office was not covered in the press accounts of the rescue, allowing the factory to stand as an example of the self-reliance that a firm could muster to revive itself. The manager of the Hardware Casting Factory was able to claim that the fortunes of the factory were reversed just by "breaking the iron rice bowl." In this case the phrase referred to the manager forcing individual workers to bear the responsibility—in deductions from or bonuses added onto their wages—for the profits and losses of their workshops.⁹⁶

The intention behind the bankruptcy office's creation—but also behind keeping its work out of the lime-light—fits the purpose of experimenting with bankruptcy in the first place. As one analyst of the bankruptcy law noted:

*The original idea [of experimenting with bankruptcy], as illustrated in the many press articles on warned enterprises that have returned miraculously to profit, seemed to have been that the warning would so galvanize the workers of the enterprise that they would be able to reverse the losses within one year.*⁹⁷

Bidding market management offices. Another market reform aimed at breaking down the rigidity of the command economy is the use of bidding in construction work, instead of relying on specific bureaucratic units to assign supply equipment to specific projects. In Shenyang, where the first nationwide construction project bidding market was set up, the city government instituted a "bidding market management office." This

⁹¹FBIS-CHI, Oct. 6, 1988, p. 26.

⁹²Ibid., Dec. 7, 1988, p. 37.

⁹³See *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 12, 1988, trans. in FBIS-CHI, Aug. 23, 1988, p. 27; and *Renmin ribao*, June 6, 1988, p. 5, trans. in FBIS-CHI, June 23, 1988, p. 38. Fuxin city encouraged its more progressive firms to take over failing firms by using favorable credit and tax policies, as reported in *Dongbei jingjibao*, May 10, 1988, p. 1; the same paper on April 19, 1988, p. 1, stated that Dalian city's government was acting as a go-between to plan the mergers that would contribute to a rearrangement of the city's industrial structure. In Shanghai, according to FBIS-CHI, Sept. 29, 1988, p. 55, the leading organ for economic restructuring was studying the city's economy and planning future mergers. Nanjing's municipal administration was urging its firms to link their own short-term interest to the city's long-term development interest, under the guidance of the leading departments in the city. See *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 18, 1988, p. 1. The article on Nanjing mentions the city's *guihua*, as did a number of interviewees in Wuhan in June/July 1988.

⁹⁴FBIS-CHI, Nov. 4, 1988, p. 44.

⁹⁵Author's interview, July 12, 1988.

⁹⁶In an interview at the plant itself, on July 12, 1988, the manager accounted for her successes mainly by referring to the successful implementation of a contracting system "down to the individual level." In fact, a total of only two people were fired in the course of this process! Upon inquiry, she did admit to some of the forms of assistance mentioned by the city bankruptcy office official, but in less detail.

⁹⁷Chang, loc. cit., p. 358.

body, conveniently placed within the old bureaucracy, is under the city's bureau of construction work. It is responsible for managing the bidding, in which all capital construction and renovation projects that were written into state plans (at any level), are on a scale surpassing 2,000 square meters, and have a price-tag above 300,000 yuan must engage.⁹⁸ Again, an innovation has been brought under state control.

Trade associations. Trade associations have been organized in many cities to act as a "bridge between the people and the government," in the words of a local economic planner in Wuhan, where there were some 20 to 30 of these new associations by mid-1988.⁹⁹ Their job includes providing the enterprises in a given trade with information and help. But their chief function is to see to it that the various firms in the line of industry under their purview play their part in helping to realize the city government's *guihua*. In most cases, the urban administration hopes to use these associations to push trades to develop along the lines city planners have worked out. For particularly important trades, the associations actually have some clout, according to the head of the national association for cable-manufacturing enterprises.¹⁰⁰ This is generally not true for the less important trades. For example, disgruntled members of the Wuhan lamps and lanterns association were so disaffected that they did not even bother to pay their dues for a year.¹⁰¹

Trust investment companies. Yet another state-managed innovation which, like the bidding office, was meant to shore up the old command economy, is the Shenyang Trust Investment Company, established in 1985. The industrial bureaus of Shenyang enlist this body both to invest their surplus capital and to provide them with capital when they need it to complete technical transformation projects provided for within the city's annual economic plan. The company's purpose, as outlined by one of its officials, is to help to realize the city's *guihua*.¹⁰² Most big cities now have an organ of this kind.

Economic and technical cooperation committees. Probably the most fascinating of the bureaucratic arrangements devised to monitor and encourage the new markets can be found in the economic and technical cooperation committees that most municipalities now maintain. The function of these organs, established in the mid-1980's, is to sponsor and further economic and technological exchanges among firms across the administrative and geographical boundaries that delineated the flow of goods, services, and materials under the state planning system. Not only the city itself, but

every administrative unit down to the county level has an agency of this sort. These agencies are responsible for ensuring that the transactions of local firms execute that area's *guihua*. This they do by using the usual preferential policies—loans, taxes, subsidies—to coordinate particular exchanges; by bringing firms together to negotiate over terms; and by supplying them with relevant market information once their union is achieved.

Especially interesting is the background of the 30-some person staff of the Economic and Technical Cooperation Committee in Wuhan. All the staff members previously worked in the area of material exchange, and they thus are quite familiar with the situations and products of the enterprises in the city. Some were employees of the city's Material Supply Bureau while others were agents delegated by the city government (planning or economic commissions, or the city government's office) to get market information to supplement planned supplies.¹⁰³

At the city level, the committee is enmeshed in a complicated set of networks at least as bureaucratic as the one that supported the command economy this committee is meant to replace. First of all, its members report on their work to Hubei province, where a similar committee presides over exchanges at the province level.¹⁰⁴ Then, along with Jiangxi and Hunan provinces, Hubei forms an economic cooperation region whose center is Wuhan. The mayors of the 10 major cities of the three provinces meet periodically in a liaison committee. There is also a working committee composed of the economic and technological cooperation committees from these 10 cities and those from the seven districts in the region; their staff meets once every three months. An officer under that committee performs the daily work of the liaison and the working committees.

Another working network consists of the chairmen of the economic commissions in each of the 17 member areas of the economic cooperation region. Each of the 17 areas also delegates the heads of its science and technology committee, its industrial bureaus, its agricultural commission, its commercial commission, its

⁹⁸Shenyang ribao, June 23, 1988, p. 2.

⁹⁹Author's interview, July 1, 1988.

¹⁰⁰The manager of the Shenyang Cable Works revealed that his association's remonstrations to the State Economic Commission forced an increase in the price of the association's products so that it covered the costs of the needed raw materials. Author's interview, July 10, 1988.

¹⁰¹Wang Haisu, "Preliminary Exploration of Wuhan's Industrial System's Reform and Improvement of its Structure," *Zhongnan caijing daxue xuebao*, No. 2, 1987, p. 46.

¹⁰²Author's interview, July 7, 1988.

¹⁰³Information supplied by member of the Mayor's Consultative Committee, July 1, 1987.

¹⁰⁴Author's interview with the City Commission on the Reform of the Economic System, June 22, 1987.

branch of the state bank, and of its propaganda and news system to form work and informational networks.¹⁰⁵

As each of these networks passes along information on the projects and the production structure in its area, it essays to satisfy the needs of its own *guihua* through a horizontal—as opposed to the hierarchically-ordered vertical—exchange of the planned economy. “Help from the leadership can’t be avoided . . . information is hard to come by . . . and the enterprises don’t know where the supplies are, or where there is technical ability,” explained a Wuhan economist.¹⁰⁶ In the midst of so much new bureaucracy, it is clear that the state is holding its own.

Conclusion

All of the above indicates that the Chinese approach to economic reform has a strongly statist organizational component. In the leadership’s effort to keep control of unplanned transactions, it is relying on old organs whose cadres know the market, and “creating” so-called new offices, which in fact, are offices that have simply emerged, without significant metamorphosis, from the units that made up the original state-run bureaucracy and directed the planned economy. In the process, the leadership is further empowering the public side of business, rather than “separating the government from the enterprise” as it claims it wishes to do.

The economist Dong Furen recently cited an old Chinese saying that neatly conveys a key message of this article: “Things turn out differently in different localities or surroundings.” Dong went on to say:

*While transplanting the successful foreign market experience, we should avoid losing the shape of our reform. Apart from considering the practical conditions of China, we must also pay attention to the soil needed for the transplantation, so that the plant we are transplanting can take root in proper soil.*¹⁰⁷

His point is the same as a strand of my argument here, namely, the capitalistic measures being injected into, or perhaps more accurately, overlaid on top of the administratively planned, state-owned economy in China are more apt at this stage to take on the features of that

old system than to remodel it. They are more likely to be forced to adapt to the state’s own fiscal needs and purposes—and to be installed and supervised by its offices—than to assert their own form.

To recapitulate, three central aspects of the post-1978 economic reforms—the connection with the world economy and the demands for foreign exchange that accompanied it; the consumer revolution initiated to right injustices from Maoist days and to offer incentives for greater individual productivity; and the programs of decentralizing decision-making power, funds, and supplies so as to stimulate growth—had cost the state dear by the end of a decade, pumping up prices and dumping deficits onto the central treasury. In response, by late 1988, the top leadership had decided to promote more energetically a set of market-style innovations (most of which were under way at least since 1985)—stock markets and shareholding, enterprise bankruptcies, mergers, raw materials markets, horizontal exchanges—not for the sake of privatization, but in a stab at budgetary savings and economic stability. Ironically, “capitalistic” practices are being attempted in the hope of regaining macrocontrols at the central level.

Moreover, in a further irony, as the central state budget sheds responsibilities—by encouraging firms to invest in each other or to buy each other out—state assets and “market” power are becoming more concentrated than ever in the best and biggest state enterprises, through the operation of policies that intentionally favor the fittest. Additional increments of power are also flowing to state-run bureaucratic offices, such as the material supply bureaus, since they are charged with supervising the disposal of surplus supplies being traded outside the plan.

Thus, even as bureaucratic brokers take advantage of their location at the crucial middle links in the transactions channels, and even as the clout of local administrations increases, even to the point of eclipsing that of the center, it is still “the state”—its offices and its officials—that wins. In large part this is the case because real prices that would truly reflect cost and scarcity do not prevail in the Chinese “market.” In addition, information is hard to come by and tends to be the monopoly of state cadres. Until these two conditions have been radically altered, and until—if ever—the political leadership at the top can make a genuine commitment to re-vamping property relations in the industrial system, the recent economic reforms may continue to permit a flourishing of exchange, but they certainly will not drastically restructure the Chinese economy.

¹⁰⁵Information supplied by the Wuhan city Economic and Technological Cooperation Committee, June 28, 1988.

¹⁰⁶Author’s interview, July 2, 1988.

¹⁰⁷*Renmin ribao*, Dec. 12, 1988, p. 5, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 30, 1988, p. 33.

Power to the Soviets?

Jeffrey W. Hahn

AS general secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev was quick to propose a major "restructuring" (*perestroyka*) of the Soviet system. At the April 1985 plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and then at the 27th CPSU Congress in early 1986, he tabled a dazzling program of reforms ranging from civil rights and *glasnost* to the anti-alcoholism campaign and economic self-sufficiency for enterprises. Like the early Bolsheviks, Gorbachev seemed so certain of the rectitude of his views that he expected no resistance. Yet by the beginning of 1988, it had become clear to him that although a number of measures had already been adopted, the reconstruction of Soviet society was falling far short of his goals. And after the economic reforms had been approved, it became evident that their successful implementation depended on the introduction of a program of political reforms as well.

The General Secretary addressed these matters in a speech to the Central Committee on February 18, 1988, in which he expressed impatience with the pace of reform, attacked those in state and party administration who refused to accept change, and called for acceleration of the "process of democratization." He also explicitly called for political reform:

Comrades! Our economic reforms, the development of the processes of democracy, the renewal of the spiri-

tual-moral sphere, that is, everything connected with the concept of revolutionary restructuring—all are links of a single chain. They are closely interrelated and interdependent, and it is necessary that if you begin to restructure one of them, then you must continue with the others. . . . Therefore, it is fully natural, and, I would say, logical to turn to the necessary restructuring of our political system. .

Looking ahead to the 19th Party Conference in June 1988, Gorbachev defined political reform as that gathering's top priority, and singled out the soviets for particular attention:

Above all, discussion should proceed about how to raise the role of the soviets as the core of the political system of our society, as its governmental embodiment. It is precisely here, in the formation and the functioning of the soviets, that we must first realize the democratic principles of socialism.¹

The soviets might have seemed an unlikely focus of political reform. Although, in theory, deputies elected to these legislative councils by all Soviet citizens choose the members of the executive and administrative departments and hold them accountable, in reality it is the administrators who have dominated the deputies. Over the years, the authority of the deputies has been largely reduced to ritualistic ratification of decisions that have already been prepared in advance by members of the state and party apparatuses. Virtually all decisions are taken unanimously, and what little participation by deputies does take place is carefully choreographed by the organizational-instructional department of the local so-

Jeffrey W. Hahn is Professor of Political Science at Villanova University and in the spring of 1987 was a Fulbright Exchange Scholar on the Juridical Faculty of Moscow State University. Among his many writings on Soviet domestic politics is *Soviet Grassroots: Citizen Participation in Local Soviet Government* (1988). The author wishes to thank the International Research Exchanges Board and the Carnegie Corporation for funding of travel to the Soviet Union in July 1988 and February 1989 respectively.

¹The Report of CC CPSU General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev "On Revolutionary *Perestroyka*—The Ideology of Renewal," in *Materialy plenuma TsK KPSS*, 18 fev. 1988 (Materials of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, Feb. 18, 1988, Moscow, Politizdat, 1988, pp. 31–32.

viet's executive committee.² Not surprisingly, this has led to a lack of public respect for the representative institutions of government.³ At the 19th Party Conference, Georgiy Arbatov depicted the soviets as "well-worn house slippers" for the bureaucrats.⁴

Yet, the choice of the soviets as the focus of political reform makes sense if one bears in mind that it is in the administration of government from top to bottom that bureaucratic resistance to *perestroyka* is rooted. Even the party has become the handmaiden of the bureaucrats through interlocking membership and control of personnel; as Gorbachev told the 19th Party Conference: "The soviets, and in many ways the party agencies as well, have proved unable to control the pressure of departmental interests."⁵ Change threatens these interests. In order to make administrators work for, not against, the implementation of his policies, Gorbachev seeks to cut through this system and reassert the authority of the legislative representatives over the bureaucracy. Indeed, one could argue that in placing reform of government at the top of the agenda, Gorbachev and his colleagues were moved not so much by commitment to democracy, at least in the short run, as by the wish to replace those members of the state bureaucracy and party apparatus who oppose *perestroyka* with those who favor it.

Below, I shall examine four areas where changes have been proposed: electoral procedures; the relationship between the executive personnel and the deputies of soviets; the role of the party in the soviets; and the economic power of the soviets. I shall conclude with an assessment of the problems that will have to be overcome if the reforms are to work.

The reader should bear in mind that several important issues related to the reform of local government lie outside the scope of the present work. These include

parliamentary reform at the federal level,⁶ electoral and other procedural changes within the CPSU, democracy in the workplace,⁷ and forms of citizen participation other than through elections.

Electoral Reform

Prior to the limited experiment in the local elections of June 1987, there had been virtually no element of competition in the election of deputies to the soviets. The system of elections was, in the words of one recent Soviet critic, one of "report-padding in the place of democracy."⁸ Although the 1936 Soviet Constitution specified that nominations were supposed to be conducted in the workplace, with the nominees being elected from the territorial district to which they were assigned, in practice, a small group of representatives from the party, trade union, and Komsomol (youth league) organizations at the place of work sat down and decided beforehand who was to be nominated, in accordance with guidelines sent from the district (*ray-on*) party organization. At a general nomination meeting, employees unanimously ratified this single list of candidates, usually with little or no discussion, by a show of hands. After six weeks of campaigning by party "agitators," voters went to the polls where they received ballots listing one candidate for each position. They deposited the ballot—occasionally with written-in requests for specific public services—in an urn. On paper, the results were impressive: almost all those eligible voted, and the fact that almost all the candidates won by more than 99 percent of the vote cast was portrayed as a ringing endorsement of Soviet socialist democracy.

The first sign that Gorbachev was interested in introducing changes into this system came at the 27th CPSU Congress, where he stated that "the time has come to make necessary adjustments in our electoral practice. A good many questions awaiting resolution

²A first-hand description of a session of a local soviet in Moscow can be found in Jeffrey W. Hahn, *Soviet Grassroots: Citizen Participation in Local Soviet Government*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 199–207.

³G. V. Barabashev, V. I. Vasil'yev, and K. R. Sheremet cite lack of public confidence as a major reason for reform of the soviets. See "Soviets of People's Deputies: A Time of Change," *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo* (Moscow), No. 5, 1988, p. 3. A 1988 survey of opinion in 12 provinces of the USSR conducted by the Institute for Sociological Research found that 56 percent of the respondents felt that a "complete overhaul" of the soviets was needed, while only 14 percent thought that no major structural changes were needed. See "What Should the Soviets Be?" *Izvestiya* (Moscow), June 27, 1988.

⁴*Pravda* (Moscow), June 30, 1988, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH—hereafter, *CDSP*), Aug. 10, 1988, p. 4.

⁵See translation of Gorbachev's speech in *ibid.*, July 27, 1988, p. 12. The interlocking relations between the party and the state are described in Ronald J. Hill, "Party-State Relations and Soviet Political Development," *British Journal of Political Science* (Cambridge), Vol. 10, 1988, pp. 149–65; and in Hahn, *op. cit.*, pp. 250–60.

⁶At the 19th Party Conference, Gorbachev announced plans to create a new Congress of People's Deputies, comprising 2,250 members elected in equal numbers from single-member districts, from nationality groups, and from social organizations. This group is to meet once a year to elect a permanently functioning Supreme Soviet of 400–450 deputies sitting in a Council of the Union and a Council of the Nationalities, and to elect a chairman (presumably Gorbachev himself) with broader powers than the present chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Gorbachev, *loc. cit.*; also *idem*, speech to the July 29, 1988, Central Committee plenum, trans. in *CDSP*, Aug. 24, 1988, pp. 4–5.

The structure proposed in many respects harks back to the structure of government created in the Constitution of 1918. See Aryeh L. Unger, *Constitutional Development in the USSR*, New York, Pica Press, 1981, Ch. 1.

⁷Russell Bova, "On *Perestroyka*: The Role of Workplace Participation," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1987, pp. 76–86.

⁸Yuriy Burtin, "Freedom of Choice," *Izvestiya*, Apr. 29, 1988.

have accumulated here."⁹ A year to the day later, decrees were adopted calling for a limited experiment in competitive elections at the local level using multi-member electoral districts (MMD). These districts were created by combining five or so single-member districts (SMD) into one. Moreover, in the MMD's, there were to be, "as a rule," more nominees than seats—say, seven or eight candidates for five places. Voters going to the polls in districts selected for the experiment received a list of candidates from which they were required to strike out sufficient names so as to leave only as many names as seats to be filled. Candidates receiving less than 50 percent of the votes cast were "not elected"; those receiving more than 50 percent but not finishing high enough to win a deputy slot were named "reserve deputies." These latter could participate in the soviets but were not allowed to vote or to hold leadership positions in the soviet.¹⁰ Although less than 5 percent of the deputies were chosen in this manner in the elections of June 29, 1987, the multi-member elections were held in districts scattered throughout the USSR with the apparent intent of using the results to develop a new national election law mandating some form of electoral choice in the local elections scheduled for 1990.¹¹

The 1987 electoral experiment was widely viewed as a success. A joint poll conducted before and after the elections by the Academy of Science's Institute for Sociological Research and Institute of State and Law revealed that the percentage of those approving the new approach jumped from 56 percent before to 77 percent after, the principal dissatisfaction expressed being that the experiment had not been more widespread and broader in scope.¹² Gorbachev himself observed:

*The competition enlivened the elections, stepped up the voters' interest in them, and increased the deputies' sense of responsibility. Now we must go further, mastering and consolidating new approaches to the electoral system.*¹³

However, less positive assessments of the experiment came from the substantial number of members of the local "leadership group"—i.e., those who held positions on the executive committees or in the administrative apparatus or were managers of local enterprises—who failed to be elected as deputies and found themselves relegated to "reserve deputy" status.¹⁴ Accustomed to being automatically renominated and reelected, they found themselves ineligible to be elected to their old executive positions and so suffered a marked loss of status. These members of the executive and administrative apparatus complained bitterly that they

had been "black-balled" by disgruntled voters for unpopular, if necessary, decisions in the past. They also argued that poorly informed voters chose solely on the basis of occupational identification, with the result that many good government workers lost their jobs.¹⁵ If the goal of the reforms is to shake up the executive and administrative apparatus, then the unhappiness of the administrative cadres suggests that Gorbachev's reform hit the intended target. Certainly, public opinion was on his side, with only 6 percent of citizens surveyed favoring retention of the old system.¹⁶

The codification of electoral reform below the federal (all-Union) level will be one of the first items on the agenda of the new Supreme Soviet chosen in April following the election to the Congress of People's Deputies on March 26, 1989. Discussion has centered on two aspects: the process of nominating candidates for deputy, and the actual conduct of voting. Let us turn first to issues regarding nomination.

The nomination process. Potentially the most consequential of the measures being discussed is the right to "unrestricted nomination of candidates" for deputy. This principle—stated in the Theses for the 19th Party Conference, advocated by Gorbachev in his speech to that gathering, and included in the conference deci-

⁹Gorbachev's report of the Central Committee to the 27th CPSU Congress, *Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1986, trans. in *CDSP*, Mar. 26, 1986, p. 24.

¹⁰For a detailed description of the experiment, see Jeffrey W. Hahn, "An Experiment in Competition: The 1987 Elections to the Local Soviets," *Slavic Review* (Austin, TX), Fall 1988, pp. 434–47. For the decree on the experimental balloting with multi-member districts, see *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR* (Moscow), No. 10, 1987, item 310.

Experiments were also carried out with the single-member district approach, though on a much more limited scale, mostly in Latvia. See Ye. G. Andryushenko and V. I. Vasil'yev, "Thoughts After the Elections," *Sovety Narodnykh Deputatov* (Moscow), No. 11, 1987, p. 95; and V. I. Vasil'yev, "Elect! But How?" *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Oct. 28, 1987.

¹¹Election results published in *Pravda*, June 27, 1987, reveal that 94,184 deputies were elected in MMD's (for the USSR as a whole, there were 2,321,766 deputies elected); another 25,127 achieved "reserve status"; and 599 candidates in the MMD's failed to receive 50 percent of the vote and hence were "not elected."

¹²Ye. G. Andryushenko interview "After the Elections," in *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya* (Moscow), Oct. 25, 1987; see also "Soviets of People's Deputies in Conditions of Perestroika," *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 6, 1988, p. 58; Ye. G. Andryushenko and V. I. Vasil'yev, "Thoughts After the Elections," loc. cit., p. 92; and the round table discussion "Elect!" in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Oct. 28, 1987, pp. 10–11.

¹³Speech to the 19th Party Conference, loc. cit., p. 15.

¹⁴Andryushenko, "After the Elections," loc. cit.

¹⁵The journal of the deputies, *Sovety Narodnykh Deputatov*, seems to have become a particularly strong forum for these views. See, for example, Yu. Baranov, "Pluses and Minuses of Multi-member Districts," *Sovety Narodnykh Deputatov*, No. 6, 1988, pp. 106–08; L. Kovaleva, "Lessons of the Experiment," *ibid.*, No. 7, 1988, pp. 58–62; and M. Kamyshev, "Is It Easy to Be a Reserve [Deputy]?" *ibid.*, pp. 63–65.

¹⁶"What Should the Soviets Be?" loc. cit.

sions¹⁷—is fraught with ambiguity. Although Gorbachev made it clear at the July 29, 1988, Central Committee plenum—devoted to implementation of the reforms—that “labor collectives and public organizations must be provided with the opportunity to nominate an unlimited number of candidates,”¹⁸ he was not specific as to which public organizations would enjoy this right or whether nominations could be put forward at pre-election meetings held at places of residence within the district. While some argue for the broadest possible interpretation, others say this would turn elections into a “bazaar.”¹⁹

An important issue in this connection is the role to be played by non-official (*neformal'nyye*) groups or by the grassroots (*samodeyatel'nyye*) organizations that have sprung up, including groups such as Memorial, Pamyat', the Democratic Union, or the “popular front” movements that have emerged in the Baltic republics and elsewhere. Determined efforts by influential academic specialists like Tat'yana Zaslavskaya and Boris Kurashvili to ensure that these groups will be able to participate politically seem to have been received favorably by some within the party leadership.²⁰ Gorbachev himself expressed support for such participation in his address to the 19th Party Conference, although he stressed that it should be contained within the one-party framework and be “in the interests of the people”; it should not extend to “groups whose interests are far removed from the goals of restructuring.”²¹

If the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies on March 26, 1989, are any indication, participation of non-official groups in the nomination of candidates to local soviets seems likely. Though the electoral law adopted on December 1, 1988, excluded such groups from the list of public organizations that elect one-third of the deputies to the new national Congress, nomina-

tions for the remainder of the deputies are open to anyone who can obtain at least 50 percent of the vote at meetings held in the district—residential or occupational—which are attended by more than 500 voters.²²

While it is true that if more than two candidates are nominated, a district pre-election meeting is called to review candidates' platforms—leading to the possibility that those with views inconsistent with party policy may be pressured to withdraw their candidacies—my conversations in Moscow in February 1989, while this process was under way, suggest that such pressure was not widespread, at least not in the capital.²³ Perhaps the most dramatic evidence that “non-official” candidates were not necessarily weeded out at this stage is information that Sajudis, the popular front in Lithuania, is backing candidates in 39 of Lithuania's 42 Congressional districts.²⁴ Clearly, a definitive, legal resolution of the participatory rights of the non-official groups in elections to the soviets below the national level awaits the deliberations of the Supreme Soviet that the Congress of People's Deputies elects.

Reform of nomination procedures seems destined to undermine another established practice: the fixed representation of certain social groups in the composition of the deputies. Although not legally specified, it has been clear from the consistency in the percentages of deputies coming from various groups that their representation was “not accidental.” In fact, the local party committees have purposefully ensured the nomination of the prescribed quota of women, youths, party members, workers, kolkhozniks, etc.,²⁵ supporting the legal fiction that government in the USSR was more democratic than elsewhere because it was more “representative.” This fig leaf has finally been dropped, and Gorbachev could have been citing Thomas Jefferson when he told the 19th Party Conference:

We should not be afraid of the disproportionate representation of various strata of the population. . . . All that needs to be done is to create a well-adjusted competitive mechanism that will ensure that the voters choose the best possible people out of this group. Then, all the

¹⁷See “The CPSU Central Committee's Theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference,” *Pravda*, May 27, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, June 22, 1988, at p. 8; Gorbachev's conference speech, loc. cit., p. 15; and *Rezolyutsii XIX vsesoyuznoy konferentsii KPSS, 1e iyulya 1988* (Resolutions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference), Moscow, Politizdat, 1988, p. 18.

¹⁸Gorbachev speech to the plenum, loc. cit.

¹⁹Compare legal specialist Vasil'yev, “Elect! But How?” loc. cit., p. 11, and V. Chicheurov, Pushkin city soviet executive committee chairman, interviewed by Y. Feofanov, “What Local Power Should Be Like,” *Izvestiya*, Mar. 20, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, June 1, 1988, p. 7.

²⁰See, for example, Zaslavskaya, “The Fundamental Question of Perestroika,” *Izvestiya*, June 4, 1988; *The New York Times*, Oct. 24 and 25, 1988; interview with Boris Kurashvili, “A Democratic Union of Social Forces? Utopia? Possibility? Necessity?” *Kommunist* (presumably Yerevan [place of publication not given]), Apr. 28, 1988, as translated in *CDSP*, May 25, 1988, p. 5.

²¹Loc. cit., p. 15. CPSU Secretary G. Razumovskiy seems even more enthusiastic about the prospect of expanding participation in the elections than does Gorbachev; see “For the Renewal of Socialism,” *Pravda*, Apr. 23, 1988.

²²See article 37 of the “USSR Law on Election of USSR People's Deputies,” *Pravda*, Dec. 4, 1988, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter—*FBIS-SOV*), Dec. 5, 1988, p. 42. The list of approved public organizations is in Article 1, loc. cit., p. 35.

²³Article 38, loc. cit., pp. 42–43. District pre-election meetings were held January 25 through February 23, 1989. The author was in Moscow for part of this period (February 10–20).

²⁴Bill Keller, “Lithuanian Nationalists: A Fine and Fragile Line,” *The New York Times*, Mar. 14, 1989.

²⁵Hahn, *Soviet Grassroots*, pp. 107–14.

*basic groups of the population and their interests will be reflected in the make-up of the soviets.*²⁶

Voting procedures. With respect to the elections themselves, there seems to be a clear consensus in favor of certain structural changes, the most important being that there should be more candidates than seats to be filled. In addition, there appears to be agreement that those elected or appointed by the deputies would be permitted to serve a limit of two terms in office, and that terms for local deputies should be extended from 2.5 years to five.²⁷

Two other questions, however, have generated considerable debate. The first is whether elections should be held in single-member districts with several candidates or should proceed according to the multi-member approach with reserve deputies that was tried in the June 1987 experiment. Public opinion in general and some specialists favor the SMD approach. One poll has indicated that 58 percent of the voters and 60 percent of the election organizers prefer single-member districts with two candidates.²⁸ A group of specialists at the Institute of State and Law has proposed that the SMD approach be employed at the oblast level and higher and that the MMD system be used for soviets at lower levels; this approach was endorsed by Gorbachev at the July 29, 1988, Central Committee plenum.²⁹

The second controversial issue is whether deputies should continue to represent territorial districts or should return to the practice that existed prior to the 1936 Constitution, whereby deputies were not only

nominated at the workplace, but elected from it as well. The argument for the latter option, or what is sometimes called the "production principle," rests in part on the contention that deputies elected from the workplace will more clearly be able to represent the interests of those who elect them. Territorial representation, it is argued, dilutes the deputy's mandate because so many different group interests are found within a single territorial district.³⁰ Interestingly, there appears to be considerable public support for this position: 48 percent of the respondents in a national poll felt that deputies should be elected, as well as nominated, at the workplace.³¹ Another national poll showed only 15 percent of the voters and 22 percent of the deputies favored the present system.³²

One of the major reasons for public dissatisfaction with this system is that frequently, deputies are nominated by a workplace not located in the territorial district they represent. More often than not, the deputies themselves live outside the district as well.³³ One obvious alternative would be to require that deputies be nominated from and live in the district they represent. This, however, would constitute a radical departure from the original conception of the soviets as "working corporations," according to which service in government was to be closely linked with one's work. Neither the production principle nor the territorial principle was endorsed in the proposed reforms. However, Article 100 of the Soviet Constitution as amended on Dec. 1, 1988, specifies that deputies may now be nominated at their place of residence as well as from the workplace. While this marks a significant change from past practice, a requirement that deputies live in the districts they represent does not appear in the legislation, nor does it seem likely that it will.

Executive-Legislative Relations

A principal thrust of the proposals to reform the soviets was to reassert the authority of elected representatives over the bureaucrats. The fiction that administrative officials were appointed by an executive committee elected from among the deputies and therefore were publicly accountable to the deputies was rarely questioned until Gorbachev came to power. Today, by con-

²⁶Gorbachev speech to the 19th Party Conference, loc. cit., p. 15. Although the legislation on elections to local soviets is not yet in place, Article 39 of the USSR Law on Election of USSR People's Deputies, (loc. cit., p. 43) states that "Any member of a social organization, including religious figures, may be nominated as candidate for USSR people's deputy from that organization."

²⁷See Chapter 12, Articles 89–92 of the "USSR Law on Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution (Fundamental Law)," published in *Pravda*, Dec. 3, 1988, and trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 5, 1988, p. 49. The law is silent on the number of terms a deputy may serve, although Article 91 limits those elected or appointed by the deputies to serving two terms.

²⁸Andryushenko and Vasil'yev, "Thoughts After the Elections," loc. cit., p. 59.

²⁹See "Soviets of People's Deputies in Conditions of *Perestroika*," loc. cit., p. 59; and Gorbachev's speech, loc. cit., p. 4.

The proposal was surfaced by scholars at the Sector on the Soviets and Problems of Territorial Development at the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of State and Law, an institute that appears to be playing a substantial role in preparing the reforms of government. This role was discussed by Joel C. Moses in "Gorbachev and the Democratization Issue," a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Boston, Nov. 5–8, 1987.

The possibility of a combination of MMD's and SMD's in soviet elections was written into Article 95 of the Soviet Constitution in the amendments approved in December 1988. Loc. cit., p. 49.

³⁰This argument is made by B. A. Strashun in "The 1918 RSFSR Constitution and Elections to Organs of Soviet Power," *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 7, 1988, pp. 29–30. See also interview with Doctor of History V. I. Desyaterik, "More Democracy," *Pravda*, Apr. 22, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, May 25, 1988, p. 4.

³¹"What Should the Soviets Be?" loc. cit.

³²"Elect! But How?" loc. cit.

³³See Hahn, "An Experiment in Competition . . .," loc. cit., p. 445.

trast, the dominance of executive officials over the legislature is regarded as the fundamental problem to be overcome. In the words of one commentary:

Over the course of many years, the situation has existed where the soviets and their deputies have in fact been subordinated to the workers in the executive agencies. These people decided when to convene sessions of the soviets and which issues to introduce; they prepared the reports and the draft legislation, they established the list of speakers and even edited their speeches. The apparat played a deciding role in the choice of candidates for deputy, and in the formation of the bodies of the soviets; they turned the mass organizational work of the soviets, their standing committees, and the deputies to their own advantage. Now it is time to break such "traditions." Unfortunately, not everyone understands the need for change; even many deputies still do not feel themselves masters of the soviet. Here is the task—to overcome such inertia more quickly, to develop initiative more persistently, to inculcate in the deputies the feeling that they possess genuine authority.³⁴

Although Soviet legal specialists are quick to attribute the current state of affairs to the legacy of Stalinism—with its preference for discipline and public unanimity over public debate and divided votes—some have pointed further back, to Lenin. They suggest that Lenin's own conception of the soviets as "working corporations" and his explicit rejection of Western parliamentarianism, with its premise that executive and legislative power be balanced, also played a role.³⁵

Today there is a lively debate among Soviet specialists on government about introducing into the Soviet system elements of parliamentary democracy,³⁶ in particular those that would enable the deputies to exert

real "kontrol'" (or oversight) with respect to administrators. Those favoring this approach maintain that in order to achieve this, executive and legislative powers must be separated, not fused.³⁷ They appear to have reached a degree of consensus about how to do this: those holding executive and administrative positions should not simultaneously be deputies;³⁸ there should be at least some deputies who are temporarily released from their jobs and paid to be full-time legislators; the term of office should be lengthened to five years, but with a limited number of terms; and fewer deputies should meet more frequently for longer sessions, which should be open to the public.³⁹

On the whole, the reform measures endorsed by the 19th Party Conference reflect this thinking. The gathering decided that members of executive and administrative agencies should not be elected simultaneously as deputies of the soviet for which they work.⁴⁰ In a move unanticipated in the "theses" for the gathering, the conference incorporated Gorbachev's recommendation that: "At sessions during which executive committees are elected and at which heads of departments and administrations are confirmed, the nomination of alternative candidates, the secret ballot, competition, and other democratic procedures should be the rule."⁴¹ Such a measure could potentially enhance the leverage of the legislature with respect to the executive, in the process giving deputies committed to Gorbachev's restructuring policies a tool with which to dislodge those bureaucrats opposed to *perestroika*.

The most significant structural change endorsed by

³⁴"Soviets of People's Deputies in Conditions of *Perestroika*," loc. cit. See, also, N. G. Starovoytov, "Sessions of the Soviets: Theory and Practice," *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 11, 1985, pp. 8–10.

³⁵Following Marx's writings on the Paris Commune of 1848, Lenin argued that the division of powers in bourgeois parliaments was a reflection of the class-divided societies that produced them. The propertied class elected its own to pass laws protecting its interests, and hired others—administrators—to make sure that these laws were observed. The idea behind the "working corporations" was that those who make laws should be responsible for implementing them and further that unless actually involved in administrative work, deputies should be employed elsewhere in the economy. Naturally, such deputies should not expect to be paid for public service lest a class of "professional legislators" emerge. The results of this conceptualization are now painfully obvious: amateur legislators are no match for professional administrators, and it is hardly surprising that the latter have taken over!

Even today, the Soviet Union is grappling with the concept of professional legislators. Should the President of the Academy of Sciences be a deputy? How can he fulfill both jobs simultaneously?

³⁶See Fedor Burlatskiy, "On Soviet Parliamentarianism," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, June 15, 1988, p. 2; Boris Kurashvili, "Restoring the Deputies to their Proper Status," *Izvestiya*, trans in *CDSP*, Mar. 16, 1988, p. 17; and Barabashev, Vasil'yev, and Sheremet, loc. cit., p. 9. A rejoinder to Kurashvili and a lively argument for preserving the present system and making it work better was given in an interview with S. Solov'yeva, "Democracy, Legality, Power," *Izvestiya*, May 31, 1988.

³⁷See Ye. G. Andryushenko, "Guarantee of Irreversibility," *Moskovskiy Novosti* (Moscow), No. 10, Mar. 6, 1988.

³⁸As Gorbachev himself noted at the 19th CPSU Conference (loc. cit., p. 15), when administrators are also deputies, "they meet and give themselves instructions, seeing to it that these instructions are as weak and as few as possible."

³⁹On the whole, the public seems to support these proposals. However, a sizeable minority—32 percent—in one poll rejected a parliamentary solution; only 53 percent supported the idea that members of the executive branch should not also be deputies; and a clear plurality opposed released time for deputies (49 percent, to 32 percent in favor). See "What Should the Soviets Be?" loc. cit.

⁴⁰*Rezolyutsii XIX vsesoyuznoy konferentsii KPSS*, p. 17. Article 96 of the December 1988 amendments to the USSR Constitution specified that persons belonging to local soviet executive committees (except for committee chairmen), leaders of agencies, departments, and administrations of local soviet executive committees, judges, and state arbitrators were not to be deputies of the soviet by which they are appointed. Loc. cit., pp. 49–50.

⁴¹*Rezolyutsii XIX vsesoyuznoy konferentsii KPSS*, p. 17. See also Gorbachev's speech to the conference, loc. cit., p. 14.

the 19th Party Conference, however, was the recommendation that the deputies in each soviet elect from their number a presidium that would sit on a permanent basis, to ensure the accountability of the executive committees by taking over the preparation of soviet sessions and coordinating the work of their standing committees.⁴² The concept of such an institution had been discussed by specialists for some time, and Gorbachev highlighted its purpose as being to ensure the "proper democratization of functions and stepping-up of the oversight functions of the representative bodies over the activity of the executive committees."⁴³

The actual resolutions of the conference made curiously little reference to the presidium idea except to limit the application of the concept to soviets above the settlement and village level.⁴⁴ Gorbachev, too, offered few specifics regarding membership in these presidiums, except to drop the bombshell that, "as a rule," the first secretaries of the corresponding party committees would be nominated to chair the presidiums, subject to confirmation by the deputies in a secret-ballot vote.⁴⁵ (Since this proposal appears to contradict Gorbachev's earlier commitment to end party interference in the running of government, I will reserve discussion of the controversy it aroused for the following section, which deals with party-state relations.)

Based on my own conversations with Soviet legal specialists in July 1988 and February 1989, it appears that the presidiums will include heads of soviet standing committees, two vice chairmen (one from the people's control committee), and a chair (who would normally be the local party secretary). These deputies will likely be released from other duties for full-time legislative work, and will be paid for their service as deputies.

Redefining Party-State Relations

From the earliest days of the Bolshevik revolution, attempts to define the relationship between the institutions of the party and those of the state were fraught with difficulty. In large part, this difficulty stemmed from Lenin's conception of the party as the "vanguard" of the working people. As such, the party claimed a legitimate monopoly over the making of policy; the function of government was to implement party policy. In theory, a boundary existed between these two functions: "the party strives to *direct* the work of the soviets, not to replace (*podmenit'*) them."⁴⁶ In other words, it was the job of party members to exert political leadership, but to leave the actual running of government to the soviets.

Although the boundary seemed clear enough in theory, it proved impossible to maintain in practice. As a prominent Soviet historian put it recently:

*Unfortunately, these principles of relations between the party and the soviets were not fully recognized subsequently. The conditions of the Civil War and the bitter struggle against the counterrevolutionaries and interventionists, and the flagrant distortions of the Leninist norms of party life and the crimes that Stalin committed all had an effect here.*⁴⁷

Whether the fault lay with Lenin's original conception of the party or with Stalin's abuse of this conception, the results were indisputable. By the time Gorbachev took over party leadership, replacement (*podmena*) of the authority of the state by that of the party was all but complete; the argument that a "boundary" existed between them was a legal fiction.

The new reform leadership recognized this problem early on. A July 1986 resolution of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Further Improvement of Party Leadership of the Soviets" called for a

resolute effort . . . to eradicate petty tutelage, duplication of the work of soviets, and usurpation of their function, and to prevent the taking of decisions on questions that fall within their jurisdiction. It is necessary, as a rule, to halt the adoption of joint resolutions by party and soviet bodies at the local level and to constantly ensure that close practical collaboration is organized among soviet, trade union, Komsomol, and economic bodies.

Yet, at the same time, the Central Committee ordered party committees to

increase the role of party groups in soviets, which, in accordance with the Party Rules [Ustav KPSS], must be a really effective mechanism for increasing party

⁴²Rezolyutsii XIX vsesoyuznoy konferentsii KPSS, p. 17. See also Gorbachev's speech to the conference, loc. cit., p. 14.

⁴³Gorbachev's speech to the conference, loc. cit., p. 14. On the prior discussion of the concept by specialists, see Ronald J. Hill, *Soviet Politics, Political Science, and Reform*, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1980, pp. 82-84; also Barabashev, Vasil'yev, and Sheremet, loc. cit., p. 10.

⁴⁴Rezolyutsii XIX vsesoyuznoy konferentsii KPSS, p. 17. This stipulation was codified in Article 91 of the December 1988 constitutional amendments. Loc. cit., p. 49.

⁴⁵Gorbachev's speech to the conference, loc. cit., p. 14.

⁴⁶The phrase originated in a March 29, 1919, resolution of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) "On the Organizational Question," and was reconfirmed in both the 1977 Constitution and in item 60 of the Party Rules. For the 1919 resolution, see Richard Gregor, Ed., *Resolutions and Decisions of the CPSU, Vol. 2: The Early Soviet Period, 1917-1929*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1974, pp. 83-88. Translations of both the 1977 Constitution (see Article 6) and the Party Rules be found in Donald Barry and Carol Barner-Barry, *Contemporary Soviet Politics*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1987, 3rd ed.

⁴⁷Interview with V. I. Desyaterik, loc. cit., p. 3.

*influence on the activity of soviets, ensure that party groups operate regularly, make fuller use of their monitoring functions with regard to Communist deputies, and collaborate closely with the primary party organizations of the soviet apparatus, especially on matters of selection and placement of cadres, and improvement of the style and methods of work of soviet bodies.*⁴⁸

Although party control of the state is like a vine with many branches, it is rooted in two phenomena: control over personnel and duplication of organizational structures. Control over personnel is ensured because the appointment of governmental personnel falls within the *nomenklatura* (patronage) of the corresponding party committee secretary and because the party, as noted earlier, dominates the process by which deputies are chosen. As a result, although a majority of those elected to the local soviets are not party members, the leaders of the soviets are overwhelmingly so. Over 80 percent of the members and virtually all of the chairmen of the executive committees of the local soviets are members of the CPSU. In fact, the post of chairman is frequently held by the first secretary of the local party committee.⁴⁹ As to duplication of structure, for each administrative department within the soviet, there is a corresponding member on the local party committee.⁵⁰

The result of this "*podmena*," of course, is that the soviets long ago lost whatever independence from party authority might have been originally intended. Resolutions adopted by the party are often published jointly with the state, and even when they are not, are often copied word for word in decisions proposed to the deputies for their unanimous ratification. Not surprisingly, the soviets are held in generally low public regard when it comes to making decisions affecting community life; it is understood that if you want to get something done, you go first to the local party leadership.⁵¹

There seems to be fairly broad public support for ending the party's duplication of the soviets' activities, for making the deputies real decision-makers and not just rubber stamps for decisions made elsewhere.⁵² A number of proposals on how to accomplish this have appeared in the specialist literature over the past year. One of the most comprehensive proposals appeared in an article by three influential legal experts, published in the May 1988 issue of the journal of the Institute of State and Law:

Put into full practice the ideas of Lenin about relations between party and state and achieve political leadership in the affairs of government above all through the soviets. The implementation of party directives through

*the soviets must be in accordance with the strictest observation of the legislative prerogatives of those bodies, and with democratic procedures as established in the laws, that is, within the framework of the Constitution. End the practice of taking joint resolutions by the party and the Council of Ministers, which effectively enhances the role of the executive branch to the detriment of the soviets in their legislative activities. Ensure that the deputies make their decisions on the basis of positions freely chosen; do not allow the use of mechanisms for party accountability and discipline, except for exceptional cases when the soviets' decisions contradict programs established by the party. Radically reduce the patronage [*nomenklatura*] over organizational issues which are decided by the soviets in accordance with an obligatory preliminary agreement with the party; also end the patronage for officials in the state apparatus whose nomination is achieved through a similar agreement; eliminate improper replication of party and state administrators.*⁵³

The fact that many of these suggestions merely repeated themes found in the July 1986 resolution shows how little had changed in party-state relations and how strong the "inertia" of past practices is. Recognizing this, Gorbachev made "demarcation of the functions of party and state institutions" one of the central items on the agenda of the 19th Party Conference.⁵⁴ The decisions that emerged from the conference and the resolution implementing them adopted at the July 1988 Central Committee plenum contained two concrete proposals to end the substitution of party authority for that of the state.

First, the party resolved "to end henceforth the taking of joint resolutions by party committees and the executive administrative bodies of the soviets; to resolutely end efforts by workers in the party apparatus to interfere in the exercise of the authority of the soviets."⁵⁵ The other measure called for a restructuring of the central

⁴⁸For the resolution, see *Pravda*, July 30, 1986.

⁴⁹See Hahn, *Soviet Grassroots*, pp. 253–55. This practice was the object of a critical letter to the editor, "A Minister Does Not Have to Be a Party Member," *Izvestiya*, Apr. 20, 1988.

⁵⁰This parallel structure at the provincial level is discussed in "It Is Very Hard To Crack Down on Oneself," *Izvestiya*, May 13, 1988.

⁵¹See, for example, Yu. Shpakov, "The First Floor of Power," *Pravda*, Apr. 28, 1988, trans in *CDSF*, June 1, 1988, p. 7; and A. S. Sudakov, "Let Us Return Power to the Soviets," *Pravda*, May 16, 1988.

⁵²In a public opinion poll taken on the eve of the 19th Party Conference, only 4 percent agreed that deputies presently "take an active part in working out decisions and seeing them implemented." Some 69 percent felt that this should be the function of deputies. See "What Should the Soviets Be?" loc. cit.

⁵³Barabashev, Vasil'yev, and Sheremet, loc. cit., pp. 10–11.

⁵⁴Gorbachev's speech to the February 1988 CC plenum, loc. cit.

⁵⁵Resolution of the CPSU CC Plenum "On Practical Work in Realizing the Decisions of the 19th CPSU Conference," *Pravda*, July 31, 1988.

and local party apparatus to end its "fragmentation based on branches of administration." It was stated that this reorganization would bring a "significant" reduction in the numbers of party personnel.⁵⁶

Continued party control. Even while setting limits to party authority, Gorbachev's CPSU is not about to relinquish its influence over the soviets. There appear to be at least two ways in which the party plans to exert its "leadership role." The first is through the "party group," a concept that dates back to Lenin's time and which was explicitly highlighted in the July 1986 Central Committee resolution (see above). Quite simply, the "party group" comprises those members of the executive and legislative branches of the state system who are members of the CPSU—in effect, a party caucus.⁵⁷ The potential for interference remains great, but the theory is that greater *inner-party* democracy could give rank-and-file party members more opportunity to hold the leaders accountable.⁵⁸

The second, and more controversial, way is through creating a "presidium" of deputies, which would be in permanent session to oversee the work of the soviets, with the first secretary of the corresponding party committee automatically nominated to chair this presidium. Advanced by Gorbachev at the 19th CPSU Conference, the proposal for such a presidium came as a surprise to the delegates and occasioned heated discussion. Several speakers, including L. I. Abalkin, openly questioned the wisdom of such a proposal, pointing out that it appeared to contradict the stated goal of ending the party's interference in governmental affairs. Others, like G. A. Arbatov, supported it in principle, but urged that deputies be able to choose among more than one candidate.⁵⁹

Gorbachev's defense of his seemingly paradoxical proposal was lengthy, and rested primarily on two arguments. The first was that to make the first secretary of the party the chair of the presidium raises the prestige of the legislative branch (at present, the first secretary almost invariably sits on the executive committee, thereby allying the party with the bureaucrats). The second point Gorbachev made was that simply because the first secretary is nominated to chair the presidium does not ensure his election, since the vote will be by secret ballot. Where secretaries are not supported by a majority of the deputies, the "appropriate conclusion" will have to be drawn by the party committee, and a discredited chairman stands to lose his party post as well. In this way "every mandate a party leader receives from the Communists will be verified and confirmed, as it were, by the representatives of the people."⁶⁰ In essence, while shifting the balance of power

from the executive to the legislative branch of government, this approach would also introduce a degree of public accountability—albeit indirect—for party secretaries that presently does not exist.

Soviets and Enterprises

A final area of reform involves relations between soviets and the enterprises and institutions located on their territories. On paper, the rights of soviets vis-à-vis such organizations are vast: Article 146 of the 1977 Constitution states that the soviets "shall decide all matters of local significance."⁶¹ And since virtually the whole economy (including the service sector) is run by the state, this would seem to give local governments considerably greater power than their counterparts in market economies.

The reality is quite different. According to the principle of "dual subordination," heads of administrative departments responsible for policy in their branch of the economy are not only subordinated horizontally to the executive committee of the local soviet that appointed them, but also vertically to the head of the branch's department at the next higher level of administration on up to the USSR Council of Ministers. As a result, department heads may be the object of conflicting demands: what is good for the ministry may not always be good for the district. Since power over both the purse and personnel is controlled from above, there is little question that ministerial priorities generally prevail. In time, as Boris Kurashvili has observed, such bureaucratic decision-making supplanted political leadership, "leading

⁵⁶Resolution of the CPSU CC Plenum 'On Basic Guidelines for Restructuring of the Party Apparatus,' *ibid.*

⁵⁷For a textbook description of how this concept is supposed to work, see G. V. Barabashev and K. F. Sheremet, *Sovetskoye stroitel'stvo* (Building the Soviets), 2nd ed., Moscow, Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1981, pp. 115–24.

⁵⁸The party group's role in setting the agenda, regulating sessions, and nominating officers of the soviets is discussed in A. V. Sudakov, *loc. cit.*

Though proposals to democratize the party itself are beyond the scope of this paper, they are a critical precondition for success in Gorbachev's attempts to enhance the authority of the soviets. Thus, elections within lower party ranks were scheduled for October and November, i.e., prior to the implementation of government reforms. See *The New York Times*, Sept. 21, 1988.

⁵⁹For a translation of Abalkin's comments, see *Pravda*, June 30, 1988, in *CDSP*, Aug. 3, 1988, p. 8; for Arbatov, *Pravda*, June 30, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, Aug. 10, 1988, p. 4. See, also, speeches by V. V. Bakatin (*Pravda*, June 30, 1988) and by V. Yu. Nizhel'skiy and A. A. Mel'nikov (*Pravda*, July 2, 1988), in *CDSP*, Aug. 3, Sept. 14, and Sept 21, 1988, respectively.

⁶⁰Gorbachev's speech to the 19th Party Conference, *loc. cit.*, p. 15. For an interesting confirmation of the pressure this would place on party secretaries, see the remarks of N. Nazarbayev, Chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers, "Cutting the 'Gross Output' Knot," *Pravda*, July 9, 1988.

⁶¹Aryeh Unger, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

to the years of stagnation."⁶²

Just how much control the center enjoys was made clear in a speech by the first secretary of the Krasnodar territory party committee:

*The Krasnodar soviet cannot decide anything on its own today; Moscow has assumed responsibility for everything. The soviet's budget is drawn up in the Ministry of Finance, state orders are drawn up in [other] ministries, Gosplan decides what to build and where. At the soviet's sessions each year we discuss plans for regional social and economic development, plans that are given to us by central departments six months later. As far as settlement and rural soviets are concerned—let's speak frankly today—they have no rights at all.*⁶³

In July 1986, a joint resolution of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers "On Measures to Further Increase the Role and Strengthen the Responsibility of the Soviets of People's Deputies in Accelerating Social-Economic Development in Light of the Resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress" specified six areas in which the local soviets were to receive greater authority. These were: comprehensive planning in areas affecting local development, in the production of consumer goods, in capital construction, and in matters affecting the environment; transfer of some of the profits of local enterprises to budgets of the soviets, and the creation of wage incentives for local bureaucrats.⁶⁴ In addition, Article 9 of the USSR Law on the State Enterprise (Association) of June 1987 obligated enterprises to contribute to the social and economic development of the territory on which they were located and to obtain approval of the local soviet for all construction. In return, the local soviets were expected to help provide the necessary conditions for optimal economic operations at the enterprises, including the provision of appropriate services for employees.⁶⁵

However, these two documents were conspicuously lacking in specifics. In fact, most local government ex-

ecutives feel that their prerogatives have narrowed since the measures were adopted. In a 1988 survey of chairmen of executive committees in 110 large cities, 73 percent expressed the opinion that responsiveness to local needs on the part of enterprises subordinated to higher ministries had actually worsened since 1987; only 5 percent saw an improvement.⁶⁶

In the spring of 1988, a number of articles in both the specialist literature and the popular press suggested ways to overcome this imbalance between the soviets and the enterprises. Most of the proposals focused on two complementary approaches: to reduce control from above by introducing autonomous decision-making (*sa'moupravleniye*) and to increase revenues and budgetary discretion at the base through self-financing (*samofinansirovaniye*).

The first of these involves devolution of authority in those areas where local interests are most clearly affected—land-use planning, the environment, distribution of consumer goods and food, the relocation of manpower, and housing. For example, it was suggested that funds for housing construction (which are now divided up according to each ministry) be given over to the Council of Ministers for distribution directly to the soviets, which would take over the financing of local housing construction—determining where, how, and for whom housing would be built, and who would build it.⁶⁷ Still another commentary rejected "dual subordination" in favor of a version of "home-rule," according to which local governments could make rules in all areas not reserved by law for higher authorities.⁶⁸

Decision-making authority without budgetary resources is, of course, meaningless. Therefore, it has been proposed to give local authorities greater financial autonomy by expanding their revenue base. Many suggest making enterprises located on a soviet's territory pay for using local natural resources and for public services which they use. (Enterprises are supposed to do this now, but often do not.) One angry executive committee chairman in an oil-producing district wanted the right to lease and tax property in order to make the soviets "genuine masters of their own territory."⁶⁹

Other ways to raise revenues include taking a specified share of above-plan enterprise profits, imposing penalties for environmental pollution, putting relations with enterprises on a contractual basis, and taxing cooperative ventures.⁷⁰ What is painfully clear in all these

⁶²Interview with Boris Kurashvili, "Restoring the Soviets to Their Proper Status," *Izvestiya*, Feb. 16, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, Mar. 16, 1988, p. 17.

⁶³Speech of I. K. Polozkov to the 19th Party Conference, *Pravda*, July 1, 1984, trans. in *CDSP*, Aug. 17, 1988, p. 22. For a good description of how the economic activity—in particular, housing construction—of a local government is subordinated to higher authorities, see "The Real Power of Local Power," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, June 15, 1988, p. 11. Such complaints are far from rare.

⁶⁴For the text of the resolution, see *Spravochnik partiynogo rabotnika* (The Party Worker's Handbook), Moscow, Politizdat, 1987, pp. 627–44.

⁶⁵*Pravda*, July 1, 1987, trans. in *CDSP*, Aug. 26, 1987, pp. 13 and 24, and Sept. 2, 1987, p. 11.

⁶⁶Ye. G. Andryushenko, "Power to [the Organs of] Power," *Sotsialisticheskaya Promyshlennost'*, June 15, 1988.

⁶⁷"The Soviets of People's Deputies in Conditions of *Perestroika*," loc. cit., p. 54.

⁶⁸Barabashev, Vasil'yev, and Sheremet, loc. cit., p. 12.

⁶⁹Interview with S. A. Sudakov, loc. cit.

approaches is that the costs of local government have long ago outstripped revenues—a fact of Soviet life only recently acknowledged publicly—and that there is little the local soviets can do on their own to change it.⁷¹

The “restructuring” of relations between the enterprises and the soviets has apparently proven very contentious, if not contradictory. Thus, for example, while local governments are encouraged to seek increased revenues from local firms, local firms, driven by the exigencies of self-financing, will seek to assume less, not more, of the tax burden. As a result, hard decisions have been deferred. Such has been the situation despite the fact that the 1986 decree on the soviets and the “Theses” on the reforms that appeared prior to the 19th Conference had been quite forthcoming about what needed to be done in this regard and had incorporated many of the ideas just discussed. For example, the “Theses” read:

*The material and financial possibilities of the local soviets should be expanded substantially. [We should] ensure the formation of the revenues of local budgets on the basis of long-term normatives, having in mind above all the expansion of receipts into the budgets of lower-level soviets from enterprises and economic organizations located within those soviets' territories. The full responsibility and independence of local bodies of power in resolving questions of the development of their territories must be established, with the broad use of “economic-accountability” [khozraschetnyye], contractual, and other relationships with enterprises and organizations, regardless of their subordination. The interference of higher-level bodies of power and administration in resolving questions falling within the jurisdiction of lower-level soviets, as well as numerous unnecessary coordination meetings, must be persistently overcome.*⁷²

Gorbachev's remarks to the 19th Party Conference, though generally endorsing the proposals in the “Theses,” were more cautious. He supported the transfer of a portion of enterprise profits to local budgets, but suggested that the local population itself should also contribute to those budgets; he agreed that authority

should be transferred to the soviets, but only with respect to those enterprises “whose output is related to the satisfaction of the population's requirements,” and that these relations must be “precisely and clearly defined in the law.” Moreover, perhaps with certain of the union-republics in mind, he injected a new note of warning into the discussion of administrative decentralization:

*All of us, I think, will vote for self-government against arbitrariness, and for taking local interests into account, but also for having those interests mandatorily combined with the interests of society as a whole. In short, those who believe that the line of decentralization is opening the floodgates to parochialism and regional selfishness are grossly mistaken.*⁷³

And at the July 29, 1988, Central Committee plenary session on implementation of proposals for political reform, the whole issue of local authority and local budget reform as it relates to the enterprises was put off until the preparation of “a new law on local self-government.” This law is to be debated by the new Supreme Soviet to be chosen by the Congress of People's Deputies elected in March 1989.⁷⁴

Prognosis

At the outset, I suggested that the goal underlying Gorbachev's acceleration of the processes of democratization is to amass greater political power in order to remove those in government who are opposed to *perestroika*. And indeed, in every instance, the policies of democratization appear to be serving this purpose. For example, the June 1987 experiment with competitive elections conducted in some 5 percent of the electoral districts resulted in the removal there of many such opponents from executive and administrative leadership positions. Elections in March 1989 to the new Congress of People's Deputies are also to be competitive (although the emphasis is on single-member rather than multi-member districts), and can be expected to eliminate additional foes of *perestroika*.⁷⁵

Moreover, there are the measures designed to diminish the role of the bureaucracy, the traditional bastion of opposition to change. For example, the executive and

⁷⁰See N. Shirkevich, “In Order to Strengthen the Local Budget,” *Sovety Narodnykh Deputatov*, No. 6, 1988, pp. 67–72; also, “The Soviets of People's Deputies in Conditions of *Perestroika*,” loc. cit.

⁷¹See *The New York Times*, Oct. 20, 1988. Although Shirkevich (loc. cit.) does not use the word “deficit,” his assertion that local expenditures grew 4.3 times between 1960 and 1985, while revenues fell, leaves little doubt about the sorry state of soviet finances.

⁷²“Theses,” loc. cit., p. 7.

⁷³Loc. cit., pp. 14, 18.

⁷⁴See Gorbachev's speech to the July 1988 plenum, loc. cit., p. 4. He also explicitly rejected the idea “that enterprises will now take orders from republic and local agencies instead of Union ministries” (ibid., p. 18).

⁷⁵The procedures for the March 26, 1989, national elections were spelled out in the USSR Law on Election of USSR People's Deputies, published in *Pravda* on Dec. 4, 1988, and trans. loc. cit.

administrative personnel are no longer to be allowed to hold elective office in the local soviets, but are to serve at the pleasure of the legislative representatives and be under the guidance of a full-time presidium composed of these representatives. To ensure the dominance of the party over the bureaucracy, Gorbachev has proposed ending parallel administrative departments in party committees and installing the local party secretary as head of the legislative presidium. It is argued that this will separate the party from the bureaucracy and enable it to control the bureaucracy instead of being controlled by it. Finally, Gorbachev has laid plans to reduce the numbers of the bureaucracy by as much as 40–50 percent at the upper levels.⁷⁶ To accomplish this, he proposes a devolution of decision-making authority to the local soviets along with an increase in their budgetary resources and discretion.

Will Gorbachev succeed? We will not know the answer to that question for years. The proposals, even if they are adopted in their present form, will not be in place until the end of 1989 at the earliest.⁷⁷ Beyond that, it will take at least two legislative terms (each of five years' duration) of practice to tell if the changes will be significant, let alone lasting.

In the meantime, the reforms are likely to face a number of problems. One is inherent in the choice of democratic means. Just because people can express their opinions more freely and choose between competing candidates does not guarantee that the views desired by the reformers will win out. Indeed, in reading much of the literature on political reform, there is a charmingly naive conviction that although elections involve a clash of ideas and issues, given the opportunity, the electorate will surely choose candidates supporting *perestroika*. In reality, elections are more often won by those who are interested in gaining and holding political power—in short, by political professionals. In the Soviet context, these qualities rest with Gorbachev's opposition, as he found out when many, if not most, of those elected to the 19th Conference turned out to be, at best, reluctant supporters of the new order.⁷⁸ That competi-

tive elections could conceivably result in the election of Gorbachev's opponents as well as supporters is buttressed by evidence indicating that even the experimental elections in 1987 tended to favor disproportionately the election of middle-aged, male party members, many of whom likely were party professionals.⁷⁹

The possibility that Gorbachev's opponents could hold their own or even win in a democratic contest is probably enhanced by the underdevelopment of democratic political culture in the Soviet Union. Most people are simply not used to the democratic rules of the game, having for so long been accustomed to having their choices made for them. Discussing the need to "raise political culture," V. N. Ivanov, Director of the Institute for Sociological Research, said:

*For a long time, the Soviet people, especially the masses, were indifferent to the electoral system, and to participation in the administration of affairs at any level other than at their own workplace. This is explained, first of all, because people did not sense that they could participate in the resolution of this or that issue, nor were they convinced that anything depended on them in the taking of important decisions.*⁸⁰

A critic of the multi-member district experiment suggested that fewer than one voter in five knew anything about the candidates they were voting against and that most voted on the basis of the candidate's occupation, which was listed on the ballot.⁸¹ Deputies, too, find themselves relatively ignorant compared to the bureaucrats who have control of information and expertise.

Much will also depend on how successful Gorbachev is in getting the party to let go. Even what he proposes is ambivalent. On the one hand, there is a willingness to recognize and condemn the practice of "*podmena*," whereby the local party committee exerted virtually complete control over personnel and policy decisions of local soviets. To deal with this, the party committees are supposed to eliminate *nomenklatura* and organizational duplication. On the other hand, it is clearly intended that the interests of socialism prevail in decisions about personnel and policy, and that these interests are to be defined within the framework of the one-party system. Party "leadership" in these matters

⁷⁶See his speech to the 19th Party Conference, loc. cit., p. 18.

⁷⁷A timetable for implementation is found in the Central Committee resolution of July 30, 1988 "On Practical Work in Realizing the Decisions of the 19th CPSU Conference," loc. cit. Following elections in March 1989, the new Congress of People's Deputies will convene in April and elect a new Supreme Soviet, which will in turn draft legislation regarding the local soviets. These bodies, reorganized, are to "enter the exercise of their authority" in December 1989.

⁷⁸Conversations in July 1988 with Soviet specialists who attended the 19th Party Conference, as well as with those who witnessed the election of delegates to it, left me with the impression that perhaps half or more of the delegates were "conservatives." This impression is reinforced when one notes those parts of Gorbachev's speech that received applause.

⁷⁹From unpublished survey results made available to the author during his July 1988 visit to Moscow. See also, "Elect! But How?" loc. cit. Conversations in Moscow in February 1989 made it clear that most specialists expected that party members would constitute a larger majority of deputies to the new Congress (80 percent) than was true of previous Supreme Soviets (70 percent).

⁸⁰Interview with Ivanov, "How We Feel About Ourselves as a Society," *Argumenty i Fakty* (Moscow), No. 1, 1988.

⁸¹Baranov, loc. cit, p. 107.

will be ensured by the party group and by the presence of the first secretary as chairman of the presidium of the local soviet. Gorbachev may be able to use revitalized deputies to clean his bureaucratic house, but only if those in the party who wield the brooms are committed to *perestroyka*, and this is far from certain at this time.

In short, the potential for long-term systemic change embodied in the far-ranging and comprehensive proposals to reform local government discussed here is great. What will be realized in practice may amount to much less. Why? In the end, the "democratization" of structures and procedures is a necessary, but not suffi-

cient condition for the emergence of a "civic culture" in the Soviet Union; it may not even be enough to gain control over the bureaucracy.

Unless the way people think about politics, and behave politically, changes, the dominance of the administrative "professionals" in both the party and state apparatuses over the people and their elected representatives will continue. And if this is so, Gorbachev may become less disdainful of L. I. Abalkin's question to the 19th Party Conference: "Are we able to ensure the democratic organization of public life while retaining the Soviet organization of society and the one-party system?"⁸²

⁸²Abalkin, loc. cit., p. 8.

Checklist of Communist Parties in 1988

EDITOR'S NOTE: By arrangement with Richard F. Staar and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (Stanford, CA), we present the latest version of the "Checklist of Communist Parties," covering developments in 1988. This Checklist continues a series that has appeared in the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (YICA)* since 1976, and has been jointly published with *Problems of Communism* since 1981. The current list is a slightly modified version of material to appear in *YICA 1989*. The authors and editors welcome corrections, additions, or amendments. Such contributions may be addressed to The Editors, *Problems of Communism*, 301 4th Street SW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.

Richard F. Staar

THE WORLD revolutionary process as perceived by Moscow is alive, but no longer well. The introduction of *glasnost* in the Soviet Union has contributed to ferment among foreign communist parties, especially revelations concerning crimes during the Stalinist period, which reflect adversely on some of the aging leaders in other communist-ruled states. The impact of Soviet reforms, or *perestroika*, has created a split, especially among ruling movements, with some opposed to emulating Moscow.¹

The *World Marxist Review (WMR)* continues to be an important Soviet vehicle for organizing, every three to four years, magazine work conferences that draw together representatives of "fraternal communist, workers', and revolutionary democratic parties." The most recent such gathering, held April 12–15, 1988, attract-

ed representatives of 93 such organizations to Prague, where *WMR* has its headquarters. Although ostensibly assembled to discuss the work of the journal, the delegates also heard an address by CPSU Secretary and Gorbachev advisor Anatoliy Dobrynin, who candidly explored reasons for the declining attraction of communism. In rhetoric directed at the world at large, such spokesmen as Dobrynin and Vadim Zagladin have downplayed talk of "two camps" and "proletarian internationalism," and have admitted that the USSR misjudged the staying power of capitalism.² Indeed, in his own vision, Gorbachev seems to put forward a world that is technologically interdependent and transcends class differences.³

The principal instrument within the CPSU apparatus for dealing with foreign communist parties remains the International Department (ID). Currently under a new

Richard F. Staar, coordinator of the international studies program at the Hoover Institution (Stanford CA), resumed editorship of the Yearbook on International Communist Affairs after having served as US Ambassador to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna, Austria. A 5th revised edition of his text, Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, appeared in December 1988. The author is indebted to Margit N. Grigory, Thomas H. Henriksen, William E. Ratliff, Ramon H. Myers, Robert Conquest, James H. Noyes, and Dennis L. Bark—all members of the YICA editorial board—for their contributions to this essay.

¹See Kevin Devlin, "The Communist Movement in 1988," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), RAD Background Report/249, Dec. 30, 1988, p. 1.

²"Communiqué," *World Marxist Review* (the English-language version of *Voprosy mira i sotsializma* [also known in many languages as *Problems of Peace and Socialism*]; references are to the North American edition, published in Toronto), June 1988, pp. 5–6, lists 91 of the movements and states that two had requested not to be identified. The Italian Communist Party withdrew from the *WMR*'s editorial board at the April gathering, which also was the occasion for familiar complaints from the Japan Communist Party about Soviet domination of the magazine. *Rudé Právo* (Prague), Apr. 15, 1988; and *Akahata* (Tokyo), Apr. 14, 1988. Dobrynin's address was published in *Pravda*, Apr. 13, 1988.

³M. S. Gorbachev, *Perestroika i novoye myshleniye* (*Perestroika and the New Thinking*), Moscow, Politizdat, 1988, pp. 137–65.

Table 1: Social Composition of Vanguard Parties

Country	Party	Members and candidate members		Workers	Farmers
		End of 70's	Mid-1980's	(in %, mid-1980's)	
Afghanistan	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan	18,000	155,000	28.0	n.a.
Angola	Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola—Party of Labor	351,000	35,000	35.0	2.0
Congo/Brazzaville	Congolese Party of Labor	7,000	8,700	31.5	14.5
Mozambique	FRELIMO	110,000	130,000	18.9	53.5
Ethiopia	Workers' Party of Ethiopia	—	44,000	21.7	3.3
Madagascar	Congress Party for Malagasy Independence	60,000	n.a.	8.0	70.0
South Yemen	Yemen Socialist Party	—	31,700	15.0	n.a.

SOURCE: A. P. Agafonov and V. F. Khalipov, *Sovremennaya epokha i mirovoy revolyutsionnyy protsess* (The Contemporary Epoch and the World Revolutionary Process), Moscow, Vysshaya shkola, 1988, p. 158.

head, former Novosti press agency board chairman Valentin Falin, the ID has been subordinated since the latter part of 1988 to a new Party Commission on Questions of International Policy,⁴ chaired by Aleksandr Yakovlev, a full Politburo member and a Central Committee secretary. This subordination probably indicates some reduction in the status of the ID (Falin is only a candidate member of the Central Committee) and tighter control of ID operations by the Politburo, although the ID does appear to have assumed the duties of the former Cadres Abroad and Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties departments.

Significantly, in his report to the 19th CPSU Conference in June 1988, Gorbachev made no claim that the world communist movement was expanding.⁵ The latest Soviet statistics confirm that there has been little, if any, growth in the movement. They acknowledge the existence of approximately 100 communist parties, with total membership at "more than 80 million" worldwide.⁶ Even the so-called vanguard Marxist-Leninist movements, i.e., Marxist ruling organizations that are seen to be on the road to becoming but yet not to have attained the maturity of ruling communist parties in Eastern Europe or Asia, are recorded as numbering only seven (see Table 1).

Nevertheless, Moscow still looks on this "world socialist system" and the more narrowly defined "socialist commonwealth" (comprising the 10 full members of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance plus Laos and

Kampuchea, which have observer status at CEMA) as an "enormous, priceless property and, moreover, as a factor of peace and progress, the property of all humanity."⁷ It is this system, however divided, which we attempt to enumerate below.

The Checklist includes 109 countries or major geographic areas that have one or more communist parties, a vanguard "revolutionary democratic" party, or a radical "national liberation" or "revolutionary democratic" movement not yet promoted to the "vanguard" category by Moscow. The CPSU recognizes more than one communist party in Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Greece, India, New Zealand, Spain, and Sweden. It also recognizes communist movements in such non-sovereign territories as Guadeloupe, Martinique, Palestine, Puerto Rico, Réunion, and West Berlin.

Moscow deems that "vanguard revolutionary-democratic" parties govern the following countries: Angola, Afghanistan, Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, and South Yemen. We also list some of the more important "revolutionary democratic" movements: those in Bahrain, Grenada, Nicaragua (the Sandinistas), Suriname, and Zimbabwe.⁸ Finally, the enumerated countries contain several significant Marxist-Leninist movements not recognized by Moscow; these are listed in italics.

Acronyms of movements not designated as "Communist Party of . . ." appear next to the name of the country or territory on the Checklist, with the full name provided in the legend. Population data are estimates

⁴"CPSU Central Committee Plenum Resolution," *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 29, 1988.

⁵Moscow Television Service, June 28, 1988, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), June 29, 1988, pp. 1–35.

⁶V. P. Agafonov and V. F. Khalipov, *Sovremennaya epokha i mirovoy revolyutsionnyy protsess* (The Contemporary Epoch and the World Revolutionary Process), Moscow, Vysshaya shkola, 1988, p. 201.

⁷From excerpts of a report delivered by Eduard Shevardnadze to a conference of workers of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 25–27, 1988, in *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR* (Moscow), No. 15, Aug. 15, 1988, p. 38.

⁸For a listing of 24 revolutionary democratic movements and vanguard parties, see Table 1.3 in Richard F. Staar, *USSR Foreign Policies After Detente*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1987, rev. ed., p. 14.

as of July 1988.⁹ The list also identifies the preeminent party leader—first secretary, general secretary, or secretary general, unless otherwise noted—the dates of the most recent congress or national conference of the party, its legal status, and the percentage of votes and number of seats won in the latest national election (the year of the last election is given in parentheses even if the party was illegal or did not participate for some other reason). Table 2 lists 30 party congresses or conferences held during 1988.

Among the 16 ruling communist parties, China recorded the largest membership increase since 1987 (almost one million), followed by the USSR (430,000), Vietnam (210,000), and Romania and Poland (about 70,000 each); significant losses were noted in Yugoslavia (88,000) and Hungary (53,000). Nonruling parties claiming gains in membership included the People's Party of Panama (a gain of almost 12,000), the illegal Communist Party of the Philippines (17,000), the Greek Communist Party (KKE, 8,000), and the Progressive Party of the Working People on Cyprus (AKEL, 3,000). The Italian Communist Party lost 122,000, and Norway's Communist Party (NKP) and Workers' Communist Party (AKP) each are estimated now to have some 4,000 fewer members.

Leadership of a number of parties changed during the year as a result of retirement, factional struggle, or unification of disparate movements. Advancing years seemed to be a principal factor in Canada, Cyprus, Indonesia, and to a considerable extent in Hungary. Party congresses or conferences in Grenada, Guadeloupe, Hungary, Spain, and Uruguay effected leadership changes.

During 1988, communist movements had to deal with parliamentary and/or presidential elections in 20 of the listed countries and regions. One of these was the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which had no problem in coopting sympathizers from other small parties. Communists opted to boycott elections in Haiti, were banned in El Salvador, lost one seat each in Ecuador and Martinique, lost two each in Sweden and Venezuela, and gained three in San Marino.

We shall now turn to a more detailed discussion of major developments, by region.

Sub-Saharan Africa. Self-proclaimed Marxist governments in Africa below the Sahara spent 1988 largely attempting to cope with economic problems that begged for practical solution, not revolutionary rhetoric

Table 2: 1988 Party Congresses & Conferences

Country	Congress/conference	Date
CONGRESSES		
Spain (PCE)	12th	Feb. 19–21
Guadeloupe	9th	Mar. 12–13
Zimbabwe		
ZANU-PT)	Extraordinary (3rd)	Apr. 9
Luxembourg	25th	Apr. 23–24
Great Britain (CPGB)	Extraordinary	Apr. 24
Grenada (MBPM)	2nd	May
Canada	27th	May 20–24
Finland (KPT)	1st	May 23–24
Belgium	Extraordinary	June 18
Malta	4th	July 15–17
Ecuador	11th	July 21–23
Guyana (PPP)	23rd	July 30–Aug. 1
Jamaica (WPJ)	4th	Sept. 11–13
Costa Rica (PVP)	16th	Sept. 15–18
Australia (SPA)	6th	Oct. 3
Turkey (UCPT)	1st (founding)	Oct. 12–13
New Zealand (SUP)	8th	Oct. 22–24
Portugal	12th	Dec. 1–4
Uruguay	21st	Dec. 7–11
Colombia	15th	Dec. 12–15
India (CPM)	13th	Dec. 26–31
CONFERENCES		
Bulgaria	National conference	Jan. 28–29
German Democratic Republic (SED)	National conference	May 15–19
Hungary (MSzMP)	National conference	May 20–22
Yugoslavia (SKJ)	National conference	May 29–31
Soviet Union	19th All-union Conference	Jun. 28–Jul. 1
Mozambique (FRELIMO)	National conference	Jul. 19
Bolivia	National conference	Jul. 30
Finland (SKP-Y)	National conference	Aug. 26–28
France	National conference	Nov. 12–13

ric these regimes, for the most part, looked to market solutions rather than the tenets of Marxism-Leninism to increase agricultural and industrial output. Political uncertainty or fighting preoccupied indigenous Marxists in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia.¹⁰ There was significant movement toward peace in southern Africa where the Marxist regimes in Angola and Mozambique moved toward reconciliation with their powerful neighbor, the Republic of South Africa (RSA).

Since independence, Angola's ruling party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labor Party (MPLA-PT) has faced serious rebellion in the country's

⁹Unless otherwise noted, population data are from US Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook 1988*, CPAS WF 88-001, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1988.

¹⁰See B. M. Zmeyev, *Politicheskaya ideologiya v stranakh tropicheskoy Afriki* (Political Ideology in the Countries of Tropical Africa), Leningrad, Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1988, pp. 91–105.

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southern region, mounted by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Each organization has received support from outside the country. Cuba dispatched combat and other troops numbering between 35,000 and 50,000 by 1988 to aid the embattled MPLA-PT regime. South Africa supported its ally UNITA with equipment, training, and, on some occasions, military incursions against joint Cuban-MPLA forces that moved south with tanks, aircraft, and artillery in attempts to dislodge the lightly armed UNITA rebels. A breakthrough in the conflict came in December when the Angolans, South Africans, and Cubans agreed to a complex 27-month phased withdrawal of Havana's troops in return for a South African grant of independence to Namibia and suspension of Pretoria's military assistance to UNITA.¹¹ UNITA chief Jonas Savimbi vowed to continue the war against the Luanda government.

Angola's efforts to restructure its economy appeared uncertain. A liberalizing program (*Saneamento Economico e Frananciero*, SEF) initiated by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos in late 1987, encountered problems in the People's Assembly. Meeting in February, the legislature failed to adopt a law establishing free-enterprise areas for the economy, but did approve other SEF-related legislation on foreign investment, state companies, planning, and the monetary system.¹²

The People's Republic of Mozambique continued the transition from a centralized Marxist economy to a system based on individual incentives announced in the Economic Rehabilitation Program (PRE) in January 1987. Government spokesmen noted higher levels of productivity during the past year.¹³ The war against the rebel RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance) movement appeared to moderate, as the army of the governing Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) benefited from the assistance of military forces of Zimbabwe and Tanzania that had been deployed in strategic areas of the country. The Soviets and Cubans also continued to provide military material

to the hard-pressed FRELIMO regime. However, the forces of RENAMO continued to confront government troops in many regions.

The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was faced with the continuing insurgency of secessionist groups in Eritrea and Tigre. Unlike in Angola and Mozambique, in Ethiopia, the fortunes of the ruling party took a sharp turn for the worse. The liberation fronts representing Eritrea and Tigre scored victories over Ethiopian forces, killing or capturing thousands of soldiers.¹⁴ President Mengistu Haile Mariam responded by executing his army generals for failure to halt the rebels, ordering all foreign relief workers out of Tigre and Eritrea, (exposing the two territories to starvation), and negotiating an end to the state of war with Somalia (a move that allowed Ethiopia to shift some 70,000 troops from its southern border to the rebellious north).

In domestic affairs, Mengistu, like other Marxist African leaders, strove to expand output by use of material incentives to producers. He increased the price paid to farmers for part of their grain harvest and allowed them to sell the balance. Additionally, he lifted internal controls, permitting development of a free market in food. The government, however, remained committed to the goal of creating a collectivized agricultural society by the year 2000. The regime also remained wedded to its relocation policy, which has attracted much international criticism in recent years. Under this program, tens of thousands of northern inhabitants have been uprooted forcibly and transported to the south as a means of denying the rebels a friendly population.

Elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, too, economic problems plagued Marxist regimes. The People's Republic of the Congo, for example, facing critical negotiations with its foreign creditors, finally decided to undertake major changes in economic policy. The ruling Congolese Party of Labor marked for shutdown, sold to foreign interests, or transferred to mixed Congolese-foreign control a total of 76 of some 100 state-owned companies.¹⁵ The regime also cut public expenditures by freezing employment in public-service activities and limiting salary increases there to the rate of inflation. Government troops captured and killed Pierre Anga, whose rebellion—raised in the north in September 1987—had posed a dangerous threat to the regime of Denis Sassou-Nguesso.

The People's Republic of Benin continued to encounter serious economic difficulties. To secure economic assistance from the International Monetary Fund and

¹¹For the statute of the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), which will probably end up ruling Namibia, see Viktor Sovetov, *Mesto prestupleniya—Namibiya* (Scene of the Crime—Namibia), Moscow, Politizdat, 1986, pp. 97–101. The organization of SWAPO is patterned after that of the CPSU. See also Gorbachev's message to SWAPO in *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR* (Moscow), Jan. 15, 1989, p. 5. For the text of the Namibia pact and the Cuban accord, see *The New York Times*, Dec. 23, 1988.

¹²Luanda Domestic Service, Feb. 27, 1988, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Africa (Sub-Sahara)* (Washington, DC—hereafter, cited as *FBIS-AFR*), Feb. 29, 1988, p. 5. For the dos Santos program, see Radio Luanda, Dec. 31, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-AFR*, Jan. 6, 1988, pp. 8–11.

¹³*Noticias* (Maputo), Apr. 2, 1988.

¹⁴*The New York Times*, Apr. 1, 1988.

¹⁵AFP (Paris), June 4, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-AFR*, June 9, 1988.

The World Bank, the Marxist government moved to implement some austerity measures, including the dismantling of state enterprises and the privatizing of others. Salary cuts for civil servants and senior army officers touched off an attempted coup by a Captain Hountondji and some 15 fellow officers, resulting in the arrest of about 100 others. The government of Mathieu Kerekou faced pressure from both leftist and rightist officers who opposed his policies. In foreign affairs, Benin continued to strengthen ties with the Soviet Union, even while accepting aid from the West, especially France.

It surfaced during 1988 that Soviet observers have now included Madagascar's Congress Party for Malagasy Independence among the "vanguard" revolutionary democratic movements. It had previously not been accorded this status in Moscow's eyes.¹⁶

The ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) entered into a merger agreement with the major opposition party, the Zimbabwe African Political Union (ZAPU). At an extraordinary ZANU-PF congress held in early April, some 3,000 delegates approved the merger, establishing a de facto one-party state. Robert Mugabe is president of the reconstituted ZANU-PF, while Joshua Nkomo, his long-standing adversary and former leader of ZAPU, became one of two vice presidents of the united party.¹⁷ The government announced an amnesty which elicited the surrender of over 100 ZAPU combatants. Mugabe implemented integration of ZANU and ZAPU political organs from the local to national levels to accomplish a reconciliation.

The new party affirmed its adherence to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Even though its key leaders endorse mixed-economy policies, Mugabe's economic policies run counter to the continent-wide movement toward privatization, by having the government acquire greater control of local large-scale enterprises.¹⁸ The government also announced its intention to make larger investments in "strategic" industries like mining and energy.

The nonruling Communist Party of Lesotho (CPL) continues its marginal and ambivalent existence. Though the party is formally illegal, its trade-union ac-

tivities go forward as legal and accepted. In August 1988, the leftist Justice Minister Halaki Sello was dismissed by the government; earlier, he had been described as a former CPL member with pro-Soviet sympathies.¹⁹ A week later, the government signed an economic and technical agreement with the People's Republic of China.

The South African Communist Party (SACP), which is banned and operates mainly from exile—remained committed to the goals of its 1984 program which, among other aims, stated that the SACP seeks to lead the working class to end capitalist exploitation and establish "a socialist republic based on the common ownership of the means of production" and to bring about the "destruction of the economic and political power of the racist ruling class."²⁰ In 1988, SACP commentators drew encouragement from the dramatic growth of campaigns against the apartheid policies of the government occurring during the mid-1980's. The SACP advocated paying special attention to blacks in "apolitical" organizations such as youth groups, women's clubs, sporting organizations, churches, and trade unions. The party also stressed the "activation of broad sectors of whites in various forms of opposition to the system."²¹

In Sudan, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) has become a visible part of the parliamentary opposition (it won five of 264 seats in the 1985 parliamentary election). The party advocates a reformist approach to change. This past year saw the SCP refuse to join a "government of reconciliation" formed by all other parties; this refusal was based on opposition to formal implementation of Islamic law in the Sudan. By year's end, the reconciliation government was fragmented.²²

In Senegal, the several nonruling Marxist parties, including the Soviet-recognized Independence and Labor Party (PIT), fared poorly in the country's presidential and National Assembly elections on February 28. Neither PIT nor the Democratic League/Movement for the Party of Labor (LD/MPT) even fielded presidential candidates. While both groups slightly improved on their 1983 showing, it was the LD/MPT that came closest to winning a seat in the National Assembly under Senegal's system of proportional representation.²³ Some of the smaller Marxist factions declined to participate in the election.

¹⁶See Agafonov and Khalipov, op. cit., p. 158; cf. V. V. Zagladin and G. A. Kiselev, Eds., *Politicheskiye partii: spravochnik* (Political Parties: A Handbook), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1986, pp. 244-45. It might be noted here that another Soviet study described the Congress Party for the Independence of Madagascar as "a revolutionary-democratic party, the leading role in which is played by Malagasy Marxists . . . based on the ideas of scientific socialism." See Anatoliy Gromyko et al., Eds., *Strany Afriki* (The Countries of Africa), Moscow, Politizdat, 1988, p. 208.

¹⁷"In Brief Items," *World Marxist Review*, June 1988, p. 87.

¹⁸See the entry "Zimbabwe" in Gromyko, op. cit., pp. 161-67.

¹⁹Radio Umtata, Aug. 2, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-AFR*, Aug. 4, 1988, p. 4.

²⁰*African Communist* (London), No. 114, 1988, pp. 73-74. Note the interview given by SACP National Chairman Dan Tloome over Moscow radio, Jan. 18, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 19, 1989, p.p. 33-34.

²¹*African Communist*, op. cit.

²²*al-Maydan* (Khartoum), Dec. 13, 1988.

²³*West Africa* (London), Mar. 7, 1988.

Réunion experienced four elections during 1968, in all of which the Réunion Communist Party (PCR) played an active role. During the French presidential election, the PCR did not support the candidate of the French Communist Party (PCF), which it accused of eurocentrism; rather, the PCR backed the successful reelection of incumbent François Mitterrand. In May elections to the National Assembly, 24 candidates ran for Réunion's allotted five seats, and the PCR retained control of two. In October, the PCR ran candidates for 26 cantons among the 44 open for election and increased its representation from seven to nine in the General Council. The final balloting was a referendum on New Caledonia, in which Réunion supported the French government's program.

The Americas. Marxist-Leninist regimes maintained their control over Cuba and Nicaragua, and similar movements aspired to power elsewhere in the Western hemisphere. Most of these groups participated in the often fragile democratic systems of their countries either independently or, more frequently, in formal and informal alliances with other leftist groups. Nine of the region's communist parties held congresses during 1988 (more than ever before in a single year), and one held a conference; these were devoted in large part to electoral strategies. Even though several guerrilla movements waged wars against governments, all but the Shining Path in Peru proclaimed, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, their support for negotiated settlements to domestic conflicts.

On January 1, 1989, Fidel Castro celebrated the 30th anniversary of the Cuban revolution. The Soviet Union was represented by Vitaliy Vorotnikov, CPSU Politburo member and chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.²⁴ With the fall of Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay in the same month, Castro is the only dictator in the hemisphere who has been entrenched in power for decades. Since his brother is the designated successor, Castro presides over the single remaining family dynasty in the Americas. Although many Latin leftists regard him as an anachronism, Castro remains the foremost communist in the Americas. At the end of December 1988, an international group of some 170 intellectuals called for a plebiscite in Cuba, to which a Havana foreign ministry spokesman retorted: "Absurd and inconceivable. Our people had a referendum 30 years ago on the day of the triumph of the revolution."²⁵

Although for much of the year, reports suggested

that human rights violations in Cuba were decreasing, the end of the year brought evidence to the contrary. Castro supposedly has ordered the millions of members of his Committees for the Defense of the Revolution to stop preparing reports on the activities of their neighbors, and several international human rights organizations were allowed to visit the island in 1988. However, Ricardo Bofill, long-time head of the Havana-based Cuban Committee for Human Rights, wrote at year's end that the foreign organizations "have done little more than scratch the surface" of human rights violations.²⁶

The Cuban economy remains in shambles, with declining production and dropping foreign reserves offset only by an estimated \$5.7 billion annually in subsidies from the Soviet Union.²⁷ Not only has Castro refused to decentralize the economy and loosen central controls, as Soviet leaders have suggested, he has increased the authority of the state and of the party. Persistent worker apathy suggests that the people lack enthusiasm under current conditions.

Through the party, Castro has vigorously promoted the "war of all the people"—a mass mobilization that has made Cuba one of the most militarized countries in the world. This is supposedly intended to forestall a US invasion, but is probably intended more to tighten control over an increasingly restive population and to discourage dissidents within the armed forces from challenging Castro's authority.

While scorning the reforms being pursued in the Soviet Union and China, Castro has maintained solidarity with numerous other Marxist governments and revolutionary groups. For example, he has continued substantial support for the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua and for the Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrillas in El Salvador. He boycotted the Seoul Olympics out of solidarity with North Korea. At the end of 1988, Cuba did sign the agreement providing for Namibian independence and the withdrawal of some 50,000 of Cuba's troops from Angola by July 1991. Cuba's relations with the People's Republic of China have improved considerably in recent years, as indicated by Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca's visit to Beijing in January 1989.²⁸

The regime in Managua celebrated the end of the

²⁶*The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Dec. 16, 1988; see also, *The Los Angeles Times*, Jan. 12, 1989.

²⁷Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of Economic Statistics 1988*, CPAS 88-10001, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, September 1988, Table 157, p. 181.

²⁸Radio Reloj (Havana), Jan. 16 and 18, 1989; trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-LAT*), Jan. 19, 1989, p. 2.

²⁴"Conversations in Havana," *Pravda*, Jan. 6, 1989.

²⁵*The New York Times*, Jan. 2 and 11, 1989.

Reagan Administration, even as Nicaragua's problems mounted. Although armed conflict between the Sandinistas and the Contra resistance virtually ceased during 1988, the relative peace brought anything but prosperity. Amidst a series of what the Sandinista newspaper *Barricada* called "adjustments," prices soared. Black markets to a considerable degree sustained the people, and inflation had rocketed to 36,000 percent by January 1989. At the end of that month, President Daniel Ortega announced a severe austerity plan which included laying-off up to 35,000 government functionaries, including 10,000 from the military and 13,000 from the security police.²⁹

Sandinista repression increased during the year, most evident in the brutal smashing of a peaceful demonstration at Nandaime in July, but also seen in numerous lesser incidents. The weekly newspaper of the small, pro-Chinese Nicaraguan Communist Party, part of the united front of organizations from left to right condemning the Sandinistas, wrote: "The police and courts are highly efficient in fabricating false proofs and jailing workers, peasants, employees, and managers, whose only fault is having independent political views and denouncing the daily abuses suffered by citizens."³⁰

Sandinista relations with the Soviet bloc remained strong, while those with the United States deteriorated and then, perhaps, improved somewhat. American military aid to the Contras ended in February 1988, and the Sandinista regime sent troops into Honduras during March in an unsuccessful effort to destroy Contra arms supplies. In July, the Sandinistas accused the US embassy in Managua of having plotted the "riots" at Nandaime and expelled the American ambassador and some of his staff. The US retaliated in kind. When Ronald Reagan left office, the Sandinistas lifted their virtual siege of the US embassy and called for a revival of the defunct Arias Peace Plan.³¹

Elsewhere in Central America, a number of communist groups engaged in armed conflict while talking periodically of peace. In El Salvador, the substantial gains registered by the right-wing ARENA party in legislative elections threw the ruling Christian Democrats into confusion and opened the door to FMLN ploys to advance the front's cause. In February 1988, the FMLN described its strategy as follows: "to annihilate and wear down enemy forces, sabotage the war economy, and destabilize and dismantle local and judicial authority."³² The guerrillas' activities included a campaign of

sabotage, which the US embassy estimates has caused \$2 billion in economic losses over the past seven years; promotion of urban confrontations through such front groups as the National Union of Salvadoran Workers; several major attacks on military bases; blockades of transportation and mining roads; and assassination and intimidation of local elected government officials. For a while, the guerrillas threatened to make US citizens targets of attacks, but this idea appears to have been dropped by early 1989.³³

At the same time, Salvadoran guerrilla leaders traveled in the region promoting their positions with non-communist politicians. For the first time, this could be done with some consistency, because during the year the FMLN consolidated its organization under the undisputed leadership of the People's Revolutionary Army and its chief, Joaquín Villalobos. In February 1989, the FMLN said that if the government would postpone the March elections until September, the guerrillas would participate in the electoral process and abide by the people's will. The guerrillas would support the Democratic Convergence coalition, headed by Guillermo Ungo and Ruben Zamora, who have long headed the FMLN's political front.³⁴

Guerrilla groups in Guatemala, united under the banner of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), lay spurious claim to being "a real force" in the country. Although some military engagements took place during the year, the guerrillas devoted more attention to a publicity campaign in Guatemala and abroad portraying the country's military as the principal obstacle to peace.³⁵

Honduras has long been a haven for both the Nicaraguan resistance and FMLN sympathizers, though there have been few military encounters in the country. During 1988, particularly after the legally dubious arrest and extradition to the United States in April of drug dealer Juan Ramón Matta, attacks increased on US personnel and facilities, as well as on Hondurans who support American policies. In Costa Rica, the communists, who split some time ago, have continued to participate in legal politics, but have recently found it difficult to cooperate in order to maximize the leftist vote.

In Panama, the communist People's Party (PdP) supports the increasingly anti-US rhetoric of Defense

²⁹Radio Venceremos, Feb. 11, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-LAT*, Feb. 19, 1988, p. 13.

³⁰*El Nuevo Herald* (Miami), Feb. 2, 1989.

³⁴*The New York Times*, Feb. 7, 1989; *The Los Angeles Times*, Feb. 8, 1989. The FMLN initiative was foreshadowed in late 1988, when Ungo stated that "an election dynamic is opening up" in El Salvador. See *La Unidad* (Mexico City), Nov. 20, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-LAT*, Jan. 10, 1989.

³⁵*Barricada Internacional* (Managua), Sept. 8, 1988.

²⁹*The New York Times*, Jan. 31 and Feb. 5, 1989.

³⁰*Avance* (Managua), Nov. 9, 1988.

³¹*The New York Times*, Feb. 8, 1989.

Forces chief Manuel Antonio Noriega and, thus, almost certainly will support his presidential candidate, Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) leader Carlos Duque in the 1989 election. The PRD, in effect Noriega's party in Panama's captive legislature, has long been strongly influenced by the Marxist-Leninist left, and is becoming more so as the US-Panamanian conflict drags on inconclusively. In September, Karen Brutents (first deputy chief of the CPSU International Department) visited Panama for the third time in four years and met with leaders of the PdP and the PRD. Noriega continues to rely on personal security forces and advisors from Cuba, and has been improving ties with the Sandinistas and other leftist and terrorist regimes.

Colombia has had problems with guerrillas for decades, and in recent years, the guerrillas have found common cause with the drug dealers who have already undermined much of the country's judicial and security systems.³⁶ More than 3,600 people were killed in political violence during 1988, and 544 kidnapped Colombians remained unaccounted-for at year's end. Rightist death squads are active as a response to the leftist/narco terrorists.

As in years past, the Colombian government tried to negotiate with the guerrillas for an end to domestic unrest. Periods of optimism were followed by renewed fighting. Even as the government reportedly concluded an initial peace agreement with one group (the M-19), the military announced a major offensive against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the armed branch of the Colombian Communist Party (PCC). Violence escalated in early 1989, with one terrorist attack taking the lives of 12 members of the judicial system in Santander Department.³⁷

Colombian intelligence reported that Cuban advisors are involved with several of the Colombian guerrilla groups, and Enrique Gómez, former Ambassador to Washington, says that when his brother, former Conservative Party presidential candidate Alvaro Gómez was kidnapped in May, the first person to be contacted in the effort to free him was Fidel Castro.³⁸ Despite the extensive guerrilla activity in the country, the Colombian Communist Party does participate in electoral politics through a leftist coalition, the Patriotic Union.

Ecuadorian communists participated in the 1988 presidential election through the United Leftist Front (FIU), which includes the Broad Leftist Front (FADI) of the pro-Soviet Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE) and the Democratic Popular Movement (MPD), founded years ago by pro-Chinese Marxists. The FADI and MPD won two seats each in the national congress. In the run-off presidential election, the PCE supported the winning social democratic Rodrigo Borja and has given cautious support to his government.

Peru boasts what is probably the broadest, but also most inherently unstable of Latin America's leftist fronts—the United Left (IU). The Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) works with the more moderate members of the IU, what is called the Socialist Convergence (COSO)—a group that has supported some of APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) President Alan Garcia's political (but not his recent economic) programs, while openly condemning Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) terrorism. The Shining Path, which held a congress in February, shifted its strategy and tactics somewhat in 1988, moving from pursuit of protracted rural war to promotion of urban revolution. Sendero members and supporters have precipitated violent showdowns with the authorities in the course of urban demonstrations mounted by other leftist groups, and they even marched through Lima under their own banner in May. Sendero activities now routinely include selective assassinations—aimed primarily at government authorities (including police) and political leaders—and economic sabotage. Sendero proposes to disrupt the 1990 elections, if possible.

The Chilean Communist Party—in the late 1960's and early 1970's a model for electoral participation—had trouble deciding whether or not to participate in the October plebiscite on an additional term for President Augusto Pinochet. Ultimately, it encouraged its members to vote, though it did not cooperate openly with other parties. The Communists continue to support terrorists of the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front and advocate both violent and nonviolent forms of struggle. Stumbling-blocks to broad leftist participation in the 1989 election are the constitutional provision outlawing the Communist Party and the government's refusal to talk with groups that seem to be fronts for the party.³⁹

Prospects for communist groups in South America's two largest countries are quite dim. In Brazil, with its rapidly deteriorating economy, the formal communist parties have little success on their own. The factionalized Workers' Party, somewhat like the Peruvian IU, wins more votes and elects a significant number of can-

³⁶Amb. Enrique Gómez, "Drugs: A Strategic Weapon," paper delivered at a National Defense University conference in Washington, DC (October 1988); and Rachel Ehrenfeld, "Narco-terrorism and the Cuban Connection," *Strategic Review* (Washington, DC), Summer 1988, pp. 55–63.

³⁷Bogotá Inravisión Television Cadena, Jan. 11, 1989, and AFP (Paris), Jan. 12, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-LAT*, Jan. 12, 1989, pp. 25–26; and Bogotá Emisoras Caracol Network, Jan. 19, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-LAT*, Jan. 23, 1989, p. 42.

³⁸Gómez, loc. cit.

³⁹*The New York Times*, Jan. 30, 1989.

didates but is too diffuse to function as a unified party. Communists in Argentina have always been totally upstaged by the Peronists in worker and other movements, and so they were again in 1988 as the Peronista party positioned itself to win the 1989 presidential election. Remnants of a 1970's Trotskyist guerrilla group attacked a military base in January 1989.

Other South American countries in which Marxist-Leninists focus most of their attention on elections include (1) Bolivia, where the Communist Party and other groups have uncharacteristically joined the United Left in anticipation of the May 1989 elections; (2) Uruguay, where the communists expect to participate in 1989 elections through the Broad Front; (3) Venezuela, where the Communist Party and its ally, the People's Electoral Movement, received less than one percent of the vote in 1988, while the more moderate Movement To Socialism (MAS) did significantly better; (4) Guyana, where Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party continues to be outmaneuvered by the perpetually ruling People's National Congress; and (5) perhaps Paraguay, if elections are actually held there following the fall of General Stroessner.

Other countries where communist groups focus on elections include (1) Mexico, where the communists, the dominant force in the Mexican Socialist Party, threw their support behind the dissident presidential candidate, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, in the July elections, and now exercise some influence on him as advisors; (2) the Dominican Republic, where the communists may support the 1990 presidential bid of Juan Bosch; (3) Guadeloupe and Martinique, where communists have some legislative representation and where the primary political concern is the potential negative consequences for the territories of West European integration; (4) Grenada, where a charismatic young leader, Terrence Marryshow, has taken over the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement and seeks closer ties to the democratic left; (5) Jamaica, where the recently split and debilitated communist movement, the Workers' Party, pondered a 1989 election in which it would have no impact; (6) Haiti, where the communists boycotted the January 1988 election and later in the year proposed a popular front government to set the stage for elections;⁴⁰ (7) Canada and the United States, where communist parties ran some candidates (in the US the party supported "independent" candidates rather than running its own) but with no significant national impact.

Several international conferences of leftist groups were held in the Western hemisphere in 1988, including

the 3rd meeting of communist parties from South America, in Montevideo during August; and the Anti-Imperialist Organization of Central America and the Caribbean, involving dozens of leftist organizations from the Caribbean Basin, in June in Panama City.

Asia and the Pacific. Communist regimes in this region continued to experience severe economic difficulties as well as challenges from within and without to revitalize their systems of public ownership and collectivist rule.

It was a particularly bad year for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Disillusionment with reform policies deepened as inflation worsened and corruption became more pervasive. One retired party cadre, recalling having fought the Japanese and the Kuomintang and having worked hard to rebuild the country in the 1950's, asked: "What was it all for? For a lousy single roll of rationed toilet paper a month?"⁴¹

At the 3rd Plenum of the 13th CCP Central Committee, held in late September, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang tried to explain what had gone wrong. Excessive demand and acute supply shortages had produced an inflation rate above 20 percent, and the state would have to cut back demand and check inflation by placing price reforms on hold. State investment in fixed assets would be reduced by 50 billion yuan in 1989, to a level some one-fifth less than in 1988.⁴² Consumption was to be curtailed and the money supply brought under tight control. But it was not clear whether the party could cope with the new economic independence of the provinces, which are reportedly no longer willing to toe the center's line.⁴³

Chinese dissidents like Ren Wanding, recently freed from prison, vowed to press for more human rights.⁴⁴ The controversial television series "River Elegy" (*Heshang*), shown in June, was warmly praised by younger political leaders, but was then severely condemned by Vice-Minister Wang Zhen in September.⁴⁵ As demands for democracy, more openness, and greater reform intensify, the party will find it increasingly difficult to justify its monopoly of power and its failure to build a prosperous socialism.

China fared somewhat better in foreign affairs. On

⁴¹Ellen Salem, "Things Fall Apart, the Centre Cannot Hold," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Oct. 27, 1988, p. 37.

⁴²*Beijing Review*, Nov. 14-20, 1988, pp. iii-iv.

⁴³Salem, loc. cit., pp. 38-39; Nicholas D. Kristof, "Beijing Authority Being Challenged by Local Powers," *The New York Times*, Dec. 11, 1988.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, Nov. 27, 1988.

⁴⁵Salem, loc. cit., pp. 37-38; Geremie Barne, "TM Requiem for the Myths of the Middle Kingdom," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Sept. 1, 1988, pp. 40-45.

⁴⁰Port-au-Prince Radio Nationale, Jan. 10, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-LAT*, Jan. 18, 1989.

December 2, the Chinese foreign minister, Qian Qichen, met Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow, and both sides agreed on a Sino-Soviet summit meeting, which later was scheduled for May 15–18, 1989.⁴⁶

In Vietnam, the economy continued to suffer severe shortages. In a move to ease the regime's defense burden, all Vietnamese civilian advisors and nearly three-quarters of Hanoi's military forces were reported to have left Cambodia by mid-December. All Vietnamese troops are supposed to be withdrawn by the end of calendar year 1989. They will be obligated to leave Cambodia even earlier, i.e., by September 1989, if Hanoi's conditions are met concerning establishment of a coalition government in Phnom Penh.⁴⁷

In July 1988, a flurry of exchanges between North and South Korea brought the two regimes closer than ever before to serious discussion. The National Assembly speaker from South Korea sent a letter to his counterpart in the North, proposing exchanges. The latter responded by proposing a nonaggression pact. The South eventually agreed to a meeting between its 299 national legislators and the 655 members of North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly, provided that both sides could agree upon a date.⁴⁸ One unsolved mystery during the year was the abrupt replacement of Oh Guk Ryol as army chief of staff in Pyongyang.⁴⁹ It is not clear whether Oh has retained his membership on the Politburo of the ruling Korean Workers' Party.

Recently captured documents of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) revealed a multimillion-dollar network to finance the purchase of arms.⁵⁰ These materials also described how the CPP's guerrilla force, the New People's Army (NPA), intended to increase operations during 1989 and promote a "revolutionary mass movement." The party apparently had been able to double its budget since 1987, and members eagerly sought to buy more weapons. The NPA already has small guerrilla base areas in Samar, Albay province of southern Luzon, Misamis Oriental, Agusan province of northeastern Mindanao, and three northern Luzon provinces—Cagayan, Ilocos Norte, and Kalinga-Apayao. The NPA is also supposed to have acquired some Soviet-manufactured RPG-7-type grenade launchers.⁵¹

Relations between the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and the CPSU continue to be strained, primarily because of the latter's continued attempts to woo the so-

cialists in Japan. After talks with the CPSU in Moscow, the JCP sent a letter in July describing such Soviet actions as "an expression of great-power chauvinism."⁵² The JCP is also critical of Moscow's unyielding stand on the four northern territories seized from Japan at the end of World War II and still occupied by the Soviet Union.

The Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) has been critical of Soviet foreign policies; it sees Gorbachev's "new thinking" as selling out the international class struggle for better relations with the Indian and US governments. Talk about healing the split between the weaker CPI and the stronger CPI-M ended when the latter clarified that the discussions which had been going on between the two parties regarded "unity" and not "unification."⁵³

The Middle East. Attempts by the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) to project authority and legitimacy became steadily more desperate in the wake of Gorbachev's dramatic promise to completely withdraw all Soviet military forces by mid-February 1989 and his evident intent to live up to the commitment. The discredited PDPA's frantic and chameleon-like attempts to obscure its Marxist coloration with Afghan traditionalism not only failed to attract cooperation from any opposition groups but alienated many of the party's small core of militants. At the same time, the Kabul regime has suffered embarrassing high-level defections, including that of President Najibullah's brother Siddiqullah; a cousin of Najibullah, Brigadier General Mohammed Gul (who said that many other key leaders would leave if they could); and a deputy foreign minister who requested asylum in the United States.⁵⁴

As the hollowness of PDPA reports became ever more obvious, Soviet media began instituting a *glasnost* policy regarding developments in Afghanistan. Against earlier PDPA claims to control all province capitals and major districts, all 45 cities, and 55 percent of the villages,⁵⁵ the Soviet press revealed that PDPA organizations function only in 900 out of about 23,000 villages.⁵⁶ Najibullah's boast of having 500,000 men under arms provoked comment in Moscow that Afghan government propaganda was "partly marked by indiscriminate optimism."⁵⁷

⁴⁶The New York Times, Feb. 6, 1989.

⁴⁷Ibid., Jan. 26, 1989; also, "Statement of Vietnamese Minister," Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow), Jan. 22, 1989.

⁴⁸Far Eastern Economic Review, Aug. 4, 1988, p. 14.

⁴⁹Ibid., Apr. 7, 1988, p. 38.

⁵⁰Ibid., July 28, 1988, p. 12.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 13. See also The New York Times, Jan. 15, 1989.

⁵²Devlin, loc. cit., p. 4.

⁵³Ibid.; Pravda, Jan. 6, 1989.

⁵⁴AFP (Paris), Oct. 25, 1988; San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 18, 1988.

⁵⁵Bakhtar, Jan. 14, 1988, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Near East & South Asia (Washington, DC—hereafter, FBIS-NES), Jan. 15, 1988, p. 47.

⁵⁶Joint Publications Research Service, Soviet Union: International Affairs (Washington, DC), JPRS-UIA-88-018, Nov. 23, 1988.

⁵⁷Pravda, May 26, 1988, trans. in FBIS-SOV, June 1, 1988, p. 26.

Checklist of Communist Parties in 1988

L — legal; O — outlawed; R — ruling; U — unrecognized

Sub-Saharan Africa ^a	Mid-1987 population ^b	Party membership	Party leader ^c	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis. ^d
A. Angola (MPLA-PT)	8,236,461	45,000 claimed	José Eduardo dos Santos	2nd, Dec. 9–11, 1985	R	— (1980); all 203 MPLA approved
B. Benin (PRPB)	4,497,150	Less than 2,000	Mathieu Kérékou (Chairman, CC)	2nd, Nov. 18–24, 1985	R	— (1984); all 196 PRPB approved
C. Congo (PCT)	2,153,685	8,679 claimed	Denis Sassou-Nguesso	3rd, July 23–30, 1984	R	95.0 (1984); all 153 PCT approved
D. Ethiopia (WPE)	48,264,570	50,000 claimed	Mengistu Haile Mariam	1st (Const.), Sept. 6–10, 1984	R	85.0 (1987); all 835 WPE members
1. Lesotho	1,666,012	No current data	Jacob M. Kena	7th, "early 1987" ^e	U	(1985) ^f
E. Madagascar (AKFM)	11,073,361	60,000 claimed	Richard Andriamanjato	n/a	L	— (1983); 9 of 137
F. Mozambique (FRELIMO)	14,947,554	130,000 claimed	Joaquim Albert Chissano (Pres.)	4th, Apr. 26–29, 1983	R	— (1986); incomplete tally
2. Nigeria (SWPP) (prob. defunct)	100,694,000 ^g	No current data	Dapo Fatogun	1st, Nov. 1978	O	(1983)
3. Réunion	557,441	2,000 est.	Paul Vergès	5th, July 12–14, 1980	L	35.0 (1988); 13 of 44 to leftist coalition (9 for PCR)
4. Senegal (PIT)	7,281,022	No current data	Amath Dansoko	2nd, Sept. 28–Oct. 2, 1984	L	0.8 (1988); none
5. South Africa	35,093,971	No current data	Joe Slovo (in exile)	6th, Dec. 1984 or early 1985 in London	O	(1984)
6. Sudan	24,014,495	9,000 est.	Muhammad Ibrahim Nugud Mansur	4th (legal), Oct. 31, 1967	L	1.67 (1986); 5 of 301 ^h
G. Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF)	9,730,000	No current data	Robert G. Mugabe (President)	3rd, Apr. 9, 1988 (extraord.)	R	76.0 (1987); 77 of 100 ⁱ
The Americas ^a	Mid-1987 population ^b	Party membership	Party leader ^c	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis. ^d
7. Argentina	31,532,538	80,000 est.	Athos Fava	16th, Nov. 4–7, 1986	L	5.3 (1987); none (in Broad Front coal.) ^j
8. Bolivia	6,448,297	500 claimed	Humberto Ramirez (majority faction) Carlos Soria Galvarro (minority)	5th, Feb. 9–13, 1985; Extraordinary, Apr. 26–29, 1986	L	2.21 (1985); 4 of 130 FPU coalition

^aArabic numerals indicate the 96 countries or geographic areas in which Moscow apparently recognizes the existence of communist parties. Listed with capital letters "A" through "M" are 13 countries in which there are significant "revolutionary democratic" parties (a majority of them ruling)—organizations on the verge of evolving into full-fledged communist parties in Moscow's eyes. In italics are several other important rival communist organizations, often pro-Beijing, that are not recognized by Moscow.

^bDrawn from US Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook 1988*, CPAS WF 87-001, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1988, unless otherwise noted.

^cThe individual listed is the most important party leader—the first secretary, secretary general, or general secretary, unless otherwise noted in parentheses.

^dAn em dash indicates that the communist party was legal and presumably participated in the election but the percentage of the vote received is not known. Where the party did not participate, the year of the most recent election (where the legislature still sits) is given in parentheses.

^eSee *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), November 1987, p. 95. This account ignores a previously mentioned November 1984 congress of the CPL (see, for example, *African Communist* [London], 3rd Quarter 1985).

^fAlthough individual party members are allowed to operate legally, the party itself is illegal and did not participate in the 1985 elections.

^gArthur S. Banks, Ed., *Political Handbook of the World 1988*, Binghamton, NY, CSA Publications, 1988, p. 431.

^hThese included two elected from territorial constituencies and three elected by graduates of universities and technical schools.

ⁱElections to the 30 seats formerly reserved for the white population increased the representation of ZANU-PF in the 100-member legislature from 64 to 77.

^jThe party also failed to win any seats in the September 6, 1987, parliamentary and provincial by-elections.

Checklist of Communist Parties in 1988

The Americas ^a (cont.)	Mid-1987 population ^b	Party membership	Party leader ^c	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis. ^d
9. Brazil	150,685,145	120,000 claimed ^k	Salomão Malina (Chairman)	8th (called Natl. Meeting of Communists), July 17–20, 1987	L	— (1986); 2 of 487
10. Canada	26,087,536	3,000 est.	George Hewison (Gen. Secretary)	27th, May 20–24, 1988	L	.05 (1988); none
11. Chile	12,638,046	20,000 est.	Luis Corvalán Lepe (in exile)	16th, June 1984 (clandestine)	O	n/a
12. Colombia	31,298,803	18,000 est. (incl. youth org.)	Gilberto Vieira White	15th, Dec. 12–15, 1988	L	1.4 (1986); 9 of 199, Patriotic Union
13. Costa Rica (PVP)	2,888,277	7,500 est. (for all leftist parties)	Humberto Vargas Carbonell	16th, Sept. 15–18, 1988	L	0.8 (1986); 1 of 57, Popular Alliance
(PPC)			Manuel Mora Valverde (to Feb.)	15th, Aug. 23–24, 1987	L	— (1986); 1 of 57, United People's coalition
14. Cuba	10,353,932	500,000 est.	Lenin Chacón Vargas Fidel Castro Ruz	3rd, Feb. 4–7, and Nov. 30–Dec. 2, 1986	R	— (1986), all 499 PCC approved
15. Dominican Republic	7,136,748	750 est.	Narciso Isa Conde	3rd, Mar. 15–17, 1984	L	0.3 (1986); none
16. Ecuador	10,231,630	750 est.	René Mauge Mosquera	11th, July 21–23, 1988	L	3.6 (1988); 2 of 71, Broad Leftist Front (FADI)
PCE-ML		200 est.	Jaime Hurtado Gonzalez, (Nat. Director, MPD)			Participates as MPD, which won 2 seats
17. El Salvador	5,388,644	1,000 est.	Shafik Jorge Handal	7th, Apr. 1979	O	(1988)
H. Grenada (MBPM)	84,455	No current data	Kenrick Radix (Chairman, to May)	2nd, May 1988	L	5.0 (1984); none
18. Guadeloupe	338,730	3,000 est.	Terrence Marryshow Guy Daninthe (to March)	9th, Mar. 12–13, 1988	L	— (1988); 22 of 42, to left coalition (10 to PCG)
19. Guatemala (PGT)	8,831,148	250 est.	Christian Céleste Carlos González Orellana ^l	4th, Dec. 1969	O	(1985)
20. Guyana (PPP)	765,796	200 est.	Cheddi Jagan	23rd, July 30–Aug. 1, 1988	L	16.8 (1985); 8 of 53 elected members
21. Haiti (PUCH)	6,295,570	350 est.	René Théodore	1st, 1979	L	(1988); boycotted
22. Honduras	4,972,287	100 est. ^m	Rigoberto Padilla Rush (in exile) ⁿ	4th, Jan. 1986 (clandestine)	O	(1985)
23. Jamaica (WPJ)	2,458,102	100 est.	Trevor Munroe	4th, Sept. 11–13, 1988	L	— (1983); boycotted
24. Martinique	351,105	1,000 est.	Armand Nicolas	9th, Dec. 12–13, 1987	L	— (1988); 2 of 45
25. Mexico (PMS)	83,527,567	No data	Gilberto Rincón Gallardo	1st, Nov. 25–29, 1987		— (1988); (presidential election)
26. Nicaragua (PSN)	3,407,183	No current data	Gustavo Tablada	10th, Oct. 1973	L	1.3 (1984); 2 of 96
I. (FSLN)		1,400 est.	Daniel Ortega (Coordinator) Exec. Committee	FSLN Assemb. Aug. 1985	R	63.0 (1984); 61 of 96
27. Panama (PdP)	2,323,622	25,600 claimed	Rubén Dario Souza	8th, Jan 24–26, 1986	L	— (1984); none

^kFrom a letter by Salomão Malina to the editors of YICA.

^lGonzález leads the "Camarilla" faction; Daniel Rios leads the National Leadership Nucleus Faction of armed revolutionary dissidents.

^mThe Honduran CP is one of six organizations in the Honduran Revolutionary Movement, formed in 1982.

ⁿAlthough Padilla, in exile, claims to be the leader, there is strong evidence that Mario Sosa Novarro is really in charge within the country.

The Americas^a						
	Mid-1987 population ^b	Party membership	Party leader ^c	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis. ^d
28. Paraguay	4,386,024	4,000 est.	Júlio Rojas (acting) ^o	3rd, Apr. 10, 1971	O	(1988)
29. Peru	21,269,074	2,000 est.	Jorge del Prado Chavez	9th, May 27-30, 1987	L	26.0 (1985); 48 of 180 to Unit. Left coal. (6 PCP)
30. Puerto Rico	3,358,879	100 est.	Frank Irrizarry	Unknown	L	(1988); (no cand.)
J. Suriname (RVP)	394,999	No current data	Michael Naarendorp		L	n/a (1987)
31. United States of America	246,043,000	20,000 claimed	Gus Hall	24th, Aug. 13-16, 1987	L	(1988); (no cand.)
32. Uruguay	2,976,138	11,000 claimed	Jaime Perez Gerschuni	21st, Dec. 7-11, 1988	L	6.0 (1984); none to Frente Amplio
33. Venezuela	18,775,780	4,000 est.	Alonso Ojeda Olaechea	7th, Oct. 24-27, 1985	L	2.0 (1988); 1 of 203
Asia and the Pacific^a						
	Mid-1987 population ^b	Party membership	Party leader ^c	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis. ^d
34. Australia (CPA)	16,260,936	1,000 est.	Judy Munday (President)	29th, June 6-8, 1987	L	0.3 (1987); none
(SPA)		500 est.	Peter Dudley Symon	6th, Oct. 3, 1988	L	negl. (1987); none
35. Bangladesh	109,963,551	5,000 claimed	Saifuden Ahmed Manik	4th, Apr. 7-11, 1987	L	(1988)
36. Burma	39,632,183	3,000 claimed	Thakin Ba Thein Tin (Chairman, CC)	3rd, Sept. 9- Oct. 2, 1985	O	n/a
37. Cambodia (KPRP)	6,685,592	9,000 est.	Heng Samrin	5th, Oct. 13-16, 1985	R	99.0 (1981); all 117
(PDK or KCP)		No current data	Pol Pot	3rd, Dec. 14, 1975	O	n/a
38. China	1,088,169,192 ^p	47,000,000 claimed	Zhao Ziyang	13th, Oct. 25- Nov. 1, 1987	R	— (1987); all 3,202 CCP approved
39. India (CPI)	816,828,360	479,000 claimed	C. Rajeswara Rao	13th, Mar. 12-17, 1986	L	2.71 (1984); 6 of 544
(CPM)		450,000 claimed	E.M.S. Namboodiripad	13th, Dec. 26-31, 1988	L	5.96 (1984); 22 of 544
40. Indonesia	184,015,906	1,500 est. (+ ca 200 exiles)	Jusuf Adjitorop (pro-Beijing)	7th Extraord., April 1962	O	n/a
			Thomas Sinuraya (pro-Moscow)			
41. Japan	122,626,038	470,000 est.	Hiromu Murakami (Chairman of Presidium)	18th, Nov. 26-28, 1987	L	9.47 (1986); 27 of 512
			Kenji Miyamoto (Chairman of CC)			
42. Korea, North (KWP)	21,983,795	2,500,000 est.	Kim Il-song	6th, Oct. 10-15, 1980	R	100 (1986); all 706 KWP approved
43. Laos (LPRP)	3,849,762	40,000 claimed	Kaysone Phomvihane	4th, Nov. 13-15, 1986	R	(1975); 46-member Sup. Peop. Ass. all LPRP apptd.
44. Malaysia (CPM)	16,309,306	1,650 est. ^q	Chin Peng	Last known, in 1965	O	(1984)
(MCP)		800 est.	Ah Leng	Unknown	O	(1984)

^aSecretary general Antonio Maidana Palacios has been in prison since 1980.^bThe Beijing Central Office of Statistics estimates the population at 1,072,330,000.^qIncludes an estimated 350 members operating in Singapore.

Checklist of Communist Parties in 1988

Asia and the Pacific ^a							Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis. ^d
	Mid-1987 population ^b	Party membership	Party leader ^c	Last congress	Legal status		
45. Mongolia (MPRP)	2,067,624	88,150 claimed	Jambyn Batmonh	19th, May 28–31, 1986	R	93.5 (1986); 346 of 370 MPRP apprvd.	
46. Nepal	18,252,001	10,000 est. ^f	Man Mohan Adhikary	3rd (pre-split), ^s 1961	O	n/a	
47. New Zealand (CPNZ)	3,343,339 ^f	50 est.	Harold Crook	23rd, Apr. 22, 1984	L	— (1987); none	
(SUP)		300 est.	George H. Jackson (President)	8th, Oct. 22–24, 1988	L	— (1987); none	
48. Pakistan	107,467,457	Less than 200 est.	Ali Nazish	1st, 1976 (cland.)	O	(1988)	
49. Philippines (PKP)	63,199,807	5,000 est.	Felicismo Macapagal (Chairman)	9th, Dec. 1986	L	(1987)	
(CPP)		32,000 est.	Rafael Baylosis (Gen. Secretary) Jose Maria Sison (Chairman)	9th, Jan. 1987	O	(1987); boycotted (participated via Bayan Party)	
50. Sri Lanka	16,639,695	5,000 est.	Kattorge P. Silva	13th, Mar. 22–26, 1987	L	1.9 (1977); 1 of 168	
51. Thailand	54,588,731	250 est.	Thong Jaensri (?)	4th, March–Apr. 1984 (cland.)	O	n/a	
52. Vietnam	65,185,278	2,120,000 claimed	Nguyen Van Linh	6th, Dec. 15–18, 1986	R	98.8 (1987); 496 of 614; all 614 VCP endorsed	
Eastern Europe and the USSR ^a							Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis. ^d
	Mid-1987 population ^b	Party membership	Party leader ^c	Last congress	Legal status		
53. Albania (PPSh)	3,147,352	147,000 claimed	Ramiz Alia	9th, Nov. 3–8, 1986	R	100 (1987); all 250 Democratic Front	
54. Bulgaria	8,966,927	932,055 claimed	Todor Zhivkov	13th, Apr. 2–5, 1986	R	99.9 (1986); all 400 Fatherland Front	
55. Czechoslovakia	15,620,722	1,705,490 claimed	Miloš Jakeš	17th, Mar. 24–28, 1986	R	99.94 (1986); all 350 National Front	
56. Germany (East) (SED)	16,596,875	2,324,995 claimed	Erich Honecker	11th, Apr. 17–21, 1986	R	99.94 (1986); all 500 National Front	
57. Hungary (MSzMP)	10,588,271	816,622 claimed	János Kádár (to May 19) Károly Grósz	13th, Mar. 25–28, 1985	R	98.9 (1985); all 352 Pat. Peop. Front	
58. Poland (PZPR)	37,958,420	2,200,000 est.	Wojciech Jaruzelski	10th, June 29–July 3, 1986	R	78.8 (1985); all 460 Fatherland Front	
59. Romania	23,040,883	3,709,735 claimed	Nicolae Ceaușescu	13th, Nov. 19–22, 1985	R	97.8 (1984); all 369 Front of Socialist Dem. and Unity	
60. USSR	285,200,000	19,468,786 claimed	Mikhail Gorbachev	27th, Feb. 25–Mar. 6, 1986	R	99.9 (1984); all 1,500 CPSU approved ^u	
61. Yugoslavia (SKJ)	23,580,148	2,079,613 claimed	Boško Krunić (to June) Stipe Suvar (Pres. of Presidium)	13th, June 25–28, 1986	R	— (1986); all 308 Soc. All. approved	

^fThree-quarters of this number are estimated to be pro-Beijing or neutral in relations with communist movements abroad.

^sThe right wing of the party held its own congress in 1968.

^fNew Zealand Department of Statistics.

^uA reported 71.4 percent are members of the CPSU. See TASS, Mar. 6, 1984, transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Mar. 7, 1984, p. R/5.

Middle East and North Africa ^a	Mid-1987 population ^b	Party membership	Party leader ^c	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis. ^d
K. Afghanistan (PDPA)	14,480,863	205,000 claimed	Najibullah	2nd Natl. Conf., Oct. 18-19, 1987	R	22.6 (1988) 42 of 184 elected so far ^v
62. Algeria (PAGS) ^w	24,194,177	450 est.	Sadiq Hadjeres	6th, Feb. 1952	O	(1982)
L. Bahrain (NLF/B)	480,383	Negligible	Saif ben Ali	Unknown	O	n/a
63. Egypt	53,347,679	500 est.	Farid Mujahid (?)	2nd, 1984 or early 1985	O	(1984)
64. Iran (Tudeh party)	51,923,689	1,500 est.	Ali Khavari (in exile)	Natl. Conf. (in exile), 1986	O	(1988)
65. Iraq	17,583,467	No current data	Aziz Muhammad	4th, Nov. 10-15, 1985	O	(1984)
66. Israel	4,297,379 ^x	2,000 est.	Meir Vilner	20th, Dec. 4-7, 1985	L	3.8 (1988); 4 of 120
67. Jordan	2,850,482	No current data	Dr. Ya'qub Zayadin	2nd, Dec. 1983	O	n/a
68. Lebanon (LCP)	2,674,385	3,000 est.	George Hawi	5th, Feb. 3-5, 1987	L	(1972)
(OCAL)		1,500 est.	Muhsin Ibrahim	1st, 1971	O	(1972)
69. Morocco (PPS)	24,976,168	4,000 est. ^y	'Ali Yata	4th, July 17-19, 1987	L	2.3 (1984); 2 of 306
70. Palestine	4,500,000 ^z	No current data	Bashir al-Barghuti (?)	1st, 1984 (?)	O	n/a
71. Saudi Arabia	15,452,123	Negligible	Mahdi Habib	2nd, Aug. 1984	O	n/a
72. Syria	11,569,659	5,000 est.	Khalid Bakhdash	6th, July 1986	L	— (1986); 8 of 195
73. Tunisia	7,738,026	2,000 est.	Muhammad Harmel	9th, June 12-14, 1987	L	(1986); boycotted
M. Yemen, Aden (YSP)	2,425,620	31,000 cl., includ. cand. membs.	'Ali Salim al-Bayd	4th, June 20-21, 1987	R	— (1986); all 111 YSP approved
Western Europe ^a	Mid-1987 population ^b	Party membership	Party leader ^c	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis. ^d
74. Austria	7,577,072	15,000 est.	Franz Muhri (Chairman)	26th, Mar. 25-28, 1987	L	0.72 (1986); none
75. Belgium	9,880,522	5,000 est.	Louis van Geyt (President)	Extraordinary, June 18, 1988	L	1.2 (1987); none
76. Cyprus (AKEL)	691,966	15,000 claimed	Ezekias Papaioan- nou (to Apr. 22) Dimitris Christofias	Extraordinary, Dec. 20, 1987	L	27.4 (1985); 15 of 56
77. Denmark	5,125,676	10,000 est.	Ole Sohn (Chairman)	28th, Apr. 16-19, 1987	L	0.8 (1988); none
78. Finland (SKP)	4,949,716	20,000 claimed	Arvo Aalto (to May 29, (Chairman) Jarmo Wahlstroem (Chairman) Esko Vainionpää (to May 29, Gen. Sec.) Helja Tammisola (Gen. Sec.)	21st, June 12-15, 1987	L	9.4 (1987); 16 of 200 to SKDL Front (11 to SKP)

^aA loose grouping of the PDPA and various small parties, including non-communist parties, won a total of 38 percent of the vote and 69 seats. Some 50 seats were held vacant for the "opposition." Elections were not held in some districts due to combat conditions.

^wThe pro-Moscow PAGS is not mentioned in the Algeria section of V. V. Zagladin and G. A. Kiselev, Eds., *Politicheskiye Partii: Spravochnik* (Political Parties: A Handbook), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1986, p. 219. The party does apparently continue to operate through various mass organizations of the ruling National Liberation Front, and has an official on the editorial board of the *World Marxist Review*.

^xExcludes the population of East Jerusalem and the West Bank.

^yThe party claims a membership of 30,000.

^zIncludes the populaton of East Jerusalem, Gaza, Jordan, and the West Bank.

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Western Europe ^a	Mid-1987 population ^b	Party membership	Party leader ^c	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis. ^d
Finland (SKP-Y)		16,663 claimed	Jouko Kajanoja (General Secretary) Taisto Sinisalo (Chairman)	1st, June 5-7, 1987	L	4.3 (1987); 4 of 200 thru DEVA Front
<i>KPT</i>		200 est.	<i>Timo Lahdenmaek</i>	1st, May 23-24 1988	L	(1987) part of DEVA Front
79. France	55,798,282	604,282 claimed	Georges Marchais	26th, Dec. 2-6, 1987	L	11.3 (1988); 25 of 577
80. Germany (West)	60,980,200 ^{aa}	38,000 est.	Herbert Mies (Chairman)	8th, May 2-4, 1986	L	0.5 (1987); none (for "Peace List")
81. Great Brit. (CPGB)	56,935,845	9,700 est.	Gordon McLennan	40th, Nov. 14-18, 1987	L	0.1 (1987); none
<i>(NCPB)</i>		No current data	<i>Eric Trevett</i>	5th, Nov. 23-24, 1985	L	No data
82. Greece (KKE)	10,015,041	50,000 est.	Kharilaos Florakis	12th, May 12-16, 1987	L	9.9 (1985); 13 of 300
<i>(E.AR)</i>		No current data	Leonidas Kyrkos	Founding Congress, Apr. 24-26, 1987 ^{cc}	L	1.8 (1985); none ^{bb}
83. Iceland (AB)	246,526	3,000 est.	Olafur Ragnar Grimsson (Chair.)	Biennial Cong., Nov. 7-10, 1987	L	13.2 (1987); 8 of 63
84. Ireland	3,531,502	500 est.	James Stewart	19th, Jan. 31- Feb. 2, 1986	L	— (1987); none
85. Italy	57,455,362	1,382,536 claimed	Alessandro Natta (to June) Achille Occhetto	17th, Apr. 9-13, 1986	L	26.6 (1987); 177 of 630
86. Luxembourg	366,232	600 est.	René Urbany (Chairman)	25th, Apr. 23-24, 1988	L	4.9 (1984); 2 of 64
87. Malta	346,890 ^{dd}	300 est.	Anthony Vassallo	4th, July 15-17, 1988	L	0.08 (1987); none
88. Netherlands	14,716,100	27,000 claimed	Elli Izeboud (Chairman)	30th, Nov. 29- Dec. 2, 1986	L	0.6 (1986); none
89. Norway (NKP)	4,190,758	1,750 est.	Kaare Andre Nilsen (Chairman)	19th, Apr. 23-26, 1987	L	0.2 (1985); none
<i>(AKP)</i>		6,000 est.	<i>Kjersti Ericsson</i> (Chair., to Dec.) <i>Siri Jensen</i> (Chair.)	5th, Dec. 1988 (cland.)	L	— (1985); none
90. Portugal	10,388,421	199,275 claimed	Alvaro Cunhal	12th, Dec. 1-4, 1988	L	11 (1987); 30 of 250 Unit. Peop. Alliance coal. (25 to PCP)
91. San Marino	22,986	1,200 claimed	Gilberto Ghiotti	11th, Jan 27, 1986	L	28.0 (1988); 18 of 60
92. Spain (PCE)	39,209,765	66,000 claimed	Gerardo Iglesias Arguellas (to Feb.) Julio Anguita Gonzalez	12th, Feb. 19-21, 1988	L	4.6 (1986); 7 of 350 United Left Coalition ^{ee}
<i>(PCPE)</i>		25,500 est.	Juan Ramos Carmavera Ignacio Gallego (Chairman)	2nd, Apr. 25-27, 1987	L	4.6 (1986); 7 of 350 United Left Coalition ^{ee}
<i>(PTE-UC)</i>		14,000 est.	<i>Adolfo Pinedo</i> <i>Santiago Carrillo</i> (Chairman)	1st, Feb. 8, 1987	L	1.2 (1986); none

^{aa}Excluding West Berlin.

^{bb}The vote was for the pre-split KKE-I.

^{cc}The E.AR is the most significant successor to the KKE-Interior (KKE-I), which split at its April 1987 congress; the smaller faction is the KKE Renovating Left of Giannis Banias.

^{dd}Malta Office of Statistics.

^{ee}The vote and seat figures are combined totals for the two parties that participated in the elections through the United Left Coalition.

Western Europe^a	Mid-1987 population ^b	Party membership	Party leader ^c	Last congress	Legal status	last elect. (date); seats in legis. ^d
93. Sweden (VPK)	8,393,071	17,800 claimed	Lars Werner (Chairman)	28th, May 23–27, 1987	L	5.8 (1988); 21 of 349
(APK)		5,000 claimed	Rolf Hagel (Chairman)	28th, Nov. 7, 1986	L	(1988); no data
94. Switzerland (PdA)	6,592,558	4,500 est.	Jean Spielman	13th, Feb. 27– Mar. 1, 1987	L	0.8 (1987); 1 of 200
95. Turkey (TCP) (UCPT)	54,167,857	Negligible Negligible	Haydar Kutlu Haydar Kutlu Nihat Sargin (President)	5th, autumn 1983 1st, Oct. 12–13, 1988	O O	(1987) n/a
96. West Berlin (SEW)	1,869,000	7,000 claimed	Horst Schmitt (Chairman)	8th, May 15–17, 1987	L	0.6 (1985); none

LEGEND OF ACRONYMS

AB	People's Alliance	PdA	Party of Labor
AKEL	Progressive Party of the Working People	PDK	Party of Democracy of Kampuchea (former Khmer Rouge, also known as the Kampu- chean Communist Party—KCP)
AKFM	Congress Party for Malagasy Independence (Madagascar)	PdP	People's Party
AKP	Workers' Communist Party	PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
APK	Communist Workers' Party	PGT	Guatemalan Party of Labor
CPA	Communist Party of Australia	PIT	Independence and Labor Party
CPGB	Communist Party of Great Britain	PKP	Philippine Communist Party
CPI	Communist Party of India	PMS	Mexican Socialist Party
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya	PPC	Costa Rican People's Party
CPM	Communist Party (Marxist) of India	PPP	People's Progressive Party
CPNZ	Communist Party of New Zealand	PPS	Party of Progress and Socialism
CPP/NPA	Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army	PPSh	Albanian Party of Labor
Ea.R	Greek Left	PRPB	People's Revolutionary Party of Benin
FSLN	Sandinista Front for National Liberation	PSN	Socialist Party of Nicaragua
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique	PTE-UC	Workers' Party of Spain—Communist Unity
KKE	Greek Communist Party	PUCH	Unified Party of Haitian Communists
KPRP	Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party	PVP	Popular Vanguard Party
KPT	Communist Workers' Party (Finland)	PZPR	Polish United Workers' Party
KWP	Korean Workers' Party	RVP	Revolutionary People's Party (Suriname)
LCP	Lebanese Communist Party	SED	Socialist Unity Party
LPRP	Lao People's Revolutionary Party	SEW	Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin
MBPM	Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement	SKJ	League of Communists of Yugoslavia
MCP	Malaysian Communist Party	SKP	Finnish Communist Party
MPLA-PT	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Party of Labor	SKP-Y	Finnish Communist Party-Unity
MPRP	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party	SPA	Socialist Party of Australia
MSzMP	Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party	SUP	Socialist Unity Party
NCPB	New Communist Party of Britain	SWPP	Socialist Working People's Party
NKP	Norwegian Communist Party	UCPT	United Communist Party of Turkey
NLF/B	National Liberation Front/Bahrain	VPK	Left Party Communists
OCAL	Organization of Communist Action of Lebanon	WPE	Workers' Party of Ethiopia
PAGS	Socialist Vanguard Party	WPJ	Workers' Party of Jamaica
PCE	Communist Party of Spain	YSP	Yemen Socialist Party
PCPE	Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain	ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
PCT	Congolese Labor Party		

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What remained of the PDPA's credibility was severely damaged when the elections to the Grand National Assembly in April, scheduled with a scant one month's notice, were held in violation of electoral laws: specifically, secret ballots were disallowed, polling booths often remained unmanned, children as young as 13 were seen voting, and candidate lists were published only after the polls opened.⁵⁸ Even so, final election results showed that only 44 percent of the votes were cast for leftist candidates, with the remaining votes going to candidates described as "independent."⁵⁹

There were reports during the year that the Soviet Union had furnished the Marxist People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) with more than enough military equipment to replace PDRY losses incurred in the 1986 civil war. These reports raised Western concern that the Soviet Union might be pre-positioning equipment there for its own future use.⁶⁰ Equally plausible, however, is the speculation that the Soviet Union designed this resupply effort to reassure its PDRY ally that the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan and declining support for other Third World military involvements did not imply the USSR's abandonment of its strategic foothold in Aden. An unusually high level of Soviet-PDRY diplomatic and economic activity gave added weight to this impression. Another indication of strong Soviet interest in the region was the opening of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Persian Gulf state of Qatar in the summer.⁶¹

The August cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war, while as generally welcomed throughout the region as was the later Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, brought unmitigated disaster for the remaining cadres of the communist parties in Iran and Iraq. Following the cease-fire, the Khomeiny regime exacted brutal vengeance against its guerrilla opposition, the Mojahedin-e Khalq, who had conducted full-scale military operations into Iran from Iraqi bases. Hundreds of leftist political prisoners were executed. By the end of the year, in an ironic echo of the Nicaraguan Communist Party's plaint, the "Tudeh Party of Iran [asked] the United Nations, the human rights committee [sic, presumably the UN Human Rights Commission], Amnesty International . . . to take prompt action to save the lives of thousands of people whose only crime [was] having a different ideology."⁶²

Highlighting the many ambiguities of the Soviet position in the Iran-Iraq war—the USSR was the principal military supplier for Iraq and yet sought to effect a major improvement in relations with Iran—Moscow's gestures on behalf of the Tudeh remained subdued. However, the Soviet press did print Tudeh denunciations of the Khomeiny regime's atrocities.⁶³ And, in a more vigorous move, Moscow radio broadcast an unattributed commentary in Persian to Iran, questioning "the policy of moral and physical assassination" by those who " . . . sacrifice the interests of the people for the sake of their own greedy interests . . .," and accusing Teheran of "sacrificing members of the Tudeh party and the Fedai'iyin organization. . . ." in order " . . . to gain the trust and support of [US] imperialism. . . ."⁶⁴

For the Iraq Communist Party (ICP), the cease-fire brought even worse devastation than that suffered by the already decimated Tudeh. From the war's onset in 1980, the ICP had concentrated its activity almost exclusively on the disaffected Kurdish areas of northern Iraq. The ICP finally joined in a formal coalition with Kurdish guerrilla parties to fight Saddam Hussein's regime in Baghdad. With Iraq long on the defensive against Iranian forces to the south, much of the north came under Kurdish control—control that with Iranian support included capture in March of the district capital at Halabja. Iraq's retribution was the highly publicized poison gas attack on that city, killing more than 5,000 people.⁶⁵ But the real onslaught began with the July cease-fire, when Khomeiny's support for the Kurds ended and the full force of redeployed Iraqi troops turned to the north. Tens of thousands of Kurds escaped to Turkey and Iran. Large numbers of those remaining were forcibly moved to the southern plains of Iraq.⁶⁶ The ICP's desperation surfaced in October with an appeal on the Kurdish resistance radio for fighters to return to Iraq and resume the struggle.⁶⁷ The exact fate of the ICP is still unknown, but with the resistance shattered, it is difficult to imagine an effective role in post-war Iraq for any surviving Communists who had committed themselves to cooperation with Iran.

Lebanon's two principal communist groups, the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) and the smaller Organization of Communist Action in Lebanon (OCAL) contin-

⁵⁸*Pravda*, Dec. 7, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 8, 1988, p. 37.

⁵⁹Radio Peace and Progress (Moscow), Nov. 5, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 30, 1988, p. 17.

⁶⁰*Le Monde* (Paris), cited in *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Sept. 11, 1988.

⁶¹Nadim Jaber in *Middle East International* (London), Sept. 9, 1988, p. 3.

⁶²*Hurriyet* (Istanbul), Oct. 2, 1988, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-WEU*), Oct. 13, 1988.

⁵⁸US Department of State, *Afghanistan: Soviet Occupation and Withdrawal*, Washington, DC, December 1988, Special Report No. 179, p. 8.

⁵⁹*Kabul Times*, Apr. 30, 1988.

⁶⁰*The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Mar. 11, 1988.

⁶¹*The New York Times*, Aug. 1, 1988.

⁶²Radio of the Iranian Toilers (clandestine), Dec. 1988, trans. in *FBIS-NES*, Dec. 2, 1988.

ued to play an active role among the confusing melee of competing militias, free-wheeling in the absence of central government authority. Though subject to multiple attacks during the continuing civil war, because of their anti-religious and pro-Palestinian orientation, both groups worked within the powerful but loose confederation of forces that support Syria. The LCP, which is active in the National Resistance Front opposing de facto Israeli occupation of a "security zone" in the south, achieved a significant propaganda victory in November when a 20-year-old female party member shot and seriously wounded Antoine Lahad, commander of the Israeli-created and -maintained South Lebanon Army.⁶⁸ With a publishing capability (it prints a weekly plus booklets and pamphlets) as well as its own radio station (which broadcasts 18 hours daily),⁶⁹ the LCP is well positioned to exploit such events.

Eastern Europe and the USSR. Five ruling communist parties held national conferences during 1988: the Bulgarian in January; the East German, Hungarian, and Yugoslav in May; and the Soviet in June-July. Two of the parties (those in Czechoslovakia and Poland) remained out of step and did not hold a national conference during 1988 (Romania had held its own in December 1987). The year witnessed changes within the leaderships of the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia—in the last two cases reflecting normal personnel rotation.

The USSR attempted to persuade its client states that they should purchase more machinery from Moscow and reduce an accumulated trade surplus of 18 billion transferable rubles.⁷⁰ Gorbachev's speech at the United Nations on December 7th, announcing unilateral cuts in Soviet armed forces, resulted in public commitments by several other Warsaw Pact governments to reduce defense outlays.⁷¹

Albania still remains the odd-man-out in Eastern Europe, a member neither of the Warsaw Treaty Organization nor of the CEMA. Tirana continues to have no party-

to-party relations with the CPSU or any other ruling communist movement in Eastern Europe, although it maintains state-to-state relations with several of Moscow's allies in the region. Albania sent a Politburo member to attend the 7th congress of the Brazilian Communist Party, received Raoul Marco, a secretary of the "orthodox" Spanish Communist Party (PCE) and Terence Bacon from the Canadian (Marxist) Communist Party. The term "Marxist-Leninist" is no longer used by the Albanians to describe themselves, a shift presumably meant to imply that splinter movements such as theirs are the only genuine ones.

The Albanian economy has been sliding, although a new policy of removing conservative bureaucrats may help reverse the decline. Those cadres who had completed five years at the same post were replaced during the month of June.⁷² The rotation affected a minimum of 70,000 senior administrators, most of whom had been appointed by the late Enver Hoxha and not by current party boss Ramiz Alia.

The Bulgarian Communist Party started off the New Year with a national conference on January 28–29, 1988. Although 71-year-old Todor Zhivkov suggested that positions in the government should not be occupied by those already holding offices in the party and that party officials should serve a maximum of three terms, action on the measures was postponed until the 14th congress in 1991.⁷³ At the July plenum of the BCP Central Committee, reputed heir-apparent Chudomir Alexandrov "resigned at his own request."⁷⁴ That same month, most of the 30,000 functionaries scheduled to be rotated out of their jobs were given other administrative posts in municipalities and enterprises.

Inadequate reforms adopted in 1987 and followed with decisions and draft laws were never implemented. A new Soviet ambassador in the person of V. V. Sharapov, a top KGB official, was posted to Sofia in March, presumably to serve as a watchdog. That did not prevent purges in July (see above) and December of all possible contenders for Zhivkov's position. Rumors persisted about mutual dislike between the Soviet and Bulgarian leaders. CPSU Politburo member Lev Zaykov spent five days during September in Sofia to sign agreements on cooperation between respective party, trade union, and youth organizations.⁷⁵

⁶⁸Voice of the Mountain (clandestine in Arabic) to Lebanon, Nov. 8, trans. in *FBIS-NES*, Nov. 8, 1988, p. 46.

⁶⁹Rafic Samhoun, "Resisting Ideological Subversions," in *World Marxist Review*, August 1988, p. 91.

⁷⁰V. V. Kusin, "Introduction to Eastern Europe in 1988," RFE-RL, *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), RAD Background Report/251, Dec. 30, 1988, p. 3.

⁷¹Gorbachev's speech appeared in *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR*, Dec. 31, 1988, pp. 1–8. For Bulgarian reductions, see *Pogled* (Sofia), Feb. 6, 1989, p. 7; for Czechoslovak, *Rudé Právo* (Prague), Jan. 28, 1989; for East German, *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Jan. 30, 1989; for Hungarian, *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Feb. 2, 1989; for Polish, *Żołnierz Wolności* (Warsaw), Feb. 20, 1989. Romania made no announcement, having already taken a 5 percent cut in 1986.

⁷²*Zëri i popullit* (Tirana), June 12, 1988.

⁷³The four principles for Bulgaria's "new socialist society," adopted at the national party conference in Sofia were enumerated by Mincho Draganov in "Party Conferences—Realistic Renewal," *World Marxist Review*, October 1988, pp. 46–47; see also *Rabotnichesko delo* (Sofia), Feb. 2, 1988.

⁷⁴*Rabotnichesko delo*, July 21, 1988.

⁷⁵*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt), Aug. 22, 1988; and *Rabotnichesko delo*, Sept. 15, 1988.

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Czechoslovakia's economy also deteriorated, with political reforms limited to several changes of leading personnel (in April, October, November). Party leader Miloš Jakeš, who had presided over the purge of some 500,000 supporters of Alexander Dubcek after the August 1968 Soviet military occupation, emerged more powerful than ever. Economic reform has involved only 400 enterprises on an experimental basis. Heavy machinery continues to be produced, even though the USSR has stopped buying it.⁷⁶

Despite a ban on independent political groups, about 10 new ones surfaced in Czechoslovakia during 1988. The number of illegal journals also has proliferated. Police dispersed demonstrations advocating religious freedom, protesting the 1968 Soviet invasion, commemorating the country's 1918 independence day, and supporting other causes.⁷⁷ Ten of the 13 Catholic bishoprics remain vacant because the regime refuses to permit the Vatican to play any role in appointments. Nevertheless, pilgrimages to holy sites around the country during the year involved some 700,000 faithful, and almost that many signatures were collected on a petition demanding religious freedom.

The German Democratic Republic (GDR) has avoided both economic and political reforms to date. Party boss Erich Honecker, age 76, has likened experiments in other East European countries to anarchy.⁷⁸ This hard line could not conceal problems in meeting production targets and shortages of consumer goods, due to bad investment policies and poor distribution.

About 5 million East Germans visited West Germany during last year, some 80 percent of them past retirement age. The number of legal emigrants tripled from the year before and totaled almost 30,000. This lowering of barriers to free movement has raised expectations that Soviet reforms may soon be emulated in the GDR and that Honecker's reign (since 1971) may be almost over.⁷⁹

Hungary already experienced its transition in communist party leadership, when 76-year-old János Kádár's rule of more than three decades ended in May 1988. His successor is Károly Grósz (58), who had become prime minister in 1987. Introduction of an economic stabilization program produced a 17–18 percent inflation rate, a lower standard of living,⁸⁰ and a growth of less than 1.5 percent in gross national product.

The number of independent political organizations in Hungary now includes a Hungarian Democratic Forum, a New March Front, and three former political parties, as well as youth, student, and trade union groupings. The Hungarian government has rewritten the law on associations to permit the existence of rival political parties and will reportedly draft a new constitution by early 1990.⁸¹ These developments are well ahead of anything occurring elsewhere in the region.

Poland experienced strikes in April and May and again in August, as the second stage of economic reform introduced radical price increases for basic needs (food, coal, rent), leading to an inflation rate of 120 percent for 1988. Wage demands were met, although the regime refused to recognize the banned Solidarity trade union. The regime promised a choice in June local elections, but these were basically still controlled by the regime (there were only 700 opposition candidates in all for 108,000 posts). Just over half of those eligible voted, the lowest turnout ever under communist rule in Poland.⁸²

General Wojciech Jaruzelski's internal affairs minister met with Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa to end the August 1988 strikes, with the promise of round-table discussions involving government and opposition representatives in the near future (these finally commenced on February 6, 1989, well after the December purge of eight hard-liners from the party Politburo). In December, a "Citizens' Committee" uniting moderate opposition forces was formed in anticipation of the talks. Only a genuine compromise between regime and Solidarity stood a chance of changing a situation in which nearly 70 percent of youths polled expressed the wish to leave Poland.⁸³

In Romania, Nicolae Ceaușescu has reverted to Stalinism. He has stated that economic reform does not mean privatization, that the Communist Party will not share its political power, and that there are no "ready-made forms of socialist construction."⁸⁴ The ruler announced a new policy under which by the year 2000, half of all 13,000 Romanian villages will have been destroyed, with the rural population eventually being moved into some 5,500 agro-industrial centers. The

⁸⁰The consumer price index shot up by an average of almost 16 percent. *Népszabadság* (Budapest), Nov. 2, 1988.

⁸¹Alfred Reisch, "Hungary," RFE-RL, *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Report/251, op. cit., pp. 28–29. See also B. Rodionov, "The MSzMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party] Proposes a Coalition," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Jan. 19, 1989, p. 5.

⁸²Louisa Vinton, "Poland," RFE-RL, *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Report/251, op. cit., pp. 39–42.

⁸³*Rzeczywistość* (Warsaw), Jan. 10, 1988.

⁸⁴Cited by Michael Szafir, in "Romania," RFE-RL, *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Report/251, op. cit., p. 43.

⁷⁶Peter Martin, "Czechoslovakia," RFE-RL, *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Report/251, op. cit., pp. 15–18.

⁷⁷Jiri Rohan, *CARIS Report No. 106/88* (BBC, London), Dec. 29, 1988.

⁷⁸Accounts of 7th SED plenum in *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Dec. 2 and 3, 1988.

⁷⁹Barbara Donovan, "German Democratic Republic," RFE-RL, *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Report/251, op. cit., p. 26.

stated goal is to eliminate private plots and foster communist values, although Romania's ethnic Hungarian minority (and Budapest) see it as an attempt to assimilate them.

Ceaușescu maintains power by rotating key personnel, with wife Elena in charge. Their son Nicu, first secretary of Sibiu county, is being trained to assume his father's position. Brothers of the leader are the deputy defense minister, the chief of cadres for the internal affairs ministry, and the deputy chairman of the State Planning Committee. At a plenum of the Central Committee, Ceaușescu stated that there would be no diminution in the status of the Communist Party.⁸⁵ Despite these policies, Ceaușescu received the Soviet Union's "Order of Lenin" on his 70th birthday, followed by similar awards from East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

Yugoslavia had more problems than any other country in the region. Some 4 to 5 million citizens participated in about 100 political demonstrations. In particular, ethnic disputes centered on Albanian harassment of minorities in Kosovo and fears that Serbia might become dominant under its energetic party president, Slobodan Milosevic. Inflation hit 300 percent, and there were more economic strikes during 1988 than the 1,570 registered in 1987. More than one-third of all enterprises run at a loss, while 60 percent of the workers are below or at the minimum income level. A national party conference at the end of May showed that the party no longer had control over society's agenda.⁸⁶

Reforms endorsed by the 14th Central Committee plenum of the Yugoslav League of Communists in early May are aimed at creating an open, united, market-oriented Yugoslav economy, but may take three or more years to implement. Without elimination of corruption and a thorough purge of incompetent officials as well as a basic reform of the communist party itself, nobody expects a change for the better in living standards—which have declined by some 40 percent since 1982 and are now at the mid-1960's level.⁸⁷ Resignation of the entire government on December 30, 1988, hardly seemed to bode well for the future. Nothing like this had ever happened in the post-World War II period. The year did see the removal of almost all the aging Tito-era leadership in the republics.

The Soviet Union experienced a surprisingly open discussion of issues at the 19th CPSU national conference (June 28–July 1). Gorbachev's speech of more than three hours' duration discussed developments since the 27th CPSU Congress in early 1986 and the

forthcoming transformation of the USSR's political system. The 4,991 delegates received his report with reservations, applauding the speaker most when he touched upon traditional party values and ideals.⁸⁸ Despite a packing of delegates by the opposition, Gorbachev seemed to have obtained most of what he wanted.⁸⁹ However, it was not until September 30 that he could break the Secretariat's traditional control of the party organization at the top and disperse power among six new commissions, all headed by secretaries with carefully defined responsibilities. The following day, Gorbachev replaced Andrey Gromyko as titular president of the country.

The Soviet party/government chief faced serious nationality problems within the USSR. The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (75 percent Armenian, although inside Azerbaijan) had been the scene of riots that triggered martial law. It was placed under direct control of Moscow in January 1989.⁹⁰ The Baltic states, which attempted to obtain genuine autonomy without resorting to violence, found their quest frustrated when Gorbachev announced that certain resolutions adopted by the Estonian Supreme Soviet were "null and void." The popular front movements in all three republics remain active, however.

Western Europe. The fortunes of the communist parties in Western Europe have undergone dramatic change. Representatives of these movements met in Dublin during the late fall to discuss implications of the Single European Act, which will unify eight of the members of the European Community in 1992. Those assembled called for "a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, a common home for all peoples."⁹¹

The French communists were still in disarray from their worst electoral showing in 60 years, in 1986, when they received only 9.8 percent of the vote in elections to the National Assembly. They fared little better in June

⁸⁸Heinz Brahm, "The 'Small Party Congress' in Moscow (June 28–July 1, 1988)," *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien* (Cologne), No. 34, 1988, pp. 13–16.

⁸⁹Cf. *Theses of the CPSU Central Committee for the 19th All-Union Party Conference*, Moscow, Novosti, 1988, p. 30, and *Rezolyutsii XIX vsesoyuznoy konferentsii KPSS, 1. iyulya 1988* (Resolutions of the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU, July 1, 1988), Moscow, Politizdat, 1988. See also John Tedstrom, "The Party Conference on Economic Reform: More of the Same," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 304/88, July 6, 1988; and Dawn Mann, "The Party Conference Resolution on Bureaucracy," *ibid.*, RL 306/88, July 6, 1988.

⁹⁰"Decree by Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet," *Pravda*, Jan. 15, 1989.

⁹¹"European CP's Discuss 1992," *Morning Star* (London), Oct. 11, 1988, listed the communist parties of Ireland, Great Britain, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Portugal, and "the Peoples of Spain" as taking part. Observers attended from Belgium and *World Marxist Review*.

⁸⁵*Scinteia* (Bucharest), Nov. 29, 1988.

⁸⁶See *Pravda*, May 30, 1988.

⁸⁷Milan Andrejevich, "Yugoslavia," RFE-RL, *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Report/251, op. cit., pp. 47–51.

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1988, with 11.3 percent (a loss of eight seats) in the parliamentary election called after François Mitterrand's re-election to the presidency. Relations with the Socialist Party continued to deteriorate, so that it may be difficult to preserve leftist unity in the March 1989 municipal elections. Nevertheless, an agreement between the two parties was concluded for the largest possible list of common candidates.⁹²

Another independent-progressive (formerly called "Eurocommunist") movement, the Italian Communist Party or PCI, also suffered a loss of support in local elections, from 37 down to 22 percent. The PCI continued to give strong support for Soviet reforms, and even threatened to break with the CPSU if Gorbachev were to be ousted.⁹³ Also on the international front, the Italian Communists have been contacting foreign socialist leaders for possible agreements or even political mergers in the European Parliament at Strasbourg.⁹⁴ Replacement of Alessandro Natta (age 70) as general secretary by Achille Occhetto (52) in May conceivably was related to this last endeavor.

The CPSU has relations with both the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) and the Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain (PCPE), which had split off. There also exists a third movement, the Spanish Workers' Party-Communist Unity (PTE-UC).⁹⁵ At a congress in mid-January 1989, leaders of the first two agreed to end their split. PCPE leader Ignacio Gallego, who had been expelled from his own party for supporting the merger, was among 23 former PCPE members coopted to the merged party's new Central Committee. The CPSU signified its neutrality by sending a low-level functionary, Kiev oblast party committee first secretary Grigoriy Revenko.⁹⁶

The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) has been losing popular support over the past three elections, from 18.8 percent in 1983 down to 12.2 percent in 1987.⁹⁷ An attempt to bring about internal party reforms at the 12th PCP congress in December 1988 proved abortive when a motion for secret ballots gained only 30 votes from the 2,000 delegates. It is interesting to note that chief Soviet ideologist Vadim Medvedev represented the CPSU at this congress.⁹⁸

The German Communist Party (DKP) faced internal dissension: its 9th Congress, held January 6–7, 1989, had to be broken off and continued a week later because of the "two lines in the party," according to its

chairman. The CPSU was represented at the gathering by Aleksandr Yakovlev, Politburo member and chairman of the Party Commission on Questions of International Policy of the Central Committee.⁹⁹ The DKP, known for its subservience to the East German regime, has lost members steadily since 1985.

To the split Finnish Communist Party—consisting of the progressive wing (SKP) and the hard-line Unity party (SKP-Y)—there was added on May 21, 1988, a third, even more orthodox splinter group, the Communist Workers' Party. The first two have been discussing reunification, although this had not led to an agreement by year's end.¹⁰⁰

In Greece, the Greek Communist Party (KKE) urged the KKE-Interior (which itself had split last year) to join the forces of the left. KKE General Secretary Kharilaos Florakis has attempted to improve relations with the Greek Left (E.AR), the more moderate of the KKE-I factions. It is possible that some agreement will be achieved early in 1989. Preparations are also being made for a common list in the June 1989 elections of Greece's representatives to the European Parliament.

In neighboring Turkey, the Communist and Workers' parties agreed to form the United Communist Party of Turkey, which remains illegal. The new party issued a New Year's message at the outset of 1989 demanding, among other things, freedom for party leaders who had been arrested in late 1987 after their return from eight years of exile in Western Europe and are now on trial.¹⁰¹

⁹²Radio Paris, Jan. 12, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-WEU*, Jan. 13, 1989, p. 18.

⁹³Gianni Cervetti, "Perspectives in Renovation," *World Marxist Review*, October 1988, pp. 86–89.

⁹⁴*La Repubblica* (Rome), Nov. 10, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-WEU*, Jan. 5, 1989, pp. 21–22.

⁹⁵Devlin, loc. cit., p. 5.

⁹⁶"Work of the Congress Ends," *Pravda*, Jan. 16, 1989; Moscow Radio, Jan. 21, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 24, 1989; also *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 18, 1989, pp. 37–38, and Feb. 17, 1989, pp. 37–39.

⁹⁷Devlin, loc. cit., p. 3.

⁹⁸See his interview in *Diário de Notícias* (Lisbon), Dec. 4, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 12, 1988, pp. 36–37.

⁹⁹"DKP Congress Will Be Extended," *Pravda*, Jan. 9, 1989; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Jan. 16, 1989.

¹⁰⁰Devlin, loc. cit., pp. 4–5; "Efforts Toward Reuniting CP," *Hufvudstadsbladet* (Helsinki), in Swedish, Nov. 22, 1988, p. 2, trans. in *FBIS-WEU*, Jan. 5, 1989, pp. 25–26.

¹⁰¹Our Radio (clandestine from Magdeburg, GDR) in Turkish, Jan. 1, trans. in *FBIS-WEU*, Jan. 3, 1989, p. 28. See also article by Clyde Haberman in *The New York Times*, Jan. 14, 1989.

Soviet-Line Fronts in 1988

Wallace Spaulding

IN 1988, the activities of the major Soviet-line international front groups in 1988 resembled those of the previous year, although the propaganda themes differed modestly. Ranging in character from the heavily communist World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), to the more diverse World Peace Council (WPC), to the technically non-communist Christian Peace Conference (CPC), the fronts have over the years sponsored conferences, meetings, publications, and other undertakings aimed at persuading non-communists to support causes and outlooks favorable to Soviet foreign policy objectives. Recently, their closeness to Moscow has been manifest in the particular interest in Asia-Pacific matters exhibited by the fronts, reflecting the concern with the region enunciated by General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev at Vladivostok in 1986 and Krasnoyarsk in 1988.

In Table 1, I present a current tabulation of the 17 international fronts that have been noted at one or more of the periodic meetings of "closely-coordinating non-governmental organizations" (as they call themselves) that have been held since at least 1979.¹ Where there is new information since last year's listing, the source is provided in the footnotes of the table.

Control and coordination. Moscow continued to exercise control of the international fronts primarily by means of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Soviet affiliates of the respective fronts, and the Soviet representatives of these affiliates in the fronts' international headquarters.² Usually these Sovi-

ets are one of several secretaries, who are the only full-time officers employed at front headquarters to run the organization on a day-to-day basis. (The president and vice presidents usually reside in their home countries and meet together only occasionally.)

Unlike the other fronts, in the case of the International Union of Students (IUS) and the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), the organization's president and vice presidents are involved to some degree in the day-to-day running of the respective organizations. The president, vice presidents, secretary general, secretaries, and treasurer of the IUS are all members of the organization's Executive Committee.³ Incumbents of the equivalent positions in the WFDY also make up that front's Bureau.⁴ As part of their involvement in the daily operation of the organization, vice presidents of the IUS and WFDY serve on the staffs of these organizations' magazines, normally a function limited to headquarters staffers (Jose de la Rosa Castillo in the case of *World Student News*, and Abd-al-Basit Musa in the case of *World Youth*). This may explain why Soviet nationals, again uniquely, have usually not occupied secretarial slots in the IUS and the WFDY⁵—a Soviet vice president suffices for control.

Influence is also exercised through the Prague-based *World Marxist Review* (WMR—known in many languages as *Problems of Peace and Socialism*), which participates in joint activities with the fronts, publi-

Wallace Spaulding, a Colonel in the USAR (ret.), is a Washington-based observer of international communist affairs. The present article is a revised version of Col. Spaulding's contribution to the Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1988, forthcoming from Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA.

¹Wallace Spaulding, "Communist Fronts in 1986," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1987, p. 59.

²*The CIA and the Media*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, US House of Representatives, Dec. 27, 1977–April 20, 1978, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1978, p. 574.

³*IUS Secretariat Reports* (Prague), No. 7–8, 1988; *World Student News* (Prague), No. 2, 1988, p. 23.

⁴See the handout of the 12th Assembly of the World Federation of Democratic Youth, Budapest, "Proposal for the Composition of the WFDY Bureau."

⁵On this point, see Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, Stanford, Ca, Hoover Institution Press, 1981, p. 461.

Table 1: Major International Communist Front Organizations

Organization (President; secretary-general)	Year founded	Headquarters	Claimed membership	Affiliates	Countries
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) (Murad Ghalib; Nuri Abd-al Razzaq Husayn) ¹	1957	Cairo	No data	87	No data
Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace (ABCP) (Kharkuu Gaadan; G. Lubsan Tseren)	1970	Ulaanbaatar	No data	15	12
Berlin Conference of European Catholics (BCEC) (Franco Leonori; ² Hubertus Guske ²)	1964	East Berlin	No data	No data	No data
Christian Peace Conference (CPC) (Károly Tóth; Lubomir Mirejovsky)	1958	Prague	No data	No data	Ca. 80
International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) (Joe Nordmann; Amar Bentoumi)	1946	Brussels	25,000	No data	Ca. 80
International Federation of Resistance Movements (FIR) (Arialdo Banfi; Alix Lhote)	1951	Vienna	5,000,000	68	29
International Institute for Peace (IIP)	1957	Vienna	No data	No data	No data
International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) (Kaarle Nordenstreng; Dusan Ulcak ²)	1946	Prague	Ca. 250,000	No data	120+
International Radio and Television Organization (OIRT) (Sakari Kuru; Gennadij Codr)	1946	Prague	No data	No data	No data
International Union of Students (IUS)	1946	Prague	Ca. 34,000,000 ³	117 ³	110 ³
Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OSPAAAL) (Susumu Osaki; Rene Anillo Capotr)	1966	Havana	No data	No data	No data
Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) (Freda Brown; Mirjam Vire-Tuominen)	1945	East Berlin	200,000,000	142 ³	124 ³
World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) (Walid Masri; György Szabó ⁴)	1945	Budapest	150,000	Ca. 270	123
World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) (Jean-Marie Legay; Stan Davison)	1946	London	740,000	Ca. 46	70+
World Federation of Teachers' Unions (FISE) (Lesturge Ariyawansa; Gerard Montant)	1946	East Berlin	26,000,000	124	79
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) (Sándor Gáspár; Ibrahim Zakariya)	1945	Prague	Ca. 214,000,000	92	81
World Peace Council (WPC) (Ramesh Chandra, Johannes Pakaslahti)	1950	Helsinki	No data	No data	145 ⁵

¹Ghalib's identity as president was confirmed and the Iraqi Husayn was reelected secretary general at the AAPSO Congress. See *People's Democracy* (New Delhi), Dec. 11, 1988.

²*Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), June 20, 1988.

³*World Student News* (Prague), No. 2, 1988, p. 22; membership figure includes newly-incorporated secondary school students; the number of affiliates is apparently for university level only.

⁴*WFDY News* (Budapest), No. 8-9, 1988.

⁵Prague, CTK, March 18, 1988, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Europe* (Washington, DC), Mar. 21, 1988, p. 14.

cizes front events, and provides a forum for front leaders. For example, the January and May 1988 issues of the journal carried information about a separate joint seminar sponsored by the WFTU and the *WMR* on "social injustice." Also, Josef Skala, President of the IUS, published a major policy statement on behalf of his organization in the July 1988 issue. The *WMR*, although officially the organ of some 70 communist parties, is tightly controlled by the Soviets; its relations with the international fronts are handled by a "Problems of Peace and Democratic Movements Commission."⁶

Aside from the ultimate control by the CPSU International Department and the influence exercised by the

Soviet-dominated *WMR*, two other mechanisms serve to coordinate the activities of the international fronts. As noted above, they meet together periodically, generally at least once a year. In addition, most of the top leaders sit on the WPC, which gives the periodic meetings of the various subdivisions of that organization—Bureau, Presidential Committee, and Council—a similar coordinating role.⁷

⁶Wallace Spaulding, "New Head, Old 'Problems of Peace and Socialism,'" *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1982, pp. 57–62.

⁷Spaulding, "Communist Fronts in 1986," loc. cit., p. 57.

In different years, different parts of the world seem to be the principal locus of major front gatherings. In 1988, the honor fell to India and the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

Perhaps because of its leadership role in the Non-Aligned Movement, India was chosen as the site of three major front gatherings in 1988. In November, India hosted the 7th Congress of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO). The second meeting (in May) of the International Preparatory Committee for the World Youth Festival and the yearly meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) General Council (in October) also were held in India.

The Soviet Union has long used the GDR to assist its efforts in cultivating influence in the Third World. In line with this Soviet policy, East Germany was chosen as a second major locus of front activity in 1988. In June, East Berlin hosted a major meeting on nuclear-weapons-free zones. More than 1,000 delegates attended this meeting, which exceeded the AAPSO gathering in size. Although this meeting was not formally a front gathering (the East German government sponsored the event), more leaders of international fronts attended this gathering than were reported at any front gathering during the year.⁸ Moreover, the meeting used the East German Peace Council's mailing address as the mailing address for its preparatory committee,⁹ and its subject matter was an important front theme (see below).

East German party leader Erich Honecker was heavily involved in opening and closing the gathering, meeting with foreign delegations, and holding a reception for attendees.¹⁰ Honecker's visible participation was reminiscent of Fidel Castro's behavior during the series of conferences on foreign debt held in Havana in the summer of 1985, but contrasted with Mikhail Gorbachev's more limited involvement in the Moscow conferences of leading "personalities" on the theme "For a Nuclear Free World, for the Survival of Humanity," and of women in 1987.¹¹ (Premier Rajiv Gandhi did keynote the AAPSO congress—a propaganda coup for the meeting's organizers—but otherwise he remained in the background.) Honecker also addressed the third meeting of the International Preparatory Committee for the World Youth Festival held in East Berlin. Other meetings that took place in the GDR included the 10th plenary session of the Berlin Conference of European Catholics (BCEC), in June, and the 10th conference of the Trade Union International of Building Workers, in September. In each case, it was the highest level of meeting that the respective organization held during 1988.

In 1988, three worldwide fronts attempted to strengthen their identification with subsidiary organizations they originally had spawned to foster the illusion of

the subsidiaries' independence. Two of these attempts occurred in the context of the WFTU General Council meeting. First, one of the major documents presented at that meeting called for a closer relationship between WFTU and the 11 trade union internationals (TUI's).¹² Second, the day after the Council meeting ended, the Asian-Pacific Trade Union Co-ordination Committee began its annual sessions in the same city. The latter organization extends Soviet influence in the trade union movement by joining WFTU affiliates in the region with leftist but non-WFTU unions.¹³ (This back-to-back technique was also in evidence when AAPSO's Asia-Pacific Presidium met in Vientiane on August 3-6, followed by an AAPSO conference on Kampuchea in nearby Phnom Penh on August 6-7. Note also that an even more closely intertwined *concurrent* set of meetings took place in Havana in October—of the Continental Front of Women from the 3rd to the 7th and of Latin American peace movements from the 3rd to the 5th.)

The third example of the forging of a closer link between a parent front organization and one of its de facto subsidiaries occurred at the Acapulco Congress of the Federation of Latin American Journalists (FELAP). The newly-elected FELAP president and secretary general, Armando Rollemberg and Ernesto Vera respectively, are, unlike their predecessors, vice presidents of the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ). Luis Suarez, reelected FELAP secretary, is also an IOJ vice president. Moreover, Vera, a Cuban, heads the recently-established IOJ regional center in Mexico City, where FELAP has its headquarters. Note also that former IOJ Secretary General Jiři Kubka had recently been appointed Czechoslovakia's Ambassador to Mexico and that he attended the Acapulco Congress (as did his IOJ successor).¹⁴

In contrast to such efforts to tighten up the mechanisms of control over trade union and journalist activities, Moscow gave the appearance of loosening control over the Soviet-line peace movement. To begin with, the peace movement's leaders admitted their past biases. Already in 1987, the WPC had recognized the

⁸*Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), June 20, 1988.

⁹See *Peace Courier* (Helsinki), No. 4, 1988.

¹⁰East Berlin, ADN, June 20 and 22, 1988, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-EEU*), June 21, 1988, pp. 2-5, and June 23, 1988, pp. 4, 5, 12-13.

¹¹Cf. Wallace Spaulding, "Communist Fronts in 1985," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1986, pp. 75-76, and idem, "Communist Fronts in 1987," *ibid.*, January-February 1988, pp. 84-85.

¹²*Flashes from the Trade Unions* (Prague), Nov. 11, 1988.

¹³Spaulding, "Communist Fronts in 1985," *loc. cit.*, p. 74.

¹⁴*Excelsior* (Mexico City), Oct. 17 and 20, 1988; *IOJ Newsletter* (Prague), No. 11, June 1988.

need for looser controls (or at least the appearance of looser controls). Thus, in 1987, WPC Secretary General Johannes Pakaslahti openly acknowledged that the one-sided stand of his organization had limited its effectiveness, and he called for cooperation, not confrontation, with other elements of the peace movement.¹⁵ In 1988, Soviet ex-WPC Secretary Tair Tairov underscored this theme when he admitted that the WPC had developed into a mere instrument of Soviet policy and added that too much emphasis had been placed on high-level conferences at the expense of "grass-roots" movements.¹⁶ The WPC's Soviet vice president, Genrikh Borovik, echoed these comments and claimed that the Soviet Peace Committee (SPC, of which he is chairman) had already developed relations with a broad spectrum of domestic political organizations.¹⁷ (Incidentally, in "explaining" why the SPC could offer little help in getting the WPC on the right track, Tairov said that the Soviet body had not made much progress in *glasnost* and that Borovik's election as SPC chairman had taken place undemocratically.¹⁸)

As a consequence of this growing concern, the November meeting of the WPC Bureau proposed that sessions of the organization's two largest bodies should have equal or near-equal representation from WPC and from non-WPC organizations (150 each on the Presidential Committee, and 400 WPC to 300 non-WPC delegates to the forthcoming December 1989 Council meeting). Ironically, although Pakaslahti had been one of the public initiators of the current campaign to open up the WPC to outside forces, he himself may have been maneuvered out of his job when the same Bureau meeting apparently eliminated the post of secretary general in the course of a restructuring designed to reduce the size of WPC bodies.¹⁹

Other fronts, too, attempted to accommodate a wider range of views than previously. The November AAPSO Congress decided that, henceforth, non-Afro-Asian associate members would be given a greater voice in running the organization, including the privilege of being elected to the Bureau of the AAPSO Presidium.²⁰ In addition, the IOJ, while tightening control of FELAP, stated its intent to open the IOJ publication *Democratic Journalist* to freer discussion and to cosponsor the "first ever" conference of secular and church journalists.²¹

Finally, it is worth noting that other organizations emulated the model presented by the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War—with its Soviet and American initiatives and co-presidents—but with an added Swedish dimension. In 1988, the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear War, which began to organize in 1987, was officially inaugurated at an April meeting in Stockholm with Soviet, American,

and Swedish co-presidents.²² A new International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Humanity emerged in January, with headquarters in Moscow but with "missions" in the United States and Sweden; it has a Soviet chairman and an American vice chairman.²³ One might also mention the April meeting in Kabul at which "Soviet, American, and Afghan academic figures" discussed the situation in Afghanistan. In structure, this gathering also brought to mind Castro's conference of "personalities" on the debt issue in 1985 and the 1987 Moscow meeting of important "personalities" on the theme of a nuclear-free world.²⁵

Themes. The themes to be promoted during 1988 (and the order of priority accorded them) were spelled out in the WPC's *Programme of Action, 1988*, published in December 1987, and were closely mirrored in the resolutions adopted by the WFTU General Council in October 1988.²⁶ The functional themes of both, with one exception, were identical and listed in the same order: (1) peace, security, and disarmament; (2) socioeconomic development, (3) human rights, and (4) environmental concerns. The *Programme of Action* had one additional topic, "culture and education for peace," which it put in fourth place, relegating the environment to fifth.

The five categories of the *Programme of Action* also provided five of the six points of the agenda for the April International Encounter for Peace, Disarmament, and

¹⁵*Peace Courier*, No. 8, 1987; *World Marxist Review* (London edition), November 1977, p. 76–79.

¹⁶*Information* (Copenhagen), Aug. 13–14, 1988; *Rauhan Puolesta* (Helsinki), September 1988, as quoted in *Tribune* (Sydney), Oct. 5, 1988.

¹⁷*Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 10, 1988, pp. 61–62; *Kansan Uutiset* (Helsinki), Oct. 29, 1988.

¹⁸*Rauhan Puolesta*, loc. cit.; *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (Moscow), June 25, 1988.

¹⁹*Peace Courier*, No. 12, 1988.

²⁰*New Age* (New Delhi), Dec. 4, 1988; and *People's Democracy* (New Delhi), Dec. 11, 1988.

²¹*Democratic Journalist* (Prague), No. 5, 1988, p. 2; and *Rudé Právo* (Prague), Dec. 12, 1988.

²²Petr Demichev, a then-candidate member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union met in Moscow with Stig Gustafsson, co-president of the new organization, on June 13. See Moscow, TASS, June 13, 1988, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), June 16, 1988, p. 6. Plans to organize such a group were noted in Spaulding, "Communist Fronts in 1987," loc. cit., p. 85.

²³Moscow, TASS, Nov. 15, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 17, 1988, p. 6.

²⁴Kabul, BAKHTAR, April 18, 1988, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Near East and South Asia* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-NES*), April 19, 1988, p. 56; Kabul, BAKHTAR, April 19, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-NES*, April 20, 1988, pp. 43–44; Kabul, BAKHTAR, April 22, 1988, in *FBIS-NES*, April 22, 1988, p. 48; Kabul, BAKHTAR, April 24, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-NES*, April 25, 1988, p. 49.

²⁵Spaulding, "Communist Fronts in 1985," pp. 75–76, and idem, "Communist Fronts in 1987," p. 85.

²⁶*Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Nov. 11, 1988.

Life, held in Merida, Venezuela, and cosponsored by the University of the Andes, the WPC, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).²⁷ Similarly, the AAPSO Congress declaration had "peace and disarmament" in first place, followed by what were essentially economic development and human rights provisions, but in reverse order from that of the WPC/WFTU listings described above, and with "national liberation" provisions inserted in between.²⁸ AAPSO gave short shrift to environmental and cultural issues. Under the rubric of "peace, security, and disarmament," the fronts emphasized their approval of the INF Treaty, which Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed in December 1987.²⁹ The WFTU's newsletter referred to the INF Treaty as "a decisive step toward ridding the world of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000,"³⁰ an idea put forth by Gorbachev in 1986 and the theme of two major front congresses in 1987.³¹ Similarly, the BCEC June 1988 plenum was held under the motto: "Free of Nuclear Weapons by 2000 A.D."³²

Front meetings—e.g., the AAPSO conference in Kabul in March and the WPC Presidium meeting in Prague the same month—also focused on regional conflicts. However, as the Angolan, Iran-Iraq, and Afghanistan wars wound down during the year, this subject seemed to receive less and less attention, although WFDY at its December executive meeting in Kiev still made note of it. Significantly, one conflict where little progress toward settlement had occurred—Kampuchea—was the subject of an AAPSO meeting in Phnom Penh in August (noted above).

The most striking subdivision of the peace and disarmament theme emphasized in 1988 seems to have been the "nuclear-free zone/nuclear-weapons-free zone/zone of peace" category. The East Berlin conference on nuclear-weapons-free zones has already been mentioned as one of the largest front gatherings during the year. Zones of peace were proposed for the South Atlantic—the subject of a June WFDY and a September WPC meeting, both in Brasilia; the Indian Ocean—the subject of a WPC/AAPSO meeting in Antananarivo, Madagascar, in April and a topic emphasized by the WFTU Bureau meeting in Addis Ababa in March and the AAPSO Asia-Pacific Presidium meeting in Vientiane; Korea—the subject of an October WPC meeting in Pyongyang; and the Asia-Pacific region—emphasized by the WFTU Bureau meeting in Addis Ababa, the WFTU General Council (New Delhi), and a WFDY Asia Pacific youth meeting in Sydney in May. In a related vein, the Vientiane AAPSO meeting advocated the removal of bases from the Asia-Pacific region (chiefly, from the Philippines, Japan, and Diego Garcia).³³

The "development" theme remained a favorite of the trade union fronts and continued to be pursued in relation both to disarmament (the message being that Western disarmament should release funds for Third World development) and to the burden of foreign debts (which were seen to hinder Third World development). In February, the WFTU conference in Paris on international economic security had workshops devoted to the relationship between disarmament and development and to more equitable international economic cooperation. It also took up the subjects of Third World debt and hunger.³⁴ At a June meeting in Geneva, the WFTU-related Dublin Committee called for a "Disarmament for Development Fund" to be set up under United Nations auspices.³⁵ This idea was supported at the WFTU General Council meeting in October, which called for a world trade union conference on development and for trade union action against "the consequences of the unpayable external debt."³⁶

The theme of unbearable foreign debt, first raised by the Cubans in the Latin American context in 1985, was taken up in the African setting by two WFTU conferences in Addis Ababa, one devoted explicitly to the subject in December 1987 and at the Bureau meeting in March 1988. In addition, the October meeting of the Asian-Pacific Trade Union Co-ordination Committee dealt with the issue of foreign debt in the Asia-Pacific region.³⁷

Along this line, the "New International Economic Order"—which is to redress the imbalance of wealth between the Third World and the developed capitalist countries—plus the disarmament for development theme (see above) found a new parallel in the "New International Scientific Order," proposed by World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) President Jean-Marie Legay in January.³⁸ Apparently, although no explanation was made in the cited source, under the

²⁷Conference brochure.

²⁸*New Age*, Dec. 4, 1988.

²⁹*Flashes from the Trade Unions*, June 17, 1988.

³⁰*Ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1988.

³¹Spaulding, "Communist Fronts in 1987," loc. cit., p. 85.

³²*Neues Deutschland*, June 3, 1988.

³³Angolan Domestic Service, (Luanda), June 21, 1988; *Peace Courier*, No. 10, 1988; *ibid.*, No. 5 (1988); *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, April 15, 1988; Laotian Domestic Service (Vientiane), August 3–5, 1988; *Neues Deutschland*, October 22–23, 1988; *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, April 15, 1988; *ibid.*, November 11, 1988; and *The Guardian* (Sydney), May 11, 1988.

³⁴*L'Humanité* (Paris), Feb. 25, 1988.

³⁵*Flashes from the Trade Unions*, July 1, 1988. On the Dublin Committee's relationship to the WFTU, see Spaulding, "Communist Fronts in 1985," loc. cit., p. 75.

³⁶*New Age*, Nov. 6, 1988.

³⁷*Ibid.*, Nov. 13, 1988.

³⁸Sofia, BTA, Jan. 23, 1988, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 25, 1988, p. 9.

new "New International Scientific Order," scientific resources would be directed from military to peaceful uses so as to benefit the developing nations.

Befitting the 40th anniversary of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, the fronts emphasized human rights, although their treatment of the topic was narrow and linked to other major themes. For example, the WPC's *Programme of Action, 1988* began with the "right to life and peace" and then gave primary emphasis to "racism and apartheid," focusing on South Africa, Namibia, and Palestine.³⁹ Both the September WFTU memorandum to the United Nations and the CPC's October Continuation Committee meeting in Görlitz, GDR, called attention to South Africa and Palestine.⁴⁰ Moreover, Palestine was the subject of an AAPSO meeting in Nicosia in June and of a special session of the AAPSO Congress in New Delhi.

The WFTU was especially active in highlighting the issue of workers' rights. It apparently cosponsored a symposium with the *WMR* on "the working class and social injustice" in early 1988, in June held a conference in Sofia on "human and trade union rights," and had articles on trade union rights in nearly half of the issues of its *World Trade Union Movement*.⁴¹ The January 1988 Asia-Pacific young workers conference held in Alma Ata called for "the right to participate in trade union life and the building of a progressive society."⁴² The AAPSO Congress, not surprisingly, stressed rights associated with political and economic independence (with a slap at transnational corporations under the latter rubric).⁴³ Finally, IUS President Josef Skala in the July issue of *WMR* (p. 51) noted, without further clarification, the formation of an International Center for the Defense of Student Rights, apparently modeled on the International Center for the Defense of Trade Union Rights, set up in Prague in November 1987.⁴⁴

The issue of the environment provided another focus of attention in 1988. The WPC's monthly *Peace Courier* carried articles devoted to ecological issues throughout the year (Nos. 4, 5, 7/8, 10, and 12). In March, the 10th Agricultural Workers TUI Conference in Prague underscored the ecological issue, and the WPC Presidential Committee meeting stressed environmental protection as a human right. The WPC/UNESCO April "International Encounter" in Merida, Venezuela, complained that the Third World is treated as "the dump site of international contaminated waste material."⁴⁵ An August-September WPC seminar in Porto Alegre, Brazil, devoted attention to the Amazon rain forest. The No. 12, 1988, issue of *Peace Courier* carried an article attributing the depletion of that area to the demand for more beef-cattle grazing, in turn the result of the demand for hamburgers (again transnational corporations were

depicted as the culprits). Less spectacularly, the WFTU's *World Trade Union Movement*, No. 11-12, 1988, devoted 7 of its 33 pages to ecological issues.

As suggested above, the WPC seemed to be almost the sole purveyor among the fronts of the theme of "culture and education for peace" (the World Federation of Teachers Unions [FISE] is the other front notably concerned about this matter).⁴⁶ Even the WPC, however, did not give the subject much attention during the year, despite the fact that the United Nations has declared 1988-1997 the World Decade for Cultural Development. (WPC Vice President Mikis Theodorakis played a leading role in a conference on the subject, held in Tübingen in May, but, with only 10 percent of the participants coming from outside West Germany, we are reluctant to consider it an international front meeting.)⁴⁷

Surprisingly, the WPC seems to have avoided a "natural" front theme linked to that of culture and education—the New International Information and Communications Order (NIICO), which would give Third World nations control over the news distribution for their respective countries rather than allowing Western news agencies the scope they currently have there. This omission occurred even in a *Peace Courier* article, No. 12, entitled "The West Distorts Third World Reality," which highlighted the very situation that the NIICO is purportedly designed to overcome.

By contrast, the NIICO had been discussed at the WFDY's Bureau meeting in December 1987. More significant from our standpoint, the IOJ's *Democratic Journalist* had articles devoted to it in three of its first 11 issues of 1988 (Nos. 3, 4, and 5). This latter fact suggests a specialized interest similar to that of trade union rights in the case of *World Trade Union Movement*, and ecology in the case of *Peace Courier*.

As in 1987, the fronts continued to stress the importance of the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, for the first time, an AAPSO Congress and a WFTU General Council meeting took place in Asia. The upcoming World Youth Festival—cosponsored by the IUS and the WFDY—is scheduled for July 1989 in Pyongyang, the first such festival scheduled to be held in Asia. This concentration of meetings may have marked a follow-through of the Asia-Pacific emphasis noted in front activity in

³⁹Op. cit., pp. 5-6.

⁴⁰*Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Sept. 30, 1988; *CPC Information* (Prague), Nov. 3, 1988.

⁴¹Nos. 2, 3, 7, and 8.

⁴²*Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Feb. 12, 1988.

⁴³*New Age*, Dec. 4, 1988.

⁴⁴Spaulding, "Communist Fronts in 1987," loc. cit., p. 87.

⁴⁵Conference brochure.

⁴⁶*Teachers of the World* (Prague), No. 4, 1988, p. xvi.

⁴⁷*World Student News*, No. 12, 1988, pp. 12-13.

1987.⁴⁸ The importance of Asia also can be seen in the number of conferences described above that were held in the area (although it might be noted that Eastern and Western Europe combined edged out Asia in this respect).⁴⁹ In addition, the WPC's *Programme of Action*, 1988 devoted more space to Asia and the Pacific than to any other geographic area.⁵⁰ Incidentally, Gorbachev's September 16, 1988, speech in Krasnoyarsk reiterated the interest in the region evident in his 1986 Vladivostok speech.

Personnel. The most salient changes in front leadership are noted in Table 1 above. In addition, a variety of other changes in leading front personnel occurred in 1988. New IOJ vice presidents noted during the year are: Chou Chang Chun (North Korea), Leszek Gontarski (Poland), and Edgar Jaramillo (Ecuador).⁵¹ IOJ secretaries newly noted were: Konstantin Ivanov (Bulgaria?), Leena Pakku (Finland), Constantin Pisacaru (Romania?), and Bernd Rayer (GDR).⁵² Incidentally, during 1988, the IOJ Secretariat appeared unique for its lack of Africans and Asians. Consequently, Rayer had the African (and apparently also the Arab) account, while Pisacaru seemed to cover Asia.⁵³ By early 1989, however, the situation appeared to have been partially remedied by the appointment of Christopher Muzavazsi (South Africa?) as an IOJ secretary.⁵⁴

From the lists of the *World Student News* editorial board, it would seem fairly certain that since the Ghanaian Pius Dakora has replaced his countryman Philip Gardiner on that body, he has also replaced him as the Ghanaian IUS secretary.⁵⁵ Similarly, one may infer that Veselin Valchev has replaced V. Zlatinov as Bulgarian IUS secretary, although the latter had never been definitely identified in that position.⁵⁶ We do have definite information that Mouhamadou M. Fall is the new Senegalese vice president of the IUS.⁵⁷ Finally, IUS Secretary Gaston Grisoni has been identified as a Uruguayan.⁵⁸

Newly-noted WFDY vice presidents Luis Cardoso (Portugal) and Matthew T. Rajajai (India) also sit on the Editorial Board of *World Youth*.⁵⁹ It also seems fairly certain that since the Dane S. Brostrom has replaced his countryman Henrik Andersen on that board, he has also replaced him as WFDY's Danish secretary.⁶⁰ Other members of the *World Youth* Editorial Board in 1988 may also occupy the slots allocated to their respective countries on the WFDY Bureau, thus demonstrating that these people are involved in the day-to-day running of the organization: vice presidents—A. Kovylov (USSR), C. de Negri (Chile); deputy secretary general—R. Lopez (Colombia); secretaries—V. Georgakakis (Greece) and U. Brockmeyer or B. Grassler (GDR).⁶¹

A comparison of the WPC's *New Perspectives* issues No. 6 for 1987 and No. 6 for 1988 shows that the organization obtained the following new vice presidents during the year: Genrikh Borovik (USSR), Abou Camara (Guinea), Marcelino Jaen (Panama), Jorge Alberto Kreyness (Argentina), Sarwar Mangal (Afghanistan), Hugo Mejias Bricero (Nicaragua), and Ali Ameri Muhammad (Tanzania). How long these people will remain members is unknown, in view of the fact that the WPC's Bureau in November proposed that the Bureau include only 30 vice presidents rather than the current 51.⁶² (It was not indicated whether 21 vice presidents would lose their positions altogether or merely their seats on the Bureau.)

A comparison of the aforementioned issues of *New Perspectives* also indicates the following new members of the publication's editorial board: Marjut Helminen (Finland) and Ray Stewart (New Zealand). And as noted above, Pakaslahti and the position of secretary general may be eliminated from the WPC.

The WFTU added a new secretary for Black Africa, the Congolese Messeambia Koulimaya.⁶³ Hans Christoph is the new FISE secretary for East Germany, while Jamil Shikada (Palestine), Antonio Jaimes A (Mexico), Helga Labs (GDR), Michele Baracat (France), and Rimm Papilov (USSR) were newly noted vice presidents of that organization.⁶⁴ Newly identified AAPSO personnel were Deputy Secretary General S. S. al-Gampi (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) and secretaries T. Schubert (GDR), S. Molifi (South Africa), and P. Spassov (Bulgaria, presumably replacing the Czechoslovak Ivan Plechaty).⁶⁵

⁴⁸Spaulding, "Communist Fronts in 1987," loc. cit., p. 86.

⁴⁹*World Student News*, No. 12, 1988, pp. 7–10.

⁵⁰*New Perspectives* (Helsinki), No. 1, 1989, p. 17.

⁵¹*Democratic Journalist*, No. 1, 1988, p. 2.

⁵²*IOJ Newsletter*, Nos. 2, 3, 15, and 18, 1988.

⁵³*Ibid.*, Nos. 7 and 18, 1988.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, No. 1, 1989.

⁵⁵*World Student News*, No. 11, 1988, p. 2; on his predecessor, see *ibid.*, No. 1, 1986, p. 1; and Spaulding, "Communist Fronts in 1986," loc. cit., p. 63.

⁵⁶*World Student News*, No. 11, 1988, p. 2; on his predecessor, see Spaulding "Communist Fronts in 1986," loc. cit., p. 63.

⁵⁷*World Student News*, No. 7, 1987, p. 9, and No. 4, 1987, p. 22.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*

⁵⁹*Op. cit.*, No. 3, 1988, p. 1; and *The Guardian*, May 18, 1988.

⁶⁰*World Youth*, No. 3, 1988, p. 1; cf. *ibid.*, No. 11–12, 1986, inside front cover, and Spaulding "Communist Fronts in 1986," loc. cit., p. 64.

⁶¹12th Assembly of the World Federation of Democratic Youth, op. cit.; and *World Youth*, No. 3, 1988, p. 1.

⁶²*Peace Courier*, No. 12, 1988.

⁶³*World Trade Union Movement*, No. 8, 1988, inside front cover.

⁶⁴Pyongyang, KCNA, Sept. 8, 1988, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Asia* (Washington, DC), Sept. 9, 1988, p. 24; *Teachers of the World*, No. 4, 1987, p. 2.

⁶⁵*Afro-Asian Solidarity* (Cairo), Nos. 3–4, 1988, inside front cover.

Books

The Chinese Revolution Reevaluated

Stephen C. Averill

CHONG-SIK LEE. *Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria: Chinese Communism and Soviet Interest, 1922–1945*. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1983.

STEVEN I. LEVINE. *Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945–1948*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1987.

FERNANDO GALBIATI. *P'eng P'ai and the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet*. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1985.

YUNG-FA CHEN. *Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937–1945*. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1986.

THE Chinese Revolution is generally viewed, together with the French and Russian revolutions, as one of a triumvirate of "great revolutions"

whose convulsions have shaken and helped shape the modern world. Within this triumvirate, the Chinese case has been viewed as the paramount example of a successful "peasant revolution," and as the source of a strategic doctrine (the "Maoist model"): Especially during the late 1960's and early 1970's, it was of intense interest to many who were concerned with either the practical or theoretical study of revolution. While the incidence of Maoist guerrilla struggles—and interest in them—has waned considerably in recent years, the Chinese Revolution continues to invite examination as a prolonged and particularly complex example of rurally-centered violent collective action occurring under the general guidance of a communist party.

My aim in the present essay is to reflect upon certain recent trends in the scholarly study of the Chinese Revolution, focusing my remarks primarily upon issues raised in the four books listed above. Beginning with a short introductory review of prior literature on the subject, I will then briefly discuss each of the books under review here, before finally turning to a somewhat fuller and more comparative discussion of the implications of some of the evidence they and other recent works present.

MOST OF the initial studies of the Chinese Revolution concerned themselves primarily with sorting out the basic political history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) before 1949. In the course of this endeavor, they sought to learn how Mao Zedong and the other major leaders of the People's Republic of China (PRC) had become dominant within the party, to uncover the numerous personal or policy disputes that had developed within this top leadership group, and to determine the nature and extent of Soviet influence upon the CCP.¹

Following soon after the publication of these ground-breaking works, or in some cases chronologically overlapping with them, a number of other studies focused on early CCP institutions and policies appeared. Although frequently still set firmly in the context of high-level intra-party leadership disputes, these works expanded the framework of analysis somewhat by focusing on the strategies of popular mobilization and political institution-

¹Well-known examples of such books include Conrad Brandt, *Stalin's Failure in China*, New York, W. W. Norton, 1958; Benjamin Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1958; and Tso-liang Hsiao, *Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930–1934*, Seattle, WA, University of Washington Press, 1961.

Stephen C. Averill is Assistant Professor of History at Michigan State University. He is the author of several articles and is completing a monograph on the origins of the Chinese Communist movement in Jiangxi province during the 1920's.

building. Of these strategies the famous "mass line," which the CCP had developed during the late 1920's and 1930's, and which was codified as formal party doctrine in the essays Mao wrote during the war against Japan, received the most attention.²

Most of these early studies were based primarily upon information gleaned from collections of Communist documentary materials, using techniques of careful textual exegesis and documentary interpretation very similar to those employed by scholars studying the Soviet Union. Although they rarely articulated an explicit and well-defined theoretical position, the issues these works chose to study clearly indicated their implicit assumption that the success of the Chinese Revolution was largely a matter of proper high-level political decision-making and organization-building.

The publication in 1962 of Chalmers Johnson's book, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power*,³ did much to change the orientation of scholarship on the Chinese Revolution from the methodological and interpretive framework outlined above. Instead of focusing on the pre-1935 period when the CCP's strength was concentrated in the cities and rural soviets of central and southern China, Johnson's book investigated the Anti-Japanese War period between 1937 and 1945, during which time the party's activities were centered primarily in the northern half of the country. Instead of sifting through the factional

struggles and political policies of the party's highest leadership circles for clues to the revolution's eventual success, Johnson stressed the vital importance of the nationalistic resentment generated among the peasant masses of northern China by the brutality of the invading Japanese, and the CCP's good fortune in being in a position (both geographically and organizationally) to harness and turn this feeling to its own advantage. And instead of presenting his argument via detailed and demanding textual exegesis based on the familiar corpus of CCP documents, Johnson relied heavily upon the rich and hitherto unused information contained in Japanese intelligence reports produced during the war.

The most noteworthy and controversial aspect of Johnson's widely-read work was his explicit denial that socioeconomic grievances had played any important part in motivating peasants to participate in the revolutionary struggle. His book soon prompted other scholars to evaluate and comment on his thesis in light of their own studies of various aspects of the revolution's history, and even today it continues to stimulate considerable debate among scholars.⁴

Although a certain amount of the research conducted after the publication of *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* has continued to examine the pre-1937 period in CCP history centered in South China, Johnson's work has shifted the most intense scholarly interest to the Communist presence in North

China during the Anti-Japanese War period. At the same time, growing interest in detailed, multi-faceted "local studies" has encouraged scholars to focus their research on a relatively small geographic area—often a single Communist "base area"—rather than upon North China or the country as a whole.

In the course of their research, scholars have formulated or commented upon several alternative general explanations for Communist success. One such explanation, articulated in response to Johnson's "peasant nationalism" thesis, stoutly defends the importance of CCP socioeconomic reform policies in gaining peasant support for the revolution. Another explanation stresses the pivotal role of CCP organizational techniques in structuring the mobilization and deployment of the Chinese population for revolutionary purposes. And yet a third explanation applies to China a general theory which emphasizes that peasants' involvement in revolution stems from a backward-looking desire to reconstruct a communitarian "moral economy" that has been shattered by the intrusion of capitalism.⁵

THE FOUR books under discussion here naturally have all been influenced by these diverse traditions of analysis and contention. At the same time, several of these works also provide evidence that scholars are beginning to move beyond the established framework of debate to explore new approaches to the study of the Chinese Revolution.

In style, methodology, and argument, Chong-sik Lee's study of the

²Examples include Trygve Lotveit, *Chinese Communism 1931–1934: Experience in Civil Government*, Lund, Sweden, Studentlitteratur, 1973; Ilpyong Kim, *The Politics of Chinese Communism: Kiangsi Under the Soviets*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1973.

³Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937–1945*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1962.

⁴Among early comments, see Donald Gillin, "'Peasant Nationalism' in the History of Chinese Communism," *Journal of Asian Studies*, (New London, CT) Vol. 23, No. 2, February 1964; Mark Selden, *The Yen'an Way in Revolutionary China*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1971. Recent comments include Yung-fa Chen's book, *Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China*, which is reviewed in this essay.

⁵Selden, op. cit.; Tetsuya Kataoka, *Resistance and Revolution in China: The Communists and the Second United Front*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1974; Ralph Thaxton, *China Turned Rightside Up: Revolutionary Legitimacy in the Peasant World*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1983.

CCP in Manchuria appears quite similar to studies of the Chinese Revolution published in the 1950's and 1960's. Like them, Lee is deeply interested in unraveling the tangled skein of changing party "lines" over time, in tracing the consequences of the complicated individual and factional divisions within the party to which disputes over these lines gave rise, and in understanding the role played by the "policies of the Soviet Union and its creature the Communist International" in the history of the CCP in Manchuria.

Lee rather superficially ornaments this basic methodological structure with other arguments (derived from Chalmers Johnson's work) concerning the decisive role of anti-Japanese nationalism, rather than socioeconomic factors, in leading Chinese peasants to embrace the CCP. Lee uses some evidence culled from the mountain of information on Manchuria compiled by Japanese researchers to argue that peasants in Manchuria were better off (and therefore less susceptible to CCP appeals) than their compatriots elsewhere in China because of the greater opportunities provided by Manchuria's expanding economy and more open "frontier" society. Lee's analysis of Manchurian society and economy is, however, quite brief. Although he suggests many tantalizing avenues for exploration, he soon loses sight of them in the dense forest of documentary exegesis and political narrative that constitutes the real heart of the book.

More surprising, given the author's insistence in his introduction on the importance of the peasantry's nationalistic attitudes in the growth of CCP power, is the limited attention devoted to demonstrating this very point in the subsequent text. In fact, Lee's book is concerned less with the nationalistic roots of Communist

success than with documenting the difficulties that a broad spectrum of Communists had in perceiving or effectively utilizing this potent weapon. Lee blames these difficulties on several factors, including early Soviet insistence on a non-aggressive policy toward the Japanese in Manchuria as a strategy for advancing the USSR's own foreign policy interests, persistent factional infighting that hobbled CCP activities at all levels, and the superb effectiveness of the Japanese intelligence and security apparatus in Manchuria. He argues that the CCP never had the success in Manchuria that it achieved elsewhere in northern China because of these factors.

In the end, Lee's book leaves one with a greater appreciation of the difficulties involved in waging a revolutionary struggle, and a sobering recognition of the power of efficient repression, but with little new insight into the processes that led to the success of the Communist party in China in 1949.

Steven Levine's crisply-written and wide-ranging book on Manchuria attempts to provide precisely such insights. Rather than joining the scholars who look to the Anti-Japanese War as the crucial period during which the CCP finally established itself as an irresistibly powerful force on the Chinese scene, Levine instead chooses to explore what he calls the "terra incognita" of the revolutionary civil war of 1946-49. He argues forcefully (p.4) that Communist success was still far from a sure thing in 1945, and that the civil war "was the period of decisive victory for the CCP."

Within this decisive struggle, Levine similarly stresses the crucial importance of Manchuria, noting that the Communist victory there significantly accelerated the CCP's nationwide triumph. As he further emphasizes, Manchuria was also a central focus of post-war interna-

tional diplomatic and strategic concern, and became an important issue in the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. He argues (p.7) that "far from being the ineluctable outcome of underlying socioeconomic forces, the Communist triumph was a contingent victory, very much dependent upon a variety of political, military, and organizational factors peculiar to the Northeast."

In the course of his discussion, Levine makes a number of bold assertions. For example, he argues that a strong Soviet presence in Manchuria, coupled with the lack of a similar direct US involvement in the civil war, combined to provide an environment favorable for CCP expansion, and that if the United States had intervened directly in the war it might have at least greatly delayed the Communist victory. Regarding the role of the CCP in the countryside, he contends that, rather than simply harnessing and redirecting the energy of an already rebellious rural population, the CCP took a quiescent and politically passive peasantry and used a variety of techniques (including coercion) to mold it into an effective support force for the Communist armies that did the decisive fighting. And, rather than accepting the conventional formula that the CCP's wartime strategy was for the revolutionary Chinese countryside to surround the Nationalist-controlled cities, he stresses the integral importance of major cities in both the strategic calculations and personal orientations of CCP leaders who remained urban intellectuals at heart despite their long years of living among the peasants.

Much of what Levine has to say in elaboration of these and other assertions is interesting. His discussion of Sino-American-Soviet interactions in the context of the emerging Cold War, for example, is

a useful addition to the available general literature on international relations in the Far East, as well as on the specific question of the diplomatic environment for revolutionary change in Manchuria. Useful as well are his reminders about the uncertain future that still seemed to face the CCP in 1945; the need to consider the civil war years as an important separate period in the history of the revolution rather than an insignificant coda to the Anti-Japanese War; and the difficulties involved in carrying out a massive social mobilization under conditions of physical insecurity and stringent time constraints.

But what Levine asserts in bold generalization in one place he often takes back with caveats, cautions, or contrary evidence in another. Thus, having noted (p.6) that the "study of the civil war in Northeast China . . . transcends local history or regional history," he several times acknowledges the likelihood of geographic diversity in the Chinese revolutionary experience, and quite sensibly cautions against generalizing too broadly on the basis of the Manchurian example. Likewise, having stressed the importance of large cities and a continued urban orientation in CCP strategy, he then provides a plethora of concrete evidence in his chapters on organization-building and rural revolution that the real center of gravity of the movement—and the bulk of its logistical and personnel support—nevertheless clearly remained in the countryside.

This sort of backing and filling, together with a tendency to skip on supporting evidence and citations at some important points (such as his discussion of changes in local elite society on pp. 244–46) sometimes leads to uncertainty about just what Levine is arguing, and how well-founded his arguments are. In general, though, it is clear that Le-

vine's is a very instrumental political view of the Chinese revolution, stressing the role of factors such as international politics, organizational skill, coercive efficiency, and sound strategic planning. As already noted, he explicitly dismisses peasant misery or other such socio-economic factors as a potential factor in the growth of a following for the CCP. For Levine, the revolution grew primarily through calculated and efficient efforts extended from the top down, rather than emerging in any meaningful sense from the bottom up.

Levine's broad, synthetic, and highly generalized picture of the civil war period in Manchuria contrasts sharply in style and approach with Fernando Galbiati's biography-cum-local study of the well-known early CCP peasant activist Peng Pai* and the Hailufeng* Soviet that he helped establish in South China's Guangdong province during the 1920's.

Both Peng and the soviet have been the subject of earlier studies,⁶ but it is safe to say that Galbiati's work, *P'eng P'ai and the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet*, is the most detailed and comprehensive narrative account of Peng's career and the history of Hailufeng. In addition to utilizing the available Chinese sources, the author draws upon a wide range

of primary and secondary materials in other languages, including Japanese, Russian, and Italian. He gathers all of this material together into a dense, richly-textured synthesis that, while clearly centered on Peng Pai's individual experience, manages in addition to convey a great deal of information about the society and economy of the Hailufeng region, the emergence of the early revolutionary movement both there and elsewhere in Guangdong province, and the intricate web of connections that developed to link localities such as Hailufeng to higher levels of authority and non-local political movements.

Galbiati's rich account is particularly noteworthy for what it reveals about the manner in which the local-level revolutionary movement in Hailufeng (as in many other parts of China) grew up in the zone of intersection between the worlds of elite and peasant. Beginning with political activity organized by young elites based predominantly in the rapidly-proliferating local Western-style schools in urban areas, the revolution gradually spread into the ranks of the peasantry. As his account effectively shows, the transformation of the original elitist revolutionary groups into mass-based local movements was not brought about by simply employing Leninist organizational techniques to manipulate passive peasants. Instead, it emerged through complicated processes of mutual adaptation and conceptual mediation in which peasants as well as CCP cadres of elite origin were active participants. In the course of these interactions, peasants formed Communist-controlled peasant associations and eventually a "soviet" (China's first). However, the region formerly had a number of societies which were formed for the purpose of engaging in conflicts and feuds with each other and the peasants viewed the so-

*Editor's note: Although Galbiati used the Wade-Giles spelling of Peng Pai (P'eng P'ai), and the Hailufeng Soviet (Hai-Lu-feng), these proper names will be spelled according to the pinyin system of romanization throughout this article.

⁶Among these are Roy Hofheinz, Jr., *The Broken Wave: The Chinese Communist Peasant Movement, 1922–1928*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1977; Robert Marks, *Rural Revolution in South China: Peasants and the Making of History in Haifeng County, 1570–1930*, Madison, WI, University of Wisconsin Press, 1984; Yong-pil Pang, "Peng Pai and the Origins of Rural Revolution under Warlordism in the 1920s: Haifeng County, Guangdong Province," Ph.D. diss., University of California—Los Angeles, 1981.

viet as a revival of this type of society. They also insisted Peng Pai was a Buddhist bodhisattva and embarked upon a bloodthirsty pogrom against their non-Communist enemies that local CCP cadres proved powerless to control.

Unfortunately, Galbiati is much better at describing these and other events than he is at highlighting their significance, and beneath the lush foliage of factual detail that gives the work its satisfyingly rich texture and tone lie surprisingly weak analytical roots. Indeed, so absorbed is Galbiati in the complex and difficult task of providing interwoven narrative accounts of Peng's life and the rise and fall of the Hailufeng Soviet that he has difficulty in stepping back and relating the events he is describing to the broader context of the Chinese Revolution. To the degree that he does so, he appears to waffle uncertainly back and forth between the views of two other, more opinionated, scholars of the Hailufeng Soviet, who have stressed, on the one hand, the importance of peasants' perceptions, attitudes, and actions, and on the other, the efficiency and effectiveness of CCP mobilizational and organizational techniques.⁷ Galbiati's inability or unwillingness to situate his work more explicitly and effectively within the wider world of scholarly discourse on the Chinese Revolution is a disappointing aspect of this valuable work.

In his book on the Communist movement in central China during the Anti-Japanese War, *Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937-45*, Chen Yung-fa manages to draw upon some of the strengths of all of the approaches described

above. Firmly basing his work on texts from the extensive archives of captured CCP documentary materials located in Taiwan, he constructs a study that combines a close and comprehensive examination of local-level, micro-political interaction between party and peasants with a willingness to step back from time to time to draw more generalized analytical conclusions from his detailed case studies.

Chen divides his book into three major sections. The first of these consists of a broad narrative overview of the formation and development of CCP base areas in central and eastern China during the war years. In this section, he includes a discussion of the disputes within the CCP leadership over alternate base-building policies, and the most detailed and up-to-date account of the well-known "New Fourth Army Incident" that I have seen. The second section describes various aspects of the CCP's mass mobilization and state-building policies, including rural administration and elections, local militarization, expansion of the party apparatus, and taxation policies. The third section examines the effects of these varied policies on the established rural order, focusing especially on local elites and "parochial" institutions such as bandit gangs and secret societies.

As this brief description indicates, Chen is deeply interested in studying the nature of the local-level political processes through which the CCP spread its influence and control in the Chinese countryside. To this end, he effectively delineates how party cadres took advantage of a variety of socioeconomic tensions and cleavages specific to different places to split the atoms of local society in a kind of controlled fission reaction whose released energy powered the expanding revolutionary movement in the region. At

the same time, he notes the extensive efforts that the party made to maintain as broad a coalition of social classes as possible, including at least some local elites.

Chen's rich and complex account of the working of these processes is notable for the considerable attention it gives, not only to the subject of CCP policies and techniques for influencing rural inhabitants, but also to the complexities and subtleties of the inhabitants' own motivations and actions. Both "peasant nationalism" and socioeconomic grievances have a place in his rather eclectic view of the impulses impelling peasants to support CCP programs, but neither factor is accorded anything like the salience in his analysis that it occupies in the work of earlier scholars who have argued over the question of motivation.

In many respects, Chen's work occupies a stylistic and methodological (as well as geographical) middle ground among the works under discussion here. Where Levine adopts a wide-ranging, synthetic approach that includes foreign as well as domestic relations, and samples the rich body of relevant non-China-centered social science literature, Chen as a rule remains quite close to his documentary sources, and restricts himself carefully to the particularities of his region and to the existing literature on the Chinese Revolution. On the other hand, where Galbiati digs deeply and doggedly into a single vein of rich factual ore, Chen pans dozens of different streams of evidence for nuggets of information, and consequently demonstrates a keener analytical eye for the broad significance of the social and intellectual terrain he scans. And while Lee displays a clear mastery of the nuances of documentary interpretation, Chen chooses to use the same techniques and similar sorts

⁷For the first view, see Marks, *Rural Revolution*; for the second, see Hofheinz, *Broken Wave*.

of materials to analyze local-level social interactions as well as regional or national political infighting. Although each of the books has its particular strengths and contributions to make, the combination of qualities that Chen's book displays distinguishes it as one of the very best books so far available on the Chinese Revolution.

AS EVEN the brief descriptions above should make clear, past scholarship about the revolution continues to exert influence on recent publications, including this diverse collection of books. Several explicitly embrace or criticize one or more of the major general explanations for the revolution's success, and even those which do not nonetheless display a clear, if unstated, awareness of the parameters of past discussion. In keeping with the now well-established trend toward local studies, none of these studies attempts to describe or characterize revolutionary processes on a national scale or throughout the revolution's entire course. Each concentrates instead on the development of the revolution during a more limited time period and in a specific geographic region or locality. In addition, three of the four books reflect in their geographical and temporal focus the heavy emphasis that recent scholarship (still animated largely by a continuing preoccupation with the arguments raised by Chalmers Johnson over 25 years ago) has placed on understanding the reasons for the remarkable growth of CCP power in northern China that began during the Anti-Japanese War period.

The very diversity of the books reviewed, however, also indicates the stimulating multiplicity of both viewpoint and explanation that now characterizes the study of the revolution. Enough has already been said in my description and compari-

son of the individual books to indicate clearly both that there are a number of different conceptual and interpretive frameworks simultaneously in use in recent works, and that these frameworks are employed to analyze the processes of revolution from a number of different angles and levels of generality. While this situation may generate some new methodological arguments (such as whether the national, regional, or local level provides the best vantage point for analyzing the processes of revolutionary change), it also obviously allows scholars to bring new ideas and techniques drawn from many disciplines to bear upon the subject, and it affords many new opportunities for comparison, both within the Chinese context and cross-culturally.

Furthermore, these recent works contain much evidence that at least some of this diversity is the result of scholars beginning to look at the Chinese revolution in new ways, rather than simply rehashing old theories. Two particularly notable manifestations of these new approaches are the growing trend toward synthetic, multi-causal explanations of the revolution's success, and the emerging interest in what might be called the political anthropology of the revolution.

Scholars have, of course, always recognized to one degree or another that the revolution was a complex phenomenon, but until recently many still hoped to identify some single key factor—such as “peasant nationalism,” CCP organizational skill, or the peasants’ “moral economy”—that would prove to be of decisive importance in the revolution's success. The trend in the works under discussion, by contrast, is to assert the necessity for eclectic, multi-faceted explanations of the success of the revolution. Levine, for example, speaks (p.7) of Communist success involv-

ing “complex, overlapping levels of domestic and international politics,” and notes that this “complexity and multiplicity of elements . . . casts doubt on any explanation of the Communist victory which is predicated predominantly on a single factor.” Chen likewise speaks (p. 18) of the “complexity of peasant motivation,” and stresses “the congruence of many different motives and factors in prodding peasants into commitment [to the revolution].” Lee and Galbiati are less explicit in their comments, but it is noteworthy that each of their accounts also draws in practice upon elements of several of the established theories devised to help explain the success of the revolution.

The parallel emergence of a multiplicity of levels and styles of analysis that vary from author to author, and of an insistence by individual scholars on a multiplicity of inseparably intertwined factors involved in revolutionary success, has had a considerable impact upon our overall understanding of the revolution. It has also affected the way we view many of the constituent issues and elements involved in that understanding.

One of the most obvious effects of the new research has been to highlight and expand our knowledge of various aspects of the political anthropology of the revolution. Early studies that focused on the emergence of ideology and the formation of policy among the CCP's national leadership group frequently paid little or no attention either to how (and how effectively) ideas and policies were spread and implemented at the local level, or to what extent the activities of lower-level cadres and peasants influenced higher-level decision-making.

Recent research, by contrast, has concentrated considerable attention on precisely such issues. As a result of the work of Chen, Gal-

biati, and others, the extensive slip-page in perceptions and policies that frequently occurred between the top and bottom layers of the party hierarchy is much more obvious now, as is the size and persistence of the perceptual synaptic gap that separated the reform-minded party from the tradition-bound peasant at the local level. Contrary to the efficient, well-organized CCP manipulation of peasants that is often assumed by earlier works, many newer studies make abundantly clear the considerable degree to which rural inhabitants resisted, redirected, misinterpreted, side-stepped, infiltrated, corrupted, and otherwise confounded the efforts of local party organizations to build a strong and united revolutionary movement.

In a related vein, the more local-oriented of the recent studies have pointed out the extent to which the CCP's mobilization efforts were both aided and hindered by the necessity to adapt them to the deeply-rooted features of rural society. Despite the undoubted social and ecological differences that existed between Guangdong, central China, and Manchuria, party cadres in all of these areas faced many common problems. One such problem was how cadres could make room for themselves and their movements in social landscapes already crowded with a luxuriant diversity of collective action groups that included sworn brotherhoods, bandit gangs, sectarian groups, lineages, and local militias.

Galbiati's research provides clear evidence of how Communist cadres seeking local footholds often sought successfully to borrow some of the functions and forms of accepted local organizations such as mutual-aid societies or elite political action associations as a way of making their own activities seem more familiar and less intrusive. His (and, to a lesser degree, Lee's)

work also shows that local CCP organizations frequently formed alliances with or absorbed bandit gangs and other types of indigenous armed forces as a means of quickly augmenting their own weak military strength. Doubtless some of these actions involved conscious and cynical attempts by CCP leaders to camouflage their radical long-term aims, but such efforts must also have seemed quite natural and appropriate to many local cadres who had been born and raised in the contentious societies of the back-country regions where many CCP base areas were located.

Nevertheless, as Chen makes clear, CCP alliances with bandits and other forms of "parochial mobilization" were frequently brief and unhappy marriages of convenience. The gangs, societies, and militias were undisciplined and localistic bodies whose members were ideologically unsophisticated, reluctant to serve outside of their own home areas, and generally resistant to party control. Moreover, the organization and military firepower that made these groups initially useful to weak and vulnerable local CCP forces also made them alternative power bases around which opposition to Communist activities could easily coalesce. For these reasons, the party made energetic and largely successful efforts to undermine and ultimately destroy the independence of such groups.

Another related aspect of the increased overall concern with the interaction between the revolutionary movement and local society has been a closer examination and (as inevitably seems to be the case) a more complex conception of the role in this interaction of specific segments of rural society such as peasants and local elites. Where many earlier Western studies of the Chinese Revolution—including some, such as Chalmers John-

son's, that sought explicitly to describe peasant motivation—tended for all intents and purposes to treat peasants as a uniform (and usually passive) mass, more recent work by Chen, Galbiati, and some other scholars has begun to show that "the peasantry" was in fact a highly differentiated, and often diversely motivated, collection of individuals.

Likewise, where most descriptions of the role of local elites during the revolutionary period have until recently portrayed them simply as implacable opponents of the CCP, some of the newer research has uncovered evidence that they—as well as peasants—varied considerably in their social situations and attitudes toward change. The implications of this have so far been followed in two different directions.

One of these—illustrated to some extent by Galbiati's work—has been to examine the considerable degree to which the earliest Communist leaders and their organizations were themselves products of elite families and elite-dominated political institutions. The point is not primarily to highlight the irony of a peasant-based movement being led by urban-oriented intellectuals from elite family backgrounds, or to assert on that basis (as Levine does, mistakenly in my view) that the Chinese Revolution is therefore not a "peasant revolution." It is instead to explore the differences in education, socioeconomic status, and career trajectories among various elite subgroups that may have helped lead some of their members to embrace the revolution and others to react to it with ambivalence and ambiguity instead of outright opposition.

The other direction taken by recent research into elites and the revolution has been to examine CCP actions toward elites. The evidence provided by such research (indirectly in Galbiati's work and

more explicitly in Chen's fine chapter on the CCP and local elites) certainly does not contradict the established view of virtually all scholars that local elite dominance over rural society was one of the main targets of the revolution. It does, however, indicate that the CCP came to analyze and subcategorize the local elite in much the same way it did the peasantry, and that its opposition toward at least some of these categories was contingent rather than absolute.

For example, small-scale landlords who cooperated with local CCP cadres and abided by Communist policies might not be severely punished, and might even be allowed to participate marginally in the political and economic organizations set up by the CCP at the local level. Moreover, CCP cadres experienced considerable practical difficulty in drawing a clear and unambiguous socioeconomic dividing line between elite and peasant, so that there were numerous marginal families whose cooperative attitude might make the difference between being considered a friend or an enemy of the revolution.

In a somewhat different vein, perusal of the recent works under discussion here also makes apparent just how long, steep, and multiple were the "learning curves" the CCP had to traverse in its efforts to develop effective and viable methods of rural mass mobilization. Granted, a great deal of cumulative progress over time in this regard becomes apparent when one compares the fumbling, trial-and-error efforts of cadres such as Peng Pai in the 1920's with the effective mobilizational juggernaut that Levine describes the CCP loosing on Manchuria in the late 1940's. Nevertheless, it is equally apparent that much spinning (and reinventing) of wheels went on as well. In addition to the fact that much-praised CCP

innovations such as the "mass line" may well have been more difficult to institutionalize than scholars have hitherto assumed, it also seems clear that the Chinese Revolution spanned such a long period of time, ebbed and flowed across such an extensive geographic area, and took such a heavy toll of cadres' lives, that many of its lessons simply had to be learned over and over again, as cadres across the country grappled in similar ways with similar problems.

IN SUM, recent scholarship has begun to consider the numerous specific uncertainties, difficulties, and ambiguities involved in the revolution's course, rather than simply continuing to debate the overall causes of its ultimate success.

In the process, it has both added to and undercut much of the scholarship that has come before it. It has added to it, above all perhaps, a sense of the complex social context of the revolutionary struggle that was notably lacking from the abstract and detached accounts of national party decision-making that dominated early scholarship on the revolution. It has undercut it, most notably, by exposing the diversity actually contained within what has hitherto been treated as essentially uniform social terrain. In both its supplementary and corrective roles, the best of this new scholarship has succeeded by documenting regional variation in processes assumed to be nationwide, by blurring presumably sharp social dividing lines, and by exploding conceptions that assume groups such as "peasants" or their motivations to be unitary, uniformly generalizable categories.

Perusal of this useful and promising recent scholarship suggests a number of directions in which future research on the Chinese Revolution might profitably proceed. Among these, let me briefly mention just two

somewhat related areas: improving the integration between detailed "local studies" and broad explanatory generalization, and making better use of social science literature not related to China.

As Lyman Van Slyke notes in his foreword to Chen's book, recent research has been more effective in exposing the shortcomings of existing explanations than in developing new alternatives. Now it is true enough, as Van Slyke says in defense of this determinedly empirical approach, that more detailed information about what happened in different base areas will allow for more informed and confident generalization about the revolutionary process in the future. But empirical investigation and analytical abstraction ought to be viewed, not as incompatible methodological opposites, or as inevitably sequential steps, but as complementary lines of inquiry that proceed most effectively in tandem. Moreover, scholarly analysis of the Chinese Revolution—including that available in the works discussed here—has far from fully digested the factual material already available.

Much opportunity, therefore, certainly still remains for thoughtful, factually-based comment upon almost all aspects of the revolution's origins, processes, and outcome. For example, it would be useful to have a more sophisticated and generalized analysis of how the CCP in various places negotiated the transition from an initial stage of adaptive compromise with local traditions to a later stage of more recognizably "revolutionary" attempts to transform radically these traditions. Also useful would be some systematic attempt to evaluate to what extent and in what areas of activity the CCP's initial efforts to mobilize local populations differed from period to period during the party's pre-1949 history. A reevalu-

ation of the scholarly views on the role of the pre-1949 "Yan'an Spirit" in post-1949 China in light of recently-developed knowledge of both periods would also be of great utility.

Such efforts to conceive and generate more closely-integrated combinations of empirical inquiry and analytical generalization would benefit considerably if China scholars devoted more effort to make appropriate use of approaches and ideas developed by social scientists outside of the China field, and (as a corollary to this effort) attempted to situate their work more explicitly in the growing body of scholarship on comparative revolution. Although there is doubtless some increased danger that fleeting academic fads or perniciously culture-bound concepts might creep into the China field across the bridges thus established to the wider scholarly world, it seems to me that the potential advantages clearly outweigh the possible costs to what is presently a surprisingly parochial field of inquiry.⁸

Again, let me suggest an example of how this sort of scholarly input might be applied to the study of the Chinese Revolution. Scholars of the

French Revolution have for some time been studying the use of political symbols and rituals during the revolutionary period, drawing for this purpose not only upon the factual data base of information on French history, but also upon a large body of existing comparative and theoretical literature in the fields of political science, sociology, and anthropology.⁹ Similar approaches might well be used in the Chinese case to explore a variety of topics, such as the symbolic and ritual use by revolutionaries of market town festivals and plays, religious symbols, sworn brotherhood initiation ceremonies, and political actions such as processions and "struggle sessions." (Regarding the latter, for example, was the common CCP practice of parading local elites wearing dunce caps through village streets a completely new tactic, or were there precursors or analogous practices existing in rural traditions?)

Readers who have already had an opportunity to look at the books under discussion here will probably recall passages in one or another of them that suggest starting points for or evidence bearing on the topics

suggested above, and many others besides. Some of these leads may be developed further in a number of research projects now in varying stages of completion. Others may be the subject of new investigations by scholars attracted to the subject by the growing availability of a wide variety of new collections of documents, reminiscences, and secondary materials on party history published in the PRC. In any event, it seems certain that our scholarly understanding of the Chinese Revolution will improve dramatically during the next decade or so, and we owe a considerable debt of gratitude to the authors of the four books reviewed here for helping pave the way for these future accomplishments.

⁸One exception to this parochialism is Levine, whose book is the only one of the four discussed in this essay to refer in more than the most incidental way to academic literature outside of the China field. Given the range and quality of material available on the theoretical issues with which he is concerned, however, even Levine's reference to this literature seems more exemplary in its intentions than in its execution.

⁹A good example is Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1984.

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China and India

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COVER: China's Deng Xiaoping and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev confer in Beijing on May 16, 1989, during the first Sino-Soviet summit in 30 years. Photo by Wide World.

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Problems of Communism

Articles

New Thinking and Northeast Asian Security

Rajan Menon

In line with his "new thinking" in foreign policy, Mikhail Gorbachev has attempted to effect substantial change in Soviet relationships with the Northeast Asian states. Thus, the USSR has offered proposals on military bases, arms control, and economic cooperation in Northeast Asia to allay the concerns in China, Japan, and, to a lesser extent, South Korea that stemmed from the Brezhnev-era's military buildup in the Far East. Attempts to explore common ground with China and Japan in promoting trade and other kinds of ties have also marked bilateral Soviet relations with these countries. To enhance the credibility of the new approach, Gorbachev has appointed new officials to be responsible for the overall direction of foreign policy as well as different specialists and diplomats to deal with the Northeast Asian countries. However, these countries are not convinced of Soviet good intentions, and many problems between them and Moscow remain unresolved.

China and India: Moving Beyond Confrontation

Surjit Mansingh and Steven I. Levine

Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in December 1988 represents a culmination of recent attempts by China and India to close the book on 30 years of hostility and to promote a better atmosphere for the resolution of long-standing contentious issues. Although summit diplomacy is unlikely to bring about dramatic changes in Sino-Indian relations in the near term, it will contribute to building support in both countries for expanded relations; and it has created a regular mechanism for working toward the settlement of the border dispute. The general relaxation of international tension also is likely to assure that Sino-Indian disputes will be resolved peacefully. However, the divergent interests and possibly incompatible regional ambitions of China and India will continue to shape interstate relations in South Asia. Thus, the normalization of Sino-Indian relations can only ameliorate, not eliminate, the long-standing rivalry between these two major powers.

The USSR and the Third World in the 1980's

David E. Albright

In the last decade, the number of distinct Soviet schools of thought concerning what policy the USSR should pursue toward the Third World has multiplied significantly. To those who would support "revolutionary-democratic" and/or radical military regimes have been added those who advocate some acceptance of the attraction that capitalism has for emergent Third World governments or who see the Soviet Union's interests to lie in dealing with the Third World as part of an economically interdependent world economy. The top Soviet leadership, in contrast with earlier periods, has not endorsed a single school of thought exclusively, but rather has combined elements of the policy prescriptions of all of the contending schools, the mix varying substantially from region to region.

The Soviet Union and Southern African Security

S. Neil MacFarlane

In recent months, the Soviet Union's outlook on regional security in Southern Africa has shifted from a posture of fostering conflict over Angola and Namibia and endorsing violent change in South Africa proper to contributing to conflict settlement on the Angola-Namibia front and even some moderation of views on social change within South Africa itself. This shift both reflects and informs a broader general trend in Soviet Third World policy, a new receptivity to regional conflict settlement that is rooted in adverse concrete local experience rather than in ideological prescriptions.

Nascent Civil Society in the German Democratic Republic

Vladimir Tismaneanu

The opposition movement of the 1980's in the German Democratic Republic began as pacifism supported by the Evangelical Church. Since the mid-1980's, it has not only become increasingly concerned with the militarization of public life internally and the threat of nuclear annihilation but has also insisted that true peace both domestically and internationally requires the observance of human rights, including political rights, on the part of the East German regime. Together, the various pacifist, ecological, and other groups represent a nascent civil society.

Note

Change and Continuity in Soviet Central American Policy

Jan S. Adams

Gorbachev's new thinking has introduced perceptible changes in Soviet policy toward Central America and the Caribbean: notably, a new Soviet reluctance to continue providing military and economic support to clients in the region at previous levels, signs of pressure from Moscow on client states and movements to settle regional conflicts by political rather than military means, and some efforts by the USSR to play down ideology in relations with states and parties of the region. While this new posture may offer a window of opportunity for regional states to resolve their differences less burdened by East-West issues, the Soviet Union continues to seek power and influence in the region, not least of all by pursuing traditional lines of behavior, including support for groups pursuing social revolution by violent means, provision of considerable amounts of military, economic, and political assistance to major client states, and the mounting of virulent ideological attacks and disinformation campaigns aimed at the United States.

Essay-Reviews

The Future of Eastern Europe

John A. Armstrong

The books by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Roman Szporluk, and Ivan Berend indicate a turning point in assessing contemporary developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. By using multidimensional interpretations solidly grounded in historical analysis, the three authors provide a coherent picture of the prospects of communism in this century and give their perspectives on the current manifestations in the communist world of nationalism, a phenomenon that had been written off as transient not only by Marxists but by many Western liberal analysts as well.

Moscow and the Military Buildup in Northern Europe

Robert W. Janes

Recent works on the Nordic security arrangements draw attention to their role in the military competition between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The key question the works under review attempt to answer is whether the postwar stability that has obtained in Northern Europe can be maintained in the face of the region's increased importance for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Several of the works under review also analyze the role of Finland in Soviet policy toward Northern Europe, the impact of domestic politics on defense policy formulation in the Nordic states, and the issue of natural-resource exploitation as it affects the region's security environment. The authors agree that Moscow will continue to take an active interest in Scandinavia; they disagree over whether this interest will enhance or diminish Nordic stability.

New Thinking and Northeast Asian Security

Rajan Menon

Since Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, he has, at regular intervals, proposed initiatives relating to security and arms control in East Asia. Gorbachev's proposals began with his July 1986 address in Vladivostok. The process continued in November 1986 with the signing in New Delhi of "The Declaration of Principles for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World" and Gorbachev's speech to the Indian Parliament, which was studded with suggestions for promoting stability and reducing armaments in the Asia-Pacific region. Then, almost exactly a year after the Vladivostok initiative, Gorbachev elaborated upon his existing proposals and offered others in an interview with the Indonesian newspaper *Merdeka*. And, to maintain the momentum, he outlined seven specific proposals—not all of them new—on East Asian security at a speech given at Krasnoyarsk in September 1988.¹

Although Gorbachev has taken a direct, personal role in this dynamic and unprecedented effort to re-

shape the Far Eastern security environment, he has been bolstered by a well-organized public relations campaign in which the Soviet media, senior party leaders, state officials, and leading academic specialists have all participated. The prolonged and intense effort leaves little doubt that the Soviets are involved in a serious, long-term drive to win support for their ideas on economic cooperation, military stability, and arms reduction in East Asia.

The specifics of the Soviet program as presented by Gorbachev and disseminated by his associates involve a range of issues: incorporating Siberia into the "international division of labor" by opening it up to foreign investment; instituting confidence-building measures to reduce the threat of accidental war; limiting specific forms of naval activity in the northwest Pacific; establishing multilateral cooperation to resolve regional conflicts; enhancing the security of sea lanes vital to commerce; initiating reciprocal US and Soviet withdrawal from existing naval bases; and calling for a new and comprehensive security regime in Asia which would ultimately merge with a similar arrangement in Europe to establish a universal system of collective security to replace the existing system based on precarious arms competitions and contending alliances.

Rajan Menon is Associate Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, author of Soviet Power and the Third World, 1986 and co-editor of and contributor to Limits to Soviet Power, (1989). During the 1988-90 academic years, he is on leave to serve as a Research Scholar at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) and as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow on the staff of Congressman Stephen J. Solarz (D-NY). The author thanks the Kennan Institute and the Institute for the Study of World Politics for research support, Ermias Abebe for research assistance, and Daniel Abele and Christopher D. Jones for comments on earlier drafts of this article.

¹For a translation of the Vladivostok speech of July 1986, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), July 29, 1986, pp. R/1-20 (the speech is cited hereafter as VS). Gorbachev's address to the Indian Parliament on Nov. 27, 1986, is translated in *ibid.*, Nov. 28, 1986, pp. D/6-12. For the text of the Delhi Declaration, see *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 28, 1986, trans. in *ibid.*, Dec. 3, 1986, pp. D/14-16. The text of the *Merdeka* interview is in *Pravda*, July 23, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, July 23, 1987, pp. CC/1-10 (the interview is hereafter cited as MI). The foreign policy portion of the Sept. 16, 1988, Krasnoyarsk speech appears in "News and Views from the USSR," Soviet Embassy Information Department (Washington, DC), Sept. 19, 1988, pp. 1-11 (the speech is cited hereafter as KS).

The Context: New Thinking

According to Gorbachev and his colleagues, these diverse and sweeping proposals for East Asian security flow from the "new political thinking" that guides Soviet foreign policy.² The already extensive Western debate about this new political thinking focuses on two issues: first, just how "new" is the new thinking; second, is it essentially a public relations offensive, devoid of any concrete Soviet actions, aimed at identifying the USSR with the forces of peace and progress and the United States and its allies with a dangerous, unstable, and wasteful status quo founded on the acquisition and expansion of arms?³

The debate over the "newness" of the new thinking is not particularly meaningful. Any body of thought—and new thinking is no exception—has ancestry, pedigree, and intellectual roots. Thus Gorbachev's insistence that survival in the nuclear age requires that the superpowers find means to coexist has, by his own admission, roots in Lenin's ideas of the 1920's on peaceful co-existence. Gorbachev's belief that the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons invalidates Clausewitzian conceptions of war and renders the notion of victory meaningless resembles views expressed after Stalin's death by Georgiy Malenkov and, indeed, parallels the direction in which Soviet military doctrine was evolving in the last years of the Brezhnev regime. Other components of "new thinking," such as banning nuclear tests or creating favorable conditions for domestic economic growth through curbing expenditures on armaments, evoke memories of Nikita Khrushchev.

The second point of debate—whether new thinking is rhetoric aimed at putting the US and its allies on the defensive or a set of serious proposals that will guide Soviet behavior—is much more important. As with most good questions, it admits no categorical answer. For one thing, the question presupposes a mutually exclusive distinction in the minds of Soviet leaders on the propagandistic value of new thinking on the one hand, and its potential operational contribution to Soviet security on the other. To be sure, the dominance of public relations as a motive is evident in some Soviet initiatives, such as the support for North Korea's calls for an end to US–South Korean military exercises, the withdrawal of US conventional and nuclear forces from the Korean peninsula, and the reunification of the Korean peninsula on a confederal basis.⁴ Such a Soviet posture is clearly meant to maintain the USSR's position in North Korea—a state that has long adroitly manipulated Sino-Soviet rivalry—as well as to appeal to that segment of the South Korean public that views the US military presence as intrusive, demeaning, and a key obstacle to national unity. The USSR understands full well the strategic significance attached by Washington to its deployments in South Korea, and that a major, unilateral disengagement by the US would, in the eyes of American leaders, contribute to instability on the Korean peninsula and weaken Japan's confidence in the reliability of American security commitments.

Similar motivation could be ascribed to Gorbachev's proposal made in the September 1988 Krasnoyarsk speech for coupling a US withdrawal from its bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay in the Philippines with a Soviet disengagement from the naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. In making this offer Gorbachev was undoubtedly aware that it would be rejected—as indeed it promptly was—by the US, given not only the centrality of the Philippine installations to the US Seventh Fleet's ability to operate in the western Pacific, but also the asymmetry between the Soviet air and naval presence in Vietnam and the significantly larger American deployments in the Philippines.⁵

⁴E.g., the message sent by the Soviet leadership on the 40th anniversary of the formation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in *Pravda*, Sept. 9, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 9, 1988, p. 18. The Soviet delegation attending the celebration of the anniversary was led by then-KGB chairman Viktor Chebrikov, who likewise supported the North Korean proposals. See *ibid.*, pp. 20–21. For other examples of Soviet support for the North Korean position, see the report on Gorbachev's speech during Kim Il-sung's October 1986 visit to Moscow in *Pravda*, Oct. 26, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 28, 1986, pp. C/3–5; Moscow, TASS in English, Dec. 30, 1986, in *ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1987, p. C/2; *Izvestiya* (Moscow), July 18, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, July 20, 1987, p. C/1; Ivan Glebov, "For New International Relations in Asia and the Pacific," *International Affairs* (Moscow), October 1987, p. 30.

⁵KS, p. 7; Milan Hauner, "Gorbachev in Krasnoyarsk: New Soviet Disarmament Proposals for Asia," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 426/88,



Soviet party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev attends an aquatic festival on July 27, 1986, during his visit to Vladivostok.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

At the same time, it is a mistake on the basis of these and other such examples to label the new thinking as pure propaganda. New thinking has entailed some major, and in some cases unprecedented, changes in actual Soviet *behavior*. Thus, from August 1985 through February 1987, the Soviet Union adhered to a unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, although it quickly became apparent that the Reagan Administration would not follow suit. Moreover, to counter US assertions that such bans could not be verified, the Soviets allowed American scientists to install monitoring devices near Soviet test sites. In making proposals for conventional and nuclear arms control, Gorbachev has incorporated provisions for on-site verification, an arrangement that the USSR had been traditionally unwilling to allow.⁶ The verification provisions of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty show that the shift in the Soviet position was not simply verbal. And, in proposing verification arrangements for reductions on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM's), Moscow has proposed on-site procedures that are far more intrusive than what the US is prepared to allow.⁷

The INF accord itself was possible only because the Soviets were willing to make major changes in their original positions. The Soviets ultimately returned to the bargaining table after having walked out of the negotiations when the US deployments of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe commenced. They then abandoned the demand that any INF agreement count British and French nuclear missiles when calculating the number of theater nuclear missiles arrayed against the USSR. Finally, the Soviets did what many had believed impossible when President Reagan suggested a global "zero option" in 1982. In the *Merdeka* interview, Gorbachev agreed to dismantle Soviet INF's from Asia and Europe, dropping in the process the Soviet demand that, for this dismantling to occur, the US would have to withdraw its nuclear weapons platforms and delivery vehicles from South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, and pull its aircraft carriers behind lines to be mutually negotiated. The USSR thus agreed to the removal of all Soviet INF's from Asia and Europe in exchange for the dismantling of similar US systems in Western Europe.⁸

Sept. 17, 1988, pp. 2-3. As Hauner points out, "Gorbachev has made no mention of giving up Da Nang air base in Vietnam or any of the other installations said to be under Soviet control" (p. 2). For early official criticisms from the US, see *The Washington Post*, Sept. 17, 1988.

⁶Evangelista, "The New Soviet Approach," loc. cit., pp. 563-67, 581-83.

⁷See the interview with Viktor Karpov in *The Guardian* (London), Mar. 31, 1988; and the interview with Colonel General Nikolay Chervov in *La Stampa* (Turin), May 29, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 8, 1988, pp. 11-12.

⁸For Gorbachev's speech in which he originally linked the zero option on (fn. continues on p. 4)

Under the rubric of new thinking, the Soviets have taken other steps that respond to the security concerns of northeast Asian states. These efforts include Gorbachev's offer, in the Vladivostok speech, to pursue force reductions along the Sino-Soviet frontier and to accept the main channel of the Amur and Ussuri rivers—rather than, as the USSR had hitherto insisted, the Chinese bank—as the demarcation line for the border, the withdrawal of a motorized rifle division “and several separate units” from Mongolia during the spring and summer of 1987; and the signing of the April 1988 Geneva accords, which provided for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.⁹ Soviet spokesmen depict these steps as products of the new thinking.¹⁰ Although this characterization need not be accepted at face value, the concrete initiatives described above show that Gorbachev's pronouncements in the areas of foreign policy and national security are not merely rhetorical flourishes with scant practical significance.

The substance of new thinking consists of broad propositions about contemporary international relations and the implications they pose for foreign policy. The principal propositions are as follows:

- The capacity of nuclear weapons to destroy civilization nullifies Clausewitzian conceptions of war as a means to political ends and requires that states, regardless of differences in social systems, coexist. This argument was contained in the statement on military doctrine adopted at the May 1987 session of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee and appears routinely in Soviet analyses of international security.¹¹ As Aleksandr Bovin, commentator for *Izvestiya* and adviser to Gorbachev, has put it: “Either peaceful coexistence or nonexistence. There is no third way.”¹²
- The destructiveness of nuclear weapons, when seen alongside the unprecedented destructive capabilities of conventional forces, demands *political* efforts, rather than traditional policies based on deter-

rence, to bolster national security. Such political efforts include arms control, confidence-building measures, and the strengthening of international law and the United Nations.¹³

- The cost of modern conventional weapons, the need to divert funds toward economic development, and the escalatory potential of conventional war in the nuclear age call for new military doctrines and force postures based on “reasonable sufficiency.” Specifically, “reasonable sufficiency” entails significantly lower force levels with weapons and doctrines oriented toward *defensive* warfare.¹⁴ Although the concept of reasonable sufficiency remains ill-defined and ambiguous in many respects, it has been discussed in several Soviet writings on military doctrine. Efforts have been made to legitimate this idea by locating it in the evolution of Soviet military thought, to demonstrate its practicality by combing the history of warfare to highlight instances where it was used with success or ignored to bad effect, and to explore how it might be implemented in practice.¹⁵

- In a world that modern technology has made militarily and economically interdependent, definitions of interests based on criteria of class or nation must be transcended in favor of a cooperative approach to common security and global problems. “The interests of mankind as a whole,” notes Aleksandr Yakovlev, “are not an abstract notion In our day, when the whole planet seems to have been compressed to an unprecedentedly small size . . . the interests of mankind as a whole have acquired flesh and blood.”¹⁶ Moreover, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

INF's to the removal of US forward-based nuclear systems from East Asia, see *Pravda*, May 20, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 21, 1987, p. E/8. For examples of the reiteration of this view by Soviet spokesmen, see Moscow, TASS International Service in Russian, May 26, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, May 28, 1987, pp. AA/1–2; and the remarks of Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov (both of the Institute of the USA and Canada) on the program “Top Priority,” Radio Moscow in English to North America, May 22, 1987, in *ibid.*, May 27, 1987, pp. AA/1–3.

⁹The completion of the withdrawal from Mongolia was announced in *Pravda*, June 8, 1987. On the Sino-Soviet river boundary proposal, see VS, p. R/14.

¹⁰Titarenko, “The Soviet Concept of Security,” loc. cit.; *idem*, “The Soviet Strategy of Peace: The Asian-Pacific Region,” *Kommunist* (Moscow), January 1987, pp. 97–98.

¹¹Major General Yuriy Lebedev and Aleksey Podberezkin, “Military Doctrines and International Security,” *ibid.*, September 1988, pp. 111–12.

¹²Aleksandr Bovin, “New Thinking—New Policy,” *ibid.*, June 1988, pp. 115–18; Major General Yuriy Lebedev and Aleksey Podberezkin, “The Contemporary World: Tendencies and Contradictions,” *ibid.*, September 1988, pp. 112–13, 115. See also, Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika i novoye myshleniye dlya nashey strany i dlya vsego mira* (*Perestroika and New Thinking for Our Country and for the Whole World*), Moscow, Politizdat, 1988, pp. 140–45.

¹³These ideas are developed in Vladimir Petrovskiy, “Security Through Disarmament,” *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow—hereafter, *MEIMO*), January 1987, pp. 3–13, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 12, 1987, pp. 1–12; Yevgeniy Primakov's article in *Pravda*, July 9, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, July 14, 1987, pp. CC/5–10; *idem*, “Soviet Policy in Regional Conflicts,” *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), May 1988, p. 8; Titarenko, “The Soviet Concept of Security,” loc. cit., pp. 67–69.

¹⁴Petrovskiy, “Security Through Disarmament,” loc. cit., pp. 2–3; *Pravda*, July 9, 1987, loc. cit., pp. CC/6–7.

¹⁵See Lebedev and Podberezkin, “Military Doctrines,” loc. cit., pp. 117–18; Andrey Kokoshin and Major General Valentin Larionov, “The Kursk Battle in Light of Contemporary Defense Doctrine,” *MEIMO*, August 1987, pp. 32–40, esp. 39–40; Kokoshin and Larionov, “The Confrontation of Conventional Forces in the Context of Ensuring Strategic Stability,” *ibid.*, June 1988, pp. 23–31, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, July 21, 1988, pp. 8–14; Kokoshin, “The Development of Military Affairs and Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Arms,” *ibid.*, January 1988, pp. 20–32, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 12, 1988, pp. 1–9.

has gone so far as to state that "[t]he struggle between two opposing systems is no longer the determining tendency of the world."¹⁷

• The Soviet Union's preoccupation with the military dimension of security and its secretiveness on military matters diverted it from badly-needed economic reform and generated worst-case thinking and suspicion in the West. Soviet overemphasis on the military aspects of security also led the USSR to engage in a costly arms race with the West and placed additional burdens on an already inefficient economy by limiting economic ties with the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. The lack of Soviet involvement in the world economy resulted in a gap between the USSR and the West in the economic-technological realm that not only impairs socialism's emergence as a viable alternative to capitalism, but also threatens the Soviet Union's status as a world power. Against this background, the principal task of Soviet foreign policy now is to fashion an external environment conducive to *perestroika*.¹⁸

Reassessment of Past Policies

In making its various proposals on East Asian security, the Gorbachev leadership has reassessed many of the policies of its predecessors. The reasons for departure from the policies of the Brezhnev era are clear. The

reliance, particularly in the 1970's, on military instruments of policy ultimately proved counterproductive. Confronted by a major Soviet buildup in the Far East—which by the late 1970's amounted to 54 divisions supported by the latest Soviet aircraft, armor, and nuclear missiles—China transformed its relationship with the US, moving from hostility to rapprochement, and ultimately, toward strategic cooperation. The 1978 Sino-Japanese treaty, which was prompted by concern about burgeoning Soviet power, indicated to the Soviets the potential for collusion between the two principal states of northeast Asia. The Reagan Administration justified the following key elements of its policy in northeast Asia by citing the need to balance Soviet deployments: the commitment to maintain forces in South Korea, a posture which had been reconsidered under President Jimmy Carter; the willingness to sell defensive military technology to China; and the buildup of the Seventh Fleet so as to equip it to execute the "maritime strategy." In a broader context, Soviet military intervention in the Third World contributed to the atrophy of détente, provided the rationale for hard-line Reagan policies toward the USSR, and short-circuited the potential for East-West trade and technology transfer.

These negative consequences are now candidly recognized by Soviet spokesmen. Speaking of Soviet involvement in the Third World in the 1970's, Vyacheslav Dashichev of the Institute for the Economy of the World Socialist System argued in a May 1988 article that: "We were wrong in assessing the global situation Though we were politically, militarily (via weapons supplies and advisors), and diplomatically involved in regional conflicts, we disregarded their influence on the relaxation of tension between the USSR and the West" He added that "chasing petty and essentially formal gains associated with leadership coups in certain developing countries" led the Soviet leadership to ignore the "genuine interest" of fostering favorable international circumstances for profound transformations in the Soviet Union's economy and socio-political system. In an obvious criticism of the past salience of military power as an instrument of Soviet policy, Dashichev called on the USSR to "influence social progress exclusively via its economic, political, scientific, and cultural successes."¹⁹ In an interview with *Der Spiegel* two months later, Dashichev described Soviet policy in the Third World in the latter part of the

¹⁶Aleksandr Yakovlev's speech at a party meeting in Lithuania, Moscow Television Service, Aug. 12, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 16, 1988, pp. 51–52. For a more elaborate, but less enthusiastic, official exposition of the significance of global problems, see Vadim Zagladin, "Socialism and the Global Problems of the Contemporary Period," *Politicheskoye Samoobrazovaniye* (Moscow), September 1986, pp. 13–22, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 25, 1986, pp. 1–11.

¹⁷Speech at a conference at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, *Pravda*, July 26, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, July 26, 1988, pp. 29–31.

¹⁸For these themes, see Vitaliy Zhurkin, Sergey Karaganov, and Andrey Kortunov, "Challenges of Security—Old and New," *Kommunist*, January 1988, pp. 47–49; Vladimir Lukin and Aleksandr Nagornyy, "The Concept of the USSR-USA-PRC 'Triangle' and the New Realities of World Politics," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya* (Moscow), June 1988, p. 6; the comments of Lukin (an East Asian specialist at the Institute of the USA and Canada, now serving as deputy chief of the Foreign Ministry's Pacific and Southeast Asia Department) at a conference on Soviet policy in the Far East attended by scholars and Foreign Ministry officials, *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, July 1988, pp. 140–55, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service (hereafter—JPRS), *Soviet Union: International Affairs*, UIA-88-015, Sept. 15, 1988, pp. 12–13 (Lukin comments); interview with Mikhail Nosov (chief of the Far Eastern Department, Institute of the USA and Canada) in *Tokyo Shimbun*, Sept. 3, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 22, 1988, p. 25; Aleksandr Bovin's article in *Izvestiya*, July 11, 1987, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH—hereafter, *CDSP*), Aug. 12, 1987, pp. 5–6; and S. Blagovolin's article in *Izvestiya*, Nov. 18, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 25, 1988, pp. 1–3. As an example of this facet of new thinking, consider Blagovolin's assertion (p. 2) that the preoccupation with military power "is one of the main reasons for the plight of the Soviet economy and the slow growth of the people's living standards."

¹⁹Vyacheslav Dashichev, "East-West: Quest for New Relations. On the Priorities of the Soviet State's Foreign Policy," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), May 18, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 20, 1988, pp. 7–8. For a similar although less pointed argument, see L. Lyubimov, "New Thinking and Soviet-American Relations," *MEIMO*, March 1988, pp. 9–10.

1970's as a resurrection of "Stalinist hegemonism" and judged it as "probably Brezhnev's greatest mistake."²⁰

The pursuit of military power and advantage has been attacked not only by prominent Soviet scholars, but also by those directly involved with the formulation of foreign policy. For example, speaking at a July 1988 conference at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Shevardnadze spoke of the economic costs incurred by the USSR's preoccupation with military competition, concluding that: "The idea, which gained a firm hold in the minds and deeds of certain strategists, that the Soviet Union could be as strong as any possible coalition of states is absolutely groundless."²¹

To be sure, the new thinking, Soviet security proposals on northeast Asia that new thinking has inspired, and the withdrawal of a number of Soviet military forces from that region certainly have a public relations aspect. But they must also be seen as products of a critical assessment of Soviet policy in the previous decade—a policy that served the interests neither of Soviet security nor of Soviet economic development.

New Agents of Policy

Gorbachev has realized that both effectiveness and credibility demand that officials not associated abroad with the Brezhnev era be entrusted with the formulation and execution of his initiatives in foreign policy. The advent of new officials to oversee Soviet foreign policy is striking. Gorbachev has effected changes both among policy-makers responsible for the overall direction of foreign policy and among specialists and practitioners responsible for the Asian-Pacific region.

Policy-makers. The most important personnel change involves the replacement in 1985 of long-time Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko with Shevardnadze, who had no prior experience in foreign policy and had spent all of his professional life in the Georgian republic working in the Komsomol, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the party organization.²² Initially, because of his lack of experience in foreign policy, Western observers doubted Shevardnadze's influence. Nevertheless, he has played an active, visible, and effective role in the dynamic and flexible foreign policy of the Gorbachev years. As a leading ally of Gorbachev in the Politburo

and an enthusiastic proponent of *glasnost*, *perestroika*, and new thinking, he has emerged as one of the most powerful members of the Soviet leadership. Shevardnadze's statements on the limits of military power as a tool of statecraft and his flexible, outgoing demeanor mark a sharp contrast with the Brezhnev era in general and with Gromyko in particular.²³

Shevardnadze has taken a number of actions that symbolize Gorbachev's new approach to East Asia. His 1986 trip to Japan was the first by a Soviet foreign minister in more than 10 years and, in conjunction with the follow-up visit in 1988, represented an effort to recast Soviet-Japanese relations in a friendlier mold. These initiatives also served notice that the USSR would cease to treat its policy toward Japan as a function of the state of US-Soviet relations. Shevardnadze's visits to Thailand and Indonesia in 1987 marked a reassessment of the Soviet attitude toward influential regional states that under Gromyko had been regarded as being of marginal significance, or, in Thailand's case, as simply a Western appendage. Finally, Shevardnadze's meetings with China's foreign minister during UN sessions and his visit to China in February 1989 set the stage for Gorbachev's May 1989 meeting with Deng Xiaoping in Beijing—the first Sino-Soviet summit in three decades.

Other personnel changes also point to the new approach in foreign policy. In 1986, Vadim Medvedev became secretary of the Central Committee's Department for Liaison with Socialist Countries. He is thus directly linked to the major improvement in Sino-Soviet relations that has occurred in the latter half of the 1980's. At the September 1988 Central Committee meeting, Medvedev was promoted to full membership in the Politburo and given responsibility over ideology—a sphere traditionally overseen by the party leader second in standing to the general secretary—in the reorganized Secretariat.²⁴ Medvedev's new position and responsibilities ensure that he will be a major factor in foreign policy.

Another official to emerge with greater authority from the September 1988 Central Committee plenum was Yakovlev, a key ally of Gorbachev and major architect of the innovations in the style and substance of Soviet foreign policy. A strong critic of the United States,

²⁰*Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), July 4, 1988, pp. 123–27, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, July 8, 1988, pp. 18–21.

²¹Loc. cit.

²²Alexander Rahr, "A Biographic Directory of 100 Leading Soviet Officials," 3rd Ed., Munich, Radio Liberty Research, March 1986, pp. 186–88.

²³A summary of Shevardnadze's thinking on foreign policy is contained in his December 13, 1988, speech at the Foreign Ministry on the implementation of the proposals contained in Gorbachev's address to the UN in the same month. See *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del, SSSR* (Moscow), Dec. 23, 1988, pp. ii–viii. Abridged trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 28, 1989, pp. 1–8.

²⁴On Medvedev, see Rahr, "A Biographic Directory," loc. cit., pp. 135–36; idem, "The Composition of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 433/88, Oct. 5, 1988, pp. 1–2, 5; *The Washington Post*, Oct. 1, 1988.



Vadim Medvedev, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Yakovlev is a force for change in Soviet foreign policy in two specific respects. First, he emphasizes the need to transcend ideological, class, and national categories in favor of a non-zero-sum, cooperative approach to security with an eye to settling global problems. The stress on the accumulation of military power and the definition of security in purely military terms—both hallmarks of the Brezhnev era—are notably absent from his analysis.²⁵ Second, Yakovlev has stressed that the changing economic balance of power among the leading capitalist states, characterized by the relative decline of the US and the ascendancy of Western Europe and Japan, intensifies discord within the Western alliance. He sees, as a result, growing independence on the part of US allies and the emergence of an incipient multipolar order.²⁶ The presumptive policy conclusion

is that diplomacy toward Western Europe and Japan ought not to be a function of US-USSR relations but should be based on an appreciation of the increasing independence of these countries vis-à-vis the US.²⁷

Specialists and practitioners. In the northeast Asian context it would make little sense to entrust the improvement of relations with China and Japan to officials who represent to these countries aspects of policy that Gorbachev is seeking to repudiate. Important personnel changes signify the earnestness of the new approach to China and Japan.

Two Asian specialists who symbolized the inflexible, swaggering policies of the past have been removed from the Central Committee's principal foreign policy departments. One change involves Oleg Rakhmanin, who long served in the Department for Liaison with Socialist Countries. Rakhmanin is a China specialist, whose past writings—appearing under the pseudonym O. Borisov—identify him as a hard-liner on Sino-Soviet relations. He came to the department following service in the foreign ministry and the Soviet embassy in Beijing and rose in this hierarchy to become its first deputy chief in 1968. His tenure was marked by Sino-Soviet tensions, border clashes, and a massive increase in Soviet military strength in the Far East.²⁸

Japan specialist Ivan Kovalenko, who symbolized the intractable and heavy-handed policies of the Brezhnev era, is the second. Thought by the Japanese to be central to Soviet policy toward their country, Kovalenko served as the chief Japan specialist in the Central Committee's International Department. According to Japanese sources, he was placed in charge of Japanese prisoners after World War II. Following a posting in Tokyo as a TASS correspondent from 1949 to 1952, Kovalenko joined the International Department, becoming head of its Japan section in 1963, and a deputy chief in 1983. Although Kovalenko spoke approvingly of new thinking, his publications—appearing under the pen name I. Ivkov—mark him as a hard-liner. Moreover, during his years in the International Department, Soviet-Japanese relations acquired the adversarial and unproductive character that Gorbachev now wants to alter. Kovalenko's association with the policies of the Brezhnev era and the tendency of influential Japanese to regard him as a symbol of Soviet arrogance and inflexibility have apparently led to his retirement. Al-

²⁵These views are represented in Yakovlev's speech to a Lithuanian party meeting on August 12, 1988, loc. cit., pp. 51–53.

²⁶For this facet of Yakovlev's thinking, see his article, "Inter-Imperialist Contradictions—The Contemporary Context," *Kommunist*, November 1986, pp. 4–17, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 12, 1986, pp. 1–16.

²⁷See Jerry F. Hough's article in *The New York Times*, Nov. 4, 1988. On Yakovlev's career and outlook, see Bill Keller, "Moscow's Other Mastermind," *The New York Times Magazine*, Feb. 19, 1989, pp. 30–33, 40–42.

²⁸On the background and career of Rakhmanin, see Rahr, "A Biographic Directory," loc. cit., pp. 161–62. In April 1989, Rakhmanin was among those dropped from the Central Committee.

though he visited Japan as late as July 1988 and met with key Japanese visitors in Moscow as late as October, according to Japanese sources Kovalenko has left the International Department for the Institute of Oriental Studies.²⁹

On the operational level of Soviet diplomacy as well, important personnel changes have occurred. Igor' Rogachev has become a deputy foreign minister—replacing Mikhail Kapitsa, who has been relegated to the directorship of the Institute for Oriental Studies—and has assumed key responsibilities for relations with China and Japan. Rogachev also replaced the aged Leonid Il'ichev as chief Soviet negotiator with China on overall political relations and the boundary dispute. The replacement of Kapitsa, viewed by the Chinese as a hard-liner, with Rogachev is intended to convey Moscow's seriousness about promoting Sino-Soviet détente. Apart from the symbolism involved in the replacement of Kapitsa, the appointment of Rogachev is important because he combines relative youth (he is 57) with considerable experience. He has spent 15 years in China (six as a child and the rest in two tours of duty at the Soviet embassy in Beijing), served as head of both the Southeast Asian and Far Eastern departments of the Foreign Ministry, and speaks fluent Chinese.³⁰

Gorbachev's desire to break with past patterns in Soviet relations with Japan and China is also indicated by his ambassadorial appointments to these countries. The new envoy to Tokyo, Nikolay Solov'yev, speaks fluent Japanese, spent eight years (1958–61 and 1966–71) in the Soviet embassy in Japan, and also directed the foreign ministry's Second Far East Department. In interviews with the Japanese press soon after his appointment in May 1986, he sought to smooth over bilateral differences and stressed the potential for co-operation in the economic and cultural spheres.³¹ In assessing the importance of Solov'yev's appointment,

²⁹On Kovalenko's career, recent activities, and reported retirement, see Tokyo, Kyodo in English, July 14, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, July 15, 1988, p. 14; Tokyo, JPS in English, Apr. 20, 1988, in *ibid.*, Apr. 29, 1988, p. 9; *Sankei Shimbun* (Tokyo), Nov. 8, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Dec. 7, 1988, p. 3; and *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (Tokyo), Mar. 4, 1989, trans. in *ibid.*, Mar. 9, 1989, p. 4. For Japanese perceptions of Kovalenko, see Hiroshi Kimura, "Gorbachev's 'New Thinking' and the Asian-Pacific Region," in Peter Juviler and Hiroshi Kimura, Eds., *Gorbachev's Reforms: US and Japanese Assessments*, New York, Aldine de Gruyter, 1988, pp. 159–60. On p. 159, Kimura refers to Kovalenko as the "notorious anti-Japanese Japanologist." Also, Myles L. C. Robertson, *Soviet Policy Towards Japan: An Analysis of Trends in the 1970s and 1980s*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 156. Kovalenko's position reportedly has been filled by Yuriy Zuyev, a deputy chief of the International Department, who dealt with Western Europe. See *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Tokyo), Mar. 21, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 3, 1989, p. 15.

³⁰On Rogachev's background and career, see *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), Mar. 8, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 14, 1988, p. 25.

a Japanese newspaper judged him "the most pro-Japanese in the whole Soviet Foreign Ministry."³² The new ambassador to China, Oleg Troyanovskiy, arrived in Beijing in May 1986 and is one of the Soviet Union's most senior and experienced diplomats, having served as Soviet ambassador in Japan (1967–76) and at the United Nations.³³

Having surveyed the new thinking and the personnel changes that have taken place among those officials who are charged with formulating and implementing policy toward Northeast Asia, we will now turn to a consideration of current Soviet policy toward the Northeast Asian states, particularly China and Japan. In addition, because the USSR has begun to make overtures to South Korea, thus potentially changing its relationship to North Korea, this article will briefly examine Soviet policy toward the Korean peninsula.

Sino-Soviet Relations

The break with the recent past is perhaps nowhere more visible than in Sino-Soviet relations. By the late 1970's, relations between China and the Soviet Union seemed fated to move from bad to worse, a welcome trend to those in the United States who viewed China as a potential partner for containing burgeoning Soviet power in the Far East.

The hallmark of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1980's, especially in the latter half of the decade, has, however, been slow, unspectacular, but steady détente. Over the course of this decade, several meetings have taken place between leading officials on each side. This upsurge of contacts fundamentally altered each country's stereotypes of the other that had emerged, among other reasons, as a result of the Cultural Revolution's frenzied anti-Soviet polemics, the 1969 border clashes, and the Soviet military buildup. Neither China nor the USSR now regards the other as an immediate security threat. On the economic front as well, a strengthening of ties between Moscow and Beijing has occurred that has implications for their security relationship.

Economic relations. To be sure, the USSR does not, and may never, play the central role in China's foreign

³¹On Solov'yev's background and early interviews in Japan, see Moscow, TASS in English, May 17, 1986, in *ibid.*, May 19, 1986, p. C/1; the interview with Solov'yev on Tokyo NHK television, May 22, 1986, trans. in *ibid.*, May 23, 1986, pp. C/1–2; Tokyo, Kyodo in English, May 22, 1986, in *ibid.*, May 23, 1986, p. C/2; the interview with *Mainichi Shimbun* (Tokyo), Aug. 10, 1986, trans. in *ibid.*, Aug. 14, 1986, pp. 2–6.

³²*Mainichi Shimbun*, Aug. 10, 1986, trans. in *ibid.*, Aug. 14, 1986, pp. 2–6.

³³On Troyanovskiy's background, see *The New York Times*, Sept. 30, 1988.



Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Chinese President Yang Shangkun review troops upon the Soviet leader's arrival in Beijing on May 15, 1989, for the first Sino-Soviet summit in 30 years.

—Wide World.

economic relations that it did in the 1950's. Although the Soviet Union is now China's fifth largest trade partner—after Hong Kong, Japan, the US, and West Germany—trade with the West is deemed by the Chinese to be far more vital to the task of economic modernization. Nevertheless, the value of Sino-Soviet trade grew from 177 million rubles in 1981 to 1.8 billion rubles in 1987.³⁴ By contrast, the total value of Sino-Soviet trade during 1976–80 was a mere 1.5 billion rubles. This growth in trade between China and the Soviet Union helps to create a context wherein the leaders of both countries can visualize and plan for cooperative, as opposed to purely conflictual, interactions.

Likewise, the resumption of the Soviet foreign aid program, with assistance promised for the construction of seven new Chinese projects and the modernization of 17 projects built earlier with Soviet aid, has important implications for the security relationship.³⁵ China now

views the USSR as willing to contribute to Chinese well-being. And a changed Soviet image of China is suggested by Moscow's willingness to have this resumed aid program cover projects such as metallurgy and power generation, which are central elements of any country's strength.³⁶

Economic developments along the 7,520-kilometer border, long viewed by China, the USSR, and outside observers solely as a zone of potential conflict, have similar implications. Of particular importance are the resumption of barter trade in the eastern sector and in the western sector, in 1983 and in 1986, respectively; the 1986 agreement to resume trade along the Amur river, involving the Soviet ports of Nizhneleninskoye, Khabarovsk, and Blagoveshchensk and the Chinese port of Tongjiang; and the agreement in 1986 on Soviet assistance in constructing a railroad in China connect-

³⁴Moscow, Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin, Nov. 11, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 17, 1988, pp. B/1–2; *Pravda*, Sept. 23, 1986, trans. in *ibid.*, Sept. 29, 1986, p. B2.

³⁵On these facets of Soviet aid to China, see Moscow International Service in Mandarin, Aug. 7, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 20, 1988, pp. 11–12; and Moscow Television Service, Sept. 8, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Sept. 8, 1988, p. 16.

³⁴Y. Bavrín, "USSR-PRC: Prospects for Business Relations," *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Feb. 7, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 20, 1987, p. B/3; Moscow International Service in Mandarin, May 21, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, May 27, 1988, p. 19; *The Washington Post*, Jan. 31, 1989.

ing the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region with Kazakhstan.³⁷ These initiatives have been supplemented by others: negotiations on the use of Chinese labor in Siberian construction projects; the opening of additional Chinese river ports—including Harbin—to Soviet shipping; the establishment of joint-venture restaurants in Khabarovsk and Harbin, and the signing of economic agreements directly between cooperatives and between towns in the two countries.³⁸

Security issues. The political and economic developments discussed so far, although having no direct, immediate significance for the Sino-Soviet balance of military power, have undoubtedly altered the Sino-Soviet security relationship. China's listing of military tasks as the last of its "Four Modernizations" and its decision to effect a 25 percent cut in the size of the People's Liberation Army by 1988 are directly related to its focus on economic development. Both steps suggest a reduction in the perceived threat from Moscow.³⁹ The Soviets have sought to reinforce this Chinese assessment by pointing out that both countries have a stake in a tranquil, secure environment, given their preoccupation with economic reforms and modernization.⁴⁰

Soviet views of China's foreign and security policies have undergone significant change. In the latter half of the 1970's, Soviet analyses were replete with references to an incipient anti-Soviet alliance between China and the US.⁴¹ Today, it is not Sino-American con-

cord that receives Soviet attention, but discord between the two states over Taiwan, technology exports, trade, and human rights. Soviet assessments maintain that such frictions, China's fear of dependence and ideological contamination, and differences with the US on regional conflicts, led to the decision at the 12th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1982 to pursue an independent foreign policy devoid of alliances. Since then, in the Soviet view, China has "stopped following American strategic suggestions. . . eased to identify with Washington in matters of . . . international security . . ." ⁴² Soviet commentary on military affairs in China also reflects this new assessment. Reporting on Chinese military reforms, meetings between US and Chinese military officials, and US sales of military technology has assumed a calm, objective tone.⁴³ Soviet coverage of such events in Japan and South Korea, by contrast, has a hostile, alarmist tone.

In the late 1970's, Soviet writings exhibited a preoccupation as well with the possibility of an alliance between China and Japan. The 1978 Sino-Japanese treaty—a document that included a criticism of hegemony, then the Chinese label for Soviet policy—was taken in Moscow to represent a step toward such a dénouement. Since 1985, a different Soviet attitude toward this issue has emerged. Thus, as the Sino-Japanese treaty neared its 10th anniversary, a Soviet report discussed its likely renewal without critical comment and, instead, focused on the issues that strain the relationship between China and Japan: Japan's trade surpluses with China, Chinese concerns about the growth in Japanese defense spending, and the comments of Japanese officials seeking to put Japan's role in World War II in a favorable light.⁴⁴ The Soviets are now convinced that the Chinese no longer have a self-evident interest in encouraging the expansion of Japanese military power and are beginning to share Moscow's longstanding concern over the prospect of a greater Japanese role in the Pacific military balance.

Soviet writings and radio broadcasts now stress areas of common ground between the USSR and China in security matters. In this vein, the Soviets highlight a shared approach to Taiwan, support for the principle of

³⁷On these developments, see Bavin, "USSR-PRC," loc. cit., pp. B/3, B/5; *Pravda*, Sept. 23, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 29, 1986, p. B/2; Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, June 7, 1986, trans. in *ibid.*, June 10, 1986, p. B/1; Moscow Television Service, Aug. 6, 1986, trans. in *ibid.*, Aug. 6, 1986, p. B/7; Moscow Domestic Service, Aug. 15, 1986, trans. in *ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1986, p. B/1.

³⁸*Pravda*, Aug. 14, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Aug. 17, 1988, p. 13; Moscow International Service in Mandarin, June 16, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, June 20, 1988, p. 16; Moscow, TASS in English Aug. 29, 1988, in *ibid.*, Aug. 30, 1988; Moscow International Service in Mandarin, Aug. 21, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Aug. 23, 1988, pp. 7–8.

³⁹Gerald Segal, "As China Grows Strong," *International Affairs* (London), Spring 1988, pp. 218, 224–25. On p. 224, Segal notes: "China's partial disarmament is undoubtedly the single largest reduction in military power since Khrushchev trimmed one million men from the Soviet army in the early 1960's. Since the majority of Chinese troops had been oriented towards meeting a perceived Soviet threat, it now appears that some 100,000 Chinese troops have been removed from the order of battle facing the Soviet Union."

⁴⁰Moscow International Service in Mandarin, May 21, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 27, 1988, p. 19.

⁴¹E.g., I. Aleksandrov's (a pseudonym used until 1983 for official statements) article in *Pravda*, May 26, 1981; *idem*, *Pravda*, June 27, 1981, both trans. in CDSP, *Soviet Foreign Policy Today*, 2nd Ed., Columbus, OH, CDSP, 1985, pp. 172–75. For a review of Soviet concerns regarding the growth of military and security content in agreements between China and the US in the 1970's and early 1980's, see USSR Academy of Sciences, Institute of the USA and Canada, *Mesto Kitaya v global'noy politike SShA* (The Place of China in the Global Policy of the USA), Moscow, Nauka, 1987, pp. 150–63.

⁴²Evgeny Bazhanov, "Shifts of Emphases. Evolution of Chinese Foreign Policy in the Eighties," *New Times* (Moscow), Apr. 1, 1988, p. 26.

⁴³E.g., Moscow, Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin, Apr. 26, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 28, 1987, p. B/2; *Krasnaya Zvezda*, July 31, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, July 31, 1987, pp. B/1–3. On the barriers to the expansion of Sino-American military ties, ranging from China's financial inability to import large stocks of weapons and its fear of dependence to bilateral disputes such as the one over Taiwan, see *Mesto Kitaya*, pp. 159, 161, 165, 166–67.

⁴⁴Moscow International Service in Mandarin, Aug. 12, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 17, 1988, pp. 15–16.

"no first use" of nuclear weapons, condemnation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and support for the Rarotonga Treaty aimed at prohibiting the basing and testing of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. The USSR underscores differences between Washington and Beijing on each of these and other issues. Thus, Moscow cites Taiwan's role as "a link in the Pentagon's strategic military chain" to explain continued US military sales to the island and blames the US for the Kuomintang's intransigence on the question of reunification.⁴⁵ In addition, Moscow argues that US military deployments in the Pacific, although "primarily directed" at the Soviet Union, are, given the American opposition to socialism, also "directed at China to a considerable extent," notwithstanding improved Sino-US relations. Finally, Soviet commentators stress the common commitment of China and the USSR to socialism and reform (Chinese economic reforms receive frequent and favorable treatment in the Soviet press), and they label the notion of a Soviet military threat to China as a tired American scare tactic.⁴⁶

The Three Obstacles

Although security perceptions in Moscow and Beijing have changed significantly in the 1980's, the practical problems have not faded as quickly. The Chinese have long maintained that three obstacles prevent full normalization of relations with the Soviet Union: Soviet military forces deployed in the Far East (including those in Mongolia), the Soviet war in Afghanistan, and Vietnam's Soviet-supported occupation of Cambodia. The Soviet Union has attempted to address China's concerns through its actions, proposals, or shifts from entrenched positions.

Force levels in the Far East. The Soviet military presence in Mongolia is meant to secure the latter's status as the USSR's sole buffer along a vast and thinly populated frontier with China. The Chinese, however, see Soviet troops as menacing the approaches to Beijing

and fear they would serve as the spearhead of any assault on their capital, which is only about 500 kilometers from the Mongolian border. A matter of particular concern to the Chinese is the fact that the two tank and two motorized rifle divisions in Mongolia have been maintained in the highest category of readiness.⁴⁷ By contrast, only a quarter or so of the 55 tank and motorized rifle divisions in the Far Eastern military theater command (headquartered at Irkutsk and encompassing the military districts of Central Asia, Siberia, Transbaykal, and the Far East) are in such a status.

In the spring and summer of 1987, the Soviet Union withdrew one motorized rifle division and some additional forces from Mongolia. Soviet press reports explicitly tied the move to "the new thinking" and depicted it as a step toward addressing the three obstacles to rapprochement with China.⁴⁸ The reduction affected some 12,000 of the 65,000 Soviet troops stationed in that country.⁴⁹

Although the Soviet withdrawal did not completely remove the threat from a military standpoint, it was viewed by the Chinese as a gesture of good faith. Following this action, however, the removal of additional forces from Mongolia was by no means assured.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, official Soviet announcements proclaiming the limited 1987 pullout of the Soviet forces based in Mongolia suggested the possibility of eventually removing all Soviet troops.

Circumstantial evidence indicates that Mongolia objected to the Soviet force reductions. Opposition to the prospects of a Soviet withdrawal is quite plausible, given Mongolia's tendency to view Moscow as the guarantor of its territorial integrity against China. Indeed, after Gorbachev first broached the possibility of a withdrawal in his Vladivostok address, Mongolia's foreign minister indicated his opposition by saying at a press conference in Zimbabwe that "there would be no complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia." This statement not only contradicted the official Soviet announcements mentioned above but also a Japanese newspaper report that a "high-ranking" Soviet diplomat at the UN had told a Chinese official that all Soviet troops would ultimately be brought back home.⁵¹

The Soviet Union evidently has not been swayed by

⁴⁵Radio Moscow in Mandarin, Jan. 23, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1987, pp. B/1-2; Moscow, Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin, Apr. 7, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, Apr. 10, 1987, p. B/2.

⁴⁶For the emphasis on these points, see V. Vorontsov, "Facing the Responsibility: China and Nuclear Disarmament," *New Times*, Sept. 29, 1986, pp. 20-21; Moscow, Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin, Oct. 30, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 30, 1986, p. B/2; *Pravda*, Jan. 4, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, Jan. 12, 1987, pp. B/1-3; *Izvestiya*, Jan. 17, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1987, pp. B/1-6; *Izvestiya*, Jan. 18, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1987, pp. B/1-5; Moscow, Radio TASS, Mar. 1, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, Mar. 4, 1987, p. B/3; Radio Moscow in Mandarin, Jan. 23, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1987, pp. B/1-2.

⁴⁷International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 1988-1989*, London, IISS, 1988, p. 43.

⁴⁸Moscow, TASS, Jan. 16, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 16, 1987, p. C/1; *Pravda*, Jan. 18, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, Jan. 20, 1987, pp. C/1-2.

⁴⁹Kimura, "Gorbachev's 'New Thinking,'" *loc. cit.*, p. 157.

⁵⁰Cf. *Pravda*, Apr. 11, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 13, 1987, p. C/1; and the Mongolian foreign minister's statement quoted in *Mainichi Shimbun*, Sept. 5, 1986, trans. in *ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1986, p. 12.

⁵¹*Yomiuri Shimbun*, Sept. 3, 1986, trans. in *ibid.*, Sept. 3, 1986, p. 2.

Mongolian objections. Following Gorbachev's December 1988 address to the UN announcing the proposed reduction of Soviet troop levels by 500,000 men, Soviet spokesmen noted that 40 percent of the scheduled decrease in military manpower would come from deployments in units east of the Urals. That the latter figure would encompass further cutbacks of the forces in Mongolia was clarified in February 1989 when Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stated while in Beijing that three-quarters of the remaining Soviet troops in that country would be removed over a period of two years. Foreign ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov formally confirmed Shevardnadze's announcement the following month in Moscow.⁵² When this reduction is completed, Soviet forces in Mongolia will have been reduced to the equivalent of about one division. In addition to shrinking the size of their military presence in Mongolia, the Soviets have either announced, or discussed with the Chinese during Shevardnadze's visit to Beijing, the removal of some of the components of their Mongolian deployments that most threaten the Chinese, e.g., airborne units and conventional missiles.⁵³

The USSR has also made several proposals to allay China's concerns about its military forces in Siberia. At Vladivostok, Gorbachev raised the possibility of "a proportionate reduction in the level of ground forces" on the part of the Soviet Union and China.⁵⁴ He also stated that Soviet SS-20 missiles removed from Europe would not be transferred to Asia. In addition, Gorbachev's agreement in the *Merdeka* interview to accept the so-called "global zero" position of the Reagan Administration removed the INF issue *per se* as a sticking point in the Sino-Soviet relationship.⁵⁵

The Soviet leadership has also proposed initiatives that are referred to in the jargon of security studies as "confidence-building measures." (These efforts involve not the reduction of forces, but steps to reduce the possibility of inadvertent war arising from misperception spawned by a state of tension between military adversaries.⁵⁶) Thus, during his visit to Beijing in February 1989, Shevardnadze brought up the possibility that China and the Soviet Union might reduce the frequency and scale of military exercises along their common bor-

der, and provide each other with advance notice of scheduled troop movements and training maneuvers.⁵⁷ Such agreements, along with others on force reductions and the border dispute were doubtless the subject of discussions and documents signed during the May 1989 summit between Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping.

But the problem of Soviet conventional and nuclear superiority in the Far East remains unsolved. It is a long-standing, complex issue not amenable to a quick and easy solution. Gorbachev made a promising start with his proposal for "proportionate reductions in the level of ground forces." This proposal is of significant symbolic and psychological value because it promises to alter a relationship long molded by suspicion and the tendency to think in terms of worst-case scenarios. But, if implemented, proportionate reductions would only reestablish Chinese inferiority at lower numerical levels. If the reductions were to emphasize manpower, the Chinese disadvantage might well be aggravated, because China's strength lies in superior numbers, while the USSR's rests upon technological superiority in firepower, mobility, and logistics. It remains to be seen whether Gorbachev's explicit reference to "ground forces" in the Vladivostok speech (thus, by implication excluding air and naval forces) indicates an unwillingness to sacrifice Soviet superiority in interceptor and ground attack aircraft, *Backfire* bombers, amphibious vessels, and attack submarines.

As for the nuclear issue, the destruction of the Soviet SS-20's based in Siberia called for by the US-Soviet INF Treaty of 1987 has greater effect on the political context of Sino-Soviet relations and Beijing's threat perceptions than on operational problems related to Soviet nuclear superiority. In fact, by redirecting less than 10 percent of their *strategic* nuclear warheads, the Soviets could attack the targets that had been covered by their SS-20's.

Can the continuing reality of Soviet military superiority be changed so as to meet China's security concerns and to foster deeper Sino-Soviet détente? One possibility would be to apply the notion of "reasonable sufficiency" to the Pacific Fleet and to Soviet forces in the Siberian, Transbaykal, and Far Eastern military districts.⁵⁸ Although defensively oriented armaments would remain, reductions would focus on strike aircraft, bombers, assault helicopter units, tanks, amphibious vessels, and attack submarines. If possible such an arrangement would unquestionably reduce Chinese vulnerabilities.

⁵²*The New York Times*, Feb. 5, 1989; *The Washington Post*, Mar. 8, 1989.

⁵³*The Washington Post*, Feb. 1, 1989; *ibid.*, Mar. 8, 1989.

⁵⁴VS, p. R/18. Also, Titarenko, "The Soviet Concept of Security," *loc. cit.*, p. 63.

⁵⁵MI, p. CC/4.

⁵⁶For a discussion of this concept, see Barry M. Blechman,

"Confidence-Building in the North Pacific: A Pragmatic Approach to Naval Arms Control," *Working Paper No. 29*, Canberra, Peace Research Center, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, February 1988, pp. 14-16.

⁵⁷*The Washington Post*, Feb. 1, 1989; *The New York Times*, Feb. 5, 1989.

⁵⁸In the Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev spoke of the applicability of "reasonable sufficiency" to the Far East. See VS, p. R/18.

But the USSR would also benefit. The forces arrayed against China account for roughly 15–20 percent of Soviet defense spending. The reduced expenditures would facilitate the transfer of funds from the military to the civilian sector and thus bolster *perestroyka*. Indeed, the Soviets have already sought to reduce the burden of defense. According to CIA estimates, the rate of growth of military spending fell from 4 percent to 2 percent from 1976 to 1983.⁵⁹ Defense budget planning for 1986–95 has curtailed expenditures for maintenance and procurement in order to marshal funds for research and development on ultra-modern weaponry.⁶⁰ And, in a speech of January 6, 1989, given at the Central Committee to a group of Soviet academic and cultural figures and attended by Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov, Gorbachev pointedly stated that the problems posed by the Soviet budget deficits and the poor performance of the economy were “so acute” that reductions in defense expenditures would have to be considered.⁶¹ Following the speech, in a meeting with members of the Trilateral Commission, Gorbachev said the military budget of the Soviet Union would be decreased by 14.2 percent.⁶²

Given the urgency of addressing the problems of the Soviet economy, major reductions in the military deployments along the border with China would be of great value. At the same time, the Soviet leadership will have to confront some difficult dilemmas before implementing any such decision. One is the difficulty of winning the armed forces' support for such a policy when Gorbachev is immersed in promoting wide-ranging reforms that have alienated conservative ideologues, state bureaucrats, and party *apparatchiks*. Major reductions in the forces based in the east cannot be based on purely economic calculations; they also must be judged by Gorbachev for their possible effect on the bureaucratic balance of power. The Brezhnev-era military buildup along the border with China meant that the military acquired additional resources, power, prestige, and positions of authority. Although the Brezhnev years are now derided as the period of stagnation, this period was hardly one of privation for the armed forces.

The Soviet military is not a monolith, of course. Each of the five services would view the effects of major force reductions on its institutional integrity somewhat differently. Any major decreases would, in general, affect the power and resource base of the military as a whole and would therefore be viewed with misgivings. However, support for the military's objections in the Central Committee was probably reduced with the removal of retired military officers Viktor Kulikov and Nikolay Ogarkov at the April 1989 plenum.

The remarks of some senior officers suggest military resistance to cutbacks in the Far East. Thus, in an interview with *Moscow News*, Army General Ivan Tret'yak, the commander of the Air Defense Forces and a former commander of the Far Eastern Military District, while supporting restructuring of the military, warned that “[t]he country's defense must be absolute” and criticized Khrushchev's economically motivated reductions in the size of the armed forces as having “dealt a colossal blow at our defense potential, the officer corps included.” In a less direct vein, the commander of the Navy, Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, although supporting restructuring, noted that “[s]ome people understand it in a simplistic way: Everything that existed before is bad and everything that is being done now is good The essence of restructuring consists, in my opinion, not in rejecting the past. Certainly, there were miscalculations, major ones at times. But there were also successes.”⁶³

A group of senior officers based in Moscow have had recent command experience in the east and might constitute a lobby opposing major force reductions in the Far East as well. In addition to General Tret'yak, this group includes Defense Minister Yazov and the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Mikhail Moiseyev (both recent commanders of the Far Eastern Military District); Army General Vladimir Govorov; the head of the Civil Defense Forces (a former commander of the Far Eastern Theater); and the deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy in charge of Rear Services, Admiral Vladimir Sidorov (a former commander of the Pacific Fleet).⁶⁴

⁵⁹Statement of Robert Gates (then the deputy director for intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency), in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance, and Security Economics, *The Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1984*, Nov. 21, 1984, mimeo., pp. 7, 11, 15–18.

⁶⁰James T. Westwood, “Soviet Reactions to the US Maritime Strategy,” *Naval War College Review* (Newport, RI), Summer 1988, pp. 62–63.

⁶¹*Pravda*, Jan. 7, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 9, 1989, pp. 52–64.

⁶²*The Washington Post*, Jan. 19, 1989. The meeting, attended, among others, by Henry Kissinger, Yasuhiro Nakasone, and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, was held on January 18.

⁶³Moscow, TASS International Service in Russian, Feb. 17, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 18, 1988, p. 89; *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 21, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Feb. 25, 1988, p. 72.

⁶⁴This group also includes two current first deputy commanders-in-chief of the Ground Forces who served previously as commanders of the Transbaykal military district: Army General S. I. Postnikov and Colonel General A. V. Betekhtin. Information on the careers of the officers in this group is from private discussions; *Voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar'* (Military Encyclopedic Dictionary), Moscow, Voennoye Izdatel'stvo, 1983, p. 752; Personnel Report: USSR Ministry of Defense (January 1989), (fn. continues on p. 14)

Beyond the possible parochial concerns of this "group," senior defense ministry officials and representatives of the services could raise important, substantive considerations regarding force reductions in the Far East. For example, although the Soviet ground forces in the east essentially have missions related to China, bombers, tactical aircraft, warships, and submarines have important tasks—both for deterrence and warfighting—against the US, Japan, and South Korea. So long as the US military presence in the Pacific does not decline and strategic coordination among the US, Japan, and South Korea continues, the implementation of "reasonable sufficiency" through major cuts and reorganizations in force structure will be difficult. The bottom line is that Sino-Soviet arms reductions that blunt significantly the offensive components of Soviet air, ground, and naval forces can proceed only in a multilateral mode with the participation of the US and its allies in the north Pacific.

A second consideration involves the implications of a major reduction in the forces of the Far Eastern Military District for the defense of the Soviet homeland. The Far Eastern Military District contains the single most important concentration of Soviet forces east of the Urals, with 43 percent of all the motorized rifle, tank, and artillery divisions and 54 percent of all tactical aircraft.⁶⁵ For major changes in the Sino-Soviet military balance, significant cuts would be required in deployments of these forces. Soviet forces defend important stretches of the Baykal-Amur rail line as it heads towards Komsomol'sk, and of the Trans-Siberian railway after it leaves Chita, goes east toward Khabarovsk and turns south to Vladivostok. Both these vital supply lines are vulnerable to Chinese interdiction. The Far Eastern Military District is also distant from the centers of Soviet power in the west—about 5,000 kilometers from Moscow, for example—so that it cannot be reinforced quickly from other parts of the Soviet Union. Nor does the Far Eastern Military District's geographic configuration—it is just over 300 kilometers from Khabarovsk to the Pacific coast, and about 50 kilometers from the Chinese border to Vladivostok—facilitate a defensive strategy of trading space for time while reinforcements arrive from the west.⁶⁶ Finally, the district must secure locales of vital strategic consequence such as Khabarovsk and

Vladivostok, both cities with a population over 500,000 and the headquarters, respectively, of the Far Eastern Military District and the Soviet Pacific Fleet.

Thus major security dilemmas will arise if the Soviet leadership considers significant force reductions in the east. Yet the mere existence of dilemmas does not rule out changes in the Soviet military posture in this region, because Gorbachev has demonstrated repeatedly that the military has no veto over his domestic and foreign policies. Thus, he has set aside the criterion of seniority in selecting new individuals to fill important posts such as defense minister and chief of the General Staff; developed non-military sources of information on security matters through appointments to the International Department of the Central Committee and by tapping the expertise of civilian research institutes; and announced initiatives generally regarded by students of Soviet affairs as contrary to the interests and predispositions of the military, such as accepting on-site verification for arms control agreements and cutting the size and resources of the armed forces.⁶⁷

Can the notion of "reasonable sufficiency" be applied to Soviet forces in the east? Beneath the appealing aura of "reasonable sufficiency" lie the complexities of making clear distinctions between defensive and offensive armaments acceptable to all parties involved in a given arms control agreement. The inherent difficulty in distinguishing offensive from defensive weapons is compounded by the absence in Soviet military doctrine of a clear-cut distinction between offensive and defensive strategies of warfare. At a heuristic level, "reasonable sufficiency" suggests these distinctions in weaponry can be made, but as an operational matter, they will prove a tricky and protracted problem. Moreover, Soviet writings on this issue have yet to tackle the operational challenges of imposing a clear-cut dichotomy on weaponry.⁶⁸

⁶⁶This important point was first made in Harry Gelman, *The Soviet Military Leadership and the Question of Soviet Deployment Retreats*, R-3664-AF, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, November 1988, pp. 32–33. For the configuration of the Far Eastern Military District, see the map in David C. Isby, *Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army*, London, Jane's, 1988, p. 31. Distances calculated from *Hammond Ambassador World Atlas*, Maplewood, NJ, 1988, p. 48.

⁶⁷Additional evidence points to Gorbachev's control of the military: the replacement in February 1989 of Marshal Viktor Kulikov, a conservative, as commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact and first deputy defense minister with General Petr Lushev, first deputy defense minister; and the replacement since December 1988 of the commanders of half of the 16 military districts. *Sankei Shimbun*, Feb. 17, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 6, 1989, p. 1.

⁶⁸Wettig, loc. cit., pp. 4–8. For Soviet efforts in this direction, see Kokoshin and Larionov, loc. cit. See also Kokoshin, loc. cit., which discusses the ideas of Professor A. A. Svechin, a military theorist of the 1920's, to show that the principles of defensive warfare have a rightful place in the history of Soviet military thought.

JPRS, *Soviet Union: Military Affairs*, UMA-89-004, Feb. 10, 1989, pp. 3–4, 6, 23, 30, 55, 58, 71; Albert L. Weeks, Comp., *Soviet Nomenklatura: A Comprehensive Roster of Soviet Civilian and Military Officials*, Washington, DC, Washington Institute Press, 1987, pp. 4, 13, 25, 37, 115; *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Dec. 15, 1988, trans. in JPRS, *Soviet Union: Military Affairs*, UMA-89-002, Jan. 26, 1989, p. 31.

⁶⁵Calculated from IISS, *Military Balance 1988–1989*, p. 43.



Soviet Lt. Gen. B. Gromov is welcomed back to Soviet soil by his son on February 15, 1989, near Termez, Uzbekistan, as the last Soviet battalions complete their withdrawal from Afghanistan.

—Camera Press.

Afghanistan. The second obstacle—the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan—has now effectively been removed. In his Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev announced that six regiments, out of a total of some 120,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, would be withdrawn. Many in the West viewed this announcement as a ploy. Yet, two years later, in April 1988, the Geneva Accords were signed, providing, among other things, for the withdrawal of Soviet troops to begin on May 15, 1988, and to be fully completed by February 15, 1989. The withdrawal was completed on schedule. Although the USSR will continue to seek to influence events in Afghanistan, Beijing must view the end of the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan as a major improvement in its security environment.

The Vietnam-Cambodia conflict. The final obstacle is Vietnam's war in Cambodia and the Soviet Union's sup-

port for the Vietnamese invasion. The Chinese made a summit meeting between Deng Xiaoping and Gorbachev contingent on the Soviet ability to goad Vietnam into disengaging from Cambodia.⁶⁹ This issue, which has also been the principal hindrance to improved Soviet relations with the members of ASEAN, has thus far proved the most intractable.

In his Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev argued that Sino-Soviet détente could not come at the expense of the USSR's friendship with other countries. Sino-Soviet negotiations should, he intimated, focus on bilateral matters, and he asked China to deal directly with Vietnam on the Cambodian conflict.⁷⁰ During the biannual political negotiations that have been held since 1982, Soviet spokesmen continued to make this point in one form or the other and stressed their inability to determine Vietnamese policy.

Yet, the Soviets eventually did make the Cambodian war a subject of their negotiations with China. Just before the 10th round of Sino-Soviet talks, Troyanovskiy, although reiterating the ritualistic point about not prejudicing the interests of third countries, stated that Cambodia would be discussed.⁷¹ In a much more significant development, in August 1988, negotiations explicitly dealing with Cambodia were held in Beijing between Gorbachev and Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei. On this issue, Chinese spokesmen referred to continuing differences but also to common ground between the USSR and China.⁷²

In response to Soviet flexibility on this issue, the Chinese have also been conciliatory. Recognizing the importance of the matter to Vietnam and the USSR, Beijing now is apparently more willing to accept measures designed to prevent the Khmer Rouge (the largest and most powerful of the three Cambodian resistance groups and the recipient of Chinese arms) from returning to power after a Vietnamese withdrawal.⁷³ In addition, a month after the Sino-Soviet discussions on Cambodia, and following a meeting between the Chinese

⁶⁹See the report on Deng Xiaoping's Sept. 2, 1986, interview with CBS News in Tokyo, Kyodo in English, Oct. 15, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 16, 1986, p. 81.

⁷⁰*VS*, pp. R/17, R/19; B. N. Slavinskiy, *Vneshnyaya politika SSSR na dal'nem vostoke 1945–1986* (The Foreign Policy of the USSR in the Far East, 1945–1986), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1988, p. 240.

⁷¹Tokyo, Kyodo, Apr. 7, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 10, 1987, p. B/1. On the Soviet agreement, at the ninth round of the Sino-Soviet political talks in October 1986, to expand future discussion to cover Afghanistan and Cambodia, see Hong Kong, AFP in English, Oct. 14, 1987, in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 16, 1986, p. B/2.

⁷²*The Washington Post*, Aug. 27 and Sept. 2, 1988; *The New York Times*, Sept. 2, 1988.

⁷³*The Washington Post*, Aug. 27 and Sept. 2, 1988. For a Soviet recognition of this change in the Chinese position, see *Pravda*, Aug. 26, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 30, 1988, p. 11.

and Soviet foreign ministers in New York, it was announced that Qian Qichen, China's foreign minister, would visit Moscow at the end of 1988. This announcement signified a narrowing of differences on the Cambodian issue, as did the announcement, following the Shevardnadze visit to Beijing, that a Deng-Gorbachev summit would be held in 1989.

The Cambodian obstacle has also been partially overcome by Vietnam's announcement in May 1988 that it would withdraw fully from Cambodia by 1990 and remove 50,000 troops by the end of 1988. The Chinese demanded a total withdrawal by mid-1989, however, and were skeptical about Hanoi's good faith. Because of the inability of the Cambodian armed forces to hold their own against Khmer Rouge attacks in areas from which Vietnamese troops have disengaged, Vietnam slowed the pace of its withdrawal. Yet, an interview given by the Thai foreign minister confirmed reports that the Soviets had been using their influence to urge Vietnam to end its war.⁷⁴ Perhaps as a result of Soviet goading, during the December 1988 visit to Moscow of Chinese Foreign Minister Qian, Vietnam announced that 12,000 of its troops would be withdrawn from Cambodia to reach the target of 50,000 set for the end of the year.⁷⁵ In April 1989, the Vietnamese went even further, announcing that they would withdraw fully by the end of September.⁷⁶

Vietnam's moves to reduce its military presence, and the shifts in the positions of the USSR and China have made the Cambodian issue a less potent obstacle to the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations. But important differences remain between Moscow and Beijing. In principle, each side accepts the desirability of a monitored Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia followed by elections. But China and the Soviet Union have not reached agreement on crucial matters such as the role to be assigned to the Vietnamese-backed Cambodian government during the period between the Vietnamese withdrawal and the completion of the elections, and the linkage between the removal of all Vietnamese forces and the halt of all support in the form of weapons and foreign bases of operations to the three anti-Vietnamese Cambodian resistance groups.⁷⁷

Territorial disputes. Although not listed by the Chinese as one of the three obstacles to normal relations, the Sino-Soviet border has also been the subject of renewed negotiations. Formal border talks—held in 1964



Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at a press conference during his December 1988 visit to the Soviet Union.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

and from 1969 to 1978—resumed in February 1987 with the focus being on the eastern sector spanning the area from the trijunction with Mongolia eastward to the Pacific. Joint aerial photography to aid delimitation began in May 1988, and according to Soviet sources, an agreement in principle has been reached on the course of the boundary for most of the eastern sector.⁷⁸

Yet, China and the Soviet Union continue to dispute the status of Heixiazi (Tarabarov/Bol'shoy Ussuriysk)—a 300-square kilometer island at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers. This dispute has an important bearing on Soviet security. The island is claimed by the Chinese but controlled by the USSR. Because Heixiazi overlooks Khabarovsk as well as the point where the Trans-Siberian railway crosses the Amur river, the Soviets are reluctant to see it pass from their control. The issue has yet to be settled, and it remains to be seen whether the change in Sino-Soviet relations and Moscow's altered perception of China's security policy allay Soviet concerns about the danger of any future use of the island for hostile purposes. Such apprehensions

⁷⁴Radio Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia, July 28, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 1, 1988, pp. 16–17; *Krasnaya Zvezda*, July 31, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Aug. 4, 1988, p. 19.

⁷⁸*Izvestiya*, Nov. 1, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Nov. 2, 1988, p. 19. This article, which appeared at the end of the third round on the boundary talks (October 20–31), noted that the two sides had "a common understanding on the majority of sections" of the eastern border. See also, *The New York Times*, Nov. 1, 1988.

⁷⁴For details on the Cambodian situation and the positions of Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union, see *The Washington Post*, Aug. 27 and Oct. 1, 1988.

⁷⁵*The New York Times*, Dec. 2, 1988.

⁷⁶*The Washington Post*, Apr. 19, 1989.

could well be addressed by measures such as partition, joint administration, or Chinese control with verifiable demilitarization provisions. The state of Sino-Soviet relations makes a political settlement more plausible than ever before.

Japan

The easing of Sino-Soviet tensions sharply contrasts with the state of Soviet-Japanese relations. Moscow's concerns about the growing strength of Japan's military and its ties with the United States, the long-standing and vast US military presence in Japan, and mutual rigidity on the territorial dispute all make for the persistence of an adversarial relationship between Moscow and Tokyo.

Japan's military buildup. In the 1980's, amidst an unprecedentedly candid discussion in Japan of the pros and cons of a major expansion of the country's military buildup, Soviet analyses have focused on what they perceive to be an American-inspired plan to increase the value of Japan as a military partner in the Pacific.⁷⁹

In the Soviet view, one aspect of this plan was the approval by the Japanese government in December 1986 of a defense budget that exceeded the official ceiling of 1 percent of GNP for military expenditures established—as a temporary restriction—when the National Defense Program Outline was developed in 1976.⁸⁰ According to a TASS broadcast, this decision meant that “an important psychological barrier on the road to the non-nuclear rearmament of the country has been passed.” For the Soviet Union, the event was particularly worrisome because it occurred when Tokyo was harping on the Soviet military threat and was allegedly making “revanchist” and “unlawful” claims upon the territory of the USSR while pressing its claims to the Northern Territories (the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Etorofu, and Kunashiri, occupied by the USSR since the end of World War II and claimed by Japan).⁸¹

Soviet writings underscore Japan's increasing value to the US as an ally with references to other develop-

ments and trends indicating a significant growth in Japanese military power in the 1980's. Moscow argues, for example, that Japan has maintained a rate of growth in defense expenditures far surpassing that of America's NATO allies. This tempo, together with the rising value of the yen in the 1980's, has, Moscow stresses, made the Japanese defense budget the third largest in the world when calculated in US dollars.⁸² Although Western analyses emphasize the continuing weaknesses of the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF), Soviet reports note time and again that Japan now has twice the number of destroyers as the US Seventh Fleet, four times as many aircraft for anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and as many tactical aircraft as are deployed on the continental US.⁸³

As for the future, Soviet analyses have paid particular attention to Japan's plans to acquire ships equipped with advanced ASW sonar and the AEGIS air defense system, additional P-3C *Orion* ASW patrol aircraft, new fighter aircraft, and over-the-horizon radar capable of tracking distant aircraft and ship movements. Discussions in Japan about strategies of defense involving preemptive attacks on opponents and the possibility of building aircraft carriers also receive considerable Soviet comment. To the Soviets, these discussions indicate a departure from Japan's defensive military posture.⁸⁴

US-Japanese military relations. The USSR has maintained that the scope and intimacy of US-Japanese military relations threaten stability in the Far East. Thus, Moscow argues that despite Japan's commitment to the three non-nuclear principles (to refrain from the possession, manufacture, and introduction of nuclear weapons), it has, in fact, become central to the US ability to employ nuclear weapons in the Pacific. A specific example the Soviets use to substantiate this conclusion is the US-Japanese decision to station American F-16 fighter-bombers at the Misawa air base in northern Honshu.

The deployment began in the spring of 1986 and, according to Soviet reports, reached 54 aircraft by the summer of 1987. Soviet reports often cite the nuclear-

⁷⁹See Mikhail Ivanov, *Rost militarizma v Yaponii* (The Growth of Militarism in Japan), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1982, pp. 31–39, 54–76; Nadezhda Fedulova, *Evolutsiya politiki SShA v Aziatsko-Tikhoookeanskom region 70–80 gody* (The Evolution of US Policy in the Asian-Pacific Region in the 1970's and 1980's), Moscow, Nauka, 1987, pp. 126–42; N. Vladimirov, “The Policy of Japan in the Asian-Pacific Region: Alarm Signals,” *MEiMO*, September 1985, pp. 23–26.

⁸⁰Research Institute for International Peace and Security (RIIPS), *Asian Security 1987–88*, London, Brassey's, 1987, pp. 138–39, 156–58.

⁸¹Moscow, TASS International Service in Russian, Jan. 23, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 23, 1987, pp. C/1–2; Moscow Television Service, Jan. 22, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, Jan. 23, 1987, p. C/2.

⁸²Moscow, TASS in English, Mar. 21, 1988, in *ibid.*, Mar. 2, 1988, pp. 27–28; *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Mar. 22, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Mar. 30, 1988, pp. 19–20.

⁸³For this disagreement, contrast Sheldon Simon, *The Future of Asian-Pacific Security Collaboration*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1988, pp. 49, 53, 55, with Moscow, TASS in English, Apr. 11, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 15, 1988, pp. 16–17, and Radio Moscow in Japanese, Jan. 12, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Jan. 14, 1988, pp. 18–19.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*; *Pravda*, Jan. 4, 1988; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Mar. 22, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 30, 1988, pp. 19–20; Moscow, TASS in English, Mar. 21, 1988, in *ibid.*, Mar. 22, 1988, pp. 27–28.

capable character of the F-16's as an illustration of Japan's willingness to stray from its avowed opposition to nuclear weapons.⁸⁵ The threat to the USSR was emphasized by Radio Moscow, which noted that "the F-16's are for offensive operations against the USSR's Primorskiy Kray, Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands . . . Vladivostok is only 800 kilometers away from Misawa and within the F-16's range of 1,000 kilometers."⁸⁶

Particularly since the US decision to equip vessels of the Seventh Fleet with *Tomahawk* SLCM's, the Soviets repeatedly have charged that Japan's opening of its ports to American warships is another deviation from the three non-nuclear principles. In the Soviet view, under the cover of a long-standing policy of neither confirming nor denying the existence of nuclear weapons aboard its warships, the US has regularly brought such armaments into Japanese territory.⁸⁷ The Soviets cite the comments of former US military officers and officials, as well as documents allegedly found in US archives by Japanese researchers, to show that a secret 1960 US-Japanese agreement exists to facilitate access to Japanese ports by nuclear-armed ships of the US Navy.⁸⁸ Moscow dismisses Japan's argument that the absence of American requests to bring in nuclear weapons indicates that such weapons are unloaded before US vessels call at Japanese ports. Soviet sources reply by insisting that the US would not violate its policy of "neither confirm nor deny" by seeking such permission and that, in any event, the United States does not consider anchorages and port calls by its nuclear-armed ships as equivalent to the deployment of nuclear weapons into foreign countries.⁸⁹

Aside from highlighting the alleged contrast between theory and practice in Japan's policy on nuclear weapons, Soviet analyses have followed other developments denoting an expansion in the US-Japanese military relationship. Since 1980, Japan's ships have participated along with the navies of the US, Canada, and Australia in the biennial RIMPAC naval exercises. The Soviet Union closely monitors this participation,

as well as the pattern of the exercises. Bilateral exercises are also scrutinized, particularly those suggesting US-Japanese plans to launch amphibious operations and strikes from the air and sea against the Soviet Far East, and seek-and-destroy missions against the strategic nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN's) of the Pacific Fleet.

In 1983, while on a visit to Washington, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone stated that Japan would serve as "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" for the US in the Pacific and also contribute to bottling up the Soviet Pacific Fleet by helping to blockade the straits that command its access to the high seas.⁹⁰ Since then, Soviet assessments of the East Asian security environment have emphasized that Japan adds to US military capabilities in the region in several respects: by allowing the US, in conjunction with NATO, to confront the USSR with positions of military strength on two widely-dispersed fronts; by assuming more of the financial burden of the US military presence in Japan; by providing increased levels of economic aid to the Philippines and South Korea, thus helping the US retain access to vital bases at reduced cost; and by increasing Japanese defense spending and force procurement, which provides the US with more flexible choices for deploying its Pacific forces, whether within the region or beyond.⁹¹

Another facet of US-Japanese security cooperation that evokes considerable Soviet apprehension is collaboration in the development of military technology. Soviet discussions of this issue betray Moscow's preoccupation with the Soviet Union's lag in technology, its awareness of the potential of advanced technologies to transform the character of weaponry, and its worries about being double-teamed by the world's two foremost technological powers in an area of particular weakness.

In 1983, the Japanese government approved the export of technology with military applications to the US and in July 1987, it formally agreed to participate in research and development for the SDI. The Soviets believed that the US was seeking to coopt the technological prowess of Japan for military purposes. Moscow interpreted the 1983 agreement as evidence of the American interest in gaining access to relevant tech-

⁸⁵Radio Moscow in Japanese, June 12, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, July 1, 1987, p. C/1; Moscow, TASS in English, June 3, 1987, in *ibid.*, June 5, 1987, p. C/1; and Viktor Krasnov, "US Military Buildup in the Asia and Pacific Region," *International Affairs*, May 1987, p. 97.

⁸⁶Radio Moscow in Japanese, Feb. 10, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 13, 1987, pp. C/1-2.

⁸⁷*Pravda*, Nov. 26, 1986, trans. in *ibid.*, Nov. 26, 1986, pp. C/3-4; "US Military Buildup," *loc. cit.*, pp. 97-98; L. Tolkunov, "Japan: Plagued by Contradictions," *International Affairs*, April 1984, p. 95.

⁸⁸Moscow, TASS in English, Apr. 6, 1987, in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 7, 1987, p. C/1; Moscow, TASS in English, Apr. 7, 1987, in *ibid.*, Apr. 10, 1987, pp. C/1-2.

⁸⁹Moscow, TASS in English, Feb. 7, 1988, in *ibid.*, Feb. 8, 1988, p. 24; *Pravda*, Apr. 13, 1988.

⁹⁰USSR Academy of Sciences, The Far East Institute, *SSSR i Yaponiya* (The USSR and Japan), Moscow, Nauka, 1987, pp. 369-70.

⁹¹Mikhail Nosov, "Washington and Security: The Asian-Pacific Region," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, May 1987, pp. 26, 28, 31; I. Zvyagel'skaya, "The Evolution of US Approaches to Conflict Situations in Asia (From the End of the 1970's to the 1980's)," *MEIMO*, February 1987, pp. 70-71; V. Bunin, "Japan and Washington's Asian-Pacific Strategy," *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* (Moscow), February 1987, pp. 42, 47; Radio Moscow in Japanese, Mar. 10, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 11, 1988, p. 11; Fedulova, "The Evolution of US Policy," *loc. cit.*, pp. 127-32.

nologies with military applications in which Japan has demonstrated great advancement, especially lasers, fiber optics, radar-resistant coatings, and arsenide gal-

⁹²"On New Fronts of 'Electronic War,'" *MEiMO*, April 1985, pp. 12-15; Fedulova, "The Evolution of US Policy," loc. cit., pp. 130-31; Yu. Mel'nikov, "American-Japanese Relations in the Contemporary Era," *MEiMO*, August 1986, pp. 27-28; V. Bunin, "Japan and SDI (Political, Economic, Scientific-Technical, and Military Aspects)," *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka*, January 1988, pp. 112-14.

⁹³Bunin, "Japan and SDI," loc. cit., pp. 109, 118-19.


⁹⁴On Soviet concerns regarding Japan's decisions to export military technology to the US and to participate in SDI research, see Radio Moscow in Japanese, Oct. 7, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 7, 1986, pp. C/1-2; Moscow Television Service, Apr. 21, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, Apr. 29, 1987, p. C/1; Radio Moscow in Japanese, July 22, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, July 24, 1987, p. C/2; Moscow, TASS in English, July 22, 1987, in *ibid.*, July 23, 1987, p. A/1; Elena Kirichenko, "The USA and Japan: Rivalry and Cooperation," *International Affairs*, March 1987, pp. 54-55; and V. N. Bunin, "Japan and SDI," loc. cit., pp. 107-19.

⁹⁵Moscow, TASS in English, June 30, 1987, in *FBIS-SOV*, July 10, 1987, p. C/3. Commenting on Japan's increasing role in ASW in the northern Pacific, a Soviet expert on East Asian security remarked that "one of the Soviet nuclear deterrent systems is under threat by the SDF [Japan's Self-Defense Forces]." See Vladimir Ivanov's interview with *Tokyo Shimbun*, Apr. 20, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 29, 1988, p. 8. On the US emphasis on penetrating Soviet SSBN bastions—in areas like the Sea of Okhotsk—see, for example, V. Vrevskiy and V. Ivanov, "The Asian-Pacific Region and the Realities of the Nuclear Age," *MEiMO*, August 1987, p. 22.

lium semiconductors.⁹² The Kremlin criticized the accord on SDI as a scheme by the US to fortify itself with the resources of allies for new forms of military competition aimed at exhausting the Soviet Union and frustrating its efforts at economic restructuring.⁹³

Soviet writings also portrayed the SDI agreement as *militarily* dangerous. Because SDI envisages the deployment of a nuclear-pumped x-ray laser and could impair strategic stability by undermining a Soviet assured second-strike capability, the Soviets viewed Japan's support for SDI as another departure from the country's non-nuclear principles and defensive military policy.⁹⁴ In conjunction with Japan's decision to supplement the US naval role in the north Pacific by expanding ASW operations, the collaboration on SDI is seen as especially harmful to nuclear equilibrium between the superpowers. As a Soviet commentary noted, "a buildup of . . . anti-submarine capability in combination with SDI is bound to destabilize the strategic situation."⁹⁵

Implications of Japan's security policy. What is the strategic context for these changes in Japanese secu-



A Typhoon-class Soviet nuclear submarine, capable of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles.

—US Navy Department.

riety policy, as perceived by Soviet analyses? And what do the Soviets believe the implications to be for their security? In the Soviet view, a shift in the economic balance of power is occurring in the capitalist system, highlighted by the ascendancy of Western Europe and especially Japan at the expense of the US. This shift is characterized by increased squabbling over tariffs, monetary exchange rates, and export subsidies. At the same time, the military dependence of Japan and Western Europe upon the US remains essentially unchanged. The result, in the US-Japanese context, is an increased American effort to shift the burdens of common defense onto its junior partner. For its part, Tokyo responds positively as a means to contain the economic disharmony between itself and Washington and to head off protectionist legislation in the US Congress.

Gorbachev's arms control proposals and Yakovlev's notions of polycentrism within the Western alliance have led American leaders to worry about a Soviet campaign aimed at dividing the US and its allies. But Soviet writings betray little confidence that rising economic discord will destroy US-Japanese strategic concord. Indeed, the Soviets argue that economic tensions may make Japan more predisposed to accommodate American demands for an expanded military effort in the Pacific so as to offset economic frictions. Thus commercial disputes with the US will not inevitably produce either Japanese neutralism or Gaullism. As for the US, Soviet analyses conclude that although Washington periodically complains about Japan's so-called free ride in defense, it will continue to bear this burden because of Japan's geostrategic significance to the American military presence in East Asia.⁹⁶

American pressure—spurred largely by Congressional unhappiness about persistent US trade deficits with Japan—is seen by Soviet observers as an important factor in the expansion of Japan's security role. But they do not believe that Japan is being forced to take on larger military responsibilities. In the Soviet view, although opposition to an expansion of Japan's military might remains strong among the public, the intelligentsia, the Komeito Party, the Japanese Socialist Party, and the Japan Communist Party, elements in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the SDF, and big business regard a military buildup as a necessary complement to Japan's status as an economic great power.⁹⁷

Soviet analyses note various strategic consequences of expanded Japanese military cooperation

with the US. First, Moscow sees the possibility of a Far Eastern variant of NATO brought about by a stepped-up coordination in security policy among Japan, South Korea, and the US. Nakasone's 1983 visit to South Korea, which resulted in Tokyo's commitment of US\$4 billion in aid, is presented by the Soviets in this light. Exchanges of visits between military officers from Japan and South Korea as well as US exercises with the armed forces of one of these countries in which representatives of the other participate as observers also are depicted as evidence of a "Washington-Tokyo-Seoul militarized triangle" in the making.⁹⁸

A second consequence of greater US-Japanese military cooperation is, in the Soviet view, the US effort to implement a policy of "neoglobalism" by facilitating increasing contact between Japan and NATO on security matters. Thus, in commenting on the Japanese foreign minister's visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels, TASS stated in 1986 that "Japan is being increasingly drawn into NATO military-political consultations" and that it is "turning into a 'NATO far-Eastern member'."⁹⁹

In Soviet assessments, a final strategic consequence of an expanded Japanese military role and the expanded security cooperation between Tokyo and Washington is the emergence of a Japanese role in the US "maritime strategy."¹⁰⁰ As articulated since 1980,

⁹⁷Petrov, "Japan and the USA," loc. cit., pp. 46–48; SSSR i Yaponiya, p. 372. For an extreme view on pro-military forces within Japan, see Captain Second Rank V. Zimonin, "The Evolution of the Military-Doctrinal Views of Japan in the Postwar Period," *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* (Moscow), August 1986, pp. 75–78. My reference to "the Soviet view" is for convenience and does not mean that Soviet specialists share a uniform view on the strength of pro-military sentiment in Japan and the likelihood of vast increases in Japanese military power. For the view that Japan's economic resurgence does not presage radical changes in its military status, see V. Rosin, "The Militarization of Japan: The View of an Economist," *MEIMO*, January 1988, pp. 75–87.

⁹⁸Marshall V. Petrov, "Military-Political Lessons of the Defeat of Japanese Militarism," *International Affairs*, September 1985, p. 11; A. Markov, "Japan: and South Korea in the Plans of American Imperialism," *MEIMO*, October 1984, pp. 22–23; V. Bunin, "The Defeat of Japanese Militarism: Lessons for the Contemporary Period," *MEIMO*, October 1985, p. 23.

But, just as all Soviet specialists do not expect a major expansion in Japanese military power, a monolithic view on this question does not exist either. For the view that the deep-rooted animosities between Japan and South Korea complicate an alliance between them, and hence the supposed American design for a Far Eastern NATO, see N. Shaskol'skiy, "The Asian-Pacific Region in the Military Plans of the USA," *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka*, April 1987, pp. 74–76.

⁹⁹Moscow, TASS in English, Dec. 14, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 15, 1986, p. C/1; SSSR i Yaponiya, p. 371; Nosov, "Washington and Security," loc. cit., p. 28.

¹⁰⁰The key assumptions and operational elements of the maritime strategy are well summarized in David Alan Rosenberg, "It is Hardly Possible to Imagine Anything Worse: Soviet Thoughts on the Maritime Strategy," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1988, pp. 70–73; and in Norman Friedman, *The US Maritime Strategy*, London, Jane's, 1988, Ch. 7. For a critique of the maritime strategy, see Barry Posen, "US Maritime Strategy: A Dangerous Game," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (Chicago), September 1987, pp. 24–33.

⁹⁶See Kirichenko, "The USA and Japan," loc. cit., pp. 47–54; D. Petrov, "Japan and the USA: Their 'Special' Relations," *International Affairs*, May 1984, pp. 43–48; Mel'nikov, "American-Japanese Relations," loc. cit., pp. 20–21, 24–27; Nosov, "Washington and Security," loc. cit., pp. 31–32.

the maritime strategy has several elements. It seeks to raise the Soviet costs of waging war in Europe by increasing the US capability to inflict damage to bases, ports, and other important installations on the Soviet periphery, including the Pacific coast. Simultaneously, the maritime strategy envisages attacking SSBN's in well-guarded ocean bastions, such as the Sea of Okhotsk. The strategy has two objectives. First, it seeks to prevent Soviet attack submarines from interdicting Pacific sea lines by diverting their attention to defending the SSBN's. Second, by destroying Soviet SSBN's, the maritime strategy hopes to tilt the nuclear balance against the USSR and thus provide Moscow with another inducement to end a war in Europe.

Although Soviet analyses rarely refer to the maritime strategy by its formal name, they do discuss it.¹⁰¹ With regard to Japan, the Soviets interpret the F-16 deployment in Misawa, Nakasone's 1983 statement on Japan's likely wartime role, US-Japanese naval exercises in the northern Pacific in the 1980's, and Japan's agreement with the US to expand its anti-submarine warfare capabilities as evidence of Tokyo's willingness to help implement the maritime strategy. More ominous, Soviet security experts note that by allowing US vessels armed with *Tomahawk* SLCM's into its ports, Japan supports one of the more destabilizing aspects of the maritime strategy. According to Moscow, *Tomahawk* SLCM's are detrimental to stability because they increase the angles and points of possible attack, are difficult to detect and destroy, and, being dual-capable, multiply the maritime platforms that must be neutralized.¹⁰² Soviet security experts also emphasize the

threat posed to deterrence by the maritime strategy's plan for ASW in SSBN bastions. The Soviets regard submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) as a vital complement to land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. SLBM's ensure deterrence by providing a secure capacity to launch a retaliatory strike.

In the 1970's, the USSR met perceived threats to its security in the Far East chiefly by military deployments. Just prior to the opening of an October 1988 conference on cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region hosted by the Soviets in Vladivostok, Rogachev admitted that "the Asia-Pacific line of our policy was for a long time 'frozen'. We did not look our best in the . . . region, and we were seen as a country active only in the military context, that of defense."¹⁰³ The essence of the new thinking is the recognition that this strategy was counterproductive because it worsened the USSR's security environment. By contrast, Gorbachev's efforts have been directed at promoting proposals for political dialogue and economic cooperation. We have seen the record in Soviet policy toward China. What of Soviet policy vis-à-vis Japan?

The Soviet Union has recognized that Japan may well emerge as an independent center of power. Therefore, the USSR, in an apparent application of the ideas of Yakovlev, seems no longer willing to let its approach to Japan be guided by the tenor of US-USSR relations.¹⁰⁴ Shevardnadze's visits to Tokyo in 1986 and 1988 are one such indication of this policy. So is continued Soviet-Japanese discussion of a visit to Tokyo by Gorbachev, an event desired by both sides but complicated by ongoing differences over the territorial issue.

¹⁰¹Thus according to an article in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Dec. 14, 1986, in US-Japanese military planning, Japan has been assigned the task of "backing up combat operations planned by the Pentagon in the Far East . . . The Japanese Navy is made responsible for escorting American aircraft carriers and other large warships, sealing off international straits, and taking part in antisubmarine warfare operations in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk." The article identifies joint exercises held to practice such operations. See the translation in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 19, 1986, pp. C/2-3. A Moscow television report in discussing US-Japanese naval maneuvers noted an "increasingly marked interest in the two-front strategy, which envisages—in the case of armed conflict in Europe—a preemptive strike in the Far East region." Japan's involvement in the plan, tied it "even closer to the military chariot of Washington." See Moscow Television Service in Russian, trans. in *ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1986, p. C/2. See also, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 22, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, June 5, 1987, pp. C/1-2. A Moscow, Radio Peace and Progress report in English (Oct. 13, 1988) quoted Deputy Foreign Minister Igor' Rogachev as follows: "The American military doctrine, known as the Admiral [sic] Lehman doctrine sets forth the following task for the United States naval forces: to approach the territory of the USSR dealing strikes, including nuclear ones, on both coastal targets and targets deep in the country." See Moscow, Radio Peace and Progress in English, Oct. 13, 1988, in *ibid.*, Oct. 14, 1988, p. 11. For a thorough analysis of Soviet assessments of the maritime strategy, see Rosenberg, "It is Hardly Possible," loc. cit., pp. 73-105.

¹⁰²Kokoshin, "The Development of Military Affairs," loc. cit., pp. 8-9;

Vladimir Ivanov's interview with *Tokyo Shimbun*, loc. cit., pp. 8-9; Bunin, "Japan and the Asian-Pacific Strategy," pp. 4, 14; Vrevskiy and Ivanov, "The Asian-Pacific Region," pp. 22-24. Also, Radio Moscow in Japanese, Feb. 6, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Feb. 12, 1988, pp. 24-25.


¹⁰³Moscow, TASS International Service in Russian, Sept. 30, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Oct. 5, 1988, p. 9. On the importance of altering the image of the USSR as "a belligerent undemocratic state," see also Primakov's article in *Pravda*, loc. cit., p. CC/9.

¹⁰⁴In his Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev referred to Japan as a country that "has turned into a power of front-rank significance." See VS, p. R/12. After the Reykjavik summit between Reagan and Gorbachev, a Japanese newspaper asked Vadim Zagladin about the connection between Gorbachev's planned visit to the US and his prospective trip to Japan. Zagladin replied that the two issues were separate and that Japan, although an ally of the US, was viewed by the USSR as "a big independent country." See *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Oct. 18, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 24, 1986, p. 4. Yakovlev has argued that in the face of its relative economic decline and the economic ascendancy of Japan and Western Europe—due to which "[p]olycentrism is coming to replace the monocentrism in capitalist economics and politics"—the US retains its overall predominance by virtue of the military dependence of its allies. He strongly suggests that Soviet strategy ought in such circumstances to weaken this dependence by pursuing an independent economic and political détente with Japan and the states of Western Europe. See Yakovlev, "Inter-Imperialist Contradictions," loc. cit.

The Northern Territories dispute. Soviet statements on the Northern Territories continue to criticize Japan's claims. Moscow denounces Tokyo's policy of linking progress in other spheres of Japanese-Soviet relations to a resolution of the territorial dispute.¹⁰⁵ Talks held during Shevardnadze's 1986 visit, comments in Gorbachev's speeches in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk, and Gorbachev's *Merdeka* interview all failed to indicate Soviet flexibility on this issue. Indeed, in the spring of 1988, Shevardnadze told a Japanese newspaper that Gorbachev and he would be "sacked" if they ceded islands to Japan that belonged to the USSR and that symbolized the sacrifices made during World War II.¹⁰⁶

Yet some evidence suggests that Moscow is trying to redefine its position so as to remove this important barrier to improved relations with Japan. On a practical level, Moscow has begun to allow Japanese citizens to visit ancestral graves at certain sites—the number of which has been increased—in the Northern Territories without requiring visas, in exchange for Japan's permitting Soviet citizens to visit the graves of relatives killed in the 1904–05 Russo-Japanese war.¹⁰⁷

Other signs point to the possible exploration of solutions to the dispute among influential Soviet circles. Aleksandr Bovin has called for mutual flexibility and the need to recognize that a disagreement does exist on the disposition of the islands.¹⁰⁸ At a "closed-door" symposium in Japan, G. Kunadze of the Institute of



Academician Yevgeniy Primakov, Director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations in Moscow, at a November 19, 1987, television bridge between Soviet and American legislators devoted to the issue of regional conflicts.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

World Economics and International Relations (Russian acronym—IMEMO) mentioned the possibility of joint administration of the islands but provided no further details.¹⁰⁹ Kunadze made his proposal in the presence of IMEMO Director Yevgeniy Primakov, who has emerged as Gorbachev's leading academic advisor on policy toward Japan. Primakov himself has suggested the possibility of a solution within the framework of the 1956 Soviet-Japanese statement—crafted on the occasion of the reestablishment of diplomatic relations after World War II—that called for the return of the Habomai and Shikotan islands following the signing of peace treaty between Moscow and Tokyo.¹¹⁰

This approach has also been proposed by Mikhail Titarenko, Director of the Institute of the Far East, and by leaders of the Japan Communist Party (who have suggested an "interim treaty" following the return of the two islands and pending a final peace treaty officially demarcating the border).¹¹¹ The strategic importance of using the 1956 statement as the basis of at least a first-stage solution is that the Habomai and Shikotan are the

¹⁰⁵E.g., *Pravda*, Jan. 8, 1986; *ibid.*, Jan. 20, 1986; *Izvestiya*, June 16, 1986, trans. in CDSP, *Soviet Foreign Policy Today*, p. 186; Moscow, TASS in English, Dec. 1, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 2, 1986, pp. C/1–2; Moscow Television Service, Feb. 7, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, Feb. 9, 1987, p. C/1; Slavinskiy, *Vneshnyaya politika SSSR*, pp. 276–78, 295; *SSSR i Yaponiya*, pp. 405–06. The gist of the Soviet position as reflected in these sources is that Japan's territorial claims are "illegal," "unlawful," linked to the proponents of anti-Sovietism and militarism, and an effort to disturb the postwar territorial settlement. During the visits to Tokyo of Shevardnadze (January 1986) and to Moscow of then-Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe (May 1986), the Soviets held to their position and resisted Japanese efforts to insert mention of the dispute into the joint communiqué.

¹⁰⁶*Asahi Shimbun* (Tokyo), May 10, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 11, 1988, p. 1.

¹⁰⁷Agreement to allow such visits was reached during the Abe visit and later formalized. The first group of Japanese visited in August 1986. See *SSSR i Yaponiya*, p. 400; *Izvestiya*, Dec. 29, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 16, 1987, pp. C1–C2, and *Radio Moscow in Japanese*, July 9, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, July 15, 1988, pp. 16–17.

¹⁰⁸Interview with *Mainichi Shimbun*, Jan. 3, 1989, trans. in *ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1989, p. 2.

¹⁰⁹*Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 27, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, July 28, 1988, p. 1. Kunadze also criticized Japan for linking a transformation in relations with the USSR to the settlement of the territorial dispute, noting that Tokyo had signed a peace treaty with China in 1978 without first resolving the discord over the Senkaku islands.

¹¹⁰Interview with *Asahi Shimbun*, Oct. 26, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Dec. 7, 1988, p. 4.

¹¹¹Titarenko's interview with *Asahi Shimbun*, Dec. 18, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1988, pp. 1–2; JCP discussions with Gorbachev, reported in Tokyo, *JPS in English*, May 7, 1988, in *ibid.*, May 10, 1988, p. 4.

smallest of the disputed islands and are located well to the east of the others. Thus, the integrity of the area that stretches from the Kurile Islands barrier (which stretches some 1,200 kilometers from Cape Lopatka at the tip of the Kamchatka peninsula to the coast of Hokkaido) to the Sea of Okhotsk SSBN bastion could be maintained, especially if Japan agreed to maintain the returned territory in demilitarized status.

A much more significant departure from the previous official Soviet position occurred during Shevardnadze's December 1988 visit to Tokyo. Japan and the Soviet Union agreed to set up working groups at the deputy foreign minister level to discuss various issues relevant to the conclusion of a peace treaty. Shevardnadze made it clear that among these issues were "geographical" questions.¹¹² Thus, the Soviet government, after having denied the existence of any territorial dispute, has returned to the terms of the 1973 joint statement with Japan. That document called for discussions on a peace treaty and, in an apparent reference to the territorial question, noted the need for the "settlement of outstanding questions" left over from World War II.¹¹³

Yet the agreement to discuss the territorial dispute does not guarantee that the USSR will be willing to part with some or all of the islands. Indeed, after Shevardnadze's 1988 visit to Japan, Soviet spokesmen, although conceding that the territorial dispute hindered improved Japanese-Soviet relations, have continued to maintain that Japan lacks any legally valid claim to the islands.¹¹⁴

Although several issues will be weighed by the Soviets in contemplating major concessions on the Northern Territories, the military significance of the islands, which guard the southern entrance to the Sea of Okhotsk and were fortified in 1978 with a motorized rifle division and MiG-23 fighters, will be foremost among them. And the maritime strategy, which includes in its tasks the penetration of the Sea of Okhotsk in order to track and destroy Soviet SSBN's stationed there, has increased the strategic value of this small archipelago. The real question is whether the Soviet leadership will countenance Japanese control of the disputed islands, given Japan's perceived role in the maritime strategy

and the increase in Japan's military capabilities and its cooperation with the US.

Yet the complexities involved in settling the territorial question do not rule out a solution. For one thing, increased Soviet flexibility can be expected within the context of new thinking. Moreover, Moscow is keenly interested in trade and joint economic ventures with Japan, and Gorbachev cannot hope to make a productive visit to Japan without at least some significant movement toward a settlement of the Northern Territories question.

Efforts at Soviet-Japanese détente. Some recent Soviet initiatives suggest an effort to seek détente with Japan using a strategy similar to the one the USSR is pursuing toward China and Western Europe. In the security realm, Moscow has proposed "a joint formulation of confidence-building measures in the Far East and the signing of an agreement stipulating Soviet obligations not to use nuclear weapons against Japan on the condition that Japan strictly abides by its three non-nuclear principles."¹¹⁵ Because the Soviets have maintained that port calls by nuclear-armed US vessels and Japan's participation in the SDI research program violate these principles, the proposals amount to a call for a major redefinition of Japan's security relations with the US. At the same time, as noted previously, little evidence suggests that the Soviet leadership seriously believes that it could split Japan from the US. Indeed, because a Japan bereft of the alliance with the US might be forced to reconsider the limitations observed on its military strength, it is far from clear that the USSR has an axiomatic interest in a severance of US-Japanese security ties. It is far more reasonable to interpret Soviet policy as seeking to provide Japan with inducements to eschew or limit those forms of security cooperation with the United States that Moscow finds particularly worrisome.

On the economic level as well, the USSR has tried to transform the relationship with Japan. Expansion of trade and investment ties with Japan would promote the modernization of Soviet technology and also reduce the salience of the perceived Soviet threat in Japanese eyes. In particular, Moscow wants to pull the economic relationship out of the doldrums into which it was cast when Japan, in response to the declaration of martial law in Poland and the invasion of Afghanistan, followed the United States in applying economic sanctions against the USSR in 1980-81.

¹¹²*Pravda*, Dec. 22, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Dec. 22, 1988, p. 4. See also Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita's interview with *Izvestiya*, Mar. 2, 1989, trans. in *ibid.*, Mar. 3, 1989, p. 20.

¹¹³Rajendra K. Jain, *The USSR and Japan 1945-1980*, Atlantic Highlands, NJ, Humanities Press, 1981, pp. 307-11.

¹¹⁴See the report on a Soviet television program featuring Major General Batenin, Aleksandr Bovin, Vladimir Lukin, and Ivan Ivanov carried by Radio Moscow in Japanese, Feb. 9, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 13, 1989, pp. 22-23. For a detailed rejection of Japan's claims made at a higher level, see Deputy Foreign Minister Igor' Rogachev's article in *Izvestiya*, Apr. 24, 1989.

¹¹⁵Radio Moscow in Japanese, Oct. 2, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 4, 1985, p. C/2.

The Soviets also argue that Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation promotes Japan's economic interests. One of the objectives of the new Soviet regulations on joint economic ventures is to open up Siberia to foreign investment, thus making it part of the "international division of labor." Moscow stresses the importance of this policy plus the Baykal-Amur railroad's contribution to improved transportation in Siberia in seeking to persuade Japan that it stands to gain by increasing economic cooperation with the USSR.¹¹⁶

Various measures, completed or under way, testify to the USSR's interest in expanding economic ties with the countries of the Pacific, especially Japan: the proposal to open Vladivostok and to establish Chinese-style Special Economic Zones in Siberia; indications that the existing legislation on joint ventures will be modified to make investment in the USSR more attractive; the Soviet application in 1986 for membership in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council; and the establishment in 1987 of the Committee for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, chaired by Primakov.¹¹⁷

Several factors will determine whether, in fact, the Soviets succeed in inaugurating a new phase in economic relations with Japan: the future of the Northern Territories dispute; the amendment of specific provisions of the 1987 Soviet legislation on joint ventures, particularly those covering the duration of the tax-free period and restrictions on the repatriation of profits in convertible currencies; and Tokyo's assessment of the degree to which, absent a parallel upswing in US-Soviet economic transactions, burgeoning Soviet-Japanese economic ties will be seen in Washington as a Japanese search for profits at the expense of security considerations. The last consideration may be especially salient for Japan in the aftermath of the contro-

versy created in 1986-87 after the US government uncovered evidence that the Toshiba Machine Company had, together with a Norwegian firm, and in violation of Coordinating Committee for Export Controls regulations, shipped sensitive military technology that enabled the Soviets to develop quieter submarines.¹¹⁸

The Korean Peninsula

The Korean peninsula has long been a source of concern to Moscow because of the important role it plays in the security of the Soviet Far East. South Korea, like Japan, represents a platform for potential air strikes against the Soviet mainland and for bottling up Soviet naval vessels in the Sea of Okhotsk.¹¹⁹ For this reason, the USSR needs a well-armed North Korea as a buffer between itself and the American strategic emplacement in South Korea.

South Korea. The desire to promote an American military disengagement from South Korea plus South Korea's rise as a center of economic power could prompt a new Soviet approach to Seoul. At least some developments point in this direction. The Soviets did not join North Korea in boycotting the 1988 Olympics. Indeed, according to a Japanese press report, then-KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov was sent as head of the Soviet delegation for the 40th anniversary of North Korea's founding in September 1988 to discourage Pyongyang from disrupting the Olympics.¹²⁰ The political significance of the Soviet participation in the Games was also manifested in other ways: an official accompanying the USSR's team was accorded consular status and met with South Korean president Roh Tae Woo, and the Soviets while in Seoul made efforts to appeal to South Korean public opinion.¹²¹

The decision of the two Koreas to continue their dialogue after the Olympics, Roh Tae Woo's quest for détente with Pyongyang (which has included an end to trade restrictions on civilian goods), signs of a thaw in US-North Korean relations, the emergence of substantial indirect trade ties between China and South Korea, and the February 1989 decision to establish full diplomatic relations between Hungary and South Korea may provide a favorable context for modification of Soviet policy.¹²²

¹¹⁶These themes are reflected in Tokyo, Kyodo in English, Dec. 10, 1986, in *ibid.*, Dec. 11, 1986, p. C/1; comments by Rogachev cited in Moscow, TASS in English, July 28, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, July 30, 1987, pp. B/1-2; *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, May 10, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, May 13, 1987, p. 4. On stimulating Siberia's development by increasing its ties to the "international division of labor," see comments of Anatoliy Dobrynin at a conference in Ulan Bator, Mongolia, Moscow, TASS International Service in Russian, July 7, 1987, trans. in *ibid.*, July 9, 1987, p. C/3; and Moscow, TASS International Service in Russian, Oct. 2, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1988, p. 7. A similar point is made in Mikhail Kapitsa, "Paths to Peace and Security in the Asia and Pacific Region," *International Affairs*, August 1987, p. 36.

¹¹⁷Interview with Ivan Ivanov, Deputy Chairman, State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, July 14, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, July 22, 1988, p. 14; Tokyo, Kyodo in English, May 18, 1988, in *ibid.*, May 20, 1988, p. 17; interview with Primakov, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 5, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, May 13, 1988, pp. 5-6; interview with Titarenko, *Asahi Shimbun*, Dec. 21, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1988, p. 2; interview with Vladimir Kamentsev (chairman of the USSR State Foreign Economic Commission), *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, May 1, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, May 13, 1988, p. 6.

¹¹⁸*Asian Security 1987-1988*, pp. 145, 163-64.

¹¹⁹A. Markov, "Japan and South Korea in the Plans of American Imperialism," *MEIMO*, October 1984, pp. 15-24.

¹²⁰Tokyo, Kyodo in English, in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 12, 1988, p. 23.

¹²¹*The Washington Post*, Sept. 11, 1988; *The New York Times*, Sept. 14, 1988.

The possibility of such a change was indicated by an interview given by *Izvestiya* commentator Aleksandr Bovin. Although stating that these were his "personal views," Bovin spoke approvingly of the idea of cross-recognition and the admission of both Koreas to the UN. During the same month, in reviewing the results of the October 1988 Vladivostok conference, Primakov noted that "we don't regard South Korea as our diplomatic or even our political partner. At the same time we must take account of reality. The reality is that South Korea is a fast-growing economic organism. All the world's other countries, including China, are also considering this."¹²³

Although the two-Koreas formula has not been embraced by the Soviet government, Moscow has allowed its senior scholars and its trade officials to visit South Korea, and South Koreans have been allowed to attend functions in the USSR.¹²⁴ In addition, Gorbachev (in the Krasnoyarsk address) and Shevardnadze and other foreign ministry officials have specifically mentioned Moscow's intention to expand economic ties with South Korea.¹²⁵ Following the establishment of South Korean trade missions in Hungary and Yugoslavia in 1988, Moscow also decided to set up such organizations in the USSR in 1989.¹²⁶ Discussions on joint ventures have also been held with South Korean firms such as Daewoo.¹²⁷

The Soviets have emphasized that developments on the economic front do not presage a Soviet move to recognize South Korea, and they have noted as a model China's policy of combining economic ties with non-recognition.¹²⁸ In the joint statement signed when Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited North Korea following his December 1988 trip to Japan, the Soviets ex-

plicitly disavowed the idea of admitting the two Koreas to the UN following mutual recognition, although Shevardnadze pointedly commented on the impermissibility of terrorism and violence to achieve political goals and called for Korean reunification based on "existing realities."¹²⁹

North Korea. The Soviet Union has, over the years, supported various North Korean proposals for arms control and security on the peninsula. In essence these proposals have called for a US-North Korean peace treaty, an agreement on nonaggression and mutual force reductions between the two Koreas, the termination of US-South Korean military exercises, the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, and Korean reunification on a confederal basis.¹³⁰

This policy is hardly surprising, given Soviet opposition to the American military presence in South Korea. As noted above, Moscow has also opposed the South Korean plan for "cross-recognition," that calls for mutual recognition by the two Koreas and recognition of the existence of two separate Korean states by the major powers. However, the combined influence of the new thinking and the Yakovlev strategy emphasizing the importance of a flexible and pragmatic policy in an incipient multipolar world order could eventually push Moscow away from this traditional stance and toward a "German formula" for the Korean peninsula.

North Korea is a buffer between the USSR and US forces in South Korea. North Korea is also strategically important to the USSR even though its border with the USSR is only about 25 kilometers long, because it is a mere 175 kilometers from the Pacific Fleet's principal base in Vladivostok. Moreover, North Korea's coast overlooks the routes taken by Soviet ships leaving Vladivostok and moving eastward or southward through the Sea of Japan en route to the Pacific Ocean.

Because of North Korea's strategic significance, and the competition for influence in Pyongyang between the USSR and China, Moscow continues to serve as North Korea's key source for aid, trade, and armaments. High-level Soviet officials frequently visit Pyongyang (former Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa in November 1984, then-Deputy Prime Minister Geydar Aliyev in August 1985, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in January

¹²²*The New York Times*, Sept. 14, 1988; *The Washington Post*, Aug. 27 and Oct. 21, 1988.

¹²³For the comments of Bovin, see *Mainichi Shimbun*, Oct. 12, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 20, 1988, p. 1; *Asahi Shimbun*, Oct. 13, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Oct. 21, 1988, p. 6; and *Mainichi Shimbun*, Jan. 3, 1989, trans. in *ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1989, p. 4. Primakov's remarks appear in an interview with *Pravda*, Oct. 8, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Oct. 12, 1988, p. 12.

¹²⁴For South Korean comments on the visit of Mikhail Titarenko to Seoul, see Seoul, Yonhap in English, Sept. 12, 1988, in *ibid.*, Sept. 14, 1988, pp. 11-12. See *Korea Times* (Seoul), Feb. 24, 1989, in *ibid.*, Mar. 8, 1989, p. 22, for comments on the visit of an official from the USSR's Exporters Association.

¹²⁵*KS*, p. 10; Moscow International Service in Mandarin, Dec. 22, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Dec. 29, 1988, p. 17; Tokyo, NHK Television in Japanese, Jan. 4, 1989, trans. in *ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1989, p. 12.

¹²⁶Dong Joon Hwang, "The Changing Security Equation on the Korean Peninsula," paper presented at the conference on Asian security sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute of International Relations (Taipei), Taipei, Taiwan, Nov. 30-Dec. 1, 1988, p. 29.

¹²⁷Tokyo, JIJI in English, Aug. 11, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 12, 1988, p. 1.

¹²⁸Interview with V. Tikhomirov (Institute of Oriental Studies) in *Tokyo Shimbun*, Aug. 29, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Sept. 2, 1988, pp. 12-13.

¹²⁹Shevardnadze's speech at a reception given in his honor by his North Korean hosts, Moscow, TASS in English, Dec. 23, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 27, 1988, p. 12.

¹³⁰E.g., Moscow, TASS in English, Dec. 30, 1986, in *ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1987, pp. C/2-3; Gorbachev's speech during Kim Il-sung's October 1986 visit, *Pravda*, Oct. 26, 1986, trans. in *ibid.*, Oct. 28, 1986, pp. C/3-5; Soviet leadership's message on the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, *Pravda*, Sept. 9, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 9, 1988.



Soviet SA-3 anti-aircraft missile installations such as the one pictured here have been delivered to North Korea.

—Photoreporters.

1986 and December 1988, and the Chebrikov delegation to attend the 40th anniversary of North Korea's founding in September 1988). For his part, Kim Il-song visited Moscow after a 23-year hiatus—marked by a North Korean tilt toward China—in May 1984 and again in October 1986.

Following Kim's 1984 visit, the Soviets agreed to provide North Korea some 60 MiG-23 fighter bombers, with deliveries beginning in the summer of 1985. Moscow also provided approximately 30 SA-3 surface-to-air missiles.¹³¹ After Kim's 1986 visit, the Soviets agreed to supply MiG-29 and Su-25 aircraft, SA-5 air defense missiles, and the *Tin Shield* advanced radar designed for early warning, target acquisition, and ground control.¹³²

These deliveries should be placed in proper context. It is not unreasonable to see them as a Soviet response to the American sale of 36 F-16's to South Korea and the decision to station such aircraft at the Japanese base in Misawa. Furthermore, they do not upset the inter-Korean military balance. Neither the MiG-23 nor the MiG-29 is superior to the F-16. The SA-3 and SA-5 (which were both deployed in the USSR in the early 1960's, and complement each other, their functions being low-altitude and high-altitude defense, respectively) are defensive weapons.¹³³ Although the performance record of the SA-5 is largely unknown, the SA-3 proved extremely vulnerable to Israeli countermeasures when used by Syria in the 1982 Lebanese war and in other Arab-Israeli conflicts.

The transfer of these systems undoubtedly repre-

sents an increase in Soviet-North Korean military cooperation. But it does not mean that Moscow has abandoned its traditional risk-averse policy and become cavalier about the importance of maintaining equilibrium on the Korean peninsula. Given Kim Il-song's commitment to reunification, the existence of a Soviet-North Korean security treaty, and the vast American military presence in South Korea (widely assumed to include tactical nuclear weapons), the Soviets have understood that war between the Koreas could eventually lead to a clash of the superpowers.

Following Kim's 1984 visit to Moscow and the subsequent arms transfers, the Soviet Union may have gained access to North Korean ports.¹³⁴ In August 1985, the Soviet Navy made its first visit to a North Korean port when three of its ships called at the east coast

¹³¹IISS, *Strategic Survey 1984-85*, London, IISS, 1985, p. 98; IISS, *Strategic Survey 1985-86*, London, IISS, 1986, p. 166; *The Economist* (London), Jan. 25, 1986, pp. 36-37; *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Mar. 20, 1986, p. 69; Daniel Abele, "Soviet-North Korean Relations on the Upswing," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 356/87, Aug. 24, 1987, pp. 2-4.

¹³²The first six of a total of 30 MiG-29's were delivered in the summer of 1988, and deliveries were to be completed by the end of the year. The first deployments of the SA-5 also took place just north of the DMZ at the same time. North Korea is the first non-Warsaw Pact state to receive the *Tin Shield*. For information on these Soviet arms transfers to North Korea, I am grateful to Ian Curtis of *Defense and Foreign Affairs* and John Zindar of the Center for Defense Information.

¹³³When news of the SA-5 deployments arrived, however, US officials expressed concern that civilian aircraft landing at Seoul for the Olympics could be threatened by the system.

¹³⁴Details on the naval dimension of Soviet-North Korean relations are from Abele, "Soviet-North Korea Relations," loc. cit., pp. 3-4.

port of Wonsan. In July 1986, units from the Pacific Fleet, led by its then-commander, Admiral Vladimir Sidorov, visited North Korea to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Soviet–North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. In May 1987, the commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, led a naval delegation to North Korea, and finally, in May 1988, Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Gennadiy Khvatov, led a flotilla to Wonsan. The Soviet Navy has also been allowed access to Nampo port in the west.

The nature of this access to North Korean ports is unclear, and Wonsan and Nampo are not Soviet bases in any meaningful sense of the term.¹³⁵ In a related matter, Soviet aircraft bound for Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam are now allowed to use North Korean airspace, thus enabling them to bypass Japanese and South Korean surveillance systems along the Tsushima Strait.¹³⁶

A New Asian-Pacific Security Regime?

In a variety of formats beginning in 1986, Gorbachev has proposed moving toward a new security regime for the Asian-Pacific region. The point of departure for Soviet suggestions on Asian-Pacific security is, it is emphasized, the recognition that the threat of nuclear war and the salience of global problems in an interdependent world require a reassessment of zero-sum conditions of security. Gorbachev and his advisers also have recognized that because the stability offered by competing alliances and arsenals is precarious and expensive, security must henceforth be pursued by political and economic means.

These thoughts are not mere products of abstract reasoning born of the stimulus of *glasnost*; they constitute a repudiation of the Brezhnev-era's misplaced emphasis on military power as a means to bolster Soviet security. In northeast Asia the old approach provoked regional fears of Soviet expansion, strengthened the American military presence, and created an alignment of forces that heightened Soviet insecurity and made it difficult for the Soviet Union to harness foreign capital and technology to Siberian economic development. This militarized security environment also complicated the task of expanding the Soviet Union's economic ties with Japan, and of reducing military expenditures and winning the military's support for major force reductions—a necessity if resources are to be redirected to the civilian sector.

The Soviet conception of Asian-Pacific security under Gorbachev is nothing less than a rejection of the framework of Brezhnevian security policy and the quest

for a new one. It seeks to use political means to neutralize perceived threats to Soviet security, to alter the Soviet image in the region, and to encourage foreign funds and expertise to promote economic growth in Siberia.

In proposing regional discussions on Asian-Pacific security, the Gorbachev leadership has taken care to emphasize the need for Chinese and American participation, realizing that the Asian collective security regime proposed by Brezhnev in 1969 failed, in part, because it was viewed as a means to isolate the US and to establish a coalition of states hostile to China.¹³⁷ In addition, although acknowledging that the Helsinki Accord in Europe inspires Soviet conceptions of an Asian-Pacific security system, Soviet spokesmen stress that the different circumstances (the absence of a bipolar bloc alignment, greater cultural diversity, etc.) rule out any simple transplanting of European arrangements to Asia.¹³⁸ Finally, the Soviet Union offers its proposals as points for discussion and welcomes bilateral and multilateral meetings to produce other possible measures to promote regional security.¹³⁹

Based on Gorbachev's statements and Soviet analyses explicating his proposals, the chief elements of the security order envisaged by the Soviet Union can be specified. These elements include proposals on military bases, arms control, nuclear-free zones, and economic cooperation.¹⁴⁰

Military bases. The Soviet conception of Asian-Pacific security clearly opposes foreign military bases and troops in the region. Gorbachev made this point in his

¹³⁵Ibid.; *Asian Security* 1987–88, p. 91.

¹³⁶*Sankei Shimbun*, May 13, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 20, 1987, p. 3.

¹³⁷VS, pp. R/12–15; Vladimir Lukin, "The Pacific Orientation of International Politics," *MEiMO*, November 1986, pp. 70–71.

¹³⁸Mikhail Kapitsa's comments (soon after leaving the post of deputy foreign minister to become director of the Institute of Oriental Studies) on a panel on Asian-Pacific Security, Moscow Television Service, Feb. 19, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 27, 1988, pp. CC/1–3; International Strategic Institute at Stanford, Stanford University, and Institute of Far Eastern Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, *A Program for Strengthening Security and Reducing the Risk of War in the Asian-Pacific*, Stanford University, Center for International Security and Arms Control, March 1988, pp. 5–7. Mikhail Titarenko led the Soviet delegation to the Stanford conference.

¹³⁹Comments of *Pravda* correspondent Vsevolod Ovchinnikov at Moscow Television Service panel of Feb. 19, 1987, loc. cit., p. CC/4.

¹⁴⁰The listing by category of Soviet proposals on Asian security given below is based on VS; MI; KS; Ivan Kovalenko, "On a Complex Approach to the Problem of Asian Security," *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka*, January 1986, pp. 14–36, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 9, 1986, pp. 1–16; Kapitsa, "Paths to Peace," loc. cit.; Titarenko, "The Soviet Concept of Security," loc. cit.; idem, "The Soviet Strategy of Peace," loc. cit.; Institute of World Economics and International Relations, *Pacific Ocean Security*, Moscow, Nauka, 1987; *A Program for Strengthening Security*, pp. 4–5; Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev's article in *Pravda*, Sept. 5, 1988; V. Kalugin's article in *ibid.*, Apr. 28, 1988; Lukin, "The Pacific Direction," pp. 72–73.

Vladivostok address. In the *Merdeka* interview, he specifically mentioned the US military presence in South Korea and the Philippines. The Krasnoyarsk speech made an even sharper connection between regional security and foreign bases. In this speech, Gorbachev offered a Soviet evacuation of Cam Ranh Bay in exchange for a US willingness to give up its bases in the Philippines.

Arms control. The Soviets have suggested using the principle of reasonable sufficiency for reducing conventional forces in Asia. At Vladivostok, Gorbachev mentioned the Sino-Soviet border as the starting point. The Krasnoyarsk address proposed that the levels of naval and air forces in the northwest Pacific be frozen as a prelude to discussions. And, as mentioned above, Moscow now accepts on-site verification as an essential component of arms reduction.

A new element that recently has become clear in the Soviet position is the argument that conventional arms control should not focus on Soviet advantages in armor and artillery to the exclusion of NATO's superiority in key components of the naval balance. In February 1988, Defense Minister Yazov made this point in an article in *Pravda* as did Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy at the UN in October 1988. It was repeated in the same month by Rogachev, suggesting either that the Soviets would link European conventional arms reductions to naval arms control in Europe and elsewhere, or that in any future negotiations on arms control in the Asia-Pacific region, Moscow would insist on including naval forces.¹⁴¹

On nuclear arms, the Soviets have expressed willingness to freeze their nuclear-capable aircraft in the region if the US agrees not to increase deployments in East Asia of aircraft that are capable of striking the USSR. Moscow also proposed a US-Soviet freeze on all nuclear weapons in the region. More specifically, Moscow has maintained that without a US-Soviet agreement on limiting SLCM's, the 50 percent reduction in central strategic systems envisaged in the START negotiations will prove impossible. The Soviet Union interprets the American position that the complexities of verification prevent an accord on SLCM's as a ploy to weaken the Soviet defense posture. In Moscow's view, without an accord on SLCM's, major reductions in ICBM's—the mainstay of the Soviet triad—would create new sources of vulnerability for the USSR because the US would retain the freedom to deploy SLCM's at

various locales near the Soviet periphery, including the northwest Pacific.

The superpowers have agreed in principle to limit long-range SLCM's. But the US position on the extent and nature of these limits is less well-defined than that of the Soviets. For its part, Moscow has proposed that each side limit itself to no more than 400 nuclear-armed SLCM's with a range in excess of 600 kilometers and that satellite reconnaissance plus on-site inspections of vessels can solve the verification problem posed by the dual-capable character of SLCM's.¹⁴²

Nuclear-free zones. Opposition to nuclear weapons and the desirability of nuclear-free zones are key themes in Soviet conceptions of an East Asian security regime. Regional manifestations of anti-nuclear sentiment—the Rarotonga Treaty, Australia's and New Zealand's opposition to French nuclear tests in the South Pacific, New Zealand's banning of visits by nuclear-armed ships, and discussions within ASEAN on a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia—are singled out for praise. Soviet and Chinese adoption of the "no first use" principle and the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests are contrasted with the American reluctance to reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons for security.

Confidence-building measures. The following Soviet initiatives have sought to promote stability given existing deployments: a proposed US-Soviet agreement to keep warships armed with nuclear weapons beyond the range of the respective coasts; a proposal to limit ASW in agreed-upon zones and eliminate it in others; a proposal to limit major naval exercises to one or two per year; a proposal to prohibit large naval exercises in major sea routes; a proposal to provide advance notice of planned exercises or troop movements involving forces larger than an agreed-upon number; and a proposal for on-site inspections to ensure compliance. Some of these initiatives derive from the experience of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, while others, especially those involving safe havens for SSBN's and limiting the operating areas for nuclear-armed vessels, speak to more immediate concerns such as the maritime strategy and *Tomahawk* SLCM's.

¹⁴¹*Pravda*, Feb. 8, 1988; *The New York Times*, Oct. 19, 1988; Moscow, Radio Peace and Progress, Oct. 13, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 14, 1988, p. 11.

¹⁴²For the Soviet position on SLCM's, see interviews with Colonel General Nikolay Chervov in *La Stampa*, loc. cit., pp. 11–12; with Viktor Karpov in *The Guardian*, Mar. 31, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 12, 1988, pp. 1–2; with Vladimir Ivanov in *Tokyo Shimbun*, Apr. 20, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Apr. 29, 1988; Gorbachev's remarks to Japan Communist Party Central Committee Vice-Chairman, Tetsuzo Fuwa, as reported in *Tokyo, JPS* in English, May 7, 1988, in *ibid.*, May 10, 1988, p. 2; comments of Novosti security expert Viktor Pavlov in *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), June 1, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, June 6, 1988, pp. 3–4.

Economic cooperation. The Soviets view regional economic cooperation as a means both to promote Siberian economic development and to create a setting conducive to negotiating arms-control and confidence-building measures intended to bolster Asian-Pacific security. They stress that the role envisaged for foreign capital and technology in the development of Siberia—an area now heavily subsidized by the rest of the USSR—creates immense opportunities for profitable investments. Preferential tax rates and other incentives are discussed to entice foreign investors. And, in an effort to involve itself more deeply in the East Asian economy, the USSR has sought a role in the Asian Development Bank and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, a 15-nation group established in 1980 to discuss regional economic issues.¹⁴³

Conclusion

These broad proposals as well as various bilateral relationships in the region reflect a Soviet attempt to redefine the way that Northeast Asian countries view the USSR. Moscow now wishes to be seen as a constructive partner in the region rather than as a hegemon. Senior Soviet officials, such as Gorbachev, have stressed the importance of recasting the Soviet image.

The Soviets also seek to limit the American military presence in the region. Thus, the call for dismantling foreign bases and the support of nuclear-free zones are aimed at American deployments in South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, which represent to the USSR a threatening projection of power along its periphery. The confidence-building measures seek to limit anti-submarine warfare and confine nuclear-armed vessels to areas from which they could not strike targets ashore.

Overall, the Soviet conception of Asian-Pacific security responds politically to what Moscow views as the principal military threats to its security and attempts to create a regional environment suited to two important goals of *perestroyka*: reducing the burden of defense expenditure and using foreign investment to improve technology and raise the standard of living in the USSR.

Thus far, the Soviets have been disappointed by the responses to their proposals. First, the US and its Pacific allies view Soviet initiatives on regional security as efforts to undermine the American military presence and to create a situation in which the USSR emerges preponderant simply by virtue of geographical proximity. A 1988 Japanese Defense Agency report maintains that Soviet military power in the Far East has increased

since Gorbachev became general secretary.¹⁴⁴ And William Safire has called Soviet proposals on Pacific security "a sucker play" and "the deliberate moves of a superpower switching from raw power to diplomatic trickery to further imperialist aims."¹⁴⁵ Second, the US and Japanese governments in particular do not regard Gorbachev's proposals as genuine efforts prompted by a willingness to reduce Soviet forces, but as a public relations offensive aimed at falsely presenting the USSR as the agent of peace and progress.

Neither of these views is totally without foundation. But, by the same token, they do not adequately appreciate the new domestic context of Soviet foreign policy, Gorbachev's efforts to design a security environment for the USSR supportive of *perestroyka* and the reallocation of investment resources from the military to the civilian sector.

The failure to give adequate weight to these considerations is not surprising—neither political leaders nor most Soviet specialists in the West anticipated the changes now taking place in Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Entrenched perceptions and assumptions are not easily reexamined. Yet, if Gorbachev's proposals are dismissed as pure public relations ploys, the opportunity may be lost to determine if they can lead to mutually-acceptable, mutually-beneficial, verifiable agreements that might reduce tensions, minimize the likelihood of accidental war, and decrease the defense burdens that neither superpower now can easily bear.

¹⁴³The *Daily Yomiuri* (Tokyo), May 21, 1987, in *ibid.*, May 26, 1987, p. 1, notes that the Soviets sent a representative to the 20th annual general meeting of the Asian Development Bank although since the founding of the Bank in 1966, Moscow had "not even bothered to reply to letters of invitation to the annual conference." On Soviet interest in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, see *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), May 24, 1988, which notes that a Soviet delegation headed by Primakov attended a meeting of the conference in Osaka, Japan, and sought membership. Primakov reportedly stated that the Soviets had reassessed "some dogmatic judgments we had in the past" and sought foreign cooperation to develop the Soviet Far East.

¹⁴⁴The report states that ground forces have increased by 20,000 or the equivalent of two divisions, that naval power has been strengthened by the addition to the Pacific Fleet of Sovremennyy- and Kirov-class ships, as well as Akula-class submarines marked by significant noise reduction, and that air power has grown by 190 aircraft with additional MiG-31's, Tu-22M's, and MiG-23's. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, Apr. 11, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 15, 1988, pp. 2-3; *Sankei Shimbun*, Feb. 26, 1989, trans. in *ibid.*, Mar. 6, 1989, p. 2. The Soviets have denied this claim. See Yazov's interview with Tokyo, Kyodo, July 4, 1988, in *ibid.*, July 5, 1988, p. 11; *Radio Moscow in Japanese*, Feb. 16, 1989, trans. in *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1989, pp. 20-21.

¹⁴⁵The *New York Times*, Sept. 9, 1988. The fear that Gorbachev's proposals, if implemented, would reduce the American presence and leave the USSR predominant in East Asia is reflected in Japanese reactions to Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk initiatives. See *Izvestiya*, Oct. 15, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 20, 1988, pp. 15-16, for a Soviet summation of some of the reactions.

China and India: Moving Beyond Confrontation

Surjit Mansingh and Steven I. Levine

The visit of India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China, from December 19 to 23, 1988, marked an advance in the two countries' decade-long quest for a mutually acceptable mode of coexistence. This summit diplomacy represents an attempt by China and India to close the book on 30 years of hostility and to promote a better atmosphere in which long-standing contentious issues may be peacefully resolved.

Despite the goodwill generated by Gandhi's visit, resolving disputes and easing tensions will not be easy for the two countries. Beijing and New Delhi have been attempting to improve their relations for more than a dozen years, but the road to Sino-Indian normalization has been as full of switchbacks and rough spots as any of the strategic roads that now cross the Himalayan mountains between the two countries. Although China and India have managed—not without difficulty—to prevent sporadic tensions along their disputed border from escalating into serious armed conflict (most nota-

bly in 1986–87), they are still a long way from resolving the territorial dispute over their Himalayan border, which erupted into a shooting war in October 1962. The past decade has also found the two countries on opposite sides of the protracted conflicts in Afghanistan and Cambodia, and both compete for influence in the Himalayan border kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan.

Their conflicting self-images also are divisive. New Delhi sees Beijing as an interloper in South Asia. China believes that as the leading power in Asia it is entitled to pursue active diplomacy in that region. Moreover, the smaller states of South Asia (including Pakistan) see the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a counterweight to India.

This article examines recent developments in Sino-Indian relations within their regional and global contexts. Its principal conclusion is that recent Sino-Indian summit diplomacy is unlikely to bring about any dramatic changes in the relations between Beijing and New Delhi in the near term but that the summit dialogue will contribute to building domestic support in both countries for expanded relations. The summit also has established a regular mechanism for working toward the resolution of the border conflict. But even normalization of Sino-Indian relations can only be expected to ameliorate, not eliminate, the long-standing rivalry between these two major powers, whose divergent interests and possibly incompatible regional ambitions will continue to shape inter-state relations in South Asia. Despite many changes in the domestic and international environments of China and India over the past four decades, certain unresolved issues remain at the core of relations between the two largest states in Asia, whose combined population of 1.9 billion people constitutes more than one third of the world's total.

Surjit Mansingh is currently a Visiting Scholar at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University (Washington, DC) and has taught at The American University (Washington, DC) and Delhi University. She is the author of numerous articles and monographs, including India's Search for Power (1984) and (co-authored with Charles H. Heimsath) of Diplomatic History of Modern India (1971). Steven I. Levine is Senior Research Associate at the Asian-Pacific Studies Institute of Duke University (Durham, NC). He is the author of Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria (1987) and of many articles on Chinese foreign policy.

Relations in Historical Context

Despite more than 2,000 years of cultural and economic contact, India and China emerged historically as largely autonomous civilizations whose interactions—with the significant exception of Buddhism—were peripheral to their respective development. In the century preceding modern India's independence in 1947 and the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Indian and Chinese intellectual leaders occasionally took sympathetic note of each other. However, no close ties developed between the emerging elites of the two countries; moreover, the National Congress Party of India and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) each pursued their national objectives through very different means.

Since the 1940's, Sino-Indian relations have passed through four stages. Broadly speaking, the 1950's can be characterized as an era of friendship based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence; the 1960's as a time of conflict and hostility; the 1970's as a period in which tentative efforts were made to reestablish contact; and the 1980's as an era of regular but insubstantial governmental meetings.

The brief flowering of Sino-Indian friendship in the mid-1950's was due, in large part, to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who viewed Indian independence and the Chinese Revolution as parallel expressions of resurgent Asian nationalism, and envisioned India and China as cooperating leaders of post-colonial Asia.¹ India became one of the first noncommunist states to recognize the PRC (on April 1, 1950), and New Delhi vigorously upheld Beijing's right to representation in the United Nations. After some hesitation, the Indian government also recognized China's 1951 takeover of Tibet and concluded a trade agreement in April 1954 that liquidated the privileged position there that India had inherited from the British raj. This agreement was notable also for first enshrining the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (*Panch Shila*)²—respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression, no interference in internal affairs, equality and mutuality, and peaceful coexistence. This Pan-Asian idealism, however, was rooted in the rather thin soil of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. It looked toward a self-managed Asia free not only from the domination of the existing major powers but also from the politics of power itself. This turned out to be an illusion.

Border dispute. The undemarcated border of some 2,500 miles in mountainous terrain between territories administered and/or claimed by New Delhi and Beijing

proved to be an insuperable barrier to Sino-Indian amity. Small border clashes began to occur in the middle and late 1950's, first at points in the middle sector of the Indo-Tibetan border, then in the northwestern reaches of Ladakh, a district of Kashmir, where the Chinese constructed a road linking Sinkiang to Tibet across the Aksai Chin plateau, and finally at the other extremity of the frontier where eastern Tibet met India's North East Frontier Agency (NEFA, now the state of Arunachal Pradesh) along the famous McMahon line. In a letter to Nehru dated September 8, 1959, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai laid claim to about 40,000 square miles of territory over which India's most recent maps showed it to have sovereignty. Zhou's explanation for the claim lay in his review of the history of British imperialist expansion into the Himalayas.³ However, independent India, as the successor state to British India, accepted the legitimacy of the borders it inherited. Nehru defended this position tenaciously even though he expected to resolve controversy peacefully.

In addition, India's close links with the Himalayan kingdoms of Bhutan and Nepal, as well as the small princely protectorate of Sikkim, were strengthened by treaty in 1949–50, and Nehru subsequently made it clear to China that the security of their northern borders was of vital interest to India. India and China, then, were like two powerful magnets embedded in the Himalayan region, each exerting a field of force that overlapped with that of the other.

Tibet. Although China's assertion of control over Tibet was grudgingly accepted by India, the issue of Tibet—the geographical and cultural link between China and India—is entwined with the border question since most of the border runs along the southern frontier of Tibet. Conflicting claims to specific areas rest in part in the status of Tibet as a signatory to the controversial agreement establishing the McMahon line as the boundary in the eastern sector. This agreement was negotiated between the British and Tibetans in Delhi in

¹Charles Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh, *Diplomatic History of Modern India*, New Delhi, Allied, 1971, pp. 184–201; Bhabani Sen Gupta, *The Fulcrum of Asia: Relations Among China, India, Pakistan, and the USSR*, New York, Pegasus, 1970, pp. 304–05. See also Surjit Mansingh, *India's Search for Power*, New Delhi, Sage Publications, Ltd., 1984, pp. 192–96.

²For the text of the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet, see R. K. Jain, Ed., *China-South Asian Relations 1947-1980*, Brighton, England, The Harvester Press, 1981, Vol. 1, pp. 61–64.

³This point of view is documented by British writers. See Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1972, pp. 5–55. See also Alastair Lamb, *The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries*, London, Oxford University Press, 1964; and idem, *The McMahon Line: A Study in the Relations Between India, China, and Tibet, 1904–1914*, 2 vols. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966.

February and March 1914 after the Simla Conference of 1913–14 failed to secure the formal adherence of the Chinese government to a tripartite border agreement. Although India upholds the legality of the agreement, China has denied the binding force of the McMahon line—which pushed the Indian boundary northward about 60 miles—contending that Tibet had no treaty-making power.

The PRC's imposition of its own highly centralized state structure provoked a Tibetan national uprising in 1959 and the exodus of the Dalai Lama, Tibet's preeminent religious leader, and about 100,000 others to India, where they were given sanctuary and allowed to set up a government-in-exile.⁴ Beijing responded with outrage and initiated a steady buildup of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in this sensitive and volatile border area. After China crushed the Tibetan uprising, relations with India deteriorated rapidly.

1962 war. Although the border was the subject of detailed official Sino-Indian talks in 1960, these talks did little but point up divergent Indian and Chinese interpretations of juridical principles, historical records, and even the methods of delimiting borders. By 1962, Nehru, spurred by growing Indian patriotic fervor, and convinced that the Chinese would never go to war over the barren frontier territory, abruptly adopted an assertive policy of forward patrolling along the disputed border. Local clashes between Indian and Chinese forces intensified. Reeling from the internal crises induced by the Great Leap Forward and fearing that China's external enemies, Taiwan and the United States, were taking the offensive against Beijing, Mao Zedong adopted a stiffer stand toward India and launched an ideological onslaught on Nehru.⁵ Finally, on October 20, 1962, the PLA launched an attack down the Himalayan ridge lines against Indian forces that were inadequately prepared for such an eventuality.⁶ After humiliating India and provoking international concern about a possible Chinese invasion of the North India plains, on November 21, the PLA declared a unilateral cease-fire and withdrew to the preexisting lines of control. Sino-Indian relations settled into a cold war pattern.

Several observations may be made concerning the breakdown of Sino-Indian relations in the late 1950's and early 1960's. First, with very few exceptions, Chi-

nese and Indian leaders were woefully ignorant of each other's history and culture and lacked knowledge of each other's modern politics as well. The modernizing elites of China and India had many links abroad, but they had few links with each other as Asians.

The second point, a corollary of the first, is that the two countries shared very few concrete interests. The anti-imperialist rhetoric of Pan-Asian solidarity and the peaceful code of international conduct embodied in the *Panch Shila* were insubstantial commodities compared to the heavy weight of traditional military definitions of national security. In fact, anti-imperialism in China and India was expressed in various forms, including by assertiveness in international affairs. This national assertiveness, which invoked the glorious past of both countries, accelerated the drift toward territorial conflict.

Third, China's and India's defense of their sovereignty and territorial integrity focused on remote border areas of little economic, but considerable strategic significance to both states. Moreover, the ability to pacify and incorporate these areas into their respective political systems was perceived by both Chinese and Indian leaders as proof of their political efficacy and legitimacy.⁷ This circumstance significantly reduced the flexibility on both sides and complicated the resolution of disputes.

Finally, underlying the specific conflicts between China and India were competing Chinese and Indian visions of their roles in Asia and the world, visions that touched upon questions of status, prestige, and position in the international hierarchy of nations. Maoist China saw itself as a revolutionary socialist great power providing symbolic leadership to all oppressed peoples against the dominant powers. Similarly, India's self-image in Nehru's time was that of a major power pioneering new principles of peaceful international relations through the concepts of nonalignment and evolutionary change. These Chinese and Indian self-images proved mutually incompatible. Thus, when concrete points of dispute arose between the two countries in the late 1950's, they were exacerbated by symbolic political issues, as well as by the personalities of the leaders on both sides.

Global context of Sino-Indian relations. Beginning in the 1960's, Beijing saw India as an adversary associated first with "Western imperialism" and then with "Soviet expansionism" in encircling the PRC. When, in the

⁴See John F. Avedon, *In Exile from the Land of the Snows*, New York, Vintage Books, 1986, pp. 65–133; Tom Grunfeld, *The Making of Modern Tibet*, Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1987.

⁵See the articles on Nehru in *Renmin ribao* (Beijing), especially those of May 6, 1959, and Oct. 27, 1962.

⁶For Chinese calculations and warnings, see Allen S. Whiting, *China's Calculus of Deterrence*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1975.

⁷For a similar point, see Stephen P. Cohen, "Toward a Great State in Asia?" in Onkar Marwah and Jonathan D. Pollack, Eds., *Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India, Japan*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1980, p. 22.



Chinese and Indian military officials on December 19, 1962, negotiate the return of Indian materiel seized by the Chinese during hostilities earlier in the autumn.

—China Photo Service from Eastfoto.

midst of the Bangladesh crisis of 1971, India modified its nonaligned policy and intensified its economic and security relationship with the Soviet Union, ultimately signing the Soviet-Indian Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation on August 9, 1971, the Chinese media sneered that "the Soviet Union has turned India into its dependency."⁸ However, China was also motivated by security concerns and, using Pakistan as an intermediary, entered upon a strategic relationship with the United States. In this way, the Sino-Indian conflict became linked to both the Sino-Soviet conflict and the Sino-Soviet-American strategic triangle, ensuring that no substantial change would occur in Sino-Indian relations until a thaw began between Moscow and Beijing.

From New Delhi's perspective, it was China that was actively engaged in encircling India rather than the reverse. The consolidation of an informal alliance between China and Pakistan in the 1960's posed two threats to Indian national security. First, it opened the possibility of a two-front war, though this did not materialize either during the 1965 or the 1971 Indian wars with Pakistan, and second, it brought Chinese assistance to Pakistan's clandestine nuclear weapons program.⁹

India has also regarded with suspicion China's diplomacy with respect to other South Asian states friendly to India, namely, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. It feared that China, as an outside power, was exploiting natural disagreements on a heterogeneous subcontinent for the purpose of extending its own influence at India's expense.

In the 1950's and 1960's, China's and India's divergent self-images were often discussed by outside observers, who posited the existence of competing Chinese and Indian "models" of development: peasant revolution and communism versus voluntarism and democracy.¹⁰ Since then, the many zig-zags in China's domestic policies and the difficulties that India has experienced in its development have sharply reduced the salience of this original perspective. Nevertheless, the

⁸*Peking Review*, Nov. 30, 1973, cited in R. K. Jain, op. cit., p. 440.

⁹See Carnegie Task Force on Non-Proliferation and South Asian Security, *Nuclear Weapons and South Asian Security*, Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1988.

¹⁰See, for example, Barrington R. Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1966.

sheer size of India and China, their roughly comparable stages of economic development, and the similar problems that they presently face continue to direct attention to their development strategies and their respective achievements and failures.¹¹ Although these factors also fuel the competition between the two countries, they hold the potential for collaboration and mutual learning as well.

Obstacles to Normalization

It is axiomatic that solutions of long-standing disputes in international relations require that both sides display an equal interest at the same time in reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. This is especially true when the adversaries have resorted to arms and lack both trust in and familiarity with each other.

The Sino-Indian border war of 1962, however, froze relations between India and China in a posture of mutual hostility and mistrust for nearly two decades. The Indian public's sense of outrage over the national humiliation in the war was compounded when in 1967, during the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards besieged the Indian Embassy and assaulted Indian diplomats, and Chinese media heaped abuse on Indira Gandhi's government. Relations were further complicated by China's support of tribal insurgency movements in NEFA as well as Marxist-Leninist and Maoist agitators in several Indian states.

Prime Minister Gandhi saw little opportunity for improving relations with China during her early years in power. When she was ready to explore the possibility of doing so in 1969–70, she elicited no response from the Chinese side.¹² Not only was the PRC deep in the throes of the Cultural Revolution but it was also preoccupied with a worsening conflict with the Soviet Union. The diplomatic turnabout of 1971 that produced Sino-American rapprochement and the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation further reduced the prospects for an early initiative to break the Sino-Indian logjam.

For New Delhi, close relations with Moscow acted as a constraint in at least two ways. First, for most of the Brezhnev period (1964–82), Soviet leaders were obsessed with the problem of China and viewed even tentative moves in the direction of Sino-Indian reconciliation as a threat to Soviet interests in Asia. This became particularly clear during the period of the Janata party government (1977–79), when suspicion that Prime Minister Morarji Desai wanted to improve relations with China was one of the factors that prompted reported Soviet efforts to unseat him,¹³ and when both Leonid Brezh-

nev and Aleksey Kosygin voiced objections to Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's visit to Beijing in February 1979.

Second, Soviet diplomatic support along with military and economic assistance over several decades had built a broad spectrum of support in India for close relations. Soviet embassy materials depicting Chinese foreign policy in the worst possible light easily fanned the flames of anti-Chinese sentiment among the many Indian opinion-makers who opposed rapprochement with the PRC on terms short of Chinese capitulation. In the context of continuing Sino-Soviet antagonisms, any move toward Beijing by an Indian government could be portrayed by the opposition as an unfriendly act toward Moscow rather than as a sensible step toward ameliorating bilateral relations with China. Thus, in the early 1980's Mrs. Gandhi's government was obliged to repeatedly assert that "normalization of relations with China will not be at the cost of our tested friendship with the Soviet Union."¹⁴ In sum, Indian domestic and foreign policy considerations obstructed progress toward the normalization of Sino-Indian relations.

An analogous set of circumstances prevailed on the Chinese side. As Indo-Soviet relations grew better, Sino-Soviet relations grew worse. The Chinese looked askance at India's relations with the Soviet Union and viewed Moscow's neutrality in the Sino-Indian border war and its military assistance to India as integral parts of Soviet strategy to contain China's power. In the 1960's, China acted to counter Soviet strategy throughout Asia and Africa, as well as to demonstrate its own credibility as a major Asian power whose voice should command attention in South Asia.

In 1963, China and Pakistan signed a border agreement that accorded interim recognition to Pakistani claims on Kashmir. The following year, Zhou Enlai formally supported Pakistan's position that the future of Kashmir should be determined by plebiscite. An informal alliance between China and Pakistan took shape against the backdrop of subcontinental conflict.¹⁵ Dur-

¹¹See, for example, Robert F. Dernberger and Richard S. Eckaus, *Financing Asian Development No. 2: China and India*, Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 1988. See also Sanjay Kathuria, "China Can Learn from India's Problems," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Aug. 13, 1987, p. 85.

¹²Mansingh, *India's Search for Power*, p. 204.

¹³See Arun Gandhi, *The Morarji Papers: Fall of the Janata Government*, New Delhi, Vision Books, 1983, pp. 28–29, 37–39. We are indebted to John W. Garver for bringing this source to our attention.

¹⁴Mansingh, *India's Search for Power*, p. 246.

¹⁵For a trenchant analysis, see J. D. Armstrong, *Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977, pp. 159–64; also, Yaacov Vertzberger, *China's Southwestern Strategy: Encirclement and Counterencirclement*, New York, Praeger, 1985, pp. 21–45.

ing the Pakistan-India war of 1965, China demanded that India cease fire and desist from alleged incursions along the Sino-Indian border.¹⁶ During the protracted Bangladesh crisis of 1971, Chinese leaders tried discreetly to moderate Yahya Khan's brutal policy toward East Bengal, but without success.¹⁷ Liu Shaoqi's earlier pledge to support Pakistan's territorial integrity¹⁸ was quietly interred and China remained on the sidelines during the war in December 1971, which resulted in the establishment of Bangladesh. However, the PRC, by then a member of the UN Security Council, supported Pakistan in the United Nations, and criticized India and the Soviet Union for their roles in dismembering a sovereign state.¹⁹ China did not establish diplomatic relations with Bangladesh until 1975.

In this way China aligned itself with a weaker regional state locked in chronic conflict with its more powerful neighbor.²⁰ In the polarized politics of South Asia, China's support for Pakistan, limited though it proved to be in practice, constrained Chinese diplomacy toward India. Beijing was unwilling to abandon its junior partner for the sake of better relations with New Delhi. It was only some years after the Bangladesh crisis that Chinese leaders concluded that their interests on the subcontinent would be better served by promoting rapprochement between Pakistan and India.

In the meantime, however, China provoked Indian resentment by providing an alternate source of economic and technical aid to Nepal, a Himalayan kingdom where the Indian presence was highly visible.²¹ The Sino-Indian struggle for political influence in the Himalayan border lands took a new turn in 1975 when India integrated the princely state of Sikkim into the Indian Union.²² A torrent of Chinese criticism appeared in *Renmin ribao* denouncing the action as a "flagrant act of colonialist expansion," and further proof of India's desire to become a "sub-superpower." A Chi-

nese government statement issued on April 29, 1975, condemned India's "illegal annexation," and offered to support Sikkimese resistance.²³ This was seen as an inflammatory gesture in New Delhi.

The United States also played a role in hardening the lines of confrontation in South Asia. Because of Pakistan's friendship with both the United States and the PRC, President Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger viewed President Yahya Khan as an indispensable intermediary during the delicate early stages of Sino-American rapprochement.²⁴ Kissinger's historic trip to Beijing in July 1971 coincided with the unfolding tragedy in Bangladesh. Enmeshed in the crisis, India assessed the strategic dimensions of the emerging Sino-American rapprochement as a potential threat to its interests.²⁵

Thus, from the original bilateral confrontation in 1962, Sino-Indian relations gradually evolved into a secondary or dependent antagonism within the context of great-power relations in the 1970's. A pentagon of power relations took shape in South Asia within which three linked triangles could be discerned. The politics of the triangle of regional powers—India-Pakistan-China—became linked to both a Soviet-Indian-Chinese triangle of major Asian powers as well as to the international politics of the so-called strategic triangle of the great powers—US-USSR-PRC.²⁶ (Note China's unique position in this schema.) Beijing's calculation was that the American-Pakistani-Chinese coalition would outbalance the Soviet-Indian combination. This linkage suited Chinese as well as American inclinations to treat regional issues as manifestations of a global strategic contest.²⁷ However, this approach magnified Indian fears as well, so that this "globalizing" tendency made progress towards Sino-Indian normalization exceedingly difficult.

Toward Normalization

Faint signs of a thaw in Sino-Indian relations became discernible in the mid-1970's. An Indian initiative in

¹⁶See Anwar Syed, *China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale*, Amherst, MA, University of Massachusetts Press, 1974, pp. 109–25; also Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 166–69.

¹⁷Golam W. Choudhury, *China in World Affairs: The Foreign Policy of the PRC Since 1970*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1982, pp. 254–55. Choudhury was then a member of President Yahya Khan's inner circle.

¹⁸Cited in Armstrong, op. cit., p. 170.

¹⁹*Renmin ribao*, Editorial, Jan. 31, 1972, cited in Robert G. Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Policy After the Cultural Revolution, 1966–1977*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1978, p. 134. For China's position during the 1971 crisis, see Vertzberger, op. cit., pp. 47–59.

²⁰The PRC has a proclivity for alignments with a weaker regional power against a more powerful state that was an enemy of China's partner, e.g., with Cambodia against Vietnam.

²¹See Hemen Ray, *China's Strategy in Nepal*, New Delhi, Radiant Publishers, 1983; T. R. Ghoble, *China-Nepal Relations and India*, New Delhi, Deep & Deep Publications, 1986.

²²For an insider's account of this process, see B. S. Das, *The Sikkim Saga*, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1983.

²³Sutter, op. cit., pp. 136–37.

²⁴See Seymour M. Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House*, New York, Summit Books, 1983, pp. 444–53.

²⁵For an incisive account of the international diplomacy of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, see Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1985, pp. 262–88.

²⁶For a similar point, see Raju G. C. Thomas, "India: Balancing Great Power Intrusions and Regional Security Interests," in Raju G. C. Thomas, Ed., *The Great Power Triangle and Asian Security*, Lexington, MA, D. C. Heath, 1983, p. 65.

²⁷See Steven Levine, "China in Asia: The PRC as a Regional Power," in Harry Harding, Ed., *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1984, pp. 107–45.

1976 to resume diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level was the first step. Thereafter, the two countries reestablished trade, shipping, and banking links at modest levels.²⁸

The Janata party victory in the Indian elections of 1977, coming just a few months after the death of Mao Zedong and on the eve of sweeping changes in China's domestic politics, seemed a propitious moment for new overtures in Sino-Indian relations. Morarji Desai desired better relations with China as a means of partially distancing India from the Soviet Union. Chinese leaders reciprocated for the same reason. After some preliminary exchanges, a visit by the Indian Foreign Minister A. B. Vajpayee took place in February 1979, during which the two sides set out their basic positions on the issues that divided them. Vajpayee identified the border problem as the key obstacle to normal Sino-Indian relations, and made it clear that India considered its resolution essential. Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping responded that the border problems could be resolved through consultations, but that meanwhile relations could move forward in other areas.

According to the Chinese news agency Xinhua, the meetings were highly successful. The five principles of peaceful coexistence were reaffirmed as the basis of bilateral relations and as the foundation for a settlement of the boundary question that, it was said, had been "left over from the past when the people of China and India were in a powerless position."²⁹ According to Vajpayee, the Chinese leaders "showed understanding of our policy toward Pakistan and our neighbors" and expressed "appreciation of our efforts." Furthermore, they assured him that China would stop assisting tribal insurgents in India's Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram.³⁰ As a consequence of Vajpayee's visit, the Chinese subsequently reopened Kailash and Mansarovar in Tibet to Indian pilgrims.

However, the positive momentum of Vajpayee's visit was halted by China's attack on Vietnam on February 19. Indian critics of Janata, including Mrs. Gandhi, interpreted the Chinese action as a deliberate insult to India reminiscent of China's behavior in 1962.³¹ Yet, even if China had not moved against Vietnam, Vajpayee's visit, despite its successes, could have had

only limited significance over the long term. Vajpayee himself looked on the visit as only an exploratory trip and carried with him no concrete proposals on how to settle the boundary question. Moreover, the Janata government was publicly committed to the resolution passed by the Indian Parliament on November 14, 1962, asserting "the firm resolve of the Indian people to drive out the aggressor [China] from the sacred soil of India."³² China policy was an explosive issue in domestic politics, and the Janata coalition was weak.

The Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 reinforced China's interest in mending fences with the outside world, including India, and Mrs. Gandhi's return to power in January 1980 was not seen as an impediment. (This was signalled, in part, by Foreign Minister Huang Hua's attendance at India's Republic Day celebrations at the Indian embassy, Beijing, on January 26, 1980, the first by a high ranking official in over 20 years.) Nevertheless, it must be noted that the contrast between China's and India's initial responses to the Soviet action was striking. Beijing, like Washington, quickly increased military aid to Pakistan while New Delhi refused to join in public condemnations of the Soviet Union. Both governments launched a series of high level diplomatic visits designed to accomplish different objectives. China hoped to elicit anti-Soviet commitments from all the South Asian states, while India hoped to prevent the formation of an anti-India bloc in the region. With respect to improving bilateral relations, China emphasized the need to set aside the border question and cooperate in other areas, while India insisted that its settlement was a precondition for overall improvement of relations.

In June 1980, Vice-Premier Deng attempted to address India's concerns through the medium of an interview with Krishan Kumar, the editor of *Vikrant*, an Indian defense journal. The interview took place during the visit to Beijing of Eric Gonsalves, Secretary of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. Backpedaling from China's previous position, Deng called the Kashmir dispute a bilateral problem in Indo-Pakistani relations, thereby suggesting that China would no longer take Pakistan's side in the dispute. More significant, Deng revived Zhou Enlai's "package proposals" of 1960–62 by proposing that India and China settle their border dispute on the basis of the present line of actual control and abandon their respective claims in the eastern and western sectors.³³ From India's point of view this pro-

²⁸See Shen Chun-ch'uan, "Peking-New Delhi Relations in Recent Years," *Issues and Studies* (Taipei), March 1986, pp. 142–43.

²⁹Xinhua commentary, Feb. 19, 1979, in R. K. Jain, op. cit., p. 502.

³⁰Vajpayee's statement in Parliament, Feb. 21, 1979, in *ibid.*, pp. 508–10.

³¹The leader of the Congress Party (I) in the Lok Sabha charged that China's attack on Vietnam was designed to remind India of China's military superiority and predominance in Asia. Raju G. C. Thomas, *Indian Security Policy*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 114.

³²Resolution adopted by the Lok Sabha, Nov. 14, 1962. Text in *ibid.*, p. 225.

³³Jain, op. cit., pp. 542–44; also *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 4, 1980, pp. 26–27.

posals remained as unattractive as it had been 20 years earlier because it sought to legitimize Chinese occupation of territory in Ladakh between 1959 and 1962 without offering any territorial compensation to India. Nevertheless, Foreign Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, in a statement to the Lok Sabha (India's lower house of Parliament) on July 2, 1980, welcomed the offer as a starting point for normalization and for opening negotiations on the border.³⁴

India's recognition of the Heng Samrin government in Cambodia, which the Chinese denounced as a puppet regime, delayed the next step in the nascent Sino-Indian dialogue, but by June 1981, the Chinese were ready to pick up the thread. Huang Hua, at long last returning Vajpayee's visit of February 1979, journeyed to New Delhi for talks with Foreign Minister Rao on a broad range of subjects. Meanwhile, Premier Zhao Ziyang toured Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh, assuring them of Chinese support even while calling India "a major South Asian power" and expressing enthusiasm over the prospects for South Asian regional cooperation.³⁵

Following Huang Hua's visit, the two governments embarked on a series of border talks, the first being held in Beijing in December 1981, with Secretary Gonçalves and Vice Foreign Minister Han Nianlong heading the respective delegations. Eight such meetings have taken place since the agreement. The initial optimism about settling the border issue seemed justified because at the first session China agreed to discuss the border first, while India agreed to place other issues on the agenda, such as cultural and economic ties and access to Buddhist pilgrimage sites. At the second round of talks in New Delhi in May 1982, China repeated its package offer without giving precise details while India pressed for discussion of the border question on a sector-by-sector basis without making any overall counterproposal. In February 1983 in Beijing, the two sides discussed specific outstanding claims on the border by both sides.³⁶

Some progress was apparently made during the course of the fourth round (October 1983, New Delhi), when China and India agreed to work toward defining principles that could be applied in working out a comprehensive settlement on the boundary question through a sector-by-sector approach. Under discussion, according to the Indian press, were concepts commonly found in international law such as that of the

watershed and the highest crest of a mountain range. Judging by its border agreements with Burma, Nepal, and Pakistan in the 1960's, China found such principles acceptable. The utilization of these principles was also compatible with India's traditional definition of its borders. It seemed, at the least, that a semantic logjam had been broken and that further progress could be anticipated. However, the fifth round in Beijing in September 1984 disappointed such hopes, producing nothing more than an agreement to continue to meet.

In 1985, China adopted a distinctly harder line on the border dispute, perhaps to position itself for some real bargaining with Rajiv Gandhi who, after succeeding his assassinated mother, had won a resounding personal mandate in the December parliamentary elections and may have appeared to possess a position strong enough to enable him to make the concessions that previous Indian leaders had eschewed. When pressed by India to define its package proposal, China refused to be precise but explained that it meant "mutual concessions," in which China would expect India to make territorial concessions in the eastern sector in return for which China would make concessions in the Ladakh (western) sector.

Having already agreed to the sector-by-sector approach favored by India, China now gave priority to the eastern sector, claiming that the dispute there was most acute. It is difficult to say whether this was part of its bargaining tactic, or whether it reflected a new assessment of China's interests along the eastern sector of the boundary. Be that as it may, this articulated position dashed Indian expectations of a deal by which India would recognize China's control of the Aksai Chin in return for Chinese withdrawal from those areas in Ladakh occupied in the 1962 war, as well as for *explicit* Chinese recognition of the McMahon line in the eastern sector. With the Chinese reassertion of claims in the eastern sector, the gap between Chinese demands and Indian willingness to make concessions—a gap that had appeared to be narrowing—seemed to be widening once more.

Notwithstanding its demand for concessions in the eastern sector, China did appear to be hopeful of reaching an accommodation with Rajiv Gandhi. In June 1985, Beijing proposed reopening consulates to facilitate normal commercial and cultural exchanges. The sites initially proposed were Shanghai and Lhasa on the Chinese side and Bombay and Calcutta on the Indian. Subsequently, India has had second thoughts about allowing the Chinese to set up shop again in Calcutta, which is too close for comfort to the volatile north-east tribal region, and China has rethought its offer to allow the Indians a diplomatic listening post in the even

³⁴Jain, *op. cit.*, pp. 549–50.

³⁵Bangladesh President Ziaur Rahman was soliciting support for what became the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

³⁶For an early assessment of the first three rounds, see Jerrold F. Elkin and Brian Fredericks, "Sino-Indian Border Talks: The View from New Delhi," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), October 1983, pp. 1128–39.

more volatile atmosphere of Lhasa. Thus, nothing has yet materialized.

In October 1985, Prime Ministers Zhao and Gandhi met at the United Nations and agreed on the need to upgrade Sino-Indian talks to the highest political level. The Indian leader accepted in principle an invitation to visit Beijing, but no follow-up occurred. By the end of 1985, the bright promise of Rajiv's first year in office had been tarnished by successive failures at home, and Chinese leaders may well have decided to await proof of his capacity for continued leadership before making any further overtures.

The seventh round of talks—in Beijing in July 1986—was tense because of a flare-up of border problems. In the summer of 1986, Beijing and New Delhi traded bitter charges over military activities in the Tawang tract area (eastern sector), each side alleging that the other had intruded into its territory.³⁷ In the following year, as discussed below, charges and counter charges were exchanged at an even higher pitch. Only after those tensions subsided was it possible to hold the eighth round of talks in New Delhi in November 1987. These talks merely confirmed what appeared to have been decided by Gandhi and Zhao two years earlier, namely, to shift the problem to the level of top political leaders in both states.

Meanwhile, a curious sideshow illustrated some of the continuing obstacles in the path of Sino-Indian normalization. India's grant of statehood to the Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh (NEFA prior to 1972) in December 1986 evoked a formal protest from China on grounds that this was a unilateral Indian attempt to impose the "illegal" McMahon line upon China. India rejected China's protest as "clear interference in the internal affairs of India."³⁸ New Delhi had promised statehood at an appropriate time to Arunachal in the Shillong agreement of 1975, which resolved a number of problems between the northeastern state of Assam and adjacent tribal peoples. The same agreement had also promised statehood to Mizoram, which was conferred in August 1986 after Rajiv Gandhi signed a widely acclaimed accord with Laldenga, leader of the erst-

while separatist Mizo insurrection that China had previously supported. Once this constitutional arrangement was made with Mizoram, it seemed appropriate to New Delhi to make the same arrangement with Arunachal even though there was no insurgency there.

Bearing in mind the likelihood of a negative reaction from China, Foreign Secretary A. P. Venkateshwaran warned that it might be prudent to delay implementing any change in the status of Arunachal Pradesh. In overruling this advice, Prime Minister Gandhi and his domestic political advisers perhaps displayed an element of complacency in their thinking. China's Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that conferring statehood on that "Indian occupied" area had "seriously violated China's territorial integrity and sovereignty and deeply hurt the feelings of the Chinese people." He warned that the consequences might be "serious."³⁹ Obviously, once Arunachal Pradesh became part of the Indian Union, Beijing was deprived of the ability to make a "concession" in the eastern sector to gain Indian recognition of PRC claims in Ladakh.⁴⁰

What is one to make of these 10 years in Sino-Indian relations, a period when the steps toward détente were so timid and faltering. Writing in 1987, Venketeshwaran said "we were very near to a solution of the border question in 1983 and again in 1985."⁴¹ It was his view that China, at these times, was prepared to confirm the McMahon line in the eastern sector, renounce claims to Arunachal Pradesh, and make a few concessions in the west as a gesture toward recognizing and accommodating New Delhi's constraints arising from the 1962 parliamentary resolution mentioned above, which prohibited any territorial concession by India. In his opinion, this could have given India a recognized and defensible border. Venketeshwaran blamed Indian "hesitation and vacillation" for not grasping the opportunities then offered, and for appearing to treat China with less seriousness than it deserved. His harsh conclusion was that New Delhi gave higher priority to the short-term calculus of forthcoming domestic elections than to important long-term matters of foreign and defense policy.⁴²

Other Indian officials view the matter quite differently. They suggest that China's willingness to settle the boundary issue on terms that any Indian government, even Mrs. Gandhi's with its massive majority, could sell to Parliament was not at all clear in the early 1980's. By refusing to spell out its package proposal and to admit its encroachments in Ladakh west of the 1959 line of actual control, and by reasserting claims in the eastern sector, China provided ammunition for those old guard advisers who first cautioned Mrs. Gandhi, and then Rajiv, against making any concessions.

³⁷See *India Today* (New Delhi), Aug. 31, 1986; and *Beijing Review*, Sept. 1, 1986, pp. 14–15.

³⁸*India News* (Embassy of India, Washington, DC), Mar. 16, 1987, p. 2.

³⁹*China Daily* (Beijing), Dec. 12, 1986, and Feb. 23, 1987.

⁴⁰See Liu Chu, "What Is the Illegal 'Arunachal Pradesh' All About?"

Shijie zhishi (Beijing), Mar. 16, 1987, pp. 77–78, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-CHI*), Apr. 3, 1987, pp. F/1–2.

⁴¹A. P. Venketeshwaran, "Just Neighbors, or Friends?" *Indian Express Magazine* (New Delhi), July 5, 1987.

⁴²Interview, New Delhi, June 1988.

In any case, the longer New Delhi hesitated about moving towards improving relations with China, the less eagerness there was in Beijing to do so. Hesitation characterized Mrs. Gandhi's handling of many serious problems in the early 1980's. If one goes outside the field of bilateral Indian-Chinese relations, one finds two linked explanations for this. First, the government in India had become overly centralized and personalized. Too much business was left to the discretion of the Prime Minister and her personal advisers. With regard to China, expertise in the foreign ministry and in the army was barely used, and coordination between different departments of government was minimal. Second, Mrs. Gandhi was shaken by the devastating loss of her younger son in June 1980, and though she appeared outwardly calm and authoritative, she often refrained from making decisions that were likely to provoke opposition. Thus, she did not attempt to educate the public on the need for a realistic new look at the border problem or to challenge the prevailing assumption that engaging in "mutual concessions" might endanger India's vital frontier defenses. By the mid-1980's, Chinese leaders had decided to press forward with the more important task of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union and relegated Sino-Indian relations to the back burner.

In sum, between 1976 and 1985, despite sporadic efforts on both sides, movement toward Sino-Indian normalization had failed to develop enough momentum to push it over the rough spots along the road. Yet, it seems, the two countries made enough progress in reducing the level of tension that they felt no particular urgency to press forward. The tug of existing relationships and the inertia of familiar patterns of policy and behavior inhibited greater movement toward détente.

This complacency was rudely challenged by the events of 1986 and 1987 out of which emerged a new determination to achieve some Sino-Indian understanding. But before examining the 1986-87 crisis, let us take a further look at the changes that were taking place in the international environment in the second half of the 1980's that enabled leaders on both sides to overcome a legacy of mistakes and cut through the thicket of obstacles that had previously prevented the two sides from improving relations.

Changing International Environment

In the broadest sense, China's program of economic and political reform has provided the rationale for Beijing's interest in better relations with New Delhi.⁴³ Deng Xiaoping and his associates have concluded that the

Sino-Indian confrontation was one among many dysfunctional antagonisms and conflicts inherited from the Maoist period that inhibited the rational pursuit of China's national interest. They recognized that nothing China has thus far achieved in South Asia—its alliance with Pakistan, its inroads in Nepal and Bhutan, its links with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka—is capable of counterbalancing a hostile relationship with India, the major power on the South Asian subcontinent. Indeed, rather than weakening India, Chinese hostility has helped to spur India's transformation into a major conventional military power whose forces deployed along the Himalayan border are likely to be a match for Chinese forces in Tibet.⁴⁴

In the past, Beijing has tended to approach conflict situations (e.g., US-USSR, Indo-Pakistani, Arab-Israeli, etc.) as if its sole policy option was a stark choice between one side or the other. Such dichotomous thinking is now falling out of favor as Chinese diplomacy becomes more sophisticated and nuanced. In South Asia as elsewhere, Chinese leaders are learning to manage the ambiguous complexities of international relations without making unduly restrictive choices or becoming overly identified with one or another side.

In concrete terms, China is now able to recognize India's dominant power position in South Asia and explore avenues for better relations with New Delhi without diminishing Beijing's commitment to Pakistan or its connections with the other South Asian states. Recognizing that a reduction of tension between India and Pakistan as well as movement toward regional cooperation within South Asia would reduce the conflicting tugs on China's policy, Beijing has hailed the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), founded in 1985 on the initiative of Bangladesh, as a major achievement in regional cooperation. Indeed, if anything, China exaggerates its potential to promote peace and development.⁴⁵

By the mid-1980's, it also became evident that the Sino-Soviet conflict, which had constrained both Beijing and New Delhi from pursuing opportunities for conciliation, was winding down. China had successfully re-positioned itself between the superpowers, making credible the concept of an independent Chinese foreign policy first enunciated in 1982. Beijing no longer views the Soviet Union as an imminent threat to Chinese security, but rather as an important partner in the mod-

⁴³See Harry Harding, *China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1987.

⁴⁴See Thomas, *Indian Security Policy*, pp. 141-42, 163, 171.

⁴⁵For a recent Chinese survey of international relations in South Asia, see Zheng Ruixiang, "Current Problems of Peace and Security in South Asia," *Guoji wenti yanjiu* (Beijing), No. 4, 1987.

ernization of China's economy.⁴⁶ The commencement of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and Sino-Soviet discussions on Cambodia in the summer of 1988 set the stage for the final acts of normalization—Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's visit to Moscow (December 1–3, 1988) and the summit between Deng and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Beijing in May 1989.

In short, Sino-Indian relations are now no longer hostage to Sino-Soviet hostility as they were in the last years of the Brezhnev era. The normalization of relations between Moscow and Beijing not only removes the major external obstacle to Sino-Indian conflict resolution, but actually pushes New Delhi in that direction. While Gorbachev has taken pains to reassure Gandhi that the Soviet Union remains a reliable friend of India—and there is no reason to doubt that this assurance has been backed up in concrete terms⁴⁷—he has also openly encouraged New Delhi to improve its relations with Beijing. During his November 1988 trip to India, for example, the Soviet leader referred explicitly to the common interests of the three states.⁴⁸ Some Indian leaders, perhaps wary of the drift of Soviet policy

toward a focus on East Asia, may find such talk unsettling, but to the Chinese it is another encouraging sign that the time is ripe for seeking better relations with India.

Renewed anxiety about Tibet reinforces China's desire to promote Sino-Indian relations. So far, Beijing has been satisfied with New Delhi's distance from the resurgent Tibetan nationalism of the past two years.⁴⁹ During his visit to the PRC, Rajiv Gandhi reiterated India's recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet as well as India's policy of not interfering in China's internal affairs.⁵⁰ But these pronouncements have not removed Chinese worries. Although Beijing has more or

⁴⁶John W. Garver, "Peking's Soviet-American Policies: Toward Equidistance," *Issues and Studies*, October 1988, pp. 55–77.

⁴⁷See Dilip Mukerjee, "India and the Soviet Union," *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Spring 1986, pp. 109–22. For a euphoric Indian view of contemporary Soviet-Indian relations, see S. Viswam, "Gorbachev Visit," *Indian and Foreign Review* (New Delhi), Dec. 31, 1986, pp. 4–13.

⁴⁸*Far Eastern Economic Review*, Dec. 1, 1988, p. 38.

⁴⁹See, for example, *ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1987, p. 13.

⁵⁰*China Daily*, Dec. 26, 1988.



Tibetans in Dharamsala, India, stage a token hunger strike in October 1987 in solidarity with the Tibetan Youth Congress in Delhi, protesting Chinese repressions in Tibet and demanding freedom for their homeland.

less managed to keep the lid on in Lhasa, the possibility of a more powerful manifestation of Tibetan national sentiment cannot be ruled out.⁵¹ The Chinese fear such an upsurge could generate a wave of popular sympathy in India, particularly if Beijing feels compelled to use force on a wide scale to maintain its control. China realizes this would create a dilemma for the Indian government, which has already been criticized by Tibetan groups in India, as well as by opposition parties, for exhibiting a callous indifference to the principles of freedom and human rights in its pursuit of the power game with China.⁵² Chinese leaders hope to build up a network of Indian-Chinese connections and a reservoir of goodwill in India to buffer the adverse fallout from another Tibetan crisis.

Other recent developments in Asian politics also facilitate accommodation between China and India. In particular, progress toward resolution of the protracted conflicts in Afghanistan and Cambodia has, at a minimum, opened the prospect for tacit mutual recognition of Beijing' and New Delhi's roles in Asia. Neither China's role in South Asia nor India's in Southeast Asia intrinsically threatens the legitimate interests of the other so long as regional tensions do not develop into actual conflicts. Under the big top of an emerging Sino-Indian détente, room may be found to accommodate both China's South Asia and India's Southeast Asia acts. Statesmanship and diplomacy rather than some abstract geopolitical imperatives will determine whether this possibility will be realized.

The 1986-87 Border Crisis

In deference to the official denials by India and China that their forces engaged in any actual military clashes in 1986-87, the heightened tension of this period may perhaps be dubbed the war that was not. Yet the level of tension did not escalate without some reason. Several questions inevitably arise. What troop movements or other events on the ground prompted the questions raised in the Indian Parliament concerning the possibility of a Chinese attack? What lay behind Chinese allegations that Indian troops were "nibbling" at Chinese territory? How did these events differ from the events that preceded the border war of 1962? If there was an actual crisis in the making, how did India and China de-

fuse it? Larger questions also remain. How far have the two governments advanced toward resolving the boundary question? How far can they progress toward a meaningful détente without resolving this question?

Without the benefit of reliable maps of difficult topography, open archives, or eyewitness accounts, any reconstruction of events along the Sino-Indian border in 1986-87 is bound to contain a large measure of conjecture. Nevertheless, it is virtually certain that increased border patrolling by Chinese and Indian troops took place, during the summer months of 1986, in the areas immediately east of Bhutan. This intensified patrolling brought regular troops from both sides into closer proximity and created a tense situation that the two sides interpreted differently. The government of India lodged a formal protest on June 26, 1986, against "intrusions" that it said occurred on June 16 by groups of uniformed and non-uniformed Chinese personnel six or seven kilometers into Indian territory south of the McMahon line, in the Sumdorong Chu, a valley in the Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh. This protest was announced on All-India Radio on July 15. Some Indian administrators from this area also asserted privately that New Delhi had ignored their reports of earlier Chinese forays.⁵³ Questioned later in Parliament, Indian Foreign Minister Shiv Shankar declined to describe the Sumdorong episode as an "attack," preferring to stand by the term "intrusion."⁵⁴

During this same period, China not only rejected the Indian protest but complained that Indian troops had penetrated north of the line of actual control (previously acknowledged by China to be more or less coterminous with the McMahon line) into Chinese territory, namely Wangdung (Sumdorong Chu). On August 22, 1986, the New China News Agency charged that Indian ground troops and aircraft were constantly crossing the "actual line of control" in the eastern sector in attempts to "nibble further at Chinese territory and to create more disputed territory."⁵⁵ In short, China and India traded mirror-image charges over the same piece of land.

It is worth noting that the Chinese chose to reinforce their warnings to India through US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who discussed the security situation on the Indian subcontinent while on a visit to China in October 1986. Proceeding to New Delhi, Weinberger reportedly told his Indian hosts that Deng Xiaoping had been "vehement in criticizing India" and said that China would have to "teach India a lesson" if it did not stop

⁵¹For the Tibetan nationalist view of the situation within Tibet, see *News Tibet* (New York), September-December 1988, pp. 1-16.

⁵²*Indian Express*, Dec. 22, 1988, reporting the resentment expressed by the Tibetan parliament-in-exile over Rajiv Gandhi's statements in Beijing; also *The New York Times*, Jan. 3, 1989.

⁵³Interviews, New Delhi, July 1986.

⁵⁴*Frontline* (Madras), Sept. 5, 1986; *India News*, Aug. 11, 1986, p. 3.

⁵⁵*Keatings Contemporary Archives* (Harlow, England), February 1987, p. 34946f.

"nibbling" at Chinese territory. (US Secretary of State George Shultz conveyed similar sentiments to New Delhi in March 1987.⁵⁶)

In early 1987, China's public rhetoric about India rose in a crescendo of criticism, even hostility. Privately, some Chinese officials expressed bafflement, if not contempt, at India's governmental process, as judged from its apparently uncoordinated and dangerous decisions on Arunachal. More ominously, China augmented its military presence in eastern Tibet. It brought in some 20,000 regular troops from the 53rd Army Corps in Chengdu and the 13th Army in Lanzhou, moved in American-made high-altitude helicopters, and upgraded roads, air strips, and helicopter pads throughout the border region.⁵⁷ By this time, China had completed the phase of military modernization and reconstruction that had reduced the number of military regions and combat troops, and was focusing on the acquisition of advanced military technology and equipment from the West, and the planning of combined air-land operations, including the conduct of local or limited wars and possible border conflicts.⁵⁸

India, too, was reinforcing routine administrative and police patrols in the northeast with military posts set in defensive hedgehog-type patterns. In spring 1987, India strengthened its air power in the border region and redeployed mountain divisions to the northeast. A command air-land exercise followed in the east and northeast. It focused on coordination and long-term defense of the China front, perhaps to correct what some Indian commanders regarded as excessive preoccupation with the Pakistan front.

Against this background, mutual Chinese and Indian accusations triggered alarm in the world press that conflict was imminent. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, while denying that tension along the bor-

der was as great as some press reports suggested, called for the immediate withdrawal of "intruding Indian troops" in order to ease tension and to "avoid the possible occurrence of an unpleasant event."⁵⁹ Voices in the Indian press and in Parliament drew parallels between China wanting to "teach a lesson to India" in 1987 with its language prior to attacking Vietnam in February 1979 and India in October 1962. Other Indians believed they saw evidence of a "Washington-Beijing-Islamabad axis" against India. This was the interpretation put upon the May visit to Washington of General Yang Shangkun, permanent vice-chairman of the CCP Central Committee's Military Commission, and upon the news that US officials were concerned that troop movements on the border might lead to hostilities.

British journalist Neville Maxwell, reiterating his thesis of India's sole responsibility for the 1962 war, claimed that Rajiv Gandhi was deliberately provoking China so as to "recall Indians to unity of national purpose" and to justify the "declaration of a state of emergency."⁶⁰ An editorial in the Hong Kong Chinese newspaper *Wen wei po* played the same theme.⁶¹ A Finnish newspaper reported Sino-Indian border clashes and wounded troops being treated in Lhasa hospitals.⁶² A real crisis seemed to be brewing.

However, no conflict took place, because leaders on both sides acted in time. Rajiv Gandhi told the Indian Parliament: "China is not planning to attack India . . . I do not think there is a China-Pakistan-US axis against this country . . . We must overcome the phobia about Sino-Pakistani collusion."⁶³ And Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing, who was visiting Calcutta, denied rumors that China was massing troops on the border: "I can say that there have been no clashes on the Sino-Indian border, nor do we expect any unpleasant incidents."⁶⁴

New Delhi sent messages to Beijing that disclaimed any intent of provocation and avoided making official accusations. Indian Foreign Minister N. D. Tiwari made a point of stopping in Beijing on his way back to New Delhi from a nonaligned nations meeting in Pyongyang, and joined Vice Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing in calling for the avoidance of conflict along the border while working towards a complete settlement.⁶⁵ Former Foreign Minister Huang Hua, along with other important Chinese officials, attended a banquet given by Indian Ambassador C. V. Ranganathan celebrating the 40th anniversary of Indian independence, and said that China wanted to improve relations with India and that the boundary issue could be resolved through negotiations.⁶⁶

At least equally important, mechanisms were introduced in the field to reduce the risk of skirmishes or

⁵⁶Robert G. Sutter and Richard P. Cronin, "China-India Border Friction," CRS Report, 87-514 F, Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, June 19, 1987.

⁵⁷Nayan Chanda, "Heading for a Conflict," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 4, 1987, p. 42; see also Finnish journalist Jari Lindholm's report from Tibet, "The Dragon's Teeth," in *India Today*, Aug. 15, 1987, pp. 82-84.

⁵⁸Paul Godwin, "Changing Concepts of Doctrine, Strategy and Operations in the Chinese People's Liberation Army 1978-1987," *The China Quarterly* (London), December 1987, pp. 572-90.

⁵⁹*China Daily*, May 7, 1987.

⁶⁰Neville Maxwell, "Towards India's Second China War," *South* (London), May 1987, pp. 80-83.

⁶¹*FBIS-CHI*, May 15, 1987, pp. F/2-5.

⁶²*Ibid.*, p. F/1.

⁶³*Times of India* (New Delhi), June 18, 1987.

⁶⁴*Indian Express*, June 19, 1987.

⁶⁵*China Daily*, June 17, 1987.

⁶⁶*FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 18, 1987, p. F/1.

escalation. According to an Indian commander, when his troops returned to the Sumdorong Chu in spring 1987, they found a new Chinese military post there, and the Indians established positions overlooking this post without either side firing a shot.⁶⁷ Field commanders met and, by August, had moved their men away from each other. Finally, in November 1987, Indian and Chinese officials met in New Delhi to talk in what official spokesmen described as a "positive, cordial and friendly atmosphere." They stressed that "pending a negotiated settlement on the boundary question, peace and tranquility should continue to be maintained all along the border," and they expressed the belief that there was "considerable scope for strengthening and diversifying cooperation in several fields."⁶⁸ Though no dramatic breakthrough was expected from these talks and none was achieved, they were important in two respects. These talks opened the way to elevating a dialogue among officials to the level of a summit meeting between heads of state—Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China was the result. And, they marked the end of tensions, which did not reoccur when Chinese and Indian patrols returned to their outposts in the spring 1988.

Some observers professed to be witnessing a re-enactment of the 1962 crisis as events unfolded in 1986–87.⁶⁹ In fact, the differences between the two crises were greater than the similarities, although at first glance the latter seemed much more apparent. In both cases, the two sides disagreed on where the boundary line between Chinese and Indian territory lay and what principles should guide the delimitation and demarcation of the border. India invoked legal-historical-administrative records and well-recognized geographical features that necessitated research followed by joint confirmation, while China asserted the primacy of strategic necessity, actual possession, and political expediency that required bilateral negotiation. In both cases, unrest in Tibet exacerbated tensions between Beijing and New Delhi. The sequence of events was also similar: imprecise Chinese offers to make a political exchange of respective claims in the eastern and western sectors; Indian rejection of the offers—abruptly in 1960, and with a more careful insistence on detail in the 1980's; Indian assertions of proprietary rights coupled with forward patrolling; Chinese escalation of rhetoric and strengthening of troop levels, shows of force in the border areas, and attempts to isolate India diplomatically; and, finally, the establishment of overlapping Chinese and Indian border posts and/or the

conduct of forward patrols resulting in skirmishes.

Yet the different outcomes require an examination of the dissimilarities. The first factor to note is the international situation. In 1962, Beijing felt beleaguered by a combination of internal and external enemies, and lashed out at India in part as a warning to the United States and its putative client—the Chiang Kai-shek government in Taiwan—which threatened to take advantage of China's internal disarray.⁷⁰ In addition, acute tension among the major powers (the US, the USSR, and the PRC) exacerbated Sino-Indian tensions. In the 1980's, China did not feel threatened from without, and the major powers were actually improving relations with each other, a circumstance that tends to mitigate Sino-Indian tensions. In addition, in 1987 both Moscow and Washington made known their preference for a peaceful resolution of the border flare-up.

Second, the greater degree of stability in the domestic political situations of both countries and the enhanced degree of administrative authority and central military control that Beijing and New Delhi now exercise over the border regions is different from what existed in the 1960's. There have been no significant changes of disposition along the border since March 1963, and both sides have consolidated their positions along what China terms the line of actual control.

In addition, over the past decade Deng Xiaoping's realism has neutralized the Maoist ideological venom that had charged Nehru with representing the big bourgeoisie and big landlords as well as being a cat's-paw of imperialism. Rajiv Gandhi, and Mrs. Gandhi before him, have been acknowledged as the legitimate leaders of a powerful state. Gone, too, is Chinese support for all manner of Indian revolutionaries and tribal insurgents. In the early 1960's, China faulted India for supporting the Tibetan uprising, but in the past two years Beijing has carefully refrained from imputing to India any responsibility for the demonstrations against Chinese rule in Lhasa and elsewhere in Tibet. In an atmosphere virtually free of mutual recriminations concerning interference in each other's domestic affairs, Chinese and Indian leaders have been able to deal with each other more rationally and calmly.

Contemporary Indian leaders have no illusions or misconceptions about China of the sort harbored by Prime Minister Nehru in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Nehru's misconceptions fed his sense of betrayal by the Chinese and gave rise to the injured self-righteousness that suffused his communications on the boundary question in 1959–62. Today, Indian leaders

⁶⁷Interview, June 1988.

⁶⁸*Times of India*, Dec. 10, 1987.

⁶⁹See Maxwell, loc. cit., pp. 80–83.

⁷⁰See Whiting, op. cit.

are well aware that high-flown unilateral declarations will not settle the boundary question.⁷¹ Notwithstanding the traces of Nehruvian idealism in the language and phrasing of Indian foreign policy, pragmatism and expediency reign.

Finally, there are the differences on the military side of things. Prior to the 1962 war, India's defense build-up, begun belatedly in 1960, fell well short of New Delhi's verbal diplomacy and failed to catch up with the accelerating deterioration of events on the frontier. Inadequate preparations were compounded by lack of coordination within the Indian government as well as by intelligence failures.⁷² The Indian army emerged from the debacle of 1962 determined to prevent a repetition of such an event, and by the 1980's India's mountain warfare divisions were generally judged to be a match for the PLA in Tibet. During his tenure as India's chief of army staff (February 1986–May 1989), General Krishnaswami Sundarji, an innovative thinker on matters of strategy and mobile warfare, left an impact on Indian defense policy and practice that is likely to endure.⁷³ He also impressed India's political leaders with the need for strategic rather than map-depicted legal-historical frontiers, frontiers that could be properly controlled and defended.

In sum, in 1962, the totality of international and domestic political, ideological, and military factors tilted the Sino-Indian balance toward war. In 1986–87, these same factors pointed China and India away from a military confrontation. Acutely conscious of the potential for conflict that lurked on the border, Indian and Chinese officials made conciliatory statements and took appropriate measures to reduce tensions. They also determined to accelerate the hitherto sluggish progress toward genuine détente.

Economic and Cultural Diplomacy

Less dramatic developments also were gradually ameliorating the atmosphere of Sino-Indian relations. During the Sino-Indian cold war of 1962 to 1976, people-to-people contacts between the two countries were cut off and trade came to a halt. The restoration of diplomatic relations to the ambassadorial level in 1976

opened the way for resuming economic and cultural contacts in 1977.

Generally speaking, the figures on direct Sino-Indian trade have been quite unimpressive. Prior to 1988, the peak year for trade was 1982 when a turnover of US\$145 million was registered, but the volume subsequently declined.⁷⁴ Most-favored-nation status, reciprocally conferred in the official trade protocol of 1984—the first such protocol in 30 years—failed to increase trade, which stood at \$138 million in 1986–87, with China enjoying a lopsided ratio of exports over imports.⁷⁵ At a time when China's foreign trade has been increasing dramatically, trade with India has stagnated.

Nevertheless, both sides still profess to see a great potential for various forms of economic interaction. At the opening of the India-China Chamber of Commerce branch in Calcutta in March 1988, PRC Commercial Counselor He Wei called for the use of barter, counter-trade, and counter-investment in order to expand trade.⁷⁶ With the Chinese expressing a willingness to strive for more balanced trade, Indian exporters are seeking to add a range of new products to the metal ores, leather products, tobacco, and shellac they already ship to China.⁷⁷ Under the terms of the Sino-Indian trade protocol for 1988, India will export oil field equipment, chemicals and pesticides, electronics, and software to China while importing spices, raw silk, industrial chemicals, yarn, and nonferrous metals.⁷⁸ Unlike earlier agreements, the 1988 trade protocol sets no upper limit on trade, and in the first three quarters of the year, the value of trade reached \$172 million, thereby exceeding the previous one-year mark.⁷⁹

A PRC delegation from the Foreign Investment Administration of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade visited India in June 1988, trying to drum up Indian investment in Chinese industrial development and touting the prospects for economic and technological cooperation.⁸⁰ Around the same time, a delegation from the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce visited China to explore opportunities for trade.⁸¹ Although China and India may never become major trading partners, considerable scope for expansion in their economic relations still exists, given the present low level of trade and the continued growth in the export sectors of both economies.

⁷¹Even India scholars have raised questions about the accuracy and wisdom of India's claims in Ladakh along the Kuen Lun rather than the Karakoram range of mountains. See John Lall, *Aksaichin and Sino-Soviet Conflict*, New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1988; also, Karanahur Gupta, "Doubtful Documents," *Frontline*, Aug. 23–Sept. 5, 1986.

⁷²See S. Gopal, *Nehru: A Biography*, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 131, and Vertzberger, op. cit., Ch. 8.

⁷³See "Disputed Legacy" in *India Today*, May 15, 1988, pp. 35–43.

⁷⁴*China Daily*, June 11, 1988.

⁷⁵*The Economic Times* (Delhi), June 8, 1988.

⁷⁶*FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 9, 1988, p. 9.

⁷⁷*The Economic Times*, June 8, 1988.

⁷⁸*China Daily*, June 11, 1988.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1988.

⁸⁰*The Economic Times*, June 8, 1988.

⁸¹*FBIS-CHI*, May 26, 1988, p. 8.

A marked increase in political contacts and people-to-people diplomacy has been a notable feature of Sino-Indian relations over the past few years. In 1983, the CCP reestablished ties with the long-divided Indian communist movement, beginning with the independent-minded Communist Party of India (Marxist). By the spring of 1988, the pro-Moscow Communist Party of India (CPI), which had long been wary of Chinese intentions, sent a delegation to Beijing headed by General Secretary Rajeswara Rao. CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang joined Rao in endorsing the reestablishment of party-to-party ties between the CCP and the CPI on the basis of the four principles of independence, equality, mutual respect, and mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs.⁸²

Close on the heels of the CPI visit, an official delegation from the Congress Party (I), headed by former Foreign Minister Bali Ram Bhagat, visited China for the first time and met with Vice-Premier Wu Xueqian and Politburo member Hu Qili.⁸³ Addressing the Lok Sabha on March 7, 1988, Minister of State for External Affairs K. Natwar Singh noted that 27 Chinese delegations had visited India and 26 Indian groups had traveled to China since January 1987.⁸⁴ Although the total number of persons involved in these exchanges is still very small, these visits and others like them, all of which endorsed the further expansion of economic and cultural relations between China and India, helped prepare the ground for Rajiv Gandhi's visit. In June 1988, China and India signed their first cultural exchange agreement to promote closer ties in culture, art, education, the social sciences, sports, public health, and the media.⁸⁵ Four months later, a draft protocol of exchanges in the areas of science and technology was discussed; it envisioned cooperation in agriculture, irrigation, and rural development.⁸⁶ This network of economic, political, cultural, and scientific and technological connections may gradually be shifting the center of gravity of the Sino-Indian relationship away from conflict toward cooperation. In both countries, constituencies may be emerging that support an eventual compromise solution to the border question.

The Chinese, who habitually justify current policy by invoking historical precedent, have recently dusted off the slogans of Chinese-Indian friendship from the 1950's and earlier. Commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the medical mission dispatched to China by

the Indian National Congress in 1938 as a gesture of solidarity during the Sino-Japanese war is a case in point. In May 1988, the ashes of Dr. B. K. Basu, who worked in the communist wartime capital of Yan'an until 1943, were interred in the newly constructed Memorial Hall of the Indian Mission to China at the Cemetery of Revolutionary Martyrs in Shijiazhuang.⁸⁷ In this manner, the dead confer benefits on the living.

The Summit and Beyond

The state visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in December 1988 was a definite step toward overcoming the Sino-Indian confrontation of the past three decades. Undertaken within a year of the next general elections in India, Gandhi's journey indicated his confidence that some domestic political advantage could be wrested from the visit. With the Congress (I) commanding a massive majority in Parliament, it is significant that the All-India Congress Committee passed a resolution in November 1988 that approved Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China "even if the settlement of the complex problem of the boundary takes time," and urged the government "to renew its effort for such a settlement acceptable to the peoples of both the countries . . . through peaceful negotiations."⁸⁸ The Prime Minister's personal commitment to enhancing India's diplomatic maneuverability, partly through improving relations with the Chinese, also stiffened his determination to set aside numerous doubts and ignore the vocal opposition that had surfaced in and out of the Indian government since the invitation to a summit meeting was first extended in 1985.

Chinese leaders from two different generations received Rajiv Gandhi in a manner that bespoke their parallel commitment to ending hostility toward India. Deng, the 84-year-old patron of post-Mao reform, warmly greeted his "young friend" Rajiv Gandhi—40 years his junior—and urged that China and India "forget the unpleasant past."⁸⁹ Premier Li Peng, still winning his spurs in the foreign policy arena, was Gandhi's major interlocutor during the visit, and their discussions focused on the substantive issues of the border, Tibet, bilateral relations, and the international situation. Li accepted Gandhi's invitation to pay a return visit to India. CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang underlined China's

⁸²Ibid., Apr. 1, 1988, p. 7, and Apr., 26, 1988, p. 17.

⁸³Ibid., May 16, 1988, p. 13, and May 24, 1988, p. 11.

⁸⁴Ibid., Mar. 8, 1988, p. 11.

⁸⁵Ibid., June 2, 1988, p. 23.

⁸⁶Ibid., Oct. 11, 1988, p. 10.

⁸⁷Ibid., May 26, 1988, p. 9; see also Dwijendra Nandi, "50th Anniversary of Indian Medical Mission to China," *China Reconstructs* (Beijing), December 1988, pp. 26-31.

⁸⁸*Indian Express*, Nov. 6, 1988.

⁸⁹*China Daily*, Dec. 22, 1988; *The New York Times* (National edition), Dec. 22, 1988.



Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi meets with China's senior leader Deng Xiaoping in Beijing on December 20, 1988.

—Gamma-Liaison.

and India's shared commitment to peace and development, the formula that has joined the five principles of peaceful coexistence as the tent poles of the new Sino-Indian relationship.

The joint press communiqué issued by China and India at the conclusion of Gandhi's visit enumerates areas of agreement without ignoring subjects on which agreement has yet to be reached. Implicit in the text is a significant change—each side has discarded old formulas and agreed to the other's main demand. India has accepted China's proposition that friendly bilateral relations can be expanded through a range of exchanges without waiting for a resolution of the border problem. China has agreed to a time frame of two to three years for reaching a "fair and reasonable settle-

ment" of the boundary question "through peaceful and friendly consultations" by means of mechanisms conducive to a "mutually acceptable solution."⁹⁰ A joint working group on the boundary question headed by the Indian Foreign Secretary and the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister is to be established. This group will almost certainly include technical personnel such as military commanders and surveyors from both sides.

A hopeful precedent for this joint working group, and perhaps a useful model as well, is provided by the Sino-Soviet boundary talks that resumed in February 1987.

⁹⁰Text of the Sino-Indian joint press communiqué in *China Daily*, Dec. 26, 1988. For reference to the time frame see *Indian Express*, Dec. 23, 1988.

Away from the glare of publicity, these talks had progressed significantly by the summer of 1988. In the Sino-Indian case, regular meetings of the joint group can provide time for the metamorphosis of what has been an emotional political issue into a technical one capable of resolution by experts within certain prescribed parameters. However, even if the problem is not resolved soon, and even though frontier defenses can never be totally dismantled, it is clear that the tensions of the recent past have diminished.

As mentioned above, before China's negotiating position hardened in 1985, Deng's verbal offers were generally interpreted to mean a regularization of the territorial status quo with relatively minor adjustments, perhaps including some areas taken by China in Ladakh in 1962. Now that the joint working group has been established, it will be interesting to see whether the Chinese continue to press their claims to Arunachal Pradesh or whether they will drop this matter, in effect reinstating Deng's package proposal.⁹¹ Although some sort of bartered solution would be sure to arouse controversy in India, increasing numbers of Indian opinion-makers are likely to find a solution of this sort acceptable, provided that it confirms the geostrategic principles and local custom and usage on which India's claims are based.

Although it seems quite unlikely that in the near future either country will simply agree to relinquish significant parcels of territory that it now holds, especially since China has defined the Aksai Chin in the western sector and India the McMahon line (or the highest crest principle) in the eastern sector as strategically vital, it appears equally unlikely that either country will resort to war in order to gain what it does not yet hold.

Achievements of the summit. In the course of Rajiv Gandhi's visit, specific agreements were signed on co-operation in the field of science and technology, in civil aviation, and in bilateral cultural exchanges. For the first time, Beijing and New Delhi will be directly linked by air. Also, direct-dial telephone facilities between major Indian and Chinese cities are being established. However, the scale of initial exchanges specified in the accords is small, and subject to control by joint committees of bureaucrats. Though the joint communiqué optimistically referred to the vast scope for mutual learning, it requires considerable imagination to envision waves of Indian and Chinese tourists, students, intellectuals, and business people traveling back and forth between the two countries in the immediate future.

The summit communiqué made no mention of the expected reopening of consulates. Apparently the two sides have still been unable to agree on which two of

the four suggested cities—Bombay, Calcutta, Lhasa, and Shanghai—would be most appropriate. Each potential site has its problems. Few Indians are in Shanghai; Tibet is virtually closed to foreigners; Calcutta is under the rule of a Marxist government to which New Delhi does not grant favors; and Bombay is on the opposite coast of India from the main sea route to China.

The question of Tibet deserves more extended commentary. The two sides held extensive discussions on the subject at the summit, apparently without reaching agreement on anything other than the five principles of peaceful coexistence first articulated in 1954. According to the December 1988 joint communiqué, "the Chinese side expressed concern over anti-China activities by some Tibetan elements in India. The Indian side reiterated the long-standing and consistent policy of the government of India that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and that anti-China political activities by Tibetan elements are not permitted on Indian soil."⁹² This bland formulation cannot entirely hide the fact that the situation in Tibet, closely monitored by the Dalai Lama and his followers in exile, is complex, unpredictable, and potentially explosive both in itself and in terms of Sino-Indian relations.

In the past few years, China has reacted sharply toward any country that offers public (even if unofficial) sympathy to the plight of the Tibetan people or that provides a platform to the Dalai Lama. During this same period, the resurgence of ethno-nationalist consciousness inside Tibet has animated and, to a degree, radicalized the exile community. Vocal groups among the Dalai Lama's younger followers do not echo the conciliatory tone of his proposals. They call for an independent status for Tibet, arguing that the *Cho-yon* (priest-patron) relationship between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese emperors that determined Tibet's status from the 13th century onward terminated with the end of imperial China in 1911.⁹³ (Neither the Kuomintang nor the communist government of China has accepted this argument—both claim legitimate succession to the maximal territorial extent of the Qing empire.)

Demonstrations in Tibet against Chinese control mounted in 1988, and in March 1989 on the 30th anniversary of the events that led to the Dalai Lama's departure. In response, Beijing imposed martial law on Tibet. Meanwhile, overseas Tibetan groups have sought to

⁹¹It should be noted that in recent years China has vociferously and, on occasion, forcefully upheld its territorial claims to the South China Sea islands that are also claimed by Vietnam.

⁹²*China Daily*, Dec. 26, 1988.

⁹³For a detailed exposition of this case, see Michael C. van Praag, *The Status of Tibet: History, Rights, and Prospects in International Law*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1988.



Pakistan's Benazir Bhutto and India's Rajiv Gandhi after bilateral talks in late December 1988 on the occasion of a summit meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in Islamabad.

—Gamma-Liaison.

muster international support for their cause of protecting human rights in Tibet, and Tibetans in New Delhi have demonstrated in the streets. Both publicly and privately, Chinese officials insist that Tibet will not be given independence, or even the degree of autonomy the Dalai Lama presently demands, though Beijing is ready to talk with him in order to restore peace.⁹⁴ They make clear that Chinese control will be maintained by whatever means are necessary, and that foreign support for Tibet's cause is unwelcome and will continue to be regarded as unfriendly.

Well aware of China's views, Rajiv Gandhi's government has reaffirmed the position taken by its predecessors of recognizing China's sovereignty over "the autonomous region of Tibet" and refraining from recognition of a Tibetan government-in-exile. Yet it also continues to provide sanctuary and humanitarian assistance to the Dalai Lama and his followers (and their progeny), who fled the military occupation of Tibet by the Chinese in 1959. This assistance has enabled Tibetan culture and national identity not only to survive but to flourish and become "an active part of the modern world," at a time when the Chinese were trying to extirpate it within Tibet.⁹⁵ Thus, New Delhi continues to face dilemmas similar to those it faced when PLA forces first took over Tibet in 1950. How can it build friendly relations with Beijing and acknowledge the reality of its

presence in Tibet without totally sacrificing the principles of human rights, religious freedom, and cultural autonomy that India itself proclaims, and without surrendering all control over India's borders with Tibet.

Recent developments within Tibet and among the Tibetan community in India make the issue of Tibet more acute for Chinese-Indian relations. Chinese control in Tibet is heavily dependent upon a more or less permanent display of force. Whatever they may presently think about India's recognition of Chinese control over Tibet in 1954, Indian officials know that any alteration in official Indian policy respecting Tibet would be highly provocative to China. On the other hand, such is the prestige and veneration that the Dalai Lama now commands in India that no Indian government could force upon him an unwelcome accommodation, as Nehru did in the early 1950's.

This situation is complicated by a recent development—the political, as distinct from the religious, au-

⁹⁴*Indian Express*, Mar. 14, 1989.

⁹⁵Franz Michael, "Survival of a Culture: Tibetan Refugees in India," *Asian Survey*, July 1985, pp. 737–44; also Avedon, op. cit. In recent years, the Chinese, whose historical memory can be very selective, have been urging the Tibetans to overlook and forget this attempt to wipe out their culture. At the same time, Beijing has permitted a limited and circumscribed revival of Tibetan culture in order to earn tourist dollars and to "pacify the natives."

thority of the Dalai Lama is being questioned by some Tibetans in India. The Tibetan Youth Congress, for example, demands complete Tibetan independence from China, stages frequent demonstrations in New Delhi, and even before Rajiv Gandhi returned from Beijing, denounced his statements there as capitulating to his Chinese hosts.⁹⁶ Links between vociferous Tibetan groups and some right-wing Hindu political parties opposing Rajiv Gandhi are yet another volatile element. Under the circumstances, China will undoubtedly remain hypersensitive to even the slightest signs of Indian support for Tibetan nationalist agitation and continue to demand that New Delhi adhere scrupulously to its pledge of noninvolvement.

Prospects for Sino-Indian *détente*. The view beyond the Sino-Indian summit, therefore, is not a clear one. Not only is the border dispute unresolved, but India has not received formal Chinese recognition of its integration of Sikkim in 1975, and the Kashmir dispute is still capable of stirring the pot even though Deng Xiaoping informally acknowledged, as long ago as 1980, that it was an Indo-Pakistani issue.

Yet some optimism concerning the future of Sino-Indian relations is justified, in part because of the brightening prospects for overall relaxation of conflicts

within Asia. Hard on the heels of the Sino-Indian summit, during a SAARC summit meeting in Islamabad, Rajiv Gandhi and Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's newly elected leader, pledged to seek better relations between their two countries. In May 1989, Soviet President Gorbachev visited Beijing for the first Sino-Soviet summit in 30 years, bringing to fruition the process of Sino-Soviet normalization.

Three pairs of long-time Asian adversaries—China and India, India and Pakistan, and China and the Soviet Union—appear ready to approach their deep-seated differences in a constructive way. In the past, hostile relations among each of these pairs of adversaries exacerbated relations among the other two as well. Now the regional linkages can work the other way. The gradual diminution of hostility within each of the pairs may exert a positive, reinforcing effect on the other two. Provided no unexpected disruptions occur, a steady if not necessarily speedy process of normalization can be expected. Measured against the inflated hopes of the 1950's, when an era of Sino-Indian friendship was proclaimed, this may not seem like much. Measured against the record of hostility and conflict in the intervening decades, it is a great deal.

⁹⁶*Indian Express*, Dec. 22, 1988.

The USSR and the Third World in the 1980's

David E. Albright

Virtually all Western analysts today agree that Soviet policy toward the Third World has changed during the 1980's, but they differ widely in their assessments of the extent and meaning of the policy shifts. One group argues that although Moscow's policy has undergone some modification, the Soviet approach to the Third World remains fundamentally the same as before. However, members of this group disagree as to which factors explain this perceived continuity. Some trace it back to tsarist policies that have been reinforced in the Soviet era.¹ Others view it as the product of lingering ideological commitments on the part of the Soviet elite.² Still others see it in terms of recurrent patterns of Soviet behavior toward developing areas.³

A second group asserts that the alterations in Soviet policy reflect a basic change in the Soviet approach to the Third World, yet there is also no unanimity within this group about the reasons for the shift. Some maintain that it has resulted from the declining impact of ideology on Soviet perceptions of the Third World.⁴ Others contend that it has stemmed essentially from domestic considerations—particularly the need to improve the performance of the USSR's economy.⁵

In addressing these issues, however, analysts tend to ignore some major new developments. In the last dec-

ade, the number of distinct Soviet schools of thought about what policy the USSR should pursue toward the Third World has multiplied significantly. The top Soviet leadership, in contrast with earlier periods, has not endorsed a single school of thought exclusively. Finally, the USSR's behavior in the Third World has combined elements of the policy prescriptions of all of the contending schools of persuasion, and the mix has varied substantially from region to region. Each of these developments, it should be stressed, antedates Mikhail Gorbachev's advent to power.

These changes have important implications. Moreover, these implications relate not just to the nature of policy but to the nature of policy formulation as well. The present article will examine these changes and their likely bearing on future Soviet Third World policy.

Contending Policy Viewpoints

Controversy in the USSR over policy toward the Third World is nothing new. It has prevailed almost constantly within the Soviet hierarchy since the early 1960's, as a result of differing assessments of circumstances in the

¹See, for example, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Moscow's Third World Strategy*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1988.

²A typical illustration is Daniel S. Papp, *Soviet Perceptions of the Developing World in the 1980's: The Ideological Basis*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1985.

³See, for instance, the writings of Francis Fukuyama—especially, *Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World*, R-3337-USDP, Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, February 1986; "Gorbachev and the Third World," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Spring 1986, pp. 715–31; "Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September–October 1987, pp. 1–13.

⁴Both Jerry Hough and Elizabeth Valkenier fall into this category. See Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1986; Valkenier, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind*, New York, Praeger,

David E. Albright is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Air War College (Montgomery, AL). He has written extensively on Soviet policy toward the Third World. Among his recent major works on the subject are Soviet Policy Toward Africa Revisited (1987) and the forthcoming Vanguard Parties and Revolutionary Change in the Third World: The Soviet Perspective and Its Implications. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the US Air Force or the US Government.

Third World. However, prior to the early 1980's, the debate had never involved more than two perspectives on the issue at any given juncture. From about 1962 through the mid-1960's, for example, arguments over policy had focused on the merits of two alternative approaches to trying to expand the USSR's presence and role in the Third World.⁶

Proponents of the first approach held that at least some "bourgeois-nationalist" leaders in the Third World were undergoing radicalization. Not only did these leaders exhibit increased interest in Marxism-Leninism, according to the assessment, but they were also carrying out significant "progressive" reforms in their countries. Therefore, the USSR should enter into close alliances with the states under the rule of such leaders and serve as these leaders' revolutionary mentor. That is, it should help them deepen their understanding of "true" socialism and the measures required to achieve it.

Supporters of the second approach maintained that these leaders, despite their "progressive" attributes, would probably never preside over "real" socialist transformations of their countries. Consequently, the USSR should, while taking advantage of the openings that such leaders offered for enhancing its position in the Third World, pursue a policy of both "alliance" and "struggle" with them and their governments. Specifically, it should cooperate with the leaders to the extent possible in foreign affairs, but it should encourage leftist elements in the countries under the control of these leaders to try to increase their own influence in state affairs and bring about further radicalization of local situations.

By the early 1980's, however, the number of contending Soviet visions of what policy the USSR should follow with respect to the Third World had expanded to four, and the ensuing years have witnessed no reduction in that total. These visions have entailed often conflicting judgments about what entities should be the USSR's primary targets of interest, what sort of relationships Moscow should attempt to establish with these entities,

what means it should employ to forge such links, and what posture it should strike toward the West in the Third World. As in the preceding years, the views have flowed from contrasting perceptions of conditions in the Third World.

To refer to these policy outlooks, it is useful to have short-hand designations. Thus, the analysis here will label them the "revolutionary-democratic" school, the "pro-military" school, the "national-capitalism" school, and the "economic-interdependence" school.

The "revolutionary-democratic" school. Adherents of this perspective insist that a gradual process of radicalization is taking place in Third World areas: these areas, despite some zigs and zags, are bypassing capitalism and advancing directly toward socialism. In the eyes of these individuals, not only have the ranks of Third World "socialist-oriented" states—and particularly the most radical of them, the "revolutionary democracies"—grown over time, but in some "revolutionary democracies" such as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, ruling parties of a "new" or "vanguard" type have emerged. As the revolutionary process in the Third World deepens, the estimate goes, the number of "revolutionary democracies" will continue to increase, the circle of "vanguard" parties will expand, and at least some of these parties will transform themselves into full-fledged communist parties.

Partisans of this line do admit that even existing "revolutionary-democratic" regimes with "vanguard" parties have severe faults, and they acknowledge that it is impossible to rule out a reversal of course in all cases. Nonetheless, they still maintain that the Third World is marching inexorably toward socialism and will avoid capitalism. Therefore, they hold that "socialist-oriented," and especially "revolutionary-democratic," governments—however deficient—are the wave of the future and the best available allies for the USSR in the Third World at present.

In keeping with the stress on ties with "revolutionary-democratic" regimes, this school of persuasion urges that the USSR try to build long-term structural relationships with the states that these regimes run. Here proponents of the outlook have in mind joint collaboration in constructing institutions that will enable these regimes to entrench themselves in power. This includes cooperation in building a party apparatus, in establishing or strengthening intelligence and security services, in training military personnel, and the like.

As for instruments, advocates of this viewpoint lean toward reliance on nonmilitary tools. They do not, to be sure, reject military means. Indeed, they have ap-

1983; idem, "Revolutionary Change in the Third World: Recent Soviet Assessments," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), April 1986, pp. 415–34; and idem, "New Soviet Thinking About the Third World," *World Policy Journal* (New York), Fall 1987, pp. 651–74.

⁶Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1987–88, pp. 93–131, affords a typical example.

⁷For detailed discussion of this particular controversy, see especially Uri Ra'anani, "Moscow and the Third World," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1965, pp. 22–31. A systematic treatment of all Soviet policy debates since the early 1960's may be found in David E. Albright, *Vanguard Parties and Revolutionary Change in the Third World: The Soviet Perspective and Its Implications*, forthcoming.

proved Soviet use of military force to ensure the survival of "revolutionary-democratic" governments run by "vanguard" parties, and they have recognized the role of military assistance in the development of close Soviet ties with such regimes. Yet their specific vision of a long-term structural relationship with these governments implicitly pushes them toward stress on nonmilitary instruments, especially political ones.

With respect to posture toward the West in the Third World, backers of this perspective have on occasion evinced readiness to risk confrontation with the West where ruling "revolutionary-democratic" parties of a "vanguard" type have been concerned, but that willingness has declined noticeably over the course of the 1980's. Furthermore, adherents of the school have always discouraged military confrontation with the West in the Third World. Nevertheless, the group has appeared to foresee that Soviet relations with the West in the Third World will inevitably be contentious in nature.

Among those who have publicly subscribed to this policy line since it originated in the 1970's have been several eminent political figures, although the influence of many of them has diminished in the latter half of the 1980's. Grigoriy Romanov, a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and Mikhail Gorbachev's chief rival to succeed Konstantin Chernenko as party general secretary, associated himself with the outlook before his ouster in July 1985. So did Boris Ponomarev, until February 1986 director of the CPSU International Department and an alternate member of the Politburo.⁷ Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy vocally endorsed the approach prior to his retirement as a deputy head of the International Department in late 1986, and he has persisted in doing so since then as a consultant to the African Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Anatoliy Gromyko, director of that institute and son of Andrey Gromyko (formerly a CPSU Politburo member, USSR foreign minister, and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet), has strongly supported such policy prescriptions since the 1970's.⁸

The "pro-military" school. Exponents of this viewpoint emphasize the high percentage of Third World states under military rule, or at least dominated by military elements, and they contend that a substantial number of these military governments evince a resolve to effect major social transformations in the countries that they run and a willingness to enter into close relations with the USSR. In light of such factors, the group concludes that the USSR should devote its energies principally to military-controlled states—especially those with "progressive" regimes.

These Soviet observers do concede that, in the abstract, a "vanguard" party might constitute a more satisfactory vehicle for carrying out social change and a more reliable ally for the USSR than military leaderships do, but they point out that "vanguard" parties have not yet taken shape in most Third World countries under military domination. Nor does this situation appear to them likely to change in the years immediately ahead, for many militaries in power in the Third World see "vanguard" parties as potential competitors for political authority. Even where militaries have tolerated the formation of "vanguard" parties, the champions of this perspective assert, the armed forces remain the key institutions shaping the destinies of their countries. If they decide to act in opposition to local "vanguard" parties or to do away with such parties altogether, these parties do not have the mass base and the access to instruments of violence required to meet such challenges effectively. Hence, those committed to this outlook submit that ties with Third World militaries, and particularly radical militaries, afford the USSR the best openings available to advance the revolutionary process in the Third World and improve the Soviet position there.

Support for creating long-term structural relations with states in which militaries, and especially radical militaries, are preeminent flows naturally from these Soviet observers' rationale for focusing on such countries, but the structural links that the group advocates differ from those that the "revolutionary-democratic" enthusi-

⁷See, for example, Romanov's speech of September 7, 1984, at the founding congress of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, as published in *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 9, 1984; and Ponomarev's "Real Socialism: The Liberated Countries," *Slovo Lektora* (Moscow), March 1984, pp. 13–19.

⁸Regarding Ul'yanovskiy, see his *Sovremennyye problemy Azii i Afriki* (The Contemporary Problems of Asia and Africa), Moscow, Nauka, 1978; "On the Countries of Socialist Orientation," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 11, July 1979, pp. 114–23; "The Twentieth Century and the National Liberation Movement," *Narody Azii i Afriki* (Moscow), No. 2, 1980, pp. 2–9; "Robbery under the Guise of 'Interdependence'," *Kommunist*, No. 16, November 1981, pp. 76–87; "On National and Revolutionary Democracy: Paths of Evolution," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2, 1984, pp. 9–18; *Pobedy i trudnosti natsional'no-osvoboditel'noy bor'by* (The Triumphs and Difficulties of the National Liberation Struggle), Moscow, Politizdat, 1985; "Pressing Problems

of the National Liberation Movement and of Socialist Orientation," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 6, 1986, pp. 3–13; and "Toward a Characterization of Contemporary Neo-Colonialism," *ibid.*, No. 4, 1987, pp. 83–92.

With respect to Gromyko, see his "Pressing Problems of the Most Recent History of the Developing Countries," *Kommunist*, No. 4, March 1979, pp. 117–24; "Socialist Orientation in Africa," *International Affairs* (Moscow), September 1979, pp. 95–104; "Pressing Problems of Contemporary Africa," *Kommunist*, No. 2, 1980; "The Imperialist Threat to Africa," *International Affairs*, July 1981, pp. 47–53; "The Experience and Prospects in Research on Africa's Problems," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 1, 1985, pp. 1–12; "The Revolution That Awakened Africa," *International Affairs*, December 1987, pp. 31–37; and "Africa: The Awakening," *The October Revolution and the World*, Special Supplement to *New Times* (Moscow), 1987, pp. 24–27.



The last two battalions of Soviet troops in Afghanistan cross the Amu Darya into the USSR near Termez, Uzbekistan on February 15, 1989.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

asts favor. The "pro-military school" presses for cooperation that will render the countries at issue dependent on the USSR in a military sense.

Proposals to woo military-based regimes and to make these regimes highly dependent on the USSR militarily imply an inclination on the part of endorsers of this policy perspective to rely heavily on military means. They also tend to indicate that the group is willing to see the USSR engaged in the Third World in ways that could lead to military clashes with the West; however, since the mid-1980's, backers of the perspective have explicitly sought to expunge any impression that they advocate Soviet involvement in the Third World's military conflicts.

Public articulation of this school of thought has stemmed essentially from military quarters in the 1980's. The school came into being in the mid-1970's, and although it received open endorsement from at least some lower-level civilians at that time, it enjoyed support largely in military circles even then. During the late 1970's, moreover, all overt civilian backing disappeared. In fact, the outlook itself appeared to vanish entirely from the Soviet scene for a few years.⁹ When it

resurfaced in 1982, it failed to regain any public civilian endorsement. Among defenders of this viewpoint in the 1980's have been Colonel Ye. Rybkin, long a prominent figure in the shaping of Soviet military doctrine and strategy, and Major General Ye. Dolgoplov.¹⁰

The "national-capitalism" school. According to adherents of this school, the vast majority of Third World states have now chosen the path of development that they intend to pursue, and the bulk of them have opted for a capitalist, or at least a nonsocialist, path. Thus, the analysis goes, most Third World countries will probably

⁹For more detailed discussion of the emergence and fate of this vision of policy in the 1970's, see Mark Katz, *The Third World in Soviet Military Thought*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, pp. 81–83, 104–05.

¹⁰On Rybkin, see, for instance, his "The Army in the Political System of Developed Socialism," *Voyenno-istoricheskii Zhurnal* (Moscow), August 1982, pp. 3–12, and "Fundamentals of the Study of War and the Army," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (Moscow), No. 5, March 1983, pp. 88–91.

With respect to Dolgoplov, see his "On Principles of Equality," *Soviet Military Review* (Moscow), January 1984, pp. 49–50; *Sotsial'no-politicheskaya rol' armiy osvobodivshikhsya stran* (The Socio-Political Role of the Armies of the Liberated Countries), Moscow, Voennoye izdatel'stvo, 1986; and "Working for Independence," *Soviet Military Review*, July 1987, pp. 50–51.

pass through a capitalist or non-socialist phase of development before embarking on a socialist course. This prospect means that "socialist-oriented" countries will in all likelihood remain in the minority in the Third World for the indefinite future.

Furthermore, the group argues, the states that have adopted a "socialist orientation" have disturbing faults. Even the most "progressive" of these states—the "revolutionary democracies" with "vanguard" parties—have displayed a less than steadfast desire to implement far-reaching social transformations internally and have vacillated in their foreign policies. As a result, they have substantial deficiencies as Soviet allies.

Under such circumstances, proponents of this outlook assert, the USSR needs to diversify its relationships in the Third World. Diversification of ties is not only imperative but also possible, they suggest. The objective bases for it lie in "contradictions" between Third World "capitalist-oriented" states and the West that the USSR can exploit. Perhaps the most important of these "contradictions" have economic roots. In the opinion of subscribers to this viewpoint, the rulers of many "capitalist-oriented" Third World countries want to develop a "nationalist" type of capitalism in their domains, while the "imperialist" Western powers strive to foster a "dependent" form of capitalism there. But "contradictions" of a strictly political and ideological nature exist as well. For example, from the standpoint of the group, commitment to Islam coupled with resistance to Westernization can produce tensions between a "capitalist-oriented" Third World state and the Western powers.

Advocates of this perspective believe that the USSR has little chance of constructing long-term structural links with the great bulk of the states that they consider the prime targets for courtship. And these Soviet ana-

lysts accept the probability that over time there will be divergences of interests between the USSR and many of the countries that they pinpoint for attention. Nevertheless, as they see things, eclecticism in defining potential allies will tend to offset this difficulty, for profitable relations with a large and varied circle of states will reduce the impact that a setback in any one of these states can have on overall Soviet fortunes in the Third World. The sheer volume of ties, in short, will help to insulate Moscow's Third World position.

Although expounders of this vision of policy give no sign of eschewing military tools in forging links with the diverse states upon which they concentrate, the type of opportunities that they discern for building these ties prompts them to emphasize other instruments. Economic means play a prominent role in their calculations. Yet, because the economic capabilities of the USSR are limited at present, the group places greatest stress on political tools.

Besides downplaying military instruments, this school of persuasion appears to want to avoid confrontation with the West in the Third World. Nevertheless, it still seems to favor a highly conflictual approach toward the West there. The bases upon which it intends to construct relations with a wide range of Third World countries are varied types of anti-Western sentiment, and it anticipates fashioning and/or strengthening ties by fanning such sentiments.

The front ranks of the formulators and champions of this policy outlook have long included Karen Brutents, formerly a deputy director and now a first deputy director of the CPSU International Department, and Yevgeniy Primakov, until the mid-1980's the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences and since then head of the Academy's Institute of World Economics and International Relations.¹¹ In recent years, the perspective has acquired other supporters of consequence within the Soviet elite as well. Perhaps the outstanding illustration is Aleksandr Yakovlev, a full member of the CPSU Politburo, a key secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and the supervisor of the Central Committee's new International Policy Commission.¹²

The "economic-interdependence" school. Partisans of this viewpoint note that most countries in the Third World, whether they be "capitalist-oriented" or "socialist-oriented," have to date chalked up poor records of economic performance. Not only have they been slipping farther and farther behind the advanced industrial powers, but they have also failed to achieve significant economic growth in absolute terms. Even those states that have done reasonably well economically have en-

¹¹For representative commentaries by Brutents, see his *Osvobodivshiesiya strany v 70-e gody* (The Liberated Countries in the 1970's), Moscow, Politicheskaya literatura, 1979; article in *Pravda*, Feb. 2, 1982; "The Liberated Countries at the Beginning of the 1980's," *Kommunist*, No. 3, February 1984, pp. 102–13; article in *Pravda*, Jan. 1, 1985; observations on a "Studio 9" program, Moscow Television Service in Russian, Feb. 27, 1988, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), Feb. 29, 1988, pp. 6–16.

With respect to Primakov, see his "Some Problems of the Developing Countries," *Kommunist*, No. 11, July 1978, pp. 81–91; "The Liberated Countries: Community Problems," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1980, pp. 15–28; "The Law of the Unevenness of Development and the Historical Fates of the Liberated Countries," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow—hereafter, *MEiMO*), pp. 28–47; *Vostok posle krakha kolonial'noy sistemy* (The East After the Collapse of the Colonial System), Moscow, Nauka, 1982; "Leninist Analysis of Imperialism and the Current Scene," *Kommunist*, No. 9, June 1986, pp. 103–13.

¹²See Yakovlev's "Inter-Imperialist Contradictions—The Current Context," *Kommunist*, No. 17, November 1986, esp. p. 9.

countered difficulties of one sort or another—soaring debts, depressed demand for exports, and so on. Thus, according to this group's assessment, leaders of these diverse countries are seeking ways to improve their local economic situations.

This search, backers of the perspective contend, opens up new opportunities for the USSR to broaden its relations in the Third World, for even the top economic performers among "capitalist-oriented" states are prepared to intensify their dealings with the USSR substantially to further economic development. Moreover, endorsers of the line insist, the USSR has the wherewithal to take advantage of these opportunities. To be sure, the USSR has economic troubles of its own, and it does not possess the resources to solve the economic problems of Third World countries. But these deficiencies do not really matter. The only way of overcoming Third World economic woes anyway is through the working out of a coherent world system of economic interdependence. Within such a system, these Soviet observers maintain, the USSR could play a key part that would enable it to build up ties with a broad spectrum of states.

The system that the proponents of this outlook foresee has several features. First, the industrialized countries of the West would turn out goods of high technological sophistication for sale to the USSR and other members of the Soviet bloc. The USSR and its allies, for their part, would manufacture items of a lower level of technological sophistication for export to Third World states. This last category of countries would devote its energies, at least at the outset, to producing minerals and raw materials for sale to both the Western powers and the Soviet bloc. By specializing in such output, they would develop the necessary skills and surpluses to diversify their economies, beginning with labor-intensive food and processing industries. This projected system, it should be emphasized, entails no meaningful distinctions between "capitalist-oriented" and "socialist-oriented" states in the Third World.

Promoters of this policy outlook urge the creation of a long-term structural relationship with Third World countries that they deem to be worthwhile objects for wooing, but their vision of the relationship differs considerably from those put forth by other schools of thought. Advocates of this particular viewpoint focus on the fashioning of enduring economic links with Third World countries within a multilateral framework. That is, they anticipate that economic ties will flourish in a broader setting in which other actors also have major roles to perform.

Analysts of this persuasion do not dismiss out of hand the use of military instruments, but the character

of the opportunities that they discern in the Third World dictates a heavy stress on economic tools. Even political means become decidedly secondary in such a light.

As for the stance toward the West in the Third World, exponents of this policy approach favor a less conflictual posture than do adherents of any of the other schools of thought. The group appears to assume that competition between the USSR and the Western powers will continue in the Third World, but it does not foresee that this competition will inevitably result in military clashes or even political strife. On the contrary, it entertains the possibility of Soviet-Western cooperation in certain situations. For instance, it sanctions close Soviet trade relations with the West, and it contemplates that both the West and the USSR will purchase the minerals and raw materials that Third World states will have to sell as these states attempt to develop economically.

Although no eminent political figures appear to have had a key hand in shaping this basic outlook, several have openly associated themselves with it. Among these have been Vadim Zagladin, until 1986 the sole first deputy chief of the CPSU International Department, then one of the two first deputy heads of the department, and since October 1988 a personal adviser to Gorbachev in his new capacity as president of the USSR Supreme Soviet; N. N. Inozemtsev, until his death in 1982 the director of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations as well as a member of the CPSU Central Committee; Georgiy Arbatov, director of the Institute of the United States and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences and also a member of the Central Committee; and, most recently, Eduard Shevardnadze, a full member of the CPSU Politburo and USSR foreign minister since 1985.¹³

Stance of the Top Leadership

Up to the early 1980's, the top Soviet leadership had invariably singled out for broad official endorsement one of the positions articulated during periods of controversy over the USSR's Third World policy. During the last half of the 1970's, for instance, the leadership unequivocally lent the weight of its authority to the prescriptions of the "revolutionary-democratic" school, which had emerged in the mid-1970's. Speaking to the 25th CPSU Congress in February 1976, CPSU General

¹³On Zagladin, see his joint volume with I. T. Frolov, *Global'nyye problemy sovremennosti: nauchnyye i sotsial'nyye aspekty* (Contemporary Global Problems: Scientific and Social Aspects), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1981; his joint article with I. Frolov, "Global (fn. continued on p. 56)

Secretary Leonid Brezhnev contended that "the class struggle is building up" in "many liberated countries." As a result, he said, "Arab, African, and Asian states having a socialist orientation" were undergoing "new progressive changes" in their "economic and political life." These "important changes," he asserted, "facilitated" the "strengthening" of the USSR's cooperation with such countries. Moreover, in discussing Soviet relations with specific Third World states, he dwelt almost exclusively on those which Soviet commentators classified as "revolutionary democracies."¹⁴

The following year, Brezhnev dispatched Andrey Kirilenko, a full member of the CPSU Politburo and a key secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to Angola as the Soviet representative to the congress of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) that proclaimed that party to be Marxist-Leninist. Kirilenko made clear that he viewed the emergence of this new "vanguard" party as a sign that the African revolutionary process was deepening, and as a harbinger of things to come in other "socialist-oriented" countries on the continent.¹⁵

Although Premier Alexey Kosygin's economic report to the 25th CPSU Congress mentioned the USSR's general desire to have "its cooperation with the developing countries take the form of a stable and mutually advantageous division of labor," Brezhnev's political report left no doubt that the General Secretary envisioned long-term structural ties that went well beyond economic relations in the cases of "revolutionary democracies" like Angola. He attested that the world's "progressive forces" had aided "Angola's struggle to defend its independence" in 1975–76, and he declared that "our party supports and will continue to support peoples who are fighting for their freedom."¹⁶ At the 1977 MPLA Congress, Kirilenko highlighted the persisting internal and external opposition that the new Angolan regime

faced and restated Brezhnev's pledge to help that regime survive.¹⁷

But by the early 1980's, the top Soviet leadership had ceased to uphold any single school of persuasion as official Third World policy. General Secretary Brezhnev's political report to the 26th CPSU Congress in February 1981 was indicative. It contained features that reflected aspects of at least three of the perspectives detailed above.¹⁸

In keeping with the "revolutionary-democratic" viewpoint, Brezhnev pointed out that the number of countries with a "socialist orientation" had risen in recent years, and he referred briefly to Soviet cooperation with seven "revolutionary democracies"—Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDY), Syria, Algeria, and Guinea—and somewhat more extensively to Soviet collaboration with "revolutionary-democratic" Afghanistan. He also affirmed that the USSR was helping "to strengthen the defense capability of liberated states if they ask that we do so." As illustrations, Brezhnev cited aid to Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan.

Other parts of the report, however, mirrored the perceptions and preferences of the "national-capitalism" and "economic-interdependence" schools of thought. For example, Brezhnev observed that "for all practical purposes," the 1970's had seen "the liquidation of the colonial empires," but he acknowledged that the countries "that have been liberated from colonial oppression" differed widely among themselves. Some had "taken a revolutionary-democratic path," while others had not merely opted for "capitalist orientation" but had "established capitalist relations."

Furthermore, the General Secretary paid far more attention to states that were not "socialist-oriented" than to those that were. He talked at some length about Iran. In the course of this discussion, he depicted the revolution there—despite "its complex and contradictory nature" and despite the attempts of "domestic and foreign reaction" to alter its character—as "basically an anti-imperialist revolution," and he indicated that the USSR was "prepared to develop good relations" with Iran. He underscored this willingness by failing to take "revolutionary-democratic" Iraq's side in the war that had broken out between Iran and Iraq five months earlier. On this issue, he merely urged the two battling countries to "draw the proper conclusions" from the "highly advantageous" situation that the war had created for "imperialism." Brezhnev also noted the "impor-

Problems and the Fate of Civilization," *Oktyabr* (Moscow), No. 5, 1984; his "Socialism and Contemporary Global Problems," *Politicheskoye Samoobrazovaniye* (Moscow), September 1986, pp. 13–22; "The Present and the Future: Two Strategies for the 21st Century," *MEIMO*, September 1986, pp. 3–14; and "An Arduous but Necessary Path," *International Affairs*, September 1988, pp. 28–37.

With regard to the other three, see Inozemtsev's edited volume, *Global'nyye problemy sovremennosti* (Contemporary Global Problems), Moscow, Mysl', 1981; Arbatov's address to the 26th annual convention of the International Studies Association in Washington, DC, on March 6, 1985, as published in *International Studies Newsletter* (Columbia, SC), May 1985, pp. 1–5; Shevardnadze's report of July 25, 1988, to a conference of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *International Affairs*, October 1988, particularly pp. 14–15 and 23, and his closing speech of July 27, 1988, to the same gathering, *ibid.*, especially pp. 61–62.

¹⁴*Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1976.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, Dec. 6, 1977.

¹⁶Cf. the reports of Kosygin (*ibid.*, Mar. 2, 1976) and Brezhnev (*loc. cit.*).

¹⁷*Ibid.*, Dec. 6, 1977.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, Feb. 24, 1981.

tant place" that India occupied in the USSR's "relations with liberated countries," and he promised that "interaction with peace-loving, independent India" would remain "an important area of Soviet foreign policy." In addition, he maintained that "no obstacles" existed to "good cooperation with Indonesia" or with other members of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). He even stressed that in the preceding five years, 10 states in Africa, the Caribbean, and Oceania had gained independence, and the USSR had recognized all of them "at once."

Last but not least, Brezhnev emphasized that the USSR was developing with the "liberated" countries "wide-ranging economic and scientific-technical cooperation" that was advantageous "to both sides."

In the short periods that Yuriy Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko served as CPSU general secretary, they said little in public about the Third World, and failed to associate themselves with any particular school of thought on the subject in the comments that they did make. Indeed, Andropov gave strong indications that he rejected some of the fundamental premises of the "revolutionary-democratic" outlook. Addressing a CPSU Central Committee plenum on June 15, 1983, he did depict states of "socialist orientation" as "the most close to us," yet he underscored their deficiencies as well. "It is one thing to proclaim socialism as one's aim," he argued, "and quite another to build it." Moreover, even though he pledged Soviet assistance to such countries "in the sphere of politics and culture" and in "the strengthening of their defense," Andropov insisted that "on the whole" their economic development could "only be the result of the work of their peoples and of a correct policy of their leadership."¹⁹

Gorbachev's elevation to CPSU general secretary has brought proliferating evidence that no school of thought about Third World policy can claim exclusive top-level support. Gorbachev's discussion of the Third World in his book *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*—comments that represent his most extensive and personal public statement about the Third World to date—is especially revealing in this regard.²⁰

In this discussion, the General Secretary shied away from broad references to "socialist-oriented" states, to "revolutionary democracies," and to "revolutionary-democratic" parties of a "vanguard" sort, but he wrote at fair length about a number of the entities that normally show up on the lists set forth by partisans of the "revolutionary-democratic" line. For instance, he declared that "we fully appreciate the formidable tasks facing progressive regimes in Africa." Through "economic and financial means" and even "by resorting to arms,"

imperialism "is out to retain" the positions that it acquired in African countries during the colonial era. However, he stated, the "progressive" regimes there "are determined to pursue a course toward consolidating gains." For "these efforts and these policies" he expressed firm Soviet backing, and he went on to underscore that "our country has always acted, and will continue to act, in support of the national liberation struggle of African nations."

With regard to Nicaragua, he charged the United States with pursuing "an undeclared war against a small country whose only 'fault' is that it wants to live its own way, without interference from the outside." In addition, he contended that the Nicaraguan revolution had come about in the first place because of "unbearable conditions" there that the United States had created by treating all of Central America as its "backyard." The USSR, he concluded, "sympathized" with "the liberation movements of peoples fighting for social justice," and it believed that "if the United States left Nicaragua in peace, this would be better for the US itself, for the Latin Americans, and for the rest of the world."

Consistent with the "economic-interdependence" perspective, Gorbachev pointed to "the growing tendency towards interdependence of the states of the world community." This tendency, he asserted, produces "global issues" which "become vital to the destinies of civilization" and require solutions "in the framework of the world community." Among the specific issues that he cited was the economic development of Third World states.

Such development, the General Secretary emphasized, did not threaten "traditional links between the United States and Western Europe, on the one hand, and developing countries on the other." He acknowledged "how important the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, other Third World regions, and also South Africa are for American and West European economies, in particular as raw material sources," and stated that "to cut these links is the last thing we want to do, and we have no desire to provoke ruptures in historically formed, mutual economic interests."

¹⁹Ibid. June 16, 1983.

²⁰See specifically Chs. 3 ("How We See the World of Today") and 5 ("The Third World in the International Community") in Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, New York, Harper and Row, 1987. Other key items providing insight into Gorbachev's position include the new CPSU Program published in draft in October 1985 and approved in slightly revised form at the 27th CPSU Congress in early 1986, and the General Secretary's political report to the 27th CPSU Congress. The draft of the former may be found in *Pravda*, Oct. 26, 1985, while the final version appeared in *Moscow News*, No. 12, Mar. 30–Apr. 6, 1986, Supplement. Gorbachev's report to the 27th CPSU Congress was carried in *Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1986.

In consonance with the "national-capitalism" viewpoint, Gorbachev sought to portray the USSR as a champion of Third World "capitalist-oriented" states trying to shake off the vestiges of Western domination. He began by holding that "economic, political, and ideological competition between capitalist and socialist countries is inevitable," although, "it can and must be kept within a framework of peaceful competition." Then he proceeded to demonstrate his commitment to such competition by arguing that every Third World state "is entitled to choose its own way of development, to dispose of its fate, its territory, and its human and natural resources." Significantly, he did not confine his defense of this right simply to countries that opted for "socialist orientation," but extended it to states on their way to becoming modern industrialized countries of a capitalist type. According to him, even those in this category that were "growing into great powers" confronted "uneven and painful" economic growth, for the "rich Western states" continued "to collect neo-colonialist 'tribute'." He wound up, therefore, calling upon Western leaders to "set aside the psychology and notions of colonial times" and stop treating "capitalist-oriented" as well as other kinds of Third World countries as the West's "sphere of influence."

The General Secretary's ensuing remarks about specific Third World states testified to the importance that he assigned to "capitalist-oriented" ones. He indicated that the USSR was "ready to develop [its] relations with each of the ASEAN nations individually and with ASEAN as a whole." He depicted the USSR's relations with India as "an example for others to emulate," and he saw in these relations "a budding world order in which peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation based on goodwill will be universal norms." He avowed Soviet sympathy "with the Latin American countries in their efforts to consolidate their independence in every sphere and to cast off all neo-colonialist fetters," and praised the "energetic foreign policies" and the "responsible stances on disarmament and international security" of Mexico and Argentina, the "peace-making efforts of the Contadora Group"

Indirect yet striking confirmation of the absence of top-level endorsement of a sole school of persuasion about Third World policy emerged at a major conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late July 1988. It came from Karen Brutents, at the time a deputy director of the CPSU International Department and a key expounder of the "national-capitalism" viewpoint. He told the gathering: "It is . . . only fair to say that the problems of developing countries have yet to be worked out in accordance with the concept of new thinking."²¹

Soviet Behavior

Before the early 1980's, Soviet conduct in the Third World at any given juncture had traditionally followed the recommendation of whichever policy outlook enjoyed official blessing. During the latter half of the 1970's, for instance, it conformed to the prescriptions of the "revolutionary-democratic" line. The USSR directed toward "revolutionary democracies" most of the energy and resources that it devoted to the Third World in these years. Moscow signed new treaties of friendship and cooperation with five Third World states, and from the Soviet standpoint, all of these fell into the category of "revolutionary democracies." The CPSU also developed strong ties with six ruling "revolutionary-democratic" parties of a "vanguard" kind (in Angola, Mozambique, Benin, Congo, the PDRY, and Afghanistan) and with one commission established to create such a party (in Ethiopia).

Between 1975 and 1979, the USSR delivered an estimated US\$23.2 billion of weapons and equipment to 30 Third World countries, and of this total, \$19 billion went to 17 "revolutionary democracies."²² In 1976, of the 9,080 Soviet and East European military technicians posted in Third World states, 5,975 were in eight "revolutionary democracies"; by 1979, 11 "revolutionary democracies" accounted for 14,800 of the 15,865 such technicians assigned to the Third World.²³

During 1975-79, Moscow offered economic credits to 33 countries of the developing world, of which 17 met Soviet criteria for "revolutionary democracies." These 17 states, to be sure, received only an estimated \$3.1 billion of the \$10.8 billion that the USSR extended to the developing world over the period, but large commitments to three non-"socialist-oriented" countries introduced substantial distortions into the picture—Moscow proffered \$2 billion to Morocco, \$1.85 billion to Turkey, and \$1.2 billion to Nigeria.²⁴ In 1977, Soviet and East European economic technicians in the Third World

²¹"Cooperation and Dialogue with Political Parties and Movements," *International Affairs*, November 1988, pp. 38-39.

²²This analysis is based on data in US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1970-1979*, Washington, DC, 1982.

²³US Central Intelligence Agency (hereafter, CIA), *Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1976* (hereafter, *Communist Aid, 1976*), ER 77-10296, Washington, DC, August 1977, p. 4; and idem, *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 and 1954-79* (hereafter, *Communist Aid, 1954-79*), ER 80-10318U, Washington, DC, October 1980, p. 15.

²⁴These figures were arrived at by the author from information in *Communist Aid, 1976*; CIA, *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1977* (hereafter, *Communist Aid, 1977*), ER 78-10478U,

numbered 58,730, of which 36,540 were located in 12 "revolutionary democracies." By 1979, 63,275 of the 80,820 such economic technicians were to be found in 14 "revolutionary democracies."²⁵

Throughout the second half of the 1970's, Moscow labored mightily to help Third World "revolutionary-democratic" regimes, particularly those with "vanguard" parties, to create and/or strengthen their instruments of control. Although it employed a variety of means to this end, it relied heavily on political tools.

As noted above, the CPSU fashioned close ties with the ruling "vanguard" parties in Angola, Mozambique, Benin, Congo, the PDRY, and Afghanistan and with the commission formed to set up such a party in Ethiopia. These links included providing advice on ideological and organizational matters.²⁶

The USSR also assumed key military roles in five of the seven states. To Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, it provided military advisers to assist with the development and training of local armed forces, and it became the principal supplier of weapons and equipment for the three countries. In the cases of Angola and Ethiopia, it even furnished the logistical support for large contingents of Cuban troops that stayed in these countries after, respectively, the 1975–76 Angolan civil war and the 1977–78 war between Ethiopia and Somalia in the Ogaden. As for the PDRY and Afghanistan, Moscow had served as the chief source of weapons and equipment for the two and had furnished military technicians to both prior to the mid-1970's, but it greatly expanded the amount of arms and number of military technicians that it sent to them after they established "vanguard" parties in 1978.²⁷ In all instances, the aid that Moscow gave was designed to improve the perfor-

mance of local militaries against rebellious domestic elements and threatening neighboring countries.

Only in Afghanistan did the USSR involve itself directly in assisting a "revolutionary-democratic" regime to shape or reshape its intelligence and security services. However, the USSR's staunchest East European ally, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), played a prominent part in setting up the intelligence and security services of the governments of Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and the PDRY.²⁸

Finally, the USSR adopted a fairly provocative stance toward the West in the Third World. Not only did Moscow insist that there was no linkage between détente with the West and Soviet actions in the Third World,²⁹ but it even risked confrontation with the United States by indirect involvement in military conflicts in Angola and the Horn of Africa and direct intervention in Afghanistan. All of these undertakings were in behalf of "revolutionary-democratic" regimes.

In the early 1980's, however, a new diversity crept into Soviet activities in the Third World, and this diversity has persisted throughout the remainder of the decade. The USSR's behavior has reflected a mix of elements drawn from all four of the existing schools of thought about desirable policy toward the Third World, although it has had a dominant thrust along "national-capitalism" lines. Moreover, the precise amalgamation of elements has varied on a regional basis.³⁰

Targets of interest. The USSR has continued, as the "revolutionary-democratic" enthusiasts have preferred, to channel toward the "revolutionary democracies" the bulk of the actual resources that it has allocated to the Third World. During 1982–86, Moscow shipped an estimated \$59.7 billion worth of arms to 32 Third World states, and 17 "revolutionary democracies" received

Washington, DC, November 1978; idem, *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries*, 1978 (hereafter, *Communist Aid*, 1978), ER 79-10412U, Washington, DC, September 1979; and *Communist Aid*, 1954–79; plus Carol Fogarty and Kevin Tritle, "Moscow's Economic Aid Programs in Less-Developed Countries: A Perspective on the 1980's," in *Gorbachev's Economic Plans*, Study Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1987, Vol. 2, pp. 537–38.

²⁵*Communist Aid*, 1977, p. 7, and *Communist Aid*, 1954–79, p. 21.

²⁶See, for example, Brutents, *Osvobodivshiesya strany v 70-e gody*, pp. 142–43; C. P. Nemanov, "Parties of the Vanguard Type in African Countries of Socialist Orientation," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2, 1979, p. 27; B. Ponomarev, "The Joint Struggle of the Workers' and National Liberation Movements Against Imperialism, for Social Progress," *Kommunist*, No. 16, November 1980, pp. 42–43; William F. Robinson, "Eastern Europe's Presence in Black Africa," in Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), Background Report No. 142, June 21, 1979, p. 4; Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1983, pp. 96, 102–04; Norman Cigar, "South Yemen and the USSR: Prospects for the Relationship," *The Middle East Journal* (Washington, DC), Autumn 1985, pp. 780–81.

²⁷On these various activities, see, for instance, Morris Rothenberg, *The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power*, Washington, DC,

Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980, pp. 137–47; William M. LeoGrande, *Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959–1980*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980, pp. 37–45; J. B. Kelly, "The Kremlin and the Gulf," *Encounter* (London), April 1980, pp. 87–88; Bradsher, op. cit., Chs. 5–6; *Communist Aid*, 1977, p. 3; *Communist Aid*, 1954–79, pp. 15, 35, and 40; *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1970–1979*, p. 127.

²⁸Melvin Croan, "A New Afrika Korps?" *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Winter 1980, pp. 30–31; Mark Katz, *Russia and Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Arabian Peninsula*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, p. 85; Bradsher, op. cit., p. 123; Kelly, loc. cit., p. 87.

²⁹See, for example, General Secretary Brezhnev's report to the 25th CPSU Congress, loc. cit.

³⁰To explore in depth the regional differences in the nature of Soviet undertakings, compare the analyses in two works by the present author: *Soviet Policy toward Africa Revisited*, Significant Issues Series, Vol. IX, No. 6, Washington, DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1987; and "Latin America in Soviet Third World Strategy: The Political Dimension," in Eusebio Mujal-Leon, Ed., *The USSR and Latin America: A Developing Relationship*, Winchester, MA, Unwin Hyman, 1989, pp. 3–64.

about \$46.3 billion of that sum.³¹ Of the 18,205 Soviet and East European military technicians in the Third World in 1981, 13,225 were assigned to 11 "revolutionary democracies." By 1984, 18,775 of 21,335 such technicians were posted in 14 "revolutionary democracies"; in 1986, 16,375 of 17,995 were active in the same 14 countries.³²

During 1982–86, the USSR also extended an estimated \$13.6 billion in economic credits to 43 Third World states, and \$8.3 billion of this amount went to 16 "revolutionary democracies."³³ Of 95,685 Soviet and East European economic technicians in the Third World in 1981, 74,650 were assigned to 15 "revolutionary democracies." By 1984, 101,195 of the 125,960 such technicians in the Third World were to be found in 13 "revolutionary democracies." As of the end of 1986, 17 "revolutionary democracies" had 73,695 of the 96,455 such technicians in the Third World.³⁴

A similar distribution of resources has prevailed in all of the major regions where "revolutionary democracies" exist—North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Central America and the Caribbean. For example, the Middle East's three "revolutionary democracies" (Iraq, the PDRY, and Syria) got more than \$3.5 billion of the nearly \$4 billion in economic commitments and \$26.7 billion of the roughly \$29.6 billion in arms deliveries that Middle Eastern countries obtained from the USSR during 1982–86.³⁵ In 1981, they accounted for 19,100 of the 27,150 Soviet and East European economic technicians and 4,900 of the 5,929 Soviet and East European military technicians in the Middle East. These figures stood at 23,025 of 33,100 and 7,700 of 8,310, respectively, in 1984; they were 21,485 of 30,005 and 5,100 of 5,700 in 1986.³⁶

Since Gorbachev's advent to power in early 1985, to be sure, the percentage of Soviet resources going to

"revolutionary democracies" has declined somewhat. For instance, the economic credits that Moscow offered to 16 "revolutionary democracies" during the period 1982–86 amounted to only a little more than half of the total that it extended to the whole of the Third World in these years, while the same number of "revolutionary democracies" had received a substantially larger share of Soviet commitments to the Third World during 1980–84 (\$7.6 billion of \$9.7 billion).³⁷ Still, the basic pattern of investment of Soviet resources has not altered under Gorbachev.

In accordance with the recommendations of advocates of the "pro-military" perspective, the USSR has assiduously courted "progressive" military regimes in the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. To a considerable degree, of course, Moscow has ensured major Soviet attention to states with military governments in these three regions by devoting to "revolutionary democracies" the bulk of the concrete resources that it has expended there, for most of the "revolutionary democracies" in these regions have either been headed by or dominated by the military. There has, however, been less ambiguous evidence as well that Moscow has singled out at least some of the military-controlled countries in the three regions for special wooing.

For example, the USSR has gone to unusual lengths to cultivate Ghana and the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). Neither of these states claims to be even "socialist-oriented." Yet the government of Ghana under Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings has demonstrated populist tendencies, and the YAR has toyed with the notion of uniting with the PDRY, although its enthusiasm about the idea has risen and fallen over the years.

Since Rawlings took power for the second time in Ghana in March 1982, the USSR has greatly stepped up its interaction with that African country. Delegation traffic between the two states has reached levels not attained since Kwame Nkrumah's downfall in 1966, collaboration between them has blossomed in various spheres, and Moscow has agreed to furnish technical assistance and funding for a number of economic construction and repair projects in Ghana.³⁸ In accordance with the last commitment, the USSR had by the close of 1986 extended more than \$15 million in economic credits to Ghana.³⁹ Moscow has even resumed delivery of arms to Accra for the first time since Nkru-

³¹These statistics were put together by the author from data in US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, 1987, Washington, DC, March 1988.

³²This analysis derives from information in three publications of the US Department of State: *Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World*, 1981, Washington, DC, February 1983, p. 14; *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid to Non-Communist LDC's*, 1984, Washington, DC, May 1986, p. 20; *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDC's: Holding Their Own in 1986*, Washington, DC, August 1988, p. 16.

³³Calculated from data in *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDC's: Holding Their Own in 1986*, pp. 8–9.

³⁴Based on *Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World*, 1981, pp. 20–21; *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid to Non-Communist LDC's*, 1984, p. 16; *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDC's: Holding Their Own in 1986*, p. 12.

³⁵These figures were arrived at by the author from information in *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDC's: Holding Their Own in 1986*, pp. 8–9; *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, 1987.

³⁶See the references cited in fns. 32 and 34.

³⁷For the data upon which the 1980–84 analysis is based, see Fogarty and Tritle, loc. cit., pp. 537–38.

³⁸For more detailed discussion, see Albright, *Soviet Policy toward Africa Revisited*, pp. 38–40.

³⁹*Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDC's: Holding Their Own in 1986*, p. 8.

mah's political demise, and by the end of 1986, the cumulative value of these arms had climbed to an estimated \$20 million.⁴⁰

Although the USSR had had fairly close relations with the YAR in the 1960's, these ties had deteriorated by the early 1970's and remained at low ebb for most of the 1970's.⁴¹ Only in late 1979 did they begin to revive, when Moscow reversed a long-standing policy and consented to supply arms to the Sanaa government to help it combat opposition forces backed by the PDRY. Ensuing years brought a burgeoning of ties. In 1981, the USSR proffered economic credits of \$55 million to the YAR, the largest single offer that Moscow had ever made to a government in Sanaa since North Yemen became a republic.⁴² An increase in Soviet and East European economic technicians assigned to the country followed this commitment, with the number mounting from 175 in 1981 to 565 in 1986.⁴³ In addition, the USSR has sent major quantities of arms to the YAR in the 1980's. During 1982-86 alone, Soviet arms deliveries amounted to an estimated \$1.3 billion.⁴⁴ Although the total of Soviet and East European military advisers in the state peaked at 700 in 1981, it still stood at 350 in 1986.⁴⁵

As proponents of the "national-capitalism" viewpoint have urged, the USSR has vastly increased the heed that it pays to "capitalist-oriented" countries. This shift has had two distinct dimensions.

First, Moscow has greatly expanded its contacts with two major regions that lack "revolutionary democracies" and have virtually no "socialist-oriented" states—South America and Southeast Asia. The heightened political interaction has been particularly striking. Soviet activity in Southeast Asia is illustrative.⁴⁶ During the first half of the 1980's, there was a modest rise in the number of delegations exchanged between the USSR and ASEAN countries, although most of the individuals involved were relatively low-ranking officials. Then the flow swelled dramatically and came to include many high-level figures. In March 1987, USSR Foreign Minister Shevardnadze toured Southeast Asia and stopped in both Thailand and Indonesia. His visit to Indonesia was the first by a major Soviet leader since Sukarno's ouster in 1965. Soon after Shevardnadze's trip, Soviet officials in Moscow welcomed the foreign ministers of Thailand and Malaysia for talks. Then in July 1987, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad spent several days in Moscow at Soviet invitation. Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja journeyed to the USSR for conversations with Soviet leaders in February 1988. Later in the year, the Soviet hierarchy entertained Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon of Thailand in Moscow, and Shevardnadze went to the Philippines for discussions with leaders there.

Second, even in regions where there are "revolutionary democracies," the USSR has wooed many "capitalist-oriented" states with which it had had few links at the outset of the 1980's. These have included some with especially revealing attributes.

Thus, Moscow has determinedly courted countries which, in its eyes, are guilty of having abandoned a "socialist orientation" in the recent past. Egypt is a good example. In the wake of President Anwar al-Sadat's assassination in October 1981, the USSR strove to reconstruct the economic, cultural, scientific, and trade union ties with Egypt that he had broken during the final years of his rule. In July 1984, the USSR and Egypt finally agreed to resume full diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors, and exchanges of delegations between the two states increased rapidly thereafter. Soviet officials in March 1987 addressed the last remaining source of friction between the USSR and Egypt by working out a rescheduling of Egypt's outstanding debt to Moscow on terms favorable to Cairo.⁴⁷

The USSR has also resolutely cultivated states that it has long regarded as important "capitalist-oriented" countries but that had, at best, displayed coolness toward it in the last half of the 1970's. Examples are Zaire, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

Some details of the USSR's efforts with respect to Saudi Arabia should suffice to indicate the intensity of Soviet undertakings in these cases.⁴⁸ Soviet leaders had their first talks in Moscow with a Saudi foreign minister in December 1982, when they received Prince Saud al-Faysal as a member of an Arab League delegation. There followed some lower-level contacts over the next few years, and then in early 1987, Soviet officials welcomed Saudi oil minister Hisham Nazir to Moscow for conversations about cooperation between the USSR and members of the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC). In January 1988, the Soviet hierarchy played host to Foreign Minister Saud

⁴⁰*World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, 1987, p. 127.

⁴¹See, for instance, Katz, op. cit., Ch. 1.

⁴²Fogarty and Tritle, loc. cit., p. 538; *Communist Aid*, 1976, p. 13; *Communist Aid*, 1978, p. 10; and Katz, op. cit., Ch. 1.

⁴³*Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World*, 1981, p. 21; and *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDC's: Holding Their Own in 1986*, p. 12.

⁴⁴*World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, 1987, p. 130.

⁴⁵*Communist Aid*, 1954-79, p. 15; *Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World*, 1981, p. 14; and *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDC's: Holding Their Own in 1986*, pp. 8-9.

⁴⁶Details with respect to South America may be found in Albright, "Latin America in Soviet Third World Strategy: The Political Dimension," loc. cit.

⁴⁷For more extended treatment of these various developments, see Albright, *Soviet Policy Toward Africa Revisited*, pp. 29-30.

⁴⁸On Zaire and Jordan, see *ibid.*, pp. 31-32; and Melvin A. Goodman and Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl, "Gorbachev's 'New Directions' in the Middle East," *The Middle East Journal*, Autumn 1988, pp. 571-86.



Prince Saud al-Faysal, Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, arrives in Moscow on January 28, 1988, for a working visit. He is greeted by Yu. Vorontsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

again, who ostensibly headed a group representing the Gulf Cooperation Council but brought only Saudi officials with him. The following month, Gorbachev dispatched a special envoy, Vladimir Polyakov, to Saudi Arabia. Polyakov was the first Soviet representative to pay an official call there in more than 50 years.

Consistent with the wishes of the champions of the "economic-interdependence" outlook, the USSR has expanded its economic relations with Third World states without regard to political orientation. This approach has meant that its economic links with "capitalist-oriented" countries have multiplied significantly. The USSR's trade turnover with Third World states rose from roughly \$4.8 billion a year on the average in 1975–79 to an annual average of more than \$10.8 billion in 1982–86, and most of the increase came with "capitalist-oriented" countries. A major share of the growth, for instance, came in trade with South America and Southeast Asia, where, as already mentioned, there are virtually no "socialist-oriented" states. Soviet trade turnover with South America climbed from an average annual figure of only a little more than \$800 million in 1975–79 to more than \$2.1 billion a year on the average during 1982–86. Similarly, the USSR's annual trade turnover with non-communist countries in Southeast Asia averaged nearly \$1.1 billion in 1982–86 as com-

pared with an average yearly figure of about \$460 million in 1975–79.⁴⁹

Moscow has striven especially to enhance its economic ties with the best economic performers among developing countries, and these have been almost exclusively "capitalist-oriented" states. Examples are India, Brazil, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, Tunisia, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia. In 1982–86, the USSR's trade turnover with India reached an average of \$2.9 billion a year, whereas in 1975–79 it had amounted only to an average of \$1.2 billion a year. The total for Brazil rose from about \$320 million in 1975–79 to more than \$630 million in 1982–86; for Singapore, from a little in excess of \$115 billion to almost \$290 million; for Thailand, from roughly \$22 million to more than \$115 million; for Turkey, from \$170 million to nearly \$375 million; for Tunisia, from \$17 million to \$34 million; for Sri Lanka, from \$30 million to more than \$46 million; for Malaysia, from about \$170 million to more than \$250 million.⁵⁰

Relationships sought. In the cases of "revolutionary democracies" and especially those with "vanguard" parties, the USSR has persisted in pursuing the sort of ties that adherents of the "revolutionary-democratic" perspective have touted. That is, it has tried to fashion long-term, structural links with these states by assisting the existing regimes in their efforts to solidify their rule.

For instance, Moscow has encouraged "revolutionary-democratic" regimes still without "vanguard" parties to form such parties, and it has endeavored to help strengthen existing "vanguard" parties. The leading example of Soviet efforts of the former type has to do with Ethiopia. For example, Soviet officials prodded Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile-Mariam to carry out his avowed intention to set up a "vanguard" party, and when he was preparing for the official launching of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia in September 1984, the USSR played a major part in the undertakings. This role included educating Ethiopians about the operations of a Marxist-Leninist party. No less than 12 important Ethiopian delegations visited the Soviet Union in 1983 alone to observe CPSU activities, and some of these groups comprised 30 or more persons.

⁴⁹The statistics on trade turnover here were calculated by the author in light of information in International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook* for 1981, pp. 387–88, and *ibid.* for 1988, pp. 399–400.

⁵⁰Data on the economic performances of Third World states, as measured by the growth of gross national product (GNP) per capita during 1975–85, appear in *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, 1987. The figures on commercial exchanges were arrived at by the author on the basis of information in *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook* for 1981, pp. 387–88, and *ibid.* for 1988, pp. 399–400.



The founding congress of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia in September 1984; wearing the garland, WPE leader Mengistu Haile-Mariam.

—ADN-ZB from Eastfoto.

As for Soviet bolstering of "vanguard" parties already in existence, the PDRY offers a good illustration. In January 1986, a coup there ousted President Ali Nasir Muhammad and resulted in the death of a large segment of the state's political elite. Subsequently, the USSR assumed a key role in reconstituting a government and rebuilding a viable party in the country.⁵¹

The USSR and its allies have also retained or taken over major functions with respect to the intelligence and security services of a number of "revolutionary democracies." Principal among these countries have been Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, the PDRY, Nicaragua, and (at least until early 1989) Afghanistan.⁵²

Finally, the USSR has worked closely with several "revolutionary democracies" to enhance their capacity to deal with domestic and/or foreign military challenges. For example, it has furnished military advisers to Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, the PDRY, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan (until early 1989) to assist in the training of local military forces and to offer counsel on military strategy. In addition, it has constituted the primary source of the large amounts of arms that all six states have acquired during the decade. It even de-

⁵¹See the chapters by David E. Albright on the USSR and Africa in the annual volumes of Colin Legum, Ed., *Africa Contemporary Record*, London, Holmes and Meier, for 1981–85; and David Pollock, "Moscow and Aden: Coping with a Coup," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1986, pp. 50–70.

⁵²See the entries for Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique in the yearly editions for the 1980's of *The Military Balance*, published in London by the International Institute for Strategic Studies; on the PDRY, see Pollock, loc. cit., p. 52; on Nicaragua, US Department of State and Department of Defense, *The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean*, Washington, DC, March 1985, pp. 25–27; and on Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, "Moscow's Afghan War," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1986, pp. 7–8.

ployed a large contingent of its own troops in Afghanistan until early 1989, and it has furnished logistical support for the stationing of substantial numbers of Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia.⁵³

It should be acknowledged, however, that the late 1980's have witnessed a growing Soviet leanness about involvement in attempts to bolster "revolutionary democracies" militarily when these undertakings entail high costs for the USSR or antagonize the Western powers. Not only did Soviet troops leave Afghanistan in February 1989 in line with a decision that Gorbachev had announced in 1988, but Moscow also actively promoted the accords that Angola, Cuba, and South Africa concluded in December 1988. These call for the departure of all Cuban forces from Angola by July 1991 in return for South Africa's acceptance of Namibia's independence, although they do not affect the status of Soviet military advisers in Angola.⁵⁴

In approaching military-ruled countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa, the USSR appears to have sought to create the kind of long-term structural relations of a military nature favored by the expounders of the "pro-military" school. For instance, it shipped arms to 16 military-controlled states in the three regions during 1982-86; furthermore, it served as the sole or primary source of arms for 11 of these states.⁵⁵

As proponents of the "national-capitalism" viewpoint have counseled, the USSR seems to have eschewed attempts to establish lasting structural links with most "capitalist-oriented" countries—at least over the short term. Indeed, the great diversity of such states that Moscow has been wooing in the 1980's suggests that it has been hedging against possible setbacks here and there in its relations with them.

Moscow has been courting not only the more important "capitalist-oriented" countries but many fairly minor ones as well. For example, in 1984 alone, each of the African mini-states of Gambia, Togo, Niger, Mauritania, and Rwanda received at least one significant Soviet overture.⁵⁶ After extensive diplomatic preparations, the USSR opened up official ties with both Oman and the United Arab Emirates in October 1985. In February 1987, Moscow sent its ambassador in Costa Rica to Guatemala to explore the chances for a resumption of Soviet-Guatemalan diplomatic relations.⁵⁷ No formal links had existed between the two countries since the unseating of the left-wing Arbenz government in Guatemala in the mid-1950's.

In keeping with the prescriptions of the "economic-interdependence" school, however, the USSR has tried to foster long-term, structural ties in a multilateral framework with some "capitalist-oriented" states and partic-

ularly with the best economic performers in the Third World. It has done this basically by pressing for increased purchases of Soviet goods, especially machinery. But the items that Moscow has been promoting have gone well beyond those that would improve the capabilities of these Third World countries to produce for the Soviet market; they have included any type of machine goods that would ensure "mutually advantageous" exchanges. Thus, the trade flows that the USSR has encouraged are intended to create linkages whose ultimate importance will derive from their connection to the global economic system instead of in a purely bilateral context.⁵⁸

Instruments. The USSR has employed all of the diverse means at its disposal in its handling of the Third World as a whole, but it has emphasized different tools in addressing different targets there. In dealing with "revolutionary democracies" with "vanguard" parties, Moscow has heeded the recommendations of adherents of the "revolutionary-democratic" viewpoint. It has resorted primarily to a mix of political and military instruments, with a stress on the former. The means whereby the USSR has sought to help the existing regimes in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and the PDRY put down firm roots afford excellent illustrations. As already noted, Moscow has assisted these regimes with arms and training for local military forces to try to strengthen the capacities of the regimes to meet internal and foreign military threats; however, it has relied principally on undertakings designed to improve the control capabilities of these regimes' nonmilitary institutions.

In the cases of military-run states in the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as of many "revolutionary democracies" lacking "vanguard" parties, the USSR has followed the desires of the exponents of the "pro-military" school. That is, it has used chiefly military tools. Political instruments, it is true,

⁵³On these various activities, see *The Military Balance, 1987-1988*, pp. 120, 123, 126, 129, and 133; *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDC's: Holding Their Own in 1986*, p. 16; *The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean*, p. 25; Khalilzad, loc. cit., p. 2; and *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987*.

⁵⁴See the texts of the agreements in *The New York Times*, Dec. 23, 1988.

⁵⁵This analysis is based on information in *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987*, pp. 127-30.

⁵⁶For details, see David E. Albright, "The USSR and Africa in 1984: Trials of an Aspiring Global Power," in Legum, Ed., *Africa Contemporary Record 1984-85*, pp. 253-57.

⁵⁷Guatemala City Radio-Television in Spanish, Feb. 27, 1987, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-LAT*), Mar. 2, 1987, pp. P/2-3.

⁵⁸For more extensive treatment of this subject in a specific regional setting, see Elizabeth Valkenier, "Soviet Economic Strategy in Latin America," in Mujal-Leon, op. cit., pp. 65-89.

have played a not inconsequential role in Soviet wooing of these countries, particularly the "revolutionary democracies." Yet the absence of "vanguard" parties in all of these states has imposed limits on the effectiveness with which the USSR can employ political means. Of the other types of tools available, Moscow has clearly judged military ones to be of greater value and viability than economic ones. During 1982–86, for instance, 18 military-ruled countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa received arms deliveries and/or economic credits from the USSR, and 15 of these states got more supplies of arms than economic commitments—usually by a large margin.⁵⁹

As for most "capitalist-oriented" countries, the USSR has carried out its courtship largely through political means, as partisans of the "national-capitalism" outlook have counseled. For the most part, Moscow has found the economic and military "contradictions" between these states and the West too costly to try to exploit, given Soviet resource constraints. Political "contradictions" are not as problematic. Thus, Soviet efforts to make common political cause with these states have proliferated and have covered a broad range of topics. For example, the USSR has supported the endeavors of the "capitalist-oriented" states of the South Pacific to declare their region a nuclear-free zone—a step opposed especially by the United States and France—and it has endorsed the calls by the "capitalist-oriented" countries of Latin America for the West to adopt a more flexible attitude toward their debts.

With respect to a few "capitalist-oriented" states, however, the USSR has followed the exhortations of those of an "economic-interdependence" persuasion by concentrating on economic means. The best illustrations are countries with which it has managed to establish a "mutually advantageous" economic relationship. Morocco, Turkey, and Egypt fall into this group. During 1981–86, Soviet exports to Morocco averaged about \$151 million a year, while Soviet imports amounted to an annual average of almost \$74 million. The figures for Turkey were, respectively, \$211 million and roughly \$161 million; for Egypt, more than \$211 million and nearly \$189 million.⁶⁰ All of these states, it should be underscored, qualify for listing among the developing world's better economic performers.⁶¹

Posture toward the West. To a large extent, the USSR has adopted the stance toward the West endorsed by proponents of the "national-capitalism" perspective—that is, competition without confrontation. A few diverse examples will suffice for purposes of illustration. When Thailand and the Dominican Republic in the early 1980's found themselves deprived of quotas for sale of

rice and sugar respectively in the US market, Moscow agreed to purchase substantial amounts of these commodities from them. Thus, Soviet trade turnover with Thailand jumped from \$22.2 million a year on the average in 1975–79 to an annual average of \$115.6 million in 1982–86; that with the Dominican Republic rose from nothing in 1975–79 to an average yearly figure of \$36.4 million in 1982–86.⁶²

In the early 1980's, the USSR contracted to supply weapons and equipment to Jordan for the first time after King Hussein had failed to get what he wanted from the United States or other Western powers. Over the 1982–86 period alone, Soviet arms deliveries to this Middle Eastern state totaled an estimated \$1.1 billion.⁶³

Although Moscow has throughout the 1980's encouraged Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's antipathy toward the West and has attempted to exploit it to forge strong links with Libya, the USSR has carefully dissociated itself from Qadhafi's more provocative actions toward the West. For instance, Soviet media studiously avoided mention of Libya's likely role in the mining of the Red Sea in the summer of 1984, and the USSR quietly helped with the mine-clearing operations in the Bab el-Mandeb area.⁶⁴ Furthermore, Moscow did not respond in a direct military way to the US bombing of Libya in April 1986, which Washington characterized as retaliation for Qadhafi's fostering of international terrorism. The USSR merely offered Qadhafi some new, more sophisticated military hardware—especially SA–5 missiles.⁶⁵

In line with the inclinations of the backers of both the "revolutionary-democratic" and "pro-military" schools of thought, however, the USSR maintained a limited confrontational attitude toward the West by supporting some "revolutionary democracies" until the mid-1980's. Among these were three states in which it had taken on fairly heavy military responsibilities in the latter part of the 1970's—namely, Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan—but the group also included other countries such as Nicaragua. To the governments of these states, all of which faced serious domestic and/or

⁵⁹World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987, pp. 127–30; Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDC's: Holding Their Own in 1986, pp. 8–9.

⁶⁰These statistics were derived by the author from information in *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1988*, pp. 399–400.

⁶¹World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987, pp. 57, 70, and 80.

⁶²Derived from data in *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook* for 1981, p. 388, and *ibid.* for 1988, pp. 399–400.

⁶³World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987, p. 129.

⁶⁴Middle East News Agency (Cairo) in Arabic, Aug. 23, 1984, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa* (Washington, DC), Aug. 24, 1984, p. D/1.

⁶⁵*Al-Ittihad* (Abu Dhabi), May 31, 1986, pp. 1, 9.

external military challenges, Moscow provided large quantities of arms and, often in conjunction with its allies, significant numbers of military advisers.⁶⁶ Moreover, it did so despite the fact that the Western powers, and particularly the United States, were either seeking to end the conflicts or aiding the opponents of the existing regimes in the countries concerned.

But since early 1986, the USSR has gradually abandoned most of the confrontational aspects of its posture even in these cases. In March 1986, for instance, Gorbachev indicated explicitly that the USSR was prepared to help find political solutions to the conflicts engulfing Angola.⁶⁷ Although for nearly two years Moscow played a fairly minimal part in diplomatic efforts to such an end, in late 1987 it did begin to push actively for the agreements that Angola, Cuba, and South Africa signed in December 1988.⁶⁸ In October 1986, the USSR consented to normalize its relations with Somalia, one of the Ethiopian government's main antagonists.⁶⁹ Thereafter, Moscow pressed for a rapprochement between Ethiopia and Somalia. And finally, there is Afghanistan, where in May 1986, the USSR engineered a change in the leadership of the ruling party in Afghanistan that brought to power Najibullah, a man who appeared to be more amenable to some sort of "national reconciliation" in the country than his predecessor had been. Two months later, in a major speech in Vladivostok, Gorbachev announced the withdrawal of a number of Soviet regiments from Afghanistan.⁷⁰ By early 1988, Moscow had decided to pull all of its troops out, and it concluded a formal accord to this effect in April 1988.⁷¹ In keeping with that document, the last Soviet troops left the country in February 1989.

Only with respect to Nicaragua have some elements of confrontation remained. To be sure, the USSR has endorsed peace initiatives such as the "Arias plan," set forth by the presidents of Central America in August 1987, and it has applauded conciliatory gestures by the Sandinist regime to its internal opposition. Yet Moscow has declined to involve itself in the Central American peace process. Moreover, it has promised to increase its military aid to the Managua government,

although Gorbachev did indicate in early April 1989 that he was prepared to cut off this flow of arms if the United States ceased all of its shipments of arms to Central America.⁷²

Since the mid-1980's, the USSR also has occasionally assumed the selectively cooperative stance toward the West that the champions of the "economic-interdependence" outlook favor. The manifestations of such a posture have come largely, though not exclusively, in connection with Third World conflict situations. The outstanding example is the negotiations that resulted in the pledge by Angola and Cuba to remove Cuban troops from Angolan soil in return for South Africa's acceptance of Namibian independence. Soviet and American officials worked closely together to facilitate this settlement.⁷³ The United States and Soviet Union also collaborated during the severe famine that hit Ethiopia in 1985. The USSR had little in the way of food to offer Addis Ababa, but Moscow furnished many of the trucks and airplanes required to get the relief supplies—provided by the West, especially the US—to affected areas of the country.⁷⁴

Implications

What, then, do these shifts suggest about the USSR's policy toward the Third World? Two points stand out. First, from a substantive viewpoint, increased complexity has become the key feature of Soviet policy. Specifically, the policy now reflects several different, often clashing visions of what the Soviet approach to the Third World ought to be. It is true that, as the evidence laid out in the preceding pages attests, a good case can be made that today change outweighs continuity in the content of Soviet policy. Yet elements of continuity persist. More critical, even if these elements of continuity were to disappear, the heightened complexity of policy would still prevail as long as multiple schools of persuasion about desirable policy existed and the USSR's top leadership embraced no one of them exclusively.

The significance of this new complexity in Soviet policy toward the Third World arises from its impact on the

⁶⁶See, for example, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, 1987, pp. 127–30; *Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World*, 1981, p. 14; *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid to Non-Communist LDC's*, 1984, p. 20; and *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDC's: Holding Their Own in 1986*, p. 16.

⁶⁷Speech at a dinner in Moscow for President Samora Machel of Mozambique, as reported by TASS over Radio Moscow in English, Mar. 31, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 1, 1986, pp. J/3–6.

⁶⁸On the USSR's role in the undertakings after late 1987, see, for instance, *The New York Times*, June 6, 1988.

⁶⁹This step took place at a meeting of a Somali official and USSR Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in the Yemen Arab Republic. See *Indian Ocean Newsletter* (Paris), Oct. 18, 1986.

⁷⁰The text is in *Pravda*, July 29, 1986.

⁷¹For the agreement, see *The New York Times*, Apr. 15, 1988.

⁷²See the press conference of the newly arrived Soviet ambassador to Nicaragua, as reported by Radio Belgrade, TANJUG in English, Nov. 5, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 8, 1988, p. 35; Gorbachev's speech to the National Assembly in Havana, Cuba, on Apr. 4, 1989, as carried by Havana Domestic Radio and Television Services on Apr. 4, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-LAT*, Apr. 6, 1989, pp. 7–13, esp. p. 12.

⁷³For typical discussion of this cooperation, see *The New York Times*, June 6, 1988, and Jan. 28, 1989.

⁷⁴A revealing account of Soviet activities may be found in Z. Kadymbekov's dispatch in *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Sept. 6, 1985.



Soviet Aeroflot helicopters deliver wheat shipments provided by the European Economic Community to remote villages in the northern and eastern parts of Ethiopia during the famine of 1984-85.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

predictability of that policy. In any concrete set of circumstances, it is hard to anticipate precisely what mix of the various policy perspectives will shape Soviet behavior. Thus, foreseeing the USSR's response to these circumstances is highly problematic.

From Moscow's standpoint, of course, this development is not necessarily a drawback. Nor is the greater flexibility that the added complexity permits in Soviet handling of the Third World. The absence of a firm official line, for example, gives Moscow more room to adjust its conduct in light of the conditions it may see as relevant in each individual situation.

Second, in terms of process, the formulation of the USSR's policy toward the Third World has also turned into a highly complicated affair. Policy now emerges from competition among a number of groups with diverse policy outlooks in the Soviet hierarchy.

Many signs do point to an evolution in the nature of this competition during the 1980's. In the final years of the Brezhnev era, during the brief tenures of Andropov and Chernenko as CPSU general secretary, and even in the initial stage of Gorbachev's rule, the competition resembled a free-for-all wrestling match. Advocates of the various policy lines picked concrete circumstances in which they believed that they could in-

fluence the USSR's behavior, and then they sought to exert this leverage.

Several factors contributed to this situation. Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko were elderly and suffered from serious illnesses and/or infirmities during much or all of the periods that they were in office; thus, they did not function in an activist fashion. Moreover, they faced so many pressing problems that the Third World did not rank high on their lists of priorities. As a consequence, even though they refused to lend the weight of their authority to the "revolutionary-democratic" viewpoint that had enjoyed official sanction in the late 1970's, neither did they set forth a coherent alternative to it.

Gorbachev's rise to power brought a young, dynamic individual to the top leadership post, but he lacked experience in foreign affairs and had virtually no experience in dealing with the Third World. Perhaps more important, his immediate concerns were domestic in nature, and his need to solidify his political control reinforced this preoccupation. Hence, he devoted little attention to the Third World at the outset.⁷⁵

(fn. 75 on p. 68)

In addition, until roughly 1987, officials with diverse prescriptions for the USSR's Third World policy were entrenched in those Soviet institutions that had a major hand in shaping the Soviet approach toward the Third World. The CPSU International Department, for example, included among its directing elements representatives of three of the four Soviet schools of thought about Third World policy.⁷⁶ Without firm policy guidelines from above, these and other strategically-placed individuals were in a position to affect Soviet conduct at least within their own spheres of responsibility.

Since about 1987, however, the competition has taken on a more structured form, as advocates of each policy line battle to influence the content of the "new thinking." An item published in a leading Soviet academic journal in mid-1988 affords a graphic illustration. Under the headline "Socialist Orientation and New Political Thinking," two prominent specialists on the Third World with long-standing, conflicting outlooks on Soviet Third World policy engaged in a dialogue on "socialist orientation." One expounded a "revolutionary-democratic" viewpoint; the other, a "national-capitalism" viewpoint. Yet both claimed that their arguments accorded with "new political thinking."⁷⁷

The previously cited observation by Brutents at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conference in July 1988 offers equally revealing evidence. In saying that "the problems of developing countries have yet to be worked out" in light of "the concept of new thinking," he implied that "new thinking" required further refinement. Given his long-term commitment to a "national-capitalism" perspective, there can be little doubt what sort of refinement he had in mind.

This shift in the nature of the competition has come about for a combination of reasons. Over the years, Gorbachev has greatly enhanced his power by engineering a variety of personnel and institutional changes in the USSR, although he still appears to confront strong opposition in some quarters.

⁷⁶For more extended treatment of these points, see Roderic Lyne, "Making Waves: Gorbachev's Public Diplomacy, 1985-86," in Robbin F. Laird Ed., *Soviet Foreign Policy*, New York, Academy of Political Science, 1987, pp. 235-53.

⁷⁶As already noted, Ponomarev, the head of the department, and Ul'yanovskiy, a deputy chief, subscribed to the "revolutionary-democratic" outlook; Brutents, a deputy director, to the "national-capitalism" viewpoint; and Zagladin, the first deputy chief, to the "economic-interdependence" perspective. For elaboration, see David E. Albright, "The CPSU International Department and the Third World in the Gorbachev Era," in Donald Graves, Ed., *The CPSU International Department and Soviet Foreign Policy*, Washington, DC, Center for Foreign Policy Development, forthcoming.

⁷⁷Vladimir Lee and Georgy Mirsky, "Socialist Orientation and New Political Thinking," *Asia and Africa Today* (Moscow), July-August 1988, pp. 64-70.

The General Secretary has also begun to evince a fair degree of interest in the Third World, and he has even set forth some general principles for Soviet policy toward it. These flow essentially out of his larger political and foreign policy concerns. That is particularly true of the two primary principles. As Gorbachev sees things, Soviet involvements in the Third World must not impede the restructuring of the Soviet economy, and the USSR's behavior there must not undermine Soviet attempts to improve relations with the West in general and the United States in particular.⁷⁸

Aside from insisting on adherence to a few governing principles, however, Gorbachev has shown a willingness to listen to expert advice on how to deal with the Third World. This willingness has legitimized efforts by representatives of all policy persuasions to make inputs on the subject, and despite Gorbachev's shakeup of the personnel and institutions handling Third World matters, diversity of outlook persists among the well-placed experts. Indeed, even Gorbachev's two top-ranking lieutenants in the realm of foreign policy—Yakovlev and Shevardnadze—seem to hold clashing views on desirable Soviet Third World policy.

Prospects

None of the developments highlighted in this article, it should be recognized, is necessarily permanent. Therefore, an assessment of their likely future relevance requires answers to two basic questions. First, will debate continue over what the Soviet Union's policy toward the Third World should be, and especially will there be several schools of thought on the subject? Second, will the top Soviet leadership persist in avoiding an embrace of any single school of thought as an official line? Let us address each of these issues in turn.

Although the visions of desirable Soviet policy toward the Third World advanced by Soviet observers have totaled four since the early 1980's, there is nothing magical about that number, and it could alter in the years immediately ahead. The underpinnings of the "revolutionary-democratic" and "pro-military" outlooks, for example, have eroded substantially. Indeed, criticism of even the most radical forces in power in the

⁷⁸See his speech to the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del, SSSR* (Moscow), Aug. 5, 1987, and his *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, pp. 139-40, 174, 177-78, 188-89.

⁷⁹As pointed out previously, Yakovlev, Politburo member and head of the CPSU International Policy Commission, adheres to the "national-capitalism" school, while Shevardnadze, a Politburo member and minister of foreign affairs, identifies with the "economic-interdependence" school.

Third World has come from supporters of the "revolutionary-democratic" and "pro-military" perspectives, as well as from partisans of other viewpoints.⁸⁰ Unhappiness with these forces could reach the point where the "revolutionary-democratic" and/or the "pro-military" schools of thought would disappear entirely.

By the same token, indications have cropped up since mid-1988 that a fifth vision of policy may be emerging, although these hints still remain scanty enough to leave questions about whether it has enough backing to qualify as a full-fledged school of thought. This perspective accepts a basic premise of the "national-capitalism" outlook—that at least most Third World states will pass through a capitalist or nonsocialist phase of development before arriving at socialism. Yet it sees far less possibility of advance toward socialism under present circumstances than even the "national-capitalism" line does. Not only is this viewpoint skeptical that "capitalist-oriented" countries in the Third World will try to assert their independence vis-à-vis the Western "imperialist" powers in economic and other spheres by expanding their contacts with the USSR, but it is pessimistic about even modest steps toward socialism on the part of "socialist-oriented" states. Worst of all from its standpoint, even the most consistent of the USSR's Third World allies are seeking to broaden their political and economic ties with the West, and the USSR lacks the resources to reverse this situation. In fact, Moscow is even having troubles increasing these resources, for it bears heavy military burdens in the Third World and other areas. As a result, the socialist path of development is losing its appeal in the Third World.

Thus, according to advocates of this possible new school of thought, the USSR must reduce its involvements in the Third World so as to focus on restructuring its own economy and making the socialist path more attractive. In doing so, it should not use political orientation as a basis for retaining close relations; rather, it should adopt pragmatic criteria based on its political interests and goals in each region. Nor should it attempt to maintain or develop links with Third World

countries that entail heavy commitments of resources, especially those of an economic character. In addition, it should rely chiefly on political means, instead of more costly military and economic instruments, in pursuing its ends. Finally, it should adopt a nonprovocative posture toward the West; otherwise, it might find itself embroiled in Third World conflicts that would drain off its resources.

So far, we have not been able to identify any high-level individual who has publicly associated himself with this line of argument.⁸¹ Nevertheless, some (unnamed) senior members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including ambassadors and high-ranking staff members of the ministry, did openly call at the ministry's July 1988 conference for a hard-headed reassessment of Soviet undertakings in the Third World. They urged that the USSR develop relations with Third World states "on realistic lines, with due regard to the peculiarities of each particular country and, first and foremost, to our actual possibilities."⁸²

What appears beyond doubt is that controversy over Third World policy will continue in the USSR for the foreseeable future. Moreover, it seems highly probable that multiple schools of persuasion on the subject will remain in existence as well. The "revolutionary-democratic" perspective in particular has roots too deep in Soviet policy-making for one to anticipate that it will soon vanish completely.

Were the number of visions of policy to drop to two, of course, the complexity of current policy would inevitably diminish—especially if the two happened to be the "national-capitalism" and "economic-interdependence" viewpoints, which have elements of commonality in their prescriptions. Yet complexity would not vanish entirely if the top Soviet leadership still failed to extend its official sanction to one or the other. This point brings us to the second issue.

The top Soviet leadership's position on the merits of embracing as an official line one of the extant schools of thought about policy could undergo change in two ways. Someone amenable to the notion of sanctioning one of the schools could replace Gorbachev as general secretary, or Gorbachev himself could alter his attitude on the issue.

With regard to the possibility of Gorbachev's replacement, his hold on power will ultimately depend on how well his programs work, and that question remains unresolved. For the moment, however, he seems not

⁸⁰The writings of Ul'yanovskiy, one of the prime architects of the "revolutionary-democratic" viewpoint, are indicative. Before the appearance of his article "On National and Revolutionary Democracy: Paths of Evolution" in 1984, he had never attacked "revolutionary democrats" in any severe fashion, but in this article he took them to task for a variety of failings, even though he continued to insist that the Third World was going through a protracted process of by-passing capitalism. All of his subsequent publications have been in the same vein.

⁸¹The most expansive statement to date of this vision of policy may be found in Alexey Izyumov and Andrey Kortunov, "The Soviet Union in the Changing World," *International Affairs*, August 1988, esp. pp. 51–56.

⁸²See the account by Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Il'ichev of the deliberations of a section on "Policy Toward Developing Countries and Regional Conflicts" at this conference, in *ibid.*, October 1988, pp. 49–50.

only to have enhanced his dominance of the political system but to have prevented a coalescence of different groups of malcontents, as well as to have denied them a prominent figure around whom to rally. Consequently, no succession appears to loom on the near horizon. Even were one to take place, there is no guarantee that a new general secretary would abandon Gorbachev's stance on the matter at issue here.

As for the potential for a shift in Gorbachev's attitude, such a development seems most unlikely, although not utterly impossible. Gorbachev appears to welcome the flexibility that his decision not to endorse exclusively any school of thought about policy toward the Third

World has afforded the USSR. Moreover, this increased ability to adjust policy to local conditions has to date served the USSR fairly well in its dealings with the Third World. Thus, it would probably take a major setback for the USSR in the Third World to persuade Gorbachev to reverse himself.

All in all, then, both Soviet policy toward the Third World and the process whereby that policy is formulated will probably continue to evince a high degree of complexity in the years immediately ahead. This judgment, it should be stressed, does not preclude change, but it does mean that change is likely to be at the margins.

The Soviet Union and Southern African Security

S. Neil MacFarlane

A major step toward resolution of regional conflict in Southern Africa was taken in New York on December 22, 1988, when Cuba, Angola, and the Union of South Africa signed a treaty at the United Nations agreeing on the transition to independence of Namibia and a timetable for withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.¹ While many factors contributed to this outcome—rising South African casualties, growing concern in Luanda about the sorry state of the Angolan economy after 12 years of civil war, and the active mediation of the United States, to mention a few—it is difficult to conceive of such progress in negotiations on Angolan-Namibian issues without the acquiescence, if not support, of the Soviet Union. In fact, Moscow—long a major supporter of Cuba, Angola, the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO), and the African National Congress (ANC)—participated as an observer in the series of US-mediated talks leading up to the signing of the treaty.²

To some extent, this development in Southern Africa reflects a broader shift in Soviet attitudes regarding regional conflicts. The signing of the treaty on Angola and Namibia came in a period when the USSR was implementing its military withdrawal from Afghanistan, when Soviet client Vietnam was mooting the possibility of complete withdrawal from Cambodia by the end of the decade, and when one detected that—despite a shaky ceasefire—the Soviet-backed Sandinista govern-

ment was showing increased interest in exploring a peaceful resolution of Nicaragua's civil war. At the same time, one can also trace an important evolution in Soviet perspectives on conflict and regional security in Southern Africa per se. It is this evolution that I wish to discuss in this article.

The subject is an important one, foremost because recent changes in Soviet perspectives on Southern Africa could have a wide-reaching impact on the region and its security. The area has suffered from continual war, dating back to the beginning of insurgency in Angola in 1961. Will a changing Soviet perspective improve prospects for ending this seemingly interminable conflict? During the 1970's, conflict in the region became an important impediment to constructive developments in East-West relations. Will changing Soviet policies reduce such impediments in the future? Resolution of the issue of apartheid in South Africa has long been clouded by the specter of possible Soviet exploitation of upheaval in that society. Might a changing

¹See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-AFR*), Dec. 23, 1988, p. 1. This treaty culminated a series of talks mediated by the United States, which began in Lusaka in early 1988, continued in March in Cairo, in London and Brazzaville in May, in New York in July, and subsequently in Cabo Verde, Geneva, and finally Brazzaville in early December. A key stage in these negotiations was the emergence in New York of a 14-point agreement in principle committing the three negotiating parties to implementation of United Nations Resolution 435/78 on Namibian independence and to withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola (see *The New York Times*, July 21, 1988). In August, there was agreement on a ceasefire and the beginning of a South African withdrawal from Angola. In the autumn, there was considerable wrangling over the timetable for Cuban withdrawal, but these issues were resolved in Brazzaville, paving the way for the New York signing.

²*The New York Times* of August 3, 1988, reported that Anatoliy Adamishin, the Soviet deputy foreign minister responsible for Southern African affairs and the Soviet observer at some of the negotiations, had "implied" that the USSR was pressing Angola and Cuba toward a compromise. Soviet observers played a critical role during the Cairo round in preventing a walkout by Cuba and Angola.

S. Neil MacFarlane is Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia (Charlottesville), where he specialized on Soviet foreign policy. He is the author of numerous articles and monographs on Soviet theory and practice in the Third World, including Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism (1985).



At the signing of the treaty on Angola and Namibia at the United Nations in New York on December 22, 1988: at center, US diplomat Chester A. Crocker looks on as UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and US Secretary of State George P. Shultz shake hands; at the left are two representatives of South Africa, and at right, two representatives each from Angola and Cuba.

—US Department of State.

Soviet policy make possible a more productive solution to the deep indigenous socio-economic and political problems in South Africa and elsewhere in the region? In a broader context, detailed attention to specific regional cases can greatly enhance the examination of the broader issue of the current directions of Soviet Third World policy.

In broaching the subject, I will make a few general observations concerning changing Soviet attitudes toward the Third World as a whole and pursuit of Soviet interests there. Then I will explore shifts in Soviet attitudes regarding Sub-Saharan Africa before turning to a more detailed examination of the evolution of Moscow's perceptions of the conflict in Angola and the revolutionary process in South Africa itself. I will conclude with a discussion of the significance of this evolution in Soviet policy for the regional security of Southern Africa. It is not my intention to deal at any length with Soviet relations with other regional actors (e.g., Mozambique,

Zimbabwe, and Zambia); these topics are important, but they are not mine.

The analysis here is based on a reading of the Soviet literature on the Third World in general—and on Africa specifically—from 1976 through early 1989, on numerous interviews with Soviet regional specialists, on a field research trip to South Africa at the beginning of 1988, and on extensive discussions with participants in Soviet-American exchanges of Africanists.

General Trends in Soviet Policy

The USSR has pursued an array of objectives in the Third World. These have included competitive goals relating to strategic position, political influence, and expansion of the realm in which socialist ideology holds sway. This last reflects not only genuine commitment on the part of Soviet leaders to this ideology, but also their

need to legitimize their rule by acting as purveyors of a universalistic ideology, the victory of which over international imperialism is alleged to be historically determined. The competition may have been pursued positively (through the acquisition of new assets) or negatively (through efforts to weaken the position of or deny gains to the adversary).³

The Soviet Union has also pursued economic objectives and sought to attain status in the international community as a superpower. This latter, essentially nationalist, objective may again have reflected either the genuine commitment of decision-makers to the "glory" of their state, or an attempt to appeal to Russian nationalism as part of a strategy of legitimation. These goals could have been pursued without seriously impinging on the position or assets of other powers.

Finally, the USSR has sought to avoid direct confrontation with the United States in seeking advantage in the Third World. More generally, the Soviet leadership has sought at various times to avoid or limit damage to its agenda in relations with other major powers that might arise from its *démarches* on the periphery.

The intensity with which the USSR has pursued these objectives and the priority accorded one or another of them have varied over time, in what some see as a cyclical alternation between activism and quiescence.⁴ Observers generally agree that the current period is one of Soviet caution and moderation in the Third World.⁵ Indeed, there is considerable evidence that Soviet analysts and policy-makers have concluded that a continuation of past policy in the Third World is a recipe for prolonged and increasingly costly entangle-

ment in regional conflicts; that such entanglements are damaging to Moscow's relations with the West,⁶ and, often, to Soviet prestige; that given the balance of forces in most regions, Soviet objectives must be scaled down to more modest levels; and that Moscow can attain these more modest goals by diplomatic means rather than by force.

The focus of Soviet attention seems to be shifting from the socialist states (Vietnam and Cuba) and "states of socialist orientation" (e.g., Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen) to major developing states such as India, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Nigeria. The objectives are now to construct relations of economic benefit to the USSR and to provide a solid footing for the Soviet claim to status as a player in various regions of the Third World. To the extent that links to the USSR encourage and sustain a degree of independence from the United States on the part of Third World states, so much the better in Moscow's view. There is little evidence of significant Soviet willingness to take advantage of new opportunities for involvement in Third World revolutions. The Soviet Union is seeking, meanwhile, to reduce its exposure in conflicts where it is already involved, through a diplomacy of political settlement.

Where the costs of regional involvement are sufficiently high and prospects for preserving Soviet interest unpromising, as in Afghanistan, Moscow is willing to cut its losses and pull out. The Soviet Union also appears to be pressing its clients to improve their economic performance through internal reform and to diversify their external economic relations, so as to be less dependent on the USSR.

Forgoing new opportunities and seeking to utilize a diplomacy of "political settlement" to reduce Soviet exposure relate in some measure to a turnover in key persons supervising Soviet policy toward the Third World. First, ideologues such as Boris Ponomarev and Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy were replaced in the Central Committee's International Department (ID) by professional diplomats Anatoliy Dobrynin and Georgiy Korniyenko—

³I owe the distinction between acquisition goals and denial goals to George Breslauer.

⁴For a discussion of the ups and downs of Soviet policy in the Third World, see S. Neil MacFarlane, *Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism: The Idea of National Liberation*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985, pp. 132–41. Many scholars have pointed to the cyclical pattern of activism and quiescence in Soviet policy in the Third World, among them E. H. Carr, Roger Kanet, Robert Legvold, and, most recently, Francis Fukuyama.

The danger, of course, with an excessive predisposition toward cyclical interpretation is that it may underemphasize or miss altogether longer-term secular trends in Soviet international behavior.

⁵The present Soviet leadership appears to be placing a lower priority on Third World issues than did its predecessors. For example, compare the attention given to Third World issues in the reports of Leonid Brezhnev to the 26th (1981) Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and of Mikhail Gorbachev to the 27th (1986) CPSU Congress. *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 24, 1981, and *ibid.*, Feb. 26, 1986.

On the recent period, see Francis Fukuyama, *Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World*, Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 1988, pp. 1–91; and *idem*, "Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September–October, 1987, pp. 1–13. See also Elizabeth K. Valkenier, *The USSR and the Third World: An Economic Bind*, New York, Praeger, 1983; and Jerry F. Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World*, Washington, DC, Brookings, 1986.

⁶Growing Soviet sensitivity to the relationship between behavior in the Third World and the state of the central relationship between the superpowers is evident in recent Soviet examinations of what went wrong in the 1970's. Thus, one analyst has written: "Was it possible to avoid such a strong worsening of tension in Soviet-Western relations in the late 1970's and early 1980's? Without a doubt, yes. In our view, the crisis was provoked mainly by the miscalculations and incompetent approach of the Brezhnev leadership in the solution of foreign policy tasks In our political, military, and diplomatic involvement in regional conflicts, we ignored their influence on détente between the USSR and the West and on the entire system of their relations." See Vyacheslav Dashichev, "East-West—The Search for New Relations," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), May 18, 1988, p. 14. For a similar assessment, see A. Kolosovskiy, "Regional Conflicts and Global Security," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow—hereafter, *MeIMO*), No. 6, 1988, pp. 32–33.

individuals whose career experience suggests considerable sensitivity to the effects of Soviet Third World policy on Moscow's relations with the United States. Second, the authority of the ID in formulating foreign policy was considerably reduced in September 1988, when the department was subordinated to the new International Policy Commission, headed by Aleksandr Yakovlev, a man not known for radicalism on Third World issues.⁷

A number of additional factors have contributed to the current shift in Soviet Third World policy. Domestically, the Soviet leadership faces slow economic growth and the consequent difficulty of maintaining even essential investment, such as that needed for modernization of the Soviet industrial base and military establishment, let alone sustaining comparatively expensive luxuries, such as the support of Cuba, Vietnam, and—to a lesser extent—Angola and Ethiopia. Externally, the reassertion of American power on the periphery—both in the direct use of force, as in the Persian Gulf, Libya, Lebanon, and Grenada, and in covert and not so covert support of insurgencies directed against Soviet clients, as in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua—altered the relative weights of risk, cost, and benefit faced by Soviet policy-makers in pursuing activism in the Third World and their assumptions about the durability of gains there.

Moreover, Moscow's concrete experiences in the Third World have increasingly called into question the more optimistic ideological formulations that have motivated Soviet policy. From the radical nationalists such as Ahmed Ben Bella, Gamel Abdul-Nasser, Abdul Karim Kassem, and Kwame Nkrumah, who were courted by Nikita Khrushchev (with few long-term benefits), the USSR shifted its focus to ideologically orthodox communist regimes (e.g., Cuba and Vietnam) and vanguard party regimes leading states of so-called socialist orientation (e.g., Laos, Cambodia, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, and with some qualification, Nicaragua and Grenada). However, many such regimes have proven to be chronically unstable and incapable of resolving internal security problems. Others, such as Cuba and Vietnam, have mired themselves in foreign military adventures with little prospect of success. Their economies, meanwhile, are generally in disastrous shape, partly as a result of mismanagement and partly owing to disproportionate security costs. The costs of empire are growing while, as noted above, the capacity of the USSR to bear them is not.

And the USSR appears to be gaining little from paying these costs.

By contrast, it is in the areas of limiting Western influence, establishing the Soviet right to a role in Third World politics, and securing concrete material benefits through the manipulation of traditional levers of foreign policy (arms transfers, trade, aid, and diplomacy) that the most obvious and possibly durable Soviet successes have been attained. Soviet influence over India may be limited, and Soviet control negligible, but cooperation with that country has made the USSR a recognized and important regional player in South Asia and has facilitated the expression of Soviet policy in such fora as the Nonaligned Movement. It has also arguably reduced the level of Western—particularly, American—influence in the region. This is perhaps not much of a return on a 30-year Soviet investment. But the balance sheet is arguably more positive than is that of Soviet relations with radical movements and regimes over the same period. The Soviets, at least, appear to judge matters this way. Since Gorbachev's accession to power, they have tripled the total credits extended to India and have cited Soviet relations with India as a model for Soviet policy in the Third World as a whole.⁸

Focus on Africa

It is somewhat artificial to talk about *the* Soviet perspective on regional issues in the Third World. The specialist literature, authoritative pronouncements by party and foreign ministry officials, party publications, and official statements of the Soviet telegraph agency, TASS, reflect a reasonably broad diversity of opinion, and to ignore this is to distort reality.⁹ Nonetheless, it is possible to identify dominant tendencies at any point in time.¹⁰ Developments in Africa figured strongly in the former Soviet enthusiasm for an activist Third World policy founded upon support of vanguard parties, states of socialist orientation, non-capitalist development, and proletarian internationalism.

At the height of Soviet activism, in 1975–78, the prevailing Soviet perspective on Africa was that trends there favored expansion of socialism at the expense of imperialism. Witnessing the Ethiopian revolution, the

⁸These developments are covered more fully in S. Neil MacFarlane, "Continuity and Change in Soviet Policy in the Third World under Gorbachev," Harriman Institute Forum, No. 3, 1988. See also Fukuyama, "Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy," loc. cit.

⁹For a comprehensive discussion of this diversity see the article by David Albright, "The USSR and the Third World in the 1980's," in this same issue.

¹⁰See Franklyn Griffiths, "The Sources of American Conduct," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Fall 1984, pp. 3–50.

⁷For a characterization of Yakovlev's views on the Third World, see Fukuyama, "Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy," loc. cit., p. 6.

collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Southern Africa, the growing difficulties of the Smith regime in Rhodesia, the rising violence (e.g., the Soweto Uprising) in South Africa, and growth in the number of states of socialist orientation headed by vanguard parties (the Congo, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Madagascar, Sao Tome e Principe, and Benin)—most Soviet observers “were carried away on a wave of optimism.”¹¹

Soviet observers judged that in many cases, local petit bourgeois intellectuals would be capable—relying on the support of a growing and increasingly class-conscious proletariat and a sympathetic peasantry internally and on the socialist camp externally—of taking states of socialist orientation along the path of non-capitalist development.¹² In areas where these forces were not yet sufficiently strong to take the reins of power, the same role could be played by the military, whose progressive integrative and patriotic role in African polities was underlined.¹³ Obstacles to the vanguard party model such as ethnicity, religious traditions, and the role of kinship groupings in traditional African politics and society were seen, not as serious problems, but as survivals of a past already well on the way to oblivion.

In the prevailing Soviet view, “scientific socialism”—with its focus on the role of the public sector in agricultural and industrial development, on heavy industry as a motor of the development process, and on nationalization of private property—provided a theoretical and practical basis for political, social, and economic development in Africa.¹⁴ By contrast, capitalist orientation and reliance on aid from and trade with the imperialist states was a recipe for neo-colonial dependence and stagnation. According to this view, the USSR and the socialist camp could fill the role hitherto played by inter-

national capital in the external economic relations and internal economic development of the African states.¹⁵

Beyond an economic role, the USSR showed itself willing to assume substantial military responsibilities in the region as well. Commentaries from the mid-1970's frequently refer to Soviet military assistance to new socialist-oriented states and to national liberation movements that were continuing the struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism in Southern Africa. Some even suggested a willingness to assume a direct military role in the defense of such states against external aggression.¹⁶ Similar commitments were implicit in the various treaties of friendship and cooperation signed with states of socialist orientation (e.g., Angola and Ethiopia), which included clauses providing for consultation and coordinated response in the event of a threat to the security of either party.¹⁷

This munificence was related to the Soviet assessments of the sources of conflict in Africa and of how conflict in Africa affected the central relationship between the USSR and the US. With regard to the first, the Soviets tended to see local conflict in Africa as a product not of deep, sustained contradictions within African societies, but of interference on the part of international imperialism.¹⁸ Given its assumption that the position of imperialism in Africa was inexorably deteriorating, this assessment led to an underestimation of the complexity and hence protracted nature of civil and interstate conflict in the African region.

With regard to US-Soviet relations, the dominant Soviet view was that although conflict in Africa was both a product and a manifestation of the global struggle between capitalism and socialism, there was no linkage between this peripheral competition and the conduct of the central relationship between the superpowers. Whatever was going on in Africa or elsewhere in the Third World, both sides had a concrete interest in arms

¹¹From a personal conversation with a Soviet scholar. An example is Ye. Tarabrin, “Africa at a New Stage in the Liberation Struggle,” *MEIMO*, No. 2, 1979, pp. 37, 38, and passim.

¹²The path of socialist orientation refers to the broad array of policies in the political, economic, social, and cultural areas designed to prepare for the transition to socialism. The non-capitalist path of development generally refers more narrowly to policy in the economic sphere. Some authors, however, (e.g., R. Ul'yanovskiy) have used the terms synonymously.

¹³See, for example, V. S. Yag'ya, “Revolutionary Changes in Ethiopia,” *Narody Azii i Afriki* (Moscow), No. 6, 1975, pp. 17–18; V. Ya. Katsman and V. V. Pavlova, “Tendencies in the Development of Countries of Socialist Orientation in Africa,” *ibid.*, No. 4, 1975, p. 216; Yu. Irkhin, “Ethiopia on the Path of Socialist Orientation,” *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (Moscow—hereafter, KVS), No. 2, 1979, pp. 81–85. This enthusiasm was not, however, universal. See V. Yordanskiy's criticism of Z. Gafurov's positive treatment of the Third World's military in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4, 1976, p. 161.

¹⁴See V. Solodovnikov, “Africa—A New Stage in the Struggle,” *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'* (Moscow—hereafter, MZ), No. 4, 1976, p. 133; V. Korovikov, “What's New in Ancient Ethiopia,” *MZ*, No. 2, 1977, p. 127; Ye. Tarabrin, “Africa: The Liberation Struggle and the Intrigues of Imperialism,” *MEIMO*, No. 6, 1980, p. 69; A. A. Gromyko, “Africa in World Development and Problems of Soviet Africanists,” *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 3, 1980, pp. 7–9.

¹⁵See V. V. Vinnik, “Neo-colonialism in the Agriculture of the Ivory Coast,” *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4, 1975, pp. 142–43; S. Balashov, “Tendencies in the Development of Kenya's Economy,” *MEIMO*, No. 3, 1978, pp. 121–22; Tarabrin “Africa at a New Stage in the Liberation Struggle,” *loc. cit.*, pp. 44–45; N. Gavrilov, “The Face of Africa Is Changing,” *MZ*, No. 6, 1980, p. 40.

The Soviets pointed to the experience in development of peripheral regions of the USSR as a model for development in Africa. See, for example, A. A. Gromyko, “The Imperialist Threat to the Countries of Africa,” *MZ*, No. 6, 1981, p. 43.

¹⁶See A. Orlov, “The Armed Struggle of the Peoples of Africa,” *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 12, 1975, pp. 110–11.

¹⁷For a text of the Soviet-Angolan Treaty, see *Pravda*, Oct. 9, 1976, pp. 1–2. The treaty is translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, FBIS-SOV), Oct. 12, 1976, pp. H/1–4. See, in particular, Article 7.

¹⁸A. Koshelev, “A Country of a Young Revolution,” *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 6, 1978, pp. 112–13; Tarabrin, “Africa at a New Stage in the Liberation Struggle,” *loc. cit.*, p. 74; Yu. Gavrilov, “Angola: Standing Up for Independence,” *MZ*, No. 2, 1976, pp. 129–31; S. Borisov, “Africa in the Strategic Schemes of Imperialism,” *KVS*, No. 13, 1980, p. 79.

control, economic exchange, and the stabilization of the European theater. As such, questions of détente between states could be dissociated from questions of class struggle (of which Soviet support for the revolutionary process in Africa was a part).¹⁹ This implied that the potential costs of forward military policies in Africa were lower than they might otherwise be or, in fact, actually were.

Since the mid-1970's, much has changed in Soviet perspectives on African politics. In part, this evolution has been a manifestation of the broader trends in Soviet Third World policy noted above. However, it has also reflected the Soviet Union's accumulated experience of maintaining relations with specific states of socialist orientation and with "Marxist" national liberation movements on the African continent. Indeed, this experience may have itself contributed to the overall evolution of Soviet thinking on relations with the Third World.

For one thing, the Soviets have learned from their experience in Africa that the vanguard party model of political organization is not particularly appropriate in African states facing serious ethnic division, regional disparities, and low levels of politicization of the very groups that the party purportedly depends on. Efforts at controlled political mobilization have largely failed owing not to only to a lack of political expertise, but also to high levels of apathy, if not hostility, toward party workers who challenge traditional political and social structures. Ethnic and regional insurgencies that have plagued the revolutionary regimes of Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique show little sign of dissipating. Although external assistance has unquestionably played a role in sustaining insurgencies against Soviet friends in these countries, the conflicts in at least Angola and Ethiopia seem to stem from deep indigenous roots and hence to belie the orthodox Soviet interpretation of them as the product of imperialist meddling.

Moreover, the supposedly democratic centralist vanguard parties have been riven with factional disputes—the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) being the most notable example. In effect, there is a very broad gap between the theory and practice of political organization in the African socialist

states, which has led many to question the applicability of scientific socialism to Africa.²⁰

The economic performance of states attempting to implement the non-capitalist agenda through large-scale nationalization and central planning has hardly matched the rosy predictions of their Soviet and East European advisers. And although chronic internal insecurity has played a role, even Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos acknowledged last August—in a speech announcing widespread economic reform—that the poor results also stem from mismanagement and bureaucratization.²¹ Meanwhile, several "national democratic states" (e.g., Guinea, Zambia, and to some degree, Tanzania) have begun to pull back from the more extreme of their experiments with socialism and to expand the roles of the private sector and of foreign enterprise in their national economies.

The "international socialist division of labor" has proven no substitute for the international capitalist economy. Soviet and East European policy-makers have realized that they do not have the resources to subsidize the economic development of their African allies (hence the refusal of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance to admit Mozambique in 1981). Disillusioned with the quantity and quality of Soviet developmental assistance, Mozambique and other states have turned to the West for assistance. In 1985, Ethiopia had to rely on Western donors for famine relief because the USSR was either unable or unwilling to provide substantial food assistance. Moreover, Soviet trade relations with its African allies have often been exploitative, fishing agreements being the most notable example,²² and both Cuba and the Soviet Union drained the Angolan treasury of foreign exchange to pay for military operations there.²³

²⁰For an early commentary along these lines, see Kenneth Jowitt, "Scientific Socialist Regimes in Africa: Political Differentiation, Avoidance, and Unawareness," in Carl Rosberg and Thomas Callaghy, Eds., *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Berkeley, CA, Institute of International Studies, 1979, p. 133. Jowitt begins his discussion with this comment: "Currently there are a number of self-designated 'scientific socialist' and 'Marxist-Leninist' regimes in Africa. Their most striking feature is the absence of ideological commitments, developmental strategies, and institutional developments consistent with their formal identity." Although this statement is somewhat exaggerated, it is perhaps significant that it meets with wide agreement in Moscow today.

²¹Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese, *FBIS-AFR*, Aug. 19, 1987, p. D/1.

²²On the fishing question in Soviet-Angolan relations, see John Marcum, "Angola: A Quarter Century of War," *CSIS Africa Notes* (Washington, DC), Dec. 21, 1984, p. 2.

²³By 1987, the war absorbed over half the Angolan budget. *Strategic Survey 1986-87*, London, IISS, 1987, p. 190. See also, Colin Legum, Ed., *Africa Contemporary Record 1982-83*, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1984, pp. 593-94, 605-06.

¹⁹See L. Brezhnev, "Report to the Central Committee and the Party's Immediate Tasks in the Fields of Domestic and Foreign Policy," *Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1976, as translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), Mar. 24, 1976, p. 14; Yu. Alimov, "Recidivists of Colonialism," *Kommunist*, No. 9, 1978, p. 109; S. Madzoyevskiy, "The South African Junction of World Politics," *MEIMO*, No. 7, 1977, p. 20.

More generally, see S. N. MacFarlane, "The Soviet Conception of Regional Security," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), April 1985, pp.302-04; and S. N. MacFarlane, *The USSR and Arms Control: The Soviet View of Linkage*, Ottawa, Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1987, passim.



A Soviet-type Mi-25 helicopter gunship prepares for take-off near Cuito Cuanavale in 1988.

—Camera Press.

In the meantime, the Angolans in particular have learned that the only significant producers of capital resources in their country are the much vilified Western multinational corporations. It has been oil revenue generated by the likes of Gulf and, subsequently, Chevron that has allowed the Angolans to prosecute their civil conflict for a decade without incurring substantial debt to the USSR and Cuba for security assistance.

In contrast to the sorry record in the socialist-oriented states, real growth did appear to be occurring, if haltingly and in a somewhat distorted fashion, in states such as Kenya, the Ivory Coast, and, with some qualifications, Nigeria, which had eschewed socialist or quasi-socialist strategies of development, preferring instead close involvement with the international capitalist economy and the stimulation of an indigenous private sector.

Hence, the socialist orientation as originally conceived by the Soviets and their African interlocutors has proven to be a recipe, not for political stability, civil peace, and rapid, balanced, independent growth, but for poverty, civil strife, and continuing neo-colonial dependency. And this has occurred at considerable and growing cost to the USSR, in a setting where Moscow's local clients have little of value that could be hauled away.

The Soviets have also learned from their African experience that the imperialist states were still capable of

reasonably effective defense of allied regimes in Africa. Since the late 1970's, the French, in particular, have repeatedly demonstrated (in Shaba, in the Central African Republic, and, increasingly, in Chad) a willingness to defend their own (and, by extension, Western) interests in Francophone Africa. In both the Shaban and Chadian cases, the United States provided considerable and crucial logistical support, suggesting that earlier assessments of American impotence were premature. The capacity of the French and the United States to involve sympathetic African states (e.g., Morocco, Zaire, and Senegal) in operations of this type has indicated to Moscow that undifferentiated appraisals of the anti-imperialist character of the African community as a whole²⁴ were questionable.

Even where further advances have been registered in the process of liberation in Southern Africa, as in Zimbabwe, the results have not been to Soviet liking. In the Zimbabwean case, the British engineered a negotiated settlement that resulted in the victory of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in free elections and consigned the USSR's favored candidate—the Zimba-

²⁴Ye. Tarabrin, "The Developing World in the International Arena," *MZ*, No. 9, 1975, p. 137; V. Vinogradov, "Africa: The Eradication of Racism—The Most Important Task," *MZ*, No. 8, 1976, p. 130; Tarabrin, "Africa: The Liberation Struggle and the Intrigues of Imperialism," loc. cit., pp. 37, 38, 40.

bwe African People's Union (ZAPU)—to a secondary role in Zimbabwean politics.

Finally, the Soviets have learned that the gains made through Moscow's military support of revolutionary movements and regimes have carried substantial costs in the central relationship between the USSR and the US. The historical record suggests that Soviet "expansionism" in the Third World affected the American leadership's perceptions of the desirability of détente and influenced American domestic politics in such a way as to make the advocacy of détente costly to its proponents.

In light of ample evidence from the region to suggest that the rigid ideological perspective of the USSR on Africa characteristic of the mid-1970's was inadequate as a guide to action in the region, Soviet Africanists have begun a thorough critical reevaluation of most if not all of those earlier postulates.²⁵ Optimistic assessments gave way to statements of concern about the resurgence of imperialism and the substantial and growing Western military presence in the region. Although such expressions of alarm were already heard during the Shaba interventions of 1977–78,²⁶ these grew in urgency in the early 1980's with the growth and success of French and South African military activity against what the Soviets construed to be progressive forces in Africa and with the expansion of the American military presence on the Indian Ocean littoral associated with the Rapid Deployment Force. By the mid-1980's, Soviet literature on Africa gave little impression of confidence that trends in the region were moving in the Soviet direction.

Not only was the path of socialist orientation judged by the Soviets to be considerably more rocky than anticipated, but it was even found to be reversible. The vanguard parties were criticized for the unscientific, subjective, and idealistic character of their approach to the task, and for a potentially fatal inability to mobilize the masses in their support. The factionalism that plagued their internal politics was also criticized.²⁷ So-

viet commentators also took more heed of the obstacles to the transition to socialist development represented by traditional modalities of social and economic organization in African states, and their ideological reflection in religion and tribalism.²⁸ Creation of a monopoly of political power in the hands of a centralized single party came to be viewed as an ideal for the distant future, and the stress turned to advocacy of more cautious efforts to win over the less enthusiastic parts of African societies through policies of ethnic reconciliation, regional autonomy, and the construction of broad national fronts.²⁹

Some authors even concluded that the trend in African politics was toward expansion of capitalist rather than of non-capitalist structures and relations of production. Local governments were advised to be cautious about or even, in certain cases, to reverse policies of nationalization. The national bourgeoisie and private sector were rediscovered as sources of national economic development, and even foreign direct investment and participation in world trade—if properly controlled—was seen as providing a potential boost to the development process. In a word, dissociation from the Western-dominated international capitalist economy was not a viable course for Africans.³⁰ The USSR itself was in no position to fully fund the development of its Third World allies.³¹

²⁷A. A. Gromyko and G. Starushenko, "Urgent Questions in the Development of Africa," *Kommunist*, No. 2, 1980, p. 119; Irkhin, loc. cit., p. 83; Yu. Sumbantyan, "Thresholds of Struggle and Creation," *KVS*, No. 16, 1984, p. 84; Yu. Gavrilov, "Problems in the Formation of a Vanguard Party in Countries of Socialist Orientation," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 6, 1980, pp. 12–13, and passim; Yu. Osipov and Yu. Cherkasov, "Socio-economic Problems and Prospects for the Development of Africa," *MEIMO*, No. 8, 1985, pp. 56, 69–70. These last authors criticize previous Soviet uncritical optimism vis-à-vis socialist orientation and non-capitalist development in Africa, a point also often made privately by Soviet Africanists. For more general analyses, see V. Vasiliyev, "Some Questions of Socialist Orientation," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1986, pp. 16–17, 20; and A. Vasiliyev, "The Liberated Countries: The Realities and Paradoxes of Development," *Kommunist*, No. 6, 1988, pp. 117–18, 119–20.

²⁸V. Yordanskiy, "Tropical Africa: The Dynamics of National Self-Consciousness," *MEIMO*, No. 1, 1980, pp. 111–21; V. Vasiliyev, loc. cit., p. 17; A. Vasiliyev, loc. cit., pp. 121–22.

The Soviet approach to the Third World has generally suffered from an underestimation of the significance of traditional, non-class factors in developing societies. On this point, see G. Mirskiy, "On the Question of the Developing Countries' Selection of Their Path and Orientation," *MEIMO*, No. 5, 1987, p. 71. See also S. Tikhvinskiy's critique of Soviet historiography, and in particular its inattention to religion as a social force, in "Some Questions About the Work of Soviet Historians," *Voprosy Istorii* (Moscow), No. 12, 1986, p. 6.

²⁹For example, V. Vasiliyev, loc. cit., p. 19.

³⁰G. Smirnov, "Peculiarities of the Processes of Reproduction in the Liberated Countries of Africa," *MEIMO*, No. 7, 1986, p. 129; A. Vasiliyev, loc. cit., pp. 119–21; Mirskiy, loc. cit., pp. 72, 76, 80; Yu. Fedorov, "The Ivory Coast," *MZ*, No. 8, 1986, pp. 151–12. These findings with regard to Africa confirm Elizabeth Valkenier's more general discussion of Soviet attitudes on economic development (op. cit.).

²⁵This reformulation has been accompanied by trenchant critiques of Soviet African studies for ignorance of the region, for a tendency to apply concepts developed for the analysis of European society to the much different conditions of Africa, and for uncritical and simplistic optimism regarding prospects for political, social, and economic development in the region. See, inter alia, Boris Asoyan "Africa: It's Really Not That Distant," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Nov. 7, 1987, p. 14; and idem, "Half-Truth? Half-Lie!" *ibid.*, July 6, 1988, p. 14.

Asoyan is a high foreign ministry official with responsibilities for Southern Africa. He recently served as chargé d'affaires in Lesotho, a position of considerable importance in the context of Soviet attempts to improve intelligence from and communication with South Africa (see below).

²⁶See Alimov, loc. cit., pp. 109, 114; Borisov, loc. cit., p. 79; V. Smirnov, "A Movement of Solidarity: Forum in Addis Ababa," *MZ*, No. 9, 1978, p. 124.

Today, it appears that Moscow is redefining its role in the Third World in the field of national security as well. Soviet scholars now emphasize that the principal responsibility for defending a revolution lies with the revolution itself.³² This new approach suggests some reassessment by Moscow of the difficulties of consolidating and defending African revolutions, and of the potential costs of getting involved in such a process.³³ This is combined with a reasonably clear reassessment of the costs that Soviet military actions in the Third World have for relations with the United States and its allies at a time when these relations have become particularly significant for Soviet policy-makers.³⁴

Armed with a more realistic appraisal of what is possible in Africa and of the costs of pursuing one or another goal, Moscow has arguably drawn back from the activism that characterized its relations with in the continent in the second half of the 1970's.

Moscow and Southern African Security in the 1970's

The evolution of the Soviet discussion of Southern African security in the 1970's parallels rather closely the general trends noted above, but it was also strongly influenced by events specific to the sub-region. In analyzing this evolution, I shall focus on three areas of Soviet discussion: the prospects for liberation struggles in Southern Africa; the role of the West in the politics of the area; and the Soviet approach to conflict resolution.

Regarding liberation struggles, Soviet authors of the 1970's found considerable grounds for optimism in the collapse of the Portuguese Empire and the incapacity of the United States and its alleged local proxy, South Africa, to prevent the establishment of states of socialist orientation in its place in Angola and Mozambique. These developments were seen by the authors as symptomatic of a dramatic deterioration in the position

of imperialism, and as auguring well for the future resolution on terms favorable to the Soviet Union of the area's continuing security problems—notably the fate of the revolutionary process in Namibia and South Africa itself.³⁵ The heating up of the war in Zimbabwe, in which a movement—ZAPU—closely associated with the USSR was playing a significant part, seemed to confirm the prospect of a decline in Western influence in Southern Africa.

Evidence of South African interest in stabilizing its position in the region through a process of dialogue with its neighbors was interpreted by Soviet authors as a sign of weakness. Pretoria's temporary cooperation with the United Nations in the attempt to resolve the Namibian question in 1977–78 was also perceived to be evidence of a lack of staying power on the part of the only remaining significant outpost of imperialism and reaction in Southern Africa.³⁶

The internal security of Angola was not initially a focus of discussion for the Soviets, because in the early years after independence, there was not a great deal of activity on the part of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the remnants of the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA). Nor did Moscow's collaborators Cuba and Angola show much concern about the possibility of renewed South African military activity, judging from the alacrity with which the Angolans—presumably with Soviet approval—established ANC training camps within Angola and granted sanctuaries in Southern Angola to SWAPO guerrillas operating into Namibia.³⁷ Presumably, Soviet optimism concerning states of socialist orientation extended to Angola and Mozambique, although there was little specific comment in Soviet journals about pursuit of this path by these two Southern African states.³⁸

The Soweto Uprising and associated disorders within South Africa were seen as a product of the success of liberation movements elsewhere in the region and suggested to Soviet observers that the apartheid re-

³¹This position, first enunciated by the late General Secretary Yuri Andropov, is enshrined in the "The CPSU Party Program." See *Pravda*, Mar. 7, 1986, as translated in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 10, 1986, p. O/3; also, V. Vasiliev, loc. cit., p. 21.

³²This line of argument began to appear after the successful Western intervention in Shaba. See, for example, Alimov, loc. cit., p. 115. As shall be seen below, in specific instances (e.g., Angola in 1986–87) where client regimes are clearly threatened by a hostile power, Soviet statements of support have continued to be rather explicit.

³³In this reassessment of prospects in Africa, some Soviet analysts have questioned the applicability of the Soviet model, or in some cases, even Marxism-Leninism itself to the problems of political and economic development. See Mirskiy, loc. cit., p. 71.

³⁴See fn. 6 above.

³⁵I. Neklessa, "Liquidating the Remnants of the Colonial System," *MZ*, No. 3, 1975, p. 44; A. Tamarin, "Calculations and Miscalculations of Imperialists in Africa," *Kommunist*, No. 18, 1976, pp. 96–97.

³⁶B. Fetisov, "Namibia: The Colonizers Are Stubborn," *MZ*, No. 7, 1975, p. 131; A. Boretskiy, "Namibia," *MZ*, No. 6, 1978, pp. 127–28.

³⁷See John Marcum, "Angola," *Survival* (London), No. 1, 1988, pp. 5–6.

³⁸This may relate to the fact that Soviet links to FRELIMO in Mozambique had been strained in the pre-liberation period by the close ties of that liberation movement to China. In the Angolan case, it may suggest the continuing effects of problems in the Soviet relationship with the MPLA dating to the early 1970's—when the USSR ceased its support to Agostinho Neto's faction—and the movement's continuing problem of disunity typified by the Nito Alves coup in 1977. Reported Soviet acquiescence in or support of the coup—if true—presumably reflected Soviet reservations about the reliability and effectiveness of Neto.



Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) during an October 25, 1984, press conference at the USSR Foreign Ministry in Moscow.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

gime was weakening internally.³⁹ Although Soviet scholars expressed reservations about the apparently racist quality of Black Consciousness—a major ideological current underlying the events of the period in South Africa—the upsurge of popular unrest served the purposes of the revolution nonetheless and was perceived in highly positive terms.⁴⁰ The ANC was seen as the leading force or vanguard of South African revolution,⁴¹ a force that, like the MPLA in Angola and FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) in Mozambique, would lead a new South Africa along a path of socialist orientation.

Soviet scholars all but denied the prospect of reform in South Africa, given the perceived monolithic reactionary stance of the ruling Afrikaners. Under these conditions, Soviet observers saw violent revolution and the complete destruction of the apartheid system as necessary preconditions of liberation there.⁴² This emphasis on the dismantlement of—rather than negotiation with—the regime arguably suggested a Soviet belief in the imminence of significant revolutionary change. Consequently, they apparently saw no need to

broaden the ANC's organizational base through collaboration with less radical opposition groups; it would suffice for the ANC to stick to links with its close comrade-in-arms, the South African Communist Party.

Likewise, Namibia was perceived as a land to be liberated by the vanguard of the revolution—SWAPO—with gun in hand, a liberation that was expected to serve as a basis for transition to the path of socialist orientation. Other potential collaborators were largely ignored, and Soviet writers seemed convinced that the only way the South African government could be brought to accept independence for that territory was through violence.⁴³ Confident in the ability of SWAPO to make the revolution and in the limited capacity of South Africa to prevent it, the Soviet Union had little interest in efforts at conflict resolution.

How did the Soviets view the role of the West in the area (an important subject given the efforts of the Contact Group—the US, Canada, Great Britain, France and West Germany—from the mid-1970's seeking to achieve Namibian independence, Anglo-American initiatives on Zimbabwe, and the initiative of American diplomat Chester Crocker on Angola and Namibia)? During the late 1970's and much of the early 1980's, Soviet writers viewed the West monolithically, making few distinctions among the policies of France, Britain, the United States, and West Germany. In political terms, the objectives of the Western states were viewed as more or less identical and strongly informed by the global struggle between the socialist and capitalist world systems. In Southern Africa, Western nations were thought to be intent on slowing or reversing the revolutionary process, with a view to retaining access to raw materials, ensuring the continuing neo-colonial dependency of the independent states of the region, and protecting investments in South Africa itself. Although it was accepted that Western states occasionally competed in investment, marketing, and the quest for access to scarce resources, on the fundamental issues of holding back the process of liberation and prevent-

³⁹[Yusuf Dadoo], "Overseas Guests Speak," *Kommunist*, No. 8, 1976, p. 80; V. Gorodnov, "The Republic of South Africa: Deepening of the Crisis and Sharpening of the Struggle," *MEiMO*, No. 4, 1977, pp. 122–28.

⁴⁰On Black Consciousness, see A. Makarov, " 'Black Consciousness' and the Liberation Movement in South Africa," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2, 1975, pp. 34–35, 37–38; A. B. Davidson, "Whither South Africa?" *ibid.*, No. 2, 1978, pp. 15–17.

⁴¹K. Mikhaylov, "The Republic of South Africa," *MZ*, No. 6, 1978, p. 152.

⁴²Dadoo, *loc. cit.*, p. 80; V. Kremenyuk, "In the Name of National Liberation," *MEiMO*, No. 9, 1976, p. 143.

⁴³"The People of Namibia Carry on the Struggle," *KVS*, No. 3, 1978, p. 85; A. Kiselev, "The Peoples of Namibia in the Struggle Against Racist Regimes," *ibid.*, No. 23, 1979, p. 84; Tarabrin, "Africa: The Liberation Struggle and the Intrigues of Imperialism," p. 46.

ing Soviet access to the region, they were thought to be at one.

There is little evidence in Soviet commentary on the international relations of the region that Moscow recognized differences between South Africa and the Western powers on basic political issues. The South Africans were labeled the local agent of the imperialist powers in the efforts of the latter to sustain their position. Western policies apparently directed against South Africa (e.g., the arms embargo and, later, economic sanctions) were either dismissed as subterfuges designed to mask the essential Western-South African entente, or else were viewed as reluctant and basically insubstantial cosmetic responses to overwhelming international antipathy toward apartheid.⁴⁴

Moscow apparently saw little prospect, or need, for multilateral efforts at resolving conflicts in the region, and Soviet observers criticized Western efforts to this end.⁴⁵ In Angola, the problem seemed to be one of mopping up after the MPLA victory. In Namibia, there seemed little likelihood of South African or Western negotiations.⁴⁶ Soviet commentators were also consistently critical of efforts at a negotiated settlement during the period leading up to the Lancaster House Agreement on Rhodesia and came around to support the outcome only after the talks had been concluded.⁴⁷

Lessons of Experience

Developments in Southern Africa proved Soviet analysis and prognosis regarding Southern African security deficient on a number of counts. First, the reappearance of UNITA after retraining by South African forces in Namibia, the movement's reasonably rapid success in establishing a secure base area in southeastern Angola under South African air cover, and the resulting deterioration of the internal security situation in southern and central Angola drew into question the previous confidence of the Angolans and their Soviet patrons concerning the durability of the MPLA victory. Repeated South African incursions into southwestern Angola—ostensibly in retaliation for SWAPO raids launched

from Angola into Namibia—and the establishment by South Africa of a security zone along the Namibian frontier inside Angola reinforced this impression.

Matters were still worse in Mozambique, where the South African-supported Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) succeeded in the early 1980's in contesting FRELIMO control over increasingly large sections of the countryside and seriously damaging Mozambican infrastructure and agricultural production. There was, finally, evidence to suggest that elements of the South African security establishment were involved in efforts to destabilize Zimbabwe.⁴⁸

These developments highlighted a more significant Soviet misjudgment—an underestimation of the continuing and growing military strength of South Africa and of Pretoria's willingness to use it. South Africa's military forces went through a period of rapid expansion during the late 1970's and early 1980's, to the point where they exceeded both qualitatively and quantitatively the combined forces of the frontline states. In 1983, for example, South Africa's total mobilizable strength (404,500) was almost four times the size of its neighbors' combined armed forces. Its military expenditures came close to exceeding that of the frontline states by a factor of two. It had 180 more combat aircraft than its neighbors together and also had a greater number of main battle tanks than the other countries of the region combined.⁴⁹

Much of this armament came from an impressive indigenous defense industry centered on the publicly-run Armaments Corporation. The republic attained self-sufficiency in the production of small arms and small-arms ammunition. It produced its own armored cars and armored personnel carriers in considerable quantities, and helicopters and jets under license, and it benefited from substantial cooperation with Israel in the production of small missile systems. Some experts have favorably compared South African-produced systems with similar systems produced in the major arms producing countries.⁵⁰ This development not only defeated the intent of the 1977 UN-sponsored arms embargo, but greatly reduced South African vulnerability to external sanctions on arms transfers.

In the 1980's, South Africa deployed these forces in a wide array of situations in neighboring states. Opera-

⁴⁴See Yu. Bochkarev and G. Starushenko's review of A. Urnov, *Politika YuAR v Afrike* (The Policy of the UAR in Africa), Moscow, Nauka, 1982, in *Kommunist*, No. 5, 1983, p. 128; Kiselev, loc. cit., pp. 82–83; Tarabrin, "Africa in the Global Strategy of Imperialism," *MEIMO*, No. 2, 1982, p. 30.

⁴⁵See, for example, A. Klimov, "Changes in the Political Map and the Maneuvers of the Racists," *MZ*, No. 5, 1975, pp. 152–54; R. Vasiliev, "The Old Fetters of the 'New Politics,'" *MZ*, No. 11, 1976, pp. 127–28; A. Runov, "The Agony of a Racist Regime," *ibid.*, No. 12, 1976, p. 76.

⁴⁶See Solodovnikov, loc. cit., p. 135.

⁴⁷V. Mikhin, "Rhodesia: The Struggle Against Racism Goes On," *MZ*, No. 10, 1979, p. 124.

⁴⁸See Jennifer Whitaker, "Pretoria's Wars," *The New York Times*, Jan. 21, 1983; and Colin Legum, "The Southern African Crisis," *Legum*, op. cit., pp. 19–20.

⁴⁹Data derived from *The Military Balance 1983–84*, London, IISS, 1983. This imbalance has eroded somewhat since 1983 as a result of the massive buildup of the Angolan armed forces by the Soviets.

⁵⁰See the analysis of Bernard Trainor in *The New York Times*, Aug. 25, 1988.

tions in Angola, already noted, grew to considerable proportions, involving direct confrontation with the bulk of the Angolan armed forces in the air and on the ground in 1985–87. There were also South African commando raids into Zambia, Mozambique, and Lesotho, and air raids into Mozambique. Meanwhile, South African counterinsurgency efforts in Namibia had succeeded by 1987 in containing SWAPO incursions to a rather narrow strip along the Angolan frontier.⁵¹

Moscow also underestimated the ability of the South Africans to contain, with relative ease it turned out, the internal disorders of the mid-1970's and restore a degree of stability that lasted into the early 1980's. True, the constitutional reform of 1983 that granted limited political power to the colored and Asian communities while continuing to exclude blacks from meaningful political participation brought a renewal of internal opposition centered in the United Democratic Front and—in the townships—the “comrades” (informally organized groups of radical youth seeking to destroy white-dominated structures of administration in black areas and to replace them with structures of power emanating from the people themselves). These new challenges, too, were contained, if not destroyed, by the declaration of two successive states of emergency (the second remaining in effect to this day), by the intervention of the South African Defence Force (SADF) in the townships in an urban counterinsurgency campaign that met with considerable success, and, ultimately, by the virtual banning of the United Democratic Front early in 1988.

Excessive Soviet optimism concerning prospects in Southern Africa was in turn linked to a third misjudgment, namely an underestimation of the degree to which the Western powers, particularly the United States, were willing to reassert themselves in the region. The Western intervention in southeastern Zaire has already been mentioned. This was followed eight years later by the decision of the Reagan Administration to resume direct military assistance to UNITA and by the decision of the US Congress to rescind its prohibition of such activities in Angola. The weapons—notably, advanced anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems—had a crucial impact on the balance of forces within Angola, making it impossible for the Angolans to resolve their civil dispute. In political terms, this assistance meant that the USSR could not count on the acquiescence or neutrality of the Western powers in its attempts to implement its regional agenda.

On the other hand, implementation of sanctions by

the Western powers, particularly the United States, and the gradual divestiture of American and other Western holdings in South Africa suggested that to equate Western and South African interests in the region was lacking in sophistication, and that there might indeed be a degree of common ground between Soviet and American interests in the region.

These developments brought a number of significant modifications in the Soviet approach to security in Southern Africa. Optimism regarding the inexorability of “positive” trends in regional politics largely disappeared or was relegated to the very long term. Now, regional events were rarely linked to an overall positive change in the correlation of forces between socialism and imperialism. Instead, with the passage of time, Soviet scholars and spokesmen have tended to depict the conflict in the area as divorced from the overall struggle between East and West.⁵²

This extends to analysis of the sources of conflict in the region: the attribution of the conflict to the machinations of imperialist powers has been replaced by a stress on the significance of local factors in stimulating and perpetuating such disputes. In the words of one Soviet source:

*... the situation in Southern Africa is considered not in the light of a confrontation between East and West The current conflict in this area of the world is, primarily, the result of development of [the] internal socioeconomic and political process in the region, the natural consequence of [the] decay of the exhausted vicious system of social relations itself.*⁵³

One might plausibly interpret such remarks as a Soviet desire to distance the USSR from the disputes in Southern Africa. By detaching regional issues from the global struggle between capitalism and socialism, moreover, Moscow absolves itself of responsibility to sustain its involvement and provides a means for minimizing the significance of any defeats that might occur in the region.

Enthusiasm about conflict in Southern Africa has been supplanted by expressions of concern about the possibility that regional disputes might escalate.⁵⁴

⁵²See, for example S. Kozitskiy's criticism of Winrich Kuhne for having cast the Southern African conflict in “East-West” terms. Kozitskiy goes on to note that the Soviet Union opposes the transformation of Africa into an arena of confrontation with the West. *MZ*, No. 12, 1986, p. 135.

⁵³Viktor Goncharov, “The Soviet Union and Southern Africa: Issues of Ensuring Regional Security,” *Southern Africa Record* (Braamfontein, Transvaal), Nos. 47/48, 1987, p. 78. See also Mikhail Gorbachev, as cited in D. Volsky, “Regional Conflicts and Washington's Globalism,” *New Times* (Moscow), No. 1, 1986, p. 19.

⁵⁴G. Starushenko, *Problems of Struggle Against Racism, Apartheid, and Colonialism in South Africa*, Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences, Africa

⁵¹Interviews in South Africa, January 1988.

Since, realistically speaking, it is difficult to believe that the Soviets are seriously concerned about such escalation in current circumstances, one must look for a subtext to this argument. At least two are plausible. Expressed concern over escalation can serve as a justification for restraint and inaction. Moreover, as shall be discussed below, it serves to justify collaborative efforts to seek regional settlements that might stabilize current allies while safeguarding and legitimizing a Soviet role in regional affairs.

Soviet analysis has become more critical of Angola, in line with the more general disillusionment with the states of socialist orientation. Moreover, Moscow has been nudging Angola toward negotiated compromise with the UNITA guerrillas. Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin was recently quoted as calling explicitly for negotiations between the MPLA and UNITA (including Savimbi) to resolve the internal Angolan dispute,⁵⁵ thereby overcoming Soviet reluctance to make such efforts public.

Enthusiasm concerning the imminence of a successful revolution in South Africa itself has grown rare, largely replaced with a more level-headed awareness of the staying power of the South African regime. Advocacy of violence as a means for achieving revolutionary transformation within South Africa has become more muted. Growing Soviet interest in the process of constitutional reform within the country suggests an awareness of the necessity to deal with the incumbent regime rather than supplant it. Soviet discussions of the prospects for South African reform occasionally have gone well beyond the ANC position in willingness to address the fears of the white community.⁵⁶ Soviet commentators recently have tended to suggest postponing implementation of the more radical reforms (of the socialist-orientation type) and to insist on the necessity for the prolonged existence of a substantial private sector

within a mixed South African economy.⁵⁷

This approach suggests a desire to adopt positions that might have some attraction to dominant groups within South Africa. It also indicates growing awareness that rapid implementation of socialist reform is a recipe for disaster and might well create a new burden for the Soviets to carry at a time they were having trouble coping with their existing ones.

This growing interest in negotiated reform as a basis for political change within South Africa required some reassessment of the character of the white community because it presumed the existence of viable interlocutors among white South Africans. And, indeed, the Soviet literature of the mid-1980's displays a growing attentiveness to the plurality of perspectives in the white community,⁵⁸ and even within Afrikanerdom itself. In a recent article, Boris Asoyan, a prominent Soviet journalist and foreign ministry official who recently served in Lesotho, noted that not all the reforms implemented by the government of Pieter Botha could be dismissed as propaganda, since a number of them contained positive substance.⁵⁹ This suggests at least some willingness to entertain the possibility that the system is capable of reform.

Elsewhere, Soviet analysts have displayed considerable interest in and have endorsed the kinds of consultation such as occurred between white liberals from South Africa and the ANC in Dakar three years ago. Asoyan appeared to be using his posting to Maseru as a means of cultivating Soviet links with moderate white South Africans.⁶⁰ Unconfirmed reports persist that the USSR has complemented this broadening of its perspectives on South African domestic politics with informal diplomatic contacts with the South African government itself.⁶¹

This tentative exploration of the possibility of dialogue and interest in identifying viable participants in such a dialogue are related to evidence of a certain amount of disillusionment with the ANC and its sister Namibian organization, SWAPO. It is plausible that Gleb Starushenko's call for more creative thinking on

Institute, 1986, p. 3; Goncharov, "The Soviet Union and Southern Africa . . .," loc. cit., p. 77; "Soviet-Angolan Joint Communiqué," TASS in Russian for abroad, May 10, 1986, translated in *Summary of World Broadcasts* (London, BBC—hereafter, SWB), SWB/SU/8257/A5/1, May 13, 1986.

⁵⁵See *The Los Angeles Times*, Aug. 12, 1988. This is the latest episode in what appears to be a Soviet effort to encourage the MPLA to solve its dispute with UNITA that dates at least to the beginning of 1988. President Dos Santos mentioned in March 1988 that the USSR had proposed to the MPLA that it negotiate with UNITA, and in the same month Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy noted in Harare that the Soviet Union backed US efforts to mediate between the MPLA and UNITA. See *The Manchester Guardian*, Mar. 25, 1988. I am indebted to Helen Kitchen for drawing my attention to this article.

⁵⁶Starushenko (loc. cit., pp. 11–12) proposed that the rights of minority groups be protected in a new constitution as a means of reassuring whites. The ANC has never accepted the concept of group rights. Starushenko's view is not universally shared. For example, see "Soviet Policy in Southern Africa—an Interview with Viktor Goncharov," in the "progressive" South African publication, *Work in Progress*, No. 48, July 1987, p. 6.

⁵⁷Goncharov interview, loc. cit., p. 7; Starushenko, loc. cit., pp. 7, 11.

⁵⁸Starushenko, loc. cit., p. 11.

⁵⁹See Asoyan's article on President Botha in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, July 15, 1987, p. 14. For an example of other articles in the same vein appearing in 1985–87, see A. Pokrovskiy, "The Apartheid Regime and Its Imperialist Protectors," *MZ*, No. 8, 1986, p. 101.

⁶⁰See "Glasnost from Lesotho," *Front File: Southern Africa Brief* (London), Vol. 2, No. 8, June 1988, pp. 1–2. I am grateful to Helen Kitchen for providing a copy of this article.

⁶¹Interviews conducted in South Africa. See also Lester Venter's report in the *Johannesburg Sunday Times*, Feb. 21, 1988, as reproduced in *FBI-S-APR*, Feb. 23, 1988, p. 10. Soviet spokesmen adamantly deny contact with the South African government.

the question of constitutional reform cited in fn. 56 was intended as an expression of impatience with the ANC's insistence on a negotiating agenda that precludes meaningful dialogue with the white mainstream. In an interview published in a South African opposition publication in the summer of 1987, Viktor Goncharov, a deputy director of Moscow's Africa Institute, was even more direct. He noted that Soviet perspectives on South Africa had grown more flexible and realistic and that while the USSR would not attempt to dictate to the ANC, it would like to see that organization develop greater flexibility and objectivity and abandon "dogmatic formulations."⁶²

Recent meetings between Soviet diplomats and SWAPO leaders meanwhile indicate considerable Soviet disillusionment with SWAPO's reliance on the "intensification of armed struggle" and a desire for a degree of "new political thinking" on the part of Moscow's Namibian friends. Perhaps as a warning to SWAPO, Soviet representatives in a debate at the United Nations at the end of 1987 dropped their customary reference to SWAPO as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people.⁶³ SWAPO seems to have received the message, to judge from its cooperation in the recent US-mediated negotiations on Namibia and Angola.

Soviet commentary has been trying to play down the competitive aspect of United States policy in the region. It is now common to encounter statements to the effect that neither the USSR nor the US has significant interests in the region, and that what interests they do have sometimes overlap on significant issues such as the avoidance of escalation and confrontation, and the wish to see the apartheid system dismantled.⁶⁴ The recent Soviet recognition of common interests on the question of apartheid suggests, moreover, an awareness of the existence of significant contradictions between the interests of the United States and of South Africa in the region.

Such adjustments in perspective can serve as justification for Soviet acquiescence in, if not support of, American efforts at mediation of the regional conflicts. Indeed, the initially indifferent or hostile attitude of the Soviet Union toward diplomatic activity aimed at political settlements in the region has changed markedly since the late 1970's. Thus, the Soviet Union—unwilling to pull its allies' chestnuts out of the fire—generally abstained from criticizing the decision of Mozambique

and Angola to sign the respective Nkomati and Lusaka Accords with South Africa in 1984 in the wake of a renewal and intensification of South African military activity in support of RENAMO and in Angola from 1981 on.⁶⁵ At Nkomati, South Africa agreed to cease supporting RENAMO in return for Mozambique's imposition of restrictions on the use of its soil by the ANC to mount guerrilla raids into South Africa. The Lusaka Accords contemplated a disengagement of South African and Angolan forces and withdrawal of the SADF from the salient it had occupied in Cunene province of South West Angola in 1981, in return for Angolan restriction of SWAPO activity in the affected area.

Later in 1984, the Angolans—presumably with Soviet acquiescence or approval—accepted in principle the American-proposed linkage of the removal of Cuban troops from the portion of Angola south of the Benguela Railroad to independence for Namibia.⁶⁶ This concession presumably was a vain attempt to head off resumption of direct US assistance to UNITA. It also may have reflected the perception of a need to arrive at a negotiated settlement that might permit stabilization of Angola's internal affairs. In any case, the benefits arising from implementation of United Nations Resolution 435 in Namibia, e.g., the benefits accruing from denying UNITA sanctuary and close-in support from bases in the Caprivi Strip seemed to exceed the potential costs of the derogation of Angolan sovereignty implicit in such linkage. Significantly, the Angolans did not make such a settlement conditional on any change within South African society itself.⁶⁷

Prospects for regional settlement dimmed in late 1985 and 1986. First, in 1985, the Angolans had considerable military success in the field against UNITA in the aftermath of the South African withdrawal called for under the Lusaka Accords. After driving UNITA out of

⁶⁵In 1985, in discussing with me Soviet attitudes toward the two accords, a leading Soviet Africanist made an analogy between these agreements and the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Soviet Russia and Germany. It was unpleasant, but necessary, given the lack of more palatable alternatives.

⁶⁶See "Letter from José Eduardo dos Santos to the Secretary General of the UN," Nov. 17, 1984. It was reprinted without critical comment in *New Times*, No. 51, 1984. See also *Pravda*, Nov. 17, 1984. This document went beyond previous statements, such as the 1982 Cuban-Angolan declaration, which noted that the Cuban presence in Angola was a result of a South African threat to Angolan security, that Cuban forces had begun to withdraw on two previous occasions only to have the process interrupted by South African and Western threats, and that in the event of a Namibian settlement which included South African withdrawal, the Angolans and Cubans would consider the resumption of Cuban withdrawal. For a text of the 1982 document, see *FBI/IS-SOV*, Feb. 8, 1982, pp. J/1-2.

⁶⁷This "new thinking," it should be noted, predates Gorbachev's accession to power. For the text of UN Resolution 435 (1978), see *United Nations Yearbook 1978*, New York, UN, 1981, pp. 915-16.

⁶²Goncharov interview, loc. cit., p. 7.

⁶³Conversations with South African representatives at the United Nations.

⁶⁴Goncharov interview, loc. cit., p. 4.

the Cazombo Salient in eastern Angola, the Angolan armed forces (FAPLA) turned south, apparently seeking to deliver the coup de grace to an abandoned UNITA at Mavinga and then Jamba. However, it turned out that South Africa was unwilling to accept this outcome, despite its apparent acquiescence in the Lusaka Accords. Pretoria's air and ground forces intervened on behalf of UNITA, turning the FAPLA back north of Mavinga. In the aftermath of this exchange, South African spokesmen affirmed their continuing commitment to UNITA, suggesting that—agreement or no—South Africa was unwilling to permit the Angolan government to solve the UNITA problem by force.⁶⁸ This of course drew into question the utility of negotiation with the RSA.

Second, in early 1986, the United States began to supply UNITA with military assistance, ostensibly via Zaire. This aid included Stinger missiles, which threatened to neutralize Soviet efforts to challenge South African control of southern Angolan airspace through the construction of an elaborate network of radar and air defense installations. This American action restored a degree of credibility to the view that South Africa and the United States acted in unison.⁶⁹ It also drew into question the capacity of the United States to act as an impartial mediator of conflicts between South Africa and its neighbors.

Not surprisingly, Soviet writings in 1986 and 1987 reverted to rejecting any linkage between settlement of the Namibia question and the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. Also, most commentators resurrected the view that a settlement to the region's problems could be brought about "only with the granting of independence to Namibia in accord with UN Resolution 435 and the definite elimination of the apartheid system."⁷⁰

Such renewed doubts about the wisdom of negotiating with the RSA were accompanied by events raising the question of whether such negotiation would even be necessary. As noted above, 1984–86 was a period of renewed civil unrest in South Africa. The failure of the first state of emergency to contain unrest in the townships may have suggested to the Soviets and the Angolans that the South African regime was losing its grip.

However, developments in the region once again forced new shifts in Soviet analyses. The disorders in South Africa were quelled, and the internal opposition

was seriously damaged by the prolonged incarceration of large numbers of its activists under emergency statutes.⁷¹ With a few exceptions (e.g. in Pietermaritzburg), the SADF—acting in conjunction with the police—restored order in the townships and reestablished the authority of conservative older blacks there.⁷² Escalation of Soviet/Cuban/Angolan efforts to defeat UNITA in 1985–87 met with little success—and growing costs—in the face of increasingly active South African support of UNITA and the spread of the insurgency into central and even northern Angola. The last episode in this sequence was the massive Soviet rearmament of FAPLA in early 1987 and subsequent attack on UNITA positions around Mavinga in mid-year. This attack met with crushing defeat and resulted in the destruction of a number of the best-equipped and best-trained FAPLA units. Advancing South African and UNITA forces in turn put under siege the major Angolan air base in the area, at Cuito Cuanavale, and rendered it unusable by the end of the year, further complicating Angolan operations in forward theaters.

The Soviets concluded from these events that the problems of Angola could not be resolved by force alone.⁷³ Nor would the problems be solved by a revolution in South Africa anytime soon. Moreover, the Soviets recognized that the economic and political situation in Angola had deteriorated so rapidly as to draw into question the very survival of the MPLA regime.⁷⁴ Given shortfalls in oil revenue, the costs of sustaining that regime were growing more significant by the day.

Despite the dim prospects, Moscow was unwilling to walk away from the Angolan conflict. To do so would have severely damaged Soviet prestige and would have eliminated the principal position affording the Soviet Union a role in the politics of Southern Africa. It could also have raised the prospect of a domino effect that would invite more serious challenges to other Soviet positions in the Third World, many of which (e.g., Ethiopia and Nicaragua) were already insecure. A joint Soviet-Angolan statement of May 1986 affirmed:

The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Angola reaffirm their principled position agreed on at the tripartite Soviet/Angolan/Cuban consultations in Moscow in January 1986, that is, the readiness

⁶⁸Marcum, loc. cit., p. 7.

⁶⁹See the speech of Angola's President Dos Santos, reported in "In a Friendly Atmosphere," *Pravda*, May 8, 1986.

⁷⁰Moscow television, May 6, 1986, as cited in *FBIS-SOV*, May 14, 1986, p. J/10 (emphasis added). See also the communiqué from the joint Soviet-Cuban-Angolan consultations in January of 1986, translated in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 31, 1986, pp. J/4–6, where the existence of apartheid is mentioned as a permanent danger for Angola, but where its elimination is not mentioned as a precondition of settlement of the Angola and Namibia questions.

⁷¹This assessment of the effect of the emergency on the opposition is based on interviews in South Africa with several of its members.

⁷²This judgment is based in part on visits to Crossroads and Khayelitsha in January 1988.

⁷³Interviews with Soviet Africanists. This new outlook is also suggested by Soviet support of the Crocker initiative throughout much of 1988.

⁷⁴The extent of Angola's crisis was eloquently suggested in President Dos Santos' August 1987 speech on the internal economic situation. See Luanda Domestic Service, *FBIS-AFR*, Aug. 19, 1987, pp. D/1–2.



Troops of Jonas Savimbi's Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) fire off a round against Cuban-Angolan forces during the battle for Cuito Cuanavale in autumn 1988.

—Gamma-Liaison.

to undertake concerted actions in defense of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Angola.⁷⁵

Thus, the Soviet Union continued to provide support, including military support, to the Angolan regime.⁷⁶

Yet, an even more direct Soviet role in defending the Angolans would have complicated the evolving Soviet-American relationship, would have involved even greater costs, and would have been unpopular at home in the aftermath of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Moreover, it would have restored credibility to warnings of the "Soviet threat" in Southern Africa, thereby strengthening more conservative elements within South Africa itself. And it might well have involved direct and embarrassing confrontations with the South Africans.

Consequently, Moscow reembraced with a vengeance the pursuit of a political settlement. In the summer of 1987, presumably with Soviet approval, the Angolans resurrected linkage between Cuban troop withdrawals and independence for Namibia.⁷⁷ By mid-1988, the Cuban-Angolan position on linkage had evolved to envisage Cuban withdrawal not merely from

southern Angola, but from Angola altogether. The two states once again dissociated Angola-Namibia questions from internal change in South Africa itself, dropping the destruction of apartheid as a precondition for peace in the region.⁷⁸ According to press reports, Soviet diplomats pressured Angola and Cuba to be forthcoming in the timing of a Cuban withdrawal.⁷⁹ They also pushed the Angolans toward negotiation of a compromise with UNITA, in so doing assuming some risks in their relationship with Angola.⁸⁰ Presumably in an effort to allow for some permanent role for itself in the event of

⁷⁵"Joint statement by the USSR and the PRA on the Situation in Southern Africa," TASS in Russian, May 10, 1986, as translated in SWB, SWB/SU/8257/A5/5, May 13, 1986. This position was explicitly reaffirmed as Soviet policy by Goncharov in June 1987 (interview, loc. cit.).

⁷⁶For illustration of the rising quality and quantity of Soviet military assistance to Angola, see *The Military Balance* for 1985–86, pp. 91–92; for 1986–87, pp. 116–17; for 1987–88, pp. 119–20; and for 1988–89, pp. 122–23.

⁷⁷See ANGOP on Radio Luanda in Portuguese, Aug. 10, 1987, in SWB, SWB/ME/8644/B/6, Aug. 12, 1987.

⁷⁸ANGOP on Radio Luanda in Portuguese, July 13, 1987, in FBIS-AFR, July 14, 1987, p. D/1.

⁷⁹See *The Washington Post*, Aug. 11, 1988.

⁸⁰The Adamishin statement on negotiating with UNITA was rejected immediately in Luanda. See note 55.

a settlement, Moscow strongly endorsed the role of the UN Security Council as a potential guarantor of a peace settlement in the region.⁸¹

Even while moving toward compromise, Soviet policy moved on a second track, aimed at forcing South Africa to offer meaningful concessions—a possibility that did not exist so long as the RSA was victorious in both Angola and Namibia.⁸² The Cuban contingent in Angola was increased measurably in the first half of 1988, to some 40–50,000 troops. For the first time in years, regular units of heavily armed Cubans were deployed in proximity to South African forces in Southern Angola. Cuban involvement prevented the fall of Cuito Cuanavale to UNITA and South African forces at the end of 1987. In March 1988, they engaged the South Africans and inflicted substantial casualties. By May, they had established themselves in strength in southwestern Angola and were building airstrips and additional radar facilities in proximity to the Namibian frontier, denying effective air support for South African forces remaining in Angola.

As talks continued through the late spring and early summer, so too did military action involving the Cubans and South Africans, as in the exchanges near Caluque in June.⁸³ The changing military balance, the rising casualty count, and the increasing material costs of continuing its engagement in Angola fundamentally altered the RSA outlook on this adventure. And it was the consequent change in the South African diplomatic position that finally brought the parties to agreement on an Angola-Namibia settlement.

Conclusions

Judging from both Soviet analysis and Soviet behavior, the USSR has moved away from revolutionary activism and associated hopes of making significant new gains in influence, position, and prestige in Southern Africa. Instead, Moscow now seeks to sustain established positions and a role in regional politics at lower cost through the exploration of political settlements to regional problems. In the process, the Soviet position has evolved from actively opposing American efforts to resolve conflict in the region to collaboration in diplomatic undertakings toward that end.

Soviet implementation of "new thinking" in Southern Africa reflects the broader patterns of recent Soviet policy toward the Third World discussed at the outset. But it also reflects the consequences of 17 years of active Soviet involvement in the politics of a specific region. Indeed, given the prominence of Southern Africa in the previous activist phase, it seems reasonable to con-



Members of a Cuban women's anti-aircraft team at a January 10, 1989, Luanda ceremony marking the departure of the first 450 Cuban troops from Angola.

—Wide World.

clude that the regional learning experience was itself an important contributor to the broader recasting of Soviet Third World policy.

The rooting of this change in experience also suggests that the recent trend is likely to endure. Although it is by no means inconceivable that the present or a subsequent Soviet leadership might be tempted into greater activism in the area at some future date, the optimism of the mid-1970's concerning the region's revolutionary potential has fallen victim to the realities of regional politics.

⁸¹See "Joint Statement by the USSR and the PRA on the Situation in Southern Africa," TASS in Russian, May 10, 1986, trans. in *SWB*, *SWB/SU/8257/A5/6*, May 13, 1986; Goncharov, "The Soviet Union and Southern Africa . . .," loc. cit., p. 83.

⁸²This point was made rather strongly to me by South African military officers in January 1988.

⁸³See the *Southern Africa Record*, July 1, 1988, pp. 1–2.



Working to implement the December 1988 treaty on Angola and Namibia, diplomats of five countries meet in New York City in January 1989: from left to right, Vyacheslav Ustinov, the USSR; Antonio Franca Ndalu, Angola; Carlos Aldana Escalante, Cuba; Neil van Heerden, South Africa; and Chester A. Crocker, the US.

—Keystone.

The consequences for regional security of this evolution in Soviet perspectives are rather uncertain. Many factors have a stronger impact on the situation in Southern Africa than does Soviet behavior. Soviet cooperation in the peace process does not guarantee success in the US-mediated talks on Angola and Namibia—witness the recent incursions of SWAPO guerrilla forces from Angola into northern Namibia.⁸⁴ The difficulty in securing agreement on a schedule for Cuban withdrawal from Angola suggests that the Angolans and Cubans remain deeply concerned about the security of the MPLA regime despite South African withdrawal from Angolan territory. The MPLA's rejection of Soviet

suggestions that they negotiate with UNITA also indicates that they are unwilling to make the concessions on power-sharing that might diminish the internal threat. In such conditions, and despite Soviet pressure, the accord may fail.

⁸⁴The Soviet response to South African attacks on returning armed SWAPO guerrillas evolved quickly from condemnation of South African actions, to expressions of concern about the situation in Namibia and reaffirmation of support for the Brazzaville Accord, support for the compromise involving withdrawal of SWAPO forces back to Angola, and criticism of SWAPO for the mistake of sending the guerrillas home. See the commentaries of V. Korotov (*Pravda*, Apr. 12, 1989) and A. Nikanurov (*Izvestiya* [Moscow], Apr. 16, 1989).

Moreover, given the record of past South African duplicity on the Namibian issue, one should perhaps await RSA withdrawal from Namibia to judge Pretoria's sincerity. The South African agenda may have been to avoid the growing costs of an Angolan imbroglio while assuming that there would be sufficient subsequent opportunity to sabotage the settlement process. Perhaps the most that can be said is that change in Soviet perspectives has removed or weakened one impediment to settlement.

The new Soviet perspective and posture have broader implications as well. The Botha government justifies its intransigence on both regional and domestic issues in terms of the concept of a "total Marxist onslaught" on South Africa—the notion that the republic's internal and regional troubles result from an elaborate Moscow-or-orchestrated conspiracy to destroy the current system in South Africa, to seize its strategic minerals, and to dominate the Cape "choke point." Soviet advocacy of violent revolution and dramatic social transformation in South Africa, close Soviet links with SWAPO and the ANC, the presence of thousands of heavily armed Cubans and hundreds of Soviet military advisers in proximity to South Africa's borders, and the provision of sanctuary and bases to SWAPO and the ANC in states closely linked to the USSR, such as Angola, all have lent a degree of credibility to this view.

A Soviet Union cooperating in Western-backed regional peace initiatives, forswearing for the foreseeable future any socialist revolutionary agenda in South Africa, pushing the national liberation movements toward negotiated compromises with the South African government, focusing on the defense of existing interests rather than the expansion of influence, and quietly pursuing contacts with South Africa's white community undermines the credibility of the South African government's chosen strategy for legitimizing its domestic and regional policies. This development may favor reform, by refocusing attention on the internal sources of the RSA's problems.

Soviet willingness to cooperate in attempting to manage and resolve conflict in Southern Africa and to foster incremental change within the RSA might seem a function of increasingly manifest weakness in the Soviet regional position. The situation in Angola has deteriorated considerably since the late 1970's, and costs to the USSR stemming from the relationship with the Angolans have grown. The relationship with Mozambique was never fully consolidated, and the FRELIMO regime has lost control of much of its own country. SWAPO has failed thus far to mount a credible counterinsurgent challenge to South African control of Namibia. The

South African authorities have enjoyed considerable success in efforts to control their internal opposition, and in many respects the ANC has been marginalized abroad.

To the extent that the new Soviet diplomacy of political settlement is an effort to save what can be saved in the context of dramatic deterioration in the situation, one might be tempted to push the Soviets and Cubans a little bit harder in the anticipation that they would abandon the MPLA and forfeit a decade-long attempt to establish a place for themselves in regional affairs. Yet, in all probability, there is little chance for such a termination of Soviet involvement in Southern Africa. Although the Soviet-Cuban position might not be as rosy as it once appeared, there is little present danger that Soviet-bloc advisers will have to leave the roof of the Soviet embassy in Luanda by helicopter. The record of the past three years shows continued Soviet commitment to do what is possible short of direct intervention to prevent disastrous defeat for the MPLA and to improve prospects for a settlement that would stabilize the situation in Angola, preserve a role in government for Moscow's local ally, and maintain Soviet prestige. The southward deployment of Cubans and their engagement of South African forces in 1988 suggests that Moscow possesses the instruments to see it through.⁸⁵ This is not Afghanistan. The costs faced by the USSR are far lower. And the pain threshold of the SADF is apparently also far lower than that of the mujahedin.

Given that a regional settlement would reduce considerably the dependence of both the MPLA and SWAPO on the Soviets, the USSR appears to be willing to risk some loss of influence in promoting this effort. But its behavior suggests an unwillingness to accept humiliation and exclusion, and readiness to go to considerable lengths to avoid both. In sum, Moscow appears amenable to cooperative ventures in regional conflict settlement but not to exclusion from the region.

See also the remarks of Anatoliy Adamishin regarding an April 11, 1989, meeting in Mount Etjo, Namibia, of a tripartite Angolan, Cuban, and South African commission (with US and Soviet observers present) that discussed the recent events. Interview on Moscow Radio in Russian, Apr. 11, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 12, 1989, p. 30.

⁸⁵This is not to say that the southward deployment of Cubans—any more than the original Cuban decision to intervene—was by Soviet dictate. Cuban participants in recent conferences with Americans have claimed that the Soviets opposed what was a Cuban-Angolan decision. (From private communication to the author.) Cuba had reasons of its own for wanting a settlement. If there was to be a settlement, going out with a win had advantages from Castro's own perspective. However, given that the Cuban move was sustained by Soviet deliveries of matériel, and was presumably largely financed by the USSR, it seems improbable that the USSR resisted it, despite occasional Cuban hints to the contrary.

Nascent Civil Society in the German Democratic Republic

Vladimir Tismaneanu

Until recently, the political opposition in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) did not challenge the legitimacy of the existing regime. Basically, the opposition took a "loyalist" approach in criticizing the government's policies and accepted the official claim that the GDR was a socialist state of workers and peasants. In the early 1980's, however, new groups and movements have emerged that have increasingly questioned the regime's self-image as well as condemned its repressive policies. The interest among these groups in Marxist theories and ideals is also less pronounced than it was among the regime's critics of the 1960's and 1970's. Enjoying qualified though often decisive support from the East German Evangelical Church, these groups have put forward a broad social and political agenda whose aim is to bring about the demilitarization of public life and the respect for fundamental human rights by the government. The independent peace and human rights groups have become the nerve center of an expanding coalition of groups and associations striving to democratize East German society.

Vladimir Tismaneanu is Resident Scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia and Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. He is a contributing editor to ORBIS and an editor of the East European Reporter. His book, *The Crisis of Marxist Ideology in Eastern Europe: The Poverty of Utopia*, was published by Routledge in 1988. He is currently writing a political history of Romanian communism from Ana Pauker and Gheorghiu-Dej to Nicolae Ceaușescu. The present article is part of a recently completed study on independent peace movements in the Soviet Union and East-Central Europe. The author would like to thank the United States Institute of Peace for the generous grant that made research for it possible.

A Militaristic Ethos

Founded with Stalin's blessing in October 1949, the GDR has represented itself as being the first German state of workers and peasants whose policies mark a total break with the policies of German imperialism. The self-serving corollary to this assertion is that the East German regime is peaceful by nature.

However, because the existence of the East German communist regime owes so much to the presence of the Soviet Army in what was known for a long time simply as *die Zone*, the regime has suffered from a marked lack of legitimacy.¹ Furthermore, the GDR is the only European communist state established on the basis of a national division; this fact has also affected the dynamics of authority building in the GDR. Since Erich Honecker became its general secretary in 1971, the ruling communist party, the Socialist Unity Party (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*—SED), has consistently sought to implement the policy of *Abgrenzung* (demarcation) from West Germany in order to preserve and enhance the differences between the two German states;² party dogma asserts not merely the existence of two German states, but also the existence of two German nations—one socialist and the other one capital-

¹See A. James McAdams, *East Germany and Detente: Building Authority after the Wall*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 9–63; J. F. Brown, *Eastern Europe and Communist Rule*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1988, pp. 230–63; Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., *The Two Germanies since 1945*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1987, pp. 46–53 and 99–145. For a democratic-socialist critique of the East German system, see Franz Loeser, *Die unglaubliche Gesellschaft: Quo Vadis DDR* (The Incredible Society: Quo Vadis GDR), Köln, Bund Verlag, 1984.

²See Henry Krisch, "Official Nationalism," in Lyman H. Legters, Ed., *The German Democratic Republic*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1978, pp. 103–32.



The official rally in East Berlin honoring Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht on January 17, 1988. Thirty dissidents were arrested when they tried to hold a parallel demonstration.

—DPA.

ist.³ The policy of demarcation has its most visible expression in the Berlin Wall, erected in August 1961.

The communist state has laid claim to the "progressive" legacy of German culture. The official ideological apparatus spells out the link between today's East German political culture and the radical strands of German socialism, especially those associated with Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, who became the founders of the Communist Party of Germany. Speaking at a rally in East Berlin in January 1988, Egon Krenz, the SED's second-in-command and among the heirs-apparent to General Secretary Honecker, reverently evoked these two martyrs of German socialism: "We bow to their highest dedication to work, bread, and international peace. We are proud to confirm our loyalty to their revolutionary legacy. We have sworn to Karl Liebknecht and we extend our hands to Rosa Luxemburg in a spirit saying that by word and deed we will serve socialism and peace."⁴ The GDR claims to have carried out a complete de-Nazification and to have

eliminated all roots of militarism. Its self-image is one of unswerving commitment to peace and international co-operation. For long, the target of the regime's propaganda was the "revanchist" orientation of the Federal Republic of Germany. East German communists fulminated against West German membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while the GDR's membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization has been presented as a commitment to peace.

Among East European communist parties, the SED takes communist ideology particularly seriously,⁵ and

³See Martin McCauley, "The German Democratic Republic: Internal and International," in George Schöpfung, Ed., *The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*, New York and Oxford, Facts On File Publications, 1986, pp. 337-44.

⁴For the full text of Egon Krenz's speech, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-EEU*), Jan. 19, 1988, pp. 32-34.

⁵See Martin McCauley, *Marxism-Leninism in the German Democratic Republic*, New York, Harper and Row, 1979; David Childs, *The GDR: Moscow's German Ally*, second edition, London, Unwin Hyman, 1988.

for good reason: for East German communists, ideological relaxation appears to bring erosion of legitimacy rather than popular acceptance. Honecker and his comrades have directed their policies toward the provision of social welfare and the ideological indoctrination of the population. East German party leaders have not forgotten the June 1953 worker uprising against Stalinist exploitation (imposition of impossible production norms and sanctions against those who did not meet them). The SED elite has adopted a technocratic-bureaucratic model of socialism, based on accelerated economic growth, but tight political control. In view of this, de-Stalinization has never been wholeheartedly implemented in the GDR.⁶ At the same time, East German communists must contend with another political fact of life: the flow of uncontrolled information to GDR citizens from the Federal Republic. SED functionaries often complain about the presence of the "enemy," i.e., sources of uncensored information like West German TV broadcasting, in virtually every East German house.

In its recurrent campaigns against internal opposition, the official propaganda has played up the threat of external intervention. Party-controlled media frequently accuse dissidents of being on the payroll of foreign intelligence services. National "unity" is extolled as a necessary condition for the country's very survival and the state-controlled educational system has become the main vehicle for inculcating national cohesion. The values taught have a decidedly militaristic cast.

The role of the *Nationale Volksarmee* (NVA) has become so prominent that it is no exaggeration to describe the GDR as a militaristic society. To be sure, the SED retains political control over all sectors of the East German system, including the military. But the SED has itself internalized militaristic views and values and imposed them on the whole society. In addition, one cannot overlook the militaristic tendencies shown by the introduction of mandatory military education in schools and universities, the government's adamant opposition to conscientious objection, and the open celebration of militaristic traditions, including those associated with Prussian Junkerdom. As one analyst has noted, "if one focuses on the military as a means of political socialization and assumes that the GDR's military propaganda and premilitary education and training of youth are effective, one can easily come to the conclusion that the GDR is a militarized society."⁷

Militaristic education gathered momentum in the late 1970's. In 1978, mandatory military education was introduced in the 9th and 10th grades of technical high schools. Following the Soviet model, paramilitary organizations like the Society for Sports and Technology (*Gesellschaft für Sport und Technik*), which claims

a membership of 600,000, contribute to the physical preparation of youth for military service. At universities, both male and female students participate in premilitary and civil defense activities. But the most important form of military political education takes place during the 18 months of military service required of East German males. According to the SED, the purpose of socialist military education (*sozialistische Wehrerziehung*) is to create a "socialist personality" totally committed to the existing social order. The ruling elite needs to uphold the basic myth that the GDR is a beleaguered fortress, the most exposed "western stronghold of socialism."

Under Honecker, the regime's resistance to political change and social liberalization has been combined with an emphasis on economic effectiveness. The GDR justifiably boasts that it has the most developed economy and the highest standard of living in the socialist bloc, a fact that has not passed unnoticed in neighboring Warsaw Pact countries.⁸

To foster its legitimacy, the regime has stressed a separate East German national identity. It has tried to incorporate selectively symbols and traditions associated with glorious moments in the history of the German nation. For example, in November 1983 it organized state-wide celebrations to commemorate the 500th anniversary of the birth of Martin Luther; it has reassessed favorably the historical contributions of such personalities as King Frederick the Great of Prussia, Carl von Clausewitz, and even Otto von Bismarck,⁹ thereby discarding its previous judgments about the "reactionary essence of Prussianism."

In the past, the government has also tried to convince the East German population that the country's survival and the peace of the region require East Germany's complete alignment with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The presence of 400,000 Soviet military personnel on their territory gives many East Germans the feeling that they live in an occupied country. First, Walter Ulbricht, then, Honecker have gone out of their way

⁶It is thus worth noting that Walter Ulbricht, Honecker's predecessor and political mentor, was particularly instrumental in persuading the Soviet Politburo to adopt the decision to invade Czechoslovakia in August 1968. This fact has been confirmed by Alexander Dubček, the reformist communist leader of Czechoslovakia in 1968, in an interview with the Italian official Communist daily *L'Unità*. See *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 19, 1988, pp. 9-24.

⁷Gero Neugebauer, "The Military and Society in the GDR," in *Studies in the GDR Culture and Society* 5, Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 1985, p. 82.

⁸See Ian Jeffries and Manfred Melzer, Eds., *The East German Economy*, London, Croom Helm, and New York, Methuen, 1988. It is of course true that the relatively healthy state of the economy owes much to the assistance provided by West Germany.

⁹McAdams, op. cit., p. 189.

to change this perception. Inculcating loyalty to the socialist bloc has been another major task of the military-educational complex.

Independent Marxist Dissent

In the 1970's, the party grappled with a strain of intellectual dissent best characterized as independent Marxism. However, as Marxists, these dissidents and critical intellectuals identified with the values espoused by the system. To be sure, the opposition also comprised elements who squarely rejected the communist regime, but they frequently found ways of leaving the GDR.¹⁰ Basically, the intellectual dissidents did not question so much the existing social order as the "distortion" of Marxist principles by the SED. Günter Kunert, a poet who left the GDR in 1979, described the dilemma of dissident intellectuals who deplore the cultural philistinism of official politics:

*I am Jewish on my mother's side and have always been on the Left, so at first I welcomed the East German regime and was delighted to live there. But gradually things began to get difficult. My poems are on very private themes, and I just could not turn out the kind of ideological "public" poetry they wanted; also, one leit-motif of mine is the dehumanizing effect of modern technology, and Marxism does not tolerate this kind of pessimism. The party harassed me and finally refused to publish me. My break with GDR-style socialism was a slow and painful process, since I'd believed in it so much—and I still think the regime has many virtues, but not for an artist. Finally we decided to move here and there was no culture shock at all.*¹¹

Until his death in April 1982, the physicist Robert Havemann wholeheartedly advocated change from within. His statements and essays summed up the frustrations of Marxist intellectuals critical of the absence

of political and social democracy. Havemann's ideas were instrumental in the awakening and crystallization of a powerful antimilitaristic awareness in the GDR. Together with writers Stefan Heym, Jürgen Fuchs, Jurek Becker, sociologist Rudolf Bahro, poet and singer Wolf Biermann and many others, Havemann denounced the contradictions between the regime's humanistic promises and its repressive practice.

Havemann belonged to the generation of Marxist revisionists who believed that their criticism could reform the totalitarian system, a widespread illusion in Eastern Europe until it was dispelled by the communist governments' harsh reactions to their critics in the late 1960's.¹² Havemann and his supporters repudiated the bureaucratic monopoly of power and attempted to reassert the democratic potential of socialism. Havemann wrote: "There must be no privileged people, classes or groups of any description, but everybody, every person must have exactly the same opportunities, the same chances, and must be equal with regard to each other."¹³

Havemann's anti-Stalinist stance contributed to the political coming of age of a younger generation of intellectuals. Drawing on Havemann's theses, Biermann spelled out the need to elaborate a democratic-socialist alternative to the repressive regime: "My entire work has the purpose of advancing the development of a socialist workers' democracy in those countries that call themselves socialist. I voice criticism of the monopolistic-bureaucratic system; and I speak for those forces that, rather than accept a petit bourgeois liberalization forced on them by the old bankrupt and neo-Stalinistic reactionaries to shut them up, insist on the continuation of the socialist revolution."¹⁴ In the 1970's, critical ferment became more widespread in literary and artistic circles. It was due not to nostalgia for the pre-socialist order, nor to unqualified admiration for liberal democracy, nor to a wish to do away with Marxist ideology, but to dissatisfaction with the SED's dictatorship and the militaristic-bureaucratic course of the government.

The regime did not hesitate to strike back at the intellectual trouble-makers. In 1976, the SED Politburo ac-

¹⁰The poet and songwriter Sascha Anderson, who emigrated on August 15, 1986, is a case in point. Born in 1953 into an intellectual family, he is typical of a generation who refuse to consider the GDR a "motherland." Alienation from prevailing norms generates an overwhelming sense of *Heimatslosigkeit* (uprootedness). Anderson does not cherish any hopes about communism. His position is explicitly anti-systemic. He and others like him do not expect the system to humanize itself and are indifferent to its fate: "I have never taken an interest in the system. I never had an interest in undermining the system from inside. I did not even want to see myself in light of the demands of the system." See *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Sept. 1, 1986, quoted by B. V. Flow, "The Literary Avant-Garde Leaves the GDR," *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty*, *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich—hereafter *RFE*), RAD Background Report/132, Sept. 18, 1986.

¹¹Quoted in John Ardagh, *Germany and the Germans*, New York, Harper and Row, 1987, pp. 362–63.

¹²For the fate of Marxist revisionism and the process of de-Stalinization in the USSR and Eastern Europe, see Vladimir Tismaneanu, *The Crisis of Marxist Ideology in Eastern Europe: The Poverty of Utopia*, London and New York, Routledge, 1988.

¹³See Robert Havemann, *Ein deutscher Kommunist: Rückblicke und Perspektiven aus Isolation* (A German Communist: Retrospection and Perspective Out of Isolation), Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1978, pp. 98–103; excerpts from Havemann's book were published in Roger Woods, *Opposition in the GDR under Honecker, 1971–85: An Introduction and Documentation*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1986, pp. 165–69.

¹⁴See *Index on Censorship* (London), February 1973, quoted in Sharon L. Kegerreis, "The Politics of Silence: Culture and Kulturpolitik in the GDR," *RFE*, RAD Background Report/212, Oct. 2, 1979, p. 5.



„Wo gibt's denn hier Ausreiseanträge in die DDR?“

A cartoon in the Munich newspaper TZ highlights the irony of the East German ban of the Soviet publication *Sputnik*. Stalin from his grave sees a headline about the banning and asks: "Where Does One Apply for an Exit Visa to the GDR?"

—TZ (Munich).

cused Biermann of "publicly slandering our socialist state" and deprived him of his citizenship.¹⁵ When the writers Christa Wolf, Stefan Heym, and Stephan Hermlin protested, the authorities resorted to further repression: Wolf was expelled from the SED and Heym was charged with breaches of currency regulations. Havemann was placed under house arrest, and several other well-known writers were forced into exile.¹⁶

The rationale for the SED's ultradogmatic, Manichaean approach to heterodoxy was formulated by Honecker in 1979 and has remained operative ever since: "The class struggle has always involved fighting on opposing sides of the barricade—here the workers' class, there the bourgeoisie, here the socialist ideology, there the bourgeois one. There is no third alternative."¹⁷ This neo-Stalinist outlook has been reaffirmed in recent years, in direct contrast to Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost*. For example, at the commemoration marking the 70th anniversary of the founding of the

Communist Party of Germany, Honecker bluntly rejected modifications in SED policies in accordance with the wind of change now blowing from Moscow: "We have no reason to copy the practice of this or that fraternal country, even apart from the fact that this would be a gross contradiction of the fundamental teachings of Marxism. Peace . . . is served by our foreign policy, it is served by our military policy, it is served by the education of the younger generation, and it is served by the all-round strengthening of our socialist fatherland."¹⁸

The Church and the Peace Movement

The East German Protestant Church has traditionally resisted control by the communist government. However, it has also carefully avoided open conflict. The East German relationship between state and church has been aptly described as "a marriage in which the couple is always fighting—without, however, seriously thinking of divorce."¹⁹ The East German Protestant hierarchy has been a spokesman for peace and a voice of constructive criticism of state policy from the very beginning. For example, the Evangelical Church advocated the introduction of civilian service for conscientious objectors (1955); opposed mandatory military service in 1961; issued a statement deploring the NATO decision to deploy nuclear weapons as well as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (January 1980). Churches have sponsored institutions engaged in peace research, endorsed peace seminars and supported independent peace groups since 1981.²⁰

The basic stance of the Federation of Evangelical Churches of the GDR was summed up by Dr. Heino Falcke, a Protestant Church leader, in 1972:

We will not concede that man's political maturity depends on his liberation from Christ rather than on his being liberated by Christ. . . . We can accept in faith that

¹⁵Biermann seemed to anticipate this measure when he wrote: "Those who once stood before machine guns with steadfast courage now fear my guitar," *ibid.* For a perceptive analysis of East German dissent in the 1970's, see Werner Volkmer, "East Germany: Dissenting Views during the Last Decade," in Rudolf L. Tökés, Ed., *Opposition in Eastern Europe*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979, pp. 113–41.

¹⁶See Karl Wilhelm Fricke, *Opposition und Widerstand in der DDR* (Opposition and Resistance in the GDR), Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1984, pp. 173–89.

¹⁷*Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), June 24, 1979.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, Dec. 30, 1988. For the current tensions in Soviet–East German relations, including an unprecedented ban of the Soviet periodical *Sputnik* in the GDR, see "Where Sputnik Can't Land," *The Economist* (London), Nov. 26, 1988, p. 52; Barbara Donovan, "East Germany Bans Soviet Journal," *RFE*, RAD Background Report/233, Nov. 23, 1988. In December 1988, Erich Honecker criticized Moscow for tolerating the revision of Soviet history by "bourgeois types gone wild." See Serge Schmemann, "2 Germanies' Political Divide Is Being Blurred by Glasnost," *The New York Times*, Dec. 18, 1988. For an analysis of recent GDR–USSR relations, see A. James McAdams, "The New Logic in Soviet–GDR Relations," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September–October 1988, pp. 47–60.

¹⁹Peter Maser, "The Protestant Churches and the Independent Peace Movement in the GDR," in *Studies in GDR Culture and Society* 5, p. 47.

²⁰*Ibid.*; Joyce Marie Mushaben, "Swords to Plowshares: The Church, the State, and the East German Peace Movement," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), Summer 1984, pp. 123–25.

in a socialist society, too, the lordship of liberating Christ is a reality So we are set free to reject socialism's rigid view of itself, a view that would face us with the need to reject or accept it totally. We are set free from the paralyzing alternative between outright opposition and uncritically allowing ourselves to be taken over. Thus we are at liberty to offer practical and discerning cooperation.²¹

This traditional approach of Lutheranism to secular authority allows for an effective dialogue between the Church and State: the Church recognizes the existing political structures and does not intend to subvert them. As Bishop Albert Schönherr, the first president of the Federation of Evangelical Churches, put it: "We do not want to be a Church against socialism, nor a Church alongside socialism, but a Church within socialism."²² Bishop Schönherr emphasized this outlook at his historical meeting with SED General Secretary Honecker on March 6, 1978. In turn, the Honecker regime has sought to foster cooperation with the church, particularly since the late 1970's. The Church is legally entitled to "profess and evangelize," to build churches, to publish religious literature, and to broadcast religious services on radio and television.

A new stage in this cooperation was reached on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of Martin Luther's birthday in 1983. The ceremonies were organized by a joint Church-State commission chaired by Honecker. The SED intended to portray Luther as a forerunner of the "progressive" East German state, and its involvement in the celebrations was part of the general attempt to consolidate an East German political and historical identity.²³

Though less influential today than it was in the early 1950's, the Evangelical Church still has 8 million members. Along with the much smaller Catholic Church, the East German Evangelical Church "represents the sole institutional structure in the GDR not subject to party control."²⁴ The Church has offered independent pacifism more than symbolic support. It has recognized its legitimacy and has defended pacifists against official slander and harassment. Unlike in the USSR, Hungary, or Poland, where autonomous peace movements have emerged out of civil rights initiatives, in the GDR religious institutions had a vitally important role in the formation and development of East German unofficial groups. This is not to say that the East German pacifist and anti-nuclear movement remains a religious one. Yet, it maintains a basic commitment to Christian values, particularly the dignity of the individual, the sacredness of human freedom, and the ethos of nonviolence. This value system collides with the official credo.

The Church and the peace movement also share concern about intrusive state interference in private life. For young East German pacifists, encouraged by members of the Evangelical clergy, the idea of turning "Swords into Plowshares" is more than a metaphor. It is the symbol of their decision to rebel against militarism, censorship, ideological manipulation, and police repression.²⁵

From Religious to Independent Pacifism

Since the early 1980's, the SED has been confronted by autonomous, grass-roots efforts to oppose its militaristic course. These groups promote an oppositional strategy different from that of their independent Marxist forerunners. They are a response to the widespread moral crisis among East German youth and acute dissatisfaction with the values propounded by the regime.²⁶ Because of its privileged position within the East German system, the Evangelical Church has been able to provide the independent peace groups with a powerful protective shield. Under its umbrella and with its support, these groups have become significant actors on the GDR social and political scene. The independent peace movement in East Germany was also spurred by the huge anti-nuclear demonstrations in West Germany in the early 1980's, and by the nonviolent strategy for social change followed by Solidarity in Poland before the imposition of martial law on December 13, 1981.²⁷

²¹Quoted in B. Welling Hall, "The Church and the Independent Peace Movement in Eastern Europe," *Journal of Peace Research* (Oslo), No. 2, 1986, p. 200.

²²See Ronald D. Asmus, "Is There a Peace Movement in the GDR?" *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Summer 1983, p. 322; Albert Schönherr, *Horizont und Mitte* (The Horizon and the Middle Distance), Munich, Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1979.

²³See George B. von der Lippe, "Ich weiss jetzt, wer ich bin": The Figure of Martin Luther as Presented in the Literature of the GDR," in *Studies in GDR Culture and Society* 5, pp. 339-55; Robert F. Goeckel, "The Luther Anniversary in the GDR," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), October 1984, pp. 112-33.

²⁴Asmus, loc. cit., p. 306.

²⁵See "The Relevance of Pacifism: A Discussion Paper for the Communities (November 1981)," in Wolfgang Büscher, Peter Wensierski, and Klaus Wolschner, Eds., *Friedensbewegung in der DDR, Texte 1978-1982* (Peace Movement in the GDR, Documents 1978-82), Hattingen, Edition Transit, 1982, pp. 245-63.

²⁶See Wolfgang Büscher and Peter Wensierski, *Null Bock auf DDR: Aussteigerjugend im anderen Deutschland* (No Idea About the GDR: Disaffected Youth in the Other Germany), Hamburg, Rowohlt Verlag, 1984, esp. pp. 133-64.

²⁷See "The Poetic Principle of Sincerity: A Polish-German Discussion in the Fall of 1981," in Jürgen Fuchs, *Einmischung in eigene Angelegenheiten*: (fn. continued on p. 96)

The peace activists rejected from the very outset the simplistic definition of peace as the absence of war, giving it instead a much more comprehensive definition, one that encompassed the domestic policies of the government. In May 1981, lay members of the Evangelical Church in Dresden addressed a proposal to the East German Parliament advocating a two-year "social service for peace" (*Sozialer Friedensdienst*), as an alternative to the 18-month military conscription.²⁸ Those undertaking such a service for peace were to be employed primarily in care for civilians—in orphanages, old people's homes, or nursing homes; as ancillary staff at hospitals; in social welfare and environmental protection. The authors of the proposal expressed their concern about the growing militarization of East German society and suggested that the government should focus instead on the serious shortcomings in social services, which the "social service for peace" could partly correct. In August 1981, Bishop Johannes Hempel of Saxony expressed the support of the Church for this initiative: "We will obviously open our arms and speak openly with those whose motives originate in Evangelical beliefs."²⁹

In November 1981, the government replied to the growing campaign for an alternative peace service in the authoritative voice of the GDR State Secretary for Church Affairs, Klaus Gysi:

*The demand for a "social peace service" cannot be justified either on theological or religious grounds Moreover, it is not the task of the Church to change laws and the Constitution. In addition, there are people in the West who desire to see a confrontation between us. The current regulation with the construction soldier option is one of the most progressive in the world. There is no reason to deviate from it. We need everyone and cannot afford to abolish mandatory conscription.*³⁰

According to Gysi, anybody who did not agree with the state's position showed a confrontational attitude. Werner Walde, a candidate member of the SED Politburo and party chief in the district of Cottbus accused the initiative for an alternative service of being directed against the "necessary military strength of socialism."³¹ Instead of bowing to the SED's dictate, in September 1981 the Synod of the Evangelical Churches of the GDR adopted a resolution in support of the call for an alternative service. To counter the regime's criticism that they were playing a role in fomenting civic unrest, Church leaders emphasized that the Evangelical Church is "neither a camouflaged government party nor a camouflaged opposition party." In response, the

SED resorted to "class-inspired" slogans: "Peace must be defended—peace must be armed" and "Make peace without NATO weapons." The *Freie Deutsche Jugend* (FDJ), the communist youth organization, started to propagate these "militant" slogans. The government banned the wearing of pacifist badges and took repressive measures against peace activists.

Independent peace initiatives intensified following the "Peace Week" (Friedensdekade) organized by the Protestant Church in November 1981. The theme of the campaign was "Righteousness, Disarmament, Peace," and the "Swords into Plowshares" slogan was enthusiastically accepted by thousands of young people. Since this phrase is also engraved on the base of a statue donated by the Soviet Union to the United Nations in the late 1940's, initially Soviet commentators described the "Swords into Plowshares" emblem as a "reflection of their own attitudes."³² But soon the real meaning of the badge became clear: it highlighted the contrast between the GDR authorities' professed and practiced values, between official slogans and actual behavior.³³

The major impetus to the development of a self-conscious, autonomous peace movement in the GDR was the publication of the "Berlin Appeal." The "Appeal," whose main author was Reiner Eppelmann, an East Berlin minister involved in youth work, was eventually signed by more than 2,000 East Germans. In many respects, it echoed Havemann's preoccupations—among them, the division of Germany.³⁴ Widely circulated, the "Appeal" ignited passionate discussions and struck a responsive chord among those who had long distrusted the official peace institutions and pledges.

The "Berlin Appeal" challenged the government's militaristic slogans. A motto frequently found on official East German posters reads: "The stronger socialism is, the more secure peace is." To this, the signatories of the "Appeal" replied: "We propose to hold a great debate on the questions of peace, in an atmosphere of tolerance and recognition of the right of free speech, and

Gegen Krieg und verlogenen Frieden (Interference in One's Own Affairs: Against War and a Mendacious Peace), Hamburg, Rowohlt Verlag, 1984, pp. 53–79, for a fascinating discussion between Fuchs, an East German poet and human rights activist, and two Polish intellectuals.

²⁸See Buscher et al., *Friedensbewegung*, pp. 169–71.

²⁹Quoted in Asmus, loc. cit., p. 308.

³⁰See Fricke, op. cit., pp. 36–37.

³¹Ibid., p. 195.

³²Asmus, loc. cit., p. 324.

³³See Hall, loc. cit., p. 202.

³⁴Before Leonid Brezhnev's visit to West Germany in autumn 1981, Havemann had addressed an "Open Letter" to the Soviet general secretary pointing to the division of Germany as a bleeding wound in the very heart of Europe: "What Germany's partition created was not security but the precondition for the deadliest of threats that has ever existed in Europe." See Asmus, loc. cit., p. 311.

to permit and encourage every spontaneous public expression of the desire for peace."³⁵ The authors suggested a broad range of topics for such a dialogue:

- (a) *Oughtn't we to stop producing, selling, and importing so-called war toys?*
- (b) *Oughtn't we to introduce peace studies in our schools in place of military instruction?*
- (c) *Oughtn't we to allow social work for peace instead of the present alternative service for conscientious objectors?*
- (d) *Oughtn't we to stop all public displays of military might and instead use our ceremonies of state to express the nation's desire for peace?*
- (e) *Oughtn't we to stop so-called civil defense exercises? Since real civil defense is impossible in nuclear war, these exercises merely make nuclear war seem more possible. Does it not perhaps amount to a kind of psychological preparation for war?*³⁶

The tone of the "Berlin Appeal" was both optimistic and apocalyptic. Endorsed in the center of Europe by people deeply anxious over the threat of a nuclear holocaust, the document challenged East German officialdom in the name of a philosophy of democratic peace. The underlying premise was that all weapons are lethal, regardless of the ideological preferences of those who wield them. "Make peace without weapons," a position voiced in the "Appeal," has become the basic demand of the independent peace movement in East Germany: "Make peace without weapons—this does not just mean ensuring our own survival. It also means stopping senselessly wasting our people's labor and wealth on producing the engines of war and equipping enormous armies of young men, who are thereby taken out of productive work."³⁷ Regarding the division of Germany, the "Appeal" advocated in unambiguous terms the withdrawal of all occupation troops from Germany and stressed the need for guarantees against intervention in the internal affairs of both German states.

The "Berlin Appeal" was a milestone in East German independent pacifism, whose importance cannot be exaggerated. By publicizing and denouncing the preparations for war and the militarization of public education, the document exposed the regime's ideological inconsistencies. The "Appeal" proclaimed an independent struggle for peace to be a civic duty, an unmistakable allusion to the failure of the official peace institu-

tions to articulate cogent and credible platforms. It foreshadowed the linkage between peace and human rights, including free speech, which became the hallmark of independent peace initiatives in the years to come.³⁸

In the first months of 1982, the Federation of the Evangelical Churches decided not to support the "Appeal," but to continue to oppose compulsory military conscription and training. Then, in March, the regime passed a law that decreed military training for women. In response the Catholic bishops, who had long refrained from criticizing the government, declared that "it is to be feared that this kind of education will awaken the readiness to resolve conflicts by force and will thus weaken the next generation's attitude toward peace."³⁹

An important meeting took place in April between the representatives of the Federation of Evangelical Churches and the government's representative Klaus Gysi, who told the churchmen that it was not the slogan "Swords into Plowshares" as such that had upset the authorities, but its impact on the readiness of the population to engage in military preparedness. He said outright that the emblem would weaken the GDR's defense capability.⁴⁰ Some bishops had meanwhile been trying to convince the radical pacifists that wearing the emblem would get them arrested and that the Church could not permanently protect them against police harassment. An incident during the Peace Forum in Dresden in February 1982 is indicative of the mounting tensions between the church hierarchy and the pacifists. When Bishop Hempel stated that the Church could resort to open opposition only in an extreme situation that did not now exist, a young participant burst out in frustration at such an "appeasing" stance: "I am 19 years old and nevertheless have nothing to lose. You talk and talk behind safe doors. Do you intend to keep putting us off until doomsday? What about the shining city on the hill?"⁴¹

This and similar disagreements stem from the fact that the Church has its own mission, which does not always coincide with the agenda of the independent

³⁸"The Berlin Appeal was the first independent peace manifesto in the 1980's to popularize linking calls for freedom of expression with the removal of weapons and peace activity." See *From Below: Independent Peace and Environmental Movements in Eastern Europe and the USSR. A Helsinki Watch Report*, New York, October 1987, p. 29. The theme of "democratic peace" has been extensively developed in the political thought of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia. See Václav Havel, et al., *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central-Eastern Europe*, Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1985; Václav Havel, "An Anatomy of Reticence," *Crosscurrents: A Yearbook of Central European Culture*, Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan, No. 5, pp. 1-23.

³⁹Hall, loc. cit., p. 203.

⁴⁰Maser, loc. cit., p. 40.

⁴¹Ibid.

³⁵Woods, op. cit., p. 195.

³⁶Ibid., p. 196.

³⁷Ibid.

peace movement. More often than not, the Church wants the unofficial peace groups to demonstrate self-restraint and moderation, as the Church's response to the "Appeal" showed: "The church leadership strongly advises against participating in the collection of signatures because this could generate misunderstandings and dangers not conducive to the necessary impartial discussion." Havemann protested against this statement adding, "I think these statements were formulated before all of the parties concerned realized that it is impossible to deal in this way with the 'Berlin Appeal' without losing all credibility in the international arena of the peace movement."⁴²

Many peace activists have resented the Church's "abstentionism"—its failure to espouse all their demands. In all fairness, however, religious institutions in communist countries can hardly be expected to champion essentially political causes, for their mission is more comprehensive and enduring than simply leading a political battle. While numerous basic communities and peace seminars were organized within the Evangelical Church,⁴³ the church hierarchy cannot let itself be identified completely with the independent peace movement. For its part, although the peace movement has benefited from close association with the Church, it has evolved its own philosophy, methods, goals, and organization.

In recent years, the authorities have reacted very differently to peace activities taking place under the auspices of the Church and those that are independent of it. The government's aim has been to channel independent activities back into church structures, but the divide between these two forms of political activism is often blurred. The tactic of the regime is to restrict independent peace and human rights campaigns to church-sponsored activities. This policy would allow the government to delimit "tolerable" from "intolerable" actions and to force the Church hierarchy to disavow the more radical independent initiatives. Werner Fischer, one of the leaders of the independent group "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights," has described the problem of the Evangelical Church, which is caught between mounting activism from below and mounting regime pressure: "The Church cannot but give in to that pressure. The relationship between the Church and the state is a constant balancing act for the Church leadership and they have to be prepared to say that they will tolerate and support certain activities but not others."⁴⁴

The Church has not aspired to become an actor in political confrontations or to set up a parallel power structure that would rival the government's authority. Yet, activities organized and encouraged by the

Church have greatly contributed to civic mobilization. The peace education undertaken within the walls of churches has paved the way for a new critical state of mind toward official ideology, and many of the independent peace activists began as religious pacifists.

Currently, the Evangelical Church remains a center for reflection and imaginative action on fundamental issues that inevitably lead to sensitive political topics, although Church criticism of the government is offered in the language of constructive dialogue. The nature of the East German political equation is that the State has shunned direct attacks on the Church and the Church has reciprocated with what might be called critical loyalty. As Bishop Werner Krusche put it: "We have learned that it is proper for a Church not to feel to be above or beyond the social order in which it exists, that it should instead consciously accept this order as the place allotted it by God for the testing of its faith and obedient discipleship, as its mission field and opportunity for service, and as the location for new, living experiences with the living God . . . not at a critical distance, but with critical—and that always means also constructive—participation."⁴⁵ Following the crackdown on dissidents in January-February 1988, Manfred Stolpe, the president of the East Berlin Church consistory, declared that the Church does not conceive of itself as a shelter for an internal GDR opposition:

As a church we are independent and self-reliant. We are different from the social institutions in this country, the parties and mass organizations, because we have other ties. In that respect we are different in our self-reliance from the normal functioning of the GDR society. I think, however, that society has accepted the existence of independent churches and that the churches act in accordance with their mission, carrying out certain tasks in society. That is what the church does, but not in conflict with the state. The church believes in its responsibility in its entirety."⁴⁶

Referring to the need for a gradual loosening of the East German political system, Stolpe expressed reserva-

⁴²Büscher et al., *Friedensbewegung*, pp. 284–88.

⁴³Pedro Ramet, *Cross and Commissar: The Politics of Religion in Eastern Europe and the USSR*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1987, pp. 80–96.

⁴⁴"Hidden Opposition of the GDR," (an interview with Werner Fischer), *East European Reporter* (London), Autumn 1988, p. 66. According to Fischer, the regime reserves for itself the right to decide which activities on church premises are church-related, and thus is able to create tensions between the church hierarchy and the independent groups.

⁴⁵Büscher, et al., *Friedensbewegung*, p. 233.

⁴⁶See "We Need a Culture Allowing for Difference of Opinion," an interview with Manfred Stolpe, in *Der Spiegel*, Feb. 15, 1988, pp. 23–27.

tions about the wisdom of public demonstrations to protest arrests: "Our country has been undergoing a slow and cautious change. The process is continuing. It has to continue. In that process of change, conflict of opinion—the habit of conflict of opinion—is a very important element. In my view that process of change should not be strained by elements and moments that this society is still unable to cope with."

Tensions over the peace movement have also appeared among clergymen. Younger priests tend to be more supportive of independent peace initiatives than the bishops. This does not mean that the Church hierarchy has withdrawn support from the independent peace movement, but rather that the Church leadership does not consider that current circumstances warrant their direct political involvement. It does not follow from this that the chances for the independent peace movement in the GDR are reduced or that the current compact between the church and the state, under which nongovernmental activities are to be confined within the Church, leaves no room for independent activism. As Christoph Semsdorf, who is active, recently put it: "As a pastor I am not interested in the problems of the country. I am interested in the problems of the people. There is a big difference."⁴⁷

As noted, the enactment in March 1982 of a military service law providing for the conscription of women brought a remonstrance from the Catholic hierarchy. It also called forth protests from independent activists. A protest letter to Honecker described the draft of women "not as an expression of their equal rights, but as inherently contrary to their nature as women." The 300 signatures of the letter protested against the obligation to serve a country whose population would be totally annihilated in a nuclear war. Therefore, they declared: "We are not willing to submit to this compulsory military service, and we demand that the possibility of refusal should be enshrined in the law. The right of refusal is necessary because our freedom of conscience is infringed by the promulgation of this law that extends the duty of military service to women."⁴⁸ A number of the signatories of this letter were harassed by the security police. The official response was made by General Heinz Hoffmann, then a Politburo member and the Defense Minister: "The members of our army, our workers, and our women and children know that peace and socialism are inseparably linked. Our soldiers bear arms for peace, and the better command they have over their

weapons, the better will peace be assured. As much as we would like to scrap our weapons, we know that one day socialism and peace will need both our plowshares and our swords."⁴⁹

An International Agenda

Links between the independent peace activists and critical intellectuals intensified after 1982. Writers Stefan Heym, Stephan Hermlin, Sarah Kirsch, Christa Wolf, Rolf Schneider, Jurek Becker and Jürgen Fuchs are among the cultural personalities whose views most influenced the young peace activists. Critical intellectuals and independent peace activists share the same anxiety about militaristic trends in East Germany and a nuclear armageddon. Christa Wolf masterfully expressed this state of mind in her novel *Cassandra*, where she wrote: "To prevent wars, people must criticize, in their own country, the abuses that occur in their own country. The role taboos play in the preparation of war. The number of shameful secrets keeps growing incessantly, boundlessly. How meaningless all censorship taboos become, and how meaningless the consequences of overstepping them, when your life is in danger."⁵⁰ She called for unilateral disarmament by the Warsaw Pact:

I conclude that the sensible course may be the one for which there is absolutely no hope: unilateral disarmament. (I hesitate: in spite of the Reagan Administration? Yes, since I see no other way out: in spite of it!) By choosing this course, we place the other side under moral pressure from the world public; we render superfluous the USSR's extortionary policy of arming itself to death; we renounce the atomic first-strike capability, and we devote all our efforts to the most effective defense measures. Assuming that this involves some risk, how much greater is the risk of further atomic arms, which every day increase the risk of atomic annihilation, by accident if nothing else?⁵¹

"Armed peace" is rejected as an absurdity both by peace activists and critical intellectuals: "Twice in this century, war has arisen out of 'armed peace,' each war more cruel than its predecessor. Brecht said exactly the same thing in the 1950's. If we do not arm ourselves, we will have peace. If we arm ourselves, we will have

⁴⁷See Thomas F. O'Boyle, "Winds of Change Coming from Moscow Stir Hopes for Liberty in East Germany," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Feb. 19, 1988.

⁴⁸See "Open Letter to Erich Honecker," in Woods, op. cit., pp. 197–99.

⁴⁹*Neues Deutschland*, Mar. 27–28, 1982.

⁵⁰See Christa Wolf, *Cassandra: A Novel and Four Essays*, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1984, p. 258.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, pp. 229–30.

war. I do not see how anyone could think differently on this."⁵²

At an East German writers meeting in April 1983, poet Stephan Hermlin deplored the government's lack of understanding of the peace movement even as he acknowledged the validity of some criticisms of it: "We must first recognize that not everything that goes by the name of an independent peace movement in the socialist countries is concerned with peace; for the most part it is also concerned with quite different things. But there are many people, especially young people, who passionately want to make their own personal contribution to peace, but are regarded with suspicion. That is something I regret."⁵³

Roland Jahn, a young peace activist who was expelled in 1983 but who continued his activities on behalf of the East German unofficial peace movement in the Federal Republic, characterized the independent peace movement as above all an association of like-minded people: "The movement is there in every person in the GDR. Among the young there are people who say, 'I can't accept things as they are anymore.' But it would only come to a mass movement of protest when things get a lot worse in a material sense."⁵⁴

In its main aspirations and concerns, then, pacifism is not only a political but also a cultural and moral movement. It challenges the system's operational values in the name of peace. Its main aim is to promote grass-roots participation in independent initiatives and a heightened awareness about the dangers generated by the competition between the two blocs. Bärbel Bohley, a leading activist of the group "Women for Peace" summed up the psychology of independent pacifism: "I have gotten used to not being afraid any more. That is the precondition if one wants to work for peace here."⁵⁵

In an "Open Letter to the West European Peace Movement," the poet Jürgen Fuchs, who was expelled from the GDR in 1977, wrote about the fate of East German pacifists and called for a new approach to the peace issue. In his view, as in that of most East European peace activists, peace is not an isolated issue. Peace without the guarantee of human rights is at

best illusion, if not a form of capitulation. Governments that do not ensure domestic peace, can not guarantee international peace: "The matter is not to compel the peace movement 'to carry the burden of the issues dealing with human rights'! In the East, as well as in the West, the peace movement will succeed only if it will manage to dismantle the missiles, prevent the war, and open the doors of the prison cells!"⁵⁶

The East German independent peace movement has refused to identify with the ideology of either bloc. An important document addressed by the East German independent peace movement to the July 1984 European Nuclear Disarmament Conference held in Perugia gave the rationale for this stance. The authors of the memorandum called the emerging cross-frontier independent peace movement the result of decentralized, grass-roots activities whose main objective was emancipation in the broadest sense: "It must therefore enjoy autonomy from the established political systems and must not be susceptible to being taken over by them. It must also enjoy autonomy from the two superpowers, and from those who represent their interests, and this in itself is the reason why the movement must transcend the two blocs."⁵⁷ The letter also depicted the effects of the persistent militarization of public life in the GDR and informed Western anti-nuclear campaigners about the pressures communist authorities exert on independent peace activists: "The population is to be disciplined by attempts to extend military forms of organization to every aspect of life (education of children, vocational training, civil defense exercises for working people) and by the doctrinaire, repressive behavior of the organs of state (in particular the security apparatus and the judiciary) towards all citizens who publicly espouse opinions that deviate from the dogma, not to speak of alternative projects."⁵⁸

The SED intensified the campaign against independent peace activists at the end of 1983. In December, graphic artist Bärbel Bohley and historian Ulrike Poppe, prominent members of the "Women for Peace" group, were arrested. In January 1984—after the two women had been on a hunger-strike for 22 days and an international campaign had been launched on their behalf, they were released.⁵⁹ But on April 20, 1984, Sylvan Goethe, a less well-known activist in an unofficial peace group, was sentenced to 20 months in jail for having cir-

⁵²Ibid., p. 268.

⁵³For Hermlin's speech, see Woods, op. cit., pp. 200–01. More recently, Hermlin has called for the democratization of public life in the GDR, but he also criticized those who invoke Rosa Luxemburg and Mikhail Gorbachev only as a cover for their desire to emigrate to the West. See *Der Spiegel*, Feb. 6, 1989, pp. 69–80.

⁵⁴See James M. Markham, "In Militaristic East Germany, the Pacifists Mobilize," *The New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1983.


⁵⁵Quoted by Elizabeth Pond, "East Germany's Unique Peace Movement Faces Harder Times," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Jan. 5, 1984.

⁵⁶See Jürgen Fuchs, "Open Letter to the West European Peace Movement," *L'Alternative* (Paris), March–April 1983, pp. 28–29.

⁵⁷See "On Questions of the Autonomy and 'Ideological Independence' of the Peace Movement in East and West," in Woods, op. cit., p. 204.

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 205–06.

⁵⁹See *From Below*, p. 32.



East German dissident graphic artist Bärbel Bohley holding a banner the top of which reads: "We Hunger for Disarmament."

—DPA.

culated information abroad "harmful to the interests of the GDR."⁶⁰

The development of an unofficial peace movement that unites people of different political and ideological views has been a major challenge to the SED's ideological and political monopoly. The party decided to step up its "educational" activities in order to prevent the spread of pacifist views. The media were instructed to pillory the independent peace movement for playing into the hands of Western intelligence agencies. In December 1984, the socialist and pacifist Rolf Schälke was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for "incite-

ment against the state" (Article 106 of the Constitution) and "slander against the state" (Article 220). In reality, his "crime" consisted of having opposed the deployment of both NATO and Soviet missiles on German soil.

Schälke's case evinced the regime's estrangement from people who once espoused its own ideology. Schälke was born in Moscow where his German communist parents lived in exile. In the 1950's, his father was a prominent figure in the SED. In 1961, Schälke received a degree in nuclear physics from Moscow University and started a successful career at the Central Institute of Nuclear Research at Rossendorf (GDR). A "critical Marxist" in the Havemann vein, Schälke was expelled from the party for his "heretical" views and lost his job. Even after his March 1984 arrest, he continued to criticize censorship and repression in the GDR. In the Dresden courtroom before his sentencing in December, he expressed the ideological quandary of many dissenters in East Germany faced with a state apparatus that claims to represent the working class: "I am and will remain a Marxist and will not accept the label of enemy of the state."⁶¹

Instead of deterring the pacifists, the official campaign convinced them that they needed a broader agenda. In January 1985 they decided to address the relationship between peace and human rights issues in a systematic way. Such activists of the unofficial peace movement as Reiner Eppelmann, Ralf Hirsch, and Wolfgang Templin, wrote a letter to Honecker that was signed by more than 300 people. It called for the full implementation of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the demilitarization of public life and the creation of an alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors. The letter also condemned travel restrictions and demanded freedom of expression and the abolition of censorship. The government chose to ignore this memorandum. Therefore, in July 1985, a new appeal was sent to the official youth organization declaring that the main objective of the independent peace movement was to revive a civil society: "Peaceful assembly and the founding of initiatives, organizations, associations, clubs, and political parties should not be dependent on official permission. The unrestricted work of independent groups would protect society from petrifying in an inflexible administrative order that inhibits creativity among its citizens."⁶² This view represents the new evolutionism that has inspired the struggles of the Polish opposition and has become the shared outlook of democratic activists in East-Cen-

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt/Main), Dec. 8, 1984.

⁶²See A. Winton Jackson, *Introduction to "Appeal on the Occasion of UN Peace Year," East European Reporter*, Spring 1986, pp. 60-61.

tral Europe.⁶³ Its major goal is to restore to society its inherent rights and to bring the party-state apparatus under civic control by making it legally accountable.

In September 1985, activists released a new document critical of the travel restrictions imposed by the authorities: "It is unacceptable that we should receive our rights only as a favor granted to us, provided that we refrain from independent political activity. We demand the repeal of the prohibition against foreign travel that has been imposed on us. Only the implementation of human rights for all and a comprehensive expansion of the freedom of travel will help persuade people to remain willingly in this country, thereby reducing the number of émigrés."⁶⁴

The progressively more radical demands of the independent peace movement led to friction in its relations with the Church. In January 1986 the leadership of the Berlin-Brandenburg Protestant church cancelled a projected human rights seminar. A number of activists thereupon decided to found a new group called the "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights," which intends to function "throughout the GDR." At the same time, four prominent peace activists (Peter Grimm, Hirsch, Eppelmann, and Templin) sent an appeal to the government of the GDR on the occasion of the UN Peace Year. Arguing that "only a state at peace with itself internally can work convincingly for global peace," the authors suggested ways to foster internal peace in the GDR. They asked the government to show more trust in its subjects and end restrictions on travel. The appeal called for revisions of the various clauses in the penal code invoked against dissidents, saying that "the practice of juridical persecution for political activity is altogether questionable." The authors asked for changes in the laws restricting freedom of assembly, public meeting and association. They called for the nomination of independent candidates in municipal and parliamentary elections, because democracy necessitates public participation. The appeal also demanded that

the regime recognize the validity of conscientious objection through the creation of an alternative civilian service separate from military structures.⁶⁵ These constant pressures from below have borne fruit: although the asked-for alternative service has not been established, since 1986 no conscientious objector has been imprisoned in the GDR.

Turn to Political Activism

Some of the peace movement's most articulate spokespersons have come to realize the need to transcend the self-limiting peace agenda and tackle the issue of political change. This does not mean that East German pacifists have abandoned their original goals, but that they have concluded that internal peace cannot be attained without genuine dialogue between the rulers and citizens with different opinions and some measure of popular control over the government. They demand political freedoms, particularly the rights to free expression and association, as an inherent right.

The effort to loosen political controls cannot be divorced from what might be called the *glasnost* effect. "*Glasnost* from below" has become a rallying cry for many independent groups in the GDR. Gorbachev's calls for openness and general restructuring have stirred independent political activism not only in the USSR, but also, and sometimes more forcefully, in East-Central Europe. Like their peers in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, the East German human rights and peace activists see Soviet reformism as providing a chance for radical transformations in their own countries. Many East European critical intellectuals see the present moment as the right time to elaborate a strategy

*based on independent associations, a "parallel polis" influencing society through its activities and growing into a nationwide movement. . . . Such a strategy conceives of the existing independent movement as the nucleus of a new society. It is not incompatible with reformism, least of all with the notion of reform from below. . . . Out of the ruins of the old unreformable bureaucratic "transmission-belts" new organizations, institutions and initiatives are born. Instead of repression and manipulation, they strive for the emancipation of society by creating the conditions necessary for the emancipation of each individual.*⁶⁶

In April 1986, a petition urging the authorities to engage in a dialogue with society was prepared by 21 members of the independent peace movement for the delegates to the 11th SED Congress.⁶⁷ In its main ori-

⁶³The new evolutionism aims at gradual and slow change. But this does not mean that the movement for change will always be peaceful—that it will not require sacrifices and casualties The democratic opposition must be constantly and incessantly visible in public life, must create political facts by organizing mass actions, must formulate alternative programs. Everything else is an illusion." See Adam Michnik, *Letters From Prison and Other Essays*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1986, pp. 145–47.

⁶⁴*East European Reporter*, Spring 1986, p. 61.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 62.

⁶⁶See Petr Uhl, "A Czechoslovakian Perspective," *New Politics* (New York), Winter 1988, p. 109.

⁶⁷For the quotations in this and the next two paragraphs, see "Invitation to Dialogue: GDR Citizens Petition SED Party Congress," *East European Reporter*, Summer 1986, pp. 44–47; the full text is in *GDR Peace News* (a newsletter published by the GDR Working Group of END), Summer 1986, No. 3.

entation, the petition echoed the late Robert Havemann's philosophy of political reform and individual rights. The signatories condemned the authoritarian bureaucratic measures adopted by the party leadership to suffocate criticism from below. They dealt extensively with the failure of the regime's economic, social and cultural policies. They deplored the stultifying effects of constraints imposed on society: "Cultural needs are not determined by the people but are created and artificially manipulated by the party according to pragmatic criteria. Cultural policy shaped by the party is a channel for ideological infiltration of all areas of the arts and culture, thus hindering the release of artistic creativity." The absence of genuine political participation, wrote the authors, has been one of the main causes of widespread resignation and apathy. The regime had consistently ignored basic societal needs, single-mindedly pursuing its own interests. Premilitary training has been made a condition for securing higher education or vocational training. The militarization of the educational system has aggravated its already deplorable state: "There is an almost complete absence of education in democratic attitudes. The shortcomings in this field are alarming. Many people have difficulty in formulating their needs and demands, or even in recognizing them only partially. Instruction in the rights of the individual as well as in the means by which those rights can be enforced plays hardly any role in the education system."

On the peace issue, the authors expressed their appreciation for the numerous official initiatives to end the arms race. But they questioned their relevance as long as the party continued to militarize society and to reject dialogue with it. Moreover, the authors deplored "another peculiar process—to be found also in the Western sphere—in the relation between domestic and foreign policy: the greater the number of bilateral and multilateral contacts at the state level (which are to be welcomed), the more vigorously are politically important contacts below that level obstructed." In other words, they believed that the GDR government had monopolized contacts with the West and hindered cooperation at the grass-roots level. However, international cooperation between autonomous groups must be possible so that citizens may participate in decisions of vital importance to them.

The document suggested a strategy aimed at "the withdrawal in the medium term of the GDR from the Warsaw Pact to encourage the process of military disengagement. This applies also to the withdrawal from our territory of foreign troops together with their weapons of mass destruction. The long overdue settlement of questions relating to the legal status arising from the

still existing rights of the victors of World War II would then also have to be achieved. If the complete sovereignty of the GDR is to be established, the question of the outstanding peace treaties with both German states can no longer remain a taboo subject." As a first step in this direction, the authors proposed that a forum be created to organize a national dialogue on peace issues. The government-sponsored Peace Council could not play this role: "Its dependence on the foreign information department of the Central Committee of the SED means that its sole function is to be a mouthpiece and presenter of the peace policy of the state." An independent peace council is therefore necessary so that it would have the support of the unofficial peace groups: "The peace and security policy of the GDR cannot simply be left to the party and government. Peace is a human right and thus each member of society must be able to discuss and help determine everything that affects this right." The conclusion called for a "constructive dialogue": "There are no ready-made solutions to the problems referred to so far. They are not insoluble, yet we can only overcome them in an open discussion in which many partners both have equal status and can participate creatively in the social process."

This appeal highlights the fact that the peace groups face not only the repressive apparatus of their particular dictatorships but also the reality of Soviet domination in the region and their country's subordination to the Kremlin's global strategy. Their political programs thus include suggestions for domestic democratization as well as proposals for the general reassessment of East-West relations. Independent pacifists in Eastern Europe refuse to separate these goals precisely because they understand the link between their regimes' domestic and foreign policies.

Similar concerns were expressed in October 1986, when 16 East German peace and human rights activists signed a "Joint Declaration from Eastern Europe" on the 30th anniversary of the Hungarian revolution. The document, signed by 123 peace and human rights activists from four East European countries—Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland—proclaimed the traditions and experiences of the Hungarian revolution of 1956 to be their common heritage and the inspiration for their present efforts: "We proclaim our common determination to struggle for political democracy in our countries, for their independence, for pluralism founded on the principles of self-government, for the peaceful unification of a divided Europe and for its democratic integration, as well as for the rights of the minorities."⁶⁸

(fn. 68 appears on p. 104)

The significance of the joint declaration—a real watershed in the development of dissident cross-frontier cooperation—was not missed by the East German authorities. The official propagandists clung to the description of the Hungarian revolution as a “fascist rebellion.” An article published in the Berlin newspaper *Weissenseer Blätter* even said: “All who, knowing what had happened there, identify themselves with the revolt of the Hungarian Arrow Cross, identify themselves with something that can only be compared with the Black Shirts in Italy and the Brown Shirts in Germany.” The East German signatories filed a libel suit against the author, a professor of theology at Humboldt University in East Berlin. The office of the Chief Public Procurator of the GDR refused to take action. To add insult to injury, the office based its refusal on Article 27 of the GDR Constitution—which guarantees the right to freedom of opinion. In an open letter to the Public Procurator, Gerd Poppe, one of the claimants, discredited the official version of the Hungarian revolution. At the same time, he expressed the political philosophy of the independent movements: “the use of force to achieve political aims is rejected by the majority of East and West European peace and liberation movements today.”⁶⁹

Civic Activism

For a time in 1986 and 1987, it seemed that the government would avoid direct actions against the peace and human rights movement. Following the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986, the government allowed some public discussion of nuclear energy. Independent peace activists and Church leaders called for an overall reassessment of the country's nuclear energy program. Hundreds of East German citizens petitioned the authorities to stop using nuclear energy by the year 1990.

Political developments in the Soviet Union and in other East European countries also gave new impetus to the protest movement in the GDR.⁷⁰ Moreover, increased contacts with West German peace and ecology groups, the so-called Greens, contributed to the self-confidence of East German peace and human rights activists. The West German “alternative” groups become increasingly supportive of “East Germany's protest movement, which is demanding more freedom, *glasnost*’ and a voice in how the country is run.”⁷¹ The idea of a “third way,” neither communist nor capitalist, seemed an appealing alternative to the frozen divisions imposed by the official rules of the game.

In June 1986, activists associated with the group “Initiative for Peace and Human Rights”—a group founded

at the beginning of 1986—started to publish *Grenzfall*, a monthly bulletin on peace, ecology, and human rights issues. The title is deliberately ambiguous. It means “borderline case” but also plays on the word *Grenze* (border). It intends to indicate the precarious status of the opposition and the much too visible East-West border that has become part and parcel of East German political reality.⁷² In the beginning of 1987, another independent political journal—*Umweltblätter* (“Environmental Pages”)—was launched by members of the Ecology Center sponsored by the Church of Zion in East Berlin. Both publications provide coverage on the concerns and activities of the alternative social movements in the GDR.

Grenzfall has reported on current East German political, social, and cultural issues, as well as on the activities of unofficial peace and human rights activists in other countries of the Soviet bloc. The publication corrects the distorted versions of independent activities disseminated through the official media. For example, from June 6 to 8, 1987, the East German police took action against hundreds of rock fans who had gathered at the Brandenburg Gate to hear Whitsuntide concerts on the Western side of the Berlin Wall. Manhandled by plainclothes policemen, the youth started to sing the “Internationale” and chanted “The Wall Must Go!,” “Rosa Luxemburg!” and “Gorbachev!” The official media essentially ascribed the youth's behavior to “Western provocation.” But in an article in *Grenzfall*, peace and human rights activists Templin and Grimm gave a different interpretation of what started as a melee and then turned into a political demonstration: “It became clear how thin is the cover under which social conflicts in the GDR are concealed. The massive and brutal deployment of police and security forces produced not intimidation but rapid politicization. Naturally there were no political conceptions and programs behind the calls for Gorbachev, the singing of the ‘Internationale,’ the demands for freedom and democracy, and an end to

⁶⁸*Le Monde*, (Paris), Oct. 2, 1986. East German activists and members of Czechoslovakia's Charter 77 had signed a joint declaration in November 1984 to protest the deployment of more Soviet weapons in their countries. The declaration deplored the division of Europe into hostile blocs. See *The Independent* (London), Nov. 23, 1984. For a general assessment of the concerted actions of East-Central European dissidents and critical intellectuals, see Vladimir Tismaneanu, “Dissent in the Gorbachev Era,” *Orbis*, Summer 1987, pp. 234–43.

⁶⁹See Gerd Poppe's “Open Letter to the Public Prosecutor,” *East European Reporter*, Spring 1987, pp. 53–54.

⁷⁰For the intensification of dissident activities in the *glasnost*’ era, see Michael Waller, *Peace, Power, and Protest: Eastern Europe in the Gorbachev Era*, London, The Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, 1988.

⁷¹See Patricia Clough, “Germany's Divided Young Discover Unity in Dissent,” *The Independent*, Feb. 16, 1988.

⁷²See *From Below*, p. 36.

the Wall. They indicate the pressure, particularly among the younger generation, for more free space and fundamental democratization." More important, Templin and Grimm pointed to the lessons the independent peace movement should draw from the June clashes: "The East German peace movement and activist circles must ask themselves to what extent their persistence in self-contained modes of work, the writing of letters and petitions, and their self-isolation, is bypassing many conflicts and hopes. The June events will come to play a considerable role in the peace movement debate over independent activity, new points of departure, and new forms of action."⁷³

Not everybody in the East German dissident community has high expectations of Gorbachev's policies, however. For example, one contributor to *Grenzfall* found "somewhat inappropriate" the demonstrators' eagerness to identify themselves with Gorbachev's strategy of reforms from above. In his view, there is an enormous difference between chanting Rosa Luxemburg's name and the unfounded enthusiasm for the Soviet general secretary who remains a representative of the party bureaucracy. He went on: "The demonstrators' singing of the 'Internationale,' even if horribly out of tune, but especially the chorus of calls for Rosa Luxemburg during the Stasi [security police] attack at the Gate, seems to me more valid in this context than the name of Mikhail Gorbachev. The invocation of Rosa Luxemburg outside the false appropriation of her person and the misuse and the distortion of her politics by the usual parades and state organizations remains a wonderful gesture, an embittered statement of the real domestic politics of the regime and proof of the degeneration of its original goals. It clearly says: this state is a caricature of socialism and has nothing in common with the ideas and the struggle of revolutionary spirits like Rosa Luxemburg."⁷⁴

Other protests occurred in the summer of 1987. On the occasion of the state celebrations of the 750th anniversary of the founding of Berlin, the Protestant Church was for the first time allowed to organize its annual Church Festival (*Kirchentag*) in East Berlin. The venue led to conflicts between peace activists and Church authorities, who wanted to keep the festival within bounds tolerable to the state authorities. The annual "Peace Workshop" was canceled and the *Kirchentag* agenda modified. The independent activists convened their own "*Kirchentag von Unten*" ("Church Festival from Below"—KvU). An article published in *Umweltblätter* described the tensions between the Church hierarchy and the autonomous initiatives, criticizing the Church for "its increasingly repressive policy" toward peace and environmentalist groups in its parishes, and said

that the alienation of the top Church hierarchy from the independent activists "showed itself most clearly in its treatment of the 'basic' groups, who were increasingly excluded as 'freeloaders' on the Church." The article urged the Church to offer a platform to these basic groups who "belong to a genuine Christian tradition and prefigure renewal in the Church."⁷⁵ Slogans like "*Glasnost* in the State and the Church" or "the Church from Below for more Christianity, democracy, and human rights" capture the ethos of grass-roots pacifism in the GDR. The "Church from Below" has grown—it has more than 1,000 members—and some prominent Church figures have deplored the strains in the Church's relations with these and other independent activists.

The peace movement advocates the democratization of the body politic and the transformation of society into a real partner of the government in the exercise of power. They feel that if the authorities want trust, both internally and internationally, they must accept dialogue with the independent groups who voice the critical concerns of the population. In their view, official pledges of peaceful intentions are hypocritical as long as the communist regime does not fulfill all the obligations assumed under the Helsinki Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In November 1986, 30 East German citizens, most of them associated with the "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights" joined hundreds of activists from other countries in signing a memorandum addressed to the citizens and governments of all the CSCE signatories. The document insisted that, in order to become real, *détente* must reach beyond the governmental level to societies. The formula "*détente* from below" sums up this outlook: "We reject the use of military and paramilitary forces or secret service activities to suppress social changes within a country as well as any interference by such forces or threats of such interference in the internal affairs of other countries. At the same time we strongly advocate trans-frontier solidarity, mutual support and cooperation between people and groups working for peace, civil liberties, trade union rights, social justice, women's emancipation, or ecological goals. . . . Mutual trust cannot be created solely by governments. It must be built up between citizens as well."⁷⁶

⁷³See Peter Grimm and Wolfgang Templin, "The Internationale at the Brandenburg Gate," translated in A. Winton Jackson, "The New Samizdat," *Across Frontiers* (Berkeley, CA), Winter 1988, p. 16.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 16–17.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁷⁶See "Giving Real Life to the Helsinki Accords: A Memorandum to Citizens, Groups, and Governments of All CSCE Countries," published by European Network for East-West Dialogue, Berlin, November 1986; see also Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Dissent in the Gorbachev Era," *loc. cit.*, pp. 238–40.

Communist ideology has strongly opposed pacifism, which it blames for weakening the will to resist "imperialist aggression." Pacifist stances and attitudes may be desirable in the West, but they have no place in the behavior prescribed for the "socialist citizen." This attitude is reflected in the GDR's treatment of conscientious objectors. Service in military construction units in East Germany is not a satisfactory alternative to conscientious objectors because construction soldiers (*Bausoldaten*) must build military facilities (airfields, barracks, etc.). Moreover, former construction soldiers suffer job discrimination. The "total conscientious objectors," those who refuse to serve both in military and in construction units, used to receive prison sentences of 18 to 26 months.⁷⁷

Both the Church and the independent peace movement have long called for the establishment of a genuine "social service for peace."⁷⁸ The status of conscientious objectors remains a fundamental concern for independent activists and may well prompt further spontaneous initiatives in Soviet-bloc countries. An announcement in January 1988 by the Polish government of its plan to introduce an alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors has prompted East German activists to exert more pressure on their own authorities.⁷⁹ Fifteen East German activists signed an appeal with other East European peace activists on behalf of conscientious objectors. The appeal, which was sent to the Vienna follow-up conference of the CSCE, welcomed the January and March 1987 resolutions of the Council of Europe and the United Nations Human Rights Commission, respectively, which defined conscientious objection as a universal human right.⁸⁰

A New Repressive Wave

The East German regime has shown no inclination to respond to the calls of independent groups—and thus to legitimize them; instead, it has tried to silence them. In November 1987, the authorities organized a police raid on the Church of Zion in East Berlin, where they arrested two members of a peace and ecological group and confiscated printing and mimeographing supplies as well as unofficial publications considered "hostile to

the state." The raid of the church of Zion was aimed at the publishers of *Grenzfall*, which was located on the church's premises and which had become the principal organ calling for political reform.⁸¹

Without disavowing *Grenzfall*, Evangelical Church leaders reiterated that they did not take part in political opposition. While conceding that the Church's role in the GDR consists also of serving as a "safety valve" for the oppressed, Rev. Günther Krusche, general superintendent of the Evangelical Church of East Berlin, noted: "Our critics say, 'Jesus was here for everybody, but you throw them out.' We don't, but the church should stay the church. The task of the church is not the same as that of the political opposition."⁸²

In retrospect, the November 1987 crackdown appears to have been only a dress rehearsal for a wider anti-oppositional action. Disliking developments in the USSR, where thousands of independent groups, associations, and publications have sprung up due to the *glasnost* policy, and concerned over potentially disruptive developments in the GDR, the SED leadership decided on a determined campaign against all sources of political turmoil. Thus, during the first two months of 1988, the authorities organized the largest crackdown on dissidents in at least 10 years.⁸³ According to information from church sources, between January and mid-March 1988, more than 500 men and women were detained. Often, an application to emigrate to West Germany was reason for detention. More than 150 persons were sentenced to prison terms of 18 to 24 months in the wake of the outbreak of protests. Some were kept in prison while awaiting trial; those who were released had to report daily to the local police.⁸⁴ The crackdown indicates that Honecker and his comrades do not intend to experiment with pluralism, even of the "socialist" variety promoted by Károly Grósz, Wojciech Jarużelski, or Mikhail Gorbachev. They seem united in opposing internal democratization and are known to resist Soviet prodding to do so.⁸⁵

⁸¹*Grenzfall* appeared monthly during 1986–87 with a run of about 1,000 copies.

⁸²See Henry Kamm, "In East Berlin, Dissenters Resist a Crackdown," *The New York Times*, Nov. 30, 1987.

⁸³See Barbara Donovan, "Crackdown on Dissidents in the GDR," *RFE, RAD Background Report*/22, Feb. 17, 1988.

⁸⁴*FBIS-EEU*, Apr. 1, 1988, p. 11.

⁸⁵An unmistakable sign of the SED elite's displeasure with the current de-Stalinization campaign in the Soviet Union were the attacks on the Soviet anti-Stalinist film *Repentance* in the pages of the official party newspaper *Neues Deutschland* and the FDJ paper *Junge Welt*. See Barbara Donovan "Criticism in the GDR of the Soviet Film *Repentance*," *RFE, RAD Background Report*/215, Nov. 9, 1987. See also E. Kautsky, "Gorbachev and the GDR," *ibid.*, Dec. 16, 1986; and Barbara Donovan, "The GDR's Attitude Toward the Soviet 'Reform'," *ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1987.

⁷⁷See *From Below*, pp. 38–40; Barbara Donovan, "Conscientious Objection in Eastern Europe," *RFE, RAD Background Report*/9, Jan. 26, 1988.

⁷⁸See Edgar Lamm, "Highest, Holy, or Holiest Obligation," *Deutsche Tagespost/Katolische Zeitung für Deutschland* (Würzburg), Jan. 15, 1987.

⁷⁹See Martin Sieff, "Growing Pacifist Movement Gains Concessions in Poland," *The Washington Times*, Mar. 30, 1988.

⁸⁰See John Tagliabue, "In East Bloc, an Expanding Network of Dissenters," *The New York Times*, Mar. 22, 1988.



Youthful participants at a church festival in East Berlin on June 28, 1987, with placards calling for "Glasnost in State and Church," and representing the "Church from Below" in asking for "More Christianity, Democracy, and Human Rights."

—DPA.

The crackdown was precipitated by the attempt of a group of human rights and peace activists to stage a demonstration parallel to the official annual January 17th rally commemorating the death in 1919 of the founders of the Communist Party of Germany, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. Human rights activists tried to unfold banners calling for the democratization of the political system. The party newspaper *Neues Deutschland* accused the demonstrators of intending to "maliciously disturb the mourning procession." A week later, the security police expelled 54 of those arrested (as well as members of their families) who had previously applied for emigration visas. On January 25, six leading dissidents were arrested. Eleven activists were eventually sentenced to prison terms ranging from six months to one year for illegal assembly. Seven of East Germany's most prominent dissidents, including the singer Stefan Krawczyk, were investigated for "treasonable ties with the West."⁸⁶

What followed was a forceful demonstration of solidarity with those arrested. Night after night, in East Berlin and in some 30 other cities throughout the GDR, people gathered for vigils in Protestant churches. Church personalities used these meetings to speak of the need to liberalize the political system. The Rev. Manfred Becker, head of the Berlin and Brandenburg synod, noted the widespread discontent with Honecker's reluctance to emulate the Soviet policies: "Much hope in our country is linked with the name Gorbachev . . . 'Glasnost' and *perestroika* belong on the agenda in our country too."⁸⁷ On January 30, in a statement read before more than 2,000 people gathered in an East Berlin church, the Evangelical Church leadership urged the government to release the imprisoned political ac-

⁸⁶See Barbara Donovan, "Crackdown on Dissidents . . ." loc. cit.

⁸⁷See John Tagliabue, "East Germany Faces Unrest Among Youth," *The New York Times*, Feb. 4, 1988.

tivists. On February 4, the London-based East European Cultural Foundation published the text of a petition protesting the persecution of East German peace and human rights activists, which was signed by 257 representatives of human rights groups and by private individuals from the Soviet Union and other East European countries. Such international solidarity is extremely important for activists in communist states, who believe that international public opinion—from both the East and the West—will ultimately persuade local leaders to reconsider some of their more repressive measures.

In fact, after the strong domestic and international reactions, all the dissidents were released in early February. Some of them, including Krawczyk and his wife Freya Klier, emigrated. In a statement to the West German press, Krawczyk asserted that he and his wife had not left the GDR voluntarily. According to Krawczyk, the East German officials refused to allow him and his wife to remain at liberty in the GDR but gave them the choice of emigrating or facing up to 12 years' imprisonment on charges of treason.⁸⁸ Some members of the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, as well as human rights activist Vera Wollenberger of the "Church from Below," left the GDR. They also denied the government's allegation that they left the GDR voluntarily. The government thus continues to expel the most outspoken members of the peace and human rights movement to eliminate political turmoil.

An unusual move during this clampdown on dissent was the government's decision to issue passports to two of the leading members of the "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights" (Bärbel Bohley and Werner Fischer) to go to Great Britain and to allow them to return to the GDR after six months. According to Fischer, the authorities sought pretexts to accuse the two activists of having engaged in anti-GDR propaganda in the West and consequently to withdraw their passports.⁸⁹ How-



Recently expelled East German peace activists Freya Klier and Stefan Krawczyk.

—Klaus Mehner.

ever, Fischer and Bohley were allowed to return to the GDR in August 1988.

The 1988 crackdown was aptly described by Krawczyk and Klier as a neo-Stalinist attempt to resist political change and safeguard the dictatorship. In economic relations, the SED leadership is increasingly Western-oriented, but domestically it seems to favor the type of rigid control of which the most extreme example today is found in Nicolae Ceaușescu's Romania.⁹⁰ According to Manfred Stolpe, a leading Evangelical Church personality, the SED Politburo is divided between those who regret the bygone era of monolithic dictatorship and those who fear the grim prospect of ending up on the disastrous Romanian course. An ominous sign of the latter possibility were the "fraternal greetings" sent to "esteemed comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu," together with the award of a Karl Marx Order,

⁸⁸Ten years ago, the East German regime levelled similar accusations of "contacts with Western secret services" against social critic Rudolf Bahro, who was sentenced to a prison term of eight years for having written a critical analysis of "really existing socialism." Bahro was released from jail under a general amnesty and then expelled into the FRG where he has become a prominent member of the Green Party. On many occasions, Bahro has advocated a rapprochement between West and East German alternative movements based on an anti-bloc alliance that would abolish the East-West conflict: "When you look at the opposition in Hungary 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and now in Poland, and compare that with what exists in the GDR, you will see that this nonantagonistic eco-pacifist movement, which is not simply seeking a confrontation with Honecker, is much more a German than an Eastern-bloc opposition. The identity of this youthful, deeply-rooted opposition in both German states demonstrates that, beyond the Federal Republic and the GDR, there is still Germany." See Rudolf Bahro, *From Red to Green: Interviews with New Left Review*, London, Verso and New Left Books, 1984, p. 194. In fact, pacifism in East Germany has taken a path increasingly like that of other East-Central European opposition movements.

⁸⁹"Hidden Opposition in the GDR," loc. cit., p. 66.

⁹⁰For insightful views on the new dogmatic freeze in East Germany, see the discussion with the GDR protesters Freya Klier and Stefan Krawczyk in *Der Spiegel*, Feb. 8, 1988, pp. 27–32; see also Susan Buckingham, "The Freedom to Think Differently: A Report on the Latest Crackdowns on GDR Independents," *East European Reporter*, March 1988, pp. 55–57.

on the occasion of his 70th birthday in January 1988. Ironically, praises of the Romanian dictator were published on the front page of the same issue of the party daily *Neues Deutschland* that announced, on its second page, the arrest of Krawczyk and the other peace and civil rights activists.⁹¹

The expulsion of Krawczyk and the other prominent activists gave the SED a temporary political victory. Not only did the authorities rid themselves of some of the most articulate spokesmen for political change, but the expulsions convinced many people that joining the peace and human rights groups and demonstrating with them could be the easiest—and fastest—way to emigrate. This situation helps the authorities to paint the independent groups as nothing more than a springboard for emigration.

The rate of emigration has also become a major concern for those peace and human rights activists who want to continue their struggle in the GDR. Heated discussions have been reported between those whose main objective is to leave the GDR and those who want to remain and promote changes from within. The regime's decision to expel Krawczyk dealt a forceful blow to the human rights and peace movement because those who remained felt betrayed on learning about the emigration of a man who symbolized the decision to stay and seek the improvement of domestic conditions. As for the Church, although it has pressed for a more tolerant emigration policy, its leaders too have been concerned over the population drain. Hirsch, one of the leaders of the "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights" who was expelled from the GDR, has bitterly pointed to the predicament of those who do not view their political activism as a fast track for emigration: "One has to say that the demonstrators are mainly people who want to leave the GDR. They have now learned that if one takes part in a demonstration, one quickly gets out of the country. The people who want to change the GDR from within, who want to stay in this country, will have many

difficulties."⁹² In other words, they will have to work hard to repair their credibility. Hirsch was not speaking only for himself when he added: "I am faced with the problem that I am here [in the FRG] and actually I wanted to stay in my country, to change something in the country where I lived. I do not feel well, at all. And, of course, I am sad. Now everything that I have been doing for years has been ruined."

Prospects

Yet, the grass-roots human rights and peace initiatives only intensified in the aftermath of the January 1988 arrests. Far from being ephemeral or marginal, such activities are the outcome of a long process of political radicalization of East German youth. The youth revolt originates in a profound disaffection with the socialist model as it exists in the GDR. For many young East Germans, participation in the new social movements afford an opportunity to gain a sense of belonging and of doing something that is both practical and noble.

An effect of complex and contradictory social, political, and cultural processes, the independent peace and human rights movement can no longer be suppressed by decree. It represents a search for innovative forms of political struggle and organization fundamentally at odds with the bureaucratic logic of the existing system. Precisely because of its broad social appeal, the movement could gradually structure itself into a democratic opposition, much as has happened in Poland and Hungary.

In East Germany, what started as a moral initiative for demilitarization of society has now turned into a rapidly growing political movement. Despite steady police harassment, there are now about 200 independent groups active in the GDR, in and out of the Church. According to Fischer, each group has between 20 and 100 members, who in turn are part of various social organizations where they can gradually disseminate their views and gain influence. Thus, these groups represent "an enormous critical potential."⁹³

The Evangelical Church has helped the young activists to develop both their independent stance toward the authorities and the sense of mutual solidarity. In a letter to Honecker, Bärbel Bohley pointed out the need to bridge the abyss between "them" and "us," between the rulers and the ruled:

This state does not belong only to you or to me, but to all of us. Like me, there are many people who feel

⁹¹For an extensive analysis of the youth rebellion in the GDR and its implications for the political culture in that country, see *Der Spiegel*, Feb. 1, 1988, pp. 18–27. The Karl Marx Order was personally given to Ceaușescu by Erich Honecker during the Romanian leader's visit to East Berlin in November 1988. Perhaps not entirely by coincidence, the ceremony was held on the first anniversary of the popular riots in Romania's second most important city, Brașov. East German dissidents who had planned to protest Ceaușescu's repressive policy were kept under house arrest during the Romanian president's stay in East Germany.

⁹²Interview with Ralf Hirsch in *Profil* (Vienna), Feb. 22, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Feb. 23, 1988, p. 20. Hirsch's life epitomizes the ordeals of independent pacifists in East Germany: "Once, I was imprisoned for two years on charges of subversion; I had distributed fliers against military service. But arrests for between 24 and 48 hours—well, there were at least 50 in the past 10 years. For years, I was taken from my apartment or arrested off the street almost every Friday morning."

⁹³See "Hidden Opposition in the GDR," loc. cit., p. 65.

*homeless in this country. Like you, there are many who feel at home. But there are also people who have established themselves in their tiny corners and who mistake their niche for home; they dare not express their aspirations and views publicly. I am not writing you in the hope of having my own situation changed, but to have you contribute to change in the situation in the GDR in such a way that all persons can express their opinions without being threatened in their existence.*⁹⁴

Many activists still remain in the GDR to continue the struggle. The political agenda of the "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights" has become a dynamic factor in the struggle for internal change. And recent developments have shown that the authorities' attempts to compromise the movement have not succeeded. In January 1989, an open letter was addressed to Honecker by members of a group opposed to "the practice and principle of demarcation" (*Abgrenzung*) between the two German states. The authors took issue with the East German leader's statement that the Berlin Wall served the "well-understood interest of the GDR's population." It noted: "Everybody knows that the Wall is not directed against robbers from the outside but at those on the inside. Our country needs stability based on justice, not stability based on fear. . . . we demand that a free, sincere, and public dialogue among all groups and forces in our society be permitted and opened up. This would be the first and most important step to removing the reasons for having the Wall that still pertain today. . . . The reasons are primarily internal not external. It is up to you to take and permit measures to overcome them. We, and our children, do not want to wait 50 more years."⁹⁵

Also in January 1989, a group called the "Initiative for the Democratic Renewal of Our Society" distributed leaflets in Leipzig during the commemorations of the 70th anniversary of the deaths of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. The leaflet urged East German citizens to strive to democratize their society: "It is time to courageously and openly speak our minds and put an end to paralyzing apathy and indifference. Let us advocate together the right to freedom of opinion, to freedom of association and assembly, to freedom of the press, and against the ban on the [Soviet] magazine *Sputnik* and of Soviet films."⁹⁶ The authorities arrested 11 members of church, environmental, and peace groups in Leipzig.⁹⁷

Grenzfall also reappeared in January 1989, after a

one-year pause. The new issue contained information about opposition groups in Eastern Europe, a conversation with two Estonian activists about *perestroika*, and data about GDR citizens who had been denied exit visas to visit other socialist countries.⁹⁸ A new magazine entitled *Gegendruck*, meaning both counterpressure and counterpublishing, was launched in late 1988 as well.

Conclusion

The East German independent peace movement began as a form of unofficial activity concerned primarily with the growing militarization of public life. Due to qualified but consistent support offered by the Evangelical Church, the movement gained adherents and influence. Although on various occasions radical activists expressed dissatisfaction with the Church hierarchy's reluctance to engage in direct confrontation with the authorities, many clergymen have joined the independent movement represented by the "Church from Below" and turned their churches into havens for persecuted activists. One can expect this trend to continue. Other groups formed not only in protest over what were perceived as "accommodationist" positions by the Evangelical Church hierarchy, but because they had an agenda different from that being pursued by the Church.

The "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights," for example, was formed outside the Church because its founders had an agenda that went beyond traditional religious pacifism. As described by Werner Fischer, the group's attitude indicates the growing autonomy of the pacifist movement in the GDR:

*The "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights" is not particularly interested in a relationship with the Church. We use the physical space which the Church provides, but we regard ourselves as an independent group. The "Initiative" works to maintain a good working relationship with the Church because of its important function in society.*⁹⁹

⁹⁴See *ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1989. For the official commemoration, see *Neues Deutschland*, Jan. 16, 1989.

⁹⁷The police also searched several apartments and seized books, documents, and diaries. This operation prevented a planned independent demonstration scheduled to coincide with an official ceremony commemorating Rosa Luxemburg's and Karl Liebknecht's deaths. See "Police Operations Yield Arrests," AFP in English, *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 17, 1989, p. 21.

⁹⁸See "Human Rights Publication Reappears After a Year," DPA in German, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 26, 1989, p. 17.

⁹⁹See "Hidden Opposition in the GDR," *loc. cit.*, p. 65.

⁹⁴*Der Spiegel*, Feb. 1, 1988, p. 20.

⁹⁵See *Frankfurter Rundschau* (Frankfurt/Main), Jan. 28, 1989.

The group's purpose is to create a peaceful domestic climate through the exercise of basic rights, such as freedom of opinion and of the press, and the right of assembly. Although these rights are guaranteed by the East German constitution and laws, they can currently be exercised only at the discretion of state organs. A document prepared by the "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights" on the occasion of Human Rights Day (December 10, 1987) points out the organic connection between peace and the exercise of human rights:

*Peace is for us inevitably also a process of necessary social and political change. This change within society is not a threat to, but the precondition for a stable peace. We need a broad public opinion to emerge that can exercise effective control. The emergence of such a critical public opinion depends on the guarantee of human and civil rights.*¹⁰⁰

Without denying the need for dialogue with the government, the movement sees democratization as a process of self-determined social emancipation:

Fundamental change in the sense of a nonviolent policy geared to the preservation, or rather, the restoration of our natural environment and respect for human dignity is not to be expected from the "all-powerful" perfect state. To achieve this, decentralization and self-organization of society, as well as self-management in all areas of life, are required. If we wish to

*operate in such a context, we must learn to accept the pluralism that actually exists within society.*¹⁰¹

Religious pacifism is, therefore, only one current within the independent peace movement in the GDR. Other elements include ecologists, democratic socialists, neo-Marxists, etc. Yet, all these groups share a consensus about major goals and the most appropriate methods to achieve them. In the mid-1980's, the East German independent groups became increasingly critical of the existing order. Since they are all committed to a strategy of nonviolence, share the same long-term objectives, and frequently act in a coordinated way, these groups can be broadly described as a social movement.¹⁰² But it is an informal, anti-authoritarian movement, one that rejects firm institutional structures or cooptation. It is an expression of a profound desire in East German society for democratization.

The pacifist and human rights groups have felt encouraged by Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost* in working for societal renewal. Confronted by the mounting protest movement, Honecker's regime has reacted in the traditional repressive fashion: raids, searches, beatings, arrests, interrogations, imprisonments, and expulsions. But instead of deterring them, this tactic has further radicalized the independent groups.

To conclude, East German peace and human rights activism has profound social causes: discontent with the militaristic course of the regime, opposition to political and cultural repression, youth disaffection with officially propagated hackneyed dogmas, widespread attraction to a pluralistic order. It is indicative of the awakening of society after the long passivity imposed by a rigid bureaucratic regime. With support from the Church and the various alternative subcultures, the movement can become the backbone of a democratic opposition in East Germany.

¹⁰⁰See "Thoughts of the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights on the Occasion of Human Rights Day, 10 December 1987, in the Gethsemane Church," *East European Reporter*, March 1988, p. 59.

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*

¹⁰²For a discussion of the peace movement as an "integrative concept" (*Sammelbegriff*), see Eberhard Huhrt, *Wider die Militarisierung der Gesellschaft: Friedensbewegung und Kirche in der DDR* (Against the Militarization of Society: The Peace Movement and the Church in the GDR), Melle, Verlag Ernst Knoth, 1984, pp. 12-14.

Note

Change and Continuity in Soviet Central American Policy

Jan S. Adams

WHAT impact has Mikhail Gorbachev's "new political thinking" had on Soviet involvement in Central America and the Caribbean? What are the possible implications of these changes for stability in the region?

Gorbachev's new political thought has unquestionably introduced significant changes in Soviet policy toward that part of the world. These include a new Soviet reluctance to continue providing military and economic support to clients in the region at previous levels, signs of pressure from Moscow on client states and movements to settle regional conflicts by political rather than military means, and some efforts by the USSR to play down ideology in relations with states and parties of the region.

Yet, a number of powerful past habits continue to influence Soviet behavior in the region. Concurrently with the above innovations, Moscow continues to back groups pursuing social revolution by violent means and to extend considerable amounts of military, economic, and political assistance to its major clients in the region. Also, virulent ideological attacks on the United States, disinformation campaigns, and pointedly anti-Ameri-

can activities remain a part of the Soviet agenda in Central America and the Caribbean. This note examines these intertwined strands of current Soviet policy and explores their future political ramifications.

Policy Change

On the change side of the ledger, there is strong evidence that Moscow has been trying to nudge the Sandinista government of Nicaragua toward a political settlement with the opposing Contra forces by exerting economic leverage, especially by withholding oil shipments. Moscow's "petro-pressure" is accompanied by advice to the Sandinistas to seek accommodation under the Guatemala accord, an agreement that appears to be in the spirit of the Gorbachev line for ending regional strife in areas where the interests of the East and the West clash.¹

In early 1987, Moscow temporarily suspended oil deliveries to Nicaragua, indicating, in the words of one observer, the Kremlin's unwillingness to "pour money endlessly into a regional conflict that jeopardized US-

*Jan S. Adams is Faculty Associate, the Mershon Center, and Director Emeritus, University Center for International Studies, Ohio State University (Columbus). The author would like to express appreciation for the support of the Mershon Center in the preparation of this article. Long an expert on Soviet domestic politics and author of *Citizen Inspectors in the Soviet Union: The People's Control Committee* (1977), she has recently turned her attention to Soviet foreign policy.*

¹See, for example, P. Bogomolov's flat statement of Moscow's position that "the only way to normalize the [Nicaraguan] situation is through consistent implementation of the Guatemala accords . . ." and his assertion that the June 1988 cease-fire was only made possible "by the steady resolve of the revolutionary [i.e., Sandinista] government to secure peace." In "A Difficult Stage," *Pravda* (Moscow), June 5, 1988.

On the new attitude toward regional conflicts, see Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, New York, Harper & Row, 1987, pp. 175-76, 188; also, A. Kislov, "New Political Thinking and Regional Conflicts," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow), August 1988, pp. 46-47.

Soviet relations."² A clearer message could hardly have been sent, because Soviet oil is essential to the Sandinista war effort. Even the 100,000 tons promised in 1987 fell short of meeting Nicaragua's needs. In 1988, an official of the Nicaraguan Institute of Energy indicated that Soviet oil deliveries had dropped to 70,000 tons,³ and in October 1988, the Sandinistas were forced to double the domestic price of fuel.⁴

Throughout 1988, Sandinista leaders repeatedly proclaimed their allegiance to the Guatemalan peace process, hoping, it seemed, to be rewarded for their good behavior. And, in fact, on November 4, 1988, the new Soviet ambassador to Managua, Valeriy Nikolayenko, announced that "contrary to Western reports alleging that Moscow would reduce its economic aid to Managua," the Soviet Union would indeed increase its economic and military aid.⁵ But the Soviet-Nicaraguan economic agreement signed at the end of November did not promise greater quantities of oil. For 1989, the Soviets guaranteed delivery of only 60,000 tons, a 40 percent reduction from 1987 and a level of supply geared to keep the pressure on Nicaragua.⁶

While Moscow thus manipulated the economic levers, Soviet media were encouraging regional negotiation. Typical is a Moscow radio broadcast beamed to Latin America on August 20, 1988, in which a West German political advisor to the Nicaraguan government, interviewed by Radio Moscow's correspondent in Bonn, urged the Sandinistas to show flexibility in forthcoming talks with the Contras:

I hope that neither of the two sides puts forth unacceptable proposals, such as making the resumption of the talks contingent upon acceptance of their de-

mands This allows us to hope that dynamic forces in the area will rise to the occasion and do everything possible for the negotiating process to advance toward the re-establishment of peace in Nicaragua.⁷

Elsewhere in the region, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has strikingly changes its posture vis-à-vis local communist and leftist parties. Moscow has been playing down ideology in such interparty relations and has moderated its once domineering behavior. A number of Western scholars, surveying CPSU relations with fraternal parties in Latin America in 1987, noted that "the Soviets . . . have not been concerned with actively directing the Latin American communist parties." They cite, in particular, Gorbachev's explanation: "It is impossible for the Soviets to give advice on how the Argentine Communist Party should act or for the PCA to advise the CPSU; each party knows its situation better than anyone else."⁸

The CPSU's greetings to the Costa Rican Popular Vanguard (i.e., communist) Party on the occasion of its 16th Congress illustrated the new style. Instead of calling for militant revolutionary action, the Soviet party said:

We value the PVP's support for Soviet foreign policy initiatives geared to preventing a nuclear catastrophe, creating an all-embracing system of international security, and ensuring the right of peoples to free political and social choice. We hope that your congress's decisions will contribute to the cohesion of Costa Rican communists and of all who advocate the country's independent and democratic development.⁹

A similar avoidance of ideological rhetoric characterized the September 1988 greetings of the CPSU to "all Jamaican communists" gathered for the Fourth Congress of the Workers' Party of Jamaica,¹⁰ and the dis-

²Carlotta Gall, "The Burden of Empire," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 512/87, Dec. 16, 1987, p. 3.

³Moscow Radio to Latin America, Nov. 14, 1988, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), Nov. 16, 1988, p. 43. Radio Moscow was quoting Indiana Gonzalez, who attempted to depict the reduced level of Soviet deliveries as a sign of Moscow's coming to Nicaragua's assistance when Mexico and Venezuela reduced their shipments.

⁴*The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Oct. 3, 1988; at the same time Nicaragua's currency was devalued by 77 percent.

⁵Belgrade TANJUG, Nov. 5, 1988, translated in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 8, 1988, p. 35. Nikolayenko may have been responding to Western assertions that Moscow had seriously trimmed its economic aid to Nicaragua in the agreement announced in January 1988, by promising only \$294 million in aid for a three-year period, as compared with the \$260 million in economic aid Managua reportedly received from Moscow in 1986 alone. See Daniel Abele, "The Soviet Commitment to the Sandinistas," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 269/86, July 18, 1986, p. 3; Russell Leigh Moses, "Recent Developments in Soviet-Nicaraguan Relations," *ibid.*, RL 137/88, Mar. 30, 1988, p. 6.

⁶Moscow Radio to Latin America, Nov. 27, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 29, 1988, p. 44.

⁷*FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 23, 1988, pp. 30–32.

⁸US Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986–87*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, August 1987, p. 67. This portion of the study came from a conference sponsored by the US Department of State on May 7, 1987, which brought together nine prominent US scholars to discuss Soviet relations with Latin America.

⁹*Pravda*, Sept. 16, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 26, 1988, p. 27.

¹⁰*Pravda*, Sep. 8, 1988. Although Jamaica's struggle "against imperialist diktat," was mentioned, the essence of the message was expressed in the following sentence: "The CPSU and the WPJ are linked by strong bonds of comradeship and cooperation based on a community of ideals, a desire to creatively develop Marxist-Leninist teaching, and the principles of inviolable international solidarity, full equality, and independence of parties."

cussions of CPSU delegations in Colombia and Peru in mid-1987, which "focused primarily on the process of restructuring currently under way in the USSR."¹¹

Moscow is also making serious efforts to enlarge its limited diplomatic presence in Central America and the Caribbean Basin.¹² Assisting in the process is a restructured team of diplomats.¹³ The Soviet Union is also employing a less formal instrument in this endeavor—exchanges of parliamentary delegations. The establishment of links between elected delegates and regional elites deemphasizes ideological differences and facilitates Soviet contacts with non-communist systems.¹⁴

In 1987, Guatemala sent its first-ever delegation of legislators to the USSR, and in January 1988, a Soviet legislator visited the President of Suriname "to further the development of relations and cooperation."¹⁵ Two months later, members of the Costa Rican Legislative Assembly visited the Kremlin,¹⁶ and the following month, Soviet parliamentarians attended the 79th Conference of the International Parliamentary Union in Guatemala.¹⁷ In September 1988, another "first delegation," this time from Honduras, spent a week in Moscow at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet and announced the establishment of regular future exchanges.¹⁸ In the same month, legislators from Cuba and Venezuela were hosted by the USSR Supreme Soviet in Moscow.¹⁹ And in December, a deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, P. Khabibullayev, in Mexico City for the inauguration of President Carlos Salinas de Gotari, met with the foreign ministers of Belize, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic to discuss Soviet ties with these countries.²⁰ Although exchanges of parliamentary delegations may downplay ideology—with the apparent aim of avoiding an ideological backlash, especially in countries where some

local political elements may be strongly opposed to the Soviet system²¹—the broadening of such exchanges generally suggests a deemphasis of ideological advocacy and a new flexibility in promoting Soviet contacts abroad.

Change also distinguishes the new management style employed by Soviet agencies (both party and government) in their dealings with international front organizations, with the Nonaligned Movement, with trade unions, and with other international organizations and people's groups. The International Department of the CPSU Central Committee appears, in at least some cases, to be guiding the Soviet-line front organizations with a lighter touch than in the past—aided no doubt by its more broadly appealing and credible message, typified in the call by then-ID Chief Anatoliy Dobrynin for "vigorous actions of the public forces, people's diplomacy, in support of world peace and cooperation."²² The May 1986 creation within the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a new department for Soviet relations with the Nonaligned Movement—traditionally a concern of the ID—may signal a less dogmatic approach to that movement. (The institutionalization of this function is, however, open to a different interpretation—see the discussion below.)

Finally, Soviet advice to struggling economies in Central America appears less laden with ideological rhetoric and more realistic than in the past. For example, when the United States invoked economic sanctions against Nicaragua and Panama, Moscow calmly advised these countries to seek as much independence from US markets as possible by obtaining financing from and expanded economic relations with

¹¹Ibid., Jan. 6, 1988.

¹²In Central America, Moscow has embassies in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and diplomatic relations (currently implemented through the Soviet embassies in Mexico and Costa Rica) with Guatemala. In the Caribbean Basin, there are Soviet embassies serving Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Colombia, Guyana, Mexico, Suriname, and Venezuela.

¹³All heads of missions abroad were summoned to an extraordinary meeting in May 1986 at the Soviet foreign ministry at which Gorbachev informed them of his new policy priorities and the new negotiating tactics expected of the diplomats. By that time, although Gorbachev had been in power for only 14 months, one-third of the ambassadors had already been replaced. Gorbachev's diplomatic staff reputedly has a "wider knowledge of the outside world." See Alexander Rahr, "Winds of Change Hit Foreign Ministry," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 274/86, July 16, 1986, p. 6.

¹⁴As Stephen Sestanovich has observed, "the Soviets have also opened a second front in the Third World: closer relations have been actively pursued with many states once written off as American lackeys." See his "Gorbachev's Foreign Policy: A Diplomacy of Decline," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1988, pp. 12–13.

¹⁵Moscow Television, July 29, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 3, 1987, p. 1/3; TASS, Jan. 27, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1988, p. 49.

¹⁶TASS, Mar. 30, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Mar. 31, 1988, pp. 31–32.

¹⁷*Izvestiya* (Moscow), Apr. 14, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Apr. 21, 1988, p. 37.

¹⁸Moscow Radio, Aug. 30, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Sept. 2, 1988, p. 27;

Izvestiya, Sept. 9, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Sept. 12, 1988, p. 44.

¹⁹*Pravda*, Sept. 28, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Sept. 29, 1988, p. 49; TASS, Sept. 26, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Sept. 27, 1988, p. 43; Venezuela's Senator R. Carpio Castillo also discussed Soviet restructuring and international relations with Aleksandr Yakovlev during his visit.

²⁰*Pravda*, Dec. 4, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Dec. 8, 1988, pp. 42–43.

²¹Cultural exchanges in Guatemala were set back after a bomb exploded in front of the offices of the Soviet press agency TASS, resulting in the closing of this office and cancellation of a planned concert by a Soviet symphony orchestra. The Cuban press agency also closed its Guatemala office after its correspondent received death threats. See *The New York Times*, July 6, 1988, p. 2.

²²Wallace Spaulding notes that "Moscow gave the appearance of loosening control over the Soviet-line peace movement" in 1988, but that the World Peace movement is "tightly controlled by the Soviets." See his "Soviet-Line Fronts in 1988," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1989, pp. 70 and 71. For Dobrynin's comment, see TASS, May 30, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 2, 1988, p. 8.

not only countries of the East bloc, but also states of Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Western hemisphere.²³

Policy Continuities

Despite evidence of change, "old political thought" continues to characterize much of Soviet policy in Central America. Although the new thinking calls for Soviet cooperation with the US to seek political settlements to Central American and other regional conflicts,²⁴ Soviet policy practitioners continue to find in Central America irresistible opportunities to give support and encouragement to political and military groups contesting US influence and advancing Soviet interests, and a fertile field for virulent ideological attacks on the US.

Arms transfers. The most direct evidence of Soviet behavior contradicting Gorbachev's new policy directives concerning the settlement of regional conflicts by political means is the amount of military support that has continued to flow from the Soviet Union to Central America and the Caribbean throughout the 1980's. Aid to the area makes up a major share of massive Soviet arms shipments to Latin America as a whole. According to Richard Grimmert of the US Congressional Research Service, aggregate Soviet arms deliveries to all Latin American countries in 1984–87 amounted to some US\$7.6, or 59.8 percent of total world arms shipments to the region. This marked an increase of \$1.8 billion over the amount shipped in 1980–83 (when Soviet shipments comprised 46.8 percent of the total). (Since total shipments to the region from *all* sources grew by only \$1.4 billion, it is clear that other suppliers were reducing their shipments.) According to Grimmert, Cuba received 84.5 percent of the Soviet shipments in 1980–83 and 75.3 percent in 1984–87.²⁵

Arms shipments to Cuba and Nicaragua, each of which receives more than 80 percent of its arms from

the Soviet Union,²⁶ continue at high levels. Cuban arms imports, which totaled \$1.4 billion in 1984, registered \$2.1 billion in 1985, \$1.5 billion in 1986, and \$1.8 billion in 1987.²⁷ Nicaraguan arms imports, which totaled \$350 million in 1984, amounted to \$270 million in 1985 and \$575 million in 1986.²⁸ Various sources put the 1987 figure for Nicaraguan arms imports from the USSR alone at from \$500 million to \$1 billion.²⁹ Thus, the militarization of Cuba and Nicaragua continues.

Perhaps most striking with respect to the fueling of military conflict in Central America is the size of Soviet arms transfers to Nicaragua and Cuba relative to US arms transfers to Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and the Contras of Nicaragua. In 1986, the Soviet Union exported over \$2 billion in arms to Cuba and Nicaragua. US military aid to Central American governments and the Contras in that year was less than \$185 million, with an additional \$60 million going to the Contras for non-military and humanitarian aid—the total sum not exceeding one-eighth of the 1986 Soviet military investment in the Central American conflict.³⁰ Overall, Soviet arms transfers to Latin American countries during 1984–87 were 5.5 times greater than US arms deliveries (\$7.615 billion vs. \$1.367 billion), despite the proximity and strategic importance of Latin America to the United States.³¹

Ideological warfare. Ideology remains a potent Soviet weapon aimed at US interests in Central America. The USSR's international news services tirelessly expound the thesis that the US is the chief cause of all Central American problems. Thus, Yuriy Pavlov, chief of the Soviet foreign ministry's First Latin American Department, commented recently: "these internal struggles [are]

²³See O. D. Ushnurtseva, "Failure of the Policy of Economic Isolation of Nicaragua," *Latinskaya Amerika* (Moscow), July 1987, pp. 52–58. Both Nicaragua and Panama are in arrears to the World Bank—for \$250 million and \$500 million respectively. Nicaragua's debt was four years old in 1988; Panama's is of more recent vintage.

²⁴See the remarks of Nikolay Shishlin on Radio Moscow, April 16, 1989: "Soviet-US links are mixed up with negative factors and the task is . . . to put these links onto a positive footing, a positive basis, and to switch our relations from those between adversaries and rivals to relations between partners This concerns regional conflicts We have no other option. . . . [t]hat means working with the partners that God has granted us and not with any ideal partners." Trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 19, 1989, p. 22.

²⁵Richard F. Grimmert, *Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Supplier, 1980–87*, Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, May 9, 1988, pp. 5, 50, 54, and 64; Table 2C, p. 58; and Tables 1C and 1E, pp. 48, 50 (italics in the original).

²⁶In 1982–86, the USSR supplied Cuba with 81.7 percent of its arms; and Nicaragua, with 87.5 percent. See US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987* (hereafter, *WMEAT, 1987*), Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1988, p. 129.

²⁷The figures for 1984 to 1986 are from *WMEAT, 1987*, pp. 97, 113, 129. These figures do not include arms to Cuban forces in Angola, which peaked in 1984 at \$1.5 billion (followed by \$775 million in 1985 and \$1.2 billion in 1986). The 1987 figure is from David Gallick, Ed., *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1988*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, forthcoming.

²⁸*WMEAT, 1987*, pp. 97, 113, 129.

²⁹Stephanie G. Neuman, "Arms, Aid and the Superpowers," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Summer 1988, p. 1048. Concerning militarization: the size of the armed forces increased in Sandinist Nicaragua from 6,000 in 1979 to 74,000 in 1985, and in Cuba from 120,000 in 1975 to 297,000 in 1985. The proportion of the population under arms accordingly grew in Nicaragua from 2.2 inhabitants in the armed forces per 1,000 in 1979, to 23.4 in 1985; in Cuba, from 12.9 in 1935, to 29.5 in 1985.

³⁰*WMEAT, 1987*, p. 135; *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (Washington, DC), 1986, pp. 221, 394.

³¹Grimmett, op. cit., p. 58.

motivated by foreign interference. Without massive foreign aid [from the US], the Nicaraguan Contras would not last even one year. This is why the war continues."³²

On events in Panama, TASS quotes a Panamanian legislator's comment that "for a year now, Panama has been the target for an aggression by the US unprecedented in scope," and repeats General Manuel Noriega's claim that "one of the aims of the US current policy with regard to Panama is to use it as a bridgehead for the implementation of aggressions against other countries of the region in case of need."³³ In August 1988, *Krasnaya Zvezda* reported on "the mounting military threat" to Panama from Washington, basing itself on allegations by a Panamanian newspaper that the US had shipped 5,000 coffins and body bags to Panama.³⁴ And on November 20, 1988, *Pravda* quoted the assertion of the Panamanian paper *Crítica* that "before giving up the reins of government, the Reagan administration intends to conclude a new treaty on the Panama Canal with former Panamanian President Delvalle."³⁵

An extreme example of the kind of efforts that the Soviet Union is still making to discredit the United States in the eyes of its Latin American neighbors is a new wave of sensationalist reports around the world that Americans import babies from Latin America, kill them, and sell their organs for transplant.³⁶ *Izvestiya* of July 25, 1987, charged: "There is only one step from American arrogance, from racist contempt for the Latin American peoples, to cannibalistic total license."³⁷ A year later, on the eve of the Pinochet plebiscite in Chile, the same story was beamed to that country in Spanish via Moscow Radio Magallanes with embellishments about how the "baby-trafficking mafias" funnel Chilean infants to "fattening centers" in Central America "before they are used by organ-transplant centers in the developed countries."³⁸

Similarly, readers of *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* are told, "At a recently convened conference of justice ministers of the Common Market, it was noted that merchants annu-

ally sell about 1 million children from Latin America, Southeast Asia, and East African countries to people who sell them to replenish all sorts of sex and porno-business establishments in Europe," adding, "Of course, the United States occupies first place in child pornography."³⁹

Front work. Moscow combines ideological warfare with systematic, worldwide organizational activities intended to attack US interests and diminish US influence, activity that is adapted to the Central American scene with telling effect. International conferences whose themes place the US in a disadvantageous position in Third World eyes are used extensively. For example, on November 27, 1988, Moscow Radio broadcast to Latin America an account of an international conference in Moscow that discussed Latin American economic prospects and international affairs, quoting the following comment of a professor from Panama's School of Economics:

*In our opinion, the Latin American crisis is the result of a generalized crisis in the worldwide capitalist economy. We believe the Latin American crisis is manipulated directly by US financial organizations, particularly the World Bank and the IMF, and that those organizations have a plan of structural adjustment for every country, based on the use of the foreign debt as a political instrument for aggression. In other words, the reaching or failure to reach a refinancing agreement on the foreign debt is used to exert pressure or coercion on each of our countries in their political actions in the international arena. At this time, my country is subject to a brutal aggression . . . by the US Government.*⁴⁰

Soviet courtship of the Non-Aligned Movement similarly targets the US. Shortly before the Nicosia meeting of foreign ministers of that organization in September 1988, the Soviet Union sent a note of support, which alleged:

The position of the US and other imperialist countries is different [from the Soviet position]. Applying economic, political and military pressure, Washington and its closest allies attempt to split the Non-Aligned

³²Interview in Moscow with *El Día* of Mexico City, June 6, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 16, 1988, pp. 28-30.

³³TASS, June 14, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, June 15, 1988, p. 38. TASS correspondent Eldar Abdullayev drew upon separate interviews with Panamanian legislator Alberto Aleman Boyd and General Noriega for this report.

³⁴V. Vinogradov, "Military-Political Commentary: Repulsive 'Coffins Policy,'" *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), July 29, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1988, p. 42.

³⁵*Pravda*, Nov. 20, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Nov. 28, 1988, p. 39.

³⁶Linda Feldman, "Soviets Smile, but Fake Stories Continue," *The Christian Science Monitor*, Sept. 6, 1988.

³⁷Cited in *ibid.*

³⁸Moscow Radio Magallanes, Sept. 8, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 9, 1988, pp. 34-35.

³⁹Unattributed article, "When They Trade in Children," *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* (Moscow), Aug. 20, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Sept. 14, 1988, p. 33.

⁴⁰Moscow Radio to Latin America, Nov. 27, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Nov. 28, 1988, p. 41. Another example is the three-week "International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development" held in New York under United Nations auspices in August 1987, which assembled

*Movement, weaken it and turn individual nations into puppets obediently fulfilling strangers' will. Emphasis is on discrediting countries pursuing an anti-imperialist course. The "black list" includes India and Cuba, Nicaragua and Ethiopia, Angola and Zambia, Kampuchea, Libya and others. The foreign ministers of non-aligned countries are going to meet . . . to try and work out effective tactics to enable these nations to counter outside pressure.*⁴¹

The presence of Latin Americans at conferences on issues of disarmament and development is noted with special approval in Soviet commentary. For example at the "Conference of Nongovernmental Organizations on the Problem of the Interdependence of Disarmament and Development," held at Stockholm in 1987, a Soviet observer favorably noted that "for the first time, the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with the Peoples of Latin America" was in attendance at such a conference, along with "envoys of Cuba and Nicaragua, of the peace-loving nations of Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, Paraguay, Chili, and Uruguay."⁴²

Cuba has been the site of numerous international forums where US interests are attacked by various groups assembled to address "global issues."⁴³ For example, the first meeting of a newly formed "Coordinating Bureau on Disarmament Problems" of the Non-aligned Movement took place in Havana on May 28-31, 1988—as Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze noted, just before the upcoming Third UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament. The participants, representing over 100 nonaligned countries, national-liberation movements, and international organizations, endorsed a "plan of action" for the UN session and a resolution attacking the US. Referring specifically to Central America, the resolution

expressed "serious concern over the increased American military presence in this region," and called for setting up "a zone of peace and cooperation in Central America with the withdrawal of all foreign troops, which would facilitate the solution of the regional conflict."⁴⁴

Discussion of the foreign debt problem of Latin American countries provides a ready forum for the castigation of world capitalism and the US, positions that win Soviet support. Thus, when a May 1987 trade union conference in Brazil addressed the foreign debt problem of Latin American and Caribbean countries and resolved to carry on a steady campaign for nonpayment, this move was encouraged by a Soviet observer.⁴⁵ One should also note Daniel Ortega's enthusiastic response to Gorbachev's December 7, 1988, speech to the UN: "The Soviet Union's call to defer the repayment of foreign debts by the developing countries for a hundred years, and in individual cases to cancel them, finds a ready response in the hearts of Nicaraguans."⁴⁶

Party-to-party relations. Meanwhile, despite Gorbachev's stated determination to curb the CPSU's overly aggressive pursuit of Third World revolutionary activities, the party, through its International Department, vigorously continues to develop networks and channels of access to power in friendly states in Central America and the Caribbean, and to maintain its links and deepen its influence with out-of-power communist parties and leftist groups.⁴⁷ Thus, high-ranking members of the Soviet party apparat periodically visit Nicaragua—ID First Deputy Chief Vadim Zagladin in 1987 and ID Deputy Chief Andrey Urnov in mid-June 1988.⁴⁸ On March 14, 1988, Nicaraguan party official Bayardo Arce met in Moscow with International Department officials Dobrynin and Karen Brutents to sign a plan of cooperation between the CPSU and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN).⁴⁹ Such exchanges of

representatives of 122 countries to discuss how savings from future disarmament agreements might stimulate economic development in the Third World. The United States, anticipating that it would be the target of anti-imperialist attacks and of discussions of its alleged obligations to Latin America and other Third World countries for "neo-colonial exploitation," refused to take part. See Paul Lewis, "US Boycotting a UN Parley on Development," *The New York Times*, Aug. 22, 1987. The US "disregard for" this international forum was promptly interpreted by a TASS reporter, Ivan Ablamov, as evidence of US arrogance and neo-colonialism. And he added, "There is a direct link between the US total military expenditures in the past five years—one trillion dollars—being equal to the foreign debt of the developing countries"; TASS, Moscow, July 17, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, July 21, 1987, p. A/4.

⁴¹TASS, Aug. 31, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Sept. 1, 1988, p. 7.

⁴²A. P. Kireyev, "Disarmament for Development," *Latinskaya Amerika*, September 1987, p. 137.

⁴³Wallace Spaulding noted that "Havana was second only to Moscow as an important site for meetings of the fronts during 1987." See "Communist Fronts in 1987," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1988, p. 84.

⁴⁴*Pravda*, May 28, 1988; and TASS, May 31, 1988, both trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 2, 1988, pp. 9-10.

⁴⁵A. A. Sosnovskiy, "Trade Unions Against Foreign Debt," *Latinskaya Amerika*, September 1987, p. 136.

⁴⁶TASS, Dec. 11, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 12, 1988, p. 37.

⁴⁷For a fuller account of the ID's Third World activities see Jan S. Adams, "Incremental Activism in Soviet Third World Policy: The Role of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee," *Slavic Review* (Austin, TX), forthcoming.

⁴⁸TASS, Sept. 8, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 9, 1987, p. 32; and TASS, June 10, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, June 13, 1988, p. 52.

⁴⁹TASS, Mar. 14, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Mar. 15, 1988. Brutents visited Latin America for several weeks in September 1988 at the invitation of the Argentine Communist Party and the People's Party of Panama, strengthening the ties of the CPSU with these Latin American parties. See *Pravda*, Sept. 14, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Sept. 15, 1988, p. 37; *Pravda*, Sept. 20, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Sept. 21, 1988, p. 49.

visits convey the Soviet party's strong moral support for the Sandinist cause, and provide opportunities to discuss mutual strategies, strengthen party linkages, and further coordinate the growing diplomatic, military, and cultural contacts between the two countries.

Interparty contacts take various forms. A delegation from the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with the Peoples of Latin America was invited by officials of a Panamanian fund to visit Panama in August 1988 to meet with the People's (i.e., communist) Party of Panama, leaders of the ruling Democratic Revolutionary Party, and other political groups.⁵⁰ In August and September, Soviet republic and regional party officials attended the 11th Congress of the Ecuador Communist Party, the 50th Conference of the People's National Party of Jamaica, and the 23rd Congress of the People's Progressive (communist) Party of Guyana.⁵¹

The CPSU was also an "observer" at the August 1988 "Third Meeting of South American Communist Parties" in Montevideo, where "much attention was given to questions of stepping up solidarity with the peoples of Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador, Chile, and Paraguay."⁵² Other observers included the Communist Party of Cuba, the FSLN, and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. The formal participants represented communist parties of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Latin American party officials also frequently visit Moscow for consultations. During one week in September 1988, ID Chief Dobrynin received two prominent visitors from the Caribbean region—Nicaraguan party and government leader Carlos Nuñez (he is chairman of Nicaragua's National Assembly) and the general secretary of Guyana's People's Progressive Party, Cheddi Jagan.⁵³ Earlier, in July, the general secretary of the People's Party of Panama visited Moscow and, in a radio interview, charged that a US aggression was being prepared against Panama.⁵⁴

Impediments to Change

In keeping with the prescriptions of Gorbachev's "new thinking," Moscow's advice to fellow parties in Central America and the Caribbean is indeed some-

what more cautious, less ideological, and less incendiary than in the past. Still, the ultimate political objectives and rationale of the local political groups, as well as of their operations, continue to be characterized by a strong zero-sum orientation vis-à-vis world capitalism and by a sense of historic mission, both of which are probably essential to their continued vitality as organizations. On balance, the Soviet party's friendship and support probably continue to fuel rather than dampen the deep-seated ideological tendencies of these groups.

One reason why Soviet foreign policy runs counter to Gorbachev's prescriptions is the relatively short time that the new directives have been in effect. However, political and bureaucratic factors within the USSR also encourage the persistence of traditional objectives and perspectives in Soviet foreign policy. Positions that contest Gorbachev's policy include those that place priority on such objectives as military power and securing strategic military objectives, on violent export of social revolution, and on the vigorous pursuit of the worldwide struggle between socialism and capitalism.⁵⁵ Espoused by influential segments of the Soviet foreign policy and defense establishment, they can—and do—affect policy implementation.

The persistence of such views is explained both by bureaucratic inertia (in face of the enormous magnitude of the current change of course) and the fact that specific viewpoints are tied to functions performed by the various segments of the Soviet foreign policy and defense establishments. Thus, Soviet military strategists viewing the Central American region can be expected to focus on the advantages of still greater access to deep-water ports, airports, and electronic listening posts, and of joint naval maneuvers with regional forces, although Gorbachev's prescriptions would seem to label these activities intrusive and a potential danger to world peace. Similarly, certain units of the ID, whose expertise has been dedicated for more than 30 years to strengthening the Soviet party-state's ideological influence around the world in support of a revolutionary struggle against capitalism, can hardly be expected to desist readily from cultivating political groups in Central America that label themselves anti-imperialistic, revolutionary, and Marxist-Leninist.

Gorbachev's restructuring of the Soviet foreign policy establishment appears designed in part to achieve

⁵⁰Moscow Radio, July 31, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Aug. 4, 1988, p. 39.

⁵¹*Pravda*, Aug. 1, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Aug. 3, 1988, p. 37; *Pravda*, Aug. 9, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Aug. 10, 1988, p. 37; *Pravda*, Sept. 13, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Sept. 14, 1988, pp. 32–33.

⁵²Radio Moscow to Latin America, Aug. 10, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Aug. 11, 1988, p. 24.

⁵³TASS, Sept. 6, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Sept. 8, 1988, p. 41; and *Pravda*, Sept. 11, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, Sept. 13, 1988, p. 11.

⁵⁴Moscow Radio, July 15, 1988, trans. in *ibid.*, July 19, 1988, p. 58.

⁵⁵The abandonment of old positions comes hard, even within the Politburo, as shown by the refusal of Yegor Ligachev to accept Gorbachev's renunciation of the concept of class struggle in the relations between nations. See Paul Quinn-Judge, "How Ligachev Lost Out in Kremlin Shuffle," *The Christian Science Monitor*, Oct. 6, 1988.

a more unified foreign policy. The streamlining of the party foreign policy apparatus under Aleksandr Yakovlev's leadership and its closer integration with the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs seem to be aimed at placing the implementation of Soviet foreign policy more securely in the hands of diplomatic and governmental, rather than party, officials. The ministry now handles a number of foreign policy functions formerly assigned to the party apparatus, such as relations with the international press and the Nonaligned Movement (NAM).

However, some areas of activity are not easily "de-ideologized." For example, just how non-ideological is the "multi-faceted aid" that the Soviet Union offers the Nonaligned Movement?⁵⁶ US State Department officials argue that the USSR is exerting increasing influence on that organization, and that "a measure of its continuing success" might be gauged in the results of the special ministerial session of the NAM's Coordinating Bureau held in Georgetown, Guyana, in March 1987. A communiqué was issued containing 26 specific anti-US citations—a new record for a NAM document on a geographic region.⁵⁷ Similarly, how non-ideological is the new "people's diplomacy"?⁵⁸ How does it differ—in organizational techniques, operations, and objectives—from front activities managed so tightly by the International Department in the past?

Other factors that tend to shape Soviet Central American policy in ways that run counter to Gorbachev's new thought are regional factors in Central America and the Caribbean, especially those involving very complex aspects of the Soviet patron/client relationships with Cuba and Nicaragua. It is quite evident that Moscow would like to limit economic aid to its Marxist clients. However, to reverse commitments made by previous Soviet regimes—whatever the incentives to do so—can be achieved only at considerable political cost, as reducing the flow of oil to Nicaragua illustrated.⁵⁹ Long-term development projects already on the drawing board, like irrigation projects for Nicaragua, must go forward, and signed promises of increased aid are hard to disavow. There is no indication of any pullback from Soviet trade and aid agreements signed with Cuba in 1985 calling for project assistance to increase until 1990. Trade credits alone, according to Cuban reports in 1985, are to increase in 1986–1990 by 50 percent over the previous five years.⁶⁰

From a purely economic point of view, Cuba would appear to be a prime target for Soviet savings, because it alone "claims far more of Moscow's aid resources than any other LDC, about \$45 billion annually (half of Moscow's total)."⁶¹ However, Cuba's failing economy (it registered a 3.5 percent decline in GNP in 1987) acutely needs aid.⁶² Gorbachev's April 1989 visit to Havana, while apparently promising no financial panaceas such as writing off Cuba's estimated \$10 billion debt to the USSR,⁶³ clearly signaled Moscow's interest in maintaining its close relationship and leverage.

Cuba's political and military services to Moscow merit special consideration. Not the least of these services is Cuba's pivotal role in the effort to erode US influence in Central America and Havana's ability to take actions on behalf of Moscow that the Soviets themselves prefer not to take openly, such as the transshipment of arms to guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala, the organization and training of these political groups, not to mention the large contingent of Cuban troops that has been propping up the Soviet client regime in Angola. Cuba also advances Soviet positions in Third World forums, such as meetings of the Nonaligned Movement,⁶⁴ provides a conference setting for many such international meetings, and serves as a model for future revolu-

⁵⁹Carol Fogarty and Kevin Tittle note: "On the economic side, there is a real prospect that the protracted deterioration in the economies of Marxist client states will accelerate, making the aid program unacceptably expensive. This trend is already in motion: The 1984 agreement to supply oil on credit to Nicaragua, for example, will add up to \$100 million in annual disbursements that will never be repaid . . . This continuing high level of support to Marxist states seems to result from policies in place before Gorbachev assumed leadership, rather than policy decisions by the new government." See "Moscow's Economic Aid Programs in Less-Developed Countries: A Perspective on the 1980's," in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, *Gorbachev's Economic Plans*, Study Papers, Vol. 2, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1987, pp. 536–37.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 540–41; also see Roger E. Kanet's "Commentary," in the same work, p. 542; and US Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities*, p. 66. Ruben Berrios notes that Cuba has signed one long-term economic cooperation treaty stretching from 1986 to 2000. See his "Soviet–Latin American Economic Relations," Kennan Institute Occasional Paper 227, Washington, DC, Wilson Center, 1988, p. 19.

⁶¹Fogarty and Tittle, loc. cit., p. 539; they add, "In the 1980's, the USSR has provided about \$800 million a year in hard-currency support to Cuba and Vietnam by allowing Havana to resell some of the oil provided, purchasing some Cuban sugar for hard currency, and financing some imports from third countries."

⁶²Clyde Farnsworth, "Deep Cut is Reported In Soviet-Cuba Trade," *The New York Times*, Jan. 16, 1989. Farnsworth notes that trade between the USSR and Cuba grew annually by 10 percent through 1987, but fell in the first quarter of 1988, with Cuba's imports from the USSR down 8 percent from the first quarter of 1987, and Cuba's exports to the USSR down 14 percent.

⁶³Vera Tolz, "The USSR This Week," *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR* (Munich), Apr. 14, 1989, p. 41.

⁶⁴Another example is Cuba's strong support for campaigns against repayment by Latin American debtors of loans owed to Western financial institutions. See US Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities*, p. 2.

⁵⁶*Izvestiya*, Sept. 7, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Sep. 9, 1988, p. 7.

⁵⁷US Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities*, p. 5.

⁵⁸An example of "people's diplomacy"—programs of citizen exchanges—is the 1988 American-Soviet "Tour for Peace," a 32-day tour of the US by 220 Soviet citizens, which is described by one of the participants A. I. Shaskol'skiy in "Prospects for People's Diplomacy," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya* (Moscow), February 1981, pp. 63–67.

tionary states in Central America.⁶⁵ At the turn of 1988–89, Castro's unprecedented visits to Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela were a first step toward broadening of Cuba's access to the Latin American diplomatic world.⁶⁶

Meanwhile, Moscow's clients in the Central American region, strengthened by Soviet economic and military aid, display a willful proclivity to pursue their own ideological and foreign policy objectives. Such factors may constrain and embarrass the Soviet Union, but may also offer great advantages, since even sometimes obstreperous client/proxies can be of inestimable value in advancing Soviet interests in ways that violate "new thinking" without directly incriminating the USSR.

To a certain extent, Moscow's Central American policy is simply a response to openings provided by a changing Central American context, a region destabilized by social crises and war, where instability threatens the US far more than it does Moscow, and where US influence appears to have suffered a "secular slump."⁶⁷ In these conditions, the countries to the south of the US, seeking greater leverage in dealing with the "colossus of the north," are tempted to fall back upon the underlying conflict of interests of the two superpowers and, when it is advantageous, to side with the USSR for economic, diplomatic, and military support. In this

way, chronic regional instabilities continue to offer the Soviet Union irresistible opportunities to whittle away at US interests.

Conclusion

Given such complex crosscurrents of policy, bureaucratic inertia, and national interests, it is not surprising that current Soviet policies in Central America today are contradictory—partly new and partly old, reflecting freedom from some ideological motivations and the unrelenting grip of others.

This situation is not likely to change soon. However, in the short run the logic of Gorbachev's ideas about the interdependency of nations and the global threat inherent in regional crises motivates Moscow to use what leverage it has to bring its regional clients to the negotiating table. To the degree that these clients—whether willingly or reluctantly—profess their readiness to make compromises in the search for regional stability, this may reflect the changes of style and rhetoric emanating from Moscow.

In light of Moscow's current outlook and its possible reflection in the policies of Soviet clients in Central America, a window of opportunity may have opened momentarily to allow the region's states some measure of disengagement from the East-West conflict in their joint deliberations on settling regional problems. Although many factors will affect this dialogue in the years ahead, including US actions, continued Soviet encouragement of negotiations greatly improves the prospects for regional settlements in Central America.

Meanwhile, Moscow's underlying, long-term objectives remain unchanged: to avoid at all costs direct US-Soviet confrontation but to persist in the patient, deliberate expansion of Soviet influence in a region of vital security interest to the United States. In the future, pursuit of these objectives can be expected to increase the slow but steady growth of ties of the USSR and East-bloc countries with Central America and the Caribbean Basin, and to produce a greatly enhanced Soviet diplomatic, economic, and military presence in the region.

⁶⁵Grenada's ambassador to the USSR recorded his hope in 1983 that Grenada might, by becoming "the sponsor of revolutionary activities and progressive developments" among the English-speaking states of the Caribbean, emulate Cuba's relations "to the revolutionary left in the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Central America." See Mark Falcoff, "Bishop's Cuba, Castro's Grenada," in Jiri Valenta and Herbert J. Ellison, Eds., *Grenada and Soviet Cuban Policy*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1986, p. 72.

⁶⁶One Soviet observer commented: "Even a very short analysis of the results of the trip of F. Castro to Ecuador shows that the course of Cuba's foreign policy in the region has acquired a new orientation, characterized by the effort to actively participate in the process of the political integration of Latin America. See E. S. Dabagyan, "Integration Processes—The Call of the Times," *Latinskaya Amerika*, December 1988, p. 15.

⁶⁷Jan F. Triska, Ed., *Dominant Powers and Subordinate States: The United States in Latin America and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1986, p. 463.

Books

The Future of Eastern Europe

John A. Armstrong

IVAN BEREND. *The Crisis Zone of Europe: An Interpretation of East Central European History in the First Half of the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986.

ROMAN SZPORLUK. *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List*. New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI. *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century*. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989.

DESPITE great differences in their approaches, these three books suggest that a turning point may have been reached in the appraisal of developments in the Soviet bloc.

John A. Armstrong is Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of *Nations Before Nationalism* (1982), *The Politics of Totalitarianism* (1961), and several other books and many articles. The third, revised edition of his *Ukrainian Nationalism* is to be published in late 1989.

As befits his extraordinary experience, Zbigniew Brzezinski's most recent book ranges broadly over East Asia, Latin America, and Western Europe. Nevertheless, its core concerns are geographically and culturally identical to those of Berend and Szporluk: East Central Europe, where all three authors were born. As their subtitles indicate, Berend and Brzezinski focus explicitly on the 20th century, whereas Szporluk emphasizes the 19th-century ideological origins of the current political system in East Central Europe. All authors, however, are bent on demonstrating the significance of historical factors for contemporary politics.

For older American Sovietologists who studied under Merle Fainsod, Geroid T. Robinson, or Philip Mosely, such emphasis may seem familiar. Indeed, one criticism of the present authors that I shall make is that they do not reach back far enough to explain history's influence on present policy. In this connection, George F. Kennan's geo-historical admonition remains apt, namely, one must keep in mind that Lenin's "precepts are fortified by the lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain."¹

The books under review here abound in multidimensional interpretations derived from historical analysis, which is a contrast to the shallow temporal range of much current Sovietology that too often resorts to economic reductionism (albeit usually derived from Adam Smith rather than Karl Marx). Even the series of recent works on the tsarist centuries, though gratifying as monographs based on archival documentation, frequently lack the comparative perspective that all three authors reviewed here reveal.

IVAN BEREND'S principal aim is to interpret the reasons for the "long-lasting crisis which brought the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe into such speedy and restless motion" beginning with World War I (p. 5). He cogently points out that this crisis was a precursor of the crisis, far larger geographically, that transfigured the Third World after World War II. Berend recognizes the importance of economic factors like the Industrial Revolution, but he devotes more attention to cultural and social developments. Particu-

¹George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" (1947), in *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 118.

larly significant, in his interpretation, were "ideas of English liberalism and French rationalism," which "fascinated the small intellectual circles of these backward countries [farther east in Europe], and also presented an example for the ruling elite to follow in order to secure their power" (p. 6). Berend is especially concerned, in Chapter 2, to show how the search for "ethnic purity" distorted populist movements throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Eventually—he relates in Chapter 3—such national revolutions confronted class revolutions following Lenin's example. Both revolts led not only to intensified social and political upheaval, but to drastic cultural transformation.

Berend's discussion of trends in the arts before the communists came to power, providing novel examples and appraisals for most readers, is especially welcome. By reference to the creations of musicians like Béla Bartók, painters like Kasimir Malevich, and writers like Karel Čapek, Berend interprets "different modes of social revolt" as a prelude to showing how these were stifled by totalitarian regimes that were, to a considerable extent, also the products of the same societal changes that had fostered aesthetic innovation.

THE book by Szporluk is the most solidly based in research. Many writers have noted the significance of Friedrich List (1789–1846) as a forerunner and implicit antagonist of Marx, but none has explored the subject so thoroughly. His exploration leads Szporluk to confront head-on an issue at the heart of the revived concern for historical interpretation: will economics dominate the future of East Central and Eastern Europe? Szporluk's major hypothesis is that nationalism, instead of being an epiphenomenon of capitalism, as Marxists contend, was "a

third party on the battlefield where Marxism met capitalism" (p. 14). Marxism and nationalism acted as rival revolutionary movements in the "long" 19th century (to borrow Fernand Braudel's terminology) from 1789 to 1918.

Friedrich List's key role in this rivalry is the central theme of Szporluk's book. His extended discussion of earlier German nationalists (notably, Johann Gottfried Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte) is intended to demonstrate that none had reacted, in a penetrating manner, to the Industrial Revolution. Hence it remained for List to provide the synthesis between a nation's economic life and its culture and politics, which enabled nationalists to compete successfully with emerging Marxism. But List was no apologist for the existing order. After his political activities compelled him to leave the Kingdom of Württemberg, List acquired (1825–30) prominent friends—but also severe critics—in the United States, where he embraced Alexander Hamilton's "national school" of economic policy. Back in Europe, List rejected a German editorial post—a job that eventually went to Marx! Although his book, *The National System of Political Economy* (1845) ultimately had a remarkable impact, List did not live to see that success.

In contrast to Marx's belief in an international working class that would finally produce a socialist world order, List contended that each nation had legitimate interests that other nations should copy (using protective tariffs, for example) rather than criticize. Such fundamental differences in the two thinkers' action programs reflected their basic disagreement on forces behind the 19th-century transformations.

AT first sight it appears paradoxical that List, an economist promoting

industrial development, should provide a refutation of the Marxist thesis that the cultural superstructure is determined by the base of economic production relationships. The paradox is deepened by the attachment of both List and Marx to "planning rationality" versus "market rationality," that is, to state intervention versus private enterprise. Both theorists also focused on the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution as turning points in societal development—but Marx saw them as the triumph of capitalism, while List saw them as the unleashing of national forces.

Indeed, List's adherence to economic intervention by the state presents a series of difficulties for his non-Marxist critics. A brief look at these difficulties suggests, however, that the real problem may be that many non-Marxists tend to accept tacitly *other* Marxist postulates that List had already rejected before Marx even made them.

Both Szporluk and Brzezinski identify as the major Marxist error, one greatly aggravated by Lenin, the conviction that limitless benefits accrue from political action. This conviction was acted upon in a "misguided effort to impose total rationality on social affairs" (Brzezinski, p. 231). In the early 1920's, Soviet leaders seemed to subscribe to List's counsels on planning and expert management—Szporluk recalls that Edward H. Carr had termed List the "father of the theory of planning" in the Soviet Union (p. 220). However, the Soviet regime soon went far beyond rational economic direction (scarcely possible under early Soviet conditions) to engage in a ghastly manipulation of human conditions through "social engineering."

List, by contrast, began by postulating the nation-state as the normal framework for industrial development. Hence, he insisted that each developmental pattern of industrial-

ization contained its own irreducible element of cultural distinctiveness. To be sure, his limited historical perspective as well as his German bias led List to belittle the future prospects of small nations (Szporluk, p. 125). It is remarkable how this view finds perverse echoes in Russia today. Brzezinski, for example, quotes the Italian Communist newspaper *L'Unità* report on an anti-*perestroyka* manuscript circulating in the Soviet Union that contained the following sentence: "The greatest danger . . . is constituted by the scandalous nationalism of insignificant nations such as the Tatars of the Crimea and Zionist-type Jews" (p. 99). (This sentence was deleted from the text eventually published in March 1988 in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, the organ of the Russian republic.) Neither Marx nor List (nor, it appears, Szporluk) fully appreciated the fundamental significance of mythic elements in the long history of national development. Nevertheless, a crucial distinction remains between List's appreciation of the nation as an independent variable among many and Marx's rationalist insistence that the "dream history of nations" is merely a dependent variable masking capitalist interests.

UNFORTUNATELY, in their search for presumably more fundamental social factors, many Western analysts tacitly follow Marx and liberal philosophers like Jeremy Bentham in treating national identity as epiphenomenal. This implicit assumption has left them unprepared for the recent reappearance of deep cleavages among the ethnic components of the Soviet Union, which, as Brzezinski rightly emphasizes in his book, are unanticipated consequences of Mikhail Gorbachev's *glasnost* as well potentially fatal obstacles to his *perestroyka*. Just a few years ago some American so-

cial scientists were predicting that universal pressures for economic development would soon lead to a large-scale incorporation of Moslem labor from Central Asia in the urban centers of the European parts of the Soviet Union. Instead, the Moslem demographic explosion has been accompanied by the increasing attachment on the part of Soviet Moslems to the ersatz *Dar ul-Islam* represented by those Soviet republics whose populations are predominantly Moslem. In these homelands, xenophobic outbursts against Europeans—especially but not exclusively against Armenians—portend a threat to continued Soviet rule. At the western end of the "southern tier" of Soviet power, East Central European nationalism has never been quiescent. Today, it seems to threaten the Soviet imperial system more than ever. Just within the USSR's border, nationalist expression among the huge Ukrainian population constitutes, according to Brzezinski, "the potentially gravest threat to the very survival of the Soviet Union" (p. 246).

Brzezinski's assessment of specific nationalist problems in the USSR gains authority from the breadth of his comparisons. His first three chapters concentrate on the development of the Soviet system, beginning with Lenin's brief but seminal leadership and concluding with Brezhnev's 18 years, which Brzezinski calls "stagnant Stalinism." The next four chapters analyze prospects for Gorbachev's reforms. Here Brzezinski discounts fundamental cleavages among Politburo members, while recognizing notable differences on tactics. Then he identifies 10 "dynamics of disunion." These include virtually the entire range of Soviet policy, but appear to be especially significant in fields where internal Soviet problems (intellectual, religious, and na-

tional) transcend the formal frontiers of the USSR by relating to unrest in Soviet-dominated countries of East Central Europe (Chapters 8–12), to China (Chapters 12–16), to international communism (Chapter 17), and to the Third World (Chapters 18–19). Chapters 21–24, with an appendix of graphic comparisons, provide an overall assessment of what Brzezinski terms the "general crisis" of communism.

BOTH Szporluk and Berend would concur with Brzezinski's conclusion that a one-dimensional ideological emphasis on centrally directed economic development has produced a spiritual emptiness that saps Soviet domestic vitality. The close historical relationship between religion and national identity—amounting in this reviewer's view to typological continuity—means that a heightening of national awareness will also have religious implications that *could* go a long way to fill the spiritual void. But one cannot overlook the specifics of the current situation, in which ethno-religious revival can also produce catastrophic flights from reason rivalling the excesses of Marxism-Leninism. Surely, irrationality is one aspect of the shocking Armenian-Azeri clashes. More sinister, because of its broader implications, is the effort by elements in *Pamyat'* to amalgamate crude Russian nationalism and anti-Semitism with traditional Orthodox themes.

A critical ingredient of many ethno-religious amalgams is exaggeration of the Romantic folkloric and linguistic aspects of national identity at the expense of institutional components. Here, as Szporluk demonstrates, List's lessons are most valuable. A contemporary of the Romantic movement, List recognized the importance of emotional (mythic) components of the authentic national community. But,

like Edmund Burke a few decades earlier, List refused to capitulate unconditionally to the Romantic components. Instead, both men ascribed equal weight to major institutional structures—legal ones for Burke, economic ones for List. Their position was prescient. Those national movements that turned their backs on stability ensured by a legal and constitutional order, or on economic development to satisfy human needs, have produced new catastrophes. Some, like Italian predecessors of Mussolini's Fascism or the Khmer Rouge, did this by directly imposing massive sacrifices on their populations. Other nationalist movements (e.g. the "White" anti-Bolsheviks) effectively abandoned the field of popular support to ostensibly rational movements that promised security and welfare.

In my view, one must penetrate deeper into the roots of East Central European nationalism to understand how ethno-religious identity can find the delicate balance between Romantic adherence to "modern" symbols like language and the practical requirements of national reconstruction. Not only have scholars of Eastern Europe often minimized the enduring implications of the Moslem-Christian rift across Europe from the Adriatic to the Caspian Seas; they have often oversimplified relations among ethnic communities in the historically Christian sphere. Most critical have been misconceptions about the evolution of the East Central European city as an ethnically mixed entity.

The Central European myth of a superior rural gentry lifestyle confronting alien urban "islands" spread east during the 18th century to adjoining regions, especially to the European portions of the Russian Empire. As the 19th century drew on, "populist" versions (in *völk-*

kisch or *narodnik* ideologies) of this myth, stressing peasant virtues, appealed to rising nationalist elites. One result was the xenophobia of the "Black Hundreds" and their current Russian epigones. But chauvinist attacks on urban ethnic minorities were also frequent among non-Russian nations of the tsarist empire, depriving them of much needed urban skills.

Even more lastingly injurious to stable national evolution, if not so obviously repugnant, has been the populist rejection of the city itself as the center of national life. In this, Eastern and East Central European national cultures have differed sharply from most Mediterranean cultures (Castile being an extreme exception to this rule), which celebrated urban lifestyles. Hence, Szporluk's perception of parallels between early 20th-century trends in Italy and lands farther to the east seems to me somewhat superficial. Possibly, this deep-rooted negative attitude toward the city is a more serious barrier to regarding Iberia after Francisco Franco and Antonio Salazar as a model for Eastern Europe at the present time than Brzezinski's point that the persistence of autonomous institutions under the two Iberian dictators preserved a basis for pluralism that the totalitarians in the East have swept away.

MY principal point is that assessment of the future of Communist systems requires not only historical examination ranging far back in time and comparisons going far afield, but careful adaptation of analytic frameworks from diverse disciplines. Resort to fashionable comparative models may be as ephemeral as infatuation with "structural functionalism" in the early 1960's or "interest group pluralism" in the 1970's, although both cults did produce some permanent contributions to the area studies field. Con-

versely, Rankean historicism, for long the paradigm for the area studies approach, will not suffice, no matter how much it leads to the production of technically sound research.²

In the search for an adequate synthetic framework, the area student will need to turn partially to models that utilize, often fruitfully, certain Marxist theses.³ Although, as Brzezinski notes, Marxism as a coherent system is obsolete, its components will continue to permeate areas of intellectual discourse. Through prior acquaintance with Leninist systems, the area student should be extraordinarily well-prepared to extract the gold from Marxist interpretations and leave behind the dross.

From the practical standpoint, a systematic investigation of the societal manifestations permitted by Gorbachev's innovations cannot await the thorough conceptual retooling just suggested. But our three authors' stress on historical depth and comparative breadth at least point in the direction such investigations must take.

Further, Szporluk and Brzezinski note the great deterioration, since the 1970's, of the Soviet regime's position in the world, and hence the relative strengthening of the United States' position. In this appraisal, they agree with writers in the January 1989 survey issue of *Foreign Affairs*, most of whom are specialists

²In this connection one should not overlook the very important *comparative* contributions recently made by East-Central European symposia, for example, *L'Europe aux IXe-XIe siècles: Aux origines des états nationaux* (Europe in the 9th–11th Centuries: On the Origins of Nation-States), Warsaw, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1968; Vera Zimanyi, Ed., *La Pologne et la Hongrie aux XVIe–XVIIIe siècles*, (Poland and Hungary in the 16th–18th Centuries), Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1981.

³See, for example, many contributions in Theda Skocpol, Ed., *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984.

on American foreign policy. It is instructive to see such scholars as Robert W. Tucker and Paul Johnson conclude that the Reagan years, despite repeated confusion on side-issues, produced a great improvement in the American global position.⁴ From a slightly longer perspective, one might recognize Zbigniew Brzezinski's comparable contribution when he was national security adviser for the preceding administration. Amidst the cacophony of 1977–80, he maintained, I am convinced, a measure of consistency in policy toward Moscow that prepared the ground for the Reagan Administration's more apparent gains. Most academics like to write about the unity of theory and practice; Brzezinski realized it.

CONFRONTED by such pervasive optimism among diverse observers, one hesitates to interject a note of pessimism. Surely, the ideological appeal of Marxism-Leninism is essentially finished. Here and there—notably in Latin America—grossly simplified versions of Leninism still attract activists. But intellectual enthusiasts for Third World rejection of the “world center of exploitation,” although drawing on some of Lenin's theses, treat the Soviet system itself not as a model but as a make-weight in the complicated global struggle. Immanuel Wallerstein, for example, wrote in 1975 that the existence of the USSR “objectively . . . held first Nazi Germany and later the USA at bay,” legitimiz-

ing the “revolutionary struggle” and creating “world social space for opposition forces” against the capitalist center.⁵

In fact, the erosion of Marxism-Leninism's ideological appeal has been proceeding relentlessly for many years. The hidden decay of Stalin's years was sealed by Nikita Khrushchev's admissions in the late 1950's. Yet, as Brzezinski points out, for a brief period following the launching of Sputnik, Soviet power appeared to be on the ascendant. The present reviewer merely summed up widespread opinion when he wrote: “In crucial areas where Soviet threats have real meaning, however, a new group of recruits replaces the dedicated revolutionaries of the interwar period. Those who are attracted by the prospect of power unchecked by moral scruples, and those cunning opportunists who wish merely to ride the ‘wave of history’ align themselves with the Soviet presence.”⁶ The long period (1964–82) of oligarchic bureaucratic stagnation under Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail Suslov revealed the incapacity (which many had suspected earlier) of the obsolescent Soviet economy to sustain a multifaceted “presence” on the global stage.

The principal *military* instruments of Soviet world power, however, remain intact, indeed they have been immensely strengthened both relatively and absolutely since Khrushchev's day. Recent admissions that not 15, but 25 percent of the Soviet gross national product has regularly gone for military end-items reinforces rather than weakens the image of the USSR as the longest-lived modern garrison state. Regrettably, history provides several examples of other garrison polities armed with weapons slightly cruder than today's that in their vast numbers were able to overwhelm more sophisticated civilizations.

Few observers think that the present Soviet leadership, or its probable rivals, would contemplate a resort to mass destruction. Nevertheless, as Brzezinski underscores, surprisingly influential manifestations of Russian nationalism make it evident that the end of Soviet imperial power would be unacceptable to a large core element of the population. Brzezinski also believes (correctly, I think) that the Pandora's box of non-Russian national passion can never again be tightly closed. Consequently, an explosive anti-Moscow outburst, whether originating within or outside the Soviet border, is possible. Such a nationalist rebellion might be countered by an irrationally extreme Russian response, instead of by the grimly cautious preventive measures that characterized the Leninist formulas for centralized coercion. The front-line of coercion—that is, those most immediately threatened by an anti-Moscow outburst—still consists of police and military professionals. Among the various apparatuses of Soviet power, these are now the most Russian in recruitment and in bureaucratic tradition. Some evidence suggests that elements among the police and military were involved in the extreme chauvinism of *Pamyat'* and its predecessors during Brezhnev's final years. Both professional interests and ethnic affiliations suggest, therefore, that the police and the military might respond drastically to a centrifugal upheaval. Ominously, these apparatuses exert immediate control over the means of mass destruction, as the use of poison gas to control a demonstration in Georgia, ostensibly without Politburo approval, reminds us.

In a general way, therefore, Brzezinski's analysis, despite its optimism, suggests that considerable Western caution is in order. Obviously, to make sweeping Western

⁴See Robert W. Tucker, “Reagan's Foreign Policy,” and Paul Johnson, “Europe and the Reagan Years,” *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Vol. 69, No. 1, 1989, pp. 1–27 and 28–38, respectively.

⁵“Old Problems and New Syntheses,” reprinted in Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World Economy: Essays*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 242.

⁶John A. Armstrong, *The Politics of Totalitarianism*, New York, Random House, 1961, p. 347.

concessions affecting the fundamental military balance would be a dubious decision. More worthy of debate is whether the installation of defensive systems with significant capacity for countering a desperate Soviet strike (possibly weakened by incoherence at the top command level) would be desirable, should such systems be technically feasi-

ble. However, in the final analysis, no defensive measures are likely to avert mass destruction unless they have been preceded—during an interval of productive negotiations with Soviet leaders concerned to restore rationality in policy-making—by mutual limitation on the numbers and capacity of offensive weapons. To this observer, there-

fore, the basic optimism about the end of an expansive Soviet system, tempered by a dose of pessimism, calls for intensive, flexible arms negotiations with Gorbachev or any reasonable successors, unhindered by excessive concern with personalities and the accompanying “atmospherics.”

Moscow and the Military Buildup in Northern Europe

Robert W. Janes

JOHN H. M. HAGARD. *Nordic Security*. New York, Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1987.

CLIVE ARCHER, ED. *The Soviet Union and Northern Waters*. New York, Routledge, Chapman, and Hall, 1988.

ROY ALLISON. *Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, 1944-1984*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1985.

ORJAN BERNER. *Soviet Policies Toward the Nordic Countries*. Cambridge, MA, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1986.

SVERRE JERVELL and KARE NYBLOM, EDS. *The Military*

Buildup in the High North. American and Nordic Perspectives. Cambridge, MA, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1986.

JOHN C. AUSLAND. *Nordic Security and the Great Powers*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1986.

HELGE OLE BERGESEN, ARILD MOE, WILLY ØSTRENG. *Soviet Oil and Security Interests in the Barents Sea*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1987.

INGEMAR LINDAHL. *The Soviet Union and the Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone Proposal*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1988.

up of the Soviet Northern Fleet. As American analyst Steven Miller has stated: "Indeed, from an American perspective there is virtually no region in the world that has witnessed more dramatic changes in the politico-military environment than has Northern Europe" (Archer, Ed., p. 225).

Previously a topic mainly of concern to Nordic scholars, the viability of the Nordic region's equilibrium recently has come under scrutiny

from other quarters as well. Many analysts on both sides of the Atlantic now attempt to assess the influence of Soviet policies in Scandinavia and question whether stability in the region can be maintained in the face of its recently increased strategic importance.

The quiescence in the Nordic region masks its considerable complexity. The books under review present a number of regional and strategic perspectives on different but intersecting topics, and capture the mix of domestic and international politics specific to the region. Taken together, the key theme that emerges in these books is the role of traditional Nordic stability in the increasingly militarized Northern environment. This review will focus on the varying assessments of the role of the Nordic system in maintaining regional stability. Three issues are particularly salient: competing military alliances; Nordic domestic attitudes, particularly as reflected in the proposal for a Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone

Robert W. Janes is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland (College Park). His research is on Soviet-Finnish relations.

WITH considerable justification the Nordic countries have often been referred to as the quiet corner of Europe. Despite Scandinavia's strategic location, a modus vivendi of regional and superpower interaction has been worked out that has kept tension in the region fairly low. However, over the course of the 1980's, regional stability has become increasingly threatened, a trend that started in the 1970's with the build-

(NNWFZ). Before examining these topics, however, it is necessary to review the authors' perceptions of Nordic stability and patterns of Soviet policy toward the region.

AS THE Danish scholar, Erling Bjøl, notes: "viewed from the outside, the Nordic countries have the character of geostrategic unity. From the inside, from within each of the Nordic countries, the perspective is rather different. Instead of unity you see diversity" (Jervell and Nyblom, Eds., p. 91). Swedish Defense Minister Anders Thunborg made a related point when he argued that the Nordic region "constitutes an area which is neither completely neutral nor completely aligned."¹ Bjøl and Thunborg draw attention to an interesting feature of the region: the Nordic countries each have individual security policies, yet, these policies also interact to give a unique character to Nordic security. Norway, Denmark, and Iceland are founding members of NATO, although their membership in this alliance is qualified by self-imposed restraints regarding basing of troops and nuclear weapons. Sweden practices an armed neutrality, but is generally viewed as leaning toward NATO. Finland is also neutral but maintains a special relationship with the Soviet Union codified in their Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) Treaty signed in 1948. The unique character of Nordic regional security derives from the fact that, despite their differences, "the policy of each Nordic government is carried out with due regard to the interests of all the other Nordic countries" (Archer, Ed., p.

165). The themes of mutual consideration and close interaction run through practically all discussions of Nordic security; they also function extra-regionally in the security relations of the Nordic countries with outside powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union (Lindahl, p. 23).

Differences among the authors reviewed here arise over the extent to which such interaction and sensitivity can continue in a changed security environment. The strongest view of Nordic interaction is contained in the Nordic balance theory.² The theory posits, in essence, that moves by one superpower or its alliance in the region will lead to a response from the opposing superpower or its alliance. For example, were the Soviet Union to enhance its ties with Finland, this action would precipitate the greater integration of Norway and Denmark into NATO. The Nordic balance theory can thus explain Soviet restraint toward Finland, as well as the restraints on Norway's involvement in NATO (which, according to the balance theory, would lead to increased Soviet ties with Helsinki). The Nordic balance theory has gained widespread favor among Norwegian scholars (Allison, p. 55).

John H. M. Hagard's *Nordic Security* argues that the balancing process among the Nordic countries is characterized by high degrees of sensitivity and interaction both among the countries of the region and between the region and the superpowers. However, like most authors reviewed here, he argues that something less than an automatic balance regulates their relations. Thus, he ascribes consid-

erable value to the balancing mechanism as a means to regulate superpower tension by the regional powers. Hagard likens the mechanism to unilateral confidence-building measures (CBM's) taken out of "consideration for the situation and options of one or several of the other Nordic countries." As he notes: "This aspect of the Nordic security policy pattern is intended to dissuade the superpowers from increasing their involvement in the region" (Hagard, p. 5). Thus, Norway, for example, aside from its basing pledges, limits military exercises in Finnmark—its northern province on the Soviet border—and keeps its pre-positioned NATO equipment in central Norway where it poses a less dangerous threat to the USSR.

Although Clive Archer generally subscribes to the balance theory, he ascribes more importance to regional sensitivity to neighbors' security. However, in focusing mainly on the NATO Nordic countries, he uses deterrence and reassurance to analyze this sensitivity, rather than a balancing mechanism. Archer argues that while these countries need participation in NATO to deter Soviet aggressive intentions, they cannot allow their territories to pose a threat to Soviet security.

In contrast to the support the balance theory finds among the Norwegians, the Finns reject the notion of a balancing mechanism. As Roy Allison notes in *Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, 1944-1984*, "the most that Finnish officials have conceded is that a balance exists in the North as a static regional condition between spheres of interest of the superpowers" (Allison, p. 55). Allison further points out that the Nordic balance concept is fundamentally at odds with the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, as the postwar Finnish foreign and security policy is called. Accordingly, Finnish-Soviet relations operate primarily in a bilat-

¹Anders Thunborg, "Neutral States and World Peace," Address to International Seminar for Diplomats, Klessheim, Austria, August 25, 1984, quoted in Hagard, p. 4. See also Thunborg's comments on states' alignments in "The Need to Maintain Sweden's Defense Efforts," in Jervell and Nyblom, Eds., pp. 67-73.

²This theory is associated most strongly with the Norwegian scholar A. O. Brundtland. See A. O. Brundtland, "The Nordic Balance," *Cooperation and Conflict* (Stockholm), 1966 II, pp. 30-63.

eral context, and Finland ensures its independence through its own efforts at neutrality. In turn, the success of Finland's neutral policies gives the Soviet Union no reason to interfere. Moreover, the Finns view Norway's and Denmark's limited participation in NATO as deriving from domestic political constraints within those countries, and not as a result of their concern for Finland (Allison, pp. 52–54). Quite naturally, as Allison points out, the Finns would not be interested in a theory that suggested the need for closer ties to the Soviet Union, should Norway pursue greater integration with the Atlantic Alliance.

ALTHOUGH the Soviet Union denies the validity of the Nordic balance theory, at times it too has acted with restraint. Certainly, Soviet policy toward these countries has at times reflected, if not satisfaction, then at least tolerance of the status quo. A comment by a former Norwegian correspondent to Moscow reflects the intermittently anodyne perceptions Moscow has of the Nordic situation:

At the public level, one hears that Finland has a policy of positive neutrality, that Sweden's neutrality is also commendable, although it could be improved in some respects, and that Norway and Denmark are basically decent nations, who have regrettably fallen into dubious company because they did not understand what was best for them.³

By contrast, Orjan Berner, in *Soviet Policies Toward the Nordic Countries*, points to periods of considerable tension between the Nor-

dic countries and the USSR. Berner reviews the broad historical patterns of alternating tension, restraint, and accommodation that characterize Soviet policy toward the Nordic region. Berner is less interested in theoretical explanations—such as Nordic balance—than in assessing a few basic principles that seem to have guided Soviet policy. This work clearly demonstrates the value of historical perspective on the Nordic region, a quality it shares with Allison's book on Finland.

The predominant Soviet concern in the postwar period has been to minimize the Nordic countries' involvement with the Western alliance. The pattern that emerged in the postwar period was not predestined, as is shown by Berner's discussion of plans for a neutral Scandinavian Defense Union (SDU) in 1948–49. Soviet reaction to the SDU was entirely negative because Joseph Stalin believed that the organization would gravitate toward the Atlantic alliance. Although the Soviet Union was not responsible for the failure of the SDU, the episode points to a strong Soviet suspicion of Nordic neutrality. This suspicion is, however, tinged with ambivalence—after NATO had been established, the Soviet Union attempted to resurrect the idea of the SDU. The Nordic NATO countries quite naturally rejected Moscow's proposal.

Norway's and Denmark's integration into NATO in the early 1950's strained their relations with the USSR. A period of relaxation followed in 1955 with Moscow's efforts to foster détente with the Nordic countries. In the late 1950's, however, Danish and West German military cooperation in the Baltic became another source of considerable strain. A particularly sore point was the formation of the Combined Baltic Command in 1961, which created a joint military com-

mand between Denmark and West Germany for the Baltic.

Throughout the 1960's and 1970's, the Soviet Union had reason for general satisfaction with Sweden's neutral course, and indeed relations seemed to have achieved a reasonable degree of amity. Berner reviews Soviet commentary lauding Sweden for its international peace efforts, as well as analyses chiding it for the growth of its armed forces. As Berner explains, however, Moscow did not fear the size of the Swedish military per se, but rather its technological level, which created the potential for Stockholm's dependence on the American arms industry (Berner, p. 143). In this generally warm atmosphere, the Soviet submarine incursions and the renewed period of tension that ensued in the 1980's appear quite perplexing. Nevertheless, no permanent chill in relations has occurred between Sweden and the Soviet Union.

Denmark, despite its NATO membership, has developed fairly smooth relations with the Soviet Union since the 1960's. Copenhagen's policies have not proven to be major irritants to Moscow. Denmark maintains a low level of military spending within the alliance, and many Danes exhibit strong anti-nuclear sentiments (Berner, pp. 155–60). However, discordant notes arose in the early 1980's because of Danish participation in NATO exercises.

Although Iceland is the only Nordic country that allows permanent basing of American troops, its relations with Moscow generally have remained free of strain. More often, it has been the recipient of Soviet blandishments, such as a 1946 agreement to buy fish from Iceland, Soviet credits for purchasing fishing boats, and guarantees to respect Iceland's neutrality, should it leave NATO (Berner, pp. 70–71). At

³Per Egil Hegge, "The Soviet View of the Nordic Balance," *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Summer 1979, p. 63, quoted in Lindahl, p. 28.

times, the Soviet Union has taken a hostile tack and tried to exploit Icelandic anti-nuclear sentiments by charging that the United States stores nuclear weapons at Keflavik. The Icelandic government has repeatedly rejected the Soviet charges, although it is American policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of such weapons.

It has fallen on Norway to receive the brunt of Soviet criticisms. Their underlying theme has been that co-operation with the United States is slowly but surely eroding Norway's pledge not to allow nuclear weapons on its territory. Norway occupies the pivotal strategic position for NATO in Northern Europe. Thus, of the three Nordic participants in NATO, Norway is the most integrated into the alliance. Moreover, in 1980, Norway agreed to pre-positioning of matériel for the US Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB), which involves the deployment of both aircraft and artillery capable of delivering conventional and nuclear weapons. Thus, so the Soviets claim, in a crisis situation, the United States would force Norway to abandon its non-nuclear pledge. Norway also maintains electronic intelligence-gathering and navigation stations that contribute to NATO command, control, and communications. In the Soviet view, this cooperation amounts to Norway's assimilation into NATO's nuclear command structure, despite the refusal to extend navigation assistance to US strategic nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN's) by the Norwegian government (Berner, pp. 170-77).

Media campaigns and diplomatic notes have been the main instruments through which the Soviet Union has addressed the Nordic countries. Berner argues that neither Moscow's carrots nor its sticks have achieved great success. The hard-line tactics have produced

marginal accommodation at best. The blandishments may create an atmosphere of détente, but they have failed to sway the Nordic countries from their security policies (Berner, p. 84).

In Berner's view, the Soviet Union has consistently sought a *droit de regard* in the Nordic countries, at least over issues of basing policies and ties to the Western alliance. However, because both Norway and Denmark have limited their participation in NATO as a matter of self-imposed policy, the Soviet Union has no grounds to interfere. Although it has stopped short of direct interference, the Soviet Union has tried to prevent these countries' increased integration into NATO. Berner does not believe that the prevailing pattern is in immediate danger: "Whatever has preserved peace during the last decades—deterrence, parity, support for the status quo, or the absence of demands for dramatic change—might very well continue to work for the foreseeable future" (Berner, p. 184). Furthermore, despite Soviet attempts to test the Nordic countries' resolve to maintain their chosen security arrangements, Berner believes Soviet policies are also anchored in a tradition of restraint (Berner, p. 184).

A SECURE and non-hostile Finland constitutes the linchpin of Soviet policy in Northern Europe. Allison's book gives the most thorough examination to date of the Soviet-Finnish relationship. Allison's is a valuable analysis not least because of the often superficial treatment the relationship has received in the past. His account stresses the importance of historical circumstance and the Finnish character as major influences on Finnish policy.

In the immediate postwar period, the Finns adjusted to coexistence with the Soviet Union by means of

the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line: an active policy of giving careful consideration to Soviet security concerns. After the two wars Finland had fought with the USSR between 1939 and 1945, the Soviet leadership sought to ensure that Finland would never again attack the Soviet Union. In the reconstruction of relations after the war, the decisive point came in February 1948 when Stalin sent President J. K. Paasikivi of Finland a note calling for a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance between the two countries modeled on similar treaties just signed with Romania and Hungary. This action reverberated throughout the Nordic region and accelerated the Scandinavians' search for security arrangements, a point also discussed by Berner. In the end, Stalin accepted almost without change a very different version of the FCMA treaty proposed by Paasikivi. This outcome resulted from Stalin's preoccupation with the emerging cold war. In Allison's view, this preoccupation, coupled with demonstrated Finnish toughness, probably led Stalin to settle for a treaty that satisfied basic Soviet security needs relative to Finland. This explanation is shared by Berner and Lindahl.

Articles I and II are the most significant parts of the treaty. Article I states that if Germany or its allies attack the Soviet Union through Finland, Finland would fight to repel this attack, and Moscow would extend assistance as a result of mutual consultations. Article II states that the Helsinki and Moscow partners are to confer if the existence of such a threat is established.

The "note crisis" of 1961 provided further clarification of the FCMA treaty's mutual security provisions. During the tension surrounding the Berlin crisis, the Soviet Union sent a note to Finland claiming that the international situation warranted mili-

tary consultations with Helsinki on the basis of Article II of the FCMA treaty. The crisis passed fairly quickly after Finnish President Urho Kekkonen visited Khrushchev and persuaded him that invoking the treaty would add to the "war psychosis" in the North (Allison, Ch. 2).

The "note crisis" became, in Allison's view, the main point of departure for Finnish security policy. As the central objective of his foreign policy, Kekkonen sought to persuade Moscow that Finland could reliably safeguard Soviet security interests. The Finns believed that once they had gained Soviet trust, Moscow would never again feel compelled to invoke Article II of the FCMA treaty. According to Allison, "it followed that both during the Note Crisis and in subsequent years Finnish leaders had to avoid creating the impression that Finland would be disinclined to activate Articles I and II of the treaty as such" (Allison, p. 58). In this sense, Finland's own interest lies in preventing threats to the Soviet Union from the Nordic quarter. Thus, the Finns have had to prove their reliability in protecting Soviet interests and, more importantly, to undertake concrete efforts aimed at precluding the emergence of such threatening situations.

Thus, Finland took on what has been pejoratively termed its watchdog role. Its promotion of the NNFZ proposal is the best example of this effort. Other examples of the "active neutrality" in which Kekkonen engaged to reduce tension included his playing host to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the SALT I talks. For a very small country with essentially little leverage in international politics, Finland managed to become an effective actor on the international stage.

Finland's active neutrality also highlighted divergent security inter-

ests in the region. Finland's security is best assured by keeping both superpowers at the greatest possible distance. The security of Norway and Denmark, by contrast, would weaken if the United States was kept too far away from the region (Lindahl, p. 105).

The stable and extremely friendly relations that have developed between the USSR and Finland are often taken as vindication of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line. This policy has generally been identified with the term "Finlandization." Allison, however, finds little evidence to support the traditional understanding of Finlandization, which denotes the gradual loss of control over foreign and even domestic policies to the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet Union has interfered in Finland's domestic affairs, as Allison points out, such instances have been fairly limited in number. He also mentions Finnish self-censorship of subject matter offensive to Moscow, but the number of such cases is also small, and the standards for self-censorship recently have been relaxed (Allison, p. 164).

Regional security issues, however, eventually intruded into the very stable Finnish-Soviet relationship. In the late 1970's, the changing security environment revived Soviet concerns regarding Finland's fulfillment of its obligations under the FCMA treaty. Authoritative Soviet commentary began to suggest the reevaluation of the scope of the FCMA treaty and limitations on Finnish neutrality.

A specific Soviet concern was Finland's ability to defend its airspace (an issue that also troubled Sweden). As a neutral, and under the FCMA treaty, Finland is obliged to defend itself against weapons that may use its airspace and territory on their way to targets in the USSR. This problem became particularly acute in the late 1970's

with the introduction of cruise-missile technology.

Throughout this period, the Finnish government refuted charges that its neutrality was being compromised and took steps to bolster its defense capabilities. This affair demonstrates that Soviet policy toward Finland will remain sensitive to the international environment. Allison aptly describes the episode's significance: "For Finns this underlined that the destiny and security of the nation were still inextricably bound to the constellation of forces in the Nordic region as a whole" (Allison, p. 70).

THE MILITARY situation in the Nordic region has changed greatly since the late 1930's, when the Soviet Union felt itself threatened by the proximity of Leningrad to the Finnish border. In the postwar period, the Soviet Union has clearly been the dominant power in the Baltic with control of most of its southern coastline. The shift of the headquarters of the Baltic fleet from Kronstadt to Kaliningrad, along with changes in military technology, obviated the need for Soviet control of access to the Gulf of Finland, thereby allowing the return of the leased base at Porkkala to Finland. Nevertheless, the Baltic, which represents, in effect, the northern flank of the central front in Europe, retains an extremely important place in Warsaw Pact and NATO planning. The Kola Peninsula, located east of Finland, however, has become the focus of military concern as the home base of the Soviet Northern Fleet and the most important locus of the Soviet Union's strategic reserve force.

In order to assess the kind of threat that the militarization of the Kola poses to Nordic stability, it is necessary to understand Soviet objectives in the region because they have been the driving factor in the

military buildup. Tomas Ries's contribution to Clive Archer's *The Soviet Union and Northern Waters* is very useful in this regard because he clearly and thoroughly delineates Soviet strategic objectives and their effect on the regional military situation.

Some 60 percent of the Soviet SSBN fleet is based on the Kola, and although the missiles on these submarines are not directed at the Nordic countries, the presence of these submarines necessarily has an impact on regional security. The Kola is the best basing area for the SSBN fleet because the "the adjacent waters constitute the optimal operational concealment and launch stations for these forces" (Archer, Ed., p. 91). Since the late 1970's, the SSBN base at Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula has increased in importance, but Kola will certainly remain preeminent because the most modern SSBN's are based there. Ries further notes that the Soviet Union clearly adopted a bastion strategy with these boats; that is, it has kept them in the northern waters and not on patrol off the US coast.

Furthermore, the Kola Peninsula is home for crucial air defense forces because it lies beneath the shortest route that can be taken by strategic bombers attempting to reach the western Soviet Union. The Arkhangel'sk Defense Sector has an essential role in defending the greatest concentrations of population, industry, and military forces in the Soviet Union. In addition, the Kola itself is a major strategic asset and requires sizable air defense.

What effect do these factors have on regional security? The defense of the Kola will focus on the Norwegian Sea because that sea is the main route to the Kola that NATO forces will use. Ries points to the fact that air defense forces stationed at Arkhangel'sk can cover

the Norwegian Sea only with great difficulty. However, by seizing the airbases of northern Norway, Soviet airpower could be projected much farther south. A successful attack would require rapid force projection into northern Norway and the occupation of Norwegian airbases. In this regard, Ries notes a definite improvement in the conventional forces at Kola. Yet, the battle for the Norwegian Sea will be of crucial importance for NATO as well: control of the sea would give the Soviet Union easy access to NATO's sea lanes of communication (SLOC's), which are essential for resupply of the central front. The importance of the Kola Peninsula to Soviet strategic forces blurs the distinction between NATO's strategic requirements and the security requirements of the Nordic countries (particularly Norway). In other words, the militarization of the Kola Peninsula links the strategic security of NATO to the security of the Nordic countries.

Among the different works under review, a rather consistent picture emerges of the purpose of Soviet forces and the direction of Soviet strategy in the high north. Much more controversial is the American response to the Soviet military buildup. The interplay of strategic and regional considerations in the area makes it inevitable that superpower actions and reactions would be viewed as a threat to the Nordic equilibrium. Both Jervell and Nyblom's *The Military Buildup in the High North* and Archer's *The Soviet Union and Northern Waters* contain excellent discussions of the opposing points of view on this issue. The advantage of the former lies in the mix of differing perspectives offered by defense analysts and Nordic government officials. The relevant chapters in the Archer volume tend to present more focused analyses of the same issues in some-

what greater depth.

The debate centers around the US "maritime strategy"—introduced during the Reagan Administration—of aggressively confronting the Soviet Navy on a global scale. In the event of a war in Europe, the US Navy would adopt a forward strategy by attempting to contain the Soviet Navy in its home ports at Kola and in the Pacific in Petropavlovsk. Under the strategy, the US intends to "defeat Soviet maritime strength in all its dimensions, including base support."⁴ Additionally, the US Navy will seek to degrade the Soviet SSBN fleet as much as possible. Although the maritime strategy is global in its orientation, it has clear implications for the Nordic region because of the importance of the Northern Fleet.

Assessments of potential dangers posed by the maritime strategy to Nordic stability depend, of course, on perceptions of the military interaction in the region. Haggard, for example, who has a fairly robust view of intra-regional dynamics, views with foreboding the evident arms race taking place in northern waters. He succinctly reviews the arms spiral in the region and finds that because neither superpower has yet adopted a permanent naval presence or patrolling activity in the northern waters (unlike in the Mediterranean), the curtailment of the escalation—given doctrinal changes—is possible. Along this line, Ries argues that because Kola regional forces have not been built up beyond defensive strength, perhaps in order not to overly alarm the Scandinavian countries, the preservation of stability on the regional level is possible. Steven Miller, by contrast, argues

⁴Special Supplement, "The Maritime Strategy," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (Annapolis, MD), January 1986, p. 11, quoted in Archer, Ed., p. 30.

that "it is time to set aside the comforting and persistent myth that Scandinavia is a region of stability and low tension" (Archer, Ed., p. 226). In other words, once the northern waters became vital to the Soviet Union's strategic force, then the nature of the Nordic countries' security problems had to change.

What is the balance on the regional level? John Ausland's *Nordic Security and the Great Powers* deals largely with regional interaction. Ausland understands, of course, the importance of the Norwegian Sea in the strategic competition. However, he pays considerably less attention to distinctions between regional and strategic objectives. Although Ausland regards control of the Norwegian Sea as the primary regional issue, he spends much of the book comparing the Nordic countries, both individually and as part of NATO, to the Warsaw Pact. Ausland's chief purpose is to highlight the weaknesses of NATO's Nordic members and Sweden, and he is not optimistic about the odds NATO faces. Ausland underscores NATO's failure to keep pace with Moscow's conventional buildup.

Ausland's book contains appropriate prescriptions for redressing weaknesses on the regional level. However, because Ausland does not provide a clear analysis of Soviet strategy, it is difficult to assess the value of the Scandinavian peninsula as a Soviet military objective, and therefore, the requirements for deterrence. Carl Bildt, in "The Defense Efforts of Nordic Countries," in the Jervell and Nyblom volume, is much more sanguine about deterring a Soviet invasion of the Scandinavian peninsula. He points out how the geography heavily favors defenders in the Troms area (a narrow coast of mountains and fjords) of northern Norway, should a conventional attack come from the Kola

through Finnmark. Given NATO reinforcement with the MAB and F-16's flown into the airbases in northern Norway, Bildt argues that a credible defense of the area is possible.

The Soviet military also has the option of crossing Finnish Lapland and Sweden to attack Norway. Bildt acknowledges that the Swedish army has shrunk in recent years and that the Finnish army has limitations as well. However, both armies have units and tactics well-suited to the terrain, with which they are naturally very familiar. This terrain, moreover, has a poor road network, and therefore it is not conducive to mechanized attack forces.

Furthermore, the Soviets, in initiating conventional warfare in Scandinavia, would have to weigh very carefully the possibility of bringing Sweden and its formidable air force into a war on the side of NATO. As a number of analysts note, the defense of the Kola is a strategic priority whose security might be endangered rather than enhanced by attacking Norway (Berger, p. 167). In the southern Baltic, a Soviet amphibious attack on Denmark and southern Norway—and possibly southern Sweden as well—has been suggested as a possible scenario. Robert Weinland's "The Soviet Naval Buildup in the North: A Reassessment" in the Jervell and Nyblom volume discusses this option. The USSR would gain apparent advantages by seizing control of Denmark and using it for the forward basing of aircraft. Soviet occupation of Denmark would effectively outflank NATO air defense on the central front and pose an extremely serious threat to the SLOC's even without Soviet control of the Norwegian Sea. Weinland presents this scenario as a potential Soviet option and does not discuss its likelihood of success. Bildt sees considerable deterrent capability in the recent modernization of West Ger-

man, Danish and Swedish forces that would defend these areas. Ultimately, the likelihood of a Soviet conventional attack depends on Moscow's assessments of the value of forward air bases, which clearly have increased in importance. Yet, at the same time, NATO airpower has also improved.

Berner and Weinland discuss the Soviet submarine incursions into Swedish waters in the context of a possible Soviet attack on Sweden. Since the Soviet Whiskey class submarine ran aground off the Karlskrona military installation in 1981, submarine incursions have become the most visible aspect of Soviet policy in the region. A number of reported incursions have taken place since 1981. In the wake of the 1981 incident, the Swedish government mustered support for an increase in its defense budget together with the reinforcement of its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. Additionally, the incursions certainly drew the public's attention to the salience of the Soviet threat. The increased military importance of Scandinavia has meant that the Soviet Union has had to include the Baltic as well as the Norwegian Sea in its military planning. Both Weinland and Berner view the submarine incursions as examples of contingency planning for an attack on Sweden. A similar purpose might also underlie Soviet incursions into the Norwegian fjords.

An interpretation of the Soviet incursions that places more weight on political considerations merits attention. Steve Lindberg, for example, has argued that once Stockholm discovered the incursions, their military utility would have declined thanks to the adoption of Swedish countermeasures.⁵ Although the incursions might have begun as a purely military exercise, once discovered, their political value might well have risen. In the in-

creasing tension of the early 1980's, the incursions provided a means to remind Sweden of its neutrality and the importance the Soviet Union attaches to its security interests in the Baltic. Lindberg further argues that the costs of continuing the incursions are low relative to the message they send. In his view, the incursions are the equivalent of the subtle signals sent to Finland in the late 1970's—clear reminders that within a framework of essentially stable relations, Moscow is still very sensitive to perceived adverse security conditions in the North.

ONE OF the more distinctive features of the Nordic countries is the degree to which domestic politics and security policies intersect. As Ausland comments, "nuclear weapons and arms control have become a part of the fabric of domestic politics" (Ausland, p. 55). The publics in all the Nordic countries consistently support their governments' security policies. However, as Clive Archer points out, this support is not uncritical. Although the Danish public supports the country's defense policies, it is very reluctant to fund them. Norwegians and Danes received NATO's decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces with considerable criticism. In general, the Nordic peoples maintain a strong dislike of nuclear weapons (Archer, Ed., p. 174).

The Nordic nuclear-weapons-free-zone proposal provides a particularly apt illustration of domestic influence on Nordic security policies. First brought up in the 1950's, the NNWFZ might be considered the hardy perennial of arms control proposals. It was formally launched

by Kekkonen in 1963 as part of his efforts at active neutrality in the aftermath of the "note crisis." The immediate rejection of the NNWFZ proposal in the region was understandable, given its incompatibility with Norway's and Denmark's NATO membership. In addition, the Soviet Union—the only state in the region with nuclear weapons—spurned the proposal. Moscow also held firmly against an extension of the NNWFZ to the Baltic because this coverage would have prohibited the use of that sea by Soviet warships carrying nuclear arms. The states affected by the proposal had no nuclear weapons and no plans to acquire them. The NNWFZ proposal would simply have "de-nuclearized" a region devoid of nuclear weapons.

The revival of the cold war between the US and the Soviet Union and the consequent increased tension in Europe, which culminated in NATO's decision to deploy cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles, made the NNWFZ more appealing to the publics and political leaderships of the Nordic countries. For example, the Norwegian Social Democratic Party gradually adopted the NNWFZ as part of its platform, although it made the implementation of the proposal contingent on broader European disarmament. As Ingemar Lindahl points out in *The Soviet Union and the Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone Proposal*, the Social Democratic Party's policy has created the perception that the Norwegian government is severely constrained in exercising the option to acquire nuclear weapons, even in war.

According to Lindahl, the dynamic at work in the NNWFZ proposal and its warm support from the Soviet Union pits two political cultures against one other. He identifies a democratic and rational Nordic culture that abhors nuclear weapons

and the possibility of nuclear war. Nordic traditions of neutrality and aloofness from the rest of Europe reinforce this attitude. The Nordic countries' neighbor to the east, however, is a distinctly different international actor, one that is not bound by public opinion and hence can use arms control cynically to manipulate public opinion in other countries. Lindahl, indeed, considers the Nordic populations to be particularly susceptible to such manipulation.

For Lindahl, like Berner, the basic objective of Soviet policy in the 1970's and 1980's has been the attempt to gain a *droit de regard* in Nordic affairs. In contrast to Berner, however, Lindahl views the Soviet Union as much less willing to accept the status quo. The intrusiveness of the NNWFZ measures would preclude Copenhagen's and Oslo's membership in NATO. Accordingly, Lindahl argues that Moscow seeks to use the NNWFZ proposal to force Norway and Denmark into de facto neutrality.

Lindahl uses the Soviet promotion of the NNWFZ proposal as a prism for interpreting Soviet foreign policy toward the Nordic region. He argues that Marxism and Great Russian nationalism motivate Soviet foreign policy, leading Moscow to claim great-power prerogatives in relation to the interests of small states (Lindahl, pp. 186, 188; Ch. 3, passim). In this sense, Lindahl's portrayal of Soviet policy resembles the Stalinist "two-camp doctrine": the view that the international system is characterized by the unremitting struggle of capitalism against socialism. Consequently, he contends that Moscow does not fully accept the legitimacy of neutral status. Thus, were Norway and Denmark to adopt neutrality, the Soviet Union would continue to pressure them to accommodate Soviet security interests.

⁵Steve Lindberg, "Submarine Incursions for Political Consumption," *Nordic Journal of Soviet and East European Studies* (Uppsala), Vol. 4, No. 1, 1987, pp. 61–77.

Perceptions of the NNWFZ tend to reflect the assumptions of these authors' about regional politics and Soviet foreign policy. Ausland for example, with his emphasis on deterrence rather than reassurance, regards the proposal as "a residue of the myth of Nordic unity" (Ausland, p. 193). Hagard, by contrast, views the proposal as the logical extension of the confidence-building measures inherent in the Nordic security pattern. Judging from Lindahl's analysis of Soviet policy, however, stability has never truly been a feature of the Nordic region. Therefore, in Lindahl's view, the Nordic public attitude that associates the NNWFZ with Nordic stability and Hagard's understanding of the NNWFZ as an enhanced confidence-building measure are, for the most part, delusory (Lindahl, pp. 190-94).

IN THE past decade, natural-resource exploitation in the Barents Sea has become yet another issue that bears upon Soviet foreign policy concerns. The growing Soviet perception of economic benefits from these resources is shared by other states in the region. The potential economic importance of the Barents puts a premium on reinforcing patterns of cooperation and stable relations. At the same time, it increases the possibility for conflict. The problem of resource exploitation in the Barents mainly concerns petroleum exploration, although it also pertains to fisheries.

Both David Scrivener's "Soviet Fisheries and Offshore Oil Exploration in the Barents Sea," in the Archer collection, and Bergesen, Moe, and Østreng's *Soviet Oil and Security Interests in the Barents Sea* discuss Soviet efforts to explore off-shore oil reserves. These efforts entail substantial purchases of Western drilling equipment, extensive seismic tests in the Barents,

and the spudding of a limited number of wells.

The Soviet Union faces several difficult dilemmas should it pursue oil exploration in the Barents. The chief problem centers on the fact that the Barents is quite shallow, and therefore a little less than 70 percent of its area is capable of stationing the large Delta and Typhoon SSBN's. Given the fact that the SSBN's must share the sea with attack submarines fulfilling an ASW role, the result is a "strategic traffic jam."⁶

The Soviet Navy's use of the Barents as a permanent area of deployment is unlikely. The Arctic Ocean and Norwegian Sea are much more effective SSBN bastions. However, because a large percentage of Soviet SSBN's remain in port at any given time, they must be rapidly dispersed during crises. Bergesen, Moe, and Østreng conclude that "the Barents Sea is thus primarily to be considered a crisis and reserve stationing area for the port-based part of the SSBN fleet" (Bergesen, et al., p. 77). Problems arise because the areas between Norway and the Bear Islands and between Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land are the only two points of egress from the Barents into the other regions. Soviet SSBN's would be forced to escape their bastions through these narrow points of egress, thus giving rise to a channeling effect that creates significant advantages for NATO ASW efforts (Bergesen, et al., p. 82).

Oil exploration and economic activity would further complicate operation of strategic vessels in the Barents and could increase the channeling effect. Furthermore, the presence of oil drilling platforms introduces an element of uncertainty into security calculations. Yet, oil platforms could offer increased intelligence opportunities and generate a considerable amount of noise,

thereby complicating NATO ASW.

Bergesen, Moe, and Østreng's analysis suggests that if the Soviet leadership decides to proceed with oil exploration in the Barents, it will face two problems that affect the Nordic area. First, the USSR will have to accord priority to either the military or the economic exploitation of the Barents. Choice of the latter may entail opposition from the military leadership. Second, the Soviet Union will likely need assistance from the Nordic countries—particularly Norway—to explore for oil in the Barents. Therefore, decreasing political tension in the region and reinforcing patterns of cooperation will assume new importance. Soviet diplomatic démarches highly critical of one or more of the Nordic countries—such as occurred in the past—could now have economic costs.

Since the 1970's, Norway and the Soviet Union have been involved in a jurisdictional dispute over 45,000 square nautical miles of the Barents Sea shelf. This area has proven economic value for the Norwegian fishing industry, which takes a large portion of its annual catch from the Barents. It may also hold significant oil reserves. In January 1978, both countries signed the so-called Grey Zone agreement regulating use of this region. The agreement's annual renewal demonstrates the success Norway and the USSR have had thus far at limited cooperation and at keeping the dispute low-key (Archer, Ed., p. 47). Effective future management of resources, however, will require that current cooperation lead to long-term resolution of this issue.

THE Soviet Union will probably continue to take an active interest in

⁶Harriet Critchley, "Canadian Security Policy in the Arctic. The Context for the Future," (mimeograph), quoted in Bergesen, Moe, and Østreng, p. 76.

Nordic politics, especially the NNWFZ. The region's interdependence and dislike of nuclear weapons seem tailor-made for Mikhail Gorbachev's public diplomacy and regional security proposals. On October 1, 1987, Gorbachev gave a speech in Murmansk promoting the NNWFZ and stating that the Soviet Union would act as its guarantor, regardless of the stance of the other powers. If this zone is established, Moscow promises to withdraw its ballistic missile submarines from the Baltic (six submarines with a total of 18 missiles). Given the constraints imposed by NATO, however, it is unlikely that Oslo and Copenhagen will quickly take up Gorbachev's proposals.

Gorbachev also promised Soviet flexibility toward CBM's in the Baltic and in the northern waters.⁷ Several of the works—especially Ausland's *Nordic Security* and Geoffrey Till's chapter in the Archer volume—be-

lieve that CBM's are particularly appropriate for the Nordic area. Till regards CBM's as especially valuable for a region that has such an important role in the US maritime strategy. Thus, one conclusion that emerges from a number of these works is that the increased use of CBM's could maintain some form of traditional Nordic stability as well as lessen tension. The Nordic countries appear to be evolving toward a greater use of confidence-building measures to undergird this stability, an approach probably influenced by the successful conclusion of the Stockholm Conference in 1986. This conference—a follow-on to the CSCE—established CBM's regard-

⁷See Yuri Deryabin, "The Echo of Murmansk," *International Affairs* (Moscow), June 1988, pp. 36–47; and Andrei Anatolyev and Yevgeni Nadezhdin, "Northern Europe—An Invitation to a Dialogue," *ibid.*, December 1987, pp. 82–86.

ing notification and observation of military exercises in Europe.

Another interpretation presented in the books under review is also plausible. The evidence points to a high degree of regional interaction, and the different states of the region remain very sensitive to shifts in each other's security policies. But as Soviet policy toward Finland in the 1970's and Soviet submarine incursions into Swedish and Norwegian waters in the 1980's showed, not all interaction restores a balance or enhances stability. Interaction may indeed reflect a spiral of increasing tension.

A third interpretation—that of Berner—argues that past restraints, even those felt by Moscow, will remain the pattern in the future. Yet even if Berner is correct, regional dynamics will nonetheless continue to make the Nordic region an area of fruitful scholarly research.

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
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COVER: Students carrying the head of the "Goddess of Democracy" into Tiananmen Square. Photo by Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

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Problems of Communism

Articles

Tiananmen Square, 1989

A Symposium

Lowell Dittmer, Andrew J. Nathan, Andrew G. Walder, and June Teufel Dreyer analyze salient aspects of the Tiananmen demonstrations of 1989 and their violent suppression, and attempt to place these events in the context of political, military, economic, intellectual, and social developments in China.

Diplomacy Amid Protest: The Sino-Soviet Summit

Steven M. Goldstein

The dramatic developments in Chinese politics in the spring of 1989 played a paradoxical role with respect to the sixth Sino-Soviet summit. On the one hand, by taking world attention away from somewhat lackluster meetings, these developments masked the potential for further progress in Sino-Soviet relations. The hectic nature of the summit, the distraction of many of its participants, and its meager diplomatic output tended to obscure the fact that the basic scaffolding for a broadly-based and full bilateral relationship that had been constructed over the past decade remains intact. On the other hand, these same developments emphasized the salience of domestic politics and ideology for the future direction of these relations.

Note

Problems of CPSU Historiography

George M. Enteen

Under the influence of *glasnost*, some historians of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have begun to question the traditional assumptions of their approach and advocate changes in the methodology of party historiography. Party historians have sought expanded access to party documents, attempted to reconcile the quest for objectivity with the concept of party-mindedness, and devised new approaches to the periodization of party history. However, recent examples of party history show that despite historians' efforts to probe more deeply into the party's past and to marshal new kinds of evidence, the Stalinist paradigm of party history—imposed in the early 1930's—remains essentially intact.

Essay-Reviews

Stalin: Revolutionary or Counterrevolutionary?

Robert V. Daniels

Recent works on Stalin and Stalinism pose a serious challenge to the interpretation that the Soviet dictator was a revolutionary and his "revolution from above" an effective way of modernizing the Soviet Union and helping to elevate it to superpower status. They reveal that Stalin's military-political approach to industrialization not only failed to achieve planned targets, but proved to be an absolute detriment to economic growth. They portray Stalin not as a man guided by a revolutionary plan, but as a shrewd opportunist who manipulated revolutionary traditions and sentiments in order to aggrandize personal power and destroy those whom he resented or hated.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

The Propagation and Impact of Ideology in the USSR

Jan Feldman

The Bolshevik Party took power in Russia with the intention of effecting a cultural revolution and creating a new socialist man. Instead, Marxist-Leninist ideology has become a means of enforcing political control in the USSR and legitimating an oppressive social order. Wide segments of society have been involved in disseminating and studying official doctrine. Saturated with ideology the "new socialist man" has emerged compliant, cynical, and dependent, lacking the kind of civic-mindedness and initiative that the political and economic modernization of the Soviet Union now demands.

Education and Cultural Transfer in China

C. Montgomery Broaded

Since the late 19th century, the Chinese have turned to foreign educational models in the course of their efforts to modernize their country. After the Cultural Revolution in particular, the regime stepped up educational transfers from abroad. But exposure to Western educational models has encouraged Chinese to question the legitimacy of Communist Party political hegemony. In the wake of the government's crackdown on the mass demonstrations in June 1989, the regime has restricted educational contacts with the West and is imposing new political controls on education. The government has also used its job-allocation system as a means to subject intellectuals to regime control. Consequently, intellectuals now believe they have no realistic chance for meaningful participation in government decision-making processes in the foreseeable future.

Decollectivization and Democratization in China

Edward Friedman

Decollectivization of Chinese agriculture removed one of the significant bulwarks of party-state despotism in China. Collectivized agriculture, introduced with a moralistic, pseudoreligious fervor not observed in the Soviet collectivization drive, was an economically inefficient system that undergirded the system of state terror. However, as long as the Stalinist state structure remains intact, decollectivization can be reversed. Hence, peasants could have a stake in the democratization of the system as a means of ensuring their recent gains and eliminating the oppressive aspects of the state that yet remain.

Differing Perspectives on Castro's Cuba

Dennis M. Hanratty

Mainstream Cubanology gives generally negative assessments of Cuba's achievements in the areas of economic reform, health care, and housing, and of the role of the organs of People's Power in Cuba. By contrast, critics of the mainstream evaluate positively Cuba's accomplishments in these areas. Although the two approaches each have their own strengths and weaknesses, the mainstream generally offers the more accurate analyses of political, economic, and social realities in Castro's Cuba.

Gorbachev's Economic Reforms: Early Assessments

Martin C. Spechler

Mikhail Gorbachev's economic reforms seek to introduce a greater amount of personal responsibility into the economic system, reduce state orders, implement decentralized contracting and wholesale trade, and limit central interference in the routine decision-making of the enterprises, all while retaining overall central direction of the economy. Most Western economists are pessimistic about the prospects for economic *perestroika*. They cite as impediments to change the inability to carry through price reform, and the unwillingness of the leadership to tolerate unemployment and inflation, overcentralization, and high rental charges. But in addition to the economic obstacles, political problems, such as national unrest and widespread dissatisfaction with the communist regime, will also hinder the progress of economic restructuring.

Photo on opposite page: Pro-democracy demonstrations on Tiananmen Square, on May 17, 1989. Photo from Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

Tiananmen Square 1989



EDITORS' NOTE: Like "Hungary 1956," "Prague 1968," or "Gdańsk 1980," "Tiananmen Square 1989" will stand out as a critical milepost in the history of communist states. The peaceful demonstrations by tens of thousands of Chinese students on behalf of reform, the massive outpouring of sympathy and support for them by a wide spectrum of citizens not only in Beijing but in other major cities, and the brutal use of armed force on June 3–4, 1989, to repress the demonstrations in the capital, shocked the world and provoked a reassessment of the world's most populous state.

Among the salient questions raised are the following: What forces led to the demonstrations, and what did the demonstrators want? What did the official reaction say about cleavages within the political leadership? What is the future for China's economic reform? Can legitimacy be maintained by force? What will be the future political role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)?

In the symposium presented below, four distinguished scholars attempt to answer some of these questions. Lowell Dittmer of the University of California, Berkeley, sets the events within the broader context of questions about mass participation, systemic reforms, and political legitimacy. Andrew J. Nathan, of Columbia University, analyzes the antecedents of the 1989 democracy movement, its demands, and the reasons why, even after the repression of June 3–4, Chinese democrats continue to position themselves as remonstrators, not as opponents of the party. Andrew G. Walder, of Harvard University, examines the social, political, and economic factors that touched off the largest popular challenge to party rule in the history of the People's Republic. June Teufel Dreyer, of the University of Miami, Coral Gables, explores the part played by the People's Liberation Army in the Tiananmen massacre and the ramifications of this participation for political-military relations and for the PLA's public image.

The Tiananmen Massacre

Lowell Dittmer

"No!" cried his father, cutting short the answer, threw the blankets off with a strength that sent them all flying in a moment and sprang erect in his bed. Only one hand lightly touched the ceiling to steady him. "You wanted to cover me up, I know, my young sprig, but I'm far from covered up yet. And even if this is the last strength I have, it's enough for you, too much for you."

—Franz Kafka, *The Judgment*.

The suppression of democracy activists in and around Tiananmen Square on the night of June 3–4, 1989, at the cost of at least several hundred and possibly well over a thousand lives, was unprecedented in many ways. Political repression is, of course, not unheard of in the People's Republic of China (PRC). But never before had the regime unleashed the full firepower of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) against unarmed civilians.¹ Never before had the regime been confronted with such a shrewd and tenacious opposition, which seems to have utterly outmaneuvered the government in the play for public opinion. Never before had the reform regime that emerged after the Cultural Revolution been so seriously split within its own ranks (the rumor of impending civil war was, however, a great exaggeration).

Although unique in these and other respects, this watershed event in the history of the PRC can be re-

dered somewhat more comprehensible if it is seen in the context of a number of recent developments. The upheaval might be said to mark the convergence of three unresolved and festering questions: the role of the "masses," the future of reform, and the basis of political legitimacy (which subsumes the other two).

In contrast to the situation in most other socialist countries, in China, the "revolutionary masses" have always played an integral role in politics, though the form of their political mobilization has changed over time. During the first 17 years of the PRC, it took the form of the "mass movement." This was a sort of controlled unleashing, under the auspices of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), focused on a clearly defined set of negative and positive targets. And it seems to have been relatively successful, achieving the ideological objectives of the regime (i.e., "socialization of the means of production") while still achieving rapid economic progress.

During the Cultural Revolution period (1966–76), the masses could, of course, still be mobilized, but the apparent exhaustion of positive objectives (and the inability of the regime to control the masses once aroused) brought mobilization and economic production into increasing friction. Although Deng Xiaoping himself benefited from spontaneous agitation by the masses to regain power, his regime, too, has recognized this friction. On the one hand, it has attempted to deny or repress spontaneous mass movements; on the other hand, it has promoted occasional quasi-campaigns to mobilize the masses against "bourgeois liberalization" or "spiritual pollution." Yet, the first course left a vacuum between leadership and masses, while the second again precipitated friction between production and mobilization.

Lowell Dittmer is Professor of Political Science at the University of California (Berkeley). He is the author of Liu Shao-ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1974), China's Continuous Revolution (1986), and other studies of contemporary Chinese politics. The author would like to thank the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California for the financial support necessary to conduct the research on which this article is based.

¹This is one of the reasons adduced for the otherwise puzzling nostalgia for Mao Zedong, who once said that whoever suppressed the students would fall.

In the post-Cultural Revolution era, the students have stepped into the breach, reviving an old Chinese tradition of youthful idealism, utilizing appropriate ceremonial occasions and slogans to revive reform momentum when it seemed to flag. This student activism has evoked in the minds of China's leaders nightmares of Red Guard chaos and has split the reform leadership—first, in 1987 with the purge of Hu Yaobang, now again in 1989—between those most concerned with maintaining control and stability and those in search of a mass constituency for further reform.

The reforms began with the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress, in December 1978, which in effect returned control of the agricultural sector to individual families under a leasehold arrangement. This policy resulted in an impressive increase in agricultural productivity. The focus of reform shifted to the urban industrial sector at the Third Plenum of the 12th Congress, in October 1984. Although urban reforms also stimulated rapid economic growth, the leadership became divided over whether to press on to ownership reform (which aroused strong ideological reservations) or further marketization. The latter route was chosen in the spring of 1988 when Zhao Ziyang, with the support of Deng Xiaoping, initiated retail price reform. However, this reform unleashed an unprecedented bout of inflation (official figures for 1988 were 18.5 percent; unofficial figures, double that), resulting in bank runs, commodity stockpiling, and a general financial panic. The retreat from price reform left the leadership in a quandary about how and where to pursue economic reform.

The crisis of legitimacy is in part the result of the stifling of mass participation and frustration of the reform impulse already noted, and in part a predictable consequence of the systematic undermining of Maoist ideology that Deng's regime has conducted since 1977 in order to permit greater latitude for pragmatic experimentation. But the regime has been dismayed to see egoistic consumerism replace ideological dogmatism, not to mention a growing wave of crime and corruption. In the absence of any vision or plan for development beyond "moving from stone to stone to cross the river" (*mozhe shetou quo ho*), the intellectual community had tacitly begun to adopt models of "bourgeois" electoral reform and parliamentarism. Orthodox attempts to defend the "leading role" of the Communist Party and other Leninist tenets were intellectually unconvincing and failed to sway the masses. This contributed to a crisis of legitimacy so severe that in the spring of 1989, it was unclear whether the army would respond to the political leadership, and a cashiered Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary—who had clearly violated the rules of "democratic centralism"—could appeal to ideals of

parliamentary democracy to try to have the National People's Congress (NPC) repeal martial law.

In order to see how these three questions or crises culminated in the tragedy at Tiananmen, I would like to begin *in medias res*, focusing on the maneuvers of the leadership, to whom the population remained responsive even while attempting to act autonomously. My purpose is simple but not easy: to puzzle together what actually happened. Such an examination will show that the Tiananmen massacre in China was not inexorable. Rather, it was the outcome of a subtle interplay of developments whose complexity must be thoroughly examined. This contention refutes Deng Xiaoping's somewhat self-serving declaration at the June 30, 1989, meeting of the NPC Standing Committee:

The storm was bound to come sooner or later. This was determined by the macro climate of the world and the micro climate of our country. Its inevitable arrival was independent of man's will.²

Leadership Cleavages

As of the beginning of 1989, the CCP leadership was riven by two overlapping cleavages: one, ideological; the other, generational. Ideologically, the party leaders were divided between a still powerful minority committed to reform (but accepting the need for temporary retrenchment), and an ascendant majority determined to use the necessary retrenchment to reverse reform policies and shore up the centrally planned economy. Generationally, the leadership was divided between, on the one hand, the Politburo, consisting of Premier Li Peng (60 years of age), Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission Chairman Qiao Shi (65), Propaganda Department Chief Hu Qili (60), State Planning Commission Chairman Yao Yilin (72), and General Secretary Zhao Ziyang (70), and on the other hand, a shadow cabinet of senior veterans—none of whom had seats on the Politburo Standing Committee, only one of whom (Yang Shangkun) was on the Politburo, but most of whom had seats in the Central Advisory Commission (CAC). In declining rank order of power, this elder group included Deng Xiaoping (85), chairman of the party's Central Military Commission (CMC) as well as its governmental counterpart; Chen Yun (84), chairman of the CAC; Yang Shangkun (82), president of the state and executive vice-chairman of the CMC; Li Xiannian (80), chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's

²Cheng Ming (Hong Kong), July 1, 1989, pp. 6–9.

Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC); Wang Zhen (81), vice president of the state and a CMC vice-chairman; Bo Yibo (81), executive vice-chairman of the CAC; Song Renqiong (80), vice-chairman of the CAC; Peng Zhen (87), retired chairman of the NPC Standing Committee; and Deng Yingchao (85), widow of Zhou Enlai, and a former Politburo member and ex-chair of the CPPCC National Committee.

Although the older generation was generally more "leftist"—i.e., more ideologically orthodox and less reformist—than the Politburo members, the two cleavages were to some degree cross-cutting: some of the younger Politburo members (e.g., Li Peng) were also orthodox, while some of the members of the older generation (e.g., Deng Xiaoping) supported reform. The main reason for this was that as a condition of their "retirement," the senior veterans had exacted the right to name their successors to the Politburo; thus, Yao Yilin was beholden to Chen Yun, Zhao Ziyang to Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng to Deng Yingchao (and to Chen Yun). Hu Qili, an "orphan" of Hu Yaobang's China Youth League group, seems to have been "adopted" by Zhao Ziyang. These bonds of obligation ensured that the party did not have two centers but one. In fact, when important issues were at stake, the Politburo often met in "expanded" session, to which the gerontocrats were invited in their capacity as CAC members (or simply ad hoc). The elders took full advantage of their seniority and experience to weigh in on critical issues and, according to some reports, even had voting rights at these meetings.³

By the end of 1988, a strong leftist, anti-reform wind was blowing within the CCP leadership. The reform forces, stymied from further movement on the economic front by an uncontrollable double-digit inflation (which affected with particular severity reform-minded students and bureaucrats, who lived on fixed incomes), sought to counterattack on the political front. In December 1988, Hu Qili, Wang Renzhi, and Hu Sheng jointly planned and convened a seminar of reform intellectuals to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the December 1978 Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee, which had effectively launched the post-Mao re-

forms. Among the more than 300 attendees were reform intellectuals Yu Guangyuan, Wang Ruoshui, Yan Jiaqi, Su Shaozhi, and Tong Dalin. Su Shaozhi delivered a bold speech attacking the conservatives' campaigns against spiritual pollution and bourgeois liberalization and calling for a reversal of verdicts on one of their victims, Wang Ruoshui. This speech was too bold even for the seminar's organizers, Hu Qili and Wang Renzhi, who as officials of the party propaganda apparatus, decreed that Su's presentation should not be published. Nonetheless, it appeared in Qin Benli's outspoken Shanghai newspaper, *Shijie jingji daobao* (*World Economic Herald*), together with an editorial contending that in building socialist democracy, "there is a need courageously to draw lessons" from "modern democratic forms" that "have developed in Western capitalism . . ."⁴

In February and March 1989, the reform forces shifted their attention to human rights as the regime imposed martial law on Tibet for the first time since 1959.⁵ Fang Lizhi petitioned Deng Xiaoping to release all "political prisoners" (the regime denies that any exist) and sent a similar letter to the Western press.⁶ In the same period, two young literati, Bei Dao and Chen Jun, collected the signatures of some 33 scholars and writers (including prominent overseas Chinese) on a petition demanding amnesty for Wei Jingsheng, a Democracy Wall activist imprisoned since 1981 for his crusade on behalf of the "Fifth Modernization" (i.e., political democracy). Another "letter of opinion," signed by 44 scientists and scholars (including nuclear experts Wang Ganchang, Lu Liangying, and others), demanding the release of political prisoners and proposing structural reform of the political system, was submitted to the Standing Committee of the NPC.⁷

These pro-reform intellectuals had, for the most part, been protégés of Hu Yaobang, who was ousted from the CCP general secretaryship in January 1987 in the wake of the December 1986 student demonstrations. With him gone, they tended to look to Zhao Ziyang for protection. By early 1989, staunch opponents of liberalization were already holding Zhao responsible for the behavior of the reformists. Chen Yun reportedly circu-

³This inference is based on the fact that authoritative decisions issue from such "expanded" meetings, at which nonmembers are reputed to play an active role. Thus, a Politburo meeting was held on May 22–24, 1989, at which Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Peng Zhen, Yang Shangkun, and Wang Zhen, all "older veterans with great prestige" (but only one of whom is a Politburo member), decided to reaffirm the hard-line April 26 editorial and denounce Zhao's May 4 speech. *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong—hereafter, *FEER*), June 15, 1989, p. 13; *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong), May 30, 1989. My supposition that the votes of these veteran leaders are counted is based on a conversation with Feng Shengbao, a former member of Bao Tong's Commission to Restructure the Political System.

⁴"New Realm in the Emancipation of Thinking," *Guangming ribao* (Beijing), Dec. 31, 1988.

⁵Martial law was imposed in Lhasa in March following the sanguinary suppression of riots touched off when police opened fire on a small group of monks involved in a peaceful demonstration on behalf of Tibetan autonomy. Some 60,000 PLA troops were brought in to help the police with mass arrests and house-to-house searches. *Asiaweek* (Hong Kong), July 7, 1989, pp. 26–31.

⁶*Cheng Ming*, Apr. 1, 1989, pp. 6–10.

⁷*Ching Pao* (Hong Kong), Apr. 10, 1989, pp. 22–23; *Cheng Ming*, Mar. 1, 1989, pp. 6–9.

lated "Eight Opinions," accusing Zhao of a "failure to perform public opinion, ideological, and theoretical work properly," as well as neglecting grain production and central planning. Chen claimed that "the entire ideological front is occupied by the bourgeoisie, and nothing proletarian is left." Bo Yibo, who had prepared the indictment against Hu Yaobang in January 1987, submitted a "letter of appeal" to Deng Xiaoping complaining about the above-mentioned decennial conference (which he characterized as an "attack on the party Central Committee") and asking that publication of the *World Economic Herald* be suspended and its editor subjected to public criticism. Wang Zhen and Bo Yibo reportedly proposed three times to Deng that Zhao make a self-criticism for mistakes in his work.⁸

The criticism of Zhao from this conservative group (which, in addition to Chen, Wang and Bo, included Li Xiannian, Deng Yingchao, Yao Yilin, and Li Peng) continued to mount during the early spring. In March, Li Xiannian reportedly flew to Shanghai for secret talks with Deng Xiaoping, in which he urged that Zhao be pressed to make a self-criticism and to step down at the imminent Fourth Plenum of the 13th CCP Central Committee in order to clear the way for Li Peng to move into the general secretary slot, Yao Yilin to become premier, and Zou Jiahua (another leader who, like Li Peng, had studied in the Soviet Union) to replace Yao as vice-premier and head of the State Planning Commission. It was proposed that Zhao be allowed to stay on as vice-chairman of the state CMC for six months, as a sop. However, Deng decided to postpone the plenum and what promised to be a stormy leadership showdown until after the Sino-Soviet summit in May.⁹

Zhao thus was caught in the cross-fire between would-be constituents and factional antagonists. In response, he equivocated, adopting a tough rhetorical stance vis-à-vis reformist dissent without permitting a mass-criticism campaign or sanctions with teeth in them. His stance seemed to enjoy the continued protection of Deng, who on January 17, had delivered a speech contending that "we have made great achievements in reform over the past 10 years" and decrying the "trend toward taking the road back" (in economic policy).¹⁰ Zhao and Hu Qili summoned Qin Benli, the editor of *World Economic Herald*, to Beijing for a reprimand following publication of Su Shaozhi's article, and

Hu proclaimed a six-month moratorium on publishing anything written by the 33 protest signatories. But Su was not expelled from the CCP, and the case of Yu Hao-cheng (a jurist who had written an article in defense of human rights) was not investigated.¹¹ In addition, Zhao decided that Chen Yun's "Eight Opinions" need not be "transmitted throughout the country," and made it stick. In response to Bo's letter to Deng, Zhao remarked: "Intellectuals have their own understanding of problems. What is there to be surprised at?" Although the Propaganda Department compiled a list of targets for criticism, Zhao said at the last minute, "Just ignore it; there is no need for us to handle the case."¹²

However, Zhao did convene several Politburo meetings, during which he denounced Fang Lizhi and the various petition drives mentioned above as tools of international human rights organizations. At an enlarged Politburo meeting on March 5, Zhao gave what was labeled an "important speech" lambasting critics of China's Tibetan policy.¹³ Moreover, large Public Security stations were established at major university campuses in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Xi'an, Wuhan, and Chengdu (Peking University reportedly had the largest one in the nation), and the State Council's Education Commission was encouraged to send work teams to various college campuses to see what the students were up to and to prevent signature-gathering on petitions, the affixing of inflammatory wall posters, or the formation of protest movements.¹⁴

Catalyzing Events

The second session of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which convened in March, brought new hope to reform advocates and also set in motion a chain of events that brought the struggle over reform to a head. To be sure, the session introduced no noteworthy policy initiatives. It hewed to the policy of "curing and rectification" set out in Premier Li Peng's work report, and it sought (not entirely successfully) to prevent the sort of spontaneous expression of unsolicited complaints or proposals that had characterized the first session in 1988—particularly taboo were suggestions for further privatization or calls for a multi-party system. However, the session witnessed the political reappearance

⁸*Ching Pao*, Apr. 10, 1989, pp. 22–23.

⁹*Cheng Ming*, Apr. 1, 1989, pp. 6–9. The Fourth Plenum of the 13th CCP Central Committee originally expected to take place before the March 1989 meeting of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress, did not take place until June.

¹⁰*Cheng Ming*, Mar. 1, 1989, pp. 6–9.

¹¹See Yu Haocheng, "Defending Human Rights," *Shijie zhishi* (Beijing), No. 23, 1988.

¹²*Cheng Ming*, Mar. 1, 1989, pp. 6–9.

¹³*Ibid.*, Apr. 1, 1989, pp. 9–10.

¹⁴*Ibid.*; *Ching Pao*, Apr. 10, 1989, pp. 22–23.

The Tiananmen Massacre

ance of Hu Yaobang, who had not been active in policy forums since his January 1987 dismissal as general secretary.

Hu's real "comeback" came on April 8, at an enlarged Politburo meeting focusing on problems of education. Hu not only attended the meeting, but registered to address it. In carefully prepared remarks, he made an impassioned plea for greater support of education and for stabilizing the intellectuals' position in the life of the state so that this social force would rally around the party. During his speech, Hu fell into an altercation with his old nemesis Bo Yibo and was stricken with a heart attack. On April 15, Hu died. In a conversation with Li Rui shortly before his death, he reportedly confided that one of the things he most regretted was having submitted a self-criticism in January 1989 in which he had implicated others.¹⁵

Hu's death presented the leadership with two thorny problems: namely, what line to take on Hu and his 1987 "resignation," and how to respond to spontaneous demonstrations that broke out upon his death (might one say "martyrdom"?). Zhao and some colleagues proposed a compromise that would praise Hu as a "great Marxist" but not open the question of his resignation. Although Deng agreed to this compromise, some of the other elders refused to commit themselves. The memorial speech had to go through several drafts before winning approval.¹⁶

While the debate over the tone and content of the memorial speech went on, student protesters began to prepare for Hu's April 22 funeral. On the evening of April 19, thousands of students gathered in Tiananmen Square, where they staged a sit-in before the Xinhua gate and demanded the right to "petition" the CCP leaders. Their petition included demands for a reevaluation of the December 1986 student movement, a reassessment of Hu Yaobang's resignation, repudiation of the 1987 anti-spiritual pollution campaign, granting of freedom of the press, provision of more funds for students, and a crackdown on corruption. This demonstration was forcibly dispersed by armed police.¹⁷

Despite an official ban on demonstrations in the central square on April 22, the date of the official memorial service for Hu in the Great Hall of the People, an estimated 100–150,000 students occupied the square the night before and staged a sit-in, despite threatening troop and police movements and leaks to the effect that

the Ministry of Public Security had already prepared a blacklist of student leaders from universities throughout the country. On the morning of April 22, more contingents of students began marching toward the square to reinforce their comrades. That evening, the Politburo held an urgent meeting at which it was resolved: not to relent on the campaign against bourgeois liberalization, not to permit the mourning to put pressure on the government, and to end the mourning for Hu.¹⁸ In response, on April 24, the students declared a classroom boycott of indefinite duration and announced the formation of a "national students' federation preparatory committee"—the first step toward establishing autonomous student and labor unions.¹⁹

Zhao Ziyang had departed on April 23 for a scheduled week-long visit to North Korea for consultations with the Korean Workers' Party, leaving only vague instructions on how to cope with the escalating situation in Tiananmen Square. As soon as he was out of the country, party hard-liners began to respond to the demonstrations as if confronted by a national emergency. Li Peng convened the Politburo Standing Committee (Yang Shangkun also attended) on April 24 to discuss the situation. The next day Li and Yang reported to Deng Xiaoping, who came over to their way of thinking and gave a response that was recorded verbatim and widely circulated to cadres:

*We have set a very high value on Hu Yaobang, . . . but some people do not feel satisfied with this. They want to build him up as a "great Marxist." We are not qualified to be "great Marxists." I am not qualified either. . . . Hu Yaobang was irresolute and made concessions in combating liberalization. The drive against spiritual pollution lasted only a little over 20 days. If we had vigorously launched the drive, the ideological field would not have been as it is today, and would not have been so tumultuous. . . . This is the same old stuff as was prevalent during the Cultural Revolution: Some people are craving nothing short of national chaos. . . . We must take a clear-cut stand and forceful measures to oppose and stop the upheaval. Don't be afraid of students, because we still have several million troops.*²⁰

Deng further claimed the demonstrations were led by

¹⁵See *Ching Pao*, May 10, 1989, pp. 22–26; also, *Cheng Ming*, May 1, 1989, pp. 11–12.

¹⁶*Cheng Ming*, May 1, 1989, pp. 10, 94–95; *Ching Pao*, July 10, 1989, pp. 42–48.

¹⁷*Cheng Ming*, May 1, 1989, pp. 94–95.

¹⁸*Ching Pao*, May 10, 1989, pp. 22–26. There seems to have been a split at the April 22 meeting, as Wan Li expressed the view that "we must not confront the tough with toughness." *Cheng Ming*, June 1, 1989, pp. 6–10, 89.

¹⁹*Cheng Ming*, June 1, 1989, pp. 6–10.

²⁰*Ching Pao*, May 10, 1989, pp. 22–26.

"people with ulterior motives" engaged in a "premeditated conspiracy" aimed at negating the socialist system, and he warned, as he had in December 1986, of the lessons learned from the Polish developments of 1980–81: "Events in Poland prove that making concessions provides no solutions. The greater the concessions the government made, the greater the opposition forces became."

The gist of Deng's views was incorporated into a now-famous editorial broadcast on April 25 and published on April 26 in the party daily, *Renmin ribao*, under the title: "It Is Necessary to Take a Clear-Cut Stand Against the Disturbance." It was immediately evident, however, that Deng's hard line was not going to be the solution to the growing crisis. On April 27, the largest spontaneous demonstration in 40 years of CCP rule was launched to protest the editorial. Although the authorities had warned that "troops will be dispatched when necessary" to enforce the official prohibition of demonstrations, security forces made only token efforts to halt the 50–100,000 students who marched all day through the streets of Beijing and finally broke through police lines to surge into Tiananmen Square. An estimated 1 million Beijing residents also poured out of their offices and factories to applaud and support the demonstrators.

Although Deng's remarks did not head off the demonstrations, they may have had one important effect: the protest organizers maintained tight discipline over their ranks to avoid provoking what appeared to be an imminent crackdown. They formed a human chain on either side of the eight-kilometer-long procession to maintain order and prevent outsiders from joining in or from suppressing the action and to prevent acts of vandalism. The marchers interspersed their protests with patriotic songs and slogans and in their vanguard carried banners proclaiming "Long Live Communism" and "Support the Correct Leadership of the Party."

The leadership was taken aback by these tactics and, in the absence of a consensus on how to cope with the situation, began to split into two factions—"hawks" and "doves." At an April 28 Politburo meeting on how to respond to the demonstrations, some of the younger members (reportedly including Yan Mingfu, Bao Tong, and Li Tianming) counseled against a crackdown. Yuan Mu, spokesman for the State Council, in a televised meeting with students on April 29 said that the target of the provocative April 26 editorial had been not the broad masses of patriotic students but "a small minority" of "behind-the-scenes plotters."²¹

Although Zhao Ziyang had reportedly originally approved the April 26 editorial by telegram from Pyongyang, upon his return from North Korea, he traveled to Beidaihe to apprise Deng of his misgivings about its "strident" tone. Deng, perhaps chastened by the miscarriage of his own preferred hard-nosed solution, reportedly told Zhao: "The most important thing you should do is stabilize the situation. . . . If the situation is under control, you can implement your plans if they prove feasible, disregarding whatever I have said."²² Armed with this conditional endorsement, Zhao made an impromptu speech on May 4 to representatives of the Asian Development Bank assembled in Beijing, in which he set forth a new, softer line. Estimating that the majority of the students "are in no way opposed to our basic system; they only demand that we correct malpractices in our work," he called for further reforms to improve the legal system and for popular supervision over the party. "Now we must most urgently keep calm, exercise reason and restraint, and maintain order," he said. "We must solve problems on the track of democracy and legality."²³

Zhao's soft line remained in effect for two weeks, although hard-liners disavowed it.²⁴ Unfortunately, it neither solved the immediate problem of removing the demonstrators from the square, nor succeeded in converting them into a mass base of support for long-term reforms. Zhao reportedly put forward two proposals to deal with the student movement—a return to the political line of the 13th CCP Congress (which had proposed reforms of the political structure) and the retirement of all senior cadres over the age of 75—but was unable to gain Politburo endorsement for them.²⁵ Yet, even these proposals (probably inadequate from the demonstrators' viewpoint) infuriated the hard-liners, who had been diverted from the crackdown on the demonstrators and were now watching for a sign of failure in the soft line so as to justify the purge of Zhao that they had already contemplated earlier in the year.

The period was a difficult one for the demonstrators. They had to cope with the regime's efforts to minimize differences between the government and the demonstrators and to co-opt them. These efforts fragmented the movement's leadership, leading to an escalation of student demands in an attempt to forestall attrition of

²²South China Morning Post (Hong Kong—hereafter, SCMP), May 29, 1989; Ming Pao, May 26, 1989.

²³Cheng Ming, June 1, 1989, pp. 6–10.

²⁴Li Peng and Yao Yilin complained that the Zhao speech had not been discussed in advance by the Politburo's Standing Committee. "Zhao Ziyang acted as a fine man, landing us in a passive position," Jiang Zemin reportedly remarked at a Politburo meeting during this period.


²⁵Ming Pao, June 1, 1989.

²¹FEER, May 11, 1989, pp. 11–12.



China's democracy movement in action, clockwise from above: thousands of students mourn former party leader Hu Yaobang; a demonstrator with a sign denouncing Premier Li Peng after he declared martial law in Beijing; students parade the "Goddess of Democracy" through Tiananmen Square on May 30; Qin Benli, editor of the World Economic Herald, a Shanghai-based reform newspaper.

—Photos by Magnum, Wide World, Gamma-Liaison, and Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.





Drama in Beijing, clockwise from top left: nurses tend to student hunger strikers; a courageous Beijing citizen faces army tanks advancing toward Tiananmen Square on the Avenue of Eternal Peace on June 5; Jiang Zemin, secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, who was elevated to the post of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party on June 24, 1989; Zhao Ziyang, then party general secretary, speaks to the hunger strikers after martial law had been declared.

—First three photos by Magnum, last two by Eastfoto.



the movement and maintain the opposition stance that gave the students' movement its identity. The students demanded a "dialogue" with the authorities, but when various representatives of the regime (including Yan Mingfu and Li Tianming) acceded to this demand, the students further demanded that the talks be televised. There resulted at least two such discussions on live TV (a four-hour session with Yuan Mu on April 29, and a meeting with Li Peng, Yan Mingfu, Chen Xitong, and others on May 18). After the first TV discussion, the students demanded that the government spokesmen meet exclusively with representatives of their autonomous student union (thereby conferring recognition on this group), and on May 13, some 1,000 students began a sit-in and hunger strike in Tiananmen Square to protest the refusal of the authorities to conduct such a dialogue.²⁶

Enter *Glasnost*'

The hunger strike was doubtless timed to coincide with the scheduled May 15–18 summit meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and top Chinese leaders. The presence of large numbers of representatives from the Western news media in Beijing to record the summit not only gave the demonstrators reason to assume that there might not be any crackdown for at least three days, but it also provided them an international audience. They ignored Zhao's appeal not to disrupt the summit, thus forcing the authorities to shift the locus of several of the scheduled events of the summit, including the official welcoming ceremony for Gorbachev.

Perhaps also related in some measure to the summit, Hu Qili decided to accede on May 16 to a demand by Chinese journalists for greater press freedom, and China's central media promptly began to report on the demonstrations factually and prominently, disseminating this information throughout the land. In Beijing, the movement swelled to more than 1 million people.²⁷ Around the country, some cities, such as Xi'an and Shanghai, had already experienced unrest following Hu Yaobang's death; now, the democracy movement spread to more than 20 provincial capitals.

These developments spelt the doom of Zhao's conciliatory approach. Deng Xiaoping now threw his support to the hard-liners, and with Yang Shangkun, Chen

Yun, and Li Xiannian, arranged an expanded meeting of the CMC in the Western Hills of Beijing on May 16. The meeting rejected the declaration of nation-wide martial law, but apparently decided to impose it on parts of the capital and worked out a detailed plan to assemble the requisite troops.²⁸

When leaders of some military regions said they would have difficulty in dispatching troops, Yang brought the problem to Deng, who traveled to Wuhan to meet with commanders and political commissars of the major military regions. Deng succeeded in getting troops transferred from Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, and Sichuan; 13 group armies out of a total of 24 in the country's seven military regions sent a total of some 100,000 well-armed soldiers to ring the capital. It was the first time since 1949 that main force units had been sent to Beijing (which is normally out of bounds for all but the Beijing garrison).²⁹

At a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee on May 16, Zhao made a "Five-Point Proposal" for concessions to the demonstrators: this included retraction of the April 26 editorial, assumption by Zhao of personal responsibility for its original publication, establishment of an organization under the NPC empowered to investigate corruption on the part of high officials or their relatives (including Zhao's two sons), and publication of details about the finances of high-level cadres (at the level of vice-minister and above), and elimination of their special privileges. This proposal was defeated by a vote of 4 to 1.³⁰

That Zhao and Deng were now at loggerheads became evident later the same day, when Zhao met with Gorbachev. Zhao commented in the course of their talk that on the whole, political reform should keep up with economic reform, otherwise the latter could not succeed. Then, looking straight into the TV camera, he noted that "Since the 13th Party Congress, we have always made reports to and asked for opinions from comrade Deng Xiaoping while dealing with most important issues."³¹ This remark, construed as flattery at the time, made Deng furious, since it revealed him to be the man pulling the strings behind the scenes at a time when very tough decisions were about to be made.

At a Politburo meeting on May 17, Zhao again argued that the April 26 editorial be disavowed, but Deng countered, "We cannot retreat. One retreat will lead to

²⁸*Asiaweek*, June 9, 1989, p. 24; *Cheng Ming*, June 1, 1989, pp. 6–10, 89.

²⁹*Cheng Ming*, June 1, 1989, pp. 6–10, 89. See the transcript of the May 22 meeting containing Yang Shangkun's speech (which attributes responsibility for the fatal decision squarely to Deng Xiaoping), as published in *Ming Pao*, May 29, 1989.

³⁰*FEER*, June 1, 1989, pp. 12–18; *Ming Pao*, May 21, 1989.

³¹*SCMP*, May 17, 1989.

²⁶*FEER*, May 28, 1989, pp. 10–11, and June 1, 1989, pp. 12–18; *SCMP*, May 13, 1989.

²⁷From May 16 to May 27, more than 200,000 students from other provinces poured into Beijing. The government sent more than 100,000 of these by offering them free tickets. See *Ming Pao*, May 26, 1989.

another," and added, "Comrade Ziyang, your speech to the Asian Development Bank officials on May 4 became a turning point because after that the students created more serious disturbances." Zhao replied, "Let comrade Xiaoping make the final decision."³² But Zhao also wrote a letter addressed to Deng, the Politburo, and its Standing Committee, in which he said that he wanted to resign from his post of general secretary because his ideas were "different from yours, and I cannot go along with your decision; if I continue to work with the Standing Committee, I might be an obstacle to the Standing Committee's implementation of the ideas of several senior colleagues, including Chairman Deng."³³ His resignation was refused at the time, apparently for fear that it would strengthen his popularity and cast Deng and other leaders in a bad light.

At a Politburo meeting early on the morning of May 19, Zhao offered to take full responsibility for the demonstrations and, at the same time, called once again for an investigation into corruption by top leaders and their relatives, including his own sons. This apparently led to an argument between Deng and Zhao in which threats were exchanged. Zhao again offered his resignation, which Deng again rejected. Zhao then returned home, ordered a car, and drove out to the square to talk to some of the hunger strikers; he was followed by a suspicious Li Peng. "We've come too late," Zhao told the demonstrators. "I'm sorry. You criticize us and blame us. It is reasonable that you should do so."³⁴ Zhao then returned to Zhongnanhai (the leadership's special compound), where he refused to see visitors, claiming to be ill.

Shortly after Zhao's visit to the square, the military moved to occupy television and radio stations and the premises of the official print media, and large troop contingents began entering the capital. At midnight, Li Peng declared martial law in a nationally televised speech before an audience of several thousand party and military officials at a military hotel. Zhao's conspicuous absence from the group of five on the stage (which included the other four Politburo Standing Committee members, plus Yang Shangkun) made the split in the leadership public.³⁵

Deng and the Politburo Standing Committee moved to strip Zhao of all his power and placed him under virtual house arrest. On May 23, the party's CMC sent a cable to the whole army, stating that only Deng and Yang had the right to transfer troops (as vice-chairman of the parallel state Central Military Commission, Zhao could conceivably have issued counteracting orders). Meanwhile, Zhao withdrew his resignation and defiantly refused to back down.³⁶

In contrast to 1986–87, when dismissal of a sympa-

thetic CCP general secretary (Hu Yaobang) left students alone and cowed, regime actions in May 1989 triggered a massive outpouring of support for the demonstrators. An estimated 1 million people flooded into the streets to protest martial law and prevent the military from marching to Tiananmen Square to evict the students. Throughout the weekend of May 20–21, there were equally impressive demonstrations of support in many other cities throughout China, including Guangzhou, as well as outside the PRC, e.g., in Hong Kong.

Even though Zhao was now powerless, his refusal to make a self-criticism may have heartened his supporters. The CCP leadership began to splinter. There are reports that Yan Mingfu and more than 150 other top party cadres wrote a joint letter to the Central Committee, urging it not to use force to suppress the pro-democracy movement. In the ministries of justice and public security, too, there was pro-Zhao (or anti-Li) sentiment. Some 260 high-ranking officers from the CMC, the General Political Department, the General Logistics Department of the PLA, and the Beijing Military Region wrote a letter to Yang Shangkun arguing against any use of force to clear the square. On May 21, about two dozen veteran military officers tried in vain to get an audience with Deng Xiaoping; instead, Yang Shangkun met with a five-man delegation for about 30 minutes and asked them to take the overall situation into account and resolutely and unconditionally carry out CMC decisions. Later the same day, seven senior generals, including former Defense Minister Zhang Aiping and retired chief of staff Yang Dezhi, reportedly drafted a petition (signed by more than 100 other officers) calling on troops not to fight civilians, and sent it to the CMC; China's two surviving marshals, 90-year-old Nie Rongzhen and 88-year-old Xu Xiangqian, also expressed opposition to deploying PLA forces in civilian areas. Deng Yingchao issued a statement that refused to recognize martial law. Finally, some 57 of the 135 members of the NPC's Standing Committee demanded that the group's chairman, Wan Li, convene an emergency session of the parliament to deal with the crisis.³⁷

³²*Ming Pao*, May 30, 1989.

³³*FEER*, June 8, 1989, pp. 14–18.

³⁴*Asiaweek*, June 2, 1989, pp. 23–29, quote on p. 27.

³⁵Yang told an emergency meeting of the CMC on May 24, "The students feel there is a person in the Party CC who supports them, and therefore, they stir up greater trouble. . . . Without the participation of the General Secretary, people could immediately discern the problem." *Ming Pao*, May 29, 1989.

³⁶*Asiaweek*, June 2, 1989, pp. 23–29.

³⁷*Cheng Ming*, June 1, 1989, pp. 6–10, 89. In response to the bidding of the NPC, a cautious Wan Li returned prematurely from a trip to the United States on May 25, but he then accepted Deng Xiaoping's invitation to "rest" in Shanghai until the situation sorted itself out in Beijing.

Ming Pao, May 31, 1989.

The initial euphoria over the unexpected failure of the authorities to enforce martial law did not last long. Once the authorities had informed the demonstrators that their acts were now illegal and had regained control over the news media, the movement's momentum seemed to slacken. After Zhao's removal, the government replaced negotiations with a cold silence. The student demonstrators, who had numbered some 200,000 at the height of the protest, dwindled to approximately 10,000 on the eve of the June 3–4 crackdown, and the movement's leadership was riven by disputes over what the next step should be. Nevertheless, sustained by a stream of cash donations from China's private sector and from overseas sympathizers, and reinforced by recruits streaming into the capital, the movement was hard put to dissolve itself.

The CCP leadership was similarly unsure about how to proceed. The failure of the hard-line strategy to remove the demonstrators seemed to validate Zhao's arguments. Because his opponents seemed to have willy-nilly adopted his Fabian strategy, it would be hard to expel Zhao from the party leadership for violations of party discipline. To charge Zhao with the more serious offense of being a counterrevolutionary would subject him to a possible death penalty, and there were fears that the accusation that the Secretary General was splitting his own party would be greeted with ridicule and would probably not win acceptance from a majority in the Central Committee. Hence, the Fourth Plenum was delayed further.

Finally, the hard-liners decided to accuse Zhao of links to a "counterrevolutionary rebellion" of their own making. On the afternoon of June 2, Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, Li Peng, Wang Zhen, Bo Yibo, Qiao Shi, and Yao Yilin held a meeting at Deng's home to finalize preparations for the forcible dispersing of the student demonstrators. Upon learning of the decision, Zhao made phone calls to Yang, Li, and other Standing Committee members to appeal to them not to carry out the crackdown. On the same evening, he apparently staged his own brief hunger strike.³⁸

The Massacre and Sequel

Once the decision was made to use armed military troops to remove the demonstrators from Tiananmen, it was carried out swiftly and brutally. On the night of June 3–4, the PLA, which had been stationed in and around Beijing, used its overwhelming firepower to clear the

streets, killing at least several hundred civilians in and about Tiananmen. As in 1987, the move against democratic forces in the capital was immediately generalized throughout the country, only in much harsher terms than before. The number of officially reported arrests as of early July 1989 exceeded 2,500; unofficial estimates put the figure at more than 10,000. Officials have announced at least 27 executions. Secret lists of intellectuals whose thinking was considered to be a source of the students' misbehavior were compiled for systematic pursuit and purge. As in the campaigns of the 1950's, units have been assigned quotas of purge targets in at least some instances.³⁹

Following the bloodbath of June 3–4, there was a brief hiatus during which few members of the central leadership were to be seen. Then on June 9, Deng, looking radiant, made a surprise TV appearance (his first since the Gorbachev summit). Together with other gerontocrats and a covey of military officers he paid tribute to the soldiers who had died defending the capital against "anarchy." His speech on that occasion has been quoted more extensively than any other document since the days of Chairman Mao.⁴⁰ At roughly the same time, in preparation for the convening of the Fourth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee on June 23, all full and alternate members of the CCP Central Committee were invited to a meeting to see doctored documentaries on the "counterrevolutionary rebellion," listen to reports, and study Deng's speech; this was followed by group discussions of the materials.⁴¹

According to officials charged with preparing for the Fourth Plenum, more than 50 Central Committee members and alternate members asked for sick leave or a leave of absence so as not to have to attend the plenum, an indication of continuing sharp division within this important party body. Zhao Ziyang's request for an opportunity to speak at the plenum was rejected.⁴² Fittingly enough, it was Li Peng who presented the Politburo report that expelled Zhao from all his party posts. A special group was also set up to "look further into his case," leaving open the possibility that Zhao may yet be expelled from the party and placed on trial (the former is a precondition for the latter, because party members cannot be tried). Through the summer and fall of 1989, this possibility steadily receded, as Deng Xiao-

³⁹FEER, July 6, 1989, pp. 10–13.

⁴⁰Ibid., June 29, 1989, pp. 10–12.

⁴¹Cheng Ming, July 1, 1989, pp. 6–9.

⁴²Ibid. Zhao was allowed to make a statement in his own defense to an expanded Politburo meeting convened before the plenum; in this speech, he denied criminal links to "counterrevolutionaries" and insisted that he had acted out of what he had believed were the best interests of the party and the people.

³⁸Cheng Ming, July 1, 1989, pp. 6–9.

ping finally rallied to the defense of his own economic reforms, whose survival would have been jeopardized by a public trial of one so closely associated with them.

To replace Zhao as secretary general, Chen Yun nominated Yao Yilin, while Peng Zhen recommended Qiao Shi. Deng broke the resulting stalemate by nominating Jiang Zemin, former party secretary of Shanghai, who won by only a slight majority of seven votes. Jiang studied in Moscow in the early 1950's, where he was almost certainly a classmate of Li Peng, and he is said to be very close (rumored to be a son-in-law) to Li Xiannian. Widely perceived a supporter of reform when deputy secretary of the Shanghai Municipal CCP Committee, Jiang came to Deng's attention for the hard line he took against the *World Economic Herald* (firing editor Qin Benli when he published minutes from a restricted briefing on Hu Yaobang in April), and his successful suppression of Shanghai's democracy movement. After the Beijing massacre, he took charge of a nationwide propaganda campaign that blanketed the country with very skillfully assembled videos and photographs that purported to prove that the capital had been threatened by a counterrevolutionary insurrection.

The plenum purged Hu Qili from the Politburo, but he retained his seat on the Central Committee. It also removed from the secretariat, in addition to Zhao, Rui Xingwen, formerly in charge of ideology, and united front chief Yan Mingfu, who had borne overall responsibility for negotiations with the democracy demonstrators. Also apparently purged were Wan Jiabao (head of the CC's General Affairs Department), Du Rensheng (director of the CC's Rural Policy Research Center), An Zhiwen (vice-minister of the State Commission for Reform of the Economic Structure), and Bao Tong (head of the Institute for Reform of the Political Structure).

Chief beneficiaries of this purge include Song Ping, 72, a former chief of the Organization Department, vice-minister and then minister of the State Planning Commission (a Cultural Revolution "survivor" and protégé of Chen Yun); and Li Ruihuan, 55, an energetic former mayor of Tianjin (rumored to be the son-in-law of Wan Li). Both became full members of the new six-man Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo, together with Li Peng, Jiang Zemin, Qiao Shi, and Yao Yilin. Li Ruihuan was also given the propaganda portfolio and promptly initiated a purge of *Renmin ribao*.

On June 30, the NPC Standing Committee, on which the reformers had staked their last desperate hopes, finally held its Eighth Session, to "study and discuss" the decisions of the previous week's Central Committee Plenum. The NPC Standing Committee's Chairman, Wan Li, called the military crackdown "legal, correct, and necessary," noting pointedly that "proletarian revolu-

tionaries of the older generation represented by comrade Deng Xiaoping had played a significant role in this struggle." Hu Jiwei, a member of the Standing Committee and president of the journalism confederation, came under criticism for having led a signature campaign to petition the NPC Standing Committee to convene a special session to abrogate martial law. Deng Xiaoping personally moved to dismiss Zhao Ziyang from his last remaining governmental position, that of vice-chairman of the state Central Military Commission (the shadow body of the party CMC). The motion carried overwhelmingly, although three of the 132 Standing Committee members, resisting strong pressure to make the vote unanimous, abstained from voting altogether, and three others failed to activate the voting mechanism.⁴³

Tiananmen in Perspective

The hard-liners' actions were swift and "effective" in obtaining their immediate objectives of ending the demonstrations and removing Zhao from power. The long-term impact of the crackdown remains to be seen. At this point, one can offer only a tentative assessment of the consequences of these events on the Chinese political system, on economic performance and policy, and on China's relations with the outside world. Let us explore these three subject areas in reverse sequence, which reflects their ascending order of importance.

Impact on China's "open door." Although the new leadership has reaffirmed China's interest in continued economic openness to the outside world, such relations have been seriously damaged because of the crackdown. This is not an inconsequential matter. In the period 1978–87, the share of foreign trade in China's total gross national product had increased from 10.2 percent to 29.7 percent, making the PRC more trade-dependent than the United States.⁴⁴ In response to US President George Bush's call on international lending institutions to postpone issuance of new loans to the PRC as a sign of outrage at the Beijing massacre, the World Bank and Japan froze aid projects worth some US\$10 billion; the Asian Development Bank postponed decision on new loans worth some \$1 billion; and the International Monetary Fund also suspended action on loan applications from China. It is unlikely that private commercial banks will extend additional loans until international aid agencies decide to make new commit-

⁴³SCMP, July 1, 1989.

⁴⁴FEER, Mar. 2, 1989, p. 49.

ments. Although moral compunctions may play some role in the decision whether or not to resume lending to China, a more important factor by far is how lending institutions perceive the prospects for China's economic stability over the next several years—witness the announcement by Moody's Investors' Service that it would review China's credit rating.⁴⁵ Over the next six months, foreign investment and loan agreements signed before June 3 will provide a steady capital inflow to China, but by the second half of 1990, as the sanctions take hold, the country will face a liquidity crisis.

Western firms already involved in China will presumably try to make good on existing investments, but firms that were on the verge of investing are now likely to think twice. The tourist industry, an important source of hard currency (\$2.2 billion in 1988), has most obviously been adversely affected: major hotels in the PRC reported occupancy rates of 7–10 percent in June.⁴⁶

Yao Yilin apparently has suggested in an unpublished speech that China deal with its sudden financial ostracism by turning its back on the United States and Japan and seeking closer cooperation with the Soviet Union.⁴⁷ However, the USSR has its own budget deficit at present and may not be prepared to offer appreciably better trade terms than the West, despite the recent normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.⁴⁸

Retrenchment and reform setbacks. China is likely to experience budget and trade deficits in the coming year and well beyond. The crackdown has clearly reinforced the economic retrenchment that has been under way since the Third Plenum of the 13th Central Committee, in September 1988. To the extent that the retrenchment has succeeded in cooling the overheated Chinese economy, it has reduced state revenues. The PRC seems to be heading into its fifth consecutive year of agricultural stagnation, which will probably require it to import as much as 15–16 million tons of grain in 1989.⁴⁹ The Chinese government forecast a \$2 billion deficit for the year in March, but the figure is now likely to be high-

er, due to expenditures for the maintenance of martial law troops and for price subsidies and worker bonuses approved in the hope of quelling social discontent. To slow continuing price rises, the authorities have been both diverting exports to the domestic market and importing more. These two steps had already resulted in a \$4.6 billion trade deficit for the January–May period.⁵⁰ If more money is printed to cope with the twin deficits, inflation will accelerate.

The difference between the current retrenchment and earlier ones, as Zhao Ziyang pointed out,⁵¹ is that this is the first to be superimposed on a two-tiered price system, so it is quite possible to get a slowdown of economic growth without any decline in inflation, a phenomenon known in the West as “stagflation.” Indeed, this seems to have been the impact of the “curing and rectification” campaign so far—inflation has remained high or even escalated (it was running at an annual rate of 28.5 percent from January through May 1989), despite an economic slowdown, bankruptcies, growing unemployment, and budget deficits.⁵²

It is possible to argue that a period of political repression is more consistent with this particular phase of China's “business cycle” than would be the initiation of ambitious new reforms, economic or political. Throughout the last decade, periods of reform vitality have consistently coincided with economic expansion, blatant appeals to material appetites, and rising living standards. By contrast, during periods of economic retrenchment, the reform process has slowed or given way to campaigns against “spiritual pollution” and other forms of corruption, to repudiation of materialism in favor of “thought and political work” and selflessness, as symbolized by Lei Feng.

If the bleak economic forecast given above is accurate, one might reasonably expect this period of economic retrenchment to be relatively short. In the past, when such upheavals resulted in the deferral of reforms, the balance always eventually swung back in favor of new reforms, with the apparent help of Deng. However, this time, Deng's commitment to reform seems less certain, and his position may be much weaker without Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili. Moreover, given Deng's complaint that the cause of present difficulties is the failure to carry out thorough anti-liberalization campaigns in the past, one might reasonably expect

⁴⁵ *Asiaweek*, June 30, 1989, pp. 28–34.

⁴⁶ Based on a conversation with an American teacher who remained in Shanghai through late June 1989.

⁴⁷ *Asiaweek*, June 9, 1989, p. 2. In September 1989, a new “half-half” policy was announced, according to which future Chinese foreign trade will be equally divided between Western capitalist countries, on the one hand, and various socialist countries, on the other. *Renmin ribao* (Beijing), Sept. 14, 1989.

⁴⁸ Indeed, one of the reasons that the USSR has been so willing to allow its East European allies to find their own path to socialism is that the Soviet Union can no longer afford to subsidize them. From a personal communication with Oleg Bogomolov, director the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System.

⁴⁹ *Kuang Chiao Ching* (Hong Kong), Apr. 16, 1989, pp. 22–25; *FEER*, July 13, 1989, p. 71.

⁵⁰ *Asiaweek*, July 7, 1989, pp. 26–31.

⁵¹ Xinhua (Beijing), Apr. 11, 1989, as cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), Apr. 12, 1989, pp. 13–14.

⁵² *Asiaweek*, July 7, 1989, pp. 26–31; *China News Analysis* (Hong Kong), No. 1385, May 15, 1989; *FEER*, Oct. 20, 1988, pp. 70–71.

this latest campaign to be more protracted.

The price reform launched in the spring of 1988 proved politically disastrous, and ownership reforms have encountered ideological objections from those with whom Deng chose to align himself to crack down on the democracy activists. There does not seem to be a very coherent policy program to return to, and surviving reformers may well be too shell-shocked to stick their necks out for new experiments.

Conservatives within the leadership have sought—increasingly so after the elimination of both Hu and Zhao—to utilize the retrenchment to gut market reforms and restore the planning apparatus. The rectification campaign launched under the auspices of Jiang Zemin has focused its attacks on private businesses, services, and rural enterprise—all areas associated with Zhao Ziyang—claiming that these are the source of corruption and inequality. The government has also renewed its monopoly over the pricing and distribution of some major commodities—such as cotton, steel, and grain—reimposing single fixed prices in hopes of thereby curbing inflation. Since the Third Plenum of the 13th CC, the number of commodities over which the government has resumed monopoly control has risen from a dozen or so to 32. The central planning system, led by the powerful State Planning Commission, has regained the importance it enjoyed before the reforms. The wings of enterprises are being clipped as the People's Bank of China tries to limit the expansion of credit. In foreign trade, all unauthorized companies are targeted for closing.

Political system. As for the political system per se, the prospect of "structural reform" can probably be dismissed for the foreseeable future. Even the credibility of those modest political reforms that have been achieved

(particularly the notion of the CAC as a solution to the problems of superannuated cadres and, more generally, of political institutionalization) has been left in shambles by this latest episode.

The line of political succession has also gone awry for the second time in as many years. In July, Deng Xiaoping again expressed his desire to step out of the limelight, and in September, he indicated that Jiang Zemin was his candidate for the succession.⁵³ Yet, Deng has also been quoted as refusing to resign from the chairmanship of the party's CMC until the CAC, chaired by Chen Yun, is dissolved.⁵⁴

Beyond the problem of which individual is to succeed to power, China will also continue to face for the next decade or so the issue of the death of an entire generation of leaders. Until their successors are firmly in place, the CCP leadership may well remain unstable.

Of even greater significance, perhaps, is the question of legitimacy. That the legitimacy of the regime was severely damaged by the bloodbath is a journalistic cliché. Even before the Tiananmen massacre, legitimacy was seriously attenuated, explaining the difficulty the regime had in deciding how and when to use the army. According to Deng Xiaoping's conceptualization—namely, that legitimacy is based on the credibility of the threat to use violence—the crackdown should have bolstered legitimacy.⁵⁵ But if legitimacy is based on any notion of the reasoned consent of the governed, the use of violence to compel obedience signals a failure. We may well have an opportunity over the next few years to see which of these theories is most relevant.

By way of conclusion, it would seem that the majority of the top Chinese leadership, facing very serious and complex problems for which no easy solutions presented themselves, succumbed to the temptation to translate these problems into moral and ideological terms with which they were more familiar. But the betting at this point is that this translation was not appropriate to contemporary circumstances, i.e., that the suppression of the democracy demonstrators and purge of the reformers will not solve, but rather will exacerbate, the underlying problems of contemporary China. The most basic of these underlying problems, it seems to me, is the need to construct a credible vision of the nation's future economic development, around which a political consensus can be built.

⁵³Deng's most recent succession scenario was publicly disclosed in a commentary by Yuan Mu in *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 10, 1989. See *Oakland Tribune*, Oct. 11, 1989, p. C/10.

⁵⁴SCMP, Apr. 12, 1989.

⁵⁵Deng, a strong advocate of the use of violence to teach lessons, whether to Vietnam, to Democracy Wall activists, or to potential criminals (he once called capital punishment an indispensable educational technique), believed that the legitimacy of the communist system had been eroding largely because of the failure of weaklings like Hu Yaobang or Zhao Ziyang to maintain the credibility of the regime's willingness to use force. Deng's disappointment in Hu was quite evident in his posthumous remarks of April 25; see *Ching Pao*, May 10, 1989, pp. 22–26.

Chinese Democracy in 1989: Continuity and Change

Andrew J. Nathan

In the late 1960's millions of Red Guards, who had earlier taken to the streets full of faith in Mao, found themselves discarded in the countryside where they discovered that the peasants were still living in primitive conditions after two decades of socialist development. In 1971, Mao Zedong's "closest comrade-in-arms" and trusted successor Lin Biao perished in the course of his alleged military coup attempt against the Great Helmsman. These events provoked a sense of moral outrage among significant numbers of Chinese, as they began to ask themselves how such things could have happened.

All over the country, thousands formed small groups to discuss what had gone wrong with the political system. Some wrote letters of protest or advice to Chairman Mao; a few may have plotted violent action against the regime. These groups were rooted out by the police in campaigns called "cleansing of class ranks" (1968–69) and "one-strike, three-anti" (1970–71). Hundreds of their members were executed.¹ Although the regime surmounted this particular crisis of political control, its ideological control continued to weaken.

Only one group of dissidents of the early 1970's became known in the West, after its members hung a wall poster in Canton in 1974 under the pseudonym Li Yizhe. The poster attacked Maoist autocracy in the thin disguise of what it called the "Lin Biao system." As a solution to the flaws of dictatorship, the Li Yizhe group called on the National People's Congress (NPC) to exercise its powers.² The Li Yizhe group thus introduced what was to become a consistent strategy of Chinese democrats, namely, attempting to ameliorate or cir-

cumvent one-party dictatorship by taking seriously the provision, found in every constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC), that the National People's Congress is the supreme organ of government. This strategy was prominently reflected in many articles written during the debate over political reform in 1986–87. It surfaced again during the May 1989 crisis when Cao Siyuan, a self-styled lobbyist affiliated with the Stone Group Corporation (a privately-owned computer company in Beijing), and Hu Jiwei, a reformist member of the NPC Standing Committee, attempted to convene a meeting of the Standing Committee to overturn Premier Li Peng's May 20 declaration of martial law. After the crackdown on June 4, Cao was arrested and Hu subjected to political denunciation.

By 1989, what had started as congeries of small, isolated, clandestine groups which did not know of each other's existence, had grown step by step—through the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1976, the Democracy Wall movement of 1978–79, and the student demonstrations of 1985 and 1986–87—into a national force that apparently had the participation or sympathy of almost all urban residents in China. In the process, the movement for Chinese democracy became more complicated in its social composition and in its mix of political goals and tactics.

Although the movement crossed a major watershed in 1989, when many intellectuals gave up hope that the regime of Deng Xiaoping was capable of reforming itself politically from within, both before and after June 4, the democratic movement of 1989 retained strong continuities in personnel, goals, and tactics with its prede-

Andrew J. Nathan is Professor of Political Science at Columbia University (New York). He is the author of *Chinese Democracy* (1985) and *China's Crisis, to be published in 1990*.

¹Interviews by author in New York on Aug. 12, Oct. 25, and Nov. 20, 1987; *Chung-kung nien-pao* (Yearbook of Chinese Communism), Taipei, Chung-kung yen-chiu tsa-chih she, 1969 and 1971.

²*Chinese Law and Government* (Armonk, NY), Vol. 10, No. 3, Fall 1977, pp. 15–62.

cessors. The mainstream democratic movement has always maintained hope that the authorities would initiate the changes for which it was calling. Indeed, the movement's moderation is striking. Chinese democrats have consistently positioned themselves as remonstrators rather than opponents, pressing the party to reform in its own interests and in keeping with its own ideals.³ This position did not change in 1989. The movement's main organizations—comprised before June 4 of the Capital Federation of Autonomous College Student Organizations (*Gaozilian*), the Capital Federation of Intellectual Circles (*Beizhilian*), and the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation (*Gongzilian*), and, after June 4, of the Chinese Democratic Alliance (*Minzhu Zhongguo zhenxian*), the Association of Chinese Students and Scholars in the United States, and the Chinese Alliance for Democracy (also known as China Spring)—have all said that they do not seek the overthrow of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Even after the regime's use of force on June 4, the main elements of the democracy movement have not changed their commitment to nonviolent methods in bringing about political change.

Several factors account for the moderation of the democracy movement. The Chinese democrats have long believed that the regime was capable of reform from within, and the democrats themselves continued to believe in socialism, albeit of a democratic variety. But a moderate approach was also prudent, for the regime retained command over the police and the military, and it previously showed itself willing to use these instruments of coercion to suppress the opposition. Finally, the democracy movement was made up almost entirely of students and intellectuals, a small minority within Chinese society. These people lacked the numbers and the willingness to confront the regime head-on. These factors combined to incline Chinese democrats to press for a "self-limiting revolution" in the People's Republic of China.

Reform From Within

Perhaps the most important factor of those mentioned above is that the regime's ideology claims to be democratic and leaders of the opposition have thus had reason to hope for reform from within. All four constitutions of the PRC affirmed popular sovereignty, contained provisions for citizens to vote and run for office,

and guaranteed the rights of free speech, assembly, petition, and demonstration. Even if largely rhetorical, such provisions pay tribute to the strength of democratic yearnings in China and set standards that the regime has to pretend to meet in some fashion.

Mao resolved the contradiction between rhetoric and reality with the concept of "democratic dictatorship," which held that the system was democratic because the totalitarian vanguard party was serving the highest interests of the people—whether they liked it or not. Those subjected to repression were not the people but their enemies. However cynical the argument, many Chinese believed in it and in Mao's benevolence and wisdom. Many blamed the problems that they encountered in their own lives on individual cadres rather than on the system and the assumption was widespread that Mao did not intend the abuses that were carried out in his name. Paradoxically, the practice of writing letters of remonstrance and appeal to Mao was common in the darkest days of his regime, perhaps more common than in his relatively lenient periods.

Such beliefs had faded by the time of the Tiananmen Square Incident of April 5, 1976, especially among the sophisticated factory and office workers and Communist Youth League members in the capital who formed the main force of the demonstrators.⁴ But the demonstrators still directed the brunt of their criticism at those around Mao and not at Mao himself. This made it possible for Deng's regime, which never contemplated full de-Maoization, to reverse the verdict on the incident only two years after Mao's death.

Hopes for democratization from the top down revived after Mao's passing. Under Hu Yaobang's leadership of the CCP Organization Department, millions of individuals were exonerated from unjust criminal and political verdicts and rehabilitated, some posthumously. Property was returned, jobs restored, reputations cleared. Hu sponsored the "debate over practice as the sole criterion of truth," which opened the way for the expression of fresh ideas that party theorists had been nurturing in "cowpens" and May 7 cadre schools during the years when they were condemned to internal exile.

Most participants in the Democracy Wall movement in 1978–79 were convinced that Deng wanted democratization and welcomed their suggestions. Only a few like Wei Jingsheng argued that Deng was a "new dictator," that temporary tolerance for unsolicited advice was not equivalent to a restructuring of power, and that

³Andrew J. Nathan, *Chinese Democracy*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1986, Chs. 1 and 2.

⁴Tens of thousands of demonstrators mourning the recently deceased Zhou Enlai and criticizing Mao and his close collaborators were forcibly dispersed on this day.

a democratic climate without democratic institutions could easily dissipate whenever a change of course was initiated at the top. In the eyes of most intellectuals, the arguments of Wei and those who thought like him were premature. The intellectuals believed that reform is invariably a lengthy process; moreover, although Deng could not afford to move too fast because of conservative resistance in the party, he nevertheless was proceeding with deliberate speed in a democratic direction and had to be given plenty of time. Most democratic activists saw Deng's arrest of Wei and his fellow-thinkers as regrettable but inevitable. At the time it was felt by many that what Wei had said was true enough, but it was not the time to say it.

In 1980, Deng himself called for political reform, reviving the hope that he would pilot China toward democracy. In a major speech delivered in August, he set modest goals and stressed that political reform was meant to strengthen, not weaken, party leadership.⁵ Some people around Deng, such as Liao Gailong, took the speech as license to argue for more far-reaching reforms, including the vitalization of the people's congress system.⁶ For some of the democrats, reform of the people's congress election system opened the vista of a parliamentary road to influence. They competed vigorously in the county-level elections held in 1979–81.⁷ Until 1989, Deng continued to entertain the notion of political reform and allowed it to be discussed sporadically. An especially vigorous public discussion took place during 1986–87, after Deng had stated that political restructuring must be part of the reform agenda.

It is clear in retrospect that Deng meant what he said when he warned that reform must not infringe on the four cardinal principles, namely, keeping to the socialist road, upholding the people's democratic dictatorship, leadership by the CCP, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, but this warning was not so clearly understood at the time he issued it. His words and actions were ambiguous. His speeches contained little abstract political discussion, making it hard to determine the intellectual logic of his position. Some thought the ambiguity was tactical, as he maneuvered to maintain a fragile coalition of reformers and conservatives. Others viewed Deng as intellectually confused,

unaware that he could not reform the economy without reforming politics. My guess is that Deng shared the assumption of many Chinese political thinkers, including Mao, that democracy is an instrument of mobilization whose function is to strengthen the links of citizens to the state, rather than a set of procedures for limiting state power to protect individual rights.⁸ Thus, Deng did not see a contradiction between his vision of democracy and a benevolent dictatorship exercised by him and his party.

Although one may argue that Chinese democrats misread Deng, they were probably not entirely wrong in thinking that Deng's closest aides and designated successors, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, were willing to consider relatively far-reaching measures of political reform. Hu, head of the CCP Organization Department in 1977–78 and CCP General Secretary from 1982 to 1987, sponsored a two-part "Conference for the Discussion of Guidelines for Theoretical Work" (*Lilun gongzuo wuxu hui*) in January–April 1979, at which liberal party thinkers he had rehabilitated or promoted began the overhaul of Chinese Marxism-Leninism needed to provide an ideological basis for reform.⁹ Under a pseudonym, at least one of the works produced at this conference found its way into a publication at Democracy Wall.¹⁰

According to people who worked with Hu, his driving motive was to guarantee that another Cultural Revolution could never occur. Thus, he advocated subjecting the ruling party to outside challenges and criticism. Although his vision of political pluralism did not envisage a rotation in power between the CCP and other political parties, Hu was willing to consider a number of other suggestions, such as expanding the role of the NPC and dividing it into two or three chambers. Hu also believed that the women's organizations, the Communist Youth League, trade unions, and professional associations should have greater independence from the CCP, saying, "If we control them so tightly, why bother to have separate organizations?"¹¹

Hu was popular among intellectuals for his openness to their ideas, and was criticized by the army newspa-

⁵Deng's August 18, 1980, speech, "On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership," in *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1982)*, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1984, pp. 302–25.

⁶Liao Gailong, "The '1980 Reform' Program of China," *Chiushih nientai* (Hong Kong), Mar. 1, 1981, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China*, (Washington, DC—hereafter FBIS-CHI), Mar. 16, 1981, pp. U/1–29.

⁷Nathan, *Chinese Democracy*, Ch. 10.

⁸*Ibid.*, Chs. 4, 6.

⁹Wei Shiqing, "History Will Not Forget This Meeting: Commemorating the 10th Anniversary of the Conference for the Discussion of Guidelines on Theoretical Work," *Huaqiao ribao* (New York), Feb. 1, 1989, pp. 2, 10.

¹⁰Yan Jiaqi wrote "The Secret of Modern Religion," under the pseudonym Bu Shuming in *Beijing zhi chun* No. 1, 1979, and "Democratic Self-Management and the Theory of the Withering Away of the State," under the pseudonym Wen Qi in *ibid.*, No. 6. He had given the latter as a speech at the theoretical work conference in 1979. Personal conversation with Yan Jiaqi, New York, Aug. 1, 1979.

¹¹Interview by author, New York, Aug. 28, 1989.

per in 1982 for laxness in maintaining ideological discipline. He was purged from his party secretaryship in January 1987, after student demonstrations persuaded the party elders that he was allowing "bourgeois liberalization" to get out of hand. It was his death on April 15, 1989, that triggered the student demonstrations.

Zhao Ziyang's record was more ambiguous. His chief commitment was to economic growth, and for him the main question seemed to be what sort of political structures would best meet the needs of economic development. It seemed inevitable that the marketization he favored would lead indirectly to the eventual breakup of dictatorship. But beyond this some advisors found him receptive to the argument that development in the modern age would eventually require lifting constraints on information and tolerating social pluralism and its more open political conflict. Zhao was associated with the theory of the "primary stage of socialism," which legitimated a diversity of social interests. His aide Bao Tong articulated the concept of "the new order of the socialist commodity economy," which rationalized wider use of elections and more political openness.¹² In 1986, Bao Tong authorized the establishment in Beijing of the Fund for the Reform and Opening of China, financed by the American businessman George Soros, and operating, at least officially, independently of Chinese government control. According to one report, Zhao commissioned the preparation of a political reform proposal that included ideas for multi-party competition and an independent press.¹³ These actions indicated that Zhao was interested in a substantial opening and pluralization of the political system, at least over the long term.

On the other hand, Zhao presented a notably cautious program in the section on political reform of his report to the 13th Party Congress in October 1987. In the months before his fall from power, people around him promoted a theory called the "new authoritarianism," which argued that in the present, relatively early state of development China needs an enlightened autocrat to direct economic development while keeping order and protecting people's rights. We will probably never know to what extent this argument reflected Zhao's technocratic convictions, and to what extent it was propounded as a means to induce Deng Xiaoping to hand over power to Zhao quickly and without dividing it among several successors.

In any case, during the May-June crisis Zhao's tactics shifted. According to the subsequent official charges against him, he supported Deng Xiaoping's hard line on the demonstrations while he was on a state visit to North Korea in late April. But upon his return he changed his position, calling for the withdrawal of the controversial *People's Daily* editorial that branded the demonstrations a "turmoil" and advocating other concessions.¹⁴ His conciliatory words and actions in public indicated that calls for the resignation of Li Peng and Deng Xiaoping did not displease him. On the eve of the declaration of martial law, officials and intellectuals associated with Zhao issued a six-point statement blaming the crisis on Deng and calling for special NPC and CCP meetings to examine errors of the past and, by implication, to summon Zhao (who had already been unofficially purged) back to power. In the aftermath of the June 4 crackdown, many members of Zhao's liberal brain trust fled the country. They now appear to maintain links with the exile democratic movement headed by Yan Jiaqi, a political scientist and former advisor to Zhao. Because they represent a faction within the CCP that may some day return to power, their alliance with the democracy movement allows Chinese democrats to continue even now to hope for reform of the communist regime from within.

That Zhao's interest in democracy during the crisis may have been tactical does not render it insignificant. Transitions from authoritarianism to democracy normally come about when authoritarian rulers see tactical advantages in such shifts. If Zhao's effort to play the democracy card had succeeded, he might have reverted soon to a more authoritarian position in order to consolidate his power and address China's economic problems. But meanwhile, Zhao's behavior demonstrated that those who hoped for change of the Chinese communist system from within had some grounds for their hopes.

Whatever the personal views of various party leaders, by the end of 1988, the actual achievements of officially-sponsored political reform were meager. They included regularization and expansion of the role of people's congresses, direct elections of county-level people's congress deputies, limitations on terms of office for some party and state officials, establishment of

¹²Bao Tong, "Several Questions Concerning the Current Reform of the Political Structure," *Qiushi* (Beijing), July 1, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 19, 1988, pp. 21-26.

¹³*Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), June 1, 1989, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 31, 1989, p. 29.

¹⁴Chen Xitong, "Report on Checking the Turmoil and Quelling the Counter-Revolutionary Rebellion" (hereafter—"Report"), *Beijing Review*, July 17-23, 1989, pp. I-XX. More details of the charges against Zhao are contained in "Main Points of Yang Shangkun's Speech at Emergency Enlarged Meeting of Central Military Commission on May 24, 1989 (edited from transcript of speech)," *Ming Pao*, (Hong Kong), May 29, 1989, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 30, 1989, pp. 17-20.

employee councils in state-owned enterprises, and the enactment of several hundred laws conducive to procedural regularity. The reform program also endorsed collective leadership in the party, orderly succession, the rule of law, and independence of the judiciary, but these desiderata remained weakly institutionalized.¹⁵

There were signs that some in the leadership favored further steps toward political reform in 1989, including passing a law making the press more free and independent but still subject ultimately to party guidance; enacting a law on demonstrations permitting peaceful gatherings while still enabling the government to restrict their scope;¹⁶ reducing the role of party officials in student organizations, trade unions, enterprises, and schools, while preserving the party organs in these units as watchdogs; and further strengthening the role of the National People's Congress as a legislative and oversight organ under overall party guidance. In the crisis of spring 1989, even such half-way steps might have sufficed to satisfy many of the demonstrators. In the long run, they were unlikely to satisfy Chinese democrats, any more than similar solutions seem to have satisfied Polish or Hungarian democrats. The push for real freedom of the press and of association, as well as for truly competitive elections would have resumed, probably sooner rather than later. But in the meantime, the liberal images of Deng, Hu, and Zhao, whether they were justified or not, helped to keep Chinese democrats looking for change from above.

The Democracy Movement's Ideals

The second reason for the Chinese democrats' long-standing posture of loyalty to the regime is the nature of their own ideals. With few exceptions, the opposition's vision of Chinese democracy has been compatible with a socialist order. At Democracy Wall in 1978–79, most of the proposals were made from the perspective of party members or non-party loyalists. They called for very modest measures of political openness and competition, more in the spirit of Mao's idea of a party with an "open door" to society than in the spirit of a Western multi-party system. In 1986–87, the high point of the intra-party and academic debate over political reform

that had been initiated by Deng, major proposals included establishing a civil service system; strengthening the National People's Congress by reducing its size and enlarging its system of committees; separating the party from the government; giving a clear legal definition to vertical and horizontal jurisdictions in the bureaucracy; publishing more financial data to assure greater governmental "transparency"; providing firmer guarantees of an independent judiciary; consulting more systematically with experts and technocrats in policy-making; and paying more consistent attention to procedures in governmental decision-making.¹⁷ The emphases were on openness and procedural regularity.

None of the 1986–87 proposals that I have seen was anti-socialist or calculated to lead to the overthrow of the party. To be sure, the idea of socialism had become so diluted that it would have been hard to identify an anti-socialist proposal unless its author labeled it as such. Most of the democrats' proposals dealt with economic structures indirectly if at all and, among the economic reformers, even proposals for privatization and marketization of the economy were cast as versions of socialism. (For example, a proposal for issuing stock in state enterprises was presented as promoting "ownership by the whole people.") After the purge of Zhao Ziyang, a *People's Daily* editorial charged that in a 1987 intra-party meeting even Zhao advocated abandoning the insistence on upholding socialism on the grounds that nobody knew any more what socialism was.¹⁸ Similarly, proposals for competitive electoral politics would not have been cast as open challenges to the principle of party leadership even if they were intended as such. Indeed, the moderate guise of most proposals may signify little except that Chinese are adept at waving the red flag to oppose the red flag.

My own reading of the political reform debates and personal encounters with some of the participants, however, lead me to believe that in most cases the reformers wanted to keep China socialist as they understood the term. For example, Yan Jiaqi, Li Honglin, Su Shaozhi, and Cao Siyuan, who were named in Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong's post-crackdown report as progenitors of the "turmoil" and "counter-revolutionary rebellion" in Beijing,¹⁹ were among the leading participants in the 1986–87 discussions of political reform. All

¹⁵A useful summary of 10 years of political reform is Liu Zheng, Cheng Xiangqing, and Du Xichuan, "Important Accomplishments and Experiences of the Last 10 Years of Our Country's Democratic Construction," *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu*, (Beijing), Nov. 25, 1988, pp. 28–36.

¹⁶The law on demonstrations enacted in July 1989, on the contrary, makes autonomous demonstrations virtually impossible; see "People's Republic of China Law on Assemblies, Parades, and Demonstrations (Draft)," *Renmin ribao*, Overseas Edition, (Beijing) July 8, 1989.

¹⁷See Benedict Stavis, *China's Political Reforms: An Interim Report*, New York, Praeger, 1988; and Stavis, Ed., "Reform of China's Political System," *Chinese Law and Government*, Vol. 20, No. 1, (Special issue), Spring 1987.

¹⁸"Only Socialism Is Capable of Developing China," *Renmin ribao*, Overseas Edition, July 22, 1989.

¹⁹Chen Xitong, "Report," pp. I–XX.

were party members; all seemed to espouse some version of socialism.

With some individual variation, the vision of the reformist party intellectuals centered on a system in which the communist party continued to be dominant but was checked by competitive elections and a free press in order to keep it honest and close to the people. This dominant party would run its own affairs and those of the government with openness and in accordance with laws and established procedures. For most of these intellectuals, the idea of party pluralism owed little to admiration for the American political and social system, which they criticized for its disorderliness, polarization of rich and poor, and political apathy. Although all believed that China could emulate some aspects of the American political structure, few could conceive of, or really wanted, an American-style system for China. Rather, their expectation was that party competition would develop out of China's existing system of "democratic consultation" with the nine minor political parties.²⁰

Cao Siyuan used the term "socialist parliamentary democracy" to describe his vision. Yan Jiaqi emphasized "proceduralism." The vision of these party intellectuals was not fully articulated in print, probably because its realization depended upon a step-by-step approach that could pass muster with the supreme autocrat. But it was probably not far from the vision held by Hu Yaobang and some of Zhao Ziyang's supporters, if not by Zhao himself. Marxists such as Su Shaozhi, Li Honglin, and Wang Ruoshui argued vigorously that democracy is not only a part of the Marxist tradition but its fundamental aim. In short, what the party democrats had in mind was not the overthrow of socialism but democratic socialism.

That the democracy movement's mainstream was not anti-communist does not, however, gainsay the fact that a fundamental conflict existed between the democrats and the regime over the nature of socialist democracy, as well as over the pace of progress toward it. This conflict sharpened markedly beginning in 1987. In retrospect, the purge of Hu Yaobang in January 1987 was a major turning point. His demotion was accompanied by suppression of the student demonstrations occurring at that time, and was followed by the expulsion from the CCP of three ranking intellectuals (Fang Lizhi, Wang Ruowang, and Liu Binyan), soon followed by others, and by the initiation of a campaign to oppose "bourgeois liberalization."

The events of early 1987 radicalized a portion of the

intellectuals, because the man in whom they rested many of their hopes for the party fell, and the influence of Wang Zhen, Deng Liqun, and others whom the intellectuals regarded as hostile increased. In 1989, the key initial demands of the student demonstrators in Beijing were to reverse the verdict on Hu and to denounce the campaign against bourgeois liberalization. An immediate sign of the serious impact of Hu's ouster was the unprecedented signing of an open letter to the party Central Committee by more than 1000 Chinese students in America, about 700 of whom used their real names. This open letter became the first of several such letters and established the network that was used in 1989 to mobilize the students against the Li Peng regime. Meanwhile, the anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign was conducted so fecklessly that it created an atmosphere in which, as Fang Lizhi said, "no one is afraid of anyone any more" (*Shei ye bupa shei*).

More fires broke out than the party's ideological watchdogs could control. The *Shanghai World Economic Herald* published daring articles on the failures of reform and the need for more radical economic and political solutions. A magazine called *New Enlightenment* made its debut in October 1988, having evaded the party's control system for periodicals by registering itself as a book series. The four issues that were published before the spring crackdown contained essays by eminent theorists, many of them party members, who were at odds with the regime's ideological authorities. Contributors to these four issues, who were soon to play prominent roles in Tiananmen or who were arrested in the subsequent crackdown, included Liu Xiaobo, Bao Zunxin, Jin Guantao, Li Honglin, Yu Haocheng, and Wang Ruoshui. *The Chinese Intellectual*, long published overseas, produced its first domestic issue in January 1989, also as a book series.

Other constituents of a nascent civil society that was gradually working itself loose from effective CCP control were the Stone Group Corporation and its Institute of Social Development, the Beijing Social and Economic Research Institute (SERI), the Capital Steel Research Institute, and the Happiness Bookstore. These institutions had somewhat ambiguous relationships to the CCP. Most of them were nominally "hung" (*gua*) from some part of the CCP organizational network, but they operated independently. The same was true of some institutions that the party itself had established, such as the Economic System Reform Institute, the Rural Development Research Institute, some institutes of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and some sections of the China International Trust and Investment Corporation. Politically-oriented intellectuals used these institutions as bases from which to test the bounds


²⁰See James D. Seymour, *China's Satellite Parties*, Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1987.



Students and authority in China: above, in the traditional manner, a fasting student sits opposite the Xinhua Gate, entrance to Zhongnanhai, the party leadership compound, attempting to petition the government to enact democratic reforms and eliminate official corruption; below, Chinese Premier Li Peng on May 18, 1989, meets with Wang Dan, a prominent student leader of the pro-democracy movement from Peking University (Wang was arrested on July 2).

—Photos by Contact and Eastfoto.





Hope and despair in Tiananmen Square, clockwise from top left: a jubilant student demonstrator flashes the "V" for victory on May 20, when martial law troops were prevented from occupying the capital; Wuerkaixi, chairman of the Autonomous Student Union, calls for a demonstration on the anniversary of the May 4th Movement to protest the government's refusal to talk with a student delegation; doctors and students remove a dead student from the square on June 4; students restrain an anguished protester reacting to the advance of soldiers toward Tiananmen Square on June 3.

—Photos by Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.



of tolerance more and more adventurously.

The regime was confronting the beginnings of a "desertion of the intellectuals," against a backdrop of rising inflation and corruption, the abortion of price reform, and the ever more intense, long-standing succession conflict.²¹ Deng Xiaoping and Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong were not entirely wrong in attributing the origins of the "turmoil and rebellion" to the sharp challenge to the ethos of the regime presented by intellectuals using increasingly sophisticated tactics. But their analysis of events turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy. By proclaiming the intellectuals' democratic socialism to be non-socialist, Deng set up a head-on conflict with the intellectuals who would have preferred to work within the system.

On January 6, 1989, Fang Lizhi wrote an open letter to Deng calling for the release of political prisoners, including Wei Jingsheng, to mark the upcoming 40th anniversary of the PRC. Thirty-three noted intellectuals followed with a letter of support on February 16. Also in February, 42 leading Beijing scientists joined the call for the release of "youth imprisoned or sent to labor reform for ideological problems." And in March, 43 writers and theorists called on the NPC to grant amnesty to Wei Jingsheng and others.²² A young democratic activist named Chen Jun, who had links with China Spring, was planning to use the scheduled April 1989 meeting of the National People's Congress to submit "A Report on Amnesty '89," amidst much publicity, which he was skilled in generating. Petition campaigns in Hong Kong, France, and the United States were launched in support of the amnesty request. A shift of many of China's most prestigious intellectuals to a pro-Wei position 10 years after his arrest signalled how far the conflict between the regime and the intellectuals had developed.

The intellectuals' impertinence annoyed Deng. He was confronted with a coalescing group of influential non-party and party intellectuals, informally linked to the hated China Spring, who were conducting a sophisticated international publicity campaign around an issue that was divisive within the regime and embarrassing to him personally. To hold firm would look churlish; to yield would legitimize an independent opposition. The regime felt trapped and its responses revealed as much. The regime declared the call for an amnesty ille-

gal, clumsily blocked Fang Lizhi from attending the banquet in Beijing to which President George Bush had invited him, confiscated an international petition to the NPC delivered from Hong Kong in support of the amnesty drive on the grounds that it was propaganda, and used a weak pretext to expel Chen Jun from the country. Not only were these responses ineffective, they tarnished the regime's international image.

The student movement thus emerged against the background of a general crisis in the regime and a specific crisis in relations between the regime and the intellectuals. But in rhetoric, tactics, and demands, the students at first avoided pressing their advantage too aggressively. They positioned themselves within the established tradition of moderate democratic remonstrance. They cast themselves not as dissidents but as loyal followers, appealing to the authorities to live up to the values the authorities themselves had articulated. The purpose of the hunger strike, which was symbolically undertaken in front of the Mao Mausoleum, in the shadow of the monument to the martyrs of the communist revolution, was to force the leaders to recognize the movement as being patriotic. The message was that the students valued the welfare of the state above their own lives. It was thoroughly in the tradition of Qu Yuan, who had lived in the fourth century BC, and who committed suicide to show his loyalty to the ruler who failed to heed his advice. Indeed, Qu probably represented a more influential precedent for the opposition's tactics of non-violence than the examples of Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, or Corazon Aquino, so often mentioned in the Western media.

The students' demands followed the logic of two decades of Chinese democratic activism. Absolute power corrupts, and a good socialist government must allow itself to be supervised by the people. The demonstrators asked that the Chinese government recognize popular sovereignty and the political rights that are guaranteed by the PRC constitution. They carried signs that read "We firmly support the correct leadership of the Chinese Communist Party" and "The people love the people's police."²³ They demanded that the government end corruption, overcome bureaucratism, promote reform, and improve education. In effect they paraphrased the words of the regime's spokesmen.

The two key demands were for a free press and for dialogue—the latter implying recognition by the authorities of the students' autonomous organizations. By a free press, the demonstrators did not mean entrepreneurial, commercial, unregulated mass media that

²¹For the term "desertion of the intellectuals," see Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, New York, Vintage, 1956, pp. 42–52; for the general crisis, see Andrew J. Nathan, "Politics: Reform at the Crossroad," in Anthony Kane, Ed., *China Briefing 1989*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1989, pp. 7–25.

²²*Chiusih nientai*, Apr. 1, 1989, pp. 20–27.

²³*The New York Times*, May 5, 1989.

compete for readers and live off advertising, but simply a press that reports the truth. Except for such experiments as the *World Economic Herald*, in the spring of 1989 most Chinese media remained under the effective direct or indirect control of the CCP's Propaganda Department or its local bureaus. What was published or broadcast remained determined by the policy needs of the party, although Chinese journalists have long argued that both the people and the regime would be better served if Chinese journalists had the authority to publish what they knew to be true. Because corruption and special privilege are among the features of the communist system that most alienate the people, the students and the professional journalists who later joined them argued that a truthful press would be the best mechanism for cleaning up, and hence saving, the regime.

A draft press law defining the professional rights and responsibilities of Chinese journalists has been undergoing revision for years. According to some reports, the law was finally scheduled for enactment in late 1989.²⁴ The provisions of this law had been sharply debated, but even a relatively conservative version would have gone a long way toward meeting the demands of the demonstrators. The government needed only to have made some final revisions and handed the draft to the NPC to enact. But this possibility was overtaken by events.

The second key demand—for dialogue—was also ostensibly compatible with the regime's own logic. As part of its political reform, the government had promoted the development of the nine minority democratic parties and increased its practice of "democratic consultation" through the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and informal forums with "democratic personages." It was a CCP tradition for leaders to go to work units and solicit the people's opinions. In the course of Deng's reforms the party had re-established a system of offices for "letters and visits work" to which individuals could come with complaints. On April 4, 1989, the National People's Congress passed an Administrative Proceedings Law, which enabled citizens to take government organs to court to protect their rights.²⁵ Accordingly, the students' demand for dialogue received widespread support, including from school administrators and political hacks, and from the official trade union federation.²⁶

The regime attempted to respond on its own terms to

the demand for dialogue. Cabinet spokesman Yuan Mu received a student delegation for a nationally televised discussion on April 29. Li Peng held talks with student leaders on May 18. United Front Work Department director Yan Mingfu and other party leaders went to Tiananmen Square to speak with hunger-strikers. And finally, in his May 19 speech announcing the imposition of martial law, Li Peng emphasized that "dialogue between the party and government on the one hand, and the broad [masses of] students and personages of various circles on the other, including dialogue with students who have participated in parades, demonstrations, classroom strikes, and hunger strikes, will still be actively continued at many levels, through many channels, and in many forms, in order fully to hear opinions from various quarters."²⁷

However, the dialogue that the authorities had already engaged in, as well as the type of dialogue they promised in the future, was not what the students demanded. The government attempted to treat its encounters with the students as opportunities to feel the public pulse without decentralizing power. Yuan Mu and Li Peng acted as hosts and as authority figures, avuncularly urging the students to return to classes, defending the government's position, and delivering threats. The students in turn stated that such encounters were unsatisfactory and acted out their dissatisfaction by behaving impolitely at the meetings. They demanded that the two parties be placed on an equal footing, that the government's representatives in the dialogue be of high rank, that observers and reporters be present, and that the government give prompt responses to the students' questions. The students also demanded that their representatives be elected by autonomous student groups distinct from the puppet student unions established under party sponsorship.²⁸

Here was the Trojan horse that the regime could not accept. Had this demand been granted, the students would have achieved the legalization of the first completely independent political organization in PRC history, and the effective negation of Deng Xiaoping's four basic principles, as they were understood by Deng. This demand explains why Deng had early on "determined [the student movement's] nature" (*dingxing*) to be "a planned plot, a turmoil, whose essence is to negate fundamentally CCP leadership and the socialist system."²⁹

²⁴Huaqiao ribao, Jan. 30, 1989.

²⁵Renmin ribao, Overseas Edition, Apr. 11, 1989.

²⁶See, e.g., Renmin ribao, Overseas Edition, May 19, 1989; FBIS-CHI, May 22, 1989, pp. 78-81.

²⁷Renmin ribao, Overseas Edition, May 20, 1989.

²⁸Ibid., May 4, 1989.

²⁹This is quoted from the crucial April 26 editorial. The words are thought to have been taken from an internal talk by Deng the day before. Renmin ribao, Overseas Edition, Apr. 26, 1989.

The Chinese leaders have been obsessed since 1956 with what they see as the deterioration of the Leninist system in Poland and Hungary. In this connection, the formation of a "Capital Autonomous Workers' Association" during the demonstrations was a particularly alarming development. Although it was a tiny group, its existence evoked the specter of a Chinese "Solidarity." Leaders of this group were arrested even before the general crackdown of June 4.³⁰ As Li Peng told the other leaders shortly after declaring martial law: "There was no way out. You give a step, they advance a step; you retreat two steps, they advance two steps. It had gotten to the point where there was nowhere else to retreat. If we were going to retreat any further, we might as well have handed China over to those people."³¹ The leaders preferred military repression to seeing China become another Poland.

Chen Xitong, in the regime's most thorough indictment of the democrats to date, contends that the democratic movement wanted to achieve the violent overthrow of the government.³² The regime needed to portray the spontaneous, uncoordinated acts of defensive violence by people throughout the city of Beijing on the night of June 3, when the troops moved in, as part of a coordinated plan in order to justify calling the democrats' activities a "counter-revolutionary rebellion." Chen quoted some unsigned leaflets as calling for the use of violence to overthrow the CCP, but he was unable to name the organizations or individuals responsible for them. Nor could he find direct quotes from any specific democratic activist calling for the overthrow of the party or the use of violence. Chen could only find personal attacks on Deng and Li Peng, criticisms of the Chinese socialist system, and appeals for thoroughgoing reform.

The only exception, one worth pausing over, is Chen's charge against literary theorist Liu Xiaobo, who was arrested after June 4 and is believed to be in danger of receiving a heavy sentence for his activities.³³ Liu was one of four intellectuals who began a 48–72 hour hunger strike on June 2. Chen accused Liu of membership in China Spring and quoted him as having stated in a published interview: "We must organize an armed force among the people to effect Zhao Ziyang's comeback." But an investigation by a Chinese-lan-

guage news magazine in New York has established that these words were a mistranslation. The interview was conducted by telephone in Chinese, but the transcript was prepared in English in New York by the activist Chen Jun, for publication in the West. Chen provided a copy of the transcript to the *Independence Evening News* of Taiwan, which translated a statement by Liu, to the effect that all social forces must be mobilized, back into Chinese as "armed forces in society must be organized." The text was reprinted in Hong Kong and from there picked up by Chinese intelligence and quoted by Mayor Chen.³⁴ These facts are important not only because they may affect Liu Xiaobo's fate, but also because they confirm the nonviolent character of the democratic movement even after the declaration of martial law.

After the June 4 killings and the subsequent wave of arrests, many intellectuals broke completely with what they call the Deng-Li Peng-Yang Shangkun regime. Liu Binyan, who was often criticized by younger intellectuals after he was purged from the CCP because he continued to express hope in the communist party, has denounced the regime and predicts its fall within two years.³⁵ This attitude is widespread. But the loss of hope in the Deng regime has not brought with it a break in the moderate, remonstrative tradition of Chinese democracy. The opposition has stopped short of calls for either the use of violence or the overthrow of the CCP.

The official press has taken pains to present the post-June 4 democratic movement in exile as consisting of revolutionaries who seek to overthrow the Chinese government by armed action. This assertion is made to legitimate condemning the movement's foreign support as interference in China's internal affairs, and hence a violation of international law.³⁶ However, these charges can only be made plausible by selective quotation and quotation out of context. No major democratic organization in exile so far has called for either armed rebellion or terrorism, or, for that matter, for the overthrow of the CCP.

Yan Jiaqi, who has emerged as the main spokesman for the democratic exiles, has predicted that Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng, and Yang Shangkun will "reap the storm" that their violence has sown and will be publicly

³⁰*Huaqiao ribao*, June 1, 1989.

³¹"Important Points in the Speeches of Comrades Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, Qiao Shi, Yao Yilin, at the May 22 Meeting," inner-party document, reprinted in *Huaqiao ribao*, June 14, 1989.

³²Chen, "Report," pp. I–XX.

³³See the denunciation of Liu in *Renmin ribao*, Overseas Edition, June 26, 1989, reprinted from *Beijing ribao*, June 24, 1989.

³⁴Ch'en Chih-hsiung, "Journalistic Ethics as Seen from the Huang Te-pei Incident," *Shih-pao chou-k'an*, (New York), July 15–21, 1989, p. 3; Chen Xitong, "Report," p. XVI.

³⁵See "Liu Binyan Discusses Beijing While Visiting Hong Kong," *Huaqiao ribao*, June 19, 1989.

³⁶See, e.g., "Renegade Elements Conduct Activities to Overthrow the Chinese Government With the Protection and Support of American, Taiwan, and Hong Kong Reactionary Forces," *Renmin ribao*, Overseas Edition, Aug. 2, 1989.

tried for their crimes.³⁷ However, such statements merely describe the fragility of a coercive regime, and do not constitute a call for violence or a declaration of anti-socialism. The program of the Democratic Chinese Alliance (*Minzhu Zhongguo zhenxian*), which Yan established with Uerkesh Daolet (Wuerkaixi), Liu Binyan, Su Shaozhi, and Wan Runnan in Paris on July 20, makes "reason, peace, and nonviolence our standards for action" and "freedom, democracy, rule of law, and human rights" its goals.³⁸ The organization's strategy, according to Yan, envisages four stages. First will occur the inevitable fall of Li Peng, which will come about through his own weakness and unpopularity at home and abroad; second, the Alliance will press for reversal of the verdict on the democratic movement; third, its members will return home to participate in revising the constitution so as to establish an open, pluralistic political system similar to the ones that the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary are now moving to establish; and finally, it will work to establish a federal system in China within which the Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Tibet problems will be amenable to resolution. At the end of this process, the CCP will be competing peacefully in elections with the Kuomintang and the Democratic Alliance. Yan estimates that the entire process will take 10 years or longer.³⁹ He argues that democracy cannot be achieved by violent means and that the democracy movement itself must begin the democratization process, by relying on dialogue and the power of ideas rather than on force.

The Association of Chinese Students and Scholars in the United States established itself in Chicago in late July 1989 on a platform of moderation. It is a loosely organized liaison group rather than a political movement or party. It intends to work for democratization chiefly through the dissemination of information to China. As citizens of the PRC, its members seek to maintain normal relations with China's officials and missions abroad.⁴⁰

Even the organization that the Beijing authorities deem the most radical and dangerous, the Chinese Alliance for Democracy or China Spring, has not crossed the line separating reformism from revolution. At its Fourth National Congress, held in Los Angeles from June 23–26, 1989, China Spring debated a motion to include "overthrow of the Chinese Communist Party in its

constitution." It also examined a proposal to abandon exclusive reliance on nonviolent tactics in favor of "revolutionary" methods, which included the formation of suicide squads to conduct "secret armed struggle on the mainland" and the use of terrorism abroad against PRC officials and their children in order to deter the authorities from arresting and executing leaders of the democratic movement. Both of these proposals were rejected.⁴¹

To say that the major dissident organizations in exile have eschewed anti-communism and the use of violence is not to say that these issues are not debated among exile democrats,⁴² or that there is no armed resistance in China or assistance for it from abroad. Scattered shooting has been reported in Beijing, a train wreck occurred that might have been due to sabotage, some democratic movement leaders have been spirited out of the country, and others have somehow found ways to evade capture. Money is being collected by individual activists abroad for unspecified purposes and some individual Chinese do speak of the need to resort to violence. It is hard to gauge the prevalence and impact of such activities, which are by nature secretive, and obviously the advocacy and use of violence may increase. But so far, violence remains a minor thread in the movement as a whole, and it is not publicly advocated by any major democratic organization.

Regime Monopoly of Force

Besides intellectual reasons for nonviolence, practical concerns have dictated a nonviolent approach as well. The regime still controls overwhelming military and police force, and recent events have confirmed the importance of this factor. The events of June showed that the instruments of proletarian dictatorship—the least-mentioned but perhaps the most important of Deng's four cardinal principles—are still firmly in the hands of the senior leaders. It is hard to say whether their control is due to ordinary military discipline, the effectiveness of the political commissar system, or the reinforcement of the control system with personal networks. Whatever the reason, the army and police forces have stood firmly with the regime.

Their support explains why it would be unrealistic for the democratic movement to take to the hills as Mao did

³⁷Yan's June 4, 1989, statement in Paris; *Shih-pao chou-k'an*, July 1–7, 1989, p. 14.

³⁸"Proposal to Establish the 'Chinese Democratic Alliance'," *Shih-chieh jih-pao* (New York), July 21, 1989.

³⁹Yan speech at Columbia University, New York, Aug. 1, 1989.

⁴⁰*Shih-pao chou-k'an*, Aug. 5–11, 1989, pp. 8–10.

⁴¹*Zhongguo zhi chun* (Flushing, NY), July 15, 1989, p. 23.

⁴²For example, New York-based dissident Ni Yuxian takes issue with Yan Jiaqi's stand of not opposing the communist party; see "The Democracy Movement and the Chinese Communist Party," *Shih-chieh jih-pao*, Aug. 21, 22, 23, 1989.

in the 1930's. Conditions today are very different from those encountered by the Jiangxi Soviet when it faced Chiang Kai-shek's army. The total Nationalist forces were less than half the size of the PLA today, and much more poorly trained and armed. Chiang Kai-shek controlled only about one-fifth of the Nationalist Government's military forces, and he controlled even those forces through factional allies rather than directly. Chiang had to allocate proportionally more military resources to national defense than the PLA does today and had correspondingly fewer resources to spare for internal security. Communications and transport were primitive and the Soviet Union was willing to help the insurgents. Despite all these advantages, the CCP barely survived Chiang's extermination campaigns of the early 1930's.⁴³

The democrats say that if violence is to play a role in China's future, it will have to come from within the Chinese military and not from the democratic movement abroad or the democratic underground in China. In a debate over the use of violence at the recent Fourth Congress of the China Spring, Chairperson Hu Ping stated: "When the 'Gang of Four' was arrested in 1976, this certainly wasn't a peaceful change, but nobody complained about it. If somebody comes forward now to arrest the group of people who are holding power, there certainly won't be anyone to complain that they did not use peaceful methods. . . . However, our organization does not have the power to carry out a military coup."⁴⁴ According to Wan Runnan of the Chinese Democratic Alliance: "Our principle of nonviolence doesn't mean that no blood will flow. There is a division of roles. Our role is to carry out activities that are peaceful, rational, and nonviolent. But others will play other roles."⁴⁵

With violence ruled out as an option, nonviolence and support for socialism offer the best possibility of building a broad anti-regime coalition and maximizing official and unofficial foreign support. As a China Spring leader stated during the Fourth Congress debate, "only the flag of peaceful methods can get wide popular acceptance. . . . If anybody here asks me for money for guns [to use against the communists], I would certainly claim to be giving you the guns to use for hunting birds."⁴⁶

Social Composition of the Movement

The last factor that has argued for peaceful methods is the social composition of the democratic movement. The demonstrators in Beijing and other cities this spring were overwhelmingly urbanites (*shimin*)—students,

peddlers, office workers, teachers, shop and factory workers. In exile, the class basis of the movement has become even narrower. It is now composed almost exclusively of students and intellectuals and a few ex-officials, with financial support from overseas Chinese in Hong Kong and elsewhere (including Taiwan). The intellectuals are in no position to take up arms without the support of other classes, if only because their numbers are so small—less than half of 1 percent of the Chinese population is college-educated.⁴⁷

It is difficult to imagine an insurrection in China that is not based in the countryside. So far as I know, the democratic movement did not enjoy much active support in the rural areas. The rural dwellers may have lacked information about the democratic movement; if they participated in it, they would not have enjoyed the same anonymity as did urban crowds; they were busy earning a living; and, perhaps most importantly, although the farmers were dissatisfied with the regime, they have not been as severely affected by inflation as urban dwellers and have greater possibilities for making do economically. As Wan Runnan has said, "When the economy worsens, the peasants will suffer. This is what is needed to change their political stance. For now, they still hope to muddle through; they still think they can make it."⁴⁸

Of course, the social makeup of the countryside is becoming increasingly complex. Rural dwellers include not only farmers but also industrial workers, shop clerks, peddlers, fishermen, teachers, monks, and local officials. Members of some of these groups have evidently been willing to help the democratic activists go underground or escape. But this scattered assistance does not provide the critical mass necessary for a peasant uprising.

Conclusion

Although the democratic movement has maintained its tradition of moderation, a fundamental conflict over the nature of socialism in China reached a climax in

⁴³Lloyd E. Eastman, *Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution, 1937–1949*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1984, pp. 131–32; William Wei, *Counter-revolution in China: The Nationalists in Jiangxi during the Soviet Period*, Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, 1985, Ch. 2.

⁴⁴*Zhongguo zhi chun*, July 15, 1989, p. 32.

⁴⁵Speech at Columbia University, Aug. 1, 1989.

⁴⁶*Zhongguo zhi chun*, July 15, 1989, p. 33.

⁴⁷*Zhongguo tongji nianjian* 1984 (China Statistical Yearbook 1984), Beijing, Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1984, p. 492.

⁴⁸Wan Runnan speaking at Columbia University, Aug. 1, 1989.

1989. Mikhail Gorbachev was so popular with the Chinese demonstrators not because he was seen, as so many Americans see him, as leading a retreat from socialism, but because the Chinese saw him as symbolizing the hope that a communist regime can permit a free press, a dialogue with society, and an independent political opposition, and can thrive under the stimulus of such challenges. Deng and the surviving senior revolutionaries, by contrast, have remained orthodox Stalinists on the question of power. To Deng, "the key point is that [the demonstrators] wanted to overthrow our state and the party. Failing to understand this means failing to understand the nature of the matter. . . . Their goal was to establish a bourgeois republic entirely dependent on the West."⁴⁹

Deng has a point: if his four principles are the standard of true socialism, then the democrats did want to overthrow the socialist system. If open, competitive democracy and political freedom are the monopoly of the bourgeoisie, they did want to establish a bourgeois republic. If the exercise of free speech that is guaranteed by the Chinese constitution is illegal, then the students and intellectuals denounced by Chen Xitong did commit subversion. But the democrats continue to see their relation to the regime differently. In the words of the biographer of China's first remonstrator, Qu Yuan: "It was his fate to be faithful and yet doubted, to be loyal and yet suffer slander—can one bear this without anger?"⁵⁰

⁴⁹Deng's June 9 speech in *Beijing Review*, July 10–16, 1989, p. 18.

⁵⁰Sima Qian in the *Historical Records*, quoted by Laurence A. Schneider, *A Madman of Ch'u: The Chinese Myth of Loyalty and Dissent*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1980, p. 21.

The Political Sociology of the Beijing Upheaval of 1989

Andrew G. Walder

Beijing's seven tumultuous weeks of popular protest marked a new stage in China's post-revolution political history. Student protest and elite power struggle, central to the events of this spring, are familiar features of the Chinese scene. But two new developments led from student protest to an unprecedented popular rebellion. First, the students received widespread and outspoken support from intellectuals in all fields, many of whom also organized protests of their own, while huge numbers of ordinary working people rallied to the demonstrations. Second, and perhaps more important, the party split internally over its response to the student movement, which prevented effective repression early on and which eventually led key elements of the capital's party apparatus and, most crucially, the mass media to support openly certain student demands. The combination of mass support and party fragmentation led rapidly to a massive, nonviolent rebellion that echoed in scores of cities throughout China, paralyzed the national leadership, and made the capital virtually ungovernable for several weeks.

Toward an Explanation

Beijing's popular rebellion presents us with two puzzles. Why did the 1989 student protests touch off the largest popular challenge to party rule in the history of the People's Republic of China (PRC), when similar campaigns in the past—the most recent led by students at the end of 1986—found little popular response and were easily suppressed? And given the apparent lack of an organized foundation within factories and other workplaces, how could such a nonviolent movement lead so quickly to the paralysis and political crisis of May?

The explanation of any political upheaval must natu-

rally begin with the dissatisfactions and motives that stimulate popular protest in the first place. But to this observer, the magnitude of this spring's rebellion cannot be explained simply by an increase in the magnitude of popular dissatisfactions. True, many have noted an increasing pessimism in the public mood after 1986 over official corruption, price inflation, and the stagnation of political and economic reform.¹ However, intense popular dissatisfaction is not a new phenomenon in China, while popular rebellion—at least the variety not instigated by a Great Leader—most decidedly is. We still need to explain how popular motives, whatever they may be, are translated into successful political action, and such an explanation cannot logically be based solely, or even primarily, on levels of dissatisfaction.

Similarly, while the size of a movement and the depth of popular support for it are important in explaining its impact, such impact depends just as much on pre-existing weaknesses in political institutions and upon disunity within ruling groups. Although this year's movement was crushed in early June, it shook the system to its foundations and provoked some of its leaders into a brutal and costly response. To this observer, the move-

¹See, for example, Perry Link's evocative "The Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolt," *New York Review of Books*, June 29, 1989, pp. 38–41.

*Andrew G. Walder is Professor of Sociology and an Associate of the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University (Cambridge, MA). He is the author of *Chang Ch'un Ch'iao and Shanghai's January Revolution (1978)* and *Communist Neo-Traditionalism. Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (1986)*. The author would like to thank Jean Oi and Lawrence Sullivan for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article.*

ment could never have grown to the size it did, nor could it have shaken the halls of power to such an extent, had the party's organized means of political control not been weakened over the decade of reform and had there not been open divisions within the party apparatus and leadership itself.

My preliminary sketch of a solution to these puzzles will therefore not dwell on the accumulated dissatisfactions of China's long-aggrieved urban citizenry. Instead, I shall outline the long-term changes and short-run developments that helped turn student protests into a popular rebellion.² The argument has three parts: the first is about altered political attitudes; the second about changes in citizens' capacity to act on their attitudes; and the third about the broader political conditions for collective action provided by the stance of the party-state apparatus. In brief, we shall see, first, that for different reasons and in different ways, changes during the decade of reform coupled with developments in the last two years undermined both intellectual and worker support for the regime. In the case of students and intellectuals, the crucial changes were greater information about the outside world and recent political changes in Eastern Europe. In the case of workers, the crucial changes were the greater workplace contention over wage issues that accompanied the monetization of labor relations and the entrenchment of a consumer mentality in the 1980's and the stagnation and perhaps decline in real wages occasioned by the post-1986 inflation. Second, over the decade of reform, citizens were granted the opportunity to travel and communicate much more freely than 10 years ago, while systems of reward and punishment in workplaces shifted away from their past emphasis on political loyalty. The system of control was thereby weakened enough to allow mass participation in street demonstrations, although not enough to allow extensive organization of wage earners in their places of work. Third, the fracturing of party unity and eventually of state sovereignty in mid-May magnified the size and scope of the demonstrations. This factor made success appear within reach and the potential costs appear low just as a suddenly independent mass media actively mobilized the Beijing population to support the students, launching them into a briefly successful rebellion against martial law.

Changing Political Outlook

Only a decade ago, China's urbanites were still shell-shocked, demoralized by the ravages of the Cultural Revolution, and grateful for any change the party would

make on behalf of their political or economic welfare. They were still largely unaware of the economic prosperity of their neighbors in East Asia, of life in Japan and in the West, and of the possibilities for change soon to be presented in the Soviet bloc. What has changed crucially in the Deng Xiaoping era is that the government has lost the ability to control the information that citizens use to evaluate their own circumstances, and thus to stem their propensity to conceive of their problems in political terms, to envisage alternatives, and to see the attainment of these alternatives as feasible. The opening to the outside world placed different ideals of governance into popular awareness, changed perceptions of the feasibility of democratic reform in China, and perhaps most importantly, provided models of strategy and tactics for public protest. Meanwhile, the 1980's consumer revolution, and increased inflation and official corruption helped spread these changing perceptions beyond the intelligentsia.

Students and intellectuals. From the outset of this year's protests, China's students and intellectuals exemplified the profound changes that a decade of openness had wrought in public perceptions. In the 1978–79 protests that are commonly referred to as the “Democracy Wall” movement, criticisms of the party were often quite scathing, but open and favorable references to foreign models of government were rare. Wei Jing-sheng, the most famous protest figure and leading victim of that era, gained notoriety primarily by daring to draw unfavorable comparisons between China's backward system of government and the “modern” politics of the liberal democracies. The iconoclastic arguments that drew to him the attention of both the foreign media and domestic security forces, however, distinguished Wei from the political mainstream of the period.³

Despite the fact that Wei remains in prison to this day, the attitude that earned him this treatment would hardly have gained notice in the intellectual climate of the mid-1980's. The ideas of the rule of law, separation of powers, and even of pluralism had moved to the sphere of permitted public discourse, and carefully worded suggestions that China might have something to learn from Western models in this regard were commonplace by

²Each of the observations that I make below strike me as plausible, but sustained research, which is now just beginning on this subject, has a way of altering such perceptions. Documentary sources are still becoming available, human sources have still to be interviewed, and no doubt future changes in China's leadership will bring fresh information and sources.

³See Roger Garside, *Coming Alive: China After Mao*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1981, pp. 212–98; and James D. Seymour, Ed., *The Fifth Modernization: China's Human Rights Movement, 1978–1979*, Stanfordville, NY, Human Rights Publishing Group, 1980.

1986.⁴ In private discussions in China and abroad, students and younger intellectuals in recent years often gave the impression that the guardians of party orthodoxy had completely lost the struggle for the hearts and minds of the younger generation. Ideas considered heretical only a decade ago have moved to the mainstream of opinion among the educated and the young.

This profound decade-long shift was fueled by the extraordinary openness of China in the 1980's. In the late 1970's, only a handful of students and visiting scholars had recently studied outside China, the foreign community was small and isolated, listening to broadcasts of the Voice of America (VOA) or the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was a punishable offense, and contacts with foreigners were tightly restricted. By the beginning of this year, many tens of thousands of students and scholars had already been to the United States alone, Beijing's long-term foreign community numbered in the thousands, and tens of thousands of others visited China for scholarly or business purposes every year and enjoyed relaxed and easy contacts with their Chinese colleagues. VOA and BBC broadcasts, no longer forbidden, had a large and open audience. Western publications, in both their original languages and in translation, were readily available, and were not subject to systematic control at China's borders. China's national television news regularly employed footage from Western news agencies.

These changes helped create a student body and an intelligentsia that were highly cosmopolitan in comparison with their late-1970's counterparts. This year's student movement bristled with foreign symbols and allusions. Students in both Beijing and Shanghai erected replicas of the Statue of Liberty in prominent public places.⁵ Wallposters and placards paraphrased or quoted Abraham Lincoln, Martin Luther King, and Patrick Henry, and they alluded to Mahatma Gandhi, Lech Wałęsa, Mikhail Gorbachev and *perestroika*, the American civil rights movement, and Kent State.⁶ The student protesters wore the white headbands they had seen in films and photos of Japanese and South Korean student radicals; they flashed the "V" sign they had

seen in news footage from the anti-Marcos movement in the Philippines.⁷ Although the mentality and style of the protesters in many ways remained characteristically Chinese, the ardent adaptation of foreign symbols and ideas was striking.

These long-run changes were unmistakable. But as long-run changes, they do not account for the striking difference in the strength and stridency of the student movement in 1989, compared with that of December 1986; nor can they account for the different response of the intelligentsia and broader populace this year. The summer of 1986, in retrospect, was the high tide of political openness in China; the impact of openness on student and intellectual mentalities was fully worked out by then. What occurred after 1986 to make demands for democracy more strident and broadly popular?

Ironically, the crucial short-run cause of changed political perceptions was not influence from the West, but from the Soviet bloc. In the period after Hu Yaobang's ouster and the conservative backlash occasioned by the 1986 student movement, China's leaders reversed themselves on the political reforms promised in the summer of 1986 and began to draw back from further economic reform. However, in precisely this period political change accelerated in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Gorbachev's *glasnost'* received the rapt attention of educated Chinese. The 19th Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1988, extraordinary for its openly contentious debate, the stunning spectacle of the Soviet party's embarrassment in parliamentary elections early in 1989, and the subsequent parliamentary debates in mid-1989 have been the object of open envy among reform-minded Chinese. Equally crucial was the evident failure of martial law to solve Poland's political and economic crises, and the turn to a free press and partially contested parliamentary elections negotiated with Solidarity. Also important, but less dramatic, have been developments in Hungary, where a number of political organizations are now readying for promised parliamentary elections.⁸

These developments have rapidly altered the standards by which educated Chinese judge their government, while they have undercut the main conservative objection to political reform. In the crackdown on the

⁴This is one reason why several groups of intellectuals sent petitions to Deng Xiaoping earlier this year to ask that Wei and other political prisoners from the Democracy Wall period be released. It should be noted, however, that as an electrician, Wei crossed strict status boundaries guarded jealously in the Chinese political system. Intellectuals in the 1980's were licensed to debate topics freely within set boundaries, and could test those boundaries from time to time. But members of the working class could not engage in political discourse; those who did were immediately viewed as subversive, especially if they sought to air nonconformist ideas of their own.

⁵The Shanghai replica was placed in front of the party headquarters in mid-May, well before the more famous statue was erected in Tiananmen Square on May 29. See *The New York Times*, May 20, 1989.

⁶See *Time* (New York), May 29, 1989, p. 21; *The Washington Post*, May 25, 1989; and a series of reports by Mike Chinoy of Cable Network News aired in April and May. Many have questioned how completely the students understood these foreign traditions, or how clear their ideas about democracy were. However, they were very clear about what they opposed and obviously drew inspiration and tactics from foreign models.

⁷See *Asian Wall Street Journal* (Hong Kong), May 25, 1989; and *Time*, May 29, 1989, p. 21.

⁸See the interview with several Chinese studying in the Boston area in the *Boston Globe*, May 23, 1989.

Democracy Wall movement, right up through the backlash against the 1986 student protests, party orthodoxy has labeled calls for democracy "bourgeois" and inappropriate for "Chinese conditions." The emergence of coveted forms of socialist democracy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe directly undermines the conservative argument. On the eve of Gorbachev's visit to China, the political scientist Yan Jiaqi, a leading Beijing proponent of political reform (and now a dissident in exile), observed: "China used to be afraid of influence from the West. Now we are afraid of influence from the Soviet Union. . . . If we want to keep out Western influence, we can say we're against 'bourgeois liberalization' or against 'total Westernization.' But we can't use that pretext against Soviet influence . . . there is no ideological concept to resist it."⁹

In effect, reform experiments in the Soviet bloc changed the terms of an implicit compact formed with China's intellectuals at the outset of Deng's reform program. Intellectuals in the post-Cultural Revolution period appear generally to have accepted Deng's argument against political reform in return for enhanced status and advisory influence, and as a price to be paid for the stability needed for economic reform and prosperity. Especially important in this acquiescence was the perception that no matter how far from the ideal, China's political situation in the early 1980's was infinitely better than in the recent Mao era and was the best that a citizen of such a party-state could hope for, at least in the immediate future.

The intellectuals' response to the student movement suggests that this political outlook had lost its viability by the late 1980's. No longer could Chinese intellectuals conclude that their political situation was the best they could hope for, nor could they be so readily convinced that democratic reforms or greater political openness were inappropriate for China or unrealistically ambitious goals. The impact of developments in world socialism was naturally greatest among students, for whom, by the mid-1980's, the political repression of the Cultural Revolution was a distant historical fact that was largely irrelevant to political judgments.

Awareness of change in the Soviet Union and admiration for Gorbachev were much in evidence before and during the Soviet leader's visit in mid-May. Students interviewed by Western reporters said that they listened regularly to Radio Moscow for news of Soviet reforms, and one student at Tiananmen Square said, "We need someone like a Gorbachev, a man with vision. Zhao [Ziyang] does not measure up to Gorbachev. He wants to modernize the country and has good ideas, but he does not know how to carry them out."¹⁰ Large demonstrations in Beijing on May 15 and 16 dis-

played placards praising the Soviet leader and calling for more *glasnost* and *perestroika* for China; thousands of students at Beijing University petitioned for Gorbachev to speak on campus.¹¹ In short, backtracking on reform in China, coupled with dramatic political developments in Eastern Europe, undermined the foundation of the intellectuals' consent to the political restrictions of the Deng regime and emboldened the students to act.

Blue- and white-collar workers. These factors were apparently less important to the broader working population than the high rate of inflation and the widely perceived upsurge of official corruption at all levels. After 1986, inflation became a serious problem for urban residents. After decades of extraordinary price stability, the last two years saw the real rate of inflation (much higher than the official rate) climb to an estimated 30 percent. Difficult as it is to measure inflation, it is even harder to assess the prevalence of corruption. Public perception of official corruption, however, does appear to have become more acute in recent years (a development not unrelated, as I shall note momentarily, to the upsurge in inflation).

The inflation of the late 1980's and the increased salience of corruption took place against the backdrop of a decade-long trend of increasing contention over wage matters.¹² Three factors explain the increased wage contention. First, it was an inevitable outgrowth of the monetization of labor relations. Growth in real wages between 1979 and 1984 far outstripped increases in labor productivity. While the share of national income generated by urban workers rose by 9.3 percent, their total compensation more than doubled. From the late 1950's through the late 1970's, bonuses were either nonexistent or small and the material incentives that were offered were consistently linked to political evaluations of employees.¹³ By the mid-1980's, bonuses comprised almost one-fourth of the wage bill, and enterprises kept much larger percentages of their profits and distributed much larger percentages of these profits as incentive pay, as managers attempted to avoid labor conflict by "overspending" on bonuses and other benefits.¹⁴ Quotas and contracts proliferated

⁹The New York Times, May 14, 1989.

¹⁰The Washington Post, May 21 and 24, 1989.

¹¹Ibid., May 18, 1989; The New York Times, May 14, 1989.

¹²Andrew G. Walder, *Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1986, Chs. 2 and 4.

¹³See Andrew G. Walder, "Factory and Manager in an Era of Reform," *China Quarterly* (London), June 1989, pp. 242-64, esp. pp. 243-44 and 249-53; and "Wage Reform and the Web of Factory Interests," *ibid.*, March 1987, pp. 22-41.

on the shop floor, intensifying contention over standards of work and pay.¹⁴

Second, the shift to light industrial production greatly increased the availability of consumer goods and purchases of key consumer goods increased by several orders of magnitude. In the late 1970's, the Chinese urban consumer aspired to own a wristwatch, a foot-powered sewing machine, a name-brand bicycle, and a transistor radio. By the mid-1980's, such items were commonplace, and the consumer could realistically aspire to own a color television (perhaps even an imported or foreign co-produced one), a washing machine, refrigerator, or a tape recorder/stereo with AM/FM/shortwave reception. From 1978 to 1987, ownership of electric fans grew 12-fold; of television sets, 38-fold; of refrigerators, 131-fold, and the number of washing machines grew from around 1000 to 5.7 million.¹⁵ During this same period, the housing stock doubled. Farmers' markets brought to cities fresh food-stuffs that had been tightly rationed or simply unavailable in the Mao era, but prices were much higher than in the reviled state stores. The consumer revolution in cities fed the workers' hunger for money, despite the sustained rise in living standards after the late 1970's.

Finally, increases in real wages, although rapid, had begun at a base more than 20 percent lower than the average real wage in the mid-1950's. Not until 1984 did the average real wage, according to official statistics, surpass the comparable figure for 1957.¹⁶ Urbanites, in fact, used the prosperity of the 1980's to recover from the depression of living standards they had suffered during the Mao era. During this process of recovery, workers were aware that peasants in suburban areas, who were now free to engage in private commerce, enjoyed much larger increases in income and could build for themselves much larger and higher quality housing than anything available to workers in cities. In short, a number of factors explain why workers' satisfaction might not increase along with their standard of living.

Given this recovery through the sustained rise of real wages, where wage issues once again became a prominent feature of shop floor politics, and where a consumer mentality became firmly entrenched once again, the inflation of 1987–89 had a major impact on public perceptions. To an extent that we are as yet un-

able to gauge, real incomes began to fall for the first time in the post-Mao era. It is reasonable to suspect that such inflation would stimulate increased corruption among petty officials and clerks, whose wages are not high and who are also hit hard by price rises. Whether or not this hypothesis is true, corruption would certainly be much more sharply resented in an era of inflation: that of petty officials and clerks because it is visible and cuts further into worker incomes; that of higher officials—who are seen as responsible for inflationary policy—because their privileges protect them from the ravages of inflation. Whether corruption increased in fact or merely in public perception, inflation made corruption less tolerable.

Because Beijing's wage earners have been less articulate in their protests than the highly educated, changes in their outlooks are more obscure. But it appears that inflation had the effect of politicizing worker dissatisfaction in a way that made the student demands for democracy more appealing than a few years ago. As bad as it is for the Chinese consumer, the inflation of the last two years does not come close to the kind of hyperinflation that has sparked riots and looting in Argentina, Venezuela, and other countries in recent years. Nor were the price rises as large as the ones that have touched off riots and strikes in Poland (nor were the price rises, as in Poland, the result of announced government decisions). Although riots did break out after student protests in Changsha and Xi'an in early May, they did not occur in Beijing, and looting was entirely absent. Inflation and corruption appear to have fueled public protest primarily by enhancing the workers' sense of powerlessness and resentment at official privilege, thereby providing a long-missing link with student and intellectual demands for greater democracy.

As with the intellectuals, the implicit compact that the Deng regime had forged with the working class began to unravel after 1986. Workers now saw themselves as being made to sacrifice for a reform program of benefit only to the corrupt petty officials and clerks, and the privileged higher officials who set the policies in the first place. One worker from the Beijing Shoe Factory, while participating in the protests, told a reporter, "I cannot afford a decent life so naturally there is anger in me. . . . When I hear our leaders speak of 'reform,' I know that means the price of food is about to increase. . . . [Inflation and corruption make] rich men of party cadres and leave the masses behind. . . . The students have given all the people the courage to raise their voice."¹⁷

Although workers' motivations were different from

¹⁴Walder, "Wage Reform," loc. cit., and Susan L. Shirk, "Recent Chinese Labour Policies and the Transformation of Industrial Organisation in China," *China Quarterly*, December 1981, pp. 575–93.

¹⁵*Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1988* (Statistical Yearbook of China 1988), Beijing, Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1988, p. 804.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 190

¹⁷*Boston Globe*, May 24, 1989.

those of the students, many apparently felt that the protests would provide an avenue of expression, and perhaps redress, of their grievances. From the outset, the students sought to show sympathy and build ties with the broader public. In the massive and pivotal march of April 27, in which workers cheered openly from the sides, helped clear away police lines in advance, and swelled the student procession to several times its original size, one student banner read "You work but you get nothing; your life is bitter."¹⁸ A library clerk in the crowd that day told a reporter: "Inflation has given us a lot of difficulties because prices rise but salaries don't. Students voice that desire of ours to suppress the inflation. And then there's corruption. Bribery is evident everywhere, and the people are sick of it." An older worker (who was wearing a Mao button) told the same reporter: "They represent the people's thinking, the sense that we the people are in control. The leaders cover everything up. People don't know anything, and we are no longer the masters. That's why there is this uprising."¹⁹ At another key mass demonstration, on May 4, an ironworker said, "I hope student demonstrators will make the government do something about inflation. But even if the students don't bring up the inflation problem, I'll still support them. They demand press freedom, which is something we need too. Now we have no freedom at all."²⁰ Workers evidently felt that students provided an opportunity to influence the leadership on matters of concern to them. The more sustained the student protests, the more encouraged and emboldened workers became.

The Weakening of Political Controls

No matter how emboldened Beijing's workers became during this period, they never demonstrated a capacity to organize and sustain a movement of their own. Blue- and white-collar workers either participated spontaneously in student-led actions or formed themselves into small bands who left their offices and factories to march under banners naming their place of work. At least one autonomous organization of industrial workers, the "Capital Independent Workers' Union," publicly announced its formation,²¹ but we have little evidence to suggest that it was able to build a significant membership or to coordinate work actions in sup-

port of the student protests. Independent unions were more a result of the upheaval than a cause. In sharp contrast to Poland, where an organized labor movement, through superbly organized strikes and demonstrations, turned itself into a virtual opposition party, in China only the students and, to a lesser extent, the intellectuals, were able to form and sustain even loose-knit political associations.

But even this organizationally limited protest activity is significant in light of the heretofore remarkably effective institutions of grass roots political control inherited from the Mao era. China under Mao developed distinctive institutions of control centered in workplaces and neighborhoods. Even more so than in most Soviet bloc regimes, these controls made it very difficult for urban Chinese to change their jobs or place of residence, travel without workplace permission, obtain information other than from approved channels, or gather together outside official scrutiny.²²

Over the past decade, the framework of these controls has been maintained, but their exercise has been relaxed. The intense workplace monitoring of behavior and thought characteristic of the past has subsided, and rewards have been distributed increasingly based on performance rather than loyalty. In addition, a small urban private sector (some 6 million nationally) and a much larger sector of peasant entrepreneurs from the city's suburban rings have been released from such controls. The strict control over travel and information and means of communication characteristic of the Mao era has also been loosened, as a consequence of both the policy of openness and of China's rapid development. For example, from 1978 to 1987, total passenger traffic grew 3.4 fold, and highway traffic 4.7 fold. The number of urban telephone lines increased 2.2 fold, long distance calls, 2.8 fold, and radio sets of all kinds, 3.4 fold.²³ These increases are due to the greater physical availability of travel and communication equipment, as well as to the fact that access to telephones, intercity travel, photocopy machines, and foreign radio broadcasts have in recent years all been subject to few or no political restrictions. These changes, of course, have been concentrated in the nation's capital: Beijing's 120,000 telex lines in 1987 were 78 percent of the nation's total, and the city's 194,000 telephones were almost three times the number of telephones in Tianjin,

¹⁸The New York Times, Apr. 28, 1989.


¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid., May 5, 1989.

²¹The Washington Post, May 31, 1989, and The New York Times, May 31, 1989.

²²See, for example, Walder, *Communist Neo-Traditionalism*, passim, and Martin K. Whyte and William L. Parish, *Urban Life in Contemporary China*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984.

²³Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1988, pp. 500-01, 523, 804. The radio figures probably understate the increase in shortwave sets, because an increasing proportion of radios sold after 1978 had this capacity.



Tiananmen currents, clockwise from top left: students draw inspiration from American revolutionary hero Patrick Henry; China Daily workers draw on Lord Acton to condemn corruption within the party leadership of the People's Republic; motorcyclists participate in the demonstrations for democracy (other cyclists kept demonstrators posted on police and army movements); a contingent of the million Beijing office workers, laborers, and others who marched in support of the pro-democracy students on May 17, 1989; students and teachers man a makeshift communications center in Tiananmen Square.

—The first two photos by Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos, one by AFP, and two by Magnum.

a nearby city of comparable size.²⁴ The rapid growth in these means of communication has clearly outpaced the capacity of the authorities to monitor them. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this fact is the ability of some hunted political activists to escape from Beijing, or from China altogether, in the weeks after the June 4 massacre.

The greater availability of these means of communication—many of which were in private hands—was much in evidence during the Beijing protests. A group of young motorcycle enthusiasts called the “Flying Tigers,” employing a mode of transportation nonexistent 10 years ago, rode throughout the city after the declaration of martial law to spread news of advancing troops and to bolster citizen defenses. Participants in the student movement communicated with their colleagues in North America and Europe via long distance telephones, facsimile machines, and electronic mail on computer networks. They received news, advice, and encouragement from Chinese students abroad via these same media; and the information on these networks helped inform news programs broadcast back to China on shortwave channels.²⁵ As acknowledged by the resumption of jamming of foreign broadcasts on May 22, these news sources played an important role in spreading information about the protest’s successes within China.²⁶ Also, even in the midst of the rebellion, international travel was still unrestricted: people easily obtained visas and arrived from overseas with contributions of funds and supplies for the student strikers. Students from outlying areas easily made it to Beijing, periodically replenishing the ranks of protesters in the square.²⁷ None of these advantages were available to the protesters of 1978–79.

Although these changes made massive street demonstrations possible, a number of barriers still hinder the political organization of the working population as a whole. Although workers joined in student protests to an unprecedented degree, they have not yet demonstrated the capacity to organize and lead a broader movement of their own.²⁸ As yet, China has no general labor market for workers in state-owned and large collective enterprises. In these sectors, which still employ more than 90 percent of urban Chinese, turnover remains very low, and most workers expect to stay at their workplace until they retire, as they did 10 years ago. State and large collective enterprises still distribute a wide array of benefits to employees, are the chief source of housing, and provide employment for their workers’ children in an overcrowded urban labor market. The small urban private sector has provided an outlet primarily for otherwise unemployed youths or families with special skills or connections; it does not yet

provide an attractive employment alternative for the secure and heavily subsidized state worker. Urban employees are therefore still very much attached to, and dependent upon, a single workplace. So far, this factor has constrained workers from organizing independently.

One reason why student demonstrations met with such enthusiastic support from the broader population is that they provided workers (and others) with a rare opportunity to protest that did not entail high and immediate costs. To organize behind factory gates, right under the nose of party officials, would be a gamble with potentially high costs.²⁹ However, simply not to show up for work or to leave early with a group of co-workers, perhaps taking a factory vehicle along, does not challenge factory authorities as directly as organizing for a work stoppage does. (Some managers might even condone outside participation by small groups of activist workers as a way of minimizing disruption of the factory.) But the events of this spring showed that it is not necessary to have an organized workers’ movement to mobilize protests that put enormous pressures on the institutions of political power. One very important reason for this circumstance lies within the party and state apparatus.

The Fracturing of Party Unity

The evident disintegration of party unity after the first week of May is perhaps the most important cause of the size and tenacity of the protest movement, especially

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 527.

²⁵The number of phone calls between China and the United States were triple the normal number during May. *Boston Globe*, May 23, 1989.

²⁶*Ibid.* The foreign radio broadcasts were especially important in spreading news about the protests to other parts of China, and were most important in Beijing before the second week of May, and after May 25, when local media reports were sketchy or biased.

²⁷This travel was facilitated by sympathetic railway staff, who reportedly let students travel free, but such travel would not have been possible if the system of travel permits, which existed during the Mao era, had still been enforced by the Bureau of Public Security.

²⁸Because it remains very difficult for managers to fire workers in China, managers are highly vulnerable to slowdowns and spontaneous walkouts. See Walder, “Factory and Manager,” *loc. cit.*, pp. 252–53. The Achilles heel of this system of political control is therefore within each isolated workplace. In the wake of the crackdown, the political system is more vulnerable to waves of isolated walkouts and slowdowns than to renewed student protest. Should a sustained stagnation or fall in urban living standards occur, such actions would be one possible source of pressure for political change.

²⁹Workplace supervisors reportedly warned workers against participating in or even watching demonstrations; others tried to lock their workers into their compounds; some offered bonuses to those who would stay or threatened to fine those who left. One bystander at the May 4 demonstration told a reporter, “Workers won’t dare march by themselves because the economic risk is too great.” See *The New York Times*, May 5, 1989.

its paradoxical growth after the May 19 declaration of martial law. The student demonstrators' invocation of the memory and progressive political legacy of former Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang drove wedges into an already divided party. Significant portions of the party-state apparatus openly supported the student campaign. Especially important was the defection of key organizations in the mass media that, on the eve of Gorbachev's visit, began to report openly and sympathetically on the growing demonstrations. This reportage helped to magnify public sympathy and involvement, and during a pivotal period, made it appear that the demonstrations might succeed in toppling the hard-line leadership.

It is apparent that the regime, beginning in the weeks leading up to martial law, was grappling with divided sovereignty in two respects. First, the Politburo Standing Committee itself found its powers usurped by Deng and members of the senior advisory group. This usurpation lasted a period of weeks, during which time there was no clear political center. Second, once these party elders, whose power rested not on formal position but on personal influence, forged an alliance with Premier Li Peng, President Yang Shangkun, and others, many of the personal followers of Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili (as well as Hu Yaobang's former followers, among whom were many intellectuals), who headed key central and provincial institutions, including, apparently, part of the armed forces, contested the rule of premier Li Peng and the Politburo majority manufactured by Deng. In essence, key governmental institutions—such as the Foreign Ministry, research institutes, key newspapers, and others—reportedly refused to take orders from the Li Peng government. The true magnitude and shape of this divided sovereignty is not clear to us at present and is in any case outside the scope of this essay, but a clearly divided party and state apparatus played a central role in feeding the popular rebellion. The population of Beijing was well aware of this division because of the mass media.

Beijing's mass media—local and national newspapers, the New China News Agency, local radio and television—also played a major role in mobilizing popular protest, initially through accurate and sympathetic reporting on the student demonstrations and the popular response, and later by openly challenging the party leaders who ordered martial law. As early as April 24, such newspapers as Shanghai's *World Economic Herald* and Beijing's *Science and Technology Daily* ventured sympathetic reports on the student protests, drawing the ire of officials.³⁰ However, the official media remained hostile or silent on the student movement and followed the line enunciated in the *People's Daily*

editorial of April 26, which attacked the students for engaging in a "planned conspiracy" aimed at overthrowing the party, until May 4, when, speaking at the reception for members of the Asian Development Bank, Zhao Ziyang declared that "the just demands of the students must be met" and that "we should solve the problem in a democratic and legal way."³¹

During this time, the student demonstrations were massive and enjoyed clear popular support. In the demonstration of April 27, hundreds of thousands of students and their supporters marched through the streets for hours, repeatedly breaking through police barricades to fill Tiananmen Square. On May 4, hundreds of thousands of students and supporters again marched, and this time were joined by organized intellectuals and journalists under banners of their own, and by young workers who "easily outnumbered" the students.³²

Despite the enormous size of the demonstrations, they did not yet constitute a popular rebellion. They would become one only after the protesters came to see themselves as having the clear sympathy of one wing of the party and government apparatus and as helping this faction in its fight against the conservatives. This process began after Zhao's May 4 speech, which was followed by a series of conciliatory statements about "patriotic" students that continued up to May 17. Beginning on May 5, the official media began to run brief but objective reports on student activities and demands; by May 9, the reports had become longer and more detailed, leading quickly to actively sympathetic media coverage for a period of about two weeks, ending on May 25.³³

At two distinct points, the suddenly independent and assertive mass media played a pivotal role in the development of the popular rebellion. First, from around May 13 through May 19, the media's detailed and sympathetic reporting riveted the city's attention on the drama of the hunger strikers, building a huge groundswell of popular support, and openly seeking to pressure top leaders to reverse their intransigent stand against negotiations. This period was one in which, for the first time, protest marches swelled to 1 million or more (May 15, 17, and 18). White- and blue-collar workers, profes-

³⁰*The New York Times*, Apr. 25, 1989. The editor of the former was sacked, and the issue in question impounded. In turn, these actions galvanized protests for a free press by leading intellectuals and journalists, beginning in earnest on April 27, and continuing through mid-May.

³¹*China Information* (Leiden), Summer 1989, p. 41.

³²*The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*, May 5, 1989.

³³*The Washington Post*, May 5 and 10, and *The New York Times*, May 10, 1989.

sionals, and cadres began to march under banners naming their workplaces (including at least eight agencies of the central government), and a force of several hundred thousand began to occupy the square continuously.³⁴ During this period, the people of Beijing were told by their press and television that "hundreds of thousands" or "more than a million people" "from all walks of life" were going to the main square "to show their support for the students." They read detailed lists of student demands and heard reports that university presidents, teachers' organizations, leading social scientists, the staff of Beijing television, the head of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, leading journalists and intellectuals, and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions had appealed to the government to negotiate with the students in good faith. Finally, they heard that citizens and organizations throughout the capital were sending aid and medical supplies to the hunger strikers.³⁵

Having so effectively mobilized public opinion for the cause of the students (and by extension for the cause of liberalization and reform), in mid-May, Beijing's mass media also laid the foundation for massive popular resistance to martial law beginning in the early morning hours of May 20. This second stage marked the start of an open popular rebellion against the Li Peng-Deng Xiaoping faction. Until troops moved into the compounds of broadcasting stations and newspapers on May 25,³⁶ the mass media openly encouraged resistance to martial law, making it appear that practically the entire country was united in opposition against it.

During this week, hundreds of thousands of students and ordinary citizens continued to demonstrate in the square, while massive numbers of other demonstrators rushed to countless barricades throughout the city to block troop movements. People could read and hear in the official media that the masses were opposed to martial law, and that military officers were pledged not to attack the demonstrators. Photographs in newspapers showed citizens and soldiers fraternizing at the barricades. As Li Peng made speeches naming "turmoil" as the pretext for the military show of force, local papers reported that rates of crime and traffic accidents had gone down in the past month.³⁷ *Science and*

Technology Daily published an appeal, signed by 24 members of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, calling for an emergency session to repeal martial law.³⁸ *People's Daily* printed on its front page an article quoting Hungarian Prime Minister Miklós Nemeth saying that his country had learned from sad experience that solutions to its problems did not come from military force, along with an article about the resignation of the Italian government.³⁹ New China News Agency reports claimed that more than 1 million people marched in the streets to oppose martial law on May 23, when foreign observers put the number at 100,000, and the agency's interviews with citizens on the street directly refuted the rationale for martial law.⁴⁰

The evident division in the national leadership and the open defection of the mass media fueled an exhilarating sense of popular power. From the outset, the student protesters, in characteristic Chinese style, saw themselves not as dissidents but as loyal remonstrators. Their sense of insult at the April 26 editorial is evidence of this mentality; and a retraction of the accusation that they were "counterrevolutionary" became a key student demand. They saw themselves as patriots carrying out their duty as educated citizens to press the government even at personal risk. However, when it became apparent that their activities had sympathizers in the government, they began to feel a sense of direct participation in national politics; as the splits in the leadership widened, they and ever broader circles of the population came to feel that they were participating directly in a momentous historical drama. The disintegration of the party apparatus made victory seem possible and lowered the perceived costs of continued participation. Without this disintegration, it is hard to imagine a population united in rebellion against a party leadership that had already publicly committed itself to the use of military force.

Conclusions

From this perspective, the military assault upon Beijing should not be interpreted simply as a tough response to stubborn student protesters. The stakes were much higher by mid-May; by the time martial law was declared, the students were no longer the hard-liners' main problem. The entire population of Beijing was seemingly united in effective resistance against the

³⁴The *New York Times*, May 16, 18, and 19, 1989, and *The Washington Post*, May 17, 1989.

³⁵See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), May 17, 18, and 19, 1989. Provincial radio stations reported on protest activities in at least 23 other cities on May 17 and 18 alone.

³⁶The *Washington Post*, May 25, 1989.

³⁷*Ibid.*, May 24 and 25, 1989. Some publications dissented by placing the word "turmoil" in quotation marks.

³⁸*Asian Wall Street Journal*, May 23, 1989.

³⁹The *Washington Post*, May 23, and *The New York Times*, May 24, 1989.

⁴⁰The *Washington Post*, May 23, 1989.

hard-liners' refusal to negotiate with students, and broad sectors of party and government were in open defiance. Outside the capital, demonstrations had occurred in more than 80 cities.⁴¹ The crackdown was, instead, an act calculated to terrorize the entire population of Beijing, and the recalcitrant party-state apparatus, back into submission.

It is tempting, but misleading, to characterize Beijing's popular rebellion as a movement by "society" against the "state." This characterization is much more appropriate for the decade-long struggle of Solidarity in Poland; the Beijing events are much more like the 1956 rebellion in Hungary. In Hungary, as in China, growing restiveness among students and intellectuals exacerbated existing divisions within the regime, and drew broad segments of the population into participation. China's ordinary citizens did not organize to force themselves onto the political stage; they used an opportunity created initially by students, and then opened wider first by the rebellion of intellectuals and later by the defection of key parts of the government apparatus and the media. The events of this spring show, instead, how explosive is the mixture of popular protest and party disunity. The splits in the party were opened wide by

the protests; but they were already deep. And while the protests showed extraordinary strength before the party's unity began to crumble, they would not likely have grown to such an extent had the party maintained internal discipline, as in 1986–87.

The June massacre has temporarily staved off the defeat of conservative political figures, but at enormous human and political cost. Moreover, it has given future popular movements a powerful symbol and rallying point, because ordinary citizens, perhaps even more than the students, bore the brunt of the massacre. And it has, if anything, further deepened existing divisions within the party apparatus, while giving future politicians a powerful issue to use against those implicated in it. The unprecedented involvement of ordinary workers in this year's street actions suggests that any future economic stagnation will once again make this group available for political mobilization. In a situation of heightened political repression, through slowdowns and isolated walkouts, workers will have more effective means of political leverage than students and intellectuals. But whoever leads future protests, and whatever form they may take, it now appears certain that the volatile mixture of popular protest and elite strife will continue to mark the path of political change in China into the next century.

⁴¹Ibid., Aug. 20, 1989.

The People's Liberation Army and the Power Struggle of 1989

June Teufel Dreyer

On May 19, 1989, Li Peng, Premier of the State Council, signed the following order:

In view of the fact that serious turmoils have taken place in Beijing and that social stability, people's normal life and social order have been disrupted, and in order to firmly stop the unrest, to safeguard social tranquility in Beijing, to safeguard the life and property of the citizens, to protect public property, and to ensure the normal function of the central departments and the Beijing Municipal Government, the State Council decided, in accordance with the stipulations of Clause 16 under Article 89 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, to execute martial law in part of Beijing as from 10:00 [am] on May 20, 1989, and that the order be implemented by the People's Government of Beijing, which is to take concrete measures according to practical needs.¹

The declaration of martial law formally brought the People's Liberation Army (PLA) into the domestic political standoff that had all but paralyzed China's capital for the previous month. The PLA, however, did not immediately respond to the civilian leadership's orders to carry out the martial law decree, thus raising questions about the military's political role and its relationship to China's civilian leaders.

Since the late 1970's, the PLA has been, under the aegis of Deng Xiaoping, undergoing multifaceted processes of modernization and professionalization. The latter was designed to secure the PLA's political loyalty and to ensure that it execute whatever directions given to it by the properly constituted political authorities. As the de facto supreme leader of the People's Republic of

China (PRC), and also as the chairman of the party Central Committee's Central Military Commission, Deng was in an ideal position to supervise the professionalization process.

Moreover, the PLA had undergone extensive personnel changes in the decade since Deng returned to power. All of the country's military region commanders and commissars had been changed at least once, as had the heads of the PLA's three general departments and the members of the Central Military Commission. Those who seemed to differ with Deng were dismissed or allowed to retire; presumably they were replaced by persons loyal to him. On grounds of both professionalism and personal loyalty, the PLA should have responded immediately to orders from the civilian leadership.

The unfolding of the political crisis from the declaration of martial law to the assault on the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square on the night of June 3-4, 1989, strongly suggests that the PLA was thrust into the role of power broker to resolve a stalemate between the political reformers, who were willing to accommodate the demonstrators' demands, and the conservatives, who rejected these demands. That stalemate was broken when what seemed to be the dominant faction of the military moved to support the conservatives.

But the reasons for the stalemate were also related to the military's divergent understandings of the role and purpose of professionalism. Hence, this article will explore how different understandings of that concept shaped the military's relationship to the martial law declaration. In addition, the article will examine the effects of the Tiananmen massacre on the public's perception

June Teufel Dreyer is Professor of Politics at the University of Miami, (Coral Gables, FL). She has written widely on contemporary China, particularly on Chinese military affairs. Her latest book is Chinese Defense and Foreign Policy (1989).

¹Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China*, (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-CHI*), May 22, 1989, p. 26.

of the PLA and the regime's use of a variety of public relations efforts to repair the damage. Finally, because this clear reliance on the military to restore "order" in Beijing portended a possible change in the balance of power between the military and civilian leadership, this article will also analyze the implications of the June events for political-military relations within the regime.

The PLA and Martial Law

Foreign observers had fully expected the PLA to obey its orders. By contrast, the leadership of the PRC had no expectation that compliance would be automatic. On the same day that martial law was declared, Deng left Beijing in order to convene an emergency meeting of the heads of China's seven military regions. The session was reportedly stormy, with the commanders of the Beijing, Lanzhou, and Guangzhou military regions refusing to endorse the decree.² Nie Rongzhen and Xu Xiangqian, the two surviving marshals of the 10 who had led China's War of Liberation—men who are literally legends in their own lifetimes—were reported to have telephoned the Martial Law Command to advise against the use of force.³ And a petition drafted by seven high-ranking military leaders and signed by more than 100 others stated:

The People's Army belongs to the people. It should not stand against the people or even kill ordinary people. It should under no circumstances fire at the people and create any bloody incidents. To prevent further deterioration of the situation, the army should not enter the city.⁴

These reports might have been dismissed as mere rumor, albeit from hitherto reliable sources were it not for the initial failure of the troops to react. To be sure, some of this inaction seemed dictated by prudence. Thousands of citizens blocked the progress of military convoys. They erected barricades out of buses, construction materials, and whatever else was handy. They also let the air out of the tires of military vehicles and lectured the soldiers on their duties to the people.

For the PLA to attempt an advance under such circumstances would have entailed inflicting major casualties on the people who formed this human wall, at the risk of significant PLA casualties as well. But curiously, many officers chose to explain their inaction as ideolog-

ically rather than pragmatically motivated, saying that the army and the people were one, and that for family members to draw swords on one another could only give joy to the country's enemies and grief to its friends.

Despite the dominance of this theme, undertones of frustration were evident as well. For example, a colonel interviewed on May 23 by Beijing's Central Television network, stated:

... our way was blocked by too many people for us to move. This has put us in a difficult position. Our superiors have ordered us to move back, but we failed to do so.⁵

Although relations between civilians and the troops sent to enforce martial law were basically cordial, the weather was hot and the days were long. Both soldiers and civilians found themselves in a difficult situation not of their own choosing. Tempers frayed, and incidents occurred. As noted by the same colonel,

... the masses of the people don't understand us. Yesterday morning many people abused us, but we ignored such misunderstanding in a bid to avoid clashes. ... I think our soldiers have behaved well, despite hunger, thirst, heat, and lack of sleep. But they feel they have been greatly humiliated.⁶

Most of the troops were unable to move, but some soldiers managed to fight through the barricades, injuring about 40 people and making it possible for a convoy of some 72 tanks and 300 trucks to enter the city. Other troops, apparently utilizing underground tunnels and the subway, managed to ensconce themselves in the Great Hall of the People.⁷

According to Uerkesh Daolet (Wuerkaixi), maneuvering for position was taking place in the streets and on the outskirts of Beijing, long discussions and fierce disputes were taking place within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the military.⁸ The terms of discussion and the techniques of persuasion used by the party are unknown. However, by May 25, six of the PRC's seven military regions—that is, all except the Beijing command—had declared their allegiance to the martial law decree. Because it was precisely troops

⁵Ibid., May 23, 1989, p. 40.

⁶Ibid.

⁷See, for example, the articles by David Chen and Marlowe Hood in *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), May 23, 1989.

⁸"Deng Will Allow the Killing of Thousands More," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), July 20, 1989, p. 124. Wuerkaixi is the Chinese transliteration of the student's name, by which he has become well known in the West. Uerkesh Daolet is his Uyghur name, by which he prefers to be known.

²Ibid., p. 4

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 16

from the Beijing command who would be expected to bear the brunt of martial law enforcement in the capital, the omission of the Beijing Military Region from the list of the loyal is important. Not surprisingly, troops from outlying areas soon began arriving in the environs of the capital, some from as far away as Inner Mongolia in the north and Sichuan in the southwest.

The number of troops—estimated at 150,000 by May 25, and still growing—seemed far in excess of what would be needed to deal with unarmed civilians. Their equipment, including tanks, heavy artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons, seemed similarly inappropriate. In view of these incongruities and the widespread evidence of dissent at the highest levels, residents began to speculate that the troops were present to support various political factions struggling for power.⁹

Political Infighting and the Military

Differences within the leadership over reform had been noticeable for some time, with the reformers maintaining in general that the solution to China's problems lay in the implementation of more reforms and the conservatives believing that the reforms had gone too far too quickly and wanting to reassert state control in certain areas. Not surprisingly, the reformers tended to sympathize with the demonstrators and the conservatives did not. A rough split characterized the five-person Standing Committee of the Politburo, with General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili representing the reformers, and Premier Li Peng, Qiao Shi, and Yao Yilin the conservatives.

Deng, the architect of the reforms, had seemed to distance himself from their political ramifications in recent months. Moreover, during the past two years, he had associated himself with the notion of "neo-authoritarianism."¹⁰ This concept represented a remarkable change for a man persecuted during the Cultural Revolution for having said "it does not matter whether it is a white cat or a black cat, as long as it catches mice," and who had supported Democracy Wall in 1978–79. As if in recognition of this change, some demonstrators carried anti-Deng banners that read "it does not matter whether it is a black cat or a white cat if it is a bad cat." The harshness of this criticism may have influenced

Deng to turn definitively away from the reformers, who were carrying out programs he had himself designed, and toward the conservatives. In turn, Deng's shift meant abandoning Zhao Ziyang, who was his protégé.

The split in the Standing Committee of the Politburo was reflected in the military. Deng's modernization program led to a number of positive results for the military as certain weapons were upgraded and efforts were made to improve training. However, military modernization ranked fourth in the country's Four Modernizations program, and it received budget allocations consonant with this ranking. Moreover, certain measures taken in order to further modernization had undesirable side-effects. For example, re-institution of the rank system and provisions requiring those who wished to become officers to attend certain academies are reasonable steps toward military modernization. However, these measures also led to an increase in status differentiations within the military. Many people found this outcome distasteful and not in keeping with the PLA's egalitarian traditions.

The inflation and widening gaps in income distribution that accompanied Deng's moves toward a market economy hurt the military badly, as well as, of course, all other sectors of society that lived on fixed incomes. The military also experienced an alarming increase in corruption. Just as in civilian society, some PLA members were willing to accept the reforms and try to ameliorate the problems they had caused, while others wished to rescind portions of the reforms.

Among those siding with the reformers was Qin Jiwei, who, before being named Minister of Defense, had been head of the Beijing Military Region for the preceding decade. Qin's long-time deputy succeeded him as Commander of the Beijing Military Region. This factor may explain the reluctance of the 38th Army—which is under the command of the Beijing Military Region—to move against the demonstrators.¹¹

The conservative faction of the military centered around Yang Shangkun, who served under Deng as

¹¹Loyalty networks, however, can sometimes be poor predictors of actual behavior. The ups and downs in Qin Jiwei's military career coincide with those in Deng's career, and the two men were believed to be very close. Qin's allegiance to Deng's position could have been taken for granted, but in this case it would have been a wrong assumption. For a brief summary of Qin's relationship with Deng, see *ibid.*, May 30, 1989, pp. 35–36.

Similar considerations apply to Yang Dezhi. When Deng withdrew from the position of head of the PLA's General Staff Department in 1980, Yang was named to succeed him. The two had had a long association, and Deng's choice of Yang Dezhi as a successor was construed as further proof of Deng's confidence in the loyalty of his subordinate. In 1989, however, Yang Dezhi was one of the seven military leaders who drafted a letter to the Martial Law Command objecting to sending the PLA into Beijing. See *ibid.*, May 22, 1989, p. 15.

⁹See, for example, *Hong Kong Standard*, May 25, 1989.

¹⁰As defined by the official media, this term meant "enlightened or elite autocracy to develop the economy and assure smooth progress in modernization," with "enlightened" in turn defined as "having good sense and being reasonable." See, for example, *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 28, 1989, pp. 30–31.

The PLA and the Power Struggle



The PLA and China's people: top, units of the 27th Army on the Avenue of Eternal Peace, June 5, 1989, guarding the approaches to Tiananmen Square; left, on May 20, an elderly citizen pleads with martial law troops not to shed the blood of fellow citizens; above, an injured tank driver is escorted to medical help; below, a citizen shot by the PLA during the crackdown is rushed to the hospital.

—First photo by Magnum, others by Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.



permanent vice-chairman and secretary general of the Central Military Commission. As de facto leader of China, Deng was preoccupied with the many non-military aspects of administering the PRC, and Yang in fact assumed responsibility for the functioning of the military. In this capacity, Yang was able to build a loyalty network of his own. He was so effective that some Chinese described the upper echelons of the military as "the Yang family village." A younger brother, Yang Baibing, served as head of the PLA's General Political Department. The head of the General Staff Department, Chi Haotian, is reputed to be Yang's brother-in-law. Yet another Yang, believed to be a nephew, is in charge of the 27th Army, one of the units that moved into Beijing to counter the influence of the 38th.¹²

Factional infighting took place against the background of continued incidents between civilians and the military. Some incidents can be documented; others turned out to be exaggerations or quite false. What is more important is that they were credible to their audiences. Significant numbers of the PLA who had been sent to enforce martial law believed that they were being harassed by Beijing citizens, and significant numbers of Beijing citizens believed that they were being harassed by the PLA.

Meanwhile, sympathy demonstrations began to occur in several of China's other large cities, occasionally—most notably in the case of Chengdu—becoming quite violent. In Hong Kong, a massive rally was held in support of the demonstrators, and sources there began to contribute large sums of money to their cause.

Politburo Standing Committee member and security expert Qiao Shi defended the army's inaction by saying that the authorities were trying to solve the problem without bloodshed, but that "it would not be good to let things drag on," and "an appropriate time will be found to clear things up."¹³ Given Qiao's standing in the highest levels of the leadership and his experience in matters of public security, it is reasonable to assume his statement indicates that the leadership was carefully monitoring the demonstrations and would make every effort to avoid violence. It is therefore puzzling that the order to go forward came, without warning, in the early morning of June 4th, just when it seemed that the demonstrations had lost their momentum. The violence seems unnecessary unless one assumes that its real aim was resolving a high-level power struggle.

The Aftermath of the Massacre

The 27th Army, considered loyal to Yang Shangkun and the conservative side, ultimately executed the or-

der to clear Tiananmen Square. Subsequently, fighting was reported among military units as well, with units of the 27th and 63rd armies said to be skirmishing with those of the 38th, 15th, 16th, and 17th armies.¹⁴ Speculations that a civil war was beginning ceased a few days later, as no more reports of fighting were received.

The victorious conservative faction then set about repairing the damage, tangible and intangible, that the confrontation had caused. The 27th Army was withdrawn from Beijing in the early hours of June 7th,¹⁵ being replaced by young peasants from other units who had not taken part in the fighting. Civilians had occasionally retaliated against soldiers with great cruelty, including disembowelment and burning alive; withdrawing the army responsible for the Tiananmen massacre was undoubtedly intended to forestall the emergence of a vicious circle of violence-retaliation-violence.

Public relations efforts. PLA members were ordered to do good deeds for the people, consonant with CCP propaganda that "the army and the people are one." Within days after the massacre, soldiers were photographed clearing garbage from urban areas, giving free haircuts to local people, and helping the elderly and infirm to cross the streets. The people were described as responding with gratitude, bringing water and soft drinks to the troops, and praising them for their brave deeds in putting down the demonstrations. Deng told a meeting of the commanders of martial law troops that this rebellion was bound to happen sooner or later; handling it was a "severe political test" for the PLA, which had indeed "passed muster."¹⁶

Ceremonies were held to honor the memory of those soldiers who died at the hands of "counterrevolutionaries," with 10 of them receiving the posthumous title "Guardian of the Republic."¹⁷ Eulogies depicted the young men as patriotic young people who had died in defense of their country.¹⁸ It was stated that more than 6,000 martial law troops had been injured, and dozens killed, whereas no civilian had been run over by any PLA vehicles, and no one died in Tiananmen Square.¹⁹ Survivors interviewed by the official press tended to stress that they had been set upon by "hooligans" or "ruffians," rather than by demonstrators or ordinary citi-

¹²*The New York Times*, June 2, 1989.

¹³*FBIS-CHI*, May 30, 1989, p. 34.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, June 6, 1989, pp. 15–16; p. 24; pp. 27–28.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, June 7, 1989, p. 28.

¹⁶"Deng Talks on Quelling Rebellion in Beijing," *Beijing Review*, July 10–16, 1989, p. 14.

¹⁷*FBIS-CHI*, July 11, 1989, pp. 41–42.

¹⁸See, for example, *ibid.*, June 29, 1989, p. 32.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, July 3, 1989, p. 17.

zens, but that they had been aided by patriotic people.²⁰ The theme that the demonstration had been a counterrevolutionary rebellion that was put down through the joint efforts of the people and the PLA was repeated again and again. And Beijing celebrated the 66th anniversary of the founding of the CCP with a songfest by martial law units called "The People's Army Is Loyal to the Party." Shown on Beijing Television, the entertainment featured several numbers on the topic of the close ties between the people and their army.²¹

Popular contempt for the PLA. Preliminary indications are that measures to convince the population that the PLA is their friend and savior rather than their enemy and oppressor have failed. When the authorities ask citizens to make public statements of their views, they invariably profess love for the military and praise the military's accomplishments in putting down the rebellion. Privately, attitudes seem overwhelmingly negative. A mother refuses to let her son wear his favorite green pants because they are the same color as PLA uniforms; a man threatens to break a small boy's legs if he so much as expresses an interest in joining the military. A Western reporter notes that the people whom the official press photographs bringing soft drinks to the troops and praising them look like soldiers out of uniform. Suspicion is the order of the day: in July, an apparently genuine civilian appeared with a pail of water to quench the troops' thirst. The soldiers had the water tested and were informed that it contained poison.²²

Hebei Radio reported that while troops from the province were posted to Beijing, "an extremely small number of bad elements . . . took the lead in storming military organs," beating and abusing those who remained and their family members.²³ In other areas, reports surfaced that "dare to die" squads of snipers had been formed. Using weapons stolen from PLA sources during the turmoil, they vowed to take revenge on military personnel.²⁴ Soldiers' relatives received death threats, and the father of a man shot in the back by soldiers as he was bicycling to work reacted to reports of the snipers by saying "I hope they keep it up. I don't mind if they shoot more of them."²⁵ It is noteworthy that all these statements concern the PLA as a whole: none of the speakers distinguished between pro-reform or pro-conservative factions of the PLA.

Future Political-Military Relations

Much speculation has arisen about the military's political role as a power broker between the reformers and the conservatives. The massacre on Tiananmen

Square ensued when the military threw its support to the conservative faction led by Deng and Li Peng. Some sources opine that Yang Shangkun agreed to move against the demonstrators only after exacting Deng's pledge to allow the military a greater political role.²⁶ Others noted that a military once called out of the barracks does not easily return to them.²⁷ Both points of view posit an increased PLA influence at the highest levels, the first based on an explicit bargaining process, and the second on the military's anticipated reluctance to withdraw from its role in the decision-making process.

So far, no evidence supports the hypothesis of greater military influence in the elite. New members appointed to the Standing Committee of the Politburo after the massacre lack substantial ties to the military. As predicted, the Committee's two pro-reform members, Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili, lost their positions. They were replaced by former Shanghai party chief Jiang Zemin, Party Organization Department chief Song Ping, and former mayor of Tianjin Li Ruihan.

The lack of a military representative on the Standing Committee is not, of course, proof that the military's position has not been enhanced. After all, Deng, although the de facto leader of China, is himself not a member of the Standing Committee. But thus far no rewards have gone to the military for its role in putting down the demonstrations, either. Pay scales remain low in comparison to those of civilian institutions, and poor living conditions continue to hamper the PLA's recruitment and retention efforts. Indeed, redressing these problems for the 3.1 million-member PLA would have a markedly detrimental effect on the conservatives' anti-inflation program.

The military's role in putting down the demonstrations also raises the issue of sanctions against those military officials who resisted the orders of the civilian leadership. One might have expected that Deng and Yang Shangkun would have moved against those military officials who were unwilling to implement the declaration of martial law. Inasmuch as political reformers lost power and were purged, it would seem reasonable that military reformers would be purged as well. So far, sanctions have not been instituted against recalcitrant mili-

²⁰"Beijingers Rescue People's Liberation Army Men," *Beijing Review*, July 10-16, 1989, pp. 6-7.

²¹*FBIS-CHI*, July 3, 1989, p. 13.

²²*The New York Times*, Aug. 5, 1989.

²³*FBIS-CHI*, July 18, 1989, pp. 1-2.

²⁴*Ibid.*, July 19, 1989, p. 18.

²⁵*The New York Times*, Aug. 5, 1989.

²⁶*South China Morning Post*, June 5, 1989.

²⁷*Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), July 6, 1989, p. 12.

tary leaders. Qin Jiwei's name appeared prominently on a list of "leading personages of the Central Military Commission" attending a ceremony honoring a young PLA man who was killed in the performance of his martial law duties.²⁸ He retains his membership on the CCP Politburo. And a book by Yang Dezhi entitled *Military Work of the Contemporary Chinese Army* came off the press in late June. The official military newspaper described its publication as "worth a celebration."²⁹ The Chinese media have reported one case of a former lower-level PLA officer currently under investigation. However, he is accused of putting up reactionary posters and vilifying the martial law troops rather than of failure to obey orders.³⁰

Why have no personnel changes in the military paralleled those in the Standing Committee of the Politburo? In the absence of hard information, one can do no more than speculate. It is possible that PLA commanders who initially opposed the imposition of martial law were able to exact a promise of no retaliation against the military in return for their pledge to go along with the decree. It is also conceivable that the leadership, recognizing that the officer corps is already suffering from the after-effects of a highly disruptive demobilization campaign,³¹ believes that it could not afford another internal upheaval. Yet another explanation might be the latent strength of the pro-reform element in the military. The conservative faction may prefer to make peace with the reformers rather than provoke them by attempting a purge. Another possibility is that cross-cutting allegiances on other issues make it inadvisable for conservatives to attempt to remove military reformers from office. Although the two groups may have disagreed on the matter of the demonstrators, agreement on other factors, such as attitudes toward military corruption, procurement of foreign technology, and the like, may dictate a policy of "seeking common ground while reserving differences."

Yet another series of questions raised by the PLA's actions after the declaration of martial law centers around the issue of military professionalism. When measured by Western standards of professionalism, the reluctance of the PLA, or at least of a part of the PLA, to enforce a properly constituted directive from the civilian authorities would be considered highly unprofessional. The letter sent by leading military figures to the

Martial Law Command would be tantamount to gross insubordination and therefore grounds for immediate dismissal. Yet clearly it was neither seen as such nor treated as such by the authorities, regardless of factional affiliation. According to the Chinese Communist concept of the military, the PLA exists to serve the party and its programs. Mao Zedong's statement that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun suggests a highly politicized military, and none of the changes made by his successors—including Deng Xiaoping—has altered this tenet. The concept of a politically neutral military is distasteful, calling forth images of warlordism and what has been termed "the purely military point of view." Indeed, the PLA is politicized. When consensus has characterized the highest levels of the CCP on political matters, the PLA has had a good record of compliance. But, when civilian leaders have disagreed over political questions, these splits have characterized the military as well.

Relations between civilian leaders and the military in the spring and summer of 1989 were further complicated by three other factors. First, under martial law, the PLA was asked to perform internal security duties that it had ostensibly given up in 1984, when the People's Armed Force Police was founded.³² Second, since the founding of the PLA, its members have been indoctrinated with the view that the military exists for the people and to serve the people. They were taught that "the army is the fish and the people are the water; the fish cannot swim without the water." Understandably, the military hesitated to attack the people. A third factor was the apparent shift of Deng, its commander-in-chief, from the camp of the reformers to that of the conservatives. In essence, Deng was asking the military to act against those who supported the same policies of political democratization that he himself had previously championed.

The interaction of these factors created a good deal of confusion over the PLA's proper course of action. In this context, it was professionally valid for one side to believe—with the reformers—that it should not move against the people. However, it was equally professionally valid for the other side to believe—with the conservatives—that those who voiced their demands for greater political and economic benefits in such a way as to disrupt political and economic activities in the capital had removed themselves from the category of "the people" and placed themselves squarely in the camp of the counterrevolutionaries. Those who sided

²⁸*FBIS-CHI*, July 14, 1989, pp. 36–37.

²⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 37–38.

³⁰*Ibid.*, June 23, 1989, p. 21.

³¹See J. Dreyer, Ed., *Chinese Defense and Foreign Policy*, New York, Paragon House, 1989, Ch. 10, for a discussion of the campaign and the problems it caused.

³²The People's Armed Force Police was not used to put down the demonstrators because it did not have sufficient numbers to handle this task.

with the conservatives believed that the army of the CCP had an obligation to defend the party against counterrevolutionaries, and was therefore duty-bound to move against the demonstrators.³³

Prospects for the Military

The image problem from which the military has suffered in recent years was appreciably worsened by its role in putting down the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. Repairing the military's image will be an arduous task. China faces no imminent external threat that would allow the PLA to be cast in the role of protector of the people. The absence of a salient threat will compound the difficulties of dispelling its present image as suppressor of the people. In addition, assuming the continued absence of external threat, common sense dictates that the bulk of the country's scarce resources be allocated to non-military sectors. The PLA's pay scales are apt to remain lower than those in the civilian sector, which will be an ongoing disincentive for the country's best and brightest young people to enlist.

The government can be expected to employ education and persuasion in an attempt to ameliorate this situ-

ation. A campaign to publicize "the new great contributions . . . made by the People's Liberation Army . . . and establish a good social practice of respecting and cherishing the army"³⁴ has already begun. Soldiers are being told to re-dedicate themselves to the CCP, the state, and the people in the manner of 1960's military role model Lei Feng.³⁵ Unfortunately, these techniques have been tried before, with little result. At least in the short term, the PLA faces difficult circumstances.

³³The question also arises as to whether changes at the top of the CCP caused by the demonstrations constitute a military coup d'etat. This question raises definitional difficulties similar to those involved in defining "professionalism." The martial law decree that brought the military into the political equation was issued in accordance with the PRC's constitution. Although much has been made of Yang Shangkun's presence during the promulgation of the decree, he is in fact the President of China, a member of the CCP Politburo, and in a very influential position with regard to the military. Where, as in China, formal title does not necessarily coincide with actual power, and a number of key individuals hold high positions in the party, the government, and the military simultaneously, a military coup is definitionally impossible.

³⁴*FBIS-CHI*, July 21, 1989, pp. 47-48.

³⁵A soldier, who, some argue, is a mythical figure. Lei reputedly kept a diary that revealed his complete dedication to Maoism. Lei was last resurrected after the purge of Hu Yaobang. Calls to emulate Lei can be expected to be met with derision.

Diplomacy Amid Protest: The Sino-Soviet Summit

Steven M. Goldstein

Sino-Soviet summits have rarely been routine occasions. Mao Zedong's two trips to Moscow (in 1949–50, and 1957) marked, respectively, the founding of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the beginnings of serious differences on matters of global policy. Nikita Khrushchev's three trips to China (in 1954, 1958, and 1959) degenerated from efforts to strengthen the alliance into heated exchanges over Soviet-American relations that became the basis for the bitter rift of the 1960's and 1970's. In all cases, then, Sino-Soviet summits have proven to be milestones presaging dramatic new developments in bilateral relations. The latest summit promised to be no exception. Many saw in Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to China and the expected "normalization" of Sino-Soviet relations a watershed event comparable to the apparent demise of the post-war order in Europe.

The results of the Soviet leader's four-day visit did not, however, live up to such expectations. The sixth Sino-Soviet summit did not solve any important issues or set any new directions for future relations; the meetings merely declared closure to nearly three decades of conflict. As Gorbachev left China, it appeared that this summit would not be remembered as one of dramatic diplomatic breakthroughs, but rather as the culmination of a long process of change that had been occurring in Sino-Soviet relations throughout the 1980's. Simply put, the road to the summit seemed more important than the summit itself.

However, appearances were deceiving—history will not judge this summit to be routine. A narrow focus on the meetings between Soviet and Chinese leaders yields only a partial insight into their results or significance. The "pro-democracy movement," as well as its brutal repression by Chinese authorities, not only overshadowed the summit but also brought into sharp relief elements of the Sino-Soviet relationship that were not

readily apparent from the diplomatic record. Like a catalyst, Chinese domestic turmoil combined with the routine diplomacy of the summit to produce a reaction that provides critical insight into the manner in which this summit might shape not only the future of Sino-Soviet relations but also the international environment of which they are a part.

The story of the sixth Sino-Soviet summit is thus one of contrasts and interactions. On the one hand, inside the meeting rooms, leaders engaged in largely predictable diplomacy concerned more with setting the seal on past developments than with solving old problems or establishing parameters for a new relationship. On the other hand, outside and after the summit, as demonstrations grew in size and scope, there was little precedent for or predictability to events. Chinese and Soviet leaders alike were responding to rapidly changing developments in Beijing that soon shaped not only the venue, but also the results of their meetings.

The analysis that follows is built around this theme of linkage between summit diplomacy and China's domestic turmoil. It first traces the diplomatic roots and results of the summit in the Sino-Soviet relations of the 1980's and considers the substance and impact of the

Steven M. Goldstein is Professor and Chair of the Department of Government at Smith College (Northampton, MA). This article has benefited from readings by Harry Harding, Steven Levine, Michel Oksenberg, Jonathan Pollack, and Alan Romberg. Research assistance was provided by Donna Milrod. Smith College furnished funding and Sophia Sluzar of Problems of Communism provided the accreditation that made possible my trip to Beijing for the summit and subsequent events. All of this assistance is gratefully acknowledged.

slow and cumulative route to the summit. Next, there is an assessment of the manner in which these very modulated diplomatic trends interacted with—and were shaped by—the fact of China's growing domestic upheaval. A final section moves beyond the retrospective nature of the diplomacy as well as the immediacy of the student demonstrations and government repression. It considers the results and lessons of their interaction and speculates on the clues which that interaction provides to the future course of Sino-Soviet relations and to the nature of international politics in East Asia.

Laying the Foundations: 1982–85

Initial signs of change in Sino-Soviet relations became apparent in the period before Leonid Brezhnev's death in the fall of 1982. As tensions developed in Sino-American relations at the end of the Carter administration and in the early Reagan presidency, Moscow sought to use the pattern of triangular politics to stunt the growth of a *de facto* security entente involving the United States, Japan, and China by fishing in the troubled waters of Washington's relations with Beijing.¹ Responding to early indications of China's "independent foreign policy" and its willingness to discuss outstanding issues, Brezhnev, in a March 1982 speech delivered in Tashkent, made important conciliatory gestures toward China. The Soviet leader acknowledged that China was socialist, rejected the idea of two Chinas (an obvious reference to Sino-American tensions over Taiwan), and offered to hold bilateral talks on the border issue. Even Brezhnev's death provided an opportunity to improve relations as Foreign Minister Huang Hua, while attending the funeral, met not only with General Secretary Yuriy Andropov but also with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko. It was the highest level of contact since the meeting between Premier Zhou Enlai and Premier Aleksey Kosygin in 1969.²

Brezhnev's immediate successors seemed willing to continue to explore the possibilities inherent in the new Chinese posture and in Sino-American tensions. But they were not willing to redirect the general thrust of Soviet policy in Asia in order to accommodate the Chinese. There was little let-up in the massive growth of

military power surrounding China that had begun under Brezhnev. The political encirclement also continued. The courtship of North Korea proceeded with Kim Il-Song's first visit to Moscow in 17 years.³ But most important, although Andropov's posture seemed more flexible than Konstantin Chernenko's, neither Soviet leader was willing to endanger seriously relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) for the sake of improving relations with China.⁴ Vietnam's strategic location and its uses as a military base made it an integral part of the Soviet military position in Asia. Here was the central thread of continuity between the Brezhnev and post-Brezhnev eras: relations with China would be improved as long as a wedge could be driven into Sino-American relations and broader Soviet strategic goals in Asia were not endangered.

The Chinese also saw the time as opportune for exploring détente with the Soviet Union. As one Chinese commentator noted, there was no reason why China should not "make active use of . . . [Soviet-American] contradictions."⁵ These contradictions not only lessened the Soviet threat to China, but were a positive stimulus to improving Sino-Soviet relations both as leverage on the Reagan administration and as a way of distancing China from any involvement in a possible Soviet-American conflict. Improving relations with Moscow would thus add credibility to the new independent foreign policy line even as it helped assure a tranquil international environment for China's development.

However, Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues remained wary of Moscow because they viewed Soviet policy toward China as a tactical shift within a general and continuing commitment to the Brezhnev policy in Asia. Despite the independent foreign policy line that condemned all forms of hegemony, including presumably US hegemony, China's differences with the Soviet Union over Afghanistan as well as Southeast and Northeast Asia were in areas of real importance to China's security.⁶ Therefore, barring a fundamental reorientation in Soviet policy, China's leaders were determined to keep their distance from the Soviet Union—and tilt toward the United States. The early declaration of the need for Moscow to address the "three obstacles"—

¹For a strong argument along these lines, see Chi Su, "China and the Soviet Union," *Current History* (Philadelphia, PA), September 1984, pp. 245–46.

²Robert C. Horn, "Soviet Leadership Changes and Sino-Soviet Relations," *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Winter 1987, pp. 687–89; and "Chronology of Sino-Soviet Relations Viewed," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington DC—hereafter, *FBIS-CHI*), Feb. 17, 1989, pp. 8–9.

³Osamu Miyoshi, "Soviet Strategy in Asia: A Japanese View," *Comparative Strategy* (New York), Vol. 6, No. 1 (1987), p. 20.

⁴Robert Horn, "Vietnam and Sino-Soviet Relations: What Price Rapprochement?" *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), July 1987, pp. 729–47; and Leszek Buszynski, "Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia," *ibid.*, May 1986, pp. 591–609.

⁵Cited in Yan Mei, "The Maturing of Soviet-Chinese Relations," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Beverly Hills, CA), No. 481, September 1985, p. 77.

⁶Chi Su, "China and the Soviet Union," *loc. cit.*, p. 246.

the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, support of Vietnam in Cambodia, and troops on the Sino-Soviet border—before China would consider “normalization” of relations made this clear.

Nonetheless, the years from Brezhnev's death until the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 saw significant development in Sino-Soviet relations. In the first place, a series of official visits raised contacts to levels that had not been seen since the 1960's. Aside from what one author has called the “funeral diplomacy” surrounding the deaths of Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko, there was a meeting of Chinese and Soviet Foreign Ministers at the United Nations, as well as the December 1984 visit to Beijing of Soviet Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov, the former head of the Soviet assistance program in China.⁷ This last meeting not only provided an occasion to review the halcyon days of Sino-Soviet relations and for Arkhipov to have “exciting meetings and frank conversations with his old friends”; it also produced a number of concrete agreements related to “economic and technical cooperation,” including a pledge to set up a joint committee for economic, trade, scientific, and technological cooperation.⁸

This final development indicated that undergirding the sub-summitry of this period was a more substantial process—the institutionalization of the relationship. The most prominent example of this institutionalization was the five rounds of semi-annual meetings between deputy foreign ministers that were held beginning in the fall of 1982. Characterized by the Chinese foreign ministry as “consultations . . . on the question of Sino-Soviet relations,” these meetings provided a regularized channel for Chinese and Soviet officials to discuss a broad range of bilateral and global issues touching on everything from security to cultural and trade relations.⁹ There were also other manifestations of the process of institutionalization. A broad program of citizen exchanges was reactivated, and economic relations between the two countries became more regularized. In 1983, trade along the northern border was resumed for the first time since 1969. Yearly trade agreements negotiated at the national level provided the framework under which national trade between the two countries, which had been only US\$263 million in 1981, grew to almost \$2 billion in 1985.¹⁰ Finally, during these years

there were suggestions that each side was reconsidering the intellectual bases of their two-decades-long confrontation. During the early 1980's, Chinese treatment of the Soviet Union became progressively more positive, and signs that Brezhnev's successors were pursuing reform policies met with favorable comment.¹¹ Similarly, on the Soviet side there were suggestions of ferment among Moscow's China-watchers, some of whom sought to break the pattern of mutual hostility.¹²

The years before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power thus represent both a crucial—as well as a paradoxical—period in the development of Sino-Soviet relations. Relations between the two countries had moved beyond the realm of simple conflict management. They were becoming routinized and institutionalized. Still, the shadows of past conflicts and mind-sets hung over the relationship. Despite initiatives by the Soviets and the declaration of an “independent foreign policy” by the Chinese, neither side was willing to stray very far from core aspects of its previous policy. Soviet military and political encirclement of China continued. Beijing, still mistrustful of Soviet motives, maintained its special relationship with the United States. In short, both sides clung to old strategies despite signs that new formulas were emerging. This was in large part because neither side was convinced that a fundamental change had occurred in the nature of the other's foreign policy. Each was probably right.

Prelude to the Summit: 1985–89

The emphasis on the centrality of domestic reform for foreign policy—and vice versa—has become the hallmark of Mikhail Gorbachev's “new thinking” on international affairs. As George Breslauer has noted, there is an urgent need “to create actively an international environment conducive to the realization of leading domestic priorities.”¹³ And although the most dramatic manifestations of “new thinking” have concerned strategic weapons and the European region, its imprint has also been apparent in Moscow's relations with Asia.

The Brezhnev policy in Asia epitomized the “old thinking.” Seeking to isolate China and disrupt Ameri-

⁷Chi Su, “Sino-Soviet Relations of the 1980's: From Confrontation to Conciliation,” in Samuel S. Kim, Ed., *China and the World*, 2nd ed., Boulder, CO, Westview, 1989, p. 113.

⁸*FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 28, 1984, p. C/1, and Dec. 31, 1984, p. C/1.

⁹*Ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1982, p. C/1.

¹⁰Valerie Niquet-Cabestan, “The Recent Evolution of Economic Relations Between China and the USSR, (1982–1987),” *Revue d'études comparatives est-ouest* (Paris), Vol. 19, No. 2, 1988, pp. 88 and 89.

¹¹Gilbert Rozman, *The Chinese Debate About Soviet Socialism, 1978–1985*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1987.

¹²See Gilbert Rozman, “Moscow's China-Watchers in the Post-Mao Era: The Response to a Changing China,” *The China Quarterly* (London), June 1983, pp. 215–41; and Chi Su, “Soviet China-Watchers' Influence on Soviet China Policy,” *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* (Washington, DC), December 1983, pp. 25–49.

¹³George Breslauer, “Linking Gorbachev's Domestic and Foreign Policies,” *Journal of International Affairs* (New York), Summer 1989, p. 267.

can influence in Asia, Moscow sought to build its own alliance structure in the area even as it projected land and naval military power. The early stirring of Soviet interest in détente with China was, of course, an implicit recognition that this policy was not working. By the time Gorbachev came to power in the spring of 1985, its failures—particularly when measured against the new leader's priorities—were obvious.¹⁴ Not only had the policy not succeeded in disrupting the American alliance structure in Asia and encircling China, it had left the Soviet Union in the unenviable position of being tied to a few unpopular allies in Asia and expending enormous amounts of money to maintain these allies, in addition to sustaining an ineffective Soviet military presence in the region. Perhaps more important, the old thinking had isolated the Soviet Union from an economically fast-growing region of the world from which the underdeveloped eastern parts of the USSR could clearly benefit.¹⁵ The "new thinking" in regard to Asia that developed during the Gorbachev era thus revolved around the relaxation of tensions in the area, some reduction in the Soviet military presence, and increased economic links with the region.

As this Asian policy unfolded between 1986 and 1989, China's place in it became apparent.¹⁶ A relaxation of Sino-Soviet tensions would permit a significant drawing-down of Soviet forces in Asia with a resulting easing of the economic burden of the 15–20 percent of defense spending committed to deployments directed against China. The growth of Sino-Soviet ties would also enhance exchanges between somewhat complementary economies (Soviet technology and raw materials for Chinese light industrial goods), while conserving scarce Western currencies. But most important, an easing of the Sino-Soviet conflict would establish Soviet bona fides as a force for peace in Asia and facilitate

better relations with Chinese friends in Southeast and East Asia—in particular, Japan. For Gorbachev, the road to Asia very clearly lay through Beijing.

The day after his election as General Secretary of the CPSU in March 1985, Gorbachev made clear his intention to address the issue of Sino-Soviet relations. Speaking to a Central Committee meeting he announced: "We would like a serious improvement of relations with the Chinese People's Republic and believe that, given reciprocity, this is quite possible."¹⁷ In the months that followed, the Chinese seemed to react positively to the apparent new tone in Soviet statements: Hu Yaobang sent party greetings on the occasion of Gorbachev's election; Deng Xiaoping suggested that if the Soviets could not deal with all three obstacles, they could begin with one—the problem of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia; Deng also noted that China would accept a Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay if Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia; and, finally, Vice Premiers Yao Yilin and Li Peng visited Moscow—the latter meeting with Gorbachev.¹⁸ However, overall, the Chinese response during Gorbachev's first year was relatively restrained, with at least one internal report suggesting that "in substance he (Gorbachev) has shown no sign of change."¹⁹

The 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1986 played a crucial role in reshaping Chinese perceptions of the new Soviet leader and his new foreign policy. Soon after the meeting, Chinese commentaries, noting the dramatic nature of the reform pronouncements made by Gorbachev, cautiously suggested that reforms of a different nature than those of the earlier Brezhnev regime were in the offing.²⁰ More important, there was the suggestion that Soviet foreign policy was being shaped by the imperatives of domestic reform. For example, writing in the influential journal *Shijie zhishi* in July, Shu Xiangdi concluded that Soviet policy toward the United States was "confronted by an acute contradiction between economic rejuvenation and the arms race." Unable to achieve both goals, Gorbachev's foreign policy toward the United States was becoming more conciliatory so as to realize his "accelerated development strategy."²¹

¹⁴The remainder of this paragraph is based on Rajan Menon, "New Thinking and Northeast Asian Security," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–June 1989, pp. 1–29; Pi Ying-hsien, "Gorbachev's New Political Thinking and Soviet Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region," *Issues & Studies* (Mucha, Republic of China), May 1989, pp. 102–22; Gerald Segal, "The Soviet Union in Asia in 1988," *Asian Survey*, January 1989, pp. 101–11; Elizabeth Wishnick, "Soviet Asian Collective Security From Brezhnev to Gorbachev," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Fall 1988, pp. 3–28; Harry Gelman, "Gorbachev's Policies in East Asia After Two Years," *ibid.*, Spring 1988, pp. 47–54; and Donald S. Zagoria, "Soviet Policy in East Asia: A New Beginning," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Vol. 68, No. 1 (1988/1989), pp. 120–38.

¹⁵On this, see Mikhail G. Nossov, "The USSR and the Security of the Asia-Pacific Region: From Vladivostok to Krasnoyarsk," *Asian Survey*, March 1989, pp. 252–67; and Gail Lapidus, "The USSR and Asia in 1986," *ibid.*, January 1987, pp. 2–3.

¹⁶This paragraph draws on Robert G. Sutter, "Sino-Soviet Relations: Recent Developments and Implications for the United States," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Spring 1987, pp. 68–69; Menon, *loc. cit.*; and Pi, *loc. cit.*

¹⁷Horn, "Soviet Leadership Changes and Sino-Soviet Relations," pp. 689–90.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 696; and Gregory D. Knight, "China's Soviet Policy in the Gorbachev Era," *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Spring 1986, p. 107; and *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 17, 1989, pp. 9–10.

¹⁹Cited in Chi Su, "Sino-Soviet Relations of the 1980's," p. 113.

²⁰See, for example, *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 31, 1986, pp. C/1–4, and Aug. 8, 1986, pp. A/3–5. This paragraph draws on talks with Lyman Miller, who has shared with the author interpretations and citations relating to Chinese views of the Soviet reform effort.

²¹*FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 8, 1986, p. A/5.

This assessment was a fundamental departure from earlier ones, which saw the reform drive as secondary to the priorities of projecting Soviet military power abroad.

Of course, from the Chinese perspective, the most important issue was Soviet policy in Asia, and here a new Soviet initiative was not long in coming. In a July 1986 speech in Vladivostok, Gorbachev spoke of an all-Asian approach to regional security based on the model of the Helsinki Agreement; announced greater Soviet economic participation in the region; suggested that troop withdrawals in Mongolia and Afghanistan would be forthcoming; declared Soviet willingness to accept the *Thalweg* (middle channel) principle of border demarcation on the Sino-Soviet border; and proposed a number of joint projects between China and the Soviet Union.²²

Although later, at the May 1989 summit, Deng would tell Gorbachev that this speech changed his perception of Soviet policy—he claimed to see “new content in the speech”—the initial Chinese response was still lukewarm. The approach to Asian regional security smacked too much of Brezhnev’s anti-American Asian collective security system. This suggested that Gorbachev’s “new thinking” in Asia was being constrained by the need to confront the United States, which was not ready to give the Soviet leader the peaceful environment he “urgently” needed for domestic reform.²³ In the Chinese view, such antagonistic superpower relations minimized the beneficial effects to China of a reformist Soviet Union by encouraging Russian expansion in the Pacific to counter American influence, and thus reducing improved relations with China to a mere strategic ploy in the still tense Soviet-American relationship.²⁴

With change in Soviet Asian policy only a possibility, Chinese policy toward Moscow continued its previous course.²⁵ There was a further institutionalization of the economic relationship via agreements to exchange engineering and technical personnel, to promote economic and technological cooperation, to broaden consular relations, to rebuild 17 plants constructed in the 1950’s, and to initiate cooperation between state planning commissions. High-level exchanges were maintained, as the biannual consultations were continued and boundary talks inaugurated. Finally, the economic relationship continued to grow—with border trade in

Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang benefiting from the relaxation in tension. By the end of 1986 total trade had reached \$2.6 billion—more than seven times what it had been in 1982.

As long as the deadlock on the three obstacles remained, however, the Chinese side refused to declare the relationship officially “normalized.” Although the Soviets suggested for the first time in the fall of 1986 that they were prepared to discuss any subject (even Cambodia) with the Chinese, little movement occurred on those issues that might suggest a fundamental change in Soviet policy. From Beijing’s perspective, although the early Gorbachev years saw a continuation of the easing in tensions that had begun under his predecessors, there was as yet little evidence that “new thinking” was *actually at work* in Sino-Soviet relations.

Matters changed radically in the second half of 1987. Running counter to Chinese expectations, the United States and the Soviet Union reached agreement on an intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty that changed China’s “strategic horizons” by similarly limiting Soviet missiles in Asia.²⁶ However, of greater importance was the environment within which Beijing saw the treaty unfolding. Although, in the Chinese view, Soviet motives remained unchanged,²⁷ American policy was seen as undergoing substantial change. Under the pressures of Irangate, a rising budget deficit, international balance of payment problems and, finally, the October 1987 collapse of the stock market, Ronald Reagan could no longer pursue his policy of forcing the arms race. Like Gorbachev, he was being compelled by domestic needs to ease international tensions. The basis for mutual agreement was thus created by domestic problems on both sides.²⁸

The implications of these developments for China’s strategic position were, of course, potentially more significant than the removal of Soviet missiles from Asia. Reagan’s sudden reversal of fortunes and the changed policy toward the Soviet Union that followed from it, profoundly changed Beijing’s view of the foreign policy impact of the Gorbachev reform. The leadership in Beijing seemed to accept the proposition that Soviet foreign policy was indeed being driven by a domestic reform policy that required “an international environment of détente and relaxation.”²⁹ Now, Chinese articles noted with approval, there was a broad reassessment of Soviet aggressive policies of the past—Finland, the

²²See Lapidus, loc. cit., p. 3; and Chi Su, “Sino-Soviet Relations of the 1980’s,” p. 114.

²³*FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 27, 1987, p. A/5.

²⁴*Ibid.*, Dec. 31, 1986, p. C/1.

²⁵This paragraph is based on Niquet-Cabestan, loc. cit., pp. 86–88; and *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 17, 1989, pp. 9–11.

²⁶James Hsiung, “Sino-Soviet Detente and Chinese Foreign Policy,” *Current History*, September 1988, p. 246.

²⁷See *FBIS-CHI*, May 26, 1987, p. A/2.

²⁸*Ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1987, pp. 1–2; and Nov. 25, 1987, pp. 1–2.

²⁹*Ibid.*, June 10, 1988, p. 2.

placing of SS-20's in Europe, and Afghanistan—with an eye toward moderating Moscow's international ambitions in the future.³⁰

But more fundamentally, the theoretical bases of Soviet foreign policy were seen as changing. As 1988 unfolded, the Chinese press depicted a corpus of “new thinking” on international affairs evolving in the Soviet Union that revolved around the concept of global interdependence rather than conflict; the recognition that “war cannot become a means of achieving any political, economic, ideological or other purpose”; a desire to gain “protracted peaceful coexistence”; and a willingness to tolerate “diversity” in socialist countries as well as a recognition that “the international Communist movement should be built on the basis of self-determination and independence.” A former director of the Xinhua news bureau in Moscow depicted these changes as “serious,” warning that China “should not consider . . . [them] as mere propaganda or political games.”³¹

Indeed, not only did Chinese assessments of the nature of Soviet foreign policy change after the fall of 1987, there was also a major revision of Beijing's view of the nature of global politics. By early 1989, Chinese statements began to argue that “peace and development have replaced war and revolution as the main themes in the contemporary world.”³² The military daily *Jiefangjun bao* seemed to be echoing late 19th-century Spencerian logic when it suggested that “economic factors” had “directed” peace. It concluded:

*In the wake of constant development and changes in the current world's economic situation, people will see more clearly that on more occasions the economy will serve as a powerful lever in solving international conflicts.*³³

In short, the Soviet reform movement and the resultant foreign policy adjustments by Moscow had become, by early 1989, nothing less than the basis for an entirely new Chinese image of the postwar world. Superpower struggles for “hegemony” seemed to have diminished. Trends toward “peace and development” presented China with an opportunity to achieve its reformist goals in an atmosphere of developing economic interdependence.³⁴ China's view of the world and the conclusions that were drawn from it regarding the op-

portunities it presented for a peaceful reform environment had, after three years, grown strikingly to resemble Gorbachev's “new thinking”—a fact that was certainly not lost on Soviet commentators.³⁵

This Chinese assessment of the nature of Soviet foreign policy—and of the world—was not unrelated to the course of Sino-Soviet relations in the period immediately preceding the summit. In a somewhat dialectical manner, it was shaped by the development of such relations even as it provided the intellectual context within which those relations developed. It is clear that 1988–89 was a period when Soviet rhetoric regarding issues of special importance to Beijing in Asia not only became more specific, but also seemed to be translated into real policy initiatives. In September 1988, Gorbachev gave a second major speech on Asia in Krasnoyarsk. Continuing his earlier themes, the Soviet leader put forth a seven-point proposal for “strengthening security in the Asia-Pacific region.” Trying to put a more conciliatory face on Soviet policy, he spoke of US participation in the discussion of regional issues, reiterated his desire for a Sino-Soviet summit, and spoke of better relations with Japan. However, the major emphasis in this talk was on the economic aspects of Soviet policy in Asia. Gorbachev proposed greater foreign economic participation in the development of the Soviet Far East through investment zones, even as he pledged greater Soviet investment in the region. This economic orientation of Soviet Asian policy was complemented by increased efforts to gain membership in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference.³⁶

The Chinese response to the speech was cautious and reflected a residual distrust of Soviet motives.³⁷ Still, in spite of Chinese suspicions regarding Gorbachev's ambitions in Asia and continued doubts regarding the extent of change in actual policy, the Soviet Union initiated movement on concrete issues central to the relationship that could not be ignored in Beijing. In April 1988, an agreement was signed in Geneva that stipulated that Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, scheduled to begin in May, would be completed in February 1989. Soviet actions on a second obstacle—Soviet troops on the Chinese border—seemed equally promising, with Gorbachev announcing to the United Nations in December of 1988 that most Soviet

³⁰*Ibid.*, July 27, 1988, pp. 5–6.

³¹*Ibid.*, June 14, 1988, pp. 8–14, and Feb. 2, 1989, p. 5.

³²*Ibid.*, Jan. 10, 1989, p. 2.

³³*Ibid.*, Sept. 30, 1988, p. 4.

³⁴*Ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1988, p. 4. It should also be noted that Deng Xiaoping was associated with this assessment. See *ibid.*, Apr. 7, 1989, pp. 1–3.

³⁵Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), Apr. 24, 1989, p. 20.

³⁶“A Siberian Serenade,” *Asiaweek* (Hong Kong), Sept. 30, 1988, pp. 18–23; *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 21, 1988, pp. 7–8; and Nossov, loc. cit., pp. 262–66.

³⁷*FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 22, 1988, p. 1; Oct. 17, 1988, pp. 2–3; and Nov. 21, 1988, pp. 8–9.

³⁸*Ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1989, p. 8.

troops in Mongolia would be withdrawn within two years within the context of an overall reduction of the Soviet military presence in Asia. In February 1989 during his trip to Beijing, Eduard Shevardnadze announced that the goal was to remove three-quarters of these troops while those remaining would play a "more defensive role."³⁸ However, as Chinese spokesmen emphasized through the summer and fall, the third and most difficult obstacle—Vietnamese troops in Cambodia—remained.

On the Soviet side, the old predicament persisted. Although Soviet support of Hanoi was clearly hampering its efforts to project a more benign image in Asia, Moscow was understandably reluctant to abandon a major military asset in the region. Yet, in contrast to earlier periods, there was evidence throughout 1988 of greater Soviet readiness to be conciliatory on the Cambodian issue. A March 1988 Sino-Vietnamese naval incident was met by "studied neutrality in Soviet statements" and there was increasing evidence that Moscow was pressuring Vietnam on Cambodia.³⁹ But even more striking was the willingness on the part of the Soviets to discuss this "third country" issue with the Chinese. At the end of August 1988, the Soviets agreed to the first of three "working meetings" on Cambodia to be held at the deputy foreign minister level; at Krashoyarsk, Gorbachev pledged continued efforts to gain agreement on the issue.⁴⁰

Although it represented a concession, the Soviet willingness to *discuss* Cambodia did not meet earlier Chinese demands that Gorbachev "bring about a pull-out of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia" before a summit would be considered. Nevertheless, the Chinese position seemed to soften somewhat in response to Soviet gestures. Beijing, in the fall of 1988, appeared willing to accept a Soviet "effort to urge a Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Cambodia" as sufficient to merit serious movement toward a summit.⁴¹ In September 1988, it was announced that the first exchange of visits between foreign ministers in more than three decades would take place. The meeting convened in Moscow in December and, despite continued differences over Cambodia, the possibility of holding a summit "in the first half of 1989" was accepted. When Shevardnadze visited Beijing in January 1989, disagreement on Cambodia continued, but the dates for Gorbachev's visit in mid-May were set. Although the issue was by no means settled, both sides spoke of progress toward an understanding.⁴² But the fact remains that the Chinese lead-

ers did clearly make a concession in the interest of facilitating a summit when they agreed to receive Gorbachev in the absence of any concrete agreement on Cambodia.⁴³ In April 1989, Hanoi announced that it would be out of Cambodia by the end of September 1989,⁴⁴ justifying China's faith in Soviet motives.

The reasons for the Chinese compromise relate both to domestic politics in Beijing as well as to the changed view of Soviet foreign policy and global strategy discussed above. Thus, a part of the explanation for the compromise can be found in Deng Xiaoping's desire to settle the Sino-Soviet dispute before his death or retirement. Moreover, Gorbachev's policy toward Asia did in fact become more conciliatory during 1987–88. Given the changed Chinese view of the world during this period as well as the gestures made by Gorbachev, Deng and his colleagues may have been cautiously willing to give Soviet policy the benefit of the doubt. Equally, this new view of the world might have given impetus to the Chinese desire to "normalize" relations with the Soviet Union lest China be left out of the impending shift in global politics. With Chinese commentaries arguing that the present Soviet-American détente was like none before it and might last through the end of the century, it made little sense to allow tensions with Moscow to force China out of the mainstream of the "'post-cold war' period."⁴⁵ In any event, the announcement of the summit as well as the exchange visits of foreign ministers that preceded it were dramatic evidence of the change in the tone and substance of Sino-Soviet relations that resulted from Gorbachev's initiatives as well as from changed Chinese perceptions of his policy and its global context. Soviet "new thinking" had clearly begun to shape Sino-Soviet relations.

Change was also evident in the evolution of other areas of the relationship. In June 1988, a Sino-Soviet agreement providing for economic relations between sub-national units was signed. The impact was immediate, with 1988 trade between Heilongjiang and the Soviet Union increasing to nearly five times what it had been in 1987 which, in turn, was equal to the total trade since 1983.⁴⁶ As a whole, border trade was said to have grown almost 4,000 percent between 1983 and 1988.⁴⁷ More important, such local economic relations expanded beyond trade into joint ventures, technology trans-

⁴²See, for example, *ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1989, pp. 10–11.

⁴³Pollack, "The Sino-Soviet Summit," *loc. cit.*, p. 13.

⁴⁴*FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 10, 1989, pp. 4–8.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, Nov. 23, 1988, pp. 4–6; and Dec. 23, 1988, p. 1. On the Chinese concern about being left out of global changes, see *The New York Times*, Sept. 30, 1988.

⁴⁶*FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 14, 1989, p. 3; and May 17, 1989, pp. 35–36.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, May 11, 1989, p. 10.

³⁹Jonathan D. Pollack, "The Sino-Soviet Summit," *The Asia Society Media Briefing*, May 1989, p. 12.

⁴⁰*FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 17, 1989, p. 13.

⁴¹This was Deng's position in November 1987. See *ibid.*, p. 12.

fers, labor contracting, etc.⁴⁸ The expansion of the economic relationship was not limited to certain regions; it was reflected as well in national trade figures and economic ties. For example, during 1988 the Soviet Union became China's fifth largest trading partner: approximately \$1 billion dollars in Sino-Soviet "cooperative projects" were negotiated; joint projects from the 1950's appear to have been revived; thousands of Chinese were working in the Soviet Union, with \$100 million in labor contracts signed in the last half of 1988 alone; and an agreement was reached providing for Soviet loans to China.⁴⁹ Indeed, picking up on Gorbachev's call at Krasnoyarsk for international economic cooperation in the Far East, Deng Xiaoping spoke of the possibility of building a "new economic order" in Northeast Asia that included the Soviet Union.⁵⁰

The range and depth of Sino-Soviet relations had thus changed dramatically and unmistakably in the year and a half before Gorbachev's arrival in Beijing. It is also true that the intellectual underpinnings of the relationship changed. Beijing came to acknowledge that significant departures from past policy were truly occurring in Soviet policy—Chinese and Soviet statements came to reflect a considerable conceptual consensus regarding domestic and international affairs. Both countries were engaged in reform of similar socialist systems and freely drew in their discussions of that process on each other's experiences. Moreover, considerable common ground existed regarding such central questions of global politics as the avoidability of war and the importance of economics—issues that earlier had been the basis for bitter ideological conflict.⁵¹

However, while it is apparent that a narrowing had occurred in the conceptual gulf separating the Soviet Union and China, the relationship between this movement toward a common *Weltanschauung* and the deepening and broadening of the relationship described above is not so apparent. Since the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986, there has been extensive Chinese commentary on the nature of the Soviet reforms. Implicitly and explicitly such commentaries have

drawn parallels with developments in China by using the Gorbachev reforms as justification for the inevitability of reform in socialist systems and by selecting certain aspects of his reform to illustrate common strategies or problems. However, at the same time, there has been considerable care taken by the Chinese to emphasize the differences between reform in the two countries and, most important, to dismiss any role that the common reform effort might play in giving a special quality to Sino-Soviet relations. Thus, in a series of remarkable articles published toward the end of 1988, it was argued that reforms in socialist countries were really a part of the universal reform efforts in both capitalist and socialist countries.⁵² The conclusion intended by these Chinese statements was clear—there was, in fact, no special relationship created by Sino-Soviet reform efforts. And lest the point be missed, it was asserted: "We do not decide on our relations with other countries based on similarities or differences in social systems or ideology," and "facts of history prove that the foreign policy of any country is first decided by the country's own interests and not by ideology."⁵³

The Chinese effort to downplay ideological kinship with the Soviet Union on the eve of the summit reflected a number of factors entering into Beijing's calculations. First, of course, it revealed the burden of history on the minds of the Chinese leaders. In the past, a shared ideology with the Soviet Union connoted hierarchy, with Moscow in the role of teacher. The possible re-emergence of this hierarchy was unacceptable to China's leaders, particularly at a time when they saw themselves in the vanguard of reform of socialist systems. Second, the effort to distance China from the Soviet Union, even as fundamental disagreements in the relationship were nearing solution, indicated Beijing's continued distrust of Soviet motives in Asia, despite much similar rhetoric on international affairs. Finally, the distancing was certainly intended to send a reassuring message to the West: despite the improvement in almost all facets of the Sino-Soviet relationship, the strategic and economic importance of the American connection would remain.

Still, in assessing the significance of these Chinese disclaimers regarding a common bond forged by reforms, we should distinguish the intentions of the Chinese leadership from the reality of Sino-Soviet relations where, as Gerald Segal has written, "the two ideologies are now facing more similar challenges and adopting

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, Nov. 29, 1988, p. 13.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, May 17, 1989, pp. 35–36, and Mar. 21, 1989, p. 5; *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 14, 1989, pp. 23–24.

⁵⁰*FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 24, 1989, pp. 2–3.

⁵¹On specific issues, a survey conducted in Taiwan found Chinese and Soviet positions to be identical on 13 of 28 issues, similar on 8 others, with disagreement on 7 issues. Cited in Chi Su, "Sino-Soviet Relations of the 1980's," p. 121. Note should also be made of an important Jan. 3, 1989, *Jiefangjun bao* (Beijing) article, which listed several "major changes" in "Marxist theory on war and peace." See *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 11, 1989, pp. 19–25. This article made many points similar to those of Gorbachev's new thinking.

⁵²*FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 15, 1988, pp. 3–9; and Oct. 21, 1988, pp. 2–4. Once more, I am indebted to Lyman Miller for the interpretation of Chinese views of the Soviet reform presented above.

⁵³*Ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1988, p. 1, and Oct. 12, 1988, p. 10.

more similar solutions than at any time since the 'honeymoon' in Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1950's."⁵⁴ The importance of these similarities became clear when, during and after the summit, domestic developments within China interacted with the objective reality of shared domestic and foreign policy concerns to decisively shape the nature of Sino-Soviet relations in the "new era" created by that summit.

The Summit: Motivations and Agenda

Even before Mikhail Gorbachev set foot in China, there had been substantial evolution in Sino-Soviet relations away from the confrontation of the 1960's, or even the tension-reduction of the post-Brezhnev interregnum. Verbal and military clashes were replaced by a growing economic exchange and political consultation. More significantly, there was a rapidly growing institutionalization of the relationship in a wide range of fields and at all levels of the bureaucracy—from local governments to scientific academies to newly-formed committees on technical and economic cooperation to foreign ministerial meetings. The claim that a summit would "normalize" relations was, thus, somewhat misleading. To be sure, a summit and the inauguration of party-to-party relations would represent a significant step forward in Sino-Soviet relations. However, it is also true that, as Jonathan Pollack has noted, in most other respects relations had "been normal for some time."⁵⁵ The summit would place a stamp of approval on past developments even as it permitted both nations to engage in what appeared to be the largely symbolic exercise of declaring the relationship "normal."

But symbolic does not mean insignificant. Indeed, for leaders on both sides, the symbolism of normalization seemed more important than any concrete results that might have come from the summit. From Mikhail Gorbachev's perspective, the symbolism of a trip to China seemed integrally related to his domestic reform program. The official settlement of the decades' long dispute would be an important part of his continuing campaign to present his administration as a break with the sterile policies of the past and to "bolster his personal image within Soviet politics as an effective problem solver in international affairs."⁵⁶ Additionally, given the high profile of China's reform movement, a visit there

would provide him with a forum to promote the idea of reform in the Communist world to support his efforts at home—a forum his preceding trip to Havana (where Castro had said it would be "madness" to apply *perestroika* in Cuba) did not afford him.⁵⁷ Indeed, given the high international visibility of the Chinese reform, Gorbachev probably hoped that—by associating himself with it—he could harness some of the momentum of that movement for his policies at home.

Regarding the Soviet leader's foreign policy goals, the symbolism of Sino-Soviet normalization was also important. During 1987 and 1988, it became clear that Gorbachev was beginning to apply his "new thinking" to Asia. Although not totally abandoned,⁵⁸ the Brezhnevian anti-Chinese and anti-American policy of confrontation in the area was being adjusted to project an image of a Soviet Union seeking multilateral strategic cooperation and tension-reduction in the interest of developing economic ties in the area. As one Soviet commentator noted, the Soviet Union suffered from a poor image in Asia due to past heavy emphasis on military power.⁵⁹ Attempting to change this image, Gorbachev combined broad statements (such as those made at Krasnoyarsk) with cautious overtures to South Korea and Japan as well as significant policy departures, for example, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan or pressure on Vietnam to leave Cambodia. By achieving "normalized" relations with a primary opponent in the region, Gorbachev would both increase Soviet leverage vis-à-vis the United States and enhance the credibility of his "new thinking" in Asia. He would also make it easier for some of Beijing's friends in Asia to deal with him because they no longer would have to fear the consequences of dealing with an "enemy" of China.

In Beijing, symbolism was also important. In contrast to their younger Soviet colleagues, many of China's leaders had been active participants in the Sino-Soviet exchanges of the 1960's. Most prominently, of course, Deng Xiaoping had been involved in bitter conflicts with Nikita Khrushchev during the 1960's and had, in fact, led the last major Chinese delegation to Moscow in 1963. Others in the Chinese elite, such as Yang Shangkun and Peng Zhen, had also played important roles. As one scholar noted, in presiding over the settlement

⁵⁷Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), Apr. 14, 1989, p. 41.

⁵⁸Soviet statements on Taiwan and Tibet made before the summit were clearly intended to contrast Moscow's support for Chinese positions with the position of Washington. Moreover, Gorbachev undoubtedly sought to use the occasion to demonstrate that the Soviet Union was not prepared to cede East Asia to the United States.

⁵⁹Konstantin Pleshkanov, "Citadel or Harbour," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 20, 1989, pp. 11–12.

⁵⁴Gerald Segal, "Sino-Soviet Relations: The New Agenda," *World Today* (London), June 1988, p. 96.

⁵⁵Pollack, "The Sino-Soviet Summit," p. 12. This entire section relies heavily on Dr. Pollack's fine paper.

⁵⁶Breslauer, loc. cit., p. 273.

of that dispute, "Deng undoubtedly feels vindicated that he has outlasted all his old Soviet antagonists."⁶⁰

But more generally, the summit was to be the capstone for a year in which China had had several diplomatic triumphs, including visits by the prime ministers of India and Japan and the president of the United States, as well as the convening of the Asian Development Bank's meeting in Beijing. A successful summit on the heels of these other foreign policy achievements would create a situation almost unprecedented in the last century of China's history—the nation would face no significant foreign threat. An accomplishment of such historic significance would enhance the standing of Deng and his colleagues at home by helping to restore national morale and leadership determination undermined by inflation, unemployment, corruption, and agricultural problems, during the past difficult year.

The symbolism of normalization also served Chinese foreign policy objectives. China's leadership sought normalization to assure that China would be an active participant in the rapidly changing diplomatic game where restructuring of relations with the Soviet Union was a clear prerequisite for participation. There was also the hope that "normalization" would increase Chinese leverage vis-à-vis third states—in particular the United States and Soviet allies in Asia such as Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, North Korea.

There were also more concrete issues on what was a carefully crafted agenda. First among these was the civil war in Cambodia. Of course, strictly speaking, this issue should not have been on the agenda at all—since China had earlier sought the removal of this "obstacle" as a precondition for a summit. However, as noted earlier, Soviet willingness to discuss the issue in the fall of 1988 was ultimately deemed a sufficient show of good faith. During the months that followed, Soviet flexibility culminated in the joint communiqué defining considerable common ground that was issued after Shevardnadze's visit in early 1989, as well as in the Vietnamese pledge of April to withdraw all troops by September 30, 1989, which was undoubtedly a result of Soviet pressure. Differences remained, however, particularly on the central questions of foreign aid to Cambodian factions and the timing and composition of any coalition government that might emerge. Moscow sought Chinese pressure on the Khmer Rouge to accept a lesser role, just as Beijing sought Soviet pressure on Hanoi to stand by its pledge to withdraw and cease aid to Vietnam's Cambodian allies.

In the period immediately preceding the summit, the Cambodia issue became more complicated as the parties directly involved began taking greater initiative. In the early months of 1989, SRV representatives held two

rounds of inconclusive talks in Beijing. Moreover, on the eve of the Gorbachev arrival, there was evidence that the Cambodians themselves were moving to settle key questions. Prince Norodom Sihanouk met with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen. Although differences over the place of the Khmer Rouge in any future government remained, there were signs of some movement that might be clarified at a meeting of all the parties involved scheduled for late July 1989.⁶¹

A second item on the agenda was the discussion of differences over the Sino-Soviet border. Once again full agreement eluded Sino-Soviet negotiators. One Hong Kong source suggested that agreement had been reached on most of the border, the only major sticking point being the Heixiazhi (Tarabarov/Bol'shoy Ussuriysk) island at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers. According to the Thalweg principle announced in 1886 by Gorbachev, this island would belong to China. However, its strategic location overlooking Khabarovsk led to Soviet reluctance to cede it.⁶² On the Soviet side, in a pre-summit interview, Deputy Foreign Minister Igor' Rogachev noted that "roughly 95 percent of all the disputed issues" on the eastern border had been settled, but that "a great deal of work remains to be done" on the western border. He made it clear that no final settlement would be announced at the summit.⁶³

Third, there was the issue of economic relations. With the total trade volume at \$3 billion—roughly equal to China's trade with South Korea or Taiwan—neither side was a major economic partner of the other. Moreover, both China and the Soviet Union were looking West for the technology needed to modernize their respective economies. Still, economics had been an area of strength in the bilateral relationship, and both sides seemed anxious to nurture it. Chinese discussions emphasized the possibilities of expanding economic cooperation in the several areas identified during the past few years. Moreover, there were localities within China for which trade with the Soviet Union was becoming vital. For example, at trade seminars, meetings, and in the press, there seemed to be a veritable Soviet trade constituency developing within China centered on the province of Heilongjiang.

Similarly, on the Soviet side, there was enthusiasm for everything—from Chinese consumer goods to labor to technical and managerial advice. Local officials

⁶⁰Pollack, "The Sino-Soviet Summit," pp. 9–11.

⁶¹*The New York Times*, May 4 and 7, 1989.

⁶²Pollack, "The Sino-Soviet Summit," p. 14; and *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 21, 1989, p. 9.

⁶³*FBIS-SOV*, May 15, 1989, p. 26. This assessment was shared by the Chinese. See *FBIS-CHI*, May 16, 1989, p. 33.

pressed their Chinese counterparts for expanded contacts. Clearly many localities in the Soviet Far East, like those in China, saw cross-border trade as a way to promote their own economy and autonomy. Given this atmosphere, pre-summit articles suggested that talks at the highest levels could lead to further development of this trade by reaching agreements in such areas as joint development of transportation and expanded provision for trade credit even while increasing cooperation between national trade and planning bodies. Indeed, one Soviet commentary suggested that the State Planning Committee had drawn up a plan for cooperation until the year 2000.⁶⁴

A fourth issue, also related to the border regions, was that of the reduction of Soviet troops.⁶⁵ Once again, there had been considerable progress on this issue in the pre-summit period with the Soviet side actually announcing target figures for troop reductions, and, even as Gorbachev arrived in Beijing, withdrawing some military forces from Mongolia.⁶⁶ The summit meeting, it was expected, would see Chinese pressure for greater specificity in terms of timing and troop levels. From previous indications, it appeared that the Soviet side would probably comply even as it tried to place the issue of border forces into a broader context by pressing for institutionalized contacts with the Chinese military and for discussions regarding the larger issue of the military balance in Asia.⁶⁷

The issue of the Asian military balance, of course, moves beyond purely bilateral questions and into a fifth, all-encompassing, item on the agenda related to the discussion of regional and global issues. Here, there were some clear asymmetries in Chinese and Soviet objectives at the summit. For Gorbachev, a discussion of these issues was the first step in a larger effort to expand Soviet influence in Asia by pursuing some sort of regional dialogue based on the model instituted in Europe. By initiating such a multilateral dialogue on regional political and military questions, Moscow sought to promote its own objectives even as it fostered pressures—similar to those in Europe—for a reduction of the American military presence.⁶⁸ The absence of such themes in the pre-summit Chinese discussions, as well as rumors that the Chinese were resisting the issuance of a final communiqué, suggest that while Beijing might have been willing to discuss specific questions related to Korea, Japan, and the ASEAN region, it was unlikely, given continued suspicion of Soviet motives, to be drawn into discussions relating to Gorbachev's conception of a regional forum. While China sought to use the summit to improve bilateral relations and solve bilateral questions, it was reluctant to facilitate the success of Soviet "new thinking" in Asia.

The Summit: Predictable Outcomes

The sixth Sino-Soviet summit lasted from May 15 to May 18, 1989. In these four days Mikhail Gorbachev visited a Sino-Japanese joint venture, laid a wreath at a monument to the Russian poet Aleksandr Pushkin, and visited two Chinese cities—Beijing and Shanghai—as well as the Great Wall. In the course of his stay he met with his two Chinese counterparts (President Yang Shangkun and Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang), the Premier of China, Li Peng, and, of course, Deng Xiaoping. Gorbachev made a major foreign policy speech, held an international press conference, and gave an interview to Chinese television. Finally, there were talks between vice premiers on economic issues and foreign ministers on questions of foreign policy. A final communiqué was issued. But despite these outward manifestations of movement, in its broad outlines, this was almost a generic summit. The putative agenda outlined in pre-summit articles in the Soviet and Chinese press was an excellent indicator both of what was discussed and of the outcome—or non-outcome—of those discussions.⁶⁹

Thus, the two sides announced that relations—both on a party-to-party and a state-to-state level—had entered a "new era," having been normalized on the basis of mutual respect and equality. There was a shared desire to put what the Soviet spokesman called the "unsatisfactory" past behind them—a sense encapsulated by a slogan attributed to Deng Xiaoping, "end the past and open up the future."⁷⁰ However, it proved not so simple to dismiss the past. In briefings, the Soviet spokesman, Gennadiy Gerasimov, bristled at the suggestion that Gorbachev might have "apologized" for the past. In his meetings with Deng, the Soviet leader acknowledged that although "Chairman Deng's views [on past problems] are not groundless, the Soviet side still has some differing views."⁷¹

The question of Cambodia was the most difficult one.

⁶⁴Pollack, "The Sino-Soviet Summit," pp. 11–17; *FBIS-SOV*, May 10, 1989, pp. 24–26; *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 24, 1989, p. 11; Feb. 1, 1989, pp. 11–12; Feb. 9, 1989, p. 5; Apr. 28, 1989, p. 3; and May 17, 1989, pp. 35–37.

⁶⁵This paragraph and the next draw on Pollack, "The Sino-Soviet Summit," pp. 13–16.

⁶⁶*FBIS-SOV*, May 16, 1989, pp. 30–31.

⁶⁷See, for example, *ibid.*, May 15, 1989, pp. 36–38.

⁶⁸One example of this is the discussions of nuclear-free zones in Asia. See, for example, *ibid.*, Apr. 24, 1989, pp. 20–21, and May 4, 1989, pp. 14–15.

⁶⁹Much of the following is based on my notes on the summit as well as the press briefings that accompanied it. Where possible I have tried to provide references to more accessible sources.

⁷⁰*China Daily News* (Beijing), May 16, 1989, p. 1.

⁷¹*FBIS-CHI*, May 16, 1989, p. 19.

The Cambodia issue was thoroughly aired both in Gorbachev's meetings as well as in those of his foreign minister. In the end, there seemed to have been very little movement. There was continued agreement on broad principles such as the need to end the civil war, the withdrawal of foreign support, and the international supervision of general elections. However, the central issue—the composition of a new Cambodian government—remained unresolved, with each side restating its previous position.⁷² This lack of movement can be attributed both to the dynamics of Sino-Soviet bargaining over this issue as well as to recent meetings between the opposing factions in Cambodia. As noted above, in the weeks before the summit there was evidence that Prince Sihanouk and the pro-Vietnamese government in Phnom Penh were edging towards some kind of accommodation that might include the Khmer Rouge. Given this fluid situation, neither side was inclined to commit itself or its allies to a firm position until matters were clarified. The Soviet side believed that it had done all that it could to bring about an end to the civil war there by pressuring Vietnam to withdraw by the end of September, and suggested that the focus had shifted to Sino-Vietnamese talks and to Cambodian efforts to find a formula for agreement.⁷³

A more positive note was struck on the issue of economic relations. But the actual accomplishments were equally thin. In his public statements, Gorbachev spoke effusively about the need to expand the relationship beyond the "limits" of trade and "to begin extensive cooperation in many fields of work" that included such ambitious-sounding projects as a joint liquid coal pipeline and a "new Silk Road from China to Europe," as well as more modest cooperation at the regional or enterprise level. However, as the Soviet leader also noted, "time was needed" for both sides to prepare for such expansion—a sentiment echoed when vice premiers Tian Jiyun and Yuriy Maslyukov met.⁷⁴ For the foreseeable future, it appeared that Sino-Soviet trade would be characterized by further growth according to the pre-summit pattern rather than by the emergence of a qualitatively new model. Continuity with the past was also apparent when the leaders turned to the issue of the border. As noted above, there was little expectation that any concrete movement would take place at the summit—and this was the case. It was agreed to raise the talks to the foreign ministerial level in an attempt to "speed up discussions" to reach a "fair and reasonable settlement" of the border.

Thanks to Soviet initiatives, the military situation on the border appears to have been addressed in a more substantive manner. Throughout the summit, Soviet rhetoric on this issue was strong. Gennadiy Gerasimov

told the press of the need for "radical military détente" and a border protected "only by friendship," while Gorbachev spoke of the need to transform the border into one "of peace and good neighborliness."⁷⁵ This rhetoric was substantiated somewhat by the December 1988 pledge to withdraw troops from Mongolia and the actual movement on the day the summit began. But the muted Chinese reaction suggested continuing wariness of Moscow's motives. Gorbachev, in his conversations with Li Peng, noted that the Soviet Union kept in touch with the military of Western countries and proposed that a similar mechanism be established with China. No apparent action was taken on this, the second, Soviet request for such a mechanism, although a Soviet source suggested that "a working mechanism" for military consultation on the border area had been established. Chinese sources remained silent on the existence of such a mechanism.⁷⁶ The final communiqué blandly noted agreement "to cut down the military forces" on the border and noted that the Chinese welcomed the Soviet intent to withdraw troops on the border while hoping that the remainder would be withdrawn in a "specified short period of time."⁷⁷

The sudden initiatives or dramatic breakthroughs that often characterize summits were thus not present in Beijing. Because the meetings were driven by the momentum of the past two years, their diplomatic results were unremarkable and easily overshadowed by the concurrent drama of the pro-democracy demonstrations. What was often forgotten, of course, was that the diplomatic output of these meetings was a poor indicator of the overall strength of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Precisely because the process of normalization had proceeded in the slow and incremental fashion described above, the relationship had a degree of breadth and substance that would have been unattainable in a few days' deliberations among top leaders. By achieving official closure to a conflict nearly three decades old, the summit unobtrusively buttressed these more positive aspects.

The resolution of questions of mutual concern was

⁷²The most detailed statement of these differences is in the final communiqué. *Ibid.*, May 18, 1989, p. 23.

⁷³*Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁷⁴See *ibid.*, May 17, 1989, pp. 27–28, and May 18, 1989, pp. 13 and 26.

⁷⁵Author's notes from Soviet press briefing of May 16, 1989; and *FBIS-CHI*, May 18, 1989, p. 13.

⁷⁶Author's notes from May 16, 1989, Soviet press briefing; and *FBIS-SOV*, May 19, 1989, p. 27. This was not the first time during Shevardnadze's February visit that the Soviets mentioned the existence of such a mechanism, but the Chinese were silent. On the eve of the summit, Moscow Radio reiterated such a proposal. See Pollack, "The Sino-Soviet Summit," p. 14; and *FBIS-SOV*, May 5, 1989, pp. 18–19.

⁷⁷*FBIS-CHI*, May 18, 1989, p. 23.

only one objective of the summit. Both the Chinese and Soviet sides had their own agenda, which each pursued outside of the bilateral context. Thus, in Gorbachev's speeches as well as in accompanying press briefings and commentaries, there was a clear effort made to link the changes in Sino-Soviet relations to broader issues of the Asia-Pacific region—where, as Gorbachev asserted, “the destiny of our civilization will largely be decided.”⁷⁸ More specifically, Soviet statements suggested three areas where the forum of the Sino-Soviet summit was being used to promote foreign policy objectives in Asia. First, there was a clear attempt made to use the Soviet gestures on the Chinese border to initiate a region-wide dialogue, similar to that in Europe, on issues of arms control and force reduction. This connection was made implicitly in Gorbachev's major foreign policy speech in which, within the context of the border issue, he announced very specific air, land, and sea reductions in the area, and explicitly in a *Pravda* editorial, which spoke of the need to begin movement toward “negotiating structures” similar to those that exist in Europe.⁷⁹

Secondly, and similarly, the Soviet leader sought to break economic cooperation out of its bilateral context into a multilateral one as he restated his desire to link Sino-Soviet developments with the “all-Asian process of economic integration taking place.”⁸⁰ A Moscow broadcast to China spoke of the desire to “invite all countries in the Asia-Pacific region” to take part in joint projects.⁸¹

Finally, there was Japan. Since the end of World War II, Soviet-Japanese relations had gone from confrontation to confrontation. Japan's role as the linchpin of the American military position in Asia, as well as the refusal of either Japan or the Soviet Union to compromise on the issue of the Northern Territories, which had been seized by the Soviets during the last days of the war, had made any reconciliation almost impossible. If Gorbachev's new Asian policy were to succeed, Soviet-Japanese relations had to be improved. Japanese abstention would render meaningless any multilateral “Asian Forum,” and development of the Soviet Far East would be impossible without Japanese participation.

In the months before the Sino-Soviet summit, Moscow approached Japan in a manner similar to that which had brought success with China. Although standing firm on the validity of the claim to the Northern Territories, Moscow departed from past practice and

expressed a willingness to discuss the Japanese counterclaim.⁸² During the first week in May, Japanese Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno visited Moscow. Although his talks with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze settled no basic questions, the incremental improvement of the recent past continued: a sub-ministerial working group on the peace treaty met, further meetings of foreign ministers were arranged, negotiations regarding a Gorbachev visit to Tokyo continued, and discussions in other areas, such as an environmental treaty, proceeded.⁸³

Soviet statements left little doubt that the summit was an integral part of the campaign to end the decades of confrontation in Soviet-Japanese relations. On the eve of the meetings with Foreign Minister Uno, Yevgeniy Primakov, a Gorbachev adviser, noted that a settlement of the Sino-Soviet rift would “contribute to Soviet-Japanese relations.”⁸⁴ In his speech in Beijing, Gorbachev raised the same theme when he stressed to his Chinese audience the Soviet desire to have “full-blooded ties” with Japan even as he acknowledged that both sides still had “a fair bit of work” to do to realize that end.⁸⁵ The bid was in. Gorbachev had used the occasion of his trip to Beijing to announce his next foreign policy goal in Asia.

The second broad area where the Soviet leader sought to use the symbolism of the summit meetings to promote his own policies was that of domestic reform or *perestroika*. He said:

*At the moment, in a number of socialist countries processes are underway that are close to our restructuring in their content and sometimes in their form as well. . . . Restructuring in the USSR, reforms in China, and the transformations in many other socialist countries are dissipating once and for all the erroneous conceptions of socialism as something uniform and unchanging. They show its ability for progressive development and self-improvement.*⁸⁶

Statements such as this served several purposes. They were a way of complimenting Gorbachev's Chi-

⁷⁸FBIS-SOV, May 18, 1989, p. 28.

⁷⁹FBIS-CHI, May 18, 1989, p. 13; and FBIS-SOV, May 23, 1989, p. 27.

⁸⁰FBIS-CHI, May 18, 1989, p. 13.

⁸¹FBIS-SOV, May 18, 1989, p. 41.

⁸²For a discussion of the background to this controversy see Kenichi Ito, “Japan and the Soviet Union—Entangled in the Deadlock of the Northern Territories,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1978, pp. 35–44; and Yevgeniy Prokhorov and Leonid Shevchuk, “Japan's Territorial Claims to Moscow,” *International Affairs* (Moscow), February 1989, pp. 42–47.

⁸³*The Economist* (London), Apr. 1, 1989, p. 30. For Soviet reportage of the May visit of Foreign Minister Uno, see FBIS-SOV, May 4, 1989, pp. 17–21; May 5, 1989, pp. 20–21; and May 8, 1989, pp. 18–23.

⁸⁴FBIS-CHI, May 15, 1989, p. 7.

⁸⁵*ibid.*, May 18, 1989, p. 17.

⁸⁶*ibid.*, May 18, 1989, p. 15.

nese hosts and using their common socialist heritage to give greater substance to the new relationship—Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev had spoken of “an affinity between the two countries.”⁸⁷ But, most importantly, with the Chinese reforms as a backdrop and a rostrum, the Soviet leader sought to extol the importance of reform and use the Chinese accomplishments to bolster his own reform program at home. Gorbachev’s message was clear: the reforms of both countries were proof not only of the necessity of socialism’s reform, but of the promise that such reform held for social improvement and national progress. When Gorbachev told the Chinese that the reforms in their countries demonstrate socialism’s “ability for progressive develop-



Chinese students on a hunger strike demanding political reforms lie near the Great Hall of the People in Tiananmen Square on May 14, the eve of the Sino-Soviet summit. Their presence forced relocation of official welcoming ceremonies for Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

ment,” he was more concerned with the progressive development of his *perestroika*. Facing a difficult first meeting of the Congress of People’s Deputies when he returned, Gorbachev was using the summit to speak to those at home skeptical of the imperative of reform.

Of course, such a dual strategy was based on two assumptions. The first was that the Chinese leaders would be receptive to a linking of the Soviet reforms to their own. The second was that the Chinese reform movement would be such that it could be used to promote Gorbachev’s vision for change in the Soviet Union. Even as Gorbachev arrived in China pro-democracy demonstrations began to call both of these assumptions into question.

Domestic Politics and Diplomacy

What later came to be known as China’s pro-democracy movement began with the death of Hu Yaobang on April 15, 1989.⁸⁸ In the month before the Gorbachev visit, the protests ebbed and flowed in tune with government action and historical coincidence. Thus, the numbers of demonstrators grew on the occasions of Hu’s April 22 funeral, a harsh April 26 *People’s Daily* editorial depicting student actions as anti-party, and the confluence of the Beijing meeting of the Asia Development Bank with the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the May 4th (1919) Movement.

A similar escalation occurred in protester’s demands. At the time of Hu’s funeral, student demands revolved around such general issues as dialogue with the government, greater openness of the press, as well as an end to government corruption and nepotism. On the eve of the May 4th anniversary, the demands had grown to include government recognition of the new student organizations and a “dialogue” with high party and state officials to be broadcast live to the nation. Finally, on the weekend before Gorbachev’s arrival, about a thousand students went on a hunger strike. In response, the authorities ordered that the square be cleared by 8:30 am, Monday, May 15, the first day of the Soviet leader’s visit.

This ultimatum, coupled with the visibility that would be provided by the thousands of media representatives

⁸⁷FBIS-SOV, May 4, 1989, p. 13.

⁸⁸On the growth of the democracy movement, see the essays in this issue by Lowell Dittmer, Andrew J. Nathan, and Andrew G. Walder. In preparing the discussion that follows, I have drawn from Fred C. Shapiro, “Letter from Beijing,” *The New Yorker* (New York), June 5, 1989, pp. 73–82; “Special Report: The Shattered Dream, China, 1989,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 25, 1989; and my own notes from my visit to Beijing, May 15–21, 1989.



Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, reviews an honor guard with Yang Shang-kun, President of the People's Republic of China, at the Beijing airport upon the Soviet leader's May 15, 1989, arrival for the Sino-Soviet summit.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

descending on Beijing for the summit, only strengthened the students' resolve. Despite Zhao Ziyang's plea that demonstrators "protect our national reputation" and "not do anything that would damage the summit meeting," Tiananmen Square was packed on May 15 and hunger-strikers were sprinkled throughout the crowd. The mood was almost festive, with banners flying from commandeered flagpoles, and impromptu discussions taking place throughout the square. The impact of the summit had been clear earlier when a student delegation appeared at the Soviet embassy to invite the Soviet leader to speak to them. In the square, many signs praised Gorbachev's political reforms, often using them as a standard against which China's slower progress was judged. With a banner proclaiming "Democracy Our Common Ideal (*lixiang*)" dominating the square from the martyrs monument, others announced "An Honor Salute to the Democratic Envoy," "You're [Gorbachev] 58, I'm [Deng] 85," or "The Soviet Union Has Gorbachev. Whom Does China Have?"⁸⁹ The demonstrations continued and grew in size during the Soviet leader's stay. By May 17, Gorbachev's last day

in Beijing, nearly 1 million people were demonstrating. During the next day's stop in Shanghai, smaller crowds greeted him as the massive demonstrations continued unabated in the capital.

Because it probes individual motives and reactions, much of the assessment of the impact of these demonstrations on the summit must remain speculative. However, assessing their influence on the physical planning for the meetings requires no such speculation. Major events had to be postponed or relocated. For example, the welcoming ceremony could not be held in Tiananmen Square; Gorbachev was unable to lay a wreath at the monument for China's revolutionary martyrs; his press conference as well as a meeting with Li Peng was moved from the Great Hall of the People (which borders on the square); an opera performance at the Hall was canceled and the Soviet leader did not visit the Forbidden City. Moreover, those few engagements (Gorbachev's speech as well as the meetings with Yang Shang-kun and Deng) that were held at the Great Hall not only required back-door arrivals, but took place as thousands of demonstrators, standing on the steps of the building, shouted slogans supporting the hunger-strikers lying on the pavement in sight of the conferees. To all—media and participants alike—the demonstrations, and the political issues that they raised, were a continual presence.

And so we return to the symbolic uses of the summit. For Mikhail Gorbachev, the demonstrations complicated his attempt to use the summit to promote reform at home. He had to balance two sets of priorities. On the one hand, there were the sensitivities of his very embarrassed Chinese hosts for whom the demonstrations were a humiliation. To exploit their difficulties by speaking positively of the demonstrators would hardly start the "new era" of Sino-Soviet relations off on the right foot. Indeed, given the vehemence with which both sides were affirming the right of every socialist state to find its own reform path, any comment by Gorbachev could easily evoke images of past Soviet interference.

On the other hand, if he made strong anti-demonstration comments in support of his hosts, he would lose the opportunity to drum up the political support both for himself as well as for *perestroika* that depicting these demonstrations in a positive light would afford. Suddenly, after decades of conflict and years when the reforms in China seemed to be surpassing those in the Soviet Union, Beijing's protesters were holding up Gorbachev's political reform program as the model to be

⁸⁹South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), May 16, 1989; The Washington Post, May 16, 1989; and Los Angeles Times, May 15, 1989.

emulated in China. As one astonished Soviet official is reported to have said of Gorbachev's reception:

*... it was a welcome beyond our imagination. Who would have thought that after all that passed between us, the leader of the Soviet Union would be welcomed as a hero in China?*⁹⁰

Could the Soviet leader afford to ignore or refuse such praise? Also, such disturbances in a land where reform seemed to have been making headway could provide Gorbachev with ammunition against those at home who either sought to slow reform or pointed to the destabilizing effects of such reform. Gorbachev could use Beijing's problems to highlight the importance of continuing political reform in order to avert such problems in the Soviet Union and the fact that some disturbances were an inevitable part of the reform process.

In both the reportage back from the summit to the Soviet Union and in Gorbachev's statements in China, the fine line between these two priorities was carefully trod.⁹¹ Soviet coverage of the student demonstrations in their initial phases, in the weeks before the Soviet leader's arrival, seemed to be very general and cautious, while staying very close to the official Chinese line that emphasized the dangers of disorder and "dissension."⁹² Immediately before and during Gorbachev's visit there was a clear shift in emphasis. Although apparently the coverage was not extensive—particularly in regard to "visuals" from Tiananmen—the Soviet media did intimate the extent of the demonstrations, the changes that they required in the summit's schedule, the nature of the protesters' demands and their tactics—especially the use of hunger strikes. Finally, the pro-Gorbachev slogans of the demonstrators were noted and shown to the Soviet audience.⁹³

Of course, once the demonstrations held up Gorbachev as a leader to be emulated, they could not be portrayed in the same negative light as they had been before. Now, they were depicted as the result of the dislocations attendant to reform as well as the result of the fact that the Chinese reform policy, unlike the Soviet, had not emphasized political reform.⁹⁴ Although there was a suggestion that the students might be over-

zealous, it was noted that the thrust of their demands was "in line with the [Chinese] government's intentions."⁹⁵ Indeed, one Moscow television broadcast was even more sympathetic and associated the protests with events in the Soviet Union by presenting them as the result of errors in a shared reform process:

*Just as the color of our two flags is common so are the main directions and the basic processes of restructuring in both our countries. . . . Democratization, yes, glasnost, yes—only in China it is called transparency, and reforms to the economy, altering its mechanisms. And the mistakes, as well as the crossroads, and putting the cart before the horse in the course of these processes, are also similar, if you like.*⁹⁶

This reportage was consistent with—and reflective of—Mikhail Gorbachev's statements in China. Although always careful to abjure any intention of interfering in a domestic Chinese matter, the visiting Soviet leader made quite clear his views on the sources and nature of the demonstrations as well as the best way to resolve the issues raised by them. In his press conference, he clearly associated the demonstrations with "the painfulness of the process of renewal," which confirms "the fact that the processes taking place in the socialist countries are profound. . . [and] not a cosmetic refurbishment."⁹⁷ As for the demonstrators themselves, Gorbachev walked a fine line between alienating his hosts by expressing sympathy for them and passing up an opportunity to exploit the political potential inherent in the movement's pro-*glasnost*' sympathies. In general, he struck the theme of overzealous or impatient youth, although his emphases varied with the nature of his audience. In his live interview on Chinese television, the Soviet leader went out of his way at the close of the broadcast to strike a very positive note, supportive of the students:

*You know, I liked very much the way young people are receiving the restructuring and reforms and the way they want rapid changes with all their heart. Perhaps they would like more than can even be done at once. But one thing is that they are committed to the renewal of socialism and to the friendship between our two countries.*⁹⁸

⁹⁰*Los Angeles Times*, June 25, 1989.

⁹¹This article is obviously not the occasion for a detailed discussion of Soviet media coverage of these events. What follows are my preliminary impressions based on the reading of a very small sampling of Soviet commentary translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

⁹²See for example, *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 24, 1989, p. 16; Apr. 28, 1989, pp. 14–15; May 1, 1989, pp. 1–2; and May 3, 1989, p. 11.

⁹³*Ibid.*, May 15, 1989, p. 28.

⁹⁴This was the conclusion of a Chinese analyst cited in *Pravda*. See *FBIS-SOV*, May 15, 1989, p. 32.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, May 17, 1989, p. 21.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, May 15, 1989, p. 28.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, May 18, 1989, p. 30.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 25.

In his private talks with the Chinese leaders, the general thrust of Gorbachev's statements stayed the same, but there was clearly a change in tone to one more supportive of the Chinese leadership and critical of the students. In his talks with Zhao, Gorbachev noted that in the Soviet Union there were also "hotheads" who sought "to renovate socialism overnight." Asserting that such things only happen in "fairy tales," and not in real life, he emphasized the importance of party leadership in any reform process, asking "who is more interested in renovation than those leaders of the party?"⁹⁹

Finally, despite the Soviet emphasis on the necessity of respecting the right of each socialist state to choose its own reform path, Gorbachev's statements and those in the Soviet media left little question as to how the mass demonstrations should be solved. In his final press conference Gorbachev expressed the "wish that through political dialogue the solutions will be found." When asked how he would handle such an occurrence in the Soviet Union, he was less guarded in his espousal of dialogue and peaceful resolution:

*I think that, in the Soviet Union, too, if problems of this or a similar kind should occur, we would look at them specifically and seek political methods of solving them in order to tackle the problems that had arisen within the framework of the political process on the basis of democracy and glasnost, so as to preserve the main values to which we have sworn allegiance.*¹⁰⁰

The Soviet leader was clearly speaking to his audience at home. In the wake of the brutal suppression of a peaceful demonstration for reform in Tbilisi, Georgia, it is probable that Gorbachev was taking advantage of China's difficulties to rebuild the somewhat damaged image of *glasnost*, even as he responded to those among his colleagues who might have had doubts about the disruptive consequences of the upcoming meeting of the newly elected Congress of People's Deputies.¹⁰¹

In short, Gorbachev undoubtedly came to Beijing intent on using the reform issue both to promote his program at home and to enhance Sino-Soviet relations. When he arrived he found himself forced to improvise in response to the huge protest demonstration. His re-

sponses were those of a skilled politician. Putting the demonstrations in a positive light and associating them with genuine reform would serve to answer those who saw recent disturbances in the Soviet Union as a negative phenomenon. Moreover, Gorbachev's own standing as a reformer benefited from: the impression that China's problems stemmed from its failure to emulate the Soviet path of emphasizing political reform; the youthful support for his program of *glasnost*; and his ability to use China's difficulties to reaffirm the importance of moderation and political methods in dealing with the problems attendant to reform.

On the other hand, the Soviet leader was careful to pursue these themes in a way that would not alienate the Chinese leadership. He lectured the press on the need to "have a respectful attitude to the Chinese people"; presented the demonstrations as evidence of positive change; empathized publicly with the Chinese leadership in their time of trial; and stressed the need for all problems to be resolved within the framework of Communist Party leadership. Assuming the posture of a sympathetic, fellow-socialist reformer, Gorbachev sought to turn the dilemma of China's leaders into an element of Sino-Soviet cohesion.

The manipulation of the issue of student demonstrations was indeed an impressive display of Mikhail Gorbachev's political skills. However, because the success of his strategy depended on events over which the Soviet leader had little control, it was a politically vulnerable one. His domestic and international goals would be reached only if the demonstrations did not become completely unmanageable and the Chinese leadership continued a dialogue with the social forces that Gorbachev had depicted as playing a positive role. Should these elements change, his arguments for a tolerant approach to reform instability at home would be seriously undermined and he would find his program associated with leaders whose approach was fundamentally at odds with his own. And as Gorbachev was leaving China, this was precisely what was happening.

The reason for this was clear: Gorbachev's symbolic gains were, in the minds of many Chinese leaders, being achieved at their expense. As noted earlier, the Chinese leadership looked to the summit as an occasion to reaffirm China's recently-earned status as a worthy and responsible member of the international community. Moreover, it was hoped that it would provide a leadership beset by domestic difficulties with an opportunity to bask in the satisfaction of declaring closure to the Sino-Soviet conflict. A successful summit could provide an opportunity to project to the nation as well as the world the image of a decisive Chinese leadership in charge of a still vital reform movement. The actual out-

⁹⁹ Author's notes from Soviet press briefing, May 16, 1989. Parts of this exchange were translated in *FBIS-SOV*, May 18, 1989, p. 19.

¹⁰⁰ *FBIS-SOV*, May 18, 1989, p. 30.

¹⁰¹ The Congress was clearly on Gorbachev's mind during his trip to China. He mentioned it in his public speech stressing the importance of "glasnost and pluralism of opinions." *FBIS-CHI*, May 18, 1989, p. 15.

come of the summit could not have been further from these expectations.

As an exercise in symbolic politics, the summit was an absolute disaster for China's leaders. With a fascinated world watching live via satellite feeds, the Chinese leadership seemed barely able to meet the schedule of the meetings, much less cope with the student demonstrations. The hope that the summit would deflect attention from the problems of China's reform was dashed as the demonstrators saw to it that the deficiencies of the reform, as well as the demonstrators' contempt for many of China's leaders (and their admiration for the Soviet reform and its leader), were known to the entire world. What was to have been the finale of a year of foreign policy victories and a triumph for Deng Xiaoping became a national as well as a personal humiliation. Finally, the summit did little to project either leadership resolution or unity. Throughout the meetings and immediately afterwards, there were signs of leadership indecision and disunity. Chinese media comments regarding the deleterious effect of these demonstrations on "the state's prestige" were thus merely stating the obvious.¹⁰²

What is not so obvious is precisely how this situation affected Chinese behavior or credibility at the summit. Clearly the leaders' attention was divided between the diplomacy of the summit and the events in the square, but it is not clear how much of a distraction the upheaval created. For the most part, the leadership tried to proceed as if the protests were having little impact on the meetings. Before a skeptical, sometimes jeering, international press, the official Chinese spokesman suggested that the demonstrations had not prevented the summit from proceeding "smoothly," and refused to comment on what he maintained was a domestic affair.¹⁰³ Observers in Beijing noted that Deng Xiaoping seemed to make a special effort to take the initiative in the televised portions of his meeting with Gorbachev. Indeed, to judge by public statements and press briefings, the Chinese leaders attempted to put the best possible face on the affair by joining with Gorbachev in seeing the demonstrations as an expected phenomenon to be handled in a moderate fashion. Even Li Peng, who would soon be seen as the quintessential "hard-liner," emphasized that "socialist countries should also enjoy freedom, democracy, and human rights."¹⁰⁴

Despite this, as the talks were proceeding, specula-

tion about splits within the Chinese leadership was rife, even though any concrete evidence for such splits was lacking and those indications that did exist were often ambiguous. For example, it was apparent that Zhao's meeting with Gorbachev went extremely well—Gerasimov noted it was as if there had never been a Sino-Soviet split—with both leaders emphasizing the same themes regarding the necessity of continued reform. Such themes were not as apparent in discussions with other leaders. Was Zhao reflecting his greater commitment to reform? Or was the difference in emphasis a result of the fact that the meeting between Zhao and Gorbachev was one between party leaders?

Of course, the most puzzling and ambiguous hint of Chinese leadership differences came when Zhao, declaring that "normalization" had really occurred when the Soviet leader met earlier with Deng, for no apparent reason turned to the television cameras and told Gorbachev a fact that had "never been published for the outside world." Despite Deng's resignation from official party posts in the fall of 1987, "our whole party knows that we cannot do without him, without his wisdom and experience. We formally adopted a decision . . . that on the most important questions, we still need him as the helmsman."¹⁰⁵ Later, Zhao would be condemned for having revealed a state secret in an attempt to place the blame for China's difficulties on Deng Xiaoping's shoulders. But his intent remains unclear. Despite later charges, he may have been seeking to curry favor with China's paramount leader during a time of leadership conflict or seeking to make perfectly clear to the millions of Chinese viewers that the leadership was united behind Deng. Whatever Zhao's motives, his comments increased speculation about divisions in the Chinese leadership.

We can only conjecture on how this colossal failure of the Chinese leaders to achieve their symbolic goals actually affected the course of the summit. There were rumors that Gorbachev was particularly impressed with the meeting of minds between Zhao and himself—a Soviet source said "these two were on the same wave length within minutes and by the end of the evening it was as if they had known one another for years."¹⁰⁶ This favorable impression might explain why Gorbachev allowed his response to the demonstrations to be so heavily dependent on the assumption of Chinese moderation. But we have no sense of how the disarray within the Chinese leadership actually affected his bargaining posture or might have shaped Soviet policy. Similarly,

¹⁰²*FBIS-SOV*, May 16, 1989, p. 25.

¹⁰³Author's notes from the May 15, 1989, Chinese press briefing.

¹⁰⁴*FBIS-CHI*, May 16, 1989, p. 27.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, p. 28.

¹⁰⁶*Los Angeles Times*, June 25, 1989.



Soviet and Chinese party chiefs Mikhail Gorbachev and Zhao Ziyang confer on May 16, 1989, during the first Sino-Soviet summit meeting in 30 years.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

although we can certainly assume that the Chinese leadership was distracted, divided, humiliated, and angered by the demonstrations, there is no evidence of the impact of these factors on the summit's outcome.

However, the events leading up to the summit and the course of the summit itself are not the whole story. The frustration and division of the Chinese leadership—barely hidden during the summit itself—would soon erupt into purges and the brutal suppression of the pro-democracy movement as a humiliated Deng Xiaoping viciously turned on his colleagues and the people of China after Gorbachev left. Although these events occurred after the summit, they were an integral part of it. Now the vulnerabilities of Gorbachev's approach to China's domestic turmoil and of the terms of normalization were apparent.

Post-Tiananmen Sino-Soviet Relations

Late in the evening of May 19, the day after Mikhail Gorbachev's departure from China, Prime Minister Li Peng, in a televised address, imposed martial law on parts of Beijing. Zhao Ziyang, who had last been seen paying a tearful, early morning visit to the students in

Tiananmen, was conspicuously absent. In the more than two weeks that followed this declaration of martial law, China seemed to be drifting uncertainly. At the apex of power, it gradually became apparent that Zhao and his policy of moderation toward the protesters had lost to those ready to take a more coercive approach. As the leadership became more inflexible, the students became more unyielding and provocative. Refusing to heed their leaders' calls that they vacate the square, they constructed a 30-foot "goddess of freedom and democracy." Finally, after a number of abortive attempts to clear the square, on the evening of June 3–4, the People's Liberation Army with massive armored support swept into the center of Beijing. The protests were brutally and murderously ended.

This, of course, was not the outcome that the Soviet side had wanted—or had even expected. On May 18, as Gorbachev left China, Moscow television told its viewers: "We are not going to make any predictions but the fact that things are moving in the direction of a political solution is excellent."¹⁰⁷ Given the chaotic state of the Beijing streets on that day, this statement was wish-

¹⁰⁷FBIS-SOV, May 19, 1989, p. 29.

ful thinking. But it was also understandable in light of Gorbachev's stake in such a solution. In the uncertain weeks that followed the summit meeting and the aftermath of the military action against the demonstrators, Soviet media and leadership statements had to grapple with the problem of responding to events in China both in light of the importance of what Gorbachev had at stake politically and the importance of preserving the diplomatic gains of the summit.

Although a widely-reported TASS dispatch that Chinese "authorities have practically lost control over the situation" was not typical of all Soviet reporting, commentaries on events in China in the aftermath of the Soviet leader's departure, but before the clearing of the square, captured much of the ferment of these days. While there were only the slightest suggestions of leadership differences, there was reportage of troops being turned back, of the ebb and flow of student demonstrations, and of the extensive evidence of the disruption of normal life in Beijing.¹⁰⁸ Yet along with this depiction of chaos, the themes staked out during the summit remained. Politburo member and Gorbachev ally Aleksandr Yakovlev spoke of the "enthusiasm" of the Chinese people, while Vitaliy Kobyshev, a commentator for *Izvestiya*, spoke effusively of how *perestroika* had "opened up the hearts of the Chinese," making the Soviet Union "not just interesting but . . . close."¹⁰⁹ The Soviet media described the demonstrations as a positive movement suffering from youthful enthusiasm, but being "heard by the whole of Chinese society."¹¹⁰ Finally, the continued Soviet emphasis on the similarity of problems facing both societies and the prominence of statements on the importance of a peaceful solution, bespoke a continued Soviet commitment to a solution of China's problems through "democratic" and "legal" methods.¹¹¹

The final, murderous denouement in Beijing could not have been farther from the peaceful resolution that Gorbachev had hoped for nor could it have come at a worse time for him. Gorbachev's attempt to link Chinese and Soviet reforms to reap domestic and foreign policy gains seemed to backfire just as policies on both fronts entered crucial phases. Domestically, during the end of May, the newly instituted Congress of People's Deputies with its many dissident voices went into session and immediately addressed the use of force in Georgia the month before as well as the violence in Uz-

bekistan that had broken out during the first week in June. With the Soviet Union taking a major step toward political dialogue, the pressures on Gorbachev to demonstrate to skeptics his commitment to peaceful change by distancing himself from Chinese methods was undoubtedly strong. Lest there be any doubt that such pressures existed, on June 5, Boris Yel'tsin made them explicit by likening the Beijing events to those in Georgia.¹¹² On the foreign policy front, Gorbachev arrived in the Federal Republic of Germany on June 12 to renew a major effort to promote himself abroad as one committed to new thinking in international relations and to peaceful reform in socialist countries. The Soviet advance team had been questioned on the China issue and a position on it would be necessary.¹¹³

Soviet public commentary on the events of June 3-4 captured much of the chaos and bloodshed of the moment, and used such words as "tragic" to characterize the incident.¹¹⁴ However, it also made clear that those concerned with Soviet reform should draw two lessons from these happenings.¹¹⁵ The first was that "all sorts of excesses" can occur during the reform process. The second, the result of drawing explicit parallels with events in Georgia, was that both events were tragedies, which only emphasized the importance of the "skill of peacefully solving internal conflicts." The resolution on China adopted by the Congress of People's Deputies pursued this theme, stressing the importance of seeking "adequate political solutions determined by the aims of consolidating society" and expressing the hope "that wisdom, common sense and a balanced approach will prevail."¹¹⁶ The events in Tiananmen thus took on a meaning in the Soviet domestic reform dialogue quite different from that which had prevailed during the Sino-Soviet summit. They became a way of cautioning those at home who might try to go too quickly with reform even though the Congress of People's Deputies resolution pledged a continuing commitment to *glasnost'* and peaceful reform.¹¹⁷ Moscow was also sensitive to the importance of not appearing out of step with the international outcry that greeted the military action. For example, Gerasimov depicted the Soviet leaders as "extremely dismayed," and the head of Novosti

¹⁰⁸This discussion is based on my reading of *FBIS-SOV* for this period.

¹⁰⁹*FBIS-SOV*, May 22, 1989, p. 18, and June 1, 1989, p. 17.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, May 19, 1989, p. 29.

¹¹¹See, for example, *ibid.*, May 19, 1989, p. 29; and May 24, 1989, pp. 18-19. The quotations are from the Soviet reporting about Wan Li.

¹¹²*FBIS-SOV*, June 5, 1989, p. 11.

¹¹³They characterized it as "regrettable." *Ibid.*, June 6, 1989, p. 13.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, June 6, 1989, pp. 9-13.

¹¹⁵See *ibid.*, p. 13, and June 16, 1989, p. 9.

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, June 8, 1989, p. 9.

¹¹⁷Some seemed unconvinced regarding this latter point. For example, an Estonian radio broadcast, which criticized the Soviet Congress's statement as "quite weak" and intended "not to upset the Chinese leadership," argued that it demonstrated that "to the Soviet Union, the state regime is . . . more important than human rights." *Ibid.*, June 13, 1989, p. 9.

Press Agency spoke of "joining Moscow's voice" to other countries' condemnation of the use of force.¹¹⁸

Yet, this was not quite true. Moscow's voice was not identical to those in the West. It had qualities that gave clear evidence of an attempt to modulate criticism in such a way as not to sacrifice the goodwill of the summit. Thus, in broadcasts beamed to China, Soviet commentators continued the theme of a common reform effort and noted, sympathetically, that in both countries "sometimes things may go too far" and that Moscow had learned from the "painful experience" of Georgia the "negative consequences of using force."¹¹⁹ This mild rebuke was, however, balanced by Soviet reliance on Chinese communiqués as sources and the acknowledgment that "at some moment the character of the action [in Tiananmen] changed."¹²⁰ Moreover, in an attempt to distance Moscow from China's critics in the West, despite the extensive commentary cited above, the Soviet press ostentatiously abjured any intent to influence internal events in China and strongly criticized those who sought to pressure Beijing or impose sanctions.¹²¹ Finally, in contrast with the West, the Soviets did attempt to maintain the impression of "business as usual," as symbolized by events such as the Chinese foreign minister's visit to Moscow and the arrival of a Kazakh trade delegation in China.¹²²

In sum, although foreign and domestic pressures conditioned a somewhat critical Soviet approach to post-summit developments in China, there was also room to demonstrate goodwill and to preserve the momentum of the summit. Indeed, it appeared at first glance as though the Soviet Union was, in the spirit of the earlier triangular politics, once again positioning itself to be the beneficiary of China's worsening relations with the outside world. And, from the initial indications of global reaction to the military suppression of the pro-democracy movement by Chinese authorities, there seemed, on the surface at least, to be great potential for Soviet gain.

The decision to use force against the pro-democracy movement only intensified the failures of the summit for China's leaders and further complicated China's relationship to the international environment. A country that for more than a decade had struggled to be accepted as a responsible and stable regional and international actor was, once again, viewed with distrust. Although

the actual scope and impact of official sanctions was unclear, China found itself condemned by Japan and the Western industrialized nations. As important multi-lateral aspects of foreign economic relations (Asian Development Bank loans, GATT membership, etc.) became endangered, Beijing was faced with the difficult task of reassuring an edgy international business community. With the economic reform at a critical point, China confronted the specter of eroding international financial and technological support.

Similarly, the nation's diplomatic position suffered from the international perception of political uncertainty. In Southeast Asia, latent distrust of China was rekindled just as the settlement in Cambodia reached a crucial juncture. The rapid change in China's domestic climate prompted calls to reassess the Sino-British agreement regarding Hong Kong, and endangered important ground recently gained in promoting economic and cultural relations with Taiwan. Finally, of course, the events in Beijing rekindled the human rights issue in Sino-American relations. As the authorities expelled American journalists amid charges that Washington was interfering in China's domestic affairs, anti-American polemics reached a pitch not heard for more than a decade.

In this international climate, the somewhat moderate—even supportive—stance taken by the Soviet Union might have seemed to some in Beijing to represent a major accomplishment of the summit. Chinese reporting of Soviet statements and actions was, of course, intended to convey an impression of support.¹²³ But there were more concrete indications that Beijing was looking to the Soviet Union. Toward the end of May, as Western nations displayed some chariness in the face of growing instability, a Hong Kong newspaper reported that Yao Yilin told a "high level meeting of the State Council" that a decision had been made "to immediately increase economic and trade cooperation with the Soviet Union by a big margin as a countermeasure to the possible reduction of loans offered by the United States, Japan, and other Western countries."¹²⁴

Supportive Soviet statements and this report of Chinese leadership thinking are, of course, reminiscent not of a "new era" in Sino-Soviet relations, but rather of an earlier triangular pattern. Was all of the talk of a changed international environment and a new relationship, which preceded and accompanied the summit, simply rhetoric covering the further refinement and development of a very familiar triangular pattern of international relations in the Far East? Perhaps. But the simi-

¹¹⁸RFE-RL, *Report on The USSR*, June 16, 1989, p. 36; and FBIS-SOV, June 16, 1989, p. 9.

¹¹⁹FBIS-SOV, June 14, 1989, p. 11.

¹²⁰Ibid.

¹²¹See, for example, *ibid.*, June 7, 1989, p. 10; and June 8, 1989, pp. 7-8.

¹²²Ibid., June 13, 1989, p. 9; and June 16, 1989, p. 9.

¹²³See, for example, FBIS-CHI, June 12, 1989, p. 7.

¹²⁴Ibid., May 31, 1989, p. 2.

larity was superficial. These events, which seem to fit so easily into such a framework, actually demonstrate a quite different point: that the international environment and the "new thinking" that was the basis for the summit actually serve to inhibit such triangular politics.

Thus, one senses the presence of Gorbachev's new thinking in post-summit Soviet policy toward China. Of course, the opportunity to reap some of the benefits of Sino-American tensions could not be ignored. But Soviet statements suggest that policy toward China in this period was still being shaped by those goals that brought the Soviet leader to Beijing: the imperative of domestic reform and the need to improve the Soviet Union's political image and economic position in Asia. According to this calculus, Soviet interests might be better served by maintaining some distance from China, rather than rushing to play triangular politics.

Gorbachev had gone to Beijing seeking to associate the Soviet Union with China's dynamic reform and to enlist China's reform movement, along with those in Poland and Hungary, as part of an international constituency that could be used to promote reform in the Soviet Union.¹²⁵ Events in Beijing moved China out of such a grouping, making it a less attractive partner. A retrogressive movement in China did not serve the Soviet leader's interests as much as a reforming one. Of course, a China on the road of reform also had been expected to serve Soviet interests in more concrete ways. The post-normalization relationship was to have had a strong economic and arms control component. For the near future, there seems to be little likelihood of Chinese initiatives in these areas, thus further diminishing the probable gains to Moscow from a tilt toward the Chinese side.

Broader Soviet diplomatic objectives also argued against the logic of earlier triangular politics. At the summit, it was clear that policy toward China was part of a more extensive reassessment of policy toward Asia. With China rocked once more by domestic turmoil, marginalized in international affairs, and viewed with distrust in Asia, it made little sense to associate closely with it. China suddenly had become a weak bridge to Asia. Gorbachev's Asian offensive thus needed to proceed in other ways. Accordingly, there was little let-up in the thrust of Moscow's policy toward Asia that had accompanied the summit. Soviet statements highlighted the impact of the summit on "peace, security, and cooperation" in all of Asia, and the Soviet Union continued efforts to promote ties with South Korea and

Japan.¹²⁶ Whether this Asian policy will be successful is uncertain. Soviet policy in Asia still has to confront the formidable obstacles posed by territorial disputes, distrust, and Moscow's weak economic position—Gorbachev has a long way to go before he establishes the kind of credibility in Asia that he has in Europe. Moreover, it may well be that Gorbachev will slow his efforts in Asia to focus on more likely and dramatic gains in Europe. But, at this writing, the indications are that he remains committed to his Asian effort, an effort that would benefit from an image of Soviet moderation and stability as well as greater distance from China.

Of course, the development of Sino-Soviet relations in the previous triangular pattern is not dependent only on Soviet behavior; forces must also be operative on the Chinese side. But here, too, there are suggestions that such politics might be blunted by recent global and domestic developments. Despite the bravado that characterized the rhetoric of the days immediately following the crushing of the pro-democracy movement, there seems to be a growing recognition in Beijing that the nation cannot easily close the door to the West. The demonstrators have been cleared from Tiananmen Square, but the economic and social problems that brought them there remain. If China is to find its way out of the current crisis in the post-Mao reform, it will need support from the outside.

Clearly the still-limited structure and content of Sino-Soviet economic relations are not up to this task. Particular provinces in China such as Heilongjiang might be expected to press for expanded ties with the Soviet Union. However, such relationships could in no way substitute for the capital and technology that is needed from the West. Moreover, although the initial international outrage at the events in Tiananmen Square raised doubts about continued support from the West, it is possible that over time such outrage might abate. There is, thus, little incentive for China to rush into expanded Soviet economic ties that could not substitute for Western support and that might serve to engender even more distrust of China.

Finally, in mirror-image fashion, it is very possible that the issue of reform politics conditioned a preference for a more distant relationship in Beijing just as it had done in Moscow. The attraction of Western democracy for the Tiananmen demonstrators was obvious. But the Chinese leaders surely have also noted their idealization of Gorbachev and his policies. And as one Chinese dissident has noted, whereas there were "pretexts" for attacking Western bourgeois thought, there is "no ideo-

¹²⁵Zvi Gitelman has suggested the existence of such a constituency. See his "The Transfer of Reforms among Communist States," unpublished ms.

¹²⁶*FBIS-SOV*, June 5, 1989, pp. 17–18; June 7, 1989, p. 10; June 8, 1989, p. 10; and June 12, 1989, pp. 13–14.

logical concept to resist" Marxist, Soviet influence.¹²⁷ For this reason, many Chinese leaders view reformist ideologies from socialist countries as more dangerous than Western democratic notions. At a time of political crackdown, such concerns would join with residual distrust of Soviet strategic motives and the need for Western support to modulate a shift within the triangle by China.

In short, the events of the summit and after it suggest caution in making any predictions about the future of Sino-Soviet relations. To be sure, after the suppression of the pro-democracy movement and the expression of Western outrage, there were certainly suggestions that the triangular politics of the past were at work. But there were also suggestions that the old formulas had lost some of their logic and potency for both China and the Soviet Union. However, the present shape of Sino-Soviet relations by no means exhausts the possible permutations suggested by the summit and the events that followed. The scenario described above assumes domestic political configurations in China and the Soviet Union that are by no means certain to continue in the future. Should they change, given the logic of the argument presented above, the nature of the relations between the two countries would also change.

For example, the recent miners' strike and continued nationality unrest in the USSR are reminders that the continuation of a reformist Soviet Union is by no means assured. Should Mikhail Gorbachev's policies change or should he be overthrown by more conservative elements, then the chemistry of Sino-Soviet relations would certainly change. A less reformist Soviet leadership would not operate under the same constraints as Gorbachev in seeking to exploit Chinese contradictions with the West and might, in fact, find kindred spirits in Beijing. It would also be a leadership less enamored of contact with the capitalist world and more willing to explore expanded relations with the more conservative post-Tiananmen leadership. A bond of common opposition to reformist socialism could, thus, prove a substantial foundation for a reconsideration of the nature of relations between the Soviet Union and China.

Conversely, of course, the leadership in China might change after Deng's death and return to the reformist path championed by Zhao Ziyang. Assuming that reform continues to dominate Soviet politics, one could imagine a renewal of the kind of rapport that seemed to exist between Zhao and Gorbachev at the summit. Although the inhibitions to an intimate Sino-Soviet rela-

tionship identified above would persist, there is also reason to expect that shared political agendas and challenges could present a very different, and quite unprecedented, basis for the relationship between the two countries. Of course, should such a change in China be accompanied by reversal in the Soviet Union, the situation would be different again, resembling a mirror image of that prevailing today: Beijing, anxious to maintain its reformist image and distrustful of Soviet motives, would keep its distance.

These scenarios, of course, do not exhaust all the possible outcomes within each country or their effect on Sino-Soviet relations. For example, both in China and the Soviet Union there are reformers as well as anti-reformers whose views go beyond the parameters suggested earlier. It is also clear that different permutations in the implicit matrix developed above will shape the various issue areas in the Sino-Soviet relationship differently. In its present form, then, this discussion can only be of heuristic value. But it does suggest that dramatic developments in Chinese domestic politics played a paradoxical role with respect to the sixth Sino-Soviet summit. By taking world attention away from somewhat lackluster meetings, these politics tended to mask the potential for development that exists in Sino-Soviet relations.

A central purpose of this essay has been to draw away that mask by presenting the meetings as the final stage in an impressive reconstitution of Sino-Soviet relations that had been going on for nearly a decade. The hectic nature of the summit, the distraction of many of its participants, and its meager diplomatic output should not obscure the fact that the basic scaffolding for a broadly-based and full bilateral Sino-Soviet relationship that resulted from this incremental process remains intact. This being the case, the issue becomes the identification of those factors that might energize the relationship and shape its future direction. In this respect, China's domestic turmoil has played a very different role, illuminating rather than masking, potential. The discussion of actual and possible permutations of post-summit Sino-Soviet relations suggests that although the actions of third states will continue to play an unquestioned part in shaping the future direction of these relations, the salience of domestic politics and ideology must not be overlooked. These internal and ideological sources of change in the relationship constitute a clear thread of consistency running back to the 1940's. Their persistence suggests that, as was the case in the past, Sino-Soviet relations will continue to frustrate the efforts of external actors either to affect or to predict their future course.

¹²⁷The dissident was Yan Jiaqi, quoted in *The New York Times*, May 14, 1989.

Note

Problems of CPSU Historiography

George M. Enteen

PARTY historians, those historians who specialize in the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), make up almost half the historians in the Soviet Union. This note examines whether party historians have, in the light of *glasnost'*, modified any of their assumptions about the nature of the historical process and the character of historical knowledge. Its tentative conclusion is that some party historians have questioned fundamental propositions about party history, but they have by no means carried the day. Party historians have been less bold than historians in other fields and much less bold than writers of *belles-lettres*. Their questioning has, however, breached the unity of outlook prized by party leaders. Some have also cast doubt on the desirability of such unity.

Two kinds of evidence are pertinent to this investigation. The first consists of discourses about party historiography itself, the reflections of historians about the nature of their undertaking and their prescriptions for its restructuring. The second consists of actual examples of investigations into party history. I have selected for analysis two recent articles that seek to assess the impact of Stalin.¹ This second source of evidence is the more problematic. Many historians inside and outside the Soviet Union question whether party historiography is genuine scholarship, because they maintain that the

preconceptions of party historians and the constraints under which they work not only inhibit, but block investigation. This generalization requires modification. Works of authentic scholarship in party history can be found in increasing number. They exist side by side with works in a more traditional vein.

Party Historiography and *Glasnost'*

Party historiography embraces a range of issues that concern the methods, sources, and content of research and writing on the CPSU. The purpose of party historiography has long been ideological and political: it was a body of work designed to legitimate the leading role of the CPSU in Soviet society, to praise the party's achievements, and to denigrate the party's enemies. However, as recent reflections on party historiography show, some party historians wish to bring party history as such more in line with a conception of historical research that seeks to understand the past, not to sanctify the present.

The role of party historiography. In most societies and in most fields, research sets the pace for public understanding. For example, historical research more than anything else determines understanding of the past. The historians' hypotheses and findings enter into popular works, including textbooks. One mark of a good textbook is that it succeeds in incorporating up-to-date results of research.

In the Soviet Union, especially where party history is concerned, this situation is reversed. In this field, textbooks set the pace, in particular, textbooks on party

George M. Enteen teaches Russian history at the Pennsylvania State University (College Park, PA). He has written a number of works about Soviet historiography, including *The Soviet Scholar-Bureaucrat: M. N. Pokrovskii and the Society of Marxist Historians (1978)* and with Tatiana Gorn and Cheryl Kern, *Soviet Historians and the Study of Russian Imperialism (1979)*. An article of his about Pokrovskiy was recently published in *Voprosy Istorii* (May 1989). He is studying the work of E. M. Yaroslavskiy.

¹Natalya V. Illeritskaya, "The Party-Historical Creativity of E. M. Yaroslavskiy," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* (Moscow), November 1987, pp. 93-107; I. L. Man'kovskaya and Yu. P. Sharapov, "The Cult of Personality and Party-Historical Science," *ibid.*, May 1988, pp. 57-70.

history. This practice appeared in some measure even in the 1920's, but it reached its zenith from 1938 to the death of Stalin in 1953. In 1938, the *Short Course of the History of the Soviet Communist Party (b)* (hereafter—the *Short Course*) appeared, and the CPSU proclaimed that work to be the official version of party history. This textbook was the point of orientation for research historians; it posed the essential questions and set the boundaries of the permissible.

The traditional role of the textbook on party history has been called into question by P. Rodionov, a member of the academic council of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. In a genuinely enlightened article in the June 14, 1988, edition of *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, Rodionov examined Mikhail Gorbachev's call for the formation of a CPSU Central Committee commission to work with a commission of historians in preparing a new textbook on party history. Rodionov drew a parallel between Gorbachev's proposal and the circumstances surrounding the *Short Course*, which was edited by Boris Ponomarev. He argued that Ponomarev's position in the Central Committee and his eventual candidate membership in the Politburo stifled all criticism of the *Short Course*. Rodionov feared the possibility that the new book might acquire a "semiofficial" character, making it a "sacred annal," and thereby hinder the development of creative thought. Instead, Rodionov proposed the creation of some sort of competitive arrangement to produce a new textbook, as well as new popular works and children's literature about party history.²

The epistemological standing of CPSU documents.

It has long been the practice of party historians to treat party documents as a source of absolute truth and therefore binding on everyone, historians and non-historians alike. Every decision contained in party resolutions was presumed correct. The documents could become a point of departure for discourse but were not themselves deemed a proper object of investigation.

This situation, too, has begun to change. Nikolay N. Maslov, who holds a chair in party history at the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee, is at present the foremost authority in the field of party historiography. He also seems to be the main force behind a push to desanctify party documents. In an article discussing the desirable properties of a textbook on party history, Maslov called for the study of the "causes

of the appearance of one or another party document, which must be analyzed not in itself, but in close connection with historical conditions."³ The fullest assertion of this same idea was made in a seminar on party historiography by A. A. Chernobayev, who is a member of Maslov's department (*kafedra*).⁴ Chernobayev rejected the prevailing view that only the documents of lower party organs, but not those of the Moscow center, require the establishment of their authenticity and reliability, and that documents of the lower organs ought to conform to those of the higher bodies. Indeed, the prevailing view illustrates one of the chief "dogmas" of party historiography: "Absolute truth is contained in party documents, truth in the final instance." Chernobayev argued that under the impact of this dogma, historians construe party documents as normative assertions and provide commentary instead of analysis. Chernobayev also maintained that if historians intend to fill the "blank spots" of party history, they must have access to all documents. Only then can they examine the concrete conditions of the creation of a document. Without access to archives, historians see only the final product, not the stages of its development. They are ignorant of the range and complexity of sources and thus can deal with them only as propagandists.

In his own report to the seminar, Maslov further developed this thesis. He urged "liberation from the deeply rooted dogma that all party documents, in their capacity as historical sources, are trustworthy (*dostovernyye*) in the highest degree, and therefore do not require analysis and need not be subjected to scholarly criticism."⁵ Maslov proceeded to distinguish two aspects or functions of party documents: they are at once a directive and a source. As a directive, the documents have normative force, but not for all time. The normative import should prevail for a period of time between party congresses or for the duration of an economic plan. Then the documents become merely sources, evidence about the past. Maslov further stipulated that even when it serves as a directive, a document must also be examined as a source.⁶ But Maslov did not confront the dilemma that the two functions of the document might lead a historian in opposite directions. How should the historian proceed when the source still functions as a directive but if, in his or her view, it was engendered by considerations of power and was dys-

²Early in 1989 a textbook on the history of the USSR appeared for secondary-school students. As of September 1989, a textbook on party history had yet to appear. See Vera Tolz, "New History Textbook for Secondary Schools," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), Sept. 1, 1989, pp. 5-7.

³"What the New Textbook on Party History Should Look Like," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, July 1987, p. 54.

⁴"The Documents of the CPSU as Historical Sources," *ibid.*, February 1988, p. 152.

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 153

functional with respect to its avowed goal? The mood of the seminar was reformist, with the participants intent upon filling the "blank spots." But the proposals of Maslov and Chernobayev found little resonance and can hardly be said to have won endorsement.

Partiynost'. Party-mindedness, a well-known principle of Leninism, when applied to historical writing asserts, first of all, that all scholarship justifies a particular class interest. It asserts, second, that Marxism is distinctive in its explicit acknowledgment of this fact and in its overt willingness to place historical writing in the service of the proletariat and its conscious vanguard, the communist party. *Partiynost'* is said to encompass the concept of objectivity: the open adherence to party-mindedness is the royal road to objectivity, because the defense of proletarian interests, the building of socialism, represents what is best for all mankind and thus constitutes the highest possible objectivity.⁷

Mark A. Varshavchik, a prolific specialist on the methods and problematics of party history, has provided a new emphasis in recent discussions of *partiynost'* by attempting to bring the concept of objectivity into clearer focus. He argues that party-mindedness by no means ensures objectivity. The "dialectical unity" between *partiynost'* and objectivity has been misunderstood, Varshavchik contends:

*The pretense of objectivity in the face of minimizing or ignoring partiynost'. . . is the purest form of bourgeois objectivism. But partiynost' without objectivity (or if the latter is relegated to a subordinate position) can turn into political babble, subjectivism of the sort that Lenin had in mind in speaking of the harm of "logomachy pretending to be communist conscientiousness."*⁸

Without objectivity, *partiynost'* is mere partisanship; without *partiynost'*, objectivity is mere pretense of detachment that conceals service to the bourgeoisie. Varshavchik indicates that the twin concepts have been out of balance in Soviet usage and their interaction incorrect, to the detriment of objectivity. The result was that party historians described "not how things had been," but conducted research and writing "as required." His use of the term objectivity is sometimes unclear and perhaps not entirely consistent. It is to him a cognitive, not an ethical concept. That is to say, under-

standing objectivity requires epistemological analysis rather than normative evaluation. Nevertheless, Varshavchik treats objectivity as an ethical concept, urging both fair-mindedness and an obligation to resist arbitrary authority.⁹

Periodization. Anyone who has devised a syllabus for a history course and earmarked assignments into separate categories has performed an exercise in periodization.¹⁰ It is implicit in any construction of events that goes beyond mere chronology and assumes narrative form. To know that the past differs from the present is the beginning of historical consciousness; to perceive that one historical age differs from another constitutes a further refinement and represents an achievement that has not been attained in all cultures. Such consciousness grows out of the discovery that human experience deposits traces more durable than "the pattern of last year's wind on the surface of a lake. . . ."¹¹ The historian seeking to depict the past construes reality "under the modality of a 'pastness' [that is] both distinct from and continuous with 'the present'."¹²

Bertram Wolfe has written that "one of the peculiarities of Soviet historiography is its obsession with 'periodization'."¹³ Soviet historians turn to it particularly in periods of change, but periodization is virtually a habit, for it flows out of Marx's materialist conception of history, which views all of history as a sequence of modes of production through which mankind passes from primitive communism to a classless society of abundance. Lenin also cherished the practice of periodization, because it provided various schemata of the history of the revolutionary movement and of the party.

Periodization provides the framework of meaning for party historiography, an infrastructure of control, and a scaffolding for the regime's mythology. As a mode of constituting the field of historical discourse, periodization assigns explicit meaning to long stretches of time and implicit meaning to the specific events that take place within them. Functioning as a master narrative, periodization determines the structure of the specific

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Robert O. Crummey, "Periodizing 'Feudal' Russian History," *Russia and Eastern European History: Selected Papers from the Second World Congress on Soviet and East European Studies*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1984, p. 17.

¹¹Herbert Butterfield, *The Origins of History*, New York, Basic Books, 1981, p. 17.

¹²Hayden White, *The Content of Form: Narrative Form and Historical Representation*, Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987, pp. 88-89.

¹³Bertram Wolfe, *Revolution and Reality: Essays on the Origin and Fate of the Soviet System*, Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina Press, 1981, p. 117.

⁷*Sovetskaya istoricheskaya entsiklopediya* (The Soviet Historical Encyclopedia), Vol. 9, Moscow, Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1966, cols. 396-98.

⁸Mark A. Varshavchik, "The Primary Orientator—The Laws of History," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, October 1987, p. 79.

narratives that contain accounts of wars, party congresses, etc. It prejudices whether a specific act is progressive or regressive with respect to history's goal of communism. The master narrative defines what is a historical fact, what and who is incidental and accidental, what is foreground, and what is background.

Periodization has served as an important bulwark of Stalinism and neo-Stalinism by relegating whole classes of facts to the background or by making them non-facts with respect to ultimate goals. This ideological objective is achieved by characterizing a period in terms of such abstractions as forces of production and production relations, which are deemed objective factors. The allegedly real effects of history are measured by changes in social structures and forms of property, which, in turn, indicate the mode of exploitation and whether, indeed, exploitation exists at all. Periodization—the story of the operation of history's "objective" forces—is the basis for the mythology that Soviet history is the story of the building of a society without exploitation. In this regard, as a methodological principle and in combination with *partiynost'*, periodization is the functional equivalent for historians of the doctrine of socialist realism for writers of *belles-lettres*. By contrast, subjective factors—history that works itself out on the backs of people—account for the differences between history as taught in Soviet books and history that one learns from one's father.¹⁴

In this light, periodization reflects the regression from historical consciousness to a more primitive way of thinking about history. It opened the way to a revival of mythical consciousness in the form of word magic.¹⁵ Periodization reduced each period and each separate socioeconomic formation to an essence. Each event and person derived its historical meaning from that essence, and systematic confusion between the essence and empirical referent prevailed. Reasoning began and ended with the assigning of a dominant attribute to each period, which was taken to denote its essence and the essence of the society being investigated in that period. Any society deemed socialist had to be seen as nonexploitative and peaceful, no matter what its specific arrangements and policies. Capitalist societies had to be seen as decaying and warlike, no matter

what their policies in a given situation. It is not the observable behavior of societies that form the basis of judgment about their historical role and worth, but their inner essence, defined in terms of property relations.

Since the 27th Congress of the CPSU in 1986, party historians have revived the discussion of periodization. Much of it merely echoed earlier discussions, but a few innovative points have emerged, notably from articles by Aleksandr I. Zevelev and L. M. Spirin. Zevelev has questioned some of the specific assertions regarding the conventional periodization of party history and some of the criteria used for the division of history into periods. Spirin has challenged one of the theoretical postulates of periodization. Both raise questions about the objectivity of schemata of periodization.

According to Zevelev, the "doctrine of socioeconomic formations provides the possibility of studying history as a law-governed process, which is composed of alternating periods that result from the action of objective causes and conditions."¹⁶ Essential for the discernment of periods is the reliance on such objective factors as the distinction between base and superstructure and the changes in the forces of production that are reflected in production relations. Therefore, for the periodization of party history, the development of the capitalist formation in Russia marks the point of departure. The emergence of a proletariat and the beginnings of revolutionary struggle led to the creation of a party of the new type, that is, a party based on Lenin's principles of "democratic centralism."

Using his discussion of periodization to establish the context, Zevelev criticizes the conventional notion that 1936, the year of the adoption of the so-called Stalin constitution, signified the completion of the building of a socialist society. Zevelev proclaims that in fact 1929 was a decisive moment in the history of the party: in that year, Stalin began his departure from Lenin's plan for the "realization of the New Economic Policy both in the city and especially in the countryside." Zevelev ascribed Stalin's decision to subjective factors.¹⁷ But in contrast to traditional party historiography, Zevelev attributes causal (or objective) significance to Stalin's subjective decision to engage in repression, because it resulted in movement away from socialist democracy and in crimes against the party and socialism. Zevelev went on to warn "if we forget this, history will avenge itself upon us."¹⁸

Zevelev is not the first specialist in party history to ac-

¹⁴"The only approved way [to talk about the past] is to show that, however bad things may have been for you, you nevertheless remain faithful to the ideas of Communism, always able to distinguish the truly important—our ultimate objective—from minor factors, such as your own ruined life." Nadezhda Mandelstam, *Hope Against Hope*, New York, Atheneum, 1970, p. 258.

¹⁵Ju. M. Lotman and B. A. Uspenskij, "Myth-Name-Culture," in Daniel P. Lucid, Ed., *Soviet Semiotics: An Anthology*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977, pp. 233–52.

¹⁶Aleksandr I. Zevelev, "Toward the Question of the Periodization of the History of the CPSU," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, December 1987, p. 72.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 78.

¹⁸*Ibid.*

knowledge subjective factors as causal agents. After all, according to Marx himself—as well as Stalin—ideas, when grasped by the masses, became weapons in their own right. But Zevelev, for the first time in party historiography, gives weight to subjective factors in a periodization scheme and attributes results of world historical significance—the deformation of socialism—to them. In this light, the cult of personality is not merely an excess or an error, but an event that affected the *objective* course of historical development.

In one respect, Zevelev's innovation is modest indeed and should have been made in 1956, because it is compatible with Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech to the 20th Congress of the CPSU. It also might be seen as no more than a finger pointed at the naked king.¹⁹ But precisely because the pointing takes place in the context of periodization, it jeopardizes the optimistic framework of party historiography, the view of party history as the story of progress and redemption.

Spirin's observation about periodization is terse but far-reaching in its implications. Although historical scholarship deals with objective reality, he argues that periodization of the historical process is a subjective process: "It is not, however, arbitrary, but reckons with change in historical actuality." Insofar as perception, especially of changing phenomena, has a "subjective character," various schemata of periodization will be put forth. These different schemata are to be expected, Spirin asserts, even within the framework of a single methodology, such as Marxism-Leninism. "The task consists, with the aid of collective discussions, free discussions, of working out a general line, achieving largely agreed-upon viewpoints. . . ."²⁰ It would seem to follow that subjective common agreement is the goal of periodization, rather than an objectively valid and binding scientific construct.

Potentially the most important aspect of Spirin's position is its legitimation of the existence of rival schemata of periodization of party history. If, in the unfolding of history, each period has a dominant value that serves as the basis for assigning ultimate significance to specific events occurring within that time-frame, then acknowledging that different assessments of periods are possible plays havoc with the very notion that an event has an objective and ultimate meaning.

Spirin uses Lenin and the uniqueness of his genius as an example of the operation of what he and his colleagues refer to as the subjective factor. Before anyone

else, Lenin's analysis of Russia's economic and social relations revealed that Russia stood at the brink of a socialist revolution, which is to say that he devised a new schema of periodization. Spirin's implication is that those who disagreed with Lenin were guilty merely of error, because they lacked his foresight; they were not class enemies or counterrevolutionaries. Spirin's immediate point of reference is the Left Communists, the party faction that stubbornly opposed Lenin during the negotiations with the German military command at Brest-Litovsk. It places Spirin in agreement with Mikhail Shatrov's depiction of these events on the Soviet stage. And, like Shatrov, Spirin implicitly abandons the Manichean model of history, which interprets every advance as a triumph over class enemies.²¹

The party as historical actor. Party historiography has traditionally held historical progress to be the outcome of ceaseless conflict between the party itself and its own internal opposition, which emerges as an inevitable manifestation of party life. It is precisely in the course of overcoming the opposition that the party finds the correct, "Leninist," line that impels history forward.²²

V. A. Kozlov has chipped away at this model on the pages of *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*.²³ He complains about the practice of ordering the past in terms of good and evil, and of ransacking history for rudiments of the present while passing over the "concrete historical contradictions" that characterize the historical process.²⁴

Kozlov probes more deeply in condemning the customary research design employed by party historians. The historian, after selecting a particular decision by the party for his investigation, reaches back to the beginning of the period and marks it as a precondition. He then traces the posing of a task and presents the decision itself. He concludes by announcing its implementation. Kozlov complains that this pattern of task and resolution suggests that Soviet party history moved in accord with some sort of "noncontradictory essence."

Party history becomes nothing more than a series of problem-solving exercises—the rational discernment

²¹For a discussion of Shatrov as a historical thinker, see David Joravsky, "Glasnost Theater," *New York Review of Books*, Nov. 10, 1988, pp. 34–39.

²²George M. Enteen, "The Stalinist Conception of Communist Party History," *Studies in Soviet Thought* (Hingham, MA), 37, 1989, pp. 259–74.

²³V. A. Kozlov, "The Historian and *Perestroika*," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, May 1987, pp. 110–22.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 113. Kozlov's work may be viewed as contemporary criticism of the "Whig interpretation of history," to use the phrase of Herbert Butterfield. According to this interpretation, the past is organized in light of present concerns and the present is viewed as the outcome of the exclusive efforts of the group with which the historian identifies. See, Butterfield, *The Whig Interpretation of History*, London, G. Bell and Sons, 1931.

¹⁹See the interview with M. Ya. Gefter, "Should They Fear Us?"

Twentieth Century and Peace (Moscow), August 1987, pp. 42–48.

²⁰L. M. Spirin, "Toward the Question of the Periodization of the History of the CPSU," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, September 1987, p. 80.

of goals followed by the search for appropriate means. For Kozlov, this procedure omits the fact that the "very tasks are formulated amidst sharp clashes of opinion that reflect the contradictions of real life." The results achieved "engender not just 'forward' [movement] but [arrangements that] produce new contradictions."²⁵ Genuine Marxism, according to the author, sees the exercise of reason resulting not in harmony, but in the creation of conditions that spawn new conflicts.

Case Studies

Two recent examples of party historiography reflect attempts by specialists to mine archives for new materials and to marshal evidence that previously had not appeared in party historiographical literature. On the surface, it would appear that much has changed. These new materials, however, ought to encourage a re-examination of the basic assumptions of party historiography—known as the "Leninist conception of party history"—which was conceptualized to help legitimate Stalin's dictatorship. The two articles show that the fundamental paradigm or the "deep structure" of party history remains intact.

The problem of falsification. In her article about Emelian Yaroslavskiy, a prominent member of Stalin's faction who was a leader in the field of party history, Natalya V. Illeritskaya demonstrates mastery of sources, including some found in the Central Party Archives. She displays knowledge of the extensive body of writings about Yaroslavskiy and has a command of the growing body of theoretical literature on party historiography. Some of the main ideas in the article come from the candidate's dissertation Illeritskaya defended in 1980, and some come from her book about Yaroslavskiy now in the final stages of preparation.

This article is exceptional in Soviet party historical literature for its display of affection on the author's part for the subject of her investigation. Illeritskaya's implicit thesis is that Yaroslavskiy was a victim of Stalin's cult of personality. This thesis contains some truth, of course; Yaroslavskiy, like everyone else, lived and worked in fear of Stalin. But, even slight knowledge of the matter reveals that Yaroslavskiy was a principal creator of the cult of personality. Hence, the ideological stance Illeritskaya assumes may be seen as a classic example of neo-Stalinism, in the sense that she is willing to sacrifice the historical reputation of Stalin for the sake of the Stalinist body of practices, ideas, and values exercised

and propagated by Stalin himself, his associates, and his successors.

The ostensible subject of Illeritskaya's study is Yaroslavskiy's growing effectiveness as a biographer of Lenin and his increasing prowess as a historian of the October Revolution. Her views of Yaroslavskiy may be summarized as follows. Yaroslavskiy overcame and rejected illusions as his position increasingly approached present-day views (which she shares). The mechanism of Yaroslavskiy's progress is his growing mastery of Lenin's own interpretation of the history of the Revolution; he gained this proficiency through the need to refute other views, especially Trotsky's. Bringing Lenin's *April Theses* into focus marked a major contribution. Yaroslavskiy achieved this mastery by successfully grasping the *April Theses* both as a major theoretical statement and as an event in the unfolding of Lenin's plan for the peaceful acquisition of power by the working class. The actual seizure of power must be seen as the working out of this plan. Lenin forged this strategy in the course of his struggle against views held by his opponents within the party. In turn, Yaroslavskiy owed his increasing command and authority to his ability to comprehend Lenin both as a historical actor and as a historian.

In Illeritskaya's depiction, Yaroslavskiy exemplifies the basic pattern of Soviet historiography. That is to say, Illeritskaya draws upon a specific paradigm or model of historiographical development and presents Yaroslavskiy as an example of its operation:

*The all-round mastery of the Leninist conception of socialist revolution on the part of Soviet historians was the condition for the creation of the scientific history of Great October. This in turn had important practical significance and was persistently bound up with the appraisal of perspectives on the building of socialism in the country, in the struggle against anti-Leninist currents and groups.*²⁶

Up to this point, Illeritskaya's study is orthodox. However, her work has another dimension that reveals itself when we see how she approaches Stalin and Stalinism. For, in depicting the relationship between Stalin and Yaroslavskiy, Illeritskaya raises the problem of falsification of history, when she writes about Yaroslavskiy's "deviations from historical truth."²⁷ According to Illeritskaya, these deviations ensued just after Stalin's direct intervention into historical scholarship by means of his

²⁵Kozlov, "The Historian and *Perestroika*," loc. cit., p. 119.

²⁶Illeritskaya, "The Party-Historical Creativity of E. M. Yaroslavskiy," loc. cit., p. 99.

²⁷Ibid., p. 98.

notorious letter to the editors of *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* late in 1931.²⁸ The letter, "Some Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism," marked the establishment of Stalin's ideological autocracy. Stalin dictated the findings historians were supposed to reach and the methods historians were supposed to use. The new version of history—called the Leninist conception of party history—exalted Lenin and elevated Stalin to Lenin's equal. Moreover, Stalin ordered that facts and documents were to be interpreted from the point of view of the present, that is, they were to be used in the political struggle on the side of Stalin against his alleged enemies. Ultimately, history became another means to legitimate Stalin's dictatorship. The Leninist conception of party history was not arrived at by historians studying Lenin's writings in the seclusion of the library. They mastered it amidst clashing expectations and struggles for power; it took shape in the atmosphere of a besieged fortress.

Stalin's letter provoked "unfounded" criticism of Yaroslavskiy, including the branding of some of his views as Trotskyite. But following Stalin's letter, Yaroslavskiy engaged in his own efforts at falsification, which Illeritskaya repudiates. These falsifications include his allegation that the Prague Conference of the party in 1912, which advanced Stalin to the Central Committee, and not the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1903, marked the creation of Bolshevism. They also include his tendency, shared by others, to elevate Stalin to a position parallel to Lenin's. His work reveals "zigzags and retreats, silences and exaggerations. It was necessary to squeeze through dogmas, and sometimes, alas, he was their prisoner and guardian. . . ."²⁹ Illeritskaya is eager to absolve Yaroslavskiy by placing the blame on Stalin.

But in moving toward this objective, she is awkwardly hesitant about Yaroslavskiy's writings before 1931. For example, prior to that year, Yaroslavskiy helped to create silence around and then falsify Stalin's conciliantist stance in February-March 1917 after his arrival in Petrograd but before Lenin's return and proclamation of the *April Theses*. In fact, Stalin shared this position with Lev Kamenev. At that time, Stalin indeed was skeptical about the Bolsheviks' ability to take power in the near future.³⁰ Yaroslavskiy blames Kamenev entirely.

Yaroslavskiy also helped to create the myth that the October Revolution was led by a party center, in which Stalin figured prominently, and not by the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, which Trotsky led as Chairman. Illeritskaya does not specifically mention the party center, but she endorses Yaroslavskiy's falsification by commending him for the stress he places on the role of the central organs of the party.³¹ As a result, she is not free of complicity in sustaining the dominance of the Leninist conception of party history created under Stalin, and its exaltation of Stalin, despite the evidence she has found to contradict it. Although Illeritskaya cites no primary sources, she repeats all the standard lies and clichés about Trotsky. As a methodologically sophisticated historian, she must suspect the accuracy of her own words about Trotsky, Nikolay Bukharin, and others.

If Illeritskaya had granted that Yaroslavskiy falsified the record before his ordeál in 1931,³² she would not merely have acknowledged his role in the creation of Stalinism. More important, Illeritskaya's work would have indicated that Stalinism is something different from and greater than Stalin himself, because Stalin's role and actions were beginning to be mythologized even before his directive appeared in *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya*. Not only was the Leninist conception of party history shaped and governed by the interests of Stalin's faction, but Stalin himself was shaped by this conception, because his own actions were, in part, a response to it.

But the implications of Illeritskaya's argument can be drawn out even further. At one point, she writes that the conditions created by Stalin's letter to *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* "influenced negatively the development of party historiography in its entirety."³³ Consequently, a re-examination on her part of all the premises of party historiography would seem to be in order. For Stalin did not merely terrorize his subjects; he locked into place a basic paradigm of party history that elevated victories over his rivals into the mainspring of historical progress.³⁴ Thus, Illeritskaya's own received ideas—the Stalinist version of party history that still dominates party historiography—were at fault. Illeritskaya refrained from exploring the implications of her findings for the

²⁸J. V. Stalin, *Sochineniya* (Works), Vol. 13, Moscow, Politicheskaya Literatura, 1952.

²⁹Illeritskaya, "The Party-Historical Creativity of E. M. Yaroslavskiy," loc. cit., p. 107.

³⁰Yaroslavskiy failed to repeat this error, or at any rate, did not impose it on his collaborator, I. I. Mints, in 1929 in the second volume of *Istoriia VKP (b)* (History of the Soviet Communist Party [b]), which he edited. This action provoked the wrath of Stalin in 1931.

³¹Illeritskaya, "The Party-Historical Creativity of E. M. Yaroslavskiy," loc. cit., p. 103.

³²See George M. Enten, "Writing Party History in the USSR: The Case of E. M. Yaroslavskiy," *Journal of Contemporary History* (London), 21, 1986, p. 327.

³³Illeritskaya, "The Party-Historical Creativity of E. M. Yaroslavskiy," loc. cit., p. 106.

³⁴See the remarks of M. Ya. Gefter in Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge*, New York, 1973, pp. 516–18.

basic paradigm of the party's history. She dealt with the problem of falsification by minimizing, by virtually denying, its impact on historical thought. Illeritskaya would not open her eyes to the conclusion she clearly implied—that hers was the Stalinist version of Leninism.

The cult of personality. I. L. Man'kovskaya and Yu. P. Sharapov have made a conscious and conscientious effort to fulfill the party command of restructuring historical scholarship.³⁵ Going beyond the mere filling-in of "blank spots," they undertake to begin writing the history of the cult of Stalin's personality in historical scholarship. Two subjects receive most of their attention—the events surrounding the celebration of Stalin's 50th birthday in 1929 and the events following the publication of Stalin's letter to *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* discussed above. The authors create a new perspective in Soviet party historiography by treating the cult of personality as more than incidental and seemingly accidental; they deem it a consequential phenomenon that requires serious investigation.

A picture emerges, drawn chiefly from the Central Party Archives, of Yaroslavskiy's agony in the wake of Stalin's letter; his ordeal persisted for more than a year and made him over into a willing falsifier. Man'kovskaya and Sharapov explain the cult chiefly as the work of two individuals aside from Stalin himself: Yaroslavskiy and Lazar Kaganovich.³⁶ As a point of contrast they promote Pavel Postyshev—a prominent party official—as the redeemer of party honor, through his effort to limit Stalin's cult.³⁷ They argue that Nadezhda Krupskaya, Lenin's widow, also deserves commendation. Like Illeritskaya, Man'kovskaya and Sharapov do not consider instances of Yaroslavskiy's falsification that occurred before 1931. They also fail to bring into their account relevant facts that have been established in Soviet historical literature, such as, for example, Stalin's and Kaganovich's instruction to Yaroslavskiy about how party history should be written,³⁸ and also the trail of falsehoods uttered in the course of Stalin's dispute with Trotsky.

The article exhibits a striking disproportion between the large amount of factual material the authors display and the narrow range of conclusions they draw. Man'kovskaya and Sharapov provide an impressive list of effects of the Stalin cult, but they fail to go beyond gen-

eralities in assessing the impact of Stalin's intervention on historical thought. They allege that in elevating Stalin, historians diminished the importance of Lenin, the masses, and the party. Such non-Marxist approaches were propagated as "subjectivism, dogmatism, and arbitrariness in the evaluation of events and people."³⁹

On the level of methodology, non-Marxist notions about the nature of the historical process gained currency as a result of the personality cult, according to the authors. The contradictory character of the past was lost sight of as the past came to be idealized. The "class approach to history and *partiynost'* of historical scholarship came to be counterpoised to objectivity." The authors manage to make such assertions without raising questions about the influence of the cult of personality on those ideas and assumptions that establish Soviet history as a history of progressive development. Perhaps most important, they manage to close their eyes to the influence of the Stalin cult on the Soviet understanding of Leninism and the Leninist conception of history.

A remarkable feature of this work is the authors' presentation of Stalin. Like Jehovah, he exists everywhere but is seen nowhere. His words are proclaimed from on high; the authors quote no conversations about him or with him or even debates in which he participated. None of his acts come into view. He is known through signs and by the behavior of such agents as Kaganovich and Yaroslavskiy. Coming to grips with Stalin's ghost is still a difficult matter for party historians.

It is remarkable, ingenious, and disquieting how well Sharapov and Man'kovskaya, like Illeritskaya, can accommodate so much new factual material to the traditional framework. They can even examine the cult of personality without forfeiting established assumptions whose origin can ultimately be traced to the cult itself.

Conclusion

First, playwrights such as Mikhail Shatrov and historians such as Roy Medvedev and Yuriy Afanas'yev attacked the traditional understanding of the Soviet past. Then, the mainstream of critical-minded historians, such as those who took over the editorial board of *Voprosy Istorii* early in 1988 assaulted many of the remaining myths. Party historiography, however, has changed much more slowly. Even if its basic assumptions have been impaired, the basic paradigm is largely intact in party journals, although it is scoffed at by society. It remains the story of the construction of a non-exploitative society—despite mistakes—by overcoming

³⁵Man'kovskaya and Sharapov, "The Cult of Personality," loc. cit.

³⁶It is curious that *Pamyat'*, the ultra-nationalist association, sees these same two individuals—both Jewish by birth—as the chief culprits in the destruction of Moscow and its churches and of Russian culture in general.

³⁷Man'kovskaya and Sharapov, "The Cult of Personality," loc. cit., p. 61.

³⁸See *Sovetskaya istoricheskaya entsiklopediya*, (Soviet Historical Encyclopedia), Vol. 7, Moscow, Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1965, col. 717.

³⁹Man'kovskaya and Sharapov, "The Cult of Personality," loc. cit., p. 58.

enemies within and without the party. It is still the sacred tale that was originally promulgated by Stalin and his associates.

A mixture of motives seems to be at work in the discourse about historiographical assumptions. Some historians, such as Man'kovskaya and Sharapov, are responding to the orders of the party leadership. They would refurbish the party's image without touching basic assumptions, but that has proved impossible. Only the re-imposition of punitive controls can forestall encroachment on the basic paradigm itself.

The motives of Maslov, Chernobayev, Varshavchik, and perhaps Zevelev and Spirin are somewhat differ-

ent. They seem to have been awaiting an opportunity to join the issue. And they are driven by the realization that they must respond to the ferment in society as a whole and in the historical profession in particular, if they are to retain a shred of relevance and even a trifle of authority as historians.

But to risk a broader generalization, the party has lost its ability to legitimate its rule on the basis of Lenin's charisma and the myth of socialism. Desanctification of party history, even in party journals, is at hand. The party must seek a rational foundation for its governance, or have recourse to new, and probably stridently chauvinistic, myths.

Books

Stalin: Revolutionary or Counterrevolutionary?

Robert V. Daniels

ROY MEDVEDEV. *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1989.

ROBERT H. McNEAL. *Stalin: Man and Ruler*. New York, New York University Press, 1988.

MICHAL REIMAN. *The Birth of Stalinism: The USSR on the Eve of the "Second Revolution."* Translated by George Saunders. Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1987.

ROBERT CONQUEST. *Stalin and the Kirov Murder*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1989.

HIROAKI KUROMIYA. *Stalin's Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers, 1928–1932*. Cambridge, England, and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1988.

CAN anything new be said about Stalinism? Indeed, yes. An end to new information and new interpretations is nowhere in sight, and the opening of Soviet sources and of genuine debate among Soviet historians promises to enliven the subject for years to come. At the same

FRANCESCO BENVENUTI. *Fuoco sui sabotatori! Stachanovismo e organizzazione industriale in Urss, 1934–1938*. Rome, Valerio Levi, 1988.

HANS-HENNING SCHRÖDER. *Industrialisierung und Partei-bürokratie in der Sowjetunion: Ein sozialgeschichtlicher Versuch über die Anfangsphase des Stalinismus (1928–1934)*. West Berlin, Osteuropa-Institut an der Freien Universität Berlin, 1988.

PAVEL CAMPEANU. *The Genesis of the Stalinist Social Order*. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1988.

time, *perestroika* seems to have written an end to the era of Stalinism and neo-Stalinism, so that one may now begin to look at this era from a somewhat more detached perspective, as a historical phenomenon with a beginning and an end.

The bounteous harvest of recent scholarship on the Stalin era, represented by the eminent works under review here, offers a wealth of new data, or new insights extracted from old sources, to add to the gory but still baffling picture of Joseph Stalin, the dictator who put such a searing stamp on the Soviet body politic.

Roy Medvedev, in *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism*, the revised and expanded version of his remarkable work of the 1960's, adds poignant personal stories of the Great Terror, related to him by survivors or other individuals with access to portions of the historical record. The late Robert McNeal re-mined the public record, of which he had such an authoritative command, to cast new light on the Stalin cult in *Stalin: Man and Ruler*. Michal Reiman (formerly of Prague and now of the Free University of Berlin) utilizes the bonanza of documentation that he unearthed in German archives to shed light on the key period of Stalin's takeover, 1927–29, in *The Birth of Stalinism: The USSR on the Eve of the "Second Revolution."* Robert Conquest reworks the story of the Kirov assassination in *Stalin and the Kirov Murder*, with the aid of new memoirs and *samizdat* material.

Robert V. Daniels is Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Vermont (Burlington) and author of numerous works on the history of the Soviet Union. A revised edition of his anthology, *The Stalin Revolution*, is scheduled to be published this fall.

Hiroaki Kuromiya (Indiana University), Francesco Benvenuti (University of Bologna), and Hans-Henning Schröder (University of Bochum) give us flesh-and-blood views of Stalin's industrialization campaign in their respective works: *Stalin's Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers, 1928–1932; Fuoco sui sabotatori! Stachanovismo e organizzazione industriale in Urss, 1934–1938* (Shoot the Saboteurs! Stakhanovism and Industrial Organization in the USSR, 1934–1938); and *Industrialisierung und Parteibürokratie in der Sowjetunion: Ein sozialgeschichtlicher Versuch über die Anfangsphase des Stalinismus* (Industrialization and Party Bureaucracy in the Soviet Union: A Social-Historical Essay on the Beginning Phase of Stalinism).

A contrasting approach is that of the Romanian dissident sociologist Pavel Campeanu in *The Genesis of the Stalinist Social Order*, the third book of his trilogy on Stalinism (it follows *The Syncretic Society* and *The Origins of Stalinism*), which aims at a highly abstract synthesis of the totalitarian model and the Marxian theory of property (Stalinism as a monopoly over property in the hands of a "supreme entity").

For a long time, the conventional wisdom about Stalin's "revolution from above" in the early 1930's held that Stalin's dictates, although harsh and cruel, were forward-looking and effective in forcing the Soviet Union to modernize and construct the economic base for victory in modern war and for superpower status thereafter. This view, perhaps illustrated most famously in the works of Isaac Deutscher, is being overwhelmed by events, as *glasnost'* under Mikhail Gorbachev reveals how hidebound, inefficient, and impoverished was the Stalinist system that the reformers have inherited. At the same time, the notion of the brutal efficacy of Stalinism is

being undermined by the new international wave of careful historical scholarship addressing the critical years of the 1930's. In its progress toward a truer appreciation of early Stalinist events, this scholarship seems to be moving away from facile generalizations about national needs and ideological imperatives, to a recognition of the chaotic character of these events and the often irrational response to them on the part of both the leaders and the led.

ONE of the inevitable difficulties in reconstructing any historical episode is to avoid reading our knowledge of subsequent outcomes into the history of earlier events. This hazard has been particularly apparent in the interpretation of the origins of Stalinism, which became a serious subject of study only after the purges, World War II, and the Cold War had intervened. It is all too easy to see Stalin's earlier moves as calculated steps in the creation of his ultimate despotism, and to attribute to him in the early stages of this grand design more personal power and discretion than he actually disposed of at the time.

The salient virtues of the new studies on Stalinism are that they depict the scene close up and let contemporary documents speak for themselves. They thereby highlight how tentative was Stalin's personal power and the direction of his program, up until the purges. The picture of Stalin that emerges is one of a shrewd opportunist, in the strictest sense of the word, who waited for opportunities to arise that he could exploit to embarrass his political opponents and attack the people he hated. Such episodes are legion. Note, for example, Stalin's maneuvers against the Left and Right oppositionists recounted by Reiman, his exploitation of the 1928 Shakhty sabotage case to work out the technique of the show trial, his

orchestration of the murder of Sergey Kirov (as shown convincingly by Conquest) after the designs of a freely-acting assassin had been detected, and his utilization of the Kirov murder as a pretext to launch the ever-widening circle of purges that followed.

This picture confirms that Stalin did not have a master plan governing each step he took, however much the descent of the Soviet system into tyranny made things appear that way. He did, nevertheless, ultimately manifest a set of personal attributes that must have been working all along. His character—"nasty, suspicious, cruel, and power-hungry," in Medvedev's words—made for both political success and despotic use of the power that he had thereby acquired.

Robert McNeal set himself the task of trying to figure out what Stalin's conscious aims actually were and, like other recent authors, showed in the process how much could be learned from the careful use of published sources, even in the Soviet context. If the view of Stalin as a madman or a traitor to socialism is "revisionist," then McNeal is the "post-revisionist," for whom Stalin meant what he said and acted accordingly. McNeal portrays Stalin as a man who continued to believe in the Revolution, the Proletariat, and the Class Struggle, and swung his political weight in this direction when he felt an upsurge of radical sentiment among party members, workers, and the intelligentsia in 1928 and 1929. If McNeal is right, until 1935–36 Stalin was still feeling his way toward the program that would most enhance his own power, encouraging the zealots in every area but calling them back (as in his well-known "Dizziness from Success" statement about collectivization in 1930) when disorder loomed. In McNeal's view, the revolution of the First Five-Year Plan was

more a revolution from below than from above, a genuine resumption of Lenin's revolution after the hiatus of the New Economic Policy (NEP).

McNeal's picture of a Stalin guided less by a master plan than by the momentum of old attitudes and the opportunities of the immediate situation is underscored by the work of Michal Reiman. Reiman situates Stalin's rise in the confluence of four short-term crises in 1927 that disrupted the Soviet Union of the NEP era: the political crisis over the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition, the economic crisis triggered by over-ambitious investment plans, the international crisis centered around the rupture of relations with Great Britain (which ruled out easing the economic crisis through foreign credits), and the resulting social crisis of urban unrest and peasant resistance. In his view, Stalinism is explicable neither as an individual aberration nor as the application of genuine socialist ideas. Rather, it "evolved as a special kind of instrument or means of finding a way out of this crisis" (p. 115). More rational paths had been closed off, Reiman believes, by the angry and violent legacy of the "plebian revolution" of 1917 in which "all traditional standards of human communal existence, the entire previous scale of values, had been destroyed" (pp. 116–17). Reiman's views are close to the argument of Robert C. Tucker, that Stalin embodied the "culture of War Communism," as he and his like-minded followers revived the spirit of the Civil War and the crusade against the class enemy.¹ Campeanu makes almost the same point in characterizing Stalinism as the outcome of an "anticipatory revolution" that destroyed more

than it could replace (p. 5).

The close-up, "microhistorical" studies of Kuromiya, Benvenuti, and Schröder on Stalin's industrialization drive lend strong support to this appraisal. The Five-Year Plans have widely been regarded (in the works of Deutscher, E. H. Carr, and many others) as a rational and effective answer, though not necessarily the sole or most cost-effective one, to the challenge of carrying Russia's modernization through to completion. The means chosen, in this view, were consistent with Russia's tradition of reform rammed through by the autocracy. Yet seen close up, the industrialization effort does not appear quite so rational or nearly so effective. During years of the First and Second Five-Year Plans (1929–32 and 1933–37), Stalin and his leading lieutenants (notably Vyacheslav Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, and Andrey Zhdanov) appear—at least off and on—more interested in fighting the class war again than in effectively building the economy.

The crucial question, then, was one of the attitude of the authorities toward management and engineering skills, upon which every industrialization effort must rely. To say the least, the position of the Communist leadership regarding scientists, engineers, and managers was highly ambivalent. Stalin would cry that "technology decides everything" or that "cadres decide everything," at the same time that he would harass the experts and stage show trials of "saboteurs"—the Shakhty trial, the "Industrial Party" trial in 1930, the trial of a team of surviving Mensheviks, including the country's best economists, in 1931, and the Metro-Vickers trial (of British engineers) in 1933. As Medvedev stresses, Stalin really did have a measure of support from below for his assault on the technical intelligentsia; McNeal and Schröder con-

cur. Again and again, industrial workers were stirred up against the managers. Benvenuti finds that the much-touted emphasis on scientific management, including Taylorism and functional organization in the factory, was brushed aside in practice as an impediment to the exercise of authority from above. Instead, reliance was put on enthusiasm, discipline, and heroic bursts of effort, exemplified in the shock worker and Stakhanovite movements.

STALINISM'S great claim to contemporary fame, a proposition that long continued to figure as a self-evident historical assumption, was the preeminent virtue of economic planning, in contrast to the capitalist scene of chaos and depression. It is now becoming clear that under the guise of planning Stalin really instituted an economy of military command and political frenzy. Thanks mainly to the former Menshevik economists serving in Gosplan and other institutions, Soviet Russia was developing a serious science of economic planning during the years of the NEP. As the late Alexander Erlich showed years ago,² the great "industrialization controversy" between the go-fast Trotskyists and the go-slow Bukharinists had resulted in a compromise by 1927, although by that time the Trotskyist side was at the point of political extinction. Stalin's adversaries in the Right Opposition were not against planning—quite the contrary: they were against unrealistic and irrational schemes of a Soviet "great leap forward" that were not truly based on genuine economic planning.

The political circumstances of the

¹Cf. Robert C. Tucker, "Stalinism as Revolution from Above," in Robert C. Tucker, Ed., *Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation*, New York, Norton, 1977.

²Alexander Erlich, *The Soviet Industrialization Debate, 1924–1928*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1960.

adoption of the First Five-Year Plan and the forced collectivization are very revealing in this regard. Stalin, up to 1928 a follower of Bukharin in economics, discovered in the course of dealing with the grain problem and the Shakhty affair that by shifting to a more radical line he could force the Bukharin group into opposition and then liquidate this last obstacle to his own power. Going far beyond the position of the 15th Party Congress in 1927, he used the Supreme Economic Council, where his own man Valerian Kuybyshev was in charge, to outdo the experts of Gosplan in the preparation of more and more ambitious drafts of the Five-Year Plan. Every time the Bukharin group and Gosplan tried to compromise, he raised the stakes. These maneuvers provoked Bukharin's prophetic warning: "The overstraining in capital expenditure will ultimately *retard the speed of development*."³ (In fact, as Reiman shows, overstraining was already causing economic disruption.) When the Five-Year Plan was approved by the 16th Party Conference (April 1929) and the Congress of Soviets (May 1929), it was adopted in its optimal variant only—assuming the best as regards the harvest and world prices—and it was back-dated to include the accounting year that had begun in October 1928. (With the declaration at the end of 1932 that the Five-Year Plan had been "fulfilled in four years," the plan had officially been in effect for only three years and eight months.)

The history of the Five-Year Plan testifies to the economically irrational though politically expedient nature of Stalin's major policy decisions, guided by the slogan: "There are no fortresses that Bolsheviks cannot capture." Here was the psychology of the revolutionary underground and civil war. Under Stalin, true economic planning gave way

to propaganda campaigns to increase effort and enthusiasm, as though trying harder would compensate for shortages of resources. When shortfalls inevitably appeared, Stalin would intervene with frantic decrees, all enhancing the priority of heavy industry. In effect he was altering an unrealizable plan in mid-stream, while blaming shortfalls in any sector of the economy on wreckers and saboteurs.

The new studies of the First Five-Year Plan era under review here reveal that Stalin's military-political approach to industrialization not only failed to achieve the planned targets, but was an absolute detriment to economic growth. Thus we have in human terms a support and explanation for the conclusions statistically demonstrated by economists such as Holland Hunter and James Millar: the shocks of the First Five-Year Plan actually left the country behind where it would have been had the modified NEP line of 1927 been allowed to continue.⁴ The command methods and high tempo demands of the Plan in practice meant colossal waste, inefficiency, and the collapse of quality in the face of the demand to fulfill quantitative targets. Managers were incompetent, engineers were terrorized, workers drifted from job to job. Attempts at scientific management gave way to work styles seemingly grounded in the peasant experience: furious effort at times and on certain projects, as in the Stakhanovite movement and in the "shturmovshchina" at the end of every plan period, but otherwise a totally uneconomic approach to time, productivity, and efficiency at the macro level and over the long haul, and no rational calculation of the effectiveness of capital investments.

In agriculture, of course, the scene was much worse than in industry. Collectivization and de-

kulakization had such a depressing effect on that sector as a whole that it failed even to serve as an object of economic exploitation to support industry, as the Trotskyists had proposed. Consequently, the main source of economic accumulation for the Plan had to be the urban population and the industrial workers, at the price of an abruptly depressed standard of living. Overall, thanks to the waste and disorganization in industry and the murderous onslaught against the peasants, it can now be said with confidence that the Soviet Union was less prepared for war when it came, in terms of materiel and morale, than it would have been if the Five-Year Plans and collectivization had never been attempted.

If the revolution from above turned out to be so deleterious to the Soviet economy, could not the Bolsheviks have turned to a more sagacious alternative? Could not the NEP itself have been continued, perhaps with gradual modification, if the Bukharin group had been victorious in the power struggle? In economic terms, modification of the NEP would undoubtedly have been a more rational approach. But the political fact is that Bukharin lost, in part, as Reiman shows, because the NEP was experiencing a crisis. Perhaps the crisis was not a fatal one for the economic line of the 1920's, but politically it spelled the end for the exponents of that line.

IT IS commonly suggested today, in the light of Gorbachev's frustrations with the Soviet economy, that "Marxism has failed," or that "Marx-

³N. I. Bukharin, "Notes of an Economist," *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 30, 1928. Bukharin's emphasis.

⁴See James R. Millar, "Ambitious First Soviet Five-Year Plan," *Slavic Review* (Seattle, WA), June 1973; "Mass Collectivization and the Contribution of Agriculture to the First Five-Year Plan," *ibid.*, December 1974.

ism-Leninism" has failed. These notions presume that Stalinism and its legacy represented the direct application of those doctrines, and that they are explicable in those terms. The detailed study of the 1930's, represented by the works reviewed here, shows that although the class-war spirit of Marx and Lenin was still alive at the time, the key economic decisions were shaped much more by the personalities and politics of the moment. It credits Stalin with too much intellectual seriousness—and too little Machiavelian maneuver—to suggest that he was really guided by Marxian theory. Indeed, he was opposed by practically every serious Marxist who ever encountered him. We can only say that some of his instincts paralleled Marxism and made it convenient for him to retain the Marxist language, above all with regard to the class struggle. But his ultimate perversion of doctrine, as Soviet writers now stress, was the bizarre notion serving to legitimize the purges, that the class enemy's resistance becomes more fierce the closer he comes to extinction.

Stalin was not a genuine revolutionary, certainly he did not play that role by the time he achieved personal rule. He was a manipulator of revolutionary traditions and sentiments, for the purpose of increasing his own power and destroying those he resented and hated. He willingly synthesized the revolution and the Old Regime, and eagerly grasped the opportunity to impress himself upon history by choosing the worst from both traditions. Thus he fashioned the unique structure of totalitarianism, with a paradoxical economic foundation, seemingly dynamic, but ultimately operating, as Soviet theorists led by Tat'yana Zaslavskaya and Anatoliy Butenko now style it, as the "braking mechanism."

Does it make sense to compare

Stalin's "revolution from above" with Mao Zedong's "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in China? The similarities have led some Sovietologists, Sheila Fitzpatrick for example, to make the parallel explicit.⁵ With the new light being shed on the first phase of the Stalinist transformation by works such as those reviewed here, the comparison gains even more substance. Both the Chinese and Russian revolutions, having destroyed (or declassified) the bourgeoisie and landlords of the old order, seem to have been driven (or at least led) to resume the class struggle against the new elite of administrators and experts that emerged to run the post-revolutionary society. In this renewed class struggle, Mao differed from Stalin only in degree: he was more utopian than Stalin, more extreme, and more successful in mobilizing an autonomous popular movement against the bureaucracy.

The Stalin-Mao parallel continues in the unspoken realization in both regimes that the renewed social conflict they had unleashed was getting out of hand. The steps then taken—in China beginning within a year after the Red Guards were first unleashed in 1966, in the Soviet Union from 1931 on (in agriculture, after the famine of 1932–33)—were aimed at restoring authority, discipline, and the role of the experts. Sheila Fitzpatrick's time frame—1928 to 1931—accurately defines the reversal of direction in the Soviet instance. In their subsequent years, of course, the Soviet and Chinese cases diverged totally: Stalin followed up his efforts at social stabilization with his devastating purges of the whole administrative apparatus, whereas in China (as

this reviewer observed during a visit in the early 1980's) the sequel to the Cultural Revolution was as if Stalin's purge victims had come back to life and resumed running the system.

The marked change in the character and direction of Stalin's Revolution from Above that occurred after 1931 seems to have been overlooked or underplayed by most writers on the general phenomenon of Stalinism, though it figures clearly in monographic studies on that era. Kuromiya, Benvenuti, and Schröder all recognize this change, expressed in economics in a partial return to monetary accounting, *khozraschet*, greater inequality in pay, and more authority for the managerial hierarchy. Possibly the contrast of chaotic class struggle in the earlier phase of the upheaval, and the search for some basis of order thereafter, helps explain the divergent views of Stalinism, as essentially revolutionary or essentially counterrevolutionary. Upon closer scrutiny, we can observe a distinct shift from the one to the other.

THE idea is an old and familiar one, especially on the non-Communist or ex-Communist Left, that Stalin was the gravedigger of the revolution, who betrayed socialism and the Leninist heritage. Roy Medvedev calls the Stalinist system "baracks pseudo-socialism" (p. 859). Reiman and Campeanu in particular second this view. Reiman terms it "an all-embracing totalitarianism. . . , a system of violent suppression of all contradictions in society" (p. 120), and Campeanu refers to a "suprastate monopoly" governing "a society stripped of every vestige of real ownership of the means of production" (pp. 87, 46). All three embody the tradition, going back to Trotsky and his many polemics against Stalin published in his years of exile, that regards Stalinism as "Soviet Bonapartism,"

⁵See Sheila Fitzpatrick, Ed., *Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1978.

a power not representing the working class but standing above all classes.

Seen from the perspective of the comparative history of revolutions, this analogy is quite compelling. I have proposed elsewhere the concept of a "postrevolutionary dictatorship," naturally following the fanaticism of the genuine revolutionary era, when a broken society invites the consolidation of new authority by an opportunist egomaniac prepared to synthesize suitable elements of the revolution and of the Old Regime.⁶ Given 20th-century means of coercion and persuasion at its disposal, this "Bonapartism" or postrevolutionary dictatorship takes the form of totalitarianism, whether its ideological rationale stems from the Left or the Right. So, *mutatis mutandis*, Stalinism, a particular amalgam of rhetoric, old political habits, and warped modernization, corresponds visibly with the "Bonapartist" phase in the history of other revolutions.

The type of society that Stalinism produced differed dramatically from the Marxist vision of a proletarian dictatorship. A familiar interpretation of Stalinist society is the theory of the "New Class" which Milovan Djilas popularized,⁷ though the Trotskyists, particularly Christian Rakovskiy, had originated it in the early 1930's. This conception of Soviet society as being ruled by a new bureaucratic class was a brilliant response to the quandary Marxists found themselves in when

they tried to account for a system that was obviously no longer dominated by either the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. The argument that the natural outcome of anticapitalist revolution—or evolution—in a technological era is to supplant the property-owning bourgeoisie with the meritocracy of experts and organizers as the ruling class has an intriguing logic to it. Trotsky's erstwhile American follower, James Burnham, made this idea the basis of his theory of the "managerial revolution,"⁸ applicable to Communism, Nazism, and capitalism alike.

The actual picture of postrevolutionary Stalinist society, however, was much less simple. Detailed investigation of Stalin's record in economic matters ("policy" would dignify it too much) seriously calls into question the notion of Stalin as the representative of a bureaucratic or meritocratic ruling stratum. There is too much evidence of class war against the experts, systematic in the first phase of the Revolution from Above, and continuing by fits and starts, as Benvenuti shows, until the convulsion of the Yezhovshchina. Campeanu rests his whole theory on the proposition that the bureaucracy as much as the workers and peasants was the subject of the autocrat—a model that recalls the old "statist school" of Russian history-writing in the 19th century. Clearly the nascent meritocracy of the 1930's was more the victim of class struggle than a ruling class in itself, until it had been thoroughly humbled, terrorized, and extensively restaffed with young apparatchiki newly risen from the proletariat and mentally compatible with Stalin's values.

A better way to conceive of the Soviet class structure derives from

the distinction offered by Svetozar Stojanović of the University of Belgrade (with traces going back to Antonio Gramsci) between the "ruling class" and the "dominant class," the latter being the social force that distinguishes the social system and keeps it running, though it may not enjoy actual political power.⁹ In this sense the meritocracy—the intelligentsia as broadly conceived in Soviet parlance—became the dominant class, without whose services the system could not function. But the ruling class, recruited in the 1930's among the workers (whose fathers or grandfathers had been peasants) and restaffed in the course of the purges, was and has remained profoundly threatened, jealous, and antagonistic toward the dominant class, the meritocracy that it could not do without. Thus Soviet society has suffered until the very recent past from a very high-tension ambivalence of the rulers toward their most valuable human resource.

In these terms, the Gorbachev "revolution" takes on an interesting new aspect. Frustrated by the conservatism of the ruling bureaucratic elite, Gorbachev turned to the "dominant" meritocracy, led by the creative intelligentsia—a personal choice no less decisive than Stalin's choice to fight the same people. In the unprecedented conditions of *glasnost'*, the meritocracy has been able to challenge the old ruling class in the apparatus, and to assert its own claim to rule through a revamped and democratized political structure. It is no accident that in the political upheaval of the spring of 1989, the Soviet intelligentsia finally came into its own.

⁶See Robert V. Daniels, *Is Russia Reformable?*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1988, pp. 89, 59–61; "Stalinism as Postrevolutionary Dictatorship," a paper presented at the Gramsci Institute International Conference on "The Age of Stalinism," in Urbino, Italy (proceedings forthcoming). The parallel has recently been recognized by a Soviet writer, Natan Eidelman, in "Winding up an Epoch of Revolutions," *Moscow News*, July 23, 1989.

⁷Milovan Djilas, *The New Class*, New York, Praeger, 1957.

⁸James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution*, New York, John Day, 1941.

⁹Svetozar Stojanovic, "Marxism and Democracy: The Ruling Class or the Dominant Class?" *Praxis International* (London), July 1981.

The Propagation and Impact of Ideology in the USSR

Jan Feldman

ARCH PUDDINGTON. *Failed Utopias: Methods of Coercion in Communist Regimes*. San Francisco, ICS Press, 1988.

MIKHAIL HELLER. *Cogs in the Wheel: The Formation of Soviet Man*. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1988.

THOMAS REMINGTON. *The Truth of Authority*. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988.

VLADIMIR SHLAPENTOKH. *Soviet Public Opinion and Ideology: Mythology and Pragmatism in Interaction*. New York, Praeger, 1986.

VLADIMIR SHLAPENTOKH. *Soviet Ideologies in the Period of Glasnost*. New York, Praeger, 1988.

IDEOLOGY and reality have met in a head-on collision on the Soviet road to utopia. Of course, the utopian vision suffers less for being postponed than for being announced prematurely. Yet, as communism, like the horizon, keeps fading into the distance as one tries to approach it, it must eventually lose credibility as anything other than an ideal. Nevertheless, as each of the

five books under review here demonstrates, ideology has played a crucial role in Soviet society—keeping the idea of communism alive even as the reality resembles the ideal less and less, justifying the political and economic policies of successive leaders, providing a common language and set of values, and helping to legitimize a system that, because it lacks democratic mechanisms for mobilizing popular support, might otherwise have to rely more heavily on coercion in order to maintain itself.

Beyond the evident goal of social control, ideological work in the Soviet Union ultimately seeks to create a “new man,” one possessing a special socialist morality. This new man would voluntarily and habitually behave according to socialist values, which would theoretically allow the state, at least in its capacity as an instrument of coercion, to “wither away.” The chief characteristics of the new man (whose prototype is the Stakhanovite and the shockworker) are a willingness to perform unstinting labor without regard to remuneration, a selfless devotion to the motherland, and a subordination of personal interests to those of the state.

The quest for the new man assumes that human nature is malleable and perfectible, almost totally responsive to the environment and

unburdened by inborn, or biological determinants of behavior. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) takes as one of its most important tasks the formation of the new man. It cannot simply be left to people to gradually come to reflect in their values and behavior the changes in social and economic relations wrought by socialism; rather, the state must intervene to shape the new consciousness. Herein lies the special task of ideology as conceived by the Soviet regime.

This conception is only remotely related to Marx's understanding of the nature and role of ideology. According to Marx, ideology is part of the superstructure—a product of intellectual activity that reflects the base, i.e., the mode of production, of a given society. Under capitalism, because of the division between mental and physical labor, ideas reputedly become detached from material reality and, instead of depicting the world as it actually is, portray it in such a way as to legitimize the dominance of the capitalist

Jan Feldman is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont (Burlington). She has published on issues of ideology and society in the Soviet Union and on Soviet defense production and trade in weapons.

class and convince the workers that capitalism is both desirable and inevitable. This "distorted" picture of reality is what Marx calls "false consciousness."

According to Marx, false consciousness is a peculiar affliction of societies that precede socialism. One of the purported effects of the socialist revolution is to bring perceptions of reality into conformity with material reality. Ideology under socialism takes on a different meaning and role than under previous modes of production. It is supposed to be the simple, straightforward, accurate, and scientific representation of material reality, validated by practice.

It is obvious that ideology in the Soviet Union is not at all what Marx envisioned. Rather, its role has become—like false consciousness under capitalism—to legitimate the existing system. Ideology has become a monopoly of the CPSU, the product of an extensive network of institutions that carefully and deliberately craft and disseminate it. Moreover, whatever persuasiveness it has is a function of its monopoly status rather than of its truth as demonstrated either by practice or because it has won out in a market place of freely competing ideas.

Yet, for all this control, the Soviet leadership seems to have met with, at best, mixed results in forging a completely loyal and submissive citizenry. Many Soviet citizens are well aware of the divergence between the myth of Marxism-Leninism and reality. The Soviet system has bred its own brand of false consciousness, but one that both its purveyors and its targets seem to recognize as such.

The leadership is fully aware of the weaknesses of ideological work, and of the declining impact of stale doctrines on the population, particularly youth. Widespread consumerism, alcoholism, crime, and

lack of labor discipline indicate that ideological upbringing (*vospitaniye*) has failed. Yet, each successive leader, including Mikhail Gorbachev, has called for strengthening and rejuvenation of ideological work, and has remained officially optimistic about the possibility of creating a society of new, perfect, communist citizens.

Why maintain the ideal of the new man? Why not simply retreat from goals that cannot be attained? Reflection on this issue should help respond to such fundamental questions about the very nature of the Soviet system as:

(1) Is the USSR a totalitarian state, or does something of a tacit social contract exist between the system and its citizens that lends the regime legitimacy?

(2) How does the system achieve external conformity, if not voluntary allegiance, and what is the role of ideology in this process?

(3) Is there a distinctive Soviet personality? If so, does it accord with the Marxist vision of the new socialist man?

(4) What are the prospects for reforming the Soviet system? If, as many argue, these prospects are dim, how can we explain the tenacity of the system?

The books explored here, although primarily interested in the nature, role, and impact of ideology, also illuminate these fundamental matters. The authors share a certain pessimism about the Soviet Union's ability to change in any meaningful way. They all, to a degree, believe that the system is built on a crumbling foundation of deceit, myth, and the threat of force. All believe that the Soviet citizen is a distinctive product of his/her environment, although not at all what Marx or the CPSU imagined the socialist citizen would be more than

seventy years after the revolution.

AMONG the four authors, Arch Puddington occupies the extreme position, perhaps explained in part by the fact that he is the only non-academic in the group and, as a journalist, is accustomed to taking an unabashedly political stance. Puddington's orientation is reflected not only in his extreme paucity of footnotes, almost exclusive reliance on secondary sources and like-minded analysts, and anecdotal approach, but in the strong agenda that is clear even in the very title of his book: *Failed Utopias, Methods of Coercion in Communist Regimes*. He uses the term "totalitarian" to describe the Soviet Union, adopting his distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes from Jeane Kirkpatrick without any further reference to the vast literature on the subject. Similarly, he makes no reference to the extensive literature on utopian thought, or even to the rich literature on the Soviet Union. In short, this work is not particularly scholarly. Yet, although it might be of little value to academics, it does present the interested public with something of an antidote to the current Western love affair with Gorbachev.

Puddington's book also distinguishes itself from the others in that it is not restricted in scope to the Soviet Union, but ranges broadly over the world, on the assumption that all contemporary socialist systems, be they East European or Third World, are spin-offs of a monolithic Soviet model. This approach, of course, overlooks the fact that almost all Third World versions of socialism, while somewhat indebted to the Soviet model for their one-party system, for their attempts to collectivize agriculture, and for their excessive haste to implement a program of industrialization, are actually hybrids combining elements of capitalism

and socialism in their pursuit of national development.

Puddington rejects the possibility that socialist systems have any willing supporters, except, perhaps, among misinformed and naïve social scientists in the West. He begins with the premise that socialist regimes can only maintain themselves through coercion or brutal repression. They "sovietize unwilling societies" (p. 123) through elaborate mechanisms for controlling the tiniest details of daily life, including indoctrination and re-education; restrictions on the press, religion, and travel; the use of terror, concentration camps, and forced labor. "The basic lesson of Soviet history is," the author states, "that an iron will and a vigilant eye count for much more than the support of the masses" (p. 4).

Despite this basic outlook, Puddington arrives at a somewhat ambiguous view of the citizens of communist states. On the one hand, he claims that the Soviet regime owes its stability to its ruthlessness, that "communism draws strength from its contempt for the popular will" (p. 256), and that it succeeded in subjugating an unwilling and resentful population. On the other hand, he observes that years of communist rule have deformed human nature: "In a way, communism has succeeded in creating a new man, someone who knows the boundaries and accepts the rules. People in communist societies think and act differently from people in democratic societies" (p. 6). Because the Soviet people are so resigned to their fate, Puddington admits, the Soviet state feels secure enough to dispense with harsh methods of repression.

This contradictory view—that the Soviet people are simultaneously slavish and coerced—is common among Western analysts. In a recent book, Walter Laqueur claims

that *glasnost* demonstrates that "the spirit of liberty is not dead in Russia," but at the same time he also asserts that uprooting the authoritarian tradition will require a change in people's nature.¹

Imagine that a sort of "social contract" does exist between the Soviet people and their government. It may be the case that only a slavish people would regard the contract as salutary, but it appears that many Soviet people are content with a paternalistic state that meets their basic needs. Perhaps the very existence of this sort of a social contract helps explain why Gorbachev is encountering so much resistance to *perestroika* among the workers who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of reform.

Sharing Puddington's contempt for this mentality, party theoretician Aleksandr Tsipko blames the socialist system for stifling the initiative of Soviet workers by treating them like children and relieving them of responsibility for their actions. The result is that a large part of the population not only has become passive but has a stake in maintaining the status quo.² The erosion of the traditional security of employment, of the system of fixed prices, and of the relatively egalitarian wage structure is seen as a major betrayal of the contract by many people. As Puddington acknowledges, "communism may have failed in any number of respects, but it has not failed to change the way people think about economic life" (p. 248).

Because Puddington views repressive measures and brutality as a requirement for the functioning of socialism, he must reject the possibility of any genuine reform. To him, socialism "with a human face" is simply a contradiction in terms, and for Western analysts to think otherwise is to engage in dangerous self-deception.

Yet, in spite of this willingness to maintain itself through ruthless measures, Puddington claims, communism is on the decline both in the Soviet Union and world-wide. It is not that the Soviet leaders have lost their stomach for brutality, it is that repression combined with centralization rob the system of the ability to modernize.

MIKHAIL HELLER concludes his book *The Formation of Soviet Man* with the remark that "the fate of mankind depends on an answer to the question: Is it possible to transform human nature?" (p. 263). Indeed, his book does assume that human nature can be changed and that this experiment in social engineering has been not only the primary goal, but one of the most significant "accomplishments" of 70 years of Soviet rule. "From whatever point of view one chooses, Soviet history is, in the final analysis, the history of the formation of Soviet man . . ." (p. 25).

What has been formed is not, however, the self-sacrificing hero with the standardized consciousness enshrined in Soviet literature and official ideology. Yet, neither is he the sinister "new Neanderthaler" of Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon*. This new man is denatured and passive—permanently "infantalized," to use the author's expression. Heller agrees with Puddington: the psychology of Soviet man is different from what came before or what exists elsewhere.

¹Walter Laqueur, *The Long Road to Freedom: Russia and Glasnost*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989, cited in Marshall D. Shulman, "Beware of Moscow Chic," *The New York Times Book Review*, May 28, 1989, p. 5.

²A. Tsipko, "Mankind Cannot Change Its Nature," *Politicheskoye Obrazovaniye* (Moscow), No. 4, 1989, pp. 68–78, discussed in Elizabeth Teague, "Soviet Theoreticians Debate 'The Human Factor,'" *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty*, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 385/89, Aug. 6, 1989, pp. 10–12.

Heller provides a chilling picture of the effects of ideological education, drawing largely on literary sources. He is indebted to Alexander Zinoviev for the concept of "homo Sovieticus" (the resigned, indifferent, and regimented Soviet citizen), to George Orwell's 1984 and to Yevgeniy Zamyatin's *We* for the concept of anti-utopia, the totalitarian or "unified" state, and to Dostoevsky's "Grand Inquisitor" for his model of how the state goes about stripping humans of their freedom and even making them willing partners in the process.

Although Heller makes a fairly convincing case for why it has been left to fiction writers to take on the task of evaluating the "effect of the ideological steam hammer on the Soviet people"—psychologists and sociologists, he argues, have failed to research the subject (p. 77)—his reliance on literary and artistic sources has its own pitfalls. It is small wonder that his book is full of hyperbole and metaphor. Still, it provides valuable insight into the sometimes subtle and unrecognized instruments used by the regime to shape behavior. These instruments include, in addition to the obvious ones of fear, workplace control, and education, the less obvious "nationalization of time" (i.e., the remolding of human consciousness to measure progress in state-determined temporal terms such as five-year plan targets) and the recasting of language and culture to shape perceptions of the world.

Heller defines totalitarianism as "the union of all vectors (methods of shaping the social environment) for the processing of human material into a single direction—aimed at instilling the conviction that the party is everywhere, that it is everything, and that without it there is nothing" (p. 87). In short, totalitarianism requires the complete subordination of the individual to the state. Clearly,

this subjugation can most lastingly be accomplished not through brutal repression but by educating people willingly to identify their interests with those of the state.

Like Puddington, Heller regards as endemic to all socialist regimes the attempt of the Soviet government to regiment every aspect of what had hitherto been private life. He contends that these regimes must attempt to change human nature because of their desire for absolute power. No superficial level of political consent on the part of the masses will do. To that end, the nationalization of culture has yielded a relationship of "co-authorship," which has placed art at the service of the state. Language has come to serve a dual purpose—communication and oppression—akin to that of Orwell's "newspeak." "Marx's statement that 'being determines consciousness' is entirely applicable to the Soviet system if it is agreed that the being, the reality, in which people live is created by language" (p. 254).

The Soviets have officially remained committed to the new man, yet, according to Heller, the ideal has evolved over time. Immediately after the revolution, the new man was conceived of as an active, daring individual, sacrificing everything to the construction of socialism. But ever since Stalin, the new man has been envisioned more and more as a cog in a complex machine, following orders and showing no initiative—the "state's man." People have lost interest in work, and become dependent, passive recipients of government handouts. Their creators are now obliged to meet all of their needs. The Soviet people have become perfectly adapted to the conditions of Soviet life. Thus, Heller argues, the regime no longer needs mass terror.

Whereas Stalin had to deal with the human material in the course of

its formation, Gorbachev has to deal with the finished product, and it is clearly not much to his liking. Ironically, the roots of the current Soviet crisis may be found precisely in the "success" of this human experiment.

Ultimately, though, Heller shares the ambivalence of the other authors concerning the success of the attempt to transform human nature. The human material continues to resist. Heller, himself a Soviet émigré, must admit—despite his claim that many Soviet émigrés long for a return to their cog status—that the desire for freedom is not easily squelched.

Prospects for reform of the Soviet system, Heller says, are bleak. He sees no great distinction between Gorbachev and his predecessors. In fact, he draws parallels between the goals and language of Stalin and of Gorbachev. As for Gorbachev's candid revelations of the errors of his predecessors, this attempt to impress the public by speaking a truth that is already well known, simply provides an excuse for the current crisis without implicating the system or suggesting that the disease is endemic. Yet, if the Soviet system is to modernize, it will have to cease to be itself.

Heller shares Puddington's view that the collapse of the Soviet system would be desirable, but he does not suggest that the West take a more active role in hastening the process of collapse, except perhaps by providing the Soviet population access to information. The only way to stop the advance of communism, he argues, is to stop the production of cogs. By breaking the magic circle of secrecy and deception that imprisons the Soviet people, the revolution in international information technology might just disrupt the cog-making process.

THE TITLE of Thomas Remington's

book, *The Truth of Authority*, is derived from a phrase of Svetozar Stojanović: "the truth of authority replaces the authority of truth." This book, written recently enough to address the changes wrought by Gorbachev, is a valuable addition to the literature on ideology and communication in general, and on the nature and function of Soviet ideology in particular. As a political scientist, Remington has produced a work that is well documented with Soviet and Western sources, accessible to the reading public, and useful to the scholar. Although the approach of social scientists is not entirely free from bias, this work, unlike those by Puddington and Heller, treats the Soviet regime as a true polity, one that—although distinctive in many ways—is not totally different from other polities.

By treating ideological structure as a dynamic political subsystem, Remington recognizes its function for social integration. Accordingly, he is less interested in the content of the message than in investigating the means by which the state maintains itself in power through its ability to draw upon a large proportion of the adult population both as activists disseminating ideology and as audience for it. The book concentrates on two major forms of official ideological work: direct political work carried out by the small cadre of full-time staff officials in the party apparatus responsible for communication and ideology, and the bulk of the mass political work, carried out by a great auxiliary body of part-time speakers and organizers through agitation and propaganda in person and via the print and broadcast media.

Unlike Puddington and Heller, Remington recognizes that ideology is not inflexible or unresponsive to changing political needs and situations. He also does not treat ideology as part of an ambitious plan to

transform human nature. Still, he views ideology as an important adjunct of party rule despite its declining impact on the population.

Though one might well wonder how long a system can maintain itself when neither party nor people accept the official world view, the relative longevity of the Soviet regime suggests that the truth of the content may indeed be less important than the structure of its organized dissemination, which relies on members of the managerial and intellectual elite (who often are CPSU members as well) to uphold a set of doctrines and policies that they may not actually believe in. Apparently, much as psychologists understand that role-playing can influence a person's thinking, the Soviets understand the value of enlisting people as purveyors of ideology. In 1985, an estimated 11 million people participated in some fashion as ideological activists, and countless others were subjected to ideological education (p. 54).

Remington finds that "levels of sociopolitical status are closely correlated with incidence of public activism, and that at higher levels of sociopolitical status, activism is likelier to take the form of ideological work" (p. 55). Clearly, recruitment of activists from among the upper echelons reflects the state's interest in extending its influence over society's "opinion leaders."

One might expect, however, that these would be the hardest people to co-opt in that their higher level of education would lead to skepticism if not cynicism about the message and, therefore, to rejection of the activist role. But this does not seem to be the case, at least in terms of what people profess publicly in their professional capacities. In the Soviet Union, career advancement is closely tied to willingness to participate in social rituals. Turning members of the elite into official

mouthpieces helps to "preserve political integration among the social elite" (p. 96). It also reduces demands for institutional autonomy.

In spite of the massive organizational resources devoted to ideological education, Remington agrees with the other authors that the inculcation of socialist ideology and values has met with mixed success in the USSR. Although Soviet officials have until very recently been reluctant to carry out public opinion surveys, the leadership has doubtless been aware for years that ideology has become a stale ritual, and that people have become increasingly cynical. The very fact that the leadership nevertheless presses on with massive ideological campaigns supports Remington's contention that ideology continues to play an indispensable role in the Soviet polity.

Remington provides a persuasive discussion of how it is that although Soviet ideology does not represent a coherent or even accurate picture of reality, it can remain an important part of the social and political fabric, and also why even educated and fairly sophisticated people can become, without coercion, vehicles for the transmission of dogmas that they and their audiences do not believe. Moreover, they can be a part of this charade without having been reduced to unthinking cogs. According to Remington, the Soviet people have simply become adept at what he calls "behavioral bilingualism."

Westerners may view this ability as an unhealthy form of cognitive dissonance, but Remington apparently does not believe that this situation amounts to a deformation of human character inconsistent with either happiness or some form of intellectual freedom and dignity. He predicts that the three-way correlation of social or political rank, performance of activist political duties, and regular exposure to courses in

political theory is likely to continue under the present regime. Gorbachev, no less than his predecessors, needs to preserve political integration among the elite and is making full use of the mighty ideological complex to publicize his goals of restructuring, *glasnost*, democratization, economic acceleration, and scientific-technological progress.

Focusing on institutional obstacles to change rather than on Gorbachev's personal political attributes or intentions, Remington concludes, as do Puddington and Heller, that Soviet ideology is inherently conservative and creates a real obstacle to reform, specifically to the technological and economic modernization that is most desperately needed. Yet, a dramatic revision of the official ideology would unravel its binding power and lead to a complete breakdown of the structure of political communication on which the regime depends.

IN HIS 1986 book, *Soviet Public Opinion and Ideology*, émigré sociologist Vladimir Shlapentokh understands ideology to be a complex, relatively flexible set of doctrines that exists on two levels: the pragmatic, reflecting the realities of material life, and the mythological, which creates abstract values that encourage consensus. Although a noticeable disparity exists between what people say and what they do, Shlapentokh (like Remington) holds that Soviet citizens manage to live fairly comfortably with a complex dual mentality. They have learned how, in Shlapentokh's words, to "decode" official statements. He sees this as typical of the accommodations made by people living in nondemocratic societies.

In analyzing public and party ideology, Shlapentokh defines ideology as "a more or less cohesive system of values and beliefs that

defines the primary needs and moral standards of behavior of a society, and that serves to justify or legitimate the existing order of society" (p. 1). This definition draws heavily on the work of Clifford Geertz.³ The Soviet regime expends great resources and energy on shaping perceptions, and it clearly maintains a jealous monopoly on this capacity. Shlapentokh sees this monopoly as a standard feature of command societies, in which the will to control behavior is not limited to the centralized, planned economy, but manifests itself in every sphere of society, from science to moral education.

The success of this enormous expenditure of resources and energy can be judged limited if we measure success solely by whether the public actually accepts the official propaganda message as valid. But Shlapentokh defines success much as Remington does: despite the declining influence of the official ideology in shaping behavior or even perspectives, what is really required from members of Soviet society, and particularly from its elite, is a measure of acquiescence, even if only the superficial verbal acquiescence of self-seekers, opportunists, social climbers, and careerists. In the Soviet Union, beating the system makes you part of the system.

Although the ideal continues to be the new man, the operation of the Soviet system has proven itself, particularly in the years of Leonid Brezhnev's rule, to be fully compatible with human behavior that is quite antithetical to the ideal. The regime and its citizens seem comfortable, one propagating two visions of reality, the other maintaining a divided mentality that reflects those two perspectives. This, too, is a "social contract."

Shlapentokh shares the judgment of the other authors that an inflexible reliance on mythical views

of reality creates a dead weight on the modernization process. He blames the dominant class for peddling a distorted reality in order to maintain its power and interests. This critique is not entirely justified, in that the political elite is as much a target as a purveyor of ideology.

As Shlapentokh points out, the elaborate, sophisticated, and intricate construction of the subjective world of Soviet citizens is a truly precarious one. Its combination of deception and hypocrisy, which incorporates virtually all members of society in a massive game of role-playing, poisons public morals. Additionally, the detrimental effect of mythology on economic life has long been apparent.

Shlapentokh's discussion raises the question that is implicit in all of the works under discussion: can a regime or an elite really benefit from an ideology that is false, self-defeating, counterproductive, and antithetical to modernization? Shlapentokh answers this riddle indirectly. The official ideology is an obstacle to modernization, but to debunk it would open the door to either radical change or a conservative backlash. The question becomes: which is more threatening to the survival of the regime, reform or maintenance of the status quo?

PUBLISHED in 1988, Shlapentokh's *Soviet Ideologies in the Period of Glasnost* represents both an update and a significant departure from his earlier book. Here Shlapentokh maintains that at any given time, there exist in the USSR several competing ideologies representing the interests of different (though unnamed) constituencies. According to Shlapentokh, a significant reappraisal of ideology is currently

³See Clifford Geertz, *Interpretation of Cultures*, New York, Basic Books, 1973.

under way in the Soviet Union. This reappraisal, in turn, has caused Shlapentokh to rethink the way he categorizes Soviet ideology.

Socialism in the Soviet Union has been beset by economic problems during the 1970's and 1980's that, according to Shlapentokh, have precipitated widespread public disillusionment with socialism and the rise of competing ideologies—official and unofficial. He proceeds to discuss three official ideologies—two of which he labels dynamic, and one, conservative.⁴ The dynamic ideologies are divided into "neo-Stalinist" and "liberal" models; the conservative ideology is associated with Brezhnev's regime. Here, Shlapentokh treats ideological propositions more as sets of policy choices associated with different social and economic consequences than as tools of political legitimation or social control.

The task that Shlapentokh sets for himself in this work is to describe the causes of the economic stagnation, and the various ideological responses to these developments. Here, the author steps boldly into the realm of economic analysis, stating that the main problem with socialist societies is their failure to evaluate and reward economic performance on its merits—the proclivity to promote bad performance, and an inclination toward conformism. In effect, the state has wrongly assumed that it could efficiently allocate resources and control human behavior.

For Shlapentokh, the key to solving the economic crisis lies with the Soviet consumer. Only when the consumer is allowed to pass judg-

ment on the quality of the product, and to reward or punish the producers, can a society avoid stagnation. Although Gorbachev and his advisers recognize the need to enhance the role of material incentives and boost the "human factor," they have not paid sufficient attention to the role of the consumer in evaluating economic performance.

The absence of market pressures and private property is, according to Shlapentokh, a recipe for economic disaster. Of course, were the Soviet Union to institute consumer sovereignty, market mechanisms, and private property, it would cease to be socialist in any meaningful sense of the word. Moreover, as Shlapentokh notes, radical changes of the sort he advocates would cost the leadership its economic, political, and social monopoly.

The selection of a new set of policy choices—a different ideology—raises questions that Shlapentokh neglects, but that would seem to be central to this part of his analysis. How is one ideology among several selected? Is the ideology backed by the strongest constituency, the one most likely to prevail? Is the most practical solution chosen? Or do leaders and their ideologies simply oscillate in some dialectical fashion between pragmatism and orthodoxy?

Clearly, Gorbachev was not selected general secretary on the merits of his *perestroika* program, because it was almost two years after his selection when he began to state his intentions explicitly. Still, Shlapentokh characterizes Gorbachev's program as an ideological response to the ideological flaws of Brezhnev's rule. The latter's conservative vision of society, his glorification of power, his distrust of the people, and his tolerance of the self-serving, go-slow approach of the bureaucracy were, in turn, an ideological response to the utopianism,

"hare-brained schemes," and voluntarism of the Khrushchev ideology.

The two "dynamic" ideologies emerged, according to Shlapentokh, as the only options after the death of Brezhnev. Shlapentokh states that they were adopted sequentially by Gorbachev. At first, the General Secretary revealed himself to be a "neo-Stalinist," when he reacted to the disorder, lack of discipline, and demoralization inherited from the Brezhnev era by attacking corruption and calling for rejuvenation of society.

But Gorbachev evolved (though the impetus behind this evolution is not made clear) in the direction of the "liberal" ideology, which distinguishes itself by blaming the bureaucrats instead of the masses and by advocating social progress. Liberals, unlike the neo-Stalinists, are not hesitant about revealing the flaws of society, although they do not eschew the traditional socialist values or "mythology," and also do not reject the critical role of the party. According to Shlapentokh, Gorbachev is more democratic than Lenin ever was, and should therefore not be identified with him; the current CPSU leader is more like Trotsky in his antipathy for the bureaucracy and more like Bukharin in his promotion of economic decentralization. If one wants to identify the roots of Gorbachev's ideology, one must look to Khrushchev, and, more important, to the West. Shlapentokh trusts that Gorbachev's call for the participation of the masses and the collaboration of the intellectuals is sincere.

But it must be noted that Gorbachev has drawn strict limits to free expression and to the activity of unofficial groups. He has not, contrary to Shlapentokh's claim (p. 162), shown himself to be a supporter of pluralism in the Western sense. The term Gorbachev uses, "socialist pluralism," has a meaning that he

⁴Another, nonideological, consequence of economic decline has been the tendency of Soviet citizens to retreat into the private realm. On this phenomenon, see Vladimir Shlapentokh, *Public and Private Life of the Soviet People*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1988.

has been careful to distinguish from the traditional liberal concept. His respect for civil society as the repository of a network of institutions independent of the state is limited to acknowledging the usefulness of these institutions for attacking the bureaucracy and promoting the goals of *perestroyka*. Moreover, he has retained control over the economy and the party, expanding his own role and power—prompting Boris Yel'tsin to charge that Gorbachev is on his way to becoming an autocrat with his own personality cult.

It is puzzling, therefore, why Shlapentokh chooses to characterize Gorbachev's ideology as "liberal" rather than simply pragmatic. Liberalism has a fairly precise meaning, one that Gorbachev seems far from adopting. It includes, for instance, an attachment to inalienable human rights; to the elevation, even sanctification of the individual; to the notion of a social contract between rulers and ruled (which if violated by the former, can be abrogated by the latter); to limited government; to tolerance for a wide variety of interests; and to a clear, law-protected boundary between the private and public realms. By these standards, Gorbachev is hardly a liberal or a democrat. Skhlapentokh's characterization of Gorbachev's ideology as "liberal-authoritative" (see Chapter 8) introduces a contradiction in terms that merely compounds the confusion.

Shlapentokh concludes that the fate of the Soviet Union depends upon which of the three conflicting ideologies emerges as the winner. The factors working against the liberal ideology are several: it is a mixed or inconsistent ideology without roots or real precedent in Soviet history. The premises of classical liberalism are at odds with both Russian tradition and socialist doctrine. Liberalism stresses the primacy of the individual; the sanctity of

natural rights; and therefore, limited government. It enshrines competition in a market economy as a means for achieving the common good rather than condemning such competition as destructive of social harmony. The neo-Stalinist ideology, by contrast, is consistent, has a strong constituency (including the bureaucracy), is compatible with the political machinery and with Soviet history, is prepared to resort to repression, and plays to Russian chauvinism.

Shlapentokh arrives at the fairly safe prediction that the Soviet Union will vacillate between periods of neo-Stalinism and of movement toward democracy. It is apparent that opponents, many of them in the Stalinist mold, are waiting in the wings for Gorbachev to slip up. And because stability and change seem to be contradictory concepts to most Soviet leaders, it is unlikely that a given leader will be able to achieve both. Hence the tasks will fall to successive leaders, each attempting to counteract the excesses of his predecessor.

Shlapentokh states in Chapter 4 his intention to evaluate the three ideologies in terms of economic performance. Yet in the end, this concept is left dangling, and it remains unclear whether, or how, Gorbachev's ideology leads him to proceed on this issue. The concepts of consumer sovereignty and economic performance are important ones, but they need to be studied empirically by economists. In the context of the present work, they are not well integrated with the author's treatment of the competition among the three ideologies.

THE AMBITIOUS social experiment that was supposed to yield a glorious new Soviet society based on freedom, the collective pursuit of the common good, and material abundance cannot be judged a

success. This experiment, as Arthur Koestler pointed out, was performed upon the living body of a largely unwilling people who have yet to experience their moment of triumph. A "vivisection morality," which treated people as means to an end, was responsible for creating much of the human suffering that it was supposed to alleviate.⁵ Even if the end seems a glorious one, and perhaps especially if it is, the builders of the new society are not exonerated when they behave ruthlessly.

Utopian aspirations, though expressing the most optimistic visions and highest ideals of humanity, in practice have proven themselves to be particularly pernicious, largely because in their quest for human perfection, they lose all sympathy for the foibles that afflict us all. Utopias are by nature both idealist and authoritarian. In the Soviet Union, excessive optimism about the flexibility of human nature was combined with the ugliest of repression and contempt for humanity when human beings did not conform to expectations.

Ideology seems to the Soviets better suited than repression to producing lasting changes in human character, because it works on subjective beliefs rather than simply on external behavior. It has, according to all of the authors under review, done its work if its objective has been social control. Whether or not it has transformed human nature, and if so, whether or not the Soviets have gotten what they bargained for, is still a matter for debate.

It would seem that the constant bombardment by ideology has bred a combination of passivity and cynicism. The forced merger of private and state interest has re-

⁵See Arthur Koestler, *Darkness at Noon*, New York, Macmillan, 1941, p. 128.

mained artificial and fragile, and instead of fostering public-spiritedness, may have had the opposite effect of promoting a retreat to the private realm.

To date, the failure of the system to respond to the needs of consumers has encouraged a variety of extralegal means for obtaining basic goods—means that, in themselves, place many citizens outside the system as prescribed in Soviet law. While Gorbachev is bent on creating wider latitude for private initiative and providing it with legal and moral legitimacy, the individual is still only encouraged to pursue this self-interest to the extent that personal gain is matched or exceeded by society's gain. The question remains as to whether Gorbachev will recognize that the true foundation of civic virtue may be individual freedom under a government that is bound by law to respect natural rights as ends in themselves.

Recent events in China provide a cautionary tale, demonstrating that there may be a limit to socialist sys-

tems' tolerance for reform. China has been attempting to achieve economic reform without parallel political changes. Gorbachev, by contrast, appears to understand that political reform is a prerequisite for economic reform. But it is not clear how far he is prepared, or will be able, to go toward changing the political system in ways supportive of economic change.

Another lesson provided by China's recent turmoil is the capacity of what had been perceived as a moderate socialist regime to bare its teeth. Repression, the alternative to reform, is always at the ready. China lacked any precedent for the army's turning on its own people, but in the Soviet Union, the precedent exists. The possibility of an unrestrained and brutal official backlash in the Soviet Union cannot, therefore, be dismissed.

But the final lesson from China, which pertains as well to the Soviet Union, has to do with the resilience of the human spirit. It would seem that the urge for freedom and de-

mocracy is not easily squelched even among people who have never experienced these rights firsthand.

We can thank all the authors for their astute observations about the power of ideology to shape perceptions and behavior, and about the dangers associated with regimes that use ideology as a tool for social control and the transformation of human nature. But perhaps we can draw some comfort from Ilya Ehrenburg, who expressed reservations about the ability of the state ever to fully control humans: "Our contemporaries know exactly what orbit a satellite launched into the cosmos will take. But we do not yet know the orbits human emotions and actions will follow."⁶

⁶Ilya Ehrenburg, *Lyudi, gody, zhizn'* (People, Years, Life), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Khudozhestvennaya Literatura," 1967, p. 487, cited in Abraham A. Kreusler, *Contemporary Education and Moral Upbringing in the Soviet Union*, Ann Arbor, MI, University Microfilms International, 1976, p. 229.

Education and Cultural Transfer in China

C. Montgomery Broaded

RUTH HAYHOE, Ed. *Contemporary Chinese Education*. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1984.

LINDA A. REED. *Education in the People's Republic of China and US-China Educational Exchanges*. Washington, DC, National Association for Foreign Student Affairs, 1988.

RUTH HAYHOE and MARIANNE BASTID, Eds. *China's Education and the Industrialized World*. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1987.

RUTH HAYHOE. *China's Universities and the Open Door*. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1989.

IF NOT Chinese education, then at least Chinese students have received a lot of press recently. The massive demonstrations in Beijing and other Chinese cities in April and May of 1989, the government's military assault on student protesters in Tiananmen Square and its environs in early June, and the subsequent widespread repression have focused a great deal of attention on China and the growing demands for political reform in that country.

In the short run, it is difficult to

predict how China's various social and political currents will play themselves out. But the books about Chinese education and China's educational relations with other countries under review provide a wealth of empirical data and a number of insightful analyses that can help clarify some of the issues involved in the current social and political unrest in China. In addition to their stated concerns about inflation and official corruption, for example, it is clear that the difficult material conditions under which Chinese college students live and the uncertainty they face in the state job-allocation system played a role in predisposing them to participate in the "pro-democracy" demonstrations. It is also clear that many of the student activists hoped to bring about a fundamental transformation in the relationship of the Chinese Communist Party to the rest of Chinese society.

THE FIRST of the two edited volumes by Ruth Hayhoe under review, *Contemporary Chinese Education*, is by now well known and deservedly well regarded among scholars interested in all aspects of Chinese education. It is perhaps the best collection of essays to provide a broad, descriptive overview of Chinese education in the period since Mao's death and the purge of the "Gang of Four" in late 1976.

The volume is organized in a straightforward manner. Introductory essays by Brian Holmes on general issues in the field of comparative education and by Hayhoe on the evolution of modern Chinese educational institutions are followed by an orderly progression up the educational ladder, from primary and secondary schooling to higher education, teacher training, and adult education. Hayhoe completes the volume with a discussion of Chinese scholarly exchanges with the West since 1977 and an assessment of their implications for Chinese education.

Of the books examined here, *Contemporary Chinese Education* focuses most fully on the structure and dynamics of the Chinese education system itself and its connections with the rest of Chinese society. (The other three volumes deal primarily with aspects of China's historical and contemporary educational relations with the industrialized countries of the West and Ja-

C. Montgomery Broaded is Assistant Professor of Sociology and Coordinator of Chinese Studies at the University of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh, PA). He has published on Chinese education and was in China from mid-May until shortly after the Tiananmen massacre.

pan.) Written in 1983, the essays in this volume reflect some of the considerable optimism among Chinese educators and other intellectuals in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Yet, they also point clearly to some of the structural problems that led scholars to conclude that China faced a crisis in education in the late 1980's.

The theme of educational opportunity and occupational mobility can serve as an example of these problems, because it runs through a number of the chapters. Where students and their families see little connection between schooling and jobs, demand for education is low and drop-out rates are high. Treating primary education, Billie L. C. Lo points out that the household production responsibility system¹ in the countryside reduces parents' incentives to send their children to school, and the problem is compounded by rural schools' commitment to provide the same academic curriculum as urban schools. Because rural schools can generally provide only a very watered-down version of the urban curriculum, rural children are at an extreme disadvantage in the competition—increasingly mediated by standardized examinations—for advancement up the educational ladder. For the vast majority of rural children, primary schooling is terminal. Rather than trying to compete with urban education, Lo argues, the curriculum of rural schools should be altered to reflect the roles in agricultural production that almost all rural children will occupy once they enter the workforce.

This proposal for what we might

call terminal agri-vocational schooling in the countryside may have some appeal from an economic planning perspective, but it ignores social and political realities that make its implementation extremely difficult, if not impossible. The most serious impediment is that both rural parents (and rural cadres in particular) and the central political authorities are strongly wedded to the notion that education should be a channel for mobility into the state-bureaucratic and/or urban sectors of the occupational structure. To adopt a terminal, agri-vocational curriculum in rural schools, and thus openly and completely to foreclose the opportunity for an escape from a lifetime of agricultural labor (no matter how small the actual chances for such an escape are), would result in large declines in rural enrollments, significant morale problems among rural cadres, and a further erosion of the legitimacy of the central political authorities. Thus, the Chinese seem quite likely to maintain the "dual-track" education system of state-supported urban schools and locally-run (*min-ban*), part-work schools in the countryside, while continuing to claim that able students in both tracks have a genuine opportunity for educational advancement.

Similar problems exist at the secondary level, as Stanley Rosen points out in his very insightful chapter. The reestablishment of a system of key schools to prepare the most able students for higher levels of education has had the unintended consequence of reducing incentives to study for urban young people assigned to non-key secondary schools. Drop-out rates are high and disciplinary problems common among those urban students who have lost hope that they will be able to continue up the educational ladder.

A related problem concerns the

balance between general (college preparatory) and vocational secondary schools. Many unrealizable hopes are raised under conditions of rapid expansion of upper secondary schooling, while the number of college and university students is kept relatively low.

In fact this problem is characteristic of the Chinese education system as a whole, as is shown by a particularly interesting chart in Linda Reed's *Education in the People's Republic of China and US-China Educational Exchanges*.² The chart, "PRC Education Track (1985)," (p. 61), listing the major levels of the Chinese educational system and the number of students enrolled at each level, portrays the tremendous narrowing of opportunity for formal schooling at each successive level of the system. We see that more than three times as many students are enrolled at the primary level as at the lower secondary level, and that the number of junior middle school students is more than five times that of regular (as opposed to vocational) senior middle school students. This narrowing is maintained in the transition from the secondary to the tertiary level, so that college and university students in China comprise only 1–2 percent of that age cohort in China.

The post-Mao leadership's response to one aspect of this prob-

¹In the household production responsibility system (*baogan*), families cultivate a plot of land for up to 15 years and deliver a fixed quantity of output to state procurement organs. The household is able to keep or market the excess after its obligations have been met.

²This work is a practical rather than a scholarly book, explicitly oriented to the needs of professionals in the field of international education and to the needs of institutions and faculty members involved in educational exchange programs with China. The book offers a brief overview of China's educational transformation over the past century; describes the structure of the current education system and the flow of students through the system; reviews educational exchanges between the United States and China in the past decade; and offers a wealth of nuts-and-bolts information and advice for foreign-student-affairs professionals (admissions officers, advisers, and others) who work with Chinese students and scholars in the United States on a daily basis.

lem has been to try to reduce the number of general secondary students, while increasing the number of students in vocational schools. This goal has not been easy to accomplish, however, in part because of popular demands for access to higher-status general education.

AMONG the most significant political decisions of the post-Mao leadership was the reaffirmation and considerable expansion of initiatives begun in the early 1970's to re-involve China in the international community diplomatically, intellectually, and economically. In education, the open-door policy resulted in a diverse and rapidly growing range of international educational exchange activities. The nature of China's educational relations with the industrialized nations of Japan and the West and the possible consequences of these exchanges, all examined against a rich historical background, form the subject of *China's Education and the Industrialized World*, edited by Hayhoe and Marianne Bastid.

The work succeeds admirably in most of its aims. An incisive introductory chapter by Bastid maps out the territory and raises some of the central issues involved in the study of cultural and educational interactions between China and a number of foreign countries. Subsequent chapters treat relations between China and specific countries of the industrialized West and Japan, and are arranged chronologically according to the period of each country's greatest involvement with China. Thus, we move from the Jesuits of the 17th and 18th centuries to the involvement of the British in the 19th century, and the Japanese, the North Americans, and the West Europeans in the first half of the 20th century. Soviet influences of the 1950's (and beyond) are assessed in complementary chapters by

long-time observers R. F. Price and Leo Orleans. The final three chapters are devoted to China's contemporary (post-1977) educational relations with other countries.

One of the central themes of the book is the balance between foreign efforts at cultural penetration into China on the one hand, and active Chinese efforts to absorb selective aspects of Western knowledge and educational patterns on the other. Representatives of the West, whether of a religious, diplomatic, or commercial stripe, were of course unwelcome suitors in China during much of the period under discussion in this volume. But much of what they had to offer, the Chinese had no particular desire to receive, and it was only through the use or threat of force that China was "opened" to Western influences. Despite their guaranteed access, for example, Western missionaries soon found that direct efforts at evangelization resulted in few converts; they increasingly turned to the establishment of schools and colleges with secular educational content (sometimes of a "modern" sort and sometimes not) in order to attract students, with the hope that Christian values and beliefs could be spread indirectly. Active efforts at religious penetration were blunted by Chinese indifference, and missionary groups had to accommodate their efforts to the interests of the people they were trying to influence. Various foreign efforts at cultural or educational penetration are portrayed as most successful when they were substantially informed by a recognition of Chinese needs and, in the most positive cases, by direct Chinese participation in the formulation of the goals of cultural transfer activities.

Several of the authors in this volume point out the very active role of successive Chinese governments—once the necessity of educational

change was recognized—in seeking information about foreign education. Bastid concludes that from 1895 to 1925, the Chinese engaged in a coherent national program of educational borrowing "in no way imposed by foreign powers. . . . Rather, [the foreign models] were desired and sought after by the Chinese on their own initiative" (p. 10). As the Chinese searched for appropriate foreign ideas for the reform of their educational system, they turned first to Japan, as very clearly described by Hiroshi Abe, and later to the progressivism of John Dewey and the American educational model, which is discussed by Hubert Brown.

An interesting parallel emerges in the selection of the Japanese system for emulation in the early years of the 20th century and the Soviet system in the 1950's. In both cases, ideological affinities (Confucianism in the former case, and Marxism-Leninism in the latter) provided a basis of presumed value-consensus, and in both cases the educational system selected for emulation was viewed as already having successfully assimilated the scientific and technical knowledge of the industrialized West.

Although *China's Education and the Industrialized World* succeeds in most of the goals it sets for itself, in one respect it leaves something to be desired. In the preface, Hayhoe states that the chapters drew on dependency theory "to test the view that educational transfers have been used to consolidate political domination and economic exploitation between developed and developing countries by a careful look at China's historical experience with Japan and the Soviet Union, as well as with Western industrialized powers" (p. vii). However, with the exception of Hayhoe and possibly Bastid, none of the authors appears to take dependency

theory particularly seriously. Some of their discussions, to be sure, implicitly reject the formulation provided in the preface; and Hayhoe returns briefly to the issue in her concluding chapter, where she argues that despite some clear instances of foreign influence, internal conditions and events were always the decisive factors in the development of China's educational system. But the volume does not contain a systematic attempt to conceptualize educational systems using dependency theory. Nor do the authors attempt to derive testable hypotheses from dependency theory or to specify what kinds of evidence might be relevant in assessing the applicability of dependency theory to Chinese education.

This objection aside, *China's Education and the Industrialized World* contains a wealth of empirical data and many valuable insights on the general phenomenon of cultural transfer. Hayhoe's excellent bibliography also deserves mention as a useful research tool.

THE WORK individually authored by Hayhoe, *China's Universities and the Open Door*, represents the culmination of several years of research and writing on the interrelated topics of the evolution of modern Chinese educational institutions; China's historical and contemporary educational relations with other countries; and the implications of those relations for Chinese education, for Chinese society, and for the role that knowledge plays in the contemporary world order. The book focuses on higher education, and is an empirical tour de force in the amount of information it brings together. The first half of the book deals primarily with China's internal educational developments, while the second half is devoted to issues of China's reinvolvement in the world community.

Hayhoe draws on strands from the critical educational theories of British, French, and German sociologists and social philosophers³ to focus attention on what she calls the "knowledge issue"—how knowledge as such is defined and categorized in society, and the connections between knowledge structures and power relations both within and among societies.

Hayhoe's discussion throughout is informed by her conception of a "fundamental contradiction" that has characterized Chinese education since the late Qing period. Knowledge in traditional China, she argues, was clearly hierarchically structured, with Confucian, moral-political content enjoying the greatest prestige and being closely intertwined with the exercise of political power. However, since the late 19th century, education has increasingly been called upon to serve not only the interests of political control (for which authoritarian Confucian knowledge patterns are appropriate), but also to serve economic development and military modernization. Successive governments have all wanted China's education system to contribute to the rapid modernization of society, but they have been unwilling to accept the democratizing implications that a transformation of traditional knowledge patterns entails.

Surely, the Chinese education system's renewed openness to Western ideas and models since the death of Mao contributed to the emergence of the pro-democracy forces beginning in the late 1970's. As in the past, this openness was dictated by China's need to catch up with the advanced industrial countries. But the Democracy Wall movement in 1978–79, the student demonstrations of 1985 and

1986–87, and of course the student occupation of Tiananmen Square in spring 1989 demonstrate the difficulty of absorbing only those aspects of Western curricula and educational patterns viewed as useful by the regime's leaders.

From their contacts with Western scholars and knowledge patterns, Chinese intellectuals understandably draw conclusions that are congenial to their own interests and structural position in Chinese society. Consequently, they have an elective affinity for Western ideologies that invest expertise acquired through higher education with considerable authority and prestige. And this perspective, of course, ultimately threatens the CCP's hold on power.

Several aspects of Hayhoe's discussion seem particularly valuable. For example, in Chapter 2, she provides a stimulating discussion of the prestige hierarchy occupied by the various fields of knowledge that was established in the 1950's, when China engaged in extensive borrowing of higher educational patterns from the Soviet Union. Hayhoe found that although political science and law, and finance and management had the lowest enrollments, they provided access to the most influential positions in the bureaucracy. The important role of People's University, the final authority in the fields of politics, law, and economics, also emerges clearly from Hayhoe's analysis. She concludes that in the post-1978 period a "gradual transformation toward a less hierarchical structuring of knowledge areas and greater permeability among disciplines and specializations in the organization of knowledge is definitely under way. Yet the leadership remains ambivalent about the implications of this transformation for the political power structure" (p. 57).

In Chapter 3, Hayhoe offers de-

³In particular, Hayhoe uses the work of Basil Bernstein, Michael Young, and Jürgen Habermas.

scriptions of the reform efforts of 10 specific higher educational institutions, ranging from key national universities and highly specialized ministerial institutions to provincial universities, agricultural schools, and more-recently-established short-cycle vocational institutions run by municipalities. Beyond offering a wealth of information on these types of schools, this chapter testifies to the great diversity in Chinese higher education and stands as a corrective to the tendency to make broad-brush generalizations about the system as a whole.

In the second half of *China's Universities and the Open Door*, Hayhoe describes in considerable detail China's educational interactions with a number of Common Market countries, focusing first on those countries' policies regarding cultural and educational transfers to China, and then on concrete examples of educational cooperation and exchange carried on within China. She also deals with the extensive involvement of the World Bank in Chinese education. Hayhoe's concern in these chapters is whether educational transfers will contribute to changes in traditional knowledge patterns in ways that serve economic modernization and political democratization, or whether they will be used to reinforce authoritarian knowledge patterns conducive to centralized political control. Although cautiously optimistic in her conclusions on this issue, Hayhoe recognizes the potential for greater efforts at repression and control as well as for greater openness.

Hayhoe is clearly committed to the view that in trying to understand contemporary issues in Chinese education and society, we need to take seriously China's cultural traditions and historical experiences. It will not do, she implicitly reminds us, to assume that everything important about contemporary China

can be explained by reference to events since 1949, or by reference to the ideologies and organizational patterns of the Chinese Communist Party. This point is well taken, and Hayhoe's historical work does indeed contribute to a fuller understanding of contemporary issues. However, in *China's Universities and the Open Door*, the stress on the continuities with Confucian knowledge patterns is sometimes so great that one is left with the impression that Hayhoe attaches only minor significance to the ideologies and structures of domination put in place by the party after 1949.

IN THE wake of the crackdown on the student demonstrations, however, it is precisely these ideologies and structures of domination that are being reasserted by the hardliners in the central leadership. In seeking to understand the social and political background of the demonstrations and the effects on education of the government's crackdown, we must not only take into account historical continuities and discontinuities in knowledge patterns, but must also recognize that the structural position of intellectuals in contemporary China is fundamentally different from that of Confucian scholar-officials of imperial times. Not only are intellectuals excluded, as a stratum, from direct participation in the exercise of political authority—this position is now being occupied by party functionaries below the level of the central leadership—but they have neither the gentry's land holdings nor elevated social status in local communities to fall back upon during times of political disfavor. Rather, contemporary intellectuals must have jobs; as "state personnel" (*guojia ganbu*), college graduates have, since the early 1950's, been subject to the state job-allocation system, and have had very little to say about

the location or the type of work to which they would be assigned. Political subordination and economic dependence are thus fundamental characteristics of intellectuals in contemporary China.

In the decade of economic reforms and (to a lesser extent) political relaxation after 1978, some aspects of the intellectuals' situation improved perceptibly. They were redefined as constituting a part of the working class, and were recruited into the party in fairly large numbers. Restrictions on freedom of academic and artistic expression were eased. Chinese scholarly interactions with the industrialized West increased rapidly. With the growth of a private or quasi-private sector of the economy, employment opportunities for college graduates outside the state sector—and hence not subject to the state job-allocation system—were created.

In the mid-1980's, the state experimented with allowing a portion of each year's graduates to find their own employment, and seriously considered eliminating the unpopular job-allocation system altogether. But by the late 1980's, to the chagrin of many college students, this goal was abandoned. In mid-May 1989, I was told by the president of a major university that almost all of this year's graduates would be assigned to jobs by the state. Many graduates of previous years, he said, had had great difficulty finding jobs, and a large number remained unemployed a year or more after graduation. No doubt this result provides evidence of the underdeveloped state of China's "labor market," but it also suggests that many graduates prefer an indefinite period of unemployment in China's cities to many of the jobs that the state makes available through its job-allocation system.

Although it is too early to assess fully their impact, many of the re-

gime's stern measures in recent months seem likely to deepen China's current educational crisis, particularly at the tertiary level. Beyond the climate of fear and mistrust created by governmental repression, concerns are widespread that the job-assignment process will be used, as in the past, to effectively banish student leaders and active participants in the demonstrations to remote and politically isolated localities.⁴

Requirements that students, faculty members, researchers, and administrators in colleges and universities study speeches by Deng Xiaoping and other leaders and "unify their thinking" in support of the official definition of the "counter-revolutionary rebellion" of April-June 1989, are a natural extension of the hard-liners' efforts to reassert political control over intellectuals. Decisions have been taken to reduce by about 5 percent the overall number of entrants to higher education this fall; these reductions seem to be concentrated in those institutions and academic departments that participated most actively in the demonstrations. The number of students to be recruited from Beijing Municipality has also been cut significantly, ostensibly because of their prior overrepresentation in universities. The opening of the fall term at Beijing University and other major institutions was delayed until mid-October in order to forestall the possibility of student demonstrations on National Day, October 1.

The government has also announced a plan, the details of which are unclear, to require applicants for graduate level study to spend two years working as laborers in basic-level units in the countryside or in urban productive enterprises

prior to entering graduate school.⁵ It is uncertain how this program will work in practice, or whether, indeed, it will be implemented, but it would seem to reduce greatly the attractiveness of graduate study among younger intellectuals who are already questioning its value.

Most relevant to Hayhoe's concerns with the "knowledge issue" is that several disciplines in the social sciences, which might be prone to produce graduates critical of party authority, will have their enrollments reduced. Likewise, although the situation remains somewhat unclear at the time of this writing, a significant shake-up seems to be underway at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The institutes most closely associated with the reform program of ousted party leader Zhao Ziyang are likely to be eliminated or reorganized, and their leading scholars demoted or reassigned. Several leading intellectuals from CASS who were already abroad in early June, or who left China soon thereafter, have elected to delay their returns to China.

In international educational relations, one must note the cancellation by the Chinese government of plans for Peace Corps volunteers to work in China for the first time this year, and the suspension of the Fulbright program under which American scholars teach in Chinese universities for an academic term or year.⁶ The People's Republic has also indicated that it will reduce the number of students it sends abroad, particularly to the United States, for graduate training.⁷ It is too early to tell whether these government policies will result in actual declines in the number of Chinese students in American universities.

Earlier pronouncements of this kind have not had the dire results that some observers had expected.⁸

Considerable uncertainty currently characterizes virtually all of the institutional programs of scholarly exchange between the United States and China. Most American programs recalled the scholars who were in China under their sponsorship at the time of the Tiananmen massacre and suspended subsequent exchange activities for the summer and fall of 1989. They have generally delayed decisions about programs for the first half of 1990. Some organizations, such as the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China under the National Academy of Sciences, are accepting proposals for 1990-91 on a tentative basis. Most analysts foresee a period of political instability when Deng Xiaoping, now 85 years old, passes from the scene. It may be several years before the political dust settles enough for educational exchange programs between the United States and China to regain some of the sense of normalcy and openness so painstakingly built up over the past decade.

One source of tension in the US-Chinese educational relations in recent years has been the tendency for Chinese graduate students in the US to extend their studies as long as possible. Many of the approximately 40,000 Chinese students and scholars in the United States participated in pro-democracy demonstrations here and publicly protested against the Tiananmen massacre. They are thus quite concerned about their fate on their return to China, and many will seek to remain abroad indefinitely. An independent association of Chinese

⁵*The New York Times*, Aug. 13, 1989.

⁶*Chronicle of Higher Education* (Washington, DC), Aug. 9, 1989.

⁷*The New York Times*, Sept. 3, 1989.

⁸On this issue, see Leo Orleans, *Chinese Students in America*, Washington, DC, National Academy Press, 1988, esp. Ch. 2.

⁴As yet, little concrete evidence indicates the extent to which this is taking place.

students has been established,⁹ and the creation or reinvigoration of several dissident groups abroad means that the Chinese government now faces an opposition in exile that enjoys much broader appeal and legitimacy than earlier Chinese dissident groups in the West. Whether these various organizations will succeed in creating a unified opposition movement remains to be seen.

AFTER a hopeful period from the late 1970's to the mid-1980's, Chinese college students have become increasingly discouraged about their prospects as intellectuals employed in state-sector enterprises and government agencies. Many feel that they "have no future"

⁹The New York Times, July 31, 1989.

(*mei qiantu*), particularly in comparison with their age mates who entered the workforce directly from junior or senior middle school. By the time they are assigned jobs, college graduates will have foregone four to eight years of income as well as various improvements of living standards (such as housing assignments) that depend in part on seniority at their place of work.

Although the Tiananmen massacre and the subsequent waves of arrests, purges, and propaganda campaigns have silenced most overt dissent for the time being, they have done little to address the social and political problems that gave rise to the demonstrations in the first place,¹⁰ and they have completely undermined the legitimacy of the current leadership in the eyes of many Chinese intellectuals. If the regime is ever to win

back their support, it will have to find ways to convince intellectuals that they do have a "future," and that they will be meaningful participants in socially consequential decision-making processes. But almost all of the measures taken by the regime in recent months seem designed to convey precisely the opposite message. Despite the short-term effectiveness of governmental repression, therefore, recurrent demands for fundamental reforms are sure to be a prominent feature of China's social landscape for the foreseeable future.

¹⁰A crackdown on both household-level and larger-scale private enterprises is proceeding simultaneously with the reassertion of political control over education (*The New York Times*, Aug. 29, 1989). One of the government's goals would seem to be to reduce income inequalities between workers tied to the state wage bill and those in the private sector.

Decollectivization and Democratization in China

Edward Friedman

DAVID ZWEIG. *Agrarian Radicalism in China, 1968–1981*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1989.

RICHARD MADSEN. *Morality and Power in a Chinese Village*. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1984.

PAT HOWARD. *Breaking the Iron Rice Bowl: Prospects for Socialism in China's Countryside*. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1988.

ASHWANI SAITH, Ed. *The Re-emergence of the Chinese Peasantry*. London, Croom Helm, 1987.

KANG CHAO. *Man and Land in Chinese History: An Economic Analysis*. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1986.

PETER NOLAN. *The Political Economy of Collective Farms: An Analysis of China's Post-Mao Rural Reforms*. Boulder, CO, Westview, 1988.

SCHOLARS do not agree on the motives for the implementation of collectivization in China. Consequently, key questions remain unanswered: why did the Leninist-Sta-

linists in the Chinese Communist Party, knowing of collectivization's severe economic and human costs in the Soviet Union, institute that inefficient and repressive agricultural system in China; why did Maoists conclude that China required a more thorough-going collectivization than the Soviet Union; or why, in the post-Mao era, even after decollectivization liberated enormous productive energies, is it quite plausible that conservatives wishing to retain as much of the Stalinist system as possible could still reverse that liberating decollectivization. After all, collectives repress production and alienate producers. Why then is collectivization still a contested policy? All the books under review shed light on these fundamental political, economic, and moral questions.

IN HIS solid and subtle Kremlinological study of the late Mao effort to force Chinese villagers to live in accord with Communist fundamentals, David Zweig describes the struggle over the question of how much collectivization as one between radicals and moderates. Radical policies, which amounted to terror, tyranny, and poverty, Zweig demonstrates, concentrated all power in the hands of officials who made use of "strong-armed tactics" to establish fiefs "ruled by

local cadre autocrats" (p. 193).

Zweig unearthed data showing persuasively that collectivized agriculture turned peasants into "serfs" and "coolies for rural cadres," and strengthened "a voracious state . . . which consumed all the peasant . . . produced" (p. 193). In sum, villagers were forced into economic backwardness to satisfy the selfish needs of the Leninist ruling group. The conclusion, it seems to me, is that decollectivization cannot be considered consolidated in what remains a Leninist state, because no matter how much decollectivization serves popular interests, it also undermines the power and privileges of ruling strata in the Leninist system.

THE GREAT contribution of the marvelously etched study of leadership styles in one pseudonymous south coastal village by Richard Madsen is its focus on the ethical dimension. Madsen presents Mao's super-collectivist project as motivated by a religious ethos. Based on a "quasi-

Edward Friedman is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he chairs the Center for East Asian Studies. He is co-author of *Villagers and State in Socialist China* (forthcoming).

religious faith" in Mao, the Chinese revolutionaries tried to mobilize an army of heroes, who would live an ascetic life and fight a war against evil by transforming peasants into selfless individuals. To be sure, Madsen finds, as does Zweig, that in the latter years of Mao's rule, "agricultural productivity . . . stagnated because . . . of unrealistic government policies and failing morale" (p. 256).

For Madsen, "moralistic revolutionary" leaders were a complete failure. He explains why such a mass religious conversion was impossible in the Chinese village. He finds that the moral revolutionary project could not woo villagers who cared primarily about their families and wanted to make a good living so they could enjoy a moral life in accordance with Confucian kinship ideals. The collectivist project alienated villagers because power came from the center of the Leninist state, thus compelling "revolutionary moralists" to compete narcissistically to prove their purity to superiors in the Leninist hierarchy, whatever the impact on local people. And, what support "revolutionary moralists" found in the village tended to come from marginal illiterates with few kinship ties, individuals who used brash physical violence to grab local power and avenge themselves on more respected villagers, whose lives were rooted in kinship networks. Finally, Madsen argues, although it made sense to villagers to sacrifice everything in the revolutionary era to fight real enemies, such as the Japanese invaders, it made no sense to continue similar sacrifices after national victory over the Japanese if those sacrifices meant forsaking family for the socialist state in peacetime.

On this last point, Madsen misreads China's wartime experience. During the patriotic war against Japan, Mao's movement did not ask

fighters to forsake family. On the contrary, the family position of army members was guaranteed, even privileged, by the emerging state. The wives of Mao's soldiers were not permitted to divorce them. Their families back home received the first priority for land and animals in the land reform. The truth contrasts with the legend that characterizes the revolutionary era as one of absolute selflessness. In fact, Mao wooed fighters with the most material of incentives.

As Zweig understood the elite debate over how far China should collectivize as one between moderates and radicals, so Madsen regards that debate as one between utilitarian conservatives and revolutionary moralists. Madsen trenchantly describes the politics of the latter group, using such religious categories as apocalypse, good versus evil, confession, purification, asceticism, sainthood, repentant wrongdoers, the sacred, the morally redemptive, zeal, and frenzy. Thus, the peasants worshipped "Mao in place of the old ancestor tablets" (p. 186). "Before meals, each household recited one of Mao's quotes. . . . Before political meetings, the peasants sang a hymn expressing loyalty to Chairman Mao" (p. 186).

This language is not one of liberation, human realization, or material progress. It has little resonance with the Enlightenment or Karl Marx. Rather, the Maoism depicted by Madsen is a form of religious fundamentalism. It uses the language of class struggle to legitimate the destruction of what it deems evil. But that destruction entails, as both Zweig and Madsen show, political terror, social reaction, and economic stagnation. The language of communist fundamentalism and the policies it legitimated are more in line with the telos of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini than with the human soli-

darity and harmony envisaged by Peter Kropotkin. Fundamentalism—whether of a religious or Marxist-Leninist variety—can win tremendous support because it taps deep fears and anxieties over the mixed impact of modernization, fears and anxieties that are not unique to China. Nonetheless, fundamentalism, however appealing to many, cannot identify or grapple with the roots of modern dilemmas. Indeed, it primarily involves a scapegoating of the innocent, as both Zweig and Madsen detail, rather than confronting the sources of real problems and dilemmas.

IN HER savvy, fact-filled, and lucid account of the dilemmas of decollectivization, Pat Howard rejects the notion that China witnessed "a conflict between good and evil" (p. 176), although she writes from a sophisticated ethical perspective, committed to both popular democracy and market socialism. For Howard, Leninism is a system that exalts industrial production, and collectivization is a means of speeding that industrialization, to the detriment of raising standards of living or properly paying peasants. Howard writes that Chinese peasants found that collectives "roped [them] together to live a poor life" (p. 44). She describes collectivization as an essential part of a process of étatization, "compulsion and self-denial," the "complete dependence of peasants," and "enforced conformity and social ostracism" (p. 185). Howard associates herself with those who see post-Mao reformers, not as moderates or utilitarians, but as socialists seeking a noncapitalist way to win popular support and the material blessings of the modern world for the populace after Maoist fundamentalism proved a disaster.

Howard finds that a successful noncapitalist path would require

the institutionalization of democratic counterweights—allowing citizens to organize and represent their own interests—to limit the power of those who control the central state apparatus. Therefore, in contrast to Zweig and Madsen who, of course, mention democracy, Howard makes it central to her contrast between civil society trying to represent itself and a dictatorial state crushing free association. Given the continued silencing of democrats and dissidents in China, Howard is not optimistic that the country's Leninist system can carry out political reform. But without political reforms, she argues, economic reforms such as decollectivization cannot win prosperity and dignity for the Chinese people.

The unique contribution of Howard's work is a profound theoretical inquiry—she never forgets for a moment the reality of the power of the Leninist state—into whether the cooperative associations and negotiated contracts engendered in rural China by decollectivization can serve as a basis for market socialism and popular democracy. This inquiry is based on a shrewd understanding of the peasantry's alienation from Leninist socialism, and thus contrasts with media pundits, who, in the wake of the Beijing Massacre of June 4, 1989, wrongly tended to dismiss China's peasants as isolated, ignorant, unconcerned, and certainly not interested in the issue of democracy. In fact, at Nanjing, where speakers from the democracy movement represented diverse sectors of society, it was the peasant representative who spoke the longest and expressed the strongest grievances. Although urban democrats identify all of Mao's tyrannical evils with his alleged peasant essence, in fact democracy is very much an issue for the peasantry. Still, the conservatives in power have shown that they know

how to appeal to peasant chauvinism and populist anti-urban, anti-intellectual passions to recruit villagers to reactionary causes.

THE ESSAYS in the work edited by Ashwani Saith compare the circumstances of Chinese peasants under collectivization and decollectivization. These studies are of a consistently higher quality than is the norm for edited volumes. Some of the essays, such as those by Saith himself, Eduard Vermeer, Elizabeth Croll, Stephan Feuchtwang, and Gordon White, are gems.

In their superb chapter, Peter Nolan and Suzanne Paine (whose recent death is a great loss) contrast the "virtuous circle" of growth brought by decollectivization with the stagnation and "abysmally low living standards" of the collective era (p. 94). Nolan and Paine draw parallels between the liberation of productive energies brought about by decollectivization and by "the breakdown of manorialism in medieval Europe" (p. 97). Richard Conroy's solid data depict how Mao's disregard for the wealth generated by modern science and technology combined with a Stalinist policy of scissor prices and high extraction from the peasantry to produce "stagnation or even decrease in peasants' income" (p. 147).

The volume's longest essay, written by Ajit Kumar Ghose, although peppered with good data and sound reasoning, claims—despite the scholarly consensus as exemplified in the materials of Zweig, Madsen, and Howard—that rural performance from 1965 to 1975 was remarkable by any standard (he is silent on the famine in southwest China from 1974 to 1977¹), including income growth. By con-

trast, Howard shows that virtually stagnant income over that period permitted a peasant to buy one more pack of cigarettes a year at best.

HISTORY makes clear why collectivization was counterproductive. Economist Kang Chao has penned an elegant work, *Man and Land in Chinese History*, which explores the long-term decline in rural China beginning in the 12th century. Kang shows that in overpopulated rural areas with dispersed land holdings of intensively farmed micro-plots, and in an economy that increasingly assumed the characteristics of a market economy (p. 221), peasants organized in a household division of labor to gain every penny possible from subsidiary, sideline, and off-farm work.

Kang reveals in his study that what China needed to break out of rural misery were technological breakthroughs and population control in order to free people to earn more value off the land, while the land supported fewer people at higher living standards. Mao's collectivization, by contrast, crushed the market, wiped out off-farm income, and locked an ever-increasing population onto the land, while constraining needed technological innovation (as Conroy shows in the Saith volume). Thus, collectivization guaranteed stagnation. The economic failure was not accidental or a matter of bad implementation, the weather, or disconcerting political struggles. It was inherent in the collectivist system.

ALTHOUGH Peter Nolan's compelling description of the achievements and problems of decollectivization in China is in agreement with those of Zweig and Howard, in the first three chapters of *The Political Economy of Collective Farms*, Nolan offers an illuminating analysis of the classical socialist debates over

¹Described in muted terms in *Renmin ribao* (Beijing), Sept. 30, 1986.

collectivization measured against the performance of collectives. This contribution is at the highest level of scholarly excellence. Moreover, Nolan grounds his analysis in the broadest comparative perspective. Nolan finds that the only defense of collectivization that accords with the record is Stalin's non-economic one—building a relatively autarkic, powerful military state (pp. 25, 228). The economic failures of collectives are manifest. Nolan concludes that "the relief of the condition . . . of poor people . . . required harnessing rather than suppressing market forces. . . . The tragedy for the socialist world is that the lesson was not learned in the Soviet Union during War Communism in 1917–21 when the costs of attempting to suppress the dynamic force of market competition were first revealed" (pp. 3–4).

Zweig, Madsen, and Howard go beyond this persuasive analysis of collectives as inherently incapable of delivering the goods to the populace to show, in addition, how the political need to compel peasants to do what is not in their interests produces a police system of institutionalized fear and demagogic scapegoating. Madsen details a life of brutality and hypocrisy. Zweig elucidates how fundamentalist "mobilization entailed . . . coercion and terror" (p. 39). Thus, "only by creating a local setting rife with political and personal insecurity; only by purging leaders with strong ties to the peasants and replacing them with leaders who had few direct links with them; only by beating landlords who in most instances had committed no offenses for twenty years; and only by press distortion, deceit, and the creation of false models could the radicals create the psychological environment necessary to compel cadres and peasants to respond to their goal. . . ." (p. 49).

One murderously logical result of this process (which Pol Pot took to its conclusion, and Zweig brilliantly explores) is that collectivist socialism requires the death of the peasantry, genocide. Mao, like Stalin, legitimated collectivization as class war. Stalin and Mao both justified the use of state violence to exterminate a group defined as class enemies, counterrevolutionaries, and traitors. Howard puts this brutality in a theoretical context that equates Mao's fundamentalism with Marx's notion of barracks communism, a system even more cruel than early capitalism, a system based on envy, anxiety, and leveling-down, a system Nolan characterizes as "equality in poverty" and "wretched socialism" (p. 27).

Opposition to foreigners who are supposedly behind the counterrevolutionary traitors makes a strong military the top priority. The logic of collectivization—seldom followed to its conclusion in real life because of the regime's need for political stability, societal support, and economic growth—is a logic of genocide and militarism. Consequently, an end to tensions brought on by the cold war can help to undermine the brutal logic of tyrannical, militaristic collectivization.

IT IS Howard's book that best explains, given the inherent negativities of traditional Soviet-style collectives that were made far worse by Maoist fundamentalism, why decollectivization is not universally popular and successful. The answer lies in the political continuity of the Leninist dictatorship, which leaves the gains of reform fragile and seemingly fraudulent. For example, it is obvious that those who get rich first should pay taxes to fund the building of the infrastructure that Maoism ignored, and which the peasants locked into the poorest regions require the most. But any taxpayer

can see that taxes are ripped off by the corrupt cadres of the Leninist system. No one finds tax-paying just, and therefore no one pays taxes. Ironically, the biggest gainers from post-Mao decollectivization are also the targets of greedy officials and therefore most alienated from the regime.

Rampant corruption makes necessary the formation of a professional civil service to replace the *nomenklatura* of political loyalists who rob the people. But those in power fear that such political reform would undermine their base of power, the political networks of the *nomenklatura*. So, they do not implement needed political reforms.

The result is an intensification of popular corruption, cynicism, and conflict within an outmoded system, whose rulers can still appeal to popular anxieties over losing guaranteed minimums, to envy against those getting rich, and to loyalty to a militarily powerful communist state that claims moral superiority over so-called capitalist states. Therefore, decollectivization cannot be an end in itself, but merely one liberating moment in a prolonged, painful conflict. Decollectivization alone cannot guarantee a peaceful or happy outcome, because without democracy, peasants incapable of representing their own interests cannot erect political barriers to the return of collectivization and its attendant horrors. Leninist dictatorship limits the rich fruits of decollectivization, even as it continues to threaten the first ripe plums.

Howard and Nolan draw our attention to the conflict between supporters of collectivization and decollectivization not as one between radicals and moderates or between revolutionaries and pragmatists, but rather as a struggle between tyrants and democrats. But only Nolan, of these many authors, concludes on a truly (and, perhaps,

overly) optimistic note when he argues that once decollectivization and market reforms occur, peasants will "demand democratic rights and ensure that the party

'withers away' through popular pressure from below, whatever the views of the matter held by the party leadership" (p. 11). Thus, just as state-coerced collectiviza-

tion formed part of the imposition of a feudal-like despotism, so decollectivization can be part of a liberating process culminating in genuine democratization.

Differing Perspectives on Castro's Cuba

Dennis M. Hanratty

ANDREW ZIMBALIST, Ed. *Cuban Political Economy: Controversies in Cubanology*. Boulder, CO, Westview, 1988.

WILBER A. CHAFFEE, JR. and GARY PREVOST, Eds. *Cuba: A Different America*. Totowa, NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, 1989.

SERGIO G. ROCA, Ed. *Socialist Cuba: Past Interpretations and Future Challenges*. Boulder, CO, Westview, 1988.

THIRTY YEARS after its revolution, Cuba remains a highly controversial subject of study. Scarcely an element of Cuban society or a policy decision by the Cuban government fails to engender deep divisions within the Western academic community. Scholars remain divided over such questions as: Has the government of Fidel Castro met the basic needs of the population? Do Cuba's political institutions promote popular participation in government,

Dennis M. Hanratty is Latin American Unit Supervisor at the Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, and a specialist on Cuba. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the United States Government.

or do they hinder such participation? Is the Cuban regime succeeding in its efforts to create a new socialist man?

The three books reviewed in this essay reflect the divisions just mentioned. None of the authors would probably agree with characterizations depicting him as a defender or critic of the revolution. Each would insist, instead, that his assessment is merely objective. Suffice it to say here, therefore, that the scholars who contributed to the Andrew Zimbalist and the Wilber Chaffee and Gary Prevost volumes conclude that the Cuban government is on the right path to addressing its varied challenges, and that the contributors to the Sergio Roca volume do not share this viewpoint.

Zimbalist's book, however, is not so much an examination of Cuban society as it is a broad-based attack on mainstream Cubanology as practiced by such specialists as Roca, Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Jorge Domínguez, and Jorge Pérez-López. At various places in his own two essays, Zimbalist contends that these and other Cubanologists have demonstrated distortion; oversimplification; an unscientific marshaling of evidence; a poverty of conceptualization, of theory, and of method; and a lack of understanding of the Cuban economy.¹

Is Zimbalist correct? Do mainstream Cubanologists distort reali-

ty? Do their critics have a clearer understanding of Cuba? In an attempt to shed some light on these issues, I will examine four contentious parts of the Cuban debate: the economy (especially its post-1986 configuration), health care, housing, and the organs of People's Power. Because Zimbalist's target is wider than the Roca book, it will be necessary to refer to other publications not reviewed here.

THE PERIOD 1976–86 saw the Cuban government take several steps in the direction of economic liberalization. Perhaps the most significant action was the establishment of the Economic Management and Planning System (*Sistema de Dirección y Planificación de Economía—SDPE*). Similar in nature to the 1965 Kosygin reforms in the Soviet

¹One of the contributors to the Zimbalist volume, Cuban economist José Luis Rodríguez, levels additional charges against the practitioners of mainstream Cubanology. Rodríguez defines Cubanology as pertaining "to that group of Cuban scholars who play a central role in the studies of Cuba in the context of the ideological and political battle against the Revolution" (Zimbalist, p. 27). According to Rodríguez, "historical evidence confirms that the theses of the so-called Cubanology endorsed and were derived from—directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously—the United States' political battle against socialism in Cuba" (ibid., pp. 27–28). Rodríguez dismisses questions of human rights abuses, contending that the analysts who raise such concerns are applying "bourgeois concepts to Cuban reality" (ibid., p. 31).

Union, the SDPE sought to delegate more authority to state enterprise managers, to introduce profitability as one measure of enterprise performance, to establish a self-financing plan for enterprises, to integrate concepts such as cost accounting and inventory controls into plant decision-making, and to strengthen material incentives for workers. Parallel to this effort was an easing of many restrictions against self-employment. The early 1980's saw the emergence of small manufacturers, a variety of street vendors, an incipient home-construction sector, and peasant and artisans markets. By 1986, all of these entities had come under attack from Castro. At the very time *perestroyka* was getting under way in the USSR, Castro unleashed a campaign known as the "Process for Rectifying Errors and Negative Tendencies," strongly criticized the prior implementation of the SDPE, including its emphasis on material incentives, and closed or curtailed the operations of those engaged in self-employment.

Several questions concerning these events demand our attention. Did decentralization occur under the SDPE? Why did the rectification process take place? Did it eliminate material incentives? Finally, is rectification working?

Based on interviews with former managers, technicians, and other state enterprise officials now living in the United States, Roca has concluded elsewhere that the SDPE did not result in a substantial degree of local autonomy. According to him, national ministries demonstrated considerable reluctance to delegate authority to state enterprises, thereby sharply curtailing the discretion purportedly given to plant managers under the SDPE. In addition, Roca states, the Cuban Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Cubano*—PCC) and its first secretary, Fidel Castro, "exercised a per-

vasive and detrimental influence at all levels of economic organization and over all functions of economic administration." Interviewees reported that Castro constantly overrode economic planning and local autonomy, exhibiting the classic style of a micromanager.²

Zimbalist's assessment is quite different. He judges that a considerable degree of decentralization occurred before 1986 and has remained in effect thereafter. In his opinion: "Direct contracting between enterprises for many inputs is being promoted, enterprise reports to their ministries are being cut back, the number of administrative personnel in the planning system is being reduced, enterprise self-financing of investment is being extended, worker participation in management and plan formulation is more extensive than before, the decentralization of enterprise management into smaller units (brigades) with greater worker control is being universalized in agriculture and extended in industry, and the role of parallel markets where prices are set according to conditions of supply and demand is growing at an accelerated pace" (p. 12).

In a recent article, however, Zimbalist appears to draw back from this optimistic assessment. Although he still maintains that some decentralization has taken place, including the establishment of brigades and the diminution of the numbers and activities of planners, he now appears to qualify his earlier statements on worker participation in management and plan formulation: "Overall, it seems that progress regarding worker participation to date has been partial and uneven, leaving much to be desir-

ed." Most striking is his admission that "the SDPE, like the 1965 Soviet economic reforms, did not bring about significant change in underlying centralization of decision-making in the economic mechanism."³ Although he arrives at this position for substantially different reasons, Zimbalist's conclusion is similar to that of Roca.

Mainstream Cubanologists and their critics differ over the reasons for the emergence of the rectification campaign. Zimbalist contends that the process flowed from the economic crunch that Cuba experienced during 1985–86. He points to a combination of low sugar prices, a sharp decline in petroleum revenues,⁴ a severe hurricane, several years of drought, the devaluation of the US dollar, increased levels of protectionism in Western countries, and the US blockade of Cuban goods, which resulted in a reduction of nearly 50 percent in hard-currency earnings in 1986. The output shortages that resulted from the loss of hard currency substantially restricted, in Zimbalist's judgment, the appropriate utilization of material incentives. In addition, consistent with a pattern found in other centrally planned economies during times of economic liberalization, many Cuban state workers had diverted their energies to private-sector activities. In this interpretation, the increased absenteeism and misuse of government resources exacerbated the consequences of the hard-currency shortfall, thus producing the government's response (Zimbalist, p. 11).

³Andrew Zimbalist, "Incentives and Planning in Cuba," *Latin American Research Review* (Albuquerque, NM), No. 1, 1989, pp. 86, 73.

⁴For a discussion of the economic importance of Cuban reexports of Soviet petroleum, see Jorge F. Pérez-López, "Cuban Hard Currency Trade and Oil Reexports," in Roca, *Socialist Cuba . . .*, pp. 123–55.

²Sergio G. Roca, "State Enterprises in Cuba Under the New System of Planning and Management (SDPE)," *Cuban Studies* (Pittsburgh), No. 16, 1986, p. 168.

In a rejoinder, Mesa-Lago disputes the notion, implicit in Zimbalist's argument, that economic liberalization works best during periods of growth. According to him, the Cuban state lacks the resources to substitute effectively for the goods and services formerly produced by small-scale businesses. Mesa-Lago maintains that the rectification campaign was grounded in politics and ideology, not economics. Most important, Castro acted to prevent a loss of power that he and the PCC might have experienced if the SDPE had been successfully implemented. In addition, Castro believed that material incentives were eroding worker commitment to defense of the revolution. Finally, Castro was afraid that the growing independence of the self-employed would produce social unrest (in Roca, op. cit., pp. 86–87).

The research of Mesa-Lago and Roca exhibits a troubling inconsistency: If the PCC and Castro were able to intervene continually at the local level to frustrate enterprise autonomy, why would they fear the SDPE? Nevertheless, Mesa-Lago is correct in observing that Castro repeatedly stated in 1986 and 1987 that the PCC had been slighted during the years of economic liberalization. For example, at the 53rd plenum of the Confederation of Cuban Workers (*Confederación de los Trabajadores Cubanos*—CTC) in January 1987, Castro denounced as reactionary and erroneous the assumption that the construction of socialism was merely a question of

implementing efficient economic mechanisms. Such a view, Castro charged, negated the primary role of the PCC in constructing a strong economy.⁵ Similarly, the report of the Second Plenum of the PCC Central Committee, in July 1986, charged that there had been a serious neglect of political and ideological instruction during the heyday of the SDPE.⁶

But had such instruction been neglected? In the wake of two events in 1980—the Mariel exodus of Cuban refugees and the election of Ronald Reagan—the Cuban government intensified its ideological message at home. The first half of the 1980's saw heightened mobilization by the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR), the reestablishment of the Cuban militia (a force that within five years included more than 10 percent of the nation's population), and the declaration of "the war of all the people." All of these campaigns involved heavy doses of ideological training. Thus, the government did expose Cubans to the message of the revolution. The leadership's problem, however, was that many remained unmoved.⁷

Did the rectification campaign involve the wholesale elimination of material incentives? Zimbalist is correct in pointing out that some mainstream Cubanologists have been too quick in suggesting the demise of material incentives. He observes that "in every speech where the excesses of material incentives are criticized or the defi-

ciencies of the SDPE are analyzed, the leadership has also made it clear that neither are being jettisoned" (p. 15). For example, Castro stated at the Deferred Session of the Third PCC Congress (in December 1986) that Cuba should not give up on the system of determining salaries on the basis of the amount produced. At the same time, material incentives clearly have been deemphasized, whereas moral incentives and revolutionary zeal are currently in vogue. In his speech to the Deferred Session, Castro stressed that economic mechanisms are secondary to political and revolutionary activities. Too many material incentives, Castro stated, will prevent the emergence of the communist man.⁸

As an illustration of the regime's approach, take the case of a textile mill in Santiago de Cuba, whose poor performance was examined by the PCC Central Committee's Second Plenum. The delegates' solution to the mill's construction deficiencies, uncompleted projects, general sense of disorder, and high level of worker absenteeism did not involve material incentives. Instead, the PCC appealed to the sense of shame that such workers must feel and warned them that they were jeopardizing the chances of their province to host the Fourth Party Congress.⁹

Finally, Zimbalist concludes that "the present 'rectification' campaign seems to be bearing fruit. Speeches and press accounts are increasingly referring to enterprises that have turned their productivity performance around, and recent aggregate productivity statistics are more encouraging." Yet, he qualifies that positive assessment with the observation that "the over-

⁵"Fidel Castro Ruz: At the 53rd Plenum of the National Congress of the CTC," *Cuba Socialista* (Havana), January-February 1987, pp. 139–77.

⁶"Second Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba: The Highest Body of the Party Analyzes the Progress of the Economy and the Process of Rectifying Errors and Negative Tendencies," *ibid.*, September–October 1986, pp. 141–49.

⁷Sergio Díaz-Briquets elaborates on this point: "Casual observers visiting Cuba have noted what appears to be a significant degree of

alienation among the nation's youth. In some respects, the Mariel events represent an extreme instance of alienation. This alienation, while in no small measure a consequence of the isolation and extreme amount of social, economic, and political stresses prevalent in revolutionary Cuba—and fueled among the baby boomers by the normal rebelliousness of youth—is exacerbated by the despair many feel as they are incapable of realizing material, cultural, and other aspirations." See Sergio Díaz-Briquets, in Roca, op. cit., p. 172.

⁸*Granma Weekly Review* (Havana), Dec. 14, 1986, Supplement, p. 12.

⁹"Second Plenum . . .," *loc. cit.*, p. 145.

all macro context in Cuba (resulting largely from the foreign exchange situation) remains difficult, and prospects for healthy growth in the near future are dim" (p. 15).

Mainstream Cubanology's evaluation of the rectification process is more pessimistic. For example, Roca concludes (op. cit., p. 118) that "if fully implemented, the Rectification Process will most likely impact negatively on Cuban production and efficiency, with deleterious consequences for the external economic balance."

Roca's judgment appears to be more accurate, even if the evidence is admittedly anecdotal. Take, for instance, the troubled situation in Cuba's ports. For several years, intolerably high levels of port congestion adversely affected other segments of the nation's economy. With the onset of the rectification campaign in 1986, local PCC officials sought to put an end to poor performance through the sponsorship of "combative assemblies" of workers. At these assemblies, many port workers acknowledged their lack of labor discipline and their high levels of absenteeism and resolved to correct these deficiencies. Two years later, however, the port crisis continued unabated. Absenteeism remained a serious problem. More important, rectification had failed to make a dent in the underlying structural deficiencies apparent in the nation's ports, especially in Havana. Workers lacked specialized equipment to load and unload ships efficiently. Because of an antiquated warehouse system, tons of perishable goods were left to rot. In addition, the transportation network for removing products from the ports functioned poorly or not at all.¹⁰

HEALTH CARE has long been regarded as one of the major achievements of the Cuban revolution. J. C. Rosenberg's comments in the Chaffee and Prevost volume (p. 125) are typical in this regard. "Whatever one's political philosophy, one cannot deny that the current Cuban government has used its power to make impressive advances in health care. They have implemented a community-oriented primary care system and public health measures that have elevated the health of their people to the level of developed countries."

In recent years, however, this conventional wisdom has come under attack from Cubanologists, who question the accuracy of Cuba's health care data, the degree to which achievements in this field are based on policies of the Castro government, and the efficacy of health services delivery. To what extent are these criticisms valid?

Nicholas Eberstadt has been the most outspoken critic of Cuba's social statistics, strongly suggesting (though not categorically stating) that the Cuban government has tampered with its health statistics. According to official Cuban data, Eberstadt notes, infant mortality climbed from 38 deaths per thousand live births in 1958 to 46 deaths per thousand live births in 1969; thereafter, the rate declined by 60 percent over the next decade to stand at 19 deaths per thousand live births in 1979. Eberstadt observes, however, that indirect infant mortality estimates conducted by demographer Kenneth Hill apparently contradict official claims of declining rates during the 1970's. Finally, Eberstadt suggests that the reported rapid decline in infant mortality is at odds with Cuba's morbidity data.¹¹

Nonetheless, other analysts appear to challenge Eberstadt's underlying assumptions. For instance,

Sergio Díaz-Briquets—identifiable as a mainstream Cubanologist—observes that the official infant mortality rate for 1958 is part of an unadjusted series that underestimates the actual mortality level during the 1950's. Díaz-Briquets concludes that the infant mortality rate in the 1950's probably ranged between 50 and 70 deaths per thousand live births.¹² If the series is adjusted, Cuba's infant mortality rate actually declined during the 1960's until it experienced a brief rise in 1969; the subsequent decline beginning in 1970 was thus consistent with the pattern of the previous decade and was not a radical departure from earlier trends.¹³

Both Sarah Santana (in Zimbalist, p. 112) and Díaz-Briquets (in "How to Figure Out Cuba . . .") also note that Cuba has published statistics that reflect poorly on its health care system. For example, Cuba reported that the infant mortality rate in 1986 rose 10 percent from the rate recorded in the previous year. Finally, as Santana observes, Kenneth Hill himself did conclude that the official infant mortality rates from the 1970's should be accepted as valid in the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary.

¹¹See his article "Literacy and Health: The Cuban Model," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Dec. 10, 1984; and idem, "Did Fidel Fudge the Figures?" *Caribbean Review* (Miami, FL), Spring 1986, pp. 5–7, 37–38.

¹²"How to Figure Out Cuba: Development, Ideology, and Morality," *Caribbean Review*, Spring 1986, pp. 8–11 and 39–42; and idem, *The Health Revolution in Cuba*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1983.

¹³It is unclear whether Eberstadt accepts or rejects the necessity of adjusting the infant mortality series. After noting the increase in infant mortality rates from 1958 to 1969, Eberstadt writes: "To some extent, this jump in death rates may have been a statistical artifact. Cuba was tightening up its vital registration system during those years, and improvements in enumeration could in theory make it seem as if death rates were rising when they were falling. On the other hand, death and birth statistics were reasonably reliable before the revolution." See "Did Fidel Fudge the Figures?" loc. cit., p. 7.

¹⁰Drawn from *Bohemia* (Havana), Oct. 17, 1986, pp. 68–72; July 22, 1988, pp. 23–24; and Sept. 16, 1988, pp. 8–10.

One can accept the veracity of Cuba's noteworthy infant mortality rates without, however, concluding that they are primarily the result of the Castro regime's policies. Although differences in reporting methods should cause us to be cautious in comparing rates across countries, Díaz-Briquets provides compelling evidence that already in the 1950's, Cuba had a highly advanced mortality pattern for a Third World nation, one that compared very favorably to other Latin American countries.¹⁴ He therefore concludes that the achievements recorded since the revolution actually follow a pattern of favorable trends that began at the onset of the 20th century. Although the Cuban government should be commended for allowing the continuation of such trends by extending low-cost health care technologies to the rural population, other societies with substantially different political and social systems have pursued similar health policies and achieved similar results.¹⁵

¹⁴Díaz-Briquets, *The Health Revolution in Cuba*, pp. 53–101. Rodríguez does not accept this argument: "It is difficult to take seriously claims that Cuba had reached high levels of health performance by 1958 only when [sic] some 20 percent of deliveries occurred in health institutions, when practically no rural hospitals existed, and when some 36 percent of rural workers suffered from intestinal parasites, 31 percent from malaria, and some 14 percent suffered, or had suffered, from tuberculosis" (in Zimbalist, op. cit., p. 97).

¹⁵For example, Costa Rica's and Panama's health indicators were roughly comparable to Cuba's in the 1950's and remained so in the 1980's. Statistics compiled by the Pan American Health Organization show Costa Rica, Panama, and Cuba to have life expectancies at birth of 73.0 years (1983 figures), 71.0 years (1982), and 73.4 years (1980–85), respectively. Infant mortality rates for Costa Rica, Panama, and Cuba were 18.6 per thousand live births (1983), 20.0 per thousand live births (1982), and 15.0 per thousand live births (1984), respectively. See Pan American Health Organization, *Evaluation of the Strategy for Health for All by the Year 2000: Seventh Report on the World Health Situation*, Washington, DC, 1986, p. 236.

Cuba has one of the world's highest ratios of doctors to inhabitants, yet Cubans are not impressed with the quality of care provided. Díaz-Briquets's observation that Cubans continually complain about the delivery of health services is supported by a 1987 public opinion survey conducted by the PCC in Holguín Province.¹⁶ The survey generated more than 10,000 responses, 87 percent of which were negative. Respondents charged, among other things, that there was a chronic shortage of supplies (medications, syringes, and stretchers); that many doctors continually were absent from their clinics, whereas those on duty had little experience, or expressed contempt for patients; and that favoritism prevailed in the delivery of health services.

At the Deferred Session of the Third PCC Congress, a physician related his experience at a hospital characterized by chronic absenteeism among nurses. The hospital solved its problem, he reported, when the nurses formed a vanguard detachment that "would have to work irregular hours all the time, would not get paid overtime, would be organized along military lines, and would be ready to undertake any national or international mission assigned to them." Filled with socialist fervor, the nurses not only ended their previous pattern of absenteeism but chalked up nearly 3,000 hours of voluntary work in one month alone.¹⁷ Despite this impressive story, it is highly unlikely that health care providers are more responsive than other Cuban workers to the tantalizing reward of a socialist emulation banner.

¹⁶*The Public Survey on the Quality of Health Care in the Province of Holguín, Cuba: A Confidential Report by the Cuban Communist Party*, Washington, DC, Cuban American National Foundation, 1988.

¹⁷*Granma Weekly Review*, Dec. 14, 1986, Supplement, p. 6.

HOUSING is another area that has generated considerable interest and discussion. Both mainstream Cubanologists and their critics generally agree that for many years, Cuba has faced an acute shortage of quality housing, the result of a pre-1959 housing deficit, of Castro's support for infrastructure development and de-emphasis of residential construction in the 1960's, and of increased demand as the baby boomers of the early to mid-1960's reached marriage age. The more contentious issue, however, concerns the government's current level of commitment to addressing this deficiency.

The General Housing Law enacted in December 1984 signified both the government's recognition of the severity of the problem and its understanding of the mechanisms needed to solve it. The law contained a variety of provisions, including a much-publicized measure under which renters became owners of their apartment units.¹⁸ Specifically in terms of expanding the number of housing units, however, the law's most important measures concerned its encouragement of private construction and allowance of relatively free market sales of land and housing. The government granted individuals rights and encouraged individual initiative in a number of areas, including purchasing undeveloped urban lots and construction materials, hiring services of qualified personnel, renting equipment and tools, and selling completed units to others (the state reserved the right to pur-

¹⁸For the draft text of the law (later promulgated without changes), see *Granma* (Havana), Nov. 5, 1984, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Latin America Report* (Washington, DC), JPRS-LAM-85-014, Feb. 12, 1985, pp. 69–113. For a useful summary of the law, see Howard Glazer, "Architecture and the Building Industry in Contemporary Cuba," (in Chaffee and Prevost, pp. 92–95).

chase such units by "paying the legally established price").

According to Howard Glazer, the law began to pay quick dividends: "Even as quickly as early 1985, although the mechanics of implementing the new housing law were still being organized, hundreds of small self-help projects were begun throughout Havana. New second-floor additions, handsome (and occasionally not so handsome) restorations of run-down houses, and hundreds of minor improvements, for example, exterior paint and stucco, were transforming the city" (in Chaffee and Prevost, p. 97).

Glazer's account, which concludes with a rather optimistic assessment of Cuban housing conditions, curiously fails to mention the controversy that enveloped the General Housing Law within 18 months of its enactment.¹⁹ By the middle of 1986, Castro was charging that unscrupulous individuals had abused the liberalized housing law by diverting resources away from state enterprises.²⁰

Did the change in government policy that occurred after that speech signify a basic shift away from support for private housing initiatives? In a recent article, Zimbalist contends that no such shift occurred: "... the major change in

housing policy came with the reform aimed at eventually converting all tenants into homeowners and allowing the private exchange and sale of houses. The private sale of houses is still permitted, but now it cannot take place directly between the buyer and seller. To avoid speculation and exorbitant prices, the state now regulates such sales. The basic change, however, is still in place."²¹

Although Zimbalist is correct in pointing out that private construction remains permissible, the degree of official support for such activity appears to have diminished considerably. A comparison of the general housing laws of December 1984 and of December 1988 reveals a notable shift away from free-market pursuits.²² (Obviously, Zimbalist cannot be held accountable for the particulars of the 1988 law, which postdates his article, but the shifts confirm that his prognosis was too optimistic.) The preamble of the new law asserts that the legislative revisions are "aimed at intensifying the control that the state must wield over operations involving housing, as well as defining the state's decisive participation in the solution to the country's housing problem." Under the new law, construction minibrigades, not individuals, "constitute the *principal* means for expanding the plan for construction of housing and social projects and also for repairing and rebuilding housing structures."²³

Moreover, sales of undeveloped lots may now take place only "with

prior approval from the Provincial Housing Directorate, which, in any case, may exercise the preferential right to purchase and acquire ownership of the lot for the state through payment of its legal price." Materials must now be purchased from authorized state agencies. Consider also the following new provision: "Grants of housing ownership and exchanges made with an ulterior motive of *profit*, amassing of wealth, or exploitation, in violation of the requirements and procedures ordered in this law, are illegal, and may be penalized with a loss of the dwelling that was the object of speculation, and of the funds acquired from the sale or exchange, through a resolution, with grounds, from the Provincial Housing Directorate or the local organs of the people's government" (emphasis added). By attempting to discourage the profit motive in housing construction, the government may be removing its most effective tool for solving its housing problem.

CRITICS often argue that mainstream Cubanology ignores the importance of municipal, provincial, and national organizations of People's Power. In the view of these critics, the establishment of the People's Power structure in December 1976 demonstrated that the Cuban government was determined to allow democratic participation and to

¹⁹According to Glazer, "Cuba has already made enormous progress in providing housing for its people. If it is not what Fidel Castro envisioned as he reviewed the plans of *Habana del Este* (1959), it stands in remarkable contrast to every other Latin American country, where tens of millions continue to live in shantytowns and slums often without even the most minimal public services. Given peace, the normalization of relations with the United States, and the opportunity to devote more resources to the problem, Cuba may well demonstrate that the universal problem of housing can be solved in a Third World country" (in Chaffee and Prevost, p. 101).

²⁰"Fidel Castro Ruz: On the 25th Anniversary of the Victory of Playa Girón and of the Proclamation of the Socialist Character of the Revolution," *Cuba Socialista*, September-October 1986, pp. 19-33.

²¹"Incentives and Planning in Cuba," p. 91.

²²For the text of the 1988 law, see *Trabajadores* (Havana), Special Supplement, Mar. 28, 1989, pp. 2-11, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Official Version of 1989 Housing Law," *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC), FBIS-LAT, June 5, 1989, Supplement. The title of the translation was wrong on the year of the law: it was adopted on December 23, 1988.

²³Emphasis added. Confronted with an estimated shortage of 1 million housing units, the government initiated the construction minibrigade program in 1970. The plan called for the construction of prefabricated apartments by teams primarily composed of unskilled and semi-skilled laborers but headed by skilled workers from the Ministry of Construction. Most analysts contend that the minibrigades stagnated and declined after 1975. Glazer notes that government officials criticized the programs for both poor quality and low cost-effectiveness. The "resurrection" of minibrigades in the latest housing law is not a promising development.

decentralize political authority. For example, writing before recent developments in Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union, Chaffee asserted that "People's Power is a unique institution among Communist countries, because its officials at the municipal level are elected by secret ballot of the electorate from a competitive slate of candidates. These officials in turn select delegates to provincial and national People's Power assemblies in indirect elections" (Chaffee and Prevost, p. 22). According to Chaffee, the combination of competitive local elections and the PCC structure provide Cuba with both political stability and the articulation of direct political demands.

Two issues require further examination. First, are the People's Power organizations democratic? Second, do they make a difference?

Mainstream Cubanologists such as Jorge Domínguez contend that the PCC can easily manipulate People's Power elections.²⁴ Consider, for instance, the process for selecting municipal candidates. Self-nomination is not possible; instead, as Chaffee notes (p. 23), mass meetings in subdistricts containing up to 400 persons propose candidates through a show of hands. Given Cuba's extensive security apparatus, party structure, and mass organizations (especially the CDR), nomination of a Castro critic thus seems impossible. Candidates may only post their pictures and biographies; further campaigning and discussion of issues are prohibited. (These rules would seem to preclude the emergence of a maverick like Soviet politician Boris Yel'tsin.) In addition, municipal delegates do not have a free hand in the selection of those who will serve at the provincial and national levels. Rather, delegates select from lists provided to them by the Communist Party and its mass organizations.

In a rejoinder to these criticisms, Carollee Bengelsdorf contends that such views reflect an inability to understand revolutionary Cuba. In her judgment, Cubanologists who dismiss the People's Power structure are operating from a model "of the idealized electoral process of the idealized society at the apex of the modernization paradigm—in this case, the United States" (in Zimbalist, p. 221).

Bengelsdorf also rejects the contention that the People's Power National Assembly merely ratifies decisions that have been made at a higher level: "Again, such a conclusion directly contrasts with the Cuban view that the fundamental authority at the national level rests entirely with the National Assembly" (ibid., pp. 224–25). This statement undoubtedly reflects the Cuban constitution, but surely no one believes that it accurately reflects political reality. Rhoda Rabkin points out that the National Assembly frequently has been bypassed on important policy decisions; for example, "the decision to open peasant markets in 1980 and then the decision to close them in 1986, never became issues in the National Assembly" (in Roca, op. cit., p. 45). Even assuming that Cuban leaders were prepared to assign a major policy-making role to the National Assembly, its members could not hope to achieve expertise while operating under their current six-days-a-year schedule.²⁵

In a review of National Assembly sessions in 1980, Domínguez concludes that although this body had little apparent impact on significant policy issues, genuine debates had occurred.²⁶ However, the most striking aspect of the five case studies presented by Domínguez was Castro's dominant presence. In each situation, Castro allowed debate to unfold but then announced a resolution of the specific issue at

hand—a resolution that was accepted without further discussion.

This last pattern continues to the present. A review of the two-day National Assembly session in July 1988, for example, found the delegates listening intently to Castro's "profound reflections." Much time was also devoted to Castro's lengthy questioning of several provincial government presidents on a wide range of economic and social issues.²⁷

It is more difficult to determine the significance of People's Power when the focus shifts from the national to the local level. Bengelsdorf challenges the assumption of some Cubanologists, who contend that municipal and provincial governments have little power: "This assessment, of course, contrasts directly with the Cubans' assertion that Popular Power represents a fundamental decentralization of power, allowing for the active participation of the people in the decisions that most affect their lives" (in Zimbalist, p. 224).

Bengelsdorf's challenge has merit. Municipal and provincial assemblies have authority over a wide range of local services such as schooling, health care, and transportation. In addition, municipal officials are encouraged to identify and address complaints regarding

²⁴Cuba: *Revolution and Order*, Cambridge, MA, Belknap, 1987, pp. 287–89.

²⁵According to Chaffee, "The National Assembly also appoints a 31-member Council of State to run the government on a day-to-day basis between the Assembly sessions" (Chaffee and Prevost, p. 22). This contention is true in a narrow constitutional sense; in reality, however, the Assembly merely ratifies a higher-level selection of Council members.

²⁶"Revolutionary Politics: The New Demands for Orderliness," in Domínguez, Ed., *Cuba: Internal and International Affairs*, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage, 1982, pp. 34–38.

²⁷See Susanna Lee, "Report on the Third Ordinary Period of Sessions of the Third Legislature," *La Nación Cubana* (Havana), No. 16, 1988, pp. 28–35.

delivery of local services. Still, as Rabkin notes (in Roca, op. cit., p. 46), such complaints may not extend to fundamental issues of the Cuban polity. Local officials cannot deviate from the basic policy outlines delineated by the PCC. In addition, the dependence of local authorities on funds from the national government often means that they lack the financial resources

to address particular problems.

ZIMBALIST concludes the overview essay in his volume by charging that mainstream Cubanology is replete with distortions that have impeded the emergence of a rational and constructive United States policy toward Cuba. After reviewing the evaluations by Cubanologists of the Cuban economy, health care, hous-

ing, and People's Power, however, I find little basis for such an indictment. Certainly, the research efforts of the mainstream are not without flaws; indeed, this essay has identified specific points of disagreement with that research. Nonetheless, in each of the four major areas examined here, the more accurate interpretation of events rests with the mainstream, not with its critics.

Gorbachev's Economic Reforms: Early Assessments

Martin C. Spechler

PADMA DESAI. *Perestroika in Perspective*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1989.

DAVID A. DYKER, Ed. *The Soviet Union under Gorbachev: Prospects for Reform*. London, England, Croom Helm, 1987.

PETER WILES, Ed. *The Soviet Economy on the Brink of Reform: Essays in Honor of Alec Nove*. Boston, MA, Unwin Hyman, 1988.

SUSAN J. LINZ and WILLIAM MOSKOFF, Eds. *Reorganization and Reform in the Soviet Economy*. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1988.

RONALD D. LIEBOWITZ, Ed. *Gorbachev's New Thinking: Prospects for Joint Ventures*. Cambridge, MA, Ballinger, 1988.

JERRY F. HOUGH. *Opening Up the Soviet Economy*. Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1988.

MIKHAIL Gorbachev's stern rhetoric of economic "crisis" and the need for a radical reconstruction (*perestroika*, broader than mere reform) of the Soviet economy has rightly stirred anticipation in the West. Such readiness for change at the top, together with unprecedented

ed demonstrations of popular discontent,¹ immediately raised demand for expert opinion about the likely course of events. And although real knowledge about the present reforms is still quite limited—the most impressive of the projects announced in 1987–88 are not yet fully implemented—a large number of articles and books (including those reviewed here) have already appeared that would seem, by their titles at least, to satisfy any reasonable demand.²

Western observers broadly agree that faced with the relative technological backwardness and declining growth of productivity of

the Soviet economy, the General Secretary has entered into a widening spiral of reforms, whose breadth and eventual limits probably no one yet knows. At the same time, we must keep in mind that these reforms take as their starting point the continued social ownership of large-scale industrial production in the USSR and Communist Party monopoly of control over that production: i.e., *perestroika* is meant to revive Soviet power, not bury it.

The central core of Gorbachev's reform is the rather conservative idea that Soviet officials and workers should be held personally responsible for their actions. How they should act is still, in the main, to be decided from above. This means greater bonuses for success and real penalties for failure—instead of the massive subsidies, excuses, and corruption of the late Brezhnev era. A primary

¹The strike by a quarter of a million coal miners in summer 1989 is the most dramatic example yet of economic discontent.

²In addition to the books under review here, the reader may also examine Marshall Goldman, *Gorbachev's Challenge*, New York, W. W. Norton, 1987; Ed A. Hewett, *Reforming the Soviet Economy: Equality versus Efficiency*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1988 (this fine analysis of the Brezhnev system and cataloguing of the early Gorbachev reform decrees was reviewed by the author in *Comparative Economic Studies* [Lake Forest, IL, Spring 1989]; the recent compendium of the Joint Economic Committee, *Gorbachev's Economic Plans*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1988; Gertrude Schroeder's acute articles in the October–December 1986, July–September 1987, and April–June and July–September 1988 issues of *Soviet Economy* (Washington, DC); Abram Bergson, "The Gorbachev Revolution," *Challenge* (Armonk, NY), September/October, 1987, pp. 26–33; and idem, "The Economics of Perestroika: An Inauspicious Beginning," *ibid.*, May/June, 1989, pp. 10–15.

Martin C. Spechler is Associate Professor of Economics and Associate of the Russian and East European Institute, Indiana University (Indianapolis and Bloomington). He is the author of several articles on Soviet planning and foreign economic relations, and is currently revising a monograph on the economics of quality in Soviet industry.

objective of industrial and agricultural establishments will be to meet a reduced but essential range of state needs. Above and beyond this goal, they are expected to contract with consumers at prices established by the laws of supply and demand. The scope of such decentralized contracting and wholesale trade is gradually to be expanded. Planners and ministry officials are supposed to reduce their interference in routine matters, including small to medium-sized investments. Prices are to be made more flexible by 1990–91, but probably not flexible enough to clear all markets. Control over quality will be exercised by the independent Gospriemka (State Acceptance of Products, under the State Committee on Standards), and hence may be more exacting than the existing “in-house” quality control.

Already, considerable institutional freedom is allowed at the fringes of the state sector—leasing of some collective farm land, liberalization of terms for foreign and joint ventures on Soviet soil, and expansion of the numbers of cooperative and private-service enterprises. Of course, as in Hungary and China, for the “second economy” to prosper, it will require legitimate means—i.e., something other than theft—to gain access to crucial inputs from the “first” economy.

MOST of the reform projects announced have been quite similar to those enunciated 24 years ago by Premier Aleksey Kosygin, as Gertrude Schroeder has rightly reminded us.³ Only now, say official spokesmen, they will really be carried out! Almost all the Western authors reviewed here agree that the Kosygin-Brezhnev reforms failed

because of supply-demand imbalances, bureaucratic resistance, unwillingness to free prices, and perhaps also deeper flaws in the socialist system. But none of the authors provides a detailed analysis of this previous Soviet reform experience, and they pay little attention to the experience with economic reform in other socialist countries.⁴ Rather, they all follow the tripartite formula: problems, proposals, and prospects.

With respect to problems—one thing never in short supply in the Soviet economy—most of the writers take the newly aggressive Soviet self-criticism at face value, discounting any contrary optimism as self-serving and reactionary. It is assumed that things are at least as bad as Soviet officials admit. We should not forget, however, that Soviet politicians have always campaigned forcefully against (and hence have tended to exaggerate) their predecessors' errors, partly in order to counter opposing views still represented within the top leadership. The same appears true in the case of Gorbachev.

Most Western writers present Gorbachev's proposals—as amplified by Abel Aganbegyan, Leonid Abalkin, and others—with critical sympathy, although the observers usually find that the proposals conflict with one another and do not go far enough to succeed. What would succeed, it is usually implied, is some form of market capitalism open to international competition. The possibility of alternative, non-capitalist roads to wealth and power is hardly considered.

As to prospects, most Western economists are skeptical that Gorbachev will be permitted to allow creation of the unemployment, inflation, national secessions, foreign influence, social disruption, and threat to communist hegemony that the market pressures to be set in

motion by his most radical proposals threaten to bring about. To survive politically, he probably will be forced to limit *perestroika* to its present, cautious scope. Such is the consensus.

Dr. Hewett's book offers the most thorough analysis of the Brezhnev system and the best catalogue of the early Gorbachev reform decrees. Of course, every book on Gorbachev is outdated before it is in print, and readers will want to supplement their reading of this work with articles in Hewett's very useful journal, *Soviet Economy*, the annual analyses published by the US Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, and the excellent articles collected by John Hardt in the compendia of the Joint Economic Committee. As is true for all the other books here, revelations of *glasnost* (“openness”) had yet to be fully reflected in Hewett's analysis of the previous period of “stagnation” (*zastoy*).

PADMA DESAI, well known for her articles on Soviet industrial productivity, foreign trade, and grain harvests,⁵ now offers us in *Perestroika in Perspective* a somewhat expanded version of a lecture given at Michigan State University last year. Desai's slim volume tries, not very successfully, to tie *perestroika* to *glasnost*, the “new thinking” on foreign policy, and political reforms.

More promising is Desai's “Schumpeterian” approach, which stresses the importance of the freedom of entrepreneurs to enter into new ventures and to invest for future, uncertain benefits. This Austrian liberal perspective, which downplays issues of monopoly power

³See her “Gorbachev: ‘Radically’ Implementing Brezhnev's Reforms,” *Soviet Economy*, October-December 1986, pp. 289–301.

⁴For a stimulating discussion of the applicability of the Hungarian and Chinese models to Soviet reform, see Goldman, op. cit.

⁵Collected in *The Soviet Economy: Problems and Prospects*, London, Basil Blackwell, 1987.

and income inequality, contrasts with the Anglo-Saxon outlook, which asks how closely Soviet officials can come to "optimal" conditions, such as marginal cost pricing and market clearing. Unfortunately, Desai does not carry through her novel approach, and she even expresses judgments that conflict with it—for example, she approves the establishment of workers' control over enterprise affairs and emphasizes uniform profit taxation. *Perestroyka*, she thinks, will require greater participation—but in which decisions? If the Soviets tacitly imitate Yugoslavia, who will look after entrepreneurship?

Some of Desai's judgments miss the mark. Her view that the priority given political reform in Eastern Europe "will continue to be lower than in the Soviet Union" (p. 91) has been overtaken by events in Hungary and Poland. And I cannot agree with her opinion that Western credits and technological transfer offer "quick economic benefits," i.e., ones quicker than those, say, that might result from a reduction in military spending. The Soviet military bill is far larger than that for foreign aid (which she urges be cut), and arguably, the opportunity cost of resources currently preempted by the military is *greater* (not smaller, as Desai writes) than their accounting value. Curtailing the ministry of defense's absolute priority in obtaining high-quality inputs could permit redirection of scarce materials to special export plants or premium-price consumer goods.

Indeed, I would argue that the opportunity to cut the military budget is the crucial link between Gorbachev's ambitions for *perestroyka* and his well-publicized ideas for détente with the United States. Cutting the defense budget would be the best way to reduce the Soviet budget deficit and close the gap between available consumer goods

and money demand for them. Raising prices and imposing an income tax would be less attractive alternatives ways to make goods available as incentives for efficiency and hard work and as compensation for unpleasant personnel decisions. And without such incentives, *pere-stroyka* will probably dissipate in bureaucratic sloth. But Desai is surely right in arguing that Gorbachev needs to accumulate some victories soon if he hopes to prevail, not just survive.

THE ESSAYS in David Dyker's new book, too, have fallen victim to the rapid obsolescence of all knowledge about the East these days, reflecting as they do events only through mid-1986.⁶ They do, however, give a clear, detailed survey of the Brezhnev-to-early-Gorbachev interregnum, including domestic politics and foreign policy.

Dyker's solid new contribution on industrial and agricultural planning should be read together with his *The Future of the Soviet Economic Planning System*,⁷ in which he analyzes the Kosygin-Brezhnev reforms. According to Dyker, overcentralization—not the absence of capitalism—is the cardinal flaw in the Soviet economy, with bureaucratic command making "disproportions and imbalance inevitable" (p. 82). Indeed, supply failure explains a great deal of Soviet inefficiency—the over-indenting for capital goods, the construction delays, the lack of specialized industrial plants, and the poor quality of output—and has caused would-be reformers, including Gorbachev himself, to backtrack on promising ideas, such as bonuses for contract fulfillment, stable norms by which to measure out incentives, and application of the collective contract and the unplanned "normless link" in agriculture.

Slack plans would do much, as

Dyker thinks, to facilitate efficient decentralization, but alas, they conflict with Bolshevik reflexes when problems arise. For example, pressure on rural producers to deliver certain crops to territorial RAPO's (district [*rayon*] agro-industrial associations, which date from the 1970's) led to soil deterioration, crop diseases, and falling yields.⁸ It is not yet clear that the greater authority Gorbachev wants to give family "links" within collective farms will come to more than previous such decrees have, given pressure transmitted through state procurement agencies to supply more high-quality foodstuffs. Moreover, the continued existence of irrational prices and the lack of meaningful rental charges mean that material incentives can easily have perverse economic consequences.

DESPITE its title, the volume edited by Peter Wiles has little to say about current economic events. One exception is the article on Soviet agriculture by Karl-Eugen Wädekin. Writing in 1984–85, the distinguished West German specialist saw some prospect for improving Soviet yields through more rational *policy* (at the time, one could hardly speak of reform). A better composition of investment, improved conversion-feed ratios and smaller units in animal husbandry, an increase in the numbers of trained personnel, and abandonment of wasteful investments in land-improvement and the agro-industrial complex could,

⁶The book originated in a symposium at the School of European Studies of the University of Sussex (England), and was purportedly an attempt at prognostication.

⁷London, Croom Helm, 1985.

⁸The days of the RAPO are clearly numbered. At the March 1989 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on agriculture, Gorbachev stated that the RAPO's "shall be abolished in those places where they still exist." See the account of his March 15 speech to the plenum in *Pravda* (Moscow), Mar. 16, 1989.

Wädekin argued, measurably improve on the "stagnation" of the 1978–83 period and perhaps even bring overall self-sufficiency in food.

Of particular interest in the Wiles volume is a lively exchange between Lev Navrozov, a former Soviet journalist now with the Center for the Survival of Western Democracies, and Philip Hanson, the authoritative British economist, on the usability of CIA estimates of Soviet consumption, gross national product, and defense spending. Some of Navrozov's strictures cut deep, but without alternative estimates, we are left only with his suggestion that the Soviet Union is simultaneously poorer and more dangerous than we had been led to believe. Similar articles published recently within the Soviet Union suffer from similar inadequacy,⁹ as they must until prices and statistical reporting in the USSR have themselves been reformed.

THE PAPERS reprinted in the volume edited by Susan Linz and William Moskoff appeared in the Winter 1987 issue of *Comparative Economic Studies*, an organ of the Association of Comparative Economic Studies (USA). Since these articles were all written before Gorbachev enunciated the more radical elements of his proposed reform in mid-1987, the rather skeptical tone of most of them regarding Gorbachev's reforms is understandable. If the sum and substance of Gorbachev's approach were only the organizational reforms described by Robert Leggett for the whole economy, by Gertrude Schroeder for industry, and by Rolf H. W. Theen for the agricultural-industrial super-ministry Gosagroprom—we would all now be yawning.

Several items in the Linz-Moskoff volume are, however, of more enduring interest. In particular, there is the proposal by F. I. Kushnirsky—one of the very few former Soviet economists to make a mark in Western academic circles—that Soviet workers receive shares in their enterprises and that prices be freed on all items except output of natural monopolies.¹⁰ No idea so radical has, to my knowledge, been published by Soviet economists, which points to a poverty of printable discussion in the USSR, as distinct from Poland and Hungary.¹¹ Apparently, Soviet economists are not as yet permitted to challenge Gorbachev frontally.

In another stimulating chapter, Peter Toumanoff offers a simple econometric test confirming that neither economic reform nor leadership change since Nikita Khrushchev has had a measurable impact on Soviet labor productivity. He does find a bit of evidence indicating that the so-called "Zlobin" brigades may have had a positive effect, but one should remember that this system extended only to about one-sixth of the labor force in 1984, the last year in Toumanoff's sample.¹² But Toumanoff's method is not suited to capturing the short-term benefits of regime change, i.e., those occurring during the first three or four years only, say from the lessening of repression in 1953–58 and 1964–66, or the stress on discipline under Andropov in 1982–83 and Gorbachev in 1985–88.

¹⁰A "natural monopoly" is an industry where cost economies of scale are so extensive that dividing the market between competitors is impractical.

¹¹See, by way of contrast, Tadeusz Kowalik, "On Crucial Reform of Real Socialism," in Hubert Bagrich, Ed., *Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1989, pp. 23–86.

¹²Zlobin brigades in construction and other sectors have considerable operational and financial autonomy.

ALSO suffering from having been written before the July 1987 plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee on economic reform is the volume edited by Ronald Liebowitz, a geographer who in 1987, organized (along with Catherine Sokil, an economist) the "East-West Conference" of Middlebury College's International Institute for Economic Advancement. Despite the title, the volume has no extended analysis of Gorbachev's "new thinking," and the editor concedes that it is "too early to provide details on the prospects for joint economic ventures," the purported subject of the volume.

The four papers on East-West trade see little significant joint activity on the horizon, for a number of reasons. Victor Mote, a geographer who has studied the BAM (Baykal-Amur Mainline) railway, is skeptical that the Soviets will find it profitable to develop Siberian raw materials for export to the Pacific Rim. Likewise, Michael Bradshaw, another geographer, shows how disappointing trade between the Soviet Far East and Japan has been; this is because the Japanese want hard currency, not compensation deals—in which they provide equipment in return for a share in future output. (There is, unfortunately, no discussion of the strong potential for Soviet trade with China and with India.)

John Parsons of the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology argues that Western distaste for counter-trade has become a barrier to trade with the East. This situation is unfortunate, he argues, because Western companies could receive high prices for their equipment in exchange for assuming the cost and risk of marketing the resulting goods. However, far from reflecting ideological prejudice, as Parsons argues, this reluctance reflects the disappointing record of counter-trade (a record he almost entirely

⁹See, e.g., V. Selyunin and G. Khanin, "Cunning Figures," *Novyy Mir* (Moscow), February 1987, pp. 181–201.

ignores). Moreover, Western firms hardly can be eager to set up on Soviet soil new competition for their own export production. Production in Southeast Asia or within the European Economic Community avoids Soviet supply bottlenecks as well as Western trade barriers and is simply more convenient. Moreover, as Bradshaw and Gary Meyers show, East-West trade is subject to political barriers and sudden disruptions, in part precisely because its economic value to the West is not highly regarded.

JERRY Hough's brief paperback is argumentative and punchy. Hough, now James B. Duke professor of political science and public policy studies and director of the Center on East-West Trade at Duke University, is renowned for his masterly scrutiny of CPSU personnel policy, and his account here of how Gorbachev built a political base among regional party officials is well grounded and highly instructive. However, on wider matters, Hough allows himself unsupported opinions which can only attract our amazement. According to him, Gorbachev does *not* want to decouple West Europe from America, since he *needs* the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a bulwark against West German nuclear rearmament. Gorbachev *needs* to use a putative threat to national security as a way to justify increased meat prices to the public; he *needs* an open economy to make the reform succeed. National Public Radio listeners will perhaps even remember Hough's confident opinion that Gorbachev *needs* Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative to promote reform. That Gorbachev and his close colleagues deny these positions does not seem to deter Hough.

Hough's identification of the social support for Gorbachev's *perestroika* is thought-provoking, but

hardly conclusive, absent any real evidence. We are told that non-Russians hoping for independence, some enterprise managers wanting reinforced authority, skilled workers hoping for promotion, military men needing high-tech weapons, and fiftyish officials personally yearning for Western things and foreign travel are all likely to favor reform, while the chief conservative opposition is made up of central ministry bureaucrats, who have however been "decisively and conclusively" overcome. The recurrent breaks in the momentum of reform Hough attributes not to opposition, but to the inherent complexity of the new arrangements. However, the events of the June 1988 CPSU conference would seem to have refuted Hough's view that regional party officials loyally support Gorbachev, and Russian dislike for the consequences of liberalization is a force yet to be reckoned with.

Hough's main point is that Gorbachev is serious about launching an "attack on protectionism"—that is, about creating a more open economy, including joint ventures with minority foreign ownership and promotion of manufacture for export by allowing firms to retain part of the dollars earned. Possibly here, too, Hough—and Gorbachev—exaggerate the break with previous policy. Projects within the framework of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance still seem to be preferred, and Soviet borrowing has been very cautious. Trade activity has not accelerated. Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov demonstrates well-placed opposition to massive imports of Western technology, when he expresses preference for development of technology at home.¹³ Even Hough makes a great deal of the secrecy in

which the joint venture law was promulgated and its sensitivity. If the General Secretary's political base is so secure, why this ambivalence about an important move in opening up the Soviet economy?

IF THE present reviewer may be allowed his own assessment—which, of course, may itself be proven wrong before it even reaches the reader—I would contend that the widespread rejection of the communist regime shown in contested elections for the new Congress of People's Deputies and in enormous national-minority demonstrations in the Baltic and Caucasus would appear to make economic changes more pressing, as a means of salvaging the legitimacy of the communist rulers. At the same time, political disorder makes Gorbachev's ultimate success less likely.

True, Gorbachev has clear control of majorities in the party's leading bodies, and only the armed forces would seem to have the power to dislodge him. Although the General Secretary has built strong support among the creative intelligentsia with *glasnost'* and reduction of oppression, no other organized group has a strong stake in radical economic reform, one that is likely to survive when the going gets tough. One can hardly make a bourgeois revolution without a bourgeoisie, even if students or others can be found to do the dirty work.

Even the revolutionary potential of the situation may make Gorbachev more cautious than he has been thus far. Certainly, in China, Hungary, and Poland, established leaders anxious to retain power appear to have been reluctant to press forward with painful, if necessary, economic reform in the face of the surprisingly strong public expressions of discontent unleashed when repression has been eased.

¹³See "Report of N. I. Ryzhkov at the 27th CPSU Congress, March 3, 1986," in *Pravda* (Moscow), Mar. 4, 1986.

Corrections

In Bruce Parrott's article "Soviet National Security under Gorbachev" (*Problems of Communism*, November-December 1988), fn. 144 on page 17 should read: "Yakovlev was made a nonvoting member at the January 1987 plenum. He was elevated to voting membership in June 1987."

* * *

The Editor's apologize to Wallace Spaulding for several errors introduced in the published text of his article "Soviet-Line Fronts in 1988" (*Problems of Communism*, January-February 1989, pp. 66-75).

In Table 1 on page 70, the president (Josef Skala) and secretary-general (Georgios Michaelides) of the International Union of Students were omitted. The status of Susuma Osaki as president of the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OSPAAL) is not certain and a "(?)" should have appeared after this name. Also, the name of the secretary-general of OSPAAL is Rene Anillo Capote. Finally, the information on the number of OSPAAL affiliates and countries in which OSPAAL has affiliates was not changed from 1987 and hence should not have been footnoted.

The first complete sentence of text in column 1 of page 70 should refer to "joint seminars" (there were two separate events).

The last sentence in the last full paragraph in column 1 of page 71 should read: "In each case, it is the highest level of meeting that the respective organization holds."

The sentence beginning at line 6 of column 2, page 72, should read: "One might also mention the April meeting in Kabul at which 'Soviet, American, and Afghan public figures' discussed the situation in Afghanistan."

Finally, the sentence beginning in column 1 and continuing to column 2 on page 74 should read: "The No. 12, 1988, issue of *Peace Courier* carried an article attributing the depletion of that area to the demand for more beef-cattle grazing, in turn the result of the demand for hamburgers (again, transnational corporations were implied to be the culprits)."

* * *

The last sentence in the first paragraph of column 3, page 128 of Joan Neuberger's article "Urbanization and the Origins of Ethnic Unrest in Imperial Russia" (*Problems of Communism*, July-August 1989) should read: "Shifting our focus from the empire's center to its periphery not only adds cultural conflict to the sources of instability, but it highlights the social fragmentation that hindered peaceful development in Russia's cities."

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Elizabeth Wishnick

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Thomas F. Remington

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Zbigniew Brzezinski



Estonia's Road to Independence

Rein Taagepera

Glasnost' and Soviet Culture

Josephine Woll

New Cooperatives in the USSR

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Note on Soviet Elections

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COVER: Jubilant East Germans stream toward the newly opened Berlin Wall on the way to West Berlin. Photo by DPA from Photoreporters.

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Articles

Toward a Common European Home

Zbigniew Brzezinski

In a speech to the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 27, 1989, Dr. Brzezinski notes the obstacles on the path to a common European home, including the economic difficulties, and discussed the need to articulate common principles and construct a cooperative institutional framework.

Estonia's Road to Independence

Rein Taagepera

Trends that emerged in the Soviet Union in the late 1980's indicate that the Soviet occupation of Estonia (and the other Baltic republics) will end sometime in the 1990's. Prompted by Moscow's policies of *glasnost'* and *perestroika*, a number of grass roots organizations—including the Popular Front of Estonia—emerged to push for fundamental political and economic changes. The leadership of the Communist Party of Estonia also has responded to popular demands for reform. These efforts have met with the organized resistance of Russian-speakers in the republic and at times vehement criticism from the Kremlin. In response, popular demands have become more and more radical. Thus, by September 1988, the Popular Front of Estonia came out for full independence, but it differed with other groups, such as the Estonian National Independence Party, over how that goal was to be attained.

New Cooperatives in the USSR

Anthony Jones and William Moskoff

As a means of spurring individual initiative the new Soviet cooperatives have been highly successful, providing a wide range of consumer goods and services, although at prices considerably higher than in the state sector. After an early wave of favorable legislation and publicity, the cooperatives are encountering strong public hostility, new official restrictions, and increasingly heavy taxation.

Glasnost' and Soviet Culture

Josephine Woll

The policy of *glasnost'* was first introduced, and most extensively applied, in the area of Soviet culture. Not only have long-suppressed works been shown on stage and screen, but there has also been a virtual explosion of publication of previously forbidden Soviet and foreign writers. The new policy has polarized the creative intelligentsia between "liberals" and "conservatives," and the literary journals have openly taken sides. While the resulting dialogue between the opposing camps is not always civil, it nevertheless continues, it has engaged Soviet readers, listeners, and viewers in the dynamic process that *glasnost'* signifies.

Note

Electing the USSR Congress of People's Deputies

Max E. Mote

While the spring 1989 elections to the Congress of People's Deputies in the Soviet Union did not shift power away from the party and the existing administrative apparatus, they did enhance the power of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. The election campaign was clearly also seen as a way to cultivate new patterns of political behavior—the stormy debates in the new Congress being the most salient result so far. However, reforms have been reversed before in Soviet history; so one cannot rule out the possibility that the Soviets might put the "genie back in the bottle."

Abstracts continued on the reverse side

Essay-Reviews

Ideology Is Dead! Long Live Ideology?

Cynthia Roberts and Elizabeth Wishnick

Examination of the evolving relationship between ideology and Soviet foreign policy requires the analysis of systematic connections between Soviet domestic politics and changing foreign policy concepts. Moreover, the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy advocated by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his advisors cannot be grasped without an understanding of Soviet ideological terms of reference. New thinking does not denote de-ideologization. Rather, Gorbachev's recent foreign policy efforts indicate a modification of the functions performed by ideology, modifications that have been prompted by changes in the international environment and by a reassessment of domestic priorities.

Evolving Center-Periphery Relations in the Soviet Polity

John P. Willerton, Jr.

Expanding Western scholarship on relations between the center and the periphery in the Soviet political system reveals a rich mosaic in which the center continues to dominate even as local actors attempt, through elaborate institutional arrangements, to influence centrally determined decisions. Since the 1950's, local and regional governments have been acquiring an expanded share of total budgetary resources, but this has not been sufficient to cover the even broader range of policy implementation tasks devolved to them nor have they been granted a free hand in important areas such as housing. Only the most far-reaching reforms—encompassing institutions, attitudes, and behavior—could significantly transform the identified proclivity of the Soviet system toward policy rigidity and incrementalism.

Soviet Society under the Old Regime

Thomas F. Remington

The quality of Western literature on Soviet society in the pre-Gorbachev era, which was characterized by a range of methodological approaches, ultimately depended on the restricted nature of the source material available, but biases and controls also characterize the flood of published information emanating from the USSR in the age of *glasnost'*. Moreover, *glasnost'* highlights the need to address the new social forces that have emerged in a society undergoing *perestroyka*. Specifically, scholars must now turn to such topics as the role of the intelligentsia, the rise of the environmental movement, and the burgeoning national movements throughout the USSR.

Understanding the Sino-Vietnamese War

William J. Duiker

The origins of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, once generally thought to lie in border disputes and the treatment of Chinese nationals in Vietnam, have developed into a heavily debated issue. Recently, studies by scholars and other observers of Southeast Asia have focused on the historical rivalry between the two countries and the superpower competition that has dominated the postwar period, and their roles in the conflict. Although the authors whose works are reviewed here differ in the relative weight they assign to history and to strategic choices made by both sides, they agree that it will be some time before these uneasy neighbors reach an amicable and lasting solution to their differences.

Toward A Common European Home

Zbigniew Brzezinski

The following is the transcript of an address given by Dr. Brzezinski to the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 27, 1989, while he was in Moscow as a member of the US delegation to a Soviet-American conference on "Changing Europe: American and Soviet Attitudes," October 24-31, 1989. The conference, sponsored on the American side by Columbia University's Research Institute on International Change, and on the Soviet side jointly by the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was a sequel to the conference on "The Place and Role of Eastern Europe in the Relaxation of Tensions between the USA and the USSR," which was held in Washington, DC, in July 1988. The US and Soviet discussion papers for the 1988 conference, as well as Dr. Brzezinski's speech to that gathering, were published in the May-August 1988 issue of this journal.

FIRST OF ALL, let me say how very deeply pleased I am to be here and to have the opportunity to speak to you. As many have noted, Moscow in recent years has become a city of surprises. For me, this has a very specific personal dimension because I learned that I would be giving a speech here only yesterday at six o'clock in the evening. You will therefore, I hope, forgive the somewhat informal character of my presentation.

Nonetheless, I am conscious of the fact that this is a very special occasion, which for me has particular meaning. This is the fourth time that I have had the opportunity to make a public address in this part of the world—which you call the socialist camp and which we call the Soviet bloc. On each occasion, there was a cer-

tain historical coincidence to the timing. The first time was in July of 1968 in Prague. The second time I made a major address was two years ago in Budapest at the beginning of the end of the Kádár era. The third time was in Poland a few weeks before the recent elections, and this is now the fourth.

Let me begin by saying that, as a private citizen, I think I can quite honestly tell you that the overwhelming majority of Americans share the view recently expressed both by the president of the United States and by the secretary of state that we wish *perestroika* success. We believe that if *perestroika* succeeds, this will contribute to a better world. By the success of *perestroika* we do not mean a renewal of dogmatic or sectarian thinking but the triumph of certain universal values. I believe that most people in the world know what these universal values are because we live in an age in which human rights have become the moral and political imperative. This is what gives us a shared framework of belief, and this is what makes us sympathetic and hopeful about *perestroika*.

The theme of the conference in which I am a participant is "Changing Europe." Change in Europe in recent months has been encapsulated in a captivating

Zbigniew Brzezinski is Professor at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University and Counsellor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (both in Washington, DC). His most recent book is The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century (1989). From 1977 to 1981, he was President Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser.

phrase, a phrase that originates in Moscow: the common European home or, if you will, the common European house. Yesterday, at the preliminary discussion of our group, someone made the point that there was a difference between the word "house" and the word "home." House has architectural implications. Home has relational implications. The first implies a structure; the second implies a family. I think the common European home, to be successful, has to be a house; and, to be a house that has life in it, it has to be a home. So, the use of both meanings is appropriate. It is to both meanings that I propose to speak and to share with you some of my own thoughts on how we go about creating such a desirable reality. To do so, in my view, we have to face up to certain objective difficulties that stand in the way of this reality. We have to face up to the need for more explicit articulation of certain shared principles so that the European house is, in fact, a shared home. And we have to face up to the requirement for cooperative institutional ventures, because we are dealing here with complex international dynamics that can only be given stability and direction if they have an institutional framework. Thus, in my remarks, I propose to address three items: the objective difficulties, the need for shared principles, and cooperative institutional approaches.

The Difficulties

As to the difficulties, there are many, although I would like to take particular note of three. But first let me emphasize that we are not yet familiar with a successful case of transition (I will use our terminology and hope you will forgive me for using our terminology, but this is the way I express my thoughts) from a communist dictatorial system to a pluralistic democracy, both in the political and economic dimensions of its meaning. There are simply no precedents. There have been instances of movement in such a direction, and currently the most important cases are those of Poland and Hungary. Both are undertaking profound political and economic changes. These political changes point toward the institutionalization of pluralist political systems with open competition between political parties. The economic restructuring involves the explicit commitment to the creation of free-market economic systems. These are truly ambitious goals: if they are successfully achieved, a historically unprecedented transition will have been accomplished to a system that elsewhere in the world has proven to be economically, socially, and intellectually dynamic and creative. But it is far from certain that this transition will be successfully negotiated, because there are enormous difficulties in the way.

The most serious of the difficulties are economic. It is

terribly difficult to restructure a statist centralized economy into a truly operative market system. A truly operative free-market system involves not only an intricate set of economic relationships, but also the emergence of an effective entrepreneurial culture. It involves a change in psychology and not just a change in objective economic conditions. This is difficult to achieve. There are no precedents for it, and it is far from certain that the processes in Poland and Hungary will be successful. My own estimate is that in all probability they will be. But I am very conscious of the difficulties, and I think there will have to be very extensive Western aid in order to promote that success. It seems to me that we all have a stake in the successful transition, for if it takes place, a major step toward building a common European home will have been taken.

The second major difficulty in the way of a common European home involves the possibility of prolonged impasse, stalemate, or ferment in the Soviet Union itself. Not necessarily a failure of *perestroika*, for this may, in some respects, be very difficult to define these days. I cannot imagine a return to some form of Stalinism, to some explicit readaptation of the past. But it is also very difficult to imagine concretely what in the foreseeable future would constitute something that would justify the word "success." This would require truly profound institutionalized political and economic changes, as well as a change in psychology and political culture of enormous magnitude. Great progress has been made. The efforts have been courageous, truly impressive. One is enormously encouraged by them. Intellectual creativity has clearly been unleashed. One senses this in the vibrance of the public intellectual discussions in Moscow and elsewhere. But I think you know better than I about the enormous difficulties in the way, about the forces of inertia, the institutionalized forces of the past, about the complexity of the problems that *perestroika* confronts. Hence, there is at least a high probability that while there will be no failure of *perestroika*—no development that would justify that single word as a definition of the actual condition of *perestroika*—it is also possible that for many years to come there will be no condition emerging that justifies applying the word "success" to *perestroika*'s process. This absence of success would also inhibit the construction of the common European home. It is a possibility that we have to face squarely.

The third objective difficulty in building a common European home is that while the first two difficulties are being tackled and faced, and hopefully overcome, the gap between the objective conditions in what is called the West and in what is called the East is widening. There is no doubt that the West (the United States,

Western Europe, Japan) are plunging headlong into a new age—the post-industrial age, the technetronic age, the age that not only in terms of economic indices but also in terms of the style of life and the quality of life is fundamentally different from the industrial age. That part of the world that we call the East is still essentially struggling with the legacies of the industrial age. In many respects, the transition that Poland and Hungary are undertaking, or the struggle for *perestroyka* in the Soviet Union, are struggles with the legacies of an unsuccessfully completed process of industrialization. Thus, the objective conditions involve a wide gap in the global condition, and it will be difficult to construct a European home if that gap becomes wider and wider.

I say these things not to indulge in pessimism, but to suggest that one needs to look beyond slogans and face hard realities if one is going to be successful in the otherwise ambitious and desirable task of building a common European home. To do that effectively, we have to have some shared principles, and we have to have some joint understanding of the need for cooperative institutional undertakings. Let me now turn to these two aspects of my presentation.

Shared Principles

Shared principles are important because we can only overcome some of the difficulties I have mentioned if we have a common understanding of them as well as common principles on the basis of which we undertake action in order to compensate for or overcome the difficulties. The first of these principles is that, insofar as the European political scene is concerned, we henceforth accept that there are shared geopolitical interests but not a shared ideological orthodoxy. In other words, alliances should be based on particular historical or geographical interests of the participants, the states which are part of such alliances, but they should not be instruments for ideological imperialism, for the imposition of a particular ideological concept of reality. On the contrary, alliances will be stronger, more effective, and more contributive to European stability if they are based on a diversity of social and political systems in the case of each alliance, because only then are such alliances true alliances, the reflection of genuinely shared aspirations and interests. I sense a movement in that direction in the Warsaw Pact because of the developments that have been taking place in the last two years. This is already the case in NATO, where a variety of governments, which often differ very sharply on some important international issues, collaborate.

The second principle that has to be the basis for building a European home is that it is acceptable to

have cross-cutting memberships in security and other forms of cooperative organizations. In other words, organizational membership should not be an exclusive condition. It should be possible for members of one alliance system to be associated with the social and economic organizations of another type. One need not have uniformity in institutional membership. I think this is particularly important if some members of the Warsaw Pact begin in effect to move toward the adoption and maintenance of free-market economic systems. I can certainly envisage in the years to come a situation in which the European Community or the European Free Trade Association has members or associate members who are also members of the Warsaw Pact. This, too, will contribute to the building of a joint house, and also is compatible with the notion of a shared home.

The third general principle is that Europe is not a geographical reality, but is, most importantly, a philosophical, cultural reality. That is to say, one does not define Europe in geographical terms. The eastern geographical limits of Europe are ultimately an imaginary line on the map—the Ural Mountains. The western extremity of Europe is the seashore of Portugal. But Europe as a cultural and philosophical reality does embrace the United States and the Soviet Union, to the extent that both of these countries partake of certain cultural and philosophical values associated with the European civilization, with the Christian tradition—values which determine the relationship between the individual and society and between society and the state. These values are incompatible with notions of oriental despotism, of the totalitarian subordination of the society to the state or of the individual to society. It is its values which define Europe, and to the extent that the United States and the Soviet Union partake of these values, they partake of the European tradition and are an extension of Europe. This is the basis for measuring the extent of American and Soviet involvement in Europe and their participation in the emerging European home.

This brings me to my fourth and last principle. The construction of the European home has to be based on the principle of freedom of choice. This means the supremacy of democracy over any "ism." When I listened to President Gorbachev speak to the United Nations in December 1988, I was especially struck by one sentence in his speech. It is a remarkable statement, which I would like to read to you. I agree with it 100 percent. I think it is an important statement. I hope that Mr. Gorbachev meant it as seriously as it sounds—and I think he does—and it has major implications. It is a simple statement: "Freedom of choice is a universal principle which allows no exceptions." It means that democracy is

more important than any "ism." That means that there is no possibility of saying, for example, "there is no retreat from socialism," which is what Mr. Gorbachev did say in a speech at the Sorbonne. That assertion is not compatible with the notion of freedom of choice as a universal principle. Every people can determine in what kind of a system they wish to live, and not have it determined for them on the basis of an arbitrary "ism." Socialism is merely one transitional definition of reality—derived, incidentally, from the early experience of Western Europe with the initial impact of the Industrial Revolution. Beyond that, it is an intellectual abstraction. Democracy is the basis for determining the kind of system under which a people wish to live. That, of course, has further implications, because freedom of choice, to be effective and to be irreversible, has to be institutionalized. Only when it is institutionalized does freedom of choice become an enduring reality. Freedom of choice is not a gift from a ruler to the people, it is a right of the people. And freedom of choice as the right of the people can only be effectively implemented if it is institutionalized. This means that it is incompatible with one-party rule. Any system of one-party rule is fundamentally unjust, because it involves a usurpation of the right of people's freedom of choice by a self-appointed elite that is not legitimated by the freely exercised will of the people. A common European home will only be a common European home when it is built on the principle of the universal applicability of freedom of choice. This is why Mikhail Gorbachev's UN statement is so fundamentally important philosophically. If we are serious about building a European home, we have to be serious about this principle.

Institutional Cooperation

If we share these principles, then we are advancing to a common European home. But in building a home, we have to build also the structure, the architecture, and this means that we have to undertake some cooperative institutional initiatives. It is to this point that I finally wish to speak. If we build a house, we have to have a secure structure for it. Europe today operates in the area of security on the basis of two alliances: NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

If there is to be a common European home, there will have to be a relationship between these two alliances that is institutionalized. I, for one, do not favor (and I have already said this publicly) the termination of the two alliances as part of the construction of a European home. I think the termination of the two alliances would contribute to anarchy. I favor the retention of the two alliances. In fact, in a speech in Poland a few months ago, I

told the Poles that in my view a democratic Poland based on freedom of choice should remain a member of the Warsaw Pact. Not everybody in the audience agreed with me, and some were surprised to hear me say it. But I think the majority actually agreed with me. The European structure will have to involve a relationship between these two alliances. These two alliances—instead of being confrontational military adversaries—ought to become the two pillars of a larger European security system. Institutional cooperation between the two alliances would preserve geopolitical stability, preserve territorial stability in Europe, while permitting political and economic change on the basis of the universality of the principle of freedom of choice. This cooperation would be a framework of stability within which change is possible.

Second, we will have to think of institutionalized links in the economic area. Here, I think, it is quite likely that we will see in the not too distant future the emergence of new forms of associate status for some countries that have been outside the European unification process with the European Economic Community. Article 238 of the Covenant binding the European Community together provides for the possibility of associate status, and I think that before too long some of the East European countries can begin to exercise that option. Mr. Jacques Delors, in a conversation with me, suggested that perhaps a better transitional option might be membership for some countries of Eastern Europe in the European Free Trade Association. This alternative should also be considered. The point is that we will be engaging increasingly, as we build a European home, in these cross-cutting and formal membership structures, thereby creating the framework for genuine cooperation.

Third, we will have to give more serious thought to the promotion of new forms of regional cooperation. Eastern Europe for the last 40 years has been subordinated to external control by the Soviet Union. This is now changing, and the relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is becoming one of more genuine accommodation and mutual respect. But in that setting there is the real danger that old East European national conflicts will surface and that political and economic fragmentation will become the dominant reality. We see this already in the relationship between Hungary and Romania.

I think it is in the interest of the common European home that efforts be made to promote regional cooperation in Central Europe. Austria and Hungary provide a fertile example of what is possible. In a few years from now, a world exhibition will be held in both Vienna and Budapest. From this, additional cooperation is likely to emerge. It is in our collective interest that Poland and

Czechoslovakia develop more viable forms of political and economic cooperation in the region lying between the Soviet Union and Germany. This is in the interest of European stability. It is also in the interest of European stability that cooperation in the Balkans be promoted, for there is a real danger of fragmentation in that part of Europe. These are issues to which no thought has been given for 40 years. Georgi Dimitrov and Tito wanted to have a Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation, and Stalin stopped that. The Poles and Czechoslovaks wanted to have a federation, and Stalin stopped that. I think it is time to start thinking creatively as to what forms of regional cooperation in Central Europe will provide for stability and progress toward the emergence of a genuine European home.

Fourth, I think we will have to start thinking more and more seriously in this context about a new status for Germany. It is impossible to think of change in Central Europe, or to envisage the emergence of a common European home, while Germany remains arbitrarily divided. That is simply a fact of life. We can have a divided Europe with a divided Germany in it, but we cannot have a united Europe or a shared European home with an artificially divided Germany. It is not just a question of a slogan about the Berlin Wall, but it is a matter of sheer common sense. There is a genuine problem here. Hungary and Poland can liberalize themselves, can democratize themselves, and they will still remain Hungary and Poland respectively. The Czechoslovak neo-Stalinist regime probably has at most one or two years before Czechoslovakia begins to experience the same process as Hungary and Poland. But Czechoslovakia will still remain Czechoslovakia. If East Germany liberalizes itself and democratizes itself, however, at some point the question will arise, "what is East Germany?" Should there be an East Germany? The division of Germany is inherent in the division of Europe and in the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union that emerged in the aftermath of Europe's historical suicide. But if we are going to be building a European home on the principle of self-determination, of freedom of choice, a common home, a joint house, then we will have to think of some new arrangement for Germany.

What form it will take I do not know, but it is a subject regarding which we will have to start thinking and talking seriously. One can envisage, for example, some arrangement for a confederation which preserves a certain degree of heterogeneity in the heart of Europe, and particularly within Germany. That may be one solution. Perhaps a confederation can be combined with some transitional security arrangements, specifically for the eastern and the western parts, so that Germany's

neighbors would not become frightened by the emergence of a more powerful Germany—and such fears would be shared by the Poles, the Czechs, the French, and others. But the point is that one has to start addressing this issue if one is serious about building a European home. The message which I wish to drive home here today is that the notion of a European home cannot be just a slogan. It is necessary to face squarely certain problems and address squarely the need for shared principles.

This brings me to my final point—at some point in the future, but in the not too distant future, the creation of a European home will probably require very major institutional changes in the Soviet Union itself. The Soviet Union is a complex society, a multinational society, and if it is to be a viable member of the European home, if it is to share in the same philosophical principles and truly apply the principle of diversity of choice, institutional changes within the Soviet Union will have to be far-reaching.

This is not to deny the importance of what has happened here in the course of the last several years. What has happened is impressive. It is stunning in some respects. It is extraordinarily courageous, but there is still a long way to go before the Soviet Union becomes a viable member of the European home. Diversity of choice will have to be institutionalized. Perhaps a Soviet confederation might be a more appropriate way of describing what the Soviet Union will then be than the notion of a Soviet union, for the word confederation implies a much greater dispersal and division and separation of powers, and also the taking into account of the national mosaic of the Soviet Union. This is not something for us to suggest, but for you to reflect on. But it is not just your business. It is our business, too, if you are serious about the notion of a common European house. If we are going to live in the same house, then how we organize ourselves is our shared business. Hence, it is appropriate to raise this issue, even though the resolution of this issue will be entirely your own responsibility.

In brief, we are hoping for enormous change. We are facing extraordinary opportunities. This is clearly the most interesting time historically since the era immediately after World War II. The era after World War II brought the end of the European phase in international affairs. As I said earlier, Europe committed political suicide in the course of the first and second world wars. Out of that emerged a superpower competition over Europe, waged largely by the Soviet Union. We now face the possibility of building a larger European home which embraces America and the Soviet Union.

This is an extraordinarily appealing and monumental challenge. It contains within it the seeds of a better and

freer life for millions and millions of people. But we can only be successful in the construction of a common European home if we face the difficult realities that confront us, if we understand that there are massive impediments to be overcome, if we realize that we have to face squarely and directly the philosophical implica-

tions of the concept of a European home, if we are ready jointly to undertake the cooperative institutional homebuilding that this challenge requires from us. I think I can say for most Americans that we are ready to join you in this effort.

Following his address, Dr. Brzezinski responded to questions from the audience.

Q: Should states be run by politicians or by academics?

A: Subjectively, I know which I prefer. But then, I would have a personal interest in that. Let me put it this way: scholars generally don't make good governors. They are too much aware of nuances, too overwhelmed by complications; they find it difficult to make fundamental choices. However, politicians tend to be more generalist, and are more inclined to try to solve problems rather than to be dominated by problems. So, I prefer politicians, but I also think that politicians should be elected by the people and accountable to the people for the decisions that they make. Only then are they truly making decisions on the basis of popular will.

Q: How do you feel sitting before a bust of Vladimir Lenin, founder of the party, system, and country?

A: First of all, he was not the founder of the country. He was the founder of the system and of the party. I have respect for Lenin as a historical figure who had something very important and very interesting to say at a specific time in past history. So I am very pleased to stand in front of him and to discuss issues that are new, that are different, and for which answers contrived at the beginning of the century are no longer relevant.

Q: How do you assess Boris Yel'tsin's visit to the United States?

A: He was charming, he was very interesting, he was very lively, and he was a symptom of the change that is happening here. Whether one agrees with his views or disagrees with his views, the fact that he was able to say what he was saying and to be visiting the United States while saying it was viewed by us as an indicator of very positive change here in the Soviet Union. This is how we view his visit. We hope there will be more visits like his and that there will be more political figures like him in the Soviet Union, irrespective of what the ultimate choice regarding leadership is here.

Q: What are the possible scenarios for the evolution of the Anglo-American special relationship in the 1990's in view of the emerging special American-Japanese relationship?

A: I think the Anglo-American special relationship is a somewhat nostalgic term for a reality that is fading. That is to say, the special relationship reached its high point during World War II and in the years immediately after it. Now the special relationship is going to be increasingly between the United States and Europe, of which we hope Britain will be very much a part. In my own personal view, we should not be sympathetic in the United States to Mrs. Thatcher's attempt to slow down the political integration of Europe. From my perspective, the political and economic integration of Europe is a desirable historical process, and it would be a mistake for us to give the British the impression that we favor a retardation of that process.

As for the American-Japanese relationship, I think it has the makings of a new special relationship. We have, in the course of the 1940's, built an enduring relationship across the Atlantic with Europe as a whole. We are now in the process of building a similar relationship across the Pacific. In that relationship, Japan is clearly going to occupy a central place.

Q: The Anglo-American special relationship has long been considered in the Soviet Union as a kind of pillar of the cold war. What are the prospects for the relations between the US and Britain in the 1990's?

A: I have already answered that question in a way. I think that our relationship with Great Britain will remain close for cultural reasons—and, to some extent, for security reasons as well. But it will be increasingly subsumed, hopefully, in the context of a larger European relationship with America, of a Europe that becomes more united. We favor that. We think this is stabilizing. We think this is in keeping with the natural development internationally toward broader, larger units of political and economic integration.

Q: Can we look forward to a book from you on the new international political world order? What will be its main message?

A: I have actually brought with me a copy of my latest book, which is not so much on international affairs as on what is happening in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. I have here the Russian translation of it, which has just come out. The title—*The Grand Failure: the Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century*—gives you a basic idea of its message. If I were to write a book on international affairs, I would be tempted to write a book on the genuine historical necessity of wider international cooperation, based on some of the principles that I enumerated here. It seems to me the human condition is now ripe for cooperation based on the triumph of pluralism, on the primacy of human rights, and on the necessity of intercontinental cooperation in economic, technological, and security areas. We are clearly entering a new age in international affairs, and some of the things said by Mr. Gorbachev and by Mr. Shevardnadze before the United Nations are very much in the spirit of the kind of changes that are taking place. Our internal policies ought to be increasingly adjusted to them.

Q: How do you see the US practical role in promoting perestroika in the USSR?

A: That is an extremely difficult question to answer, and to answer responsibly. I want, first of all, to reiterate what I said, and I said it in all seriousness. *Perestroika* is viewed with enormous sympathy in the United States. There is genuine sympathy for *perestroika* in the United States. It is true of the society at large and of the government. We think your experiment is a constructive, positive, and in some respects even a heroic undertaking. Some of us are skeptical as to whether it will succeed. I am one of those who is skeptical. I think the difficulties you face are so enormous and the cumulative legacy of Leninism-Stalinism so destructive that it will take a long time to overcome it. I think your situation objectively is much more difficult than that of Eastern Europe or even of China. In China, the cultural tradition of entrepreneurship, of business initiative, was not destroyed. In China, the peasantry was not destroyed. For China, there was an enormous community of overseas Chinese, very wealthy, inclined to invest very much in China. Hence, in China there are objective, as well as psychological and cultural conditions for reform, in spite of the current political retrogression, in spite of the

current repression of political change.

In Eastern Europe, the opportunities are also similarly greater. The economies are smaller. The West is in a better position to help. You are a much larger system, and your problems are far more complex. Therefore, I personally do not think we can do very much that is going to be decisive to the outcome. We can help at the margin. We certainly should not make your efforts more difficult. We should certainly not try to intensify your internal problems. We should not exploit your internal tensions. We should not deliberately try to make your economic reforms more difficult. But those are all negatives. What can we do concretely?

I think in some respects we can increase our trade. But trade, for us, is not philanthropy. Trade has to be based on reciprocity of profit, of advantage, and many American and West European firms are very uncertain about your economic prospects and are very confused by the anarchy that today preponderates in your economy. It now is extremely difficult to make decisions here; it is very difficult to make long-term plans. The situation is very fluid. So I am not too hopeful about very major expansion of Western trade with the Soviet Union. I think there will be some, but it will be limited. I think we can help through expertise. We can help to plan innovative, advanced, and modern forms of economic management. We can help you through exchanges. We can help you in a limited fashion through greater technological access, but these are all marginal things.

You, yourselves, have to ultimately decide what your internal priorities are going to be, and I think one very major area which has not yet been sufficiently tackled in terms of your own *perestroika* is the enormous percentage of your Gross National Product (GNP) devoted to military spending. The average West European country spends 3.5 percent of its GNP on defense. Japan spends 1 percent on defense. The United States spends about 6.5 percent. You spend somewhere in the range of 20 to 30 percent of your GNP, which is much smaller than ours. Professor Oleg Bogomolov says not more than 20 percent. I hope he is right. I strongly suspect that nobody knows, because you have an absurd system of statistics and pricing. So there is no way of knowing. But one can make some judgments even by looking at the condition of your cities, your shops, your consumer goods. In a country this rich, with such enormous natural resources, with such incredibly able people, with so much willingness to sacrifice for patriotic reasons—and you are an extremely talented, creative people—there is no reason for the economy to be in such a mess. I think a good deal of the explanation is the excessively massive

spending on defense, the scale of which is much larger than most people realize. To this day, there is not even an open defense budget that is reasonably accurate. That, I think, is a very serious problem, and I think you have a great deal of flexibility here, so that defense spending could be redirected toward making *perestroyka* a success economically.

For *perestroyka* to be successful politically, I think there is one basic principle, which is most important of all, namely, the institutionalization of freedom of choice. Only if freedom of choice is institutionalized will *perestroyka* not be reversible. This, again, is something we cannot decide. It is something that you have to decide when the moment for it has come. I think if you decide on freedom of choice, then the inclination of the West to invest more, to be more involved in the Soviet Union, will grow enormously. Just in the last three months, the West has, in effect, decided to commit somewhat more than US\$2 billion—close to \$3 billion—just for Hungary and Poland, in the wake of the decision in these two countries to make institutional reforms, political and economic. I think there would be a much greater Western response if there is this kind of comprehensive breakthrough in the implementation of *perestroyka*. I know it is difficult. I know that enormous progress has been made. But I think the response of the West will be very much influenced by what is yet to come in the Soviet Union, and we all wish that what is yet to come will go in that direction.

Q: Two questions about Germany. Could you say a bit more about your model of possible reunification of the two Germans? You predict a united or confederated Germany in ten years' time. What about special security arrangements if the West or East is threatened by such developments?

A: I am not even sure whether the word "unification" is the best word to describe what may be taking place, and what may have to take place, in the course of the next decade and a half if constructive change continues in Central Europe and in the Soviet Union. I am tempted sometimes to use the word "reassociation" of Germany to emphasize that the prospect in the long run may not necessarily be a united homogeneous state of the kind that existed from Bismarck to Hitler, and to stress that perhaps some more complex confederated arrangement may be a better way of giving Germans the self-determination to which they are entitled while also giving to Germany's neighbors the security to which they are entitled. In such a confederated Germany I could see for an indefinite number of years a spe-

cial arrangement, for example, the presence, by treaty with a terminal date to it, of representative elements of military forces from the two alliances, which in the meantime will have developed a joint structure of security for Europe. I think some arrangement of this sort could go a long way toward meeting what are legitimate aspirations of the Germans without undermining the security of Germany's neighbors and certainly without reopening territorial issues in the heart of Europe.

This is still very sketchy, and I think what is important at this stage is not to present a blueprint that is very specific but to begin a serious and responsible discussion on an East-West basis of what the future holds for Germany. Because one thing is certain: the existing division of Germany is transitional and artificial. If there is going to be a European home, the division will have to be changed in some fashion, and we need to start discussing how we can change it.

Q: What is your vision of the current situation in Afghanistan. Will the US administration change its Afghan policy in view of the failure of the Afghan rebels to defeat the government in Kabul? When? How do you understand the US commitments under the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan.

A: First of all, the current situation in Afghanistan remains very fluid. While the existing government retains control over several main cities of Afghanistan, it no longer controls the countryside. Let me also remind you that when American forces left Vietnam, it took two more years before South Vietnam fell. In other words, the fall of the South Vietnamese government was not coincidental with the departure of the American forces from South Vietnam and the cutoff of American aid. It was only two years later that the South Vietnamese government fell.

It has so far been six months since the departure of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. During these six months, about 80 percent of the territory of Afghanistan outside of the cities and off the main roads has passed into the hands of the Mujahedin. I hope there is a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan. But if there is a peaceful settlement on the basis of Afghan self-determination, I think it is very clear that Mr. Najibullah will not be a part of it, for the Afghan people did not resist for the last eight years to have Mr. Najibullah still in Kabul at the end of their resistance. It is, I think, important to realize that Mr. Najibullah is a successor to Mr. Babrak Karmal, who was imposed on Afghanistan after the assassination of the president of Afghanistan that coincided with the arrival of Soviet forces in Kabul. It is, therefore, a

continuation of the regime imposed by force from the outside. The peaceful resolution of the Afghan problem will become possible once Mr. Najibullah and his associates are no longer part of that process. Then, I think, a national council representing the different forces of Afghanistan, including some of the left-wing progressive forces in the cities, can be constructed—perhaps with the king temporarily restored as a transitional figure to provide for central government—but with Afghanistan decentralized and ruled by tribal councils based largely on the rebel commanders who now control most of the countryside. I think we will move in that direction at some point in the future when it becomes clear that the maintenance of the present situation, with cities really being fortresses, is not a solution to the problem.

Q: What is your attitude toward possible changes in COCOM restrictions? Can they facilitate substantially USSR trade with Western states, and first of all, with West European countries?

A: I think some COCOM restrictions should be liberalized, that some of them are out of date. Opening up the opportunities for greater access by the Soviet Union to Western technology is now timely, especially since such technology in many sectors does not necessarily contribute to military capabilities and could make it easier for you to try to renovate, decentralize, and re-dynamize your economy. So I don't object to some relaxation of COCOM restrictions.

At the same time, no one should have any illusions that the lifting of COCOM restrictions will greatly increase Soviet trade with the West. COCOM is not the problem in that trade. The problem is that your economy over the last 40 years has become increasingly a Third World economy. Therefore, you do not have much to offer to the West in the area of advanced industrial technological products. You can only sell natural resources, and that is what your trade with the West is mostly about. You sell oil, you sell timber, you sell gold, and the profile of your foreign trade with the advanced countries of the world is typical of a Third World country. Singapore exports more machinery to the West than the Soviet Union. This is a very serious problem. That is what limits the expansion of your trade with the West. Beyond certain limits inherent in the West's desire to buy your natural resources, there isn't too much room for expansion—until you modernize your economy, until you unleash your productive forces, until you really join the modern world in technology, in advanced industrial development. And this requires successful *perestroika*.

So I think it is really an illusion to say that the lifting of COCOM restrictions would greatly increase the possibility for more effective trade between us. The limits to it are really objective. They are not very political except in some highly specialized technological areas.

Q: What is your comment on Gorbachev's proposal regarding northern Europe in the recent speech in Finland?

A: I have not read the speech, so it is very hard for me to comment. I understand that one of the elements in it is a nuclear-free zone for the Baltic. That is perfectly fine with me, because we don't have any nuclear forces in the Baltic. So I think it is perfectly acceptable and desirable. Beyond that, you know our position on nuclear-free zones. It is that denuclearization, by itself, without significant reduction in conventional forces, is destabilizing. I subscribe to that position. I think that the East-West balance has been stable on the basis of a comprehensive structure of deterrence, ranging from the conventional to the nuclear. Simply eliminating the nuclear without changing the conventional, would create instability militarily. But I don't think that is the major problem in the Baltic, because the only nuclear ships and submarines in the Baltic have been yours. So if you decide to terminate that presence, that is perfectly all right.

Q: If you were the primary adviser of Mr. Gorbachev, what would you advise him to do, first, second, third, to achieve the goals of perestroika?

A: That is a difficult and a very serious question. I know what I would advise him in general, but my advice, to some extent, would be based upon ignorance of the internal political situation. I just am not in a position to make a judgment regarding the political risks of certain choices that he, in my judgment, ought to make. So please bear in mind that my answer is based in large measure on ignorance of the internal political situation, and therefore I am not in a position to calculate the political risk of what I would advocate. I would advocate an acceleration of institutional, political, and economic change. I think the problem you face is that *perestroika*, while courageous, even heroic, and ambitious, is undergoing increasing dissipation of dynamism at the margin. The demonstrable absence of economic progress leaves every foreigner who comes to the Soviet Union with the impression that there is no economic progress in the Soviet Union, either on the macro or mi-

cro level. I suspect that is the case. At the same time, politically there is the danger that the progress so far could produce increasing fermentation because of the surfacing of irreconcilable group conflicts.

In that context, I would probably advise acceleration of institutional changes economically and politically, the articulation of a much more explicit vision of what the new economic and political system will be like, and the acceptance of institutional diversity, economic and political—that is to say, the transformation of the word “democracy” from a slogan into an institutional reality. I think only by accelerating can this very difficult histori-

cal wave be ridden. It is a dangerous process. It is inherently unstable, but only by moving forward can momentum and balance be maintained. It is a little bit like a man or woman on a bicycle. If you don't pedal hard enough and fast enough, you begin to weave and then you can fall. I think that is fundamentally the danger that *perestroika* faces, although I could be wrong. Therefore, even though there could be even more transitional difficulties initially, I think an acceleration of the process of economic reform, of political reform, is the best way to prove my book is completely wrong in its prognosis.

Estonia's Road to Independence

Rein Taagepera

If the political trends that emerged and strengthened themselves in the Soviet Union in 1987–89 continue, the Soviet occupation of Estonia (and Latvia and Lithuania) will end sometime in the early 1990's. Even as late as 1987, such a statement would have sounded preposterous. What has happened? First, that the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians could even think about restoring their independence illustrates the extent to which the old limits on political discourse and political action have been breached, not only in the Baltic republics, but also in Mikhail Gorbachev's Soviet Union as a whole. Second, even two years ago, the very term "occupation" would have sounded propagandistic. An occupation is a temporary phenomenon, and until recently, the Soviet presence in the Baltic republics was seen as a permanent fixture. As Romuald J. Misiunas and I wrote in 1984:

*By 1953, the Soviet rule had come to be considered more than a momentary and superficial occupation. . . . The habit of mentally challenging every Soviet rule slowly shifted into the less strainful habit of submission. A significant change of attitude seems to have taken place—from struggle against a foreign "occupation" to working for one's own interest within a framework of foreign "rule."*¹

Rein Taagepera is Professor of Social Science at the University of California (Irvine, CA), and author or co-author of two books on the Baltic states, as well as *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems* (1989). He is Secretary of the Estonian Heritage Society Abroad and was recently elected to the General Committee of Citizens of the Republic of Estonia (in Tallinn).

But in contrast to such popular attitudes in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods, Estonia has again taken on the psychology of an occupied country (as have Latvia and Lithuania). Young people whose parents were born after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 discuss it as if it were a recent injustice they themselves had witnessed; Russian immigrants are openly regarded as colonists; and Estonians are vigorously and persistently reasserting their national culture and reclaiming their national history.

Such attitudes, of course, were present in the 1940's, but they could not preserve Estonia's independence in the face of Moscow's might. What has changed since that time?

A number of long-term trends underlie the recent cultural and political (but not yet economic revival) in Estonia. Indices of industrialization, urbanization, and education have all risen over the past 50 years, as they have throughout all of Europe, East and West. However, the fruits of expanded production capabilities were marred by their shoddy quality. The negative byproducts of modernization also have been especially prevalent in Estonia. For example, by 1970, abortions equalled or surpassed live births, and Estonia's divorce rate surpassed even that of the Soviet Union as a whole (3.8 versus 3.5 per 1,000 population, in 1978).²

Other factors motivating Estonia's movement for change include the recent decline in living standards and the increasing salience of environmental problems in the republic. Beginning in 1975, food and consumer-

¹Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1940–1980*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1983, p. 124.

²*Ibid.*, pp. 214, 285–86, 290–91, 294; for education, see also *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1985 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1985), Moscow, Finansy i Statistika, 1986, pp. 29, 509. As a basis for comparison, in 1978, the marriage rate in Estonia was 8.5 per 1,000 population.



Demonstrators in Tallinn mark the 70th anniversary of Estonian independence on February 24, 1989. The banner reads: "Independence Is Not Separation But Responsibility."

—F. Hibon/SYGMA.

goods shortages tended to become more pronounced. Uncontrolled air pollution became life-threatening in the Kohtla-Järve oil shale mining area, near the Kunda cement factory, and at the Maardu phosphate mine (located 15 kilometers from downtown Tallinn). Hair losses among children were detected throughout the oil shale mining area, but especially in the uranium-processing enclave of Sillamäe.³

Finally, compared to earlier periods of Soviet rule in Estonia, what has changed in the late 1980's is the de-

cline in the general health of the *all-Union* economy and society. Compared to the West, increases in the levels of education and industrialization have brought less improvement in living standards and more negative side effects, thus forcing Soviet leaders to look for new and different solutions to the various problems facing their society. The Estonians (as well as the Lithuanians and Latvians) have made full use of the opportunities provided to them by Gorbachev's policies of *glasnost'* and *perestroika*.

The colonial rule of the European powers often produced its own antidote by encouraging the emergence of modern, educated, and urbanized local elites that then assumed the leadership of the colonies' struggles for independence. By contrast, in Estonia, native elites capable of articulating the nation's demands and organizing movements for change were beginning to emerge as early as 1900, and they had full authority over the country's economy and society in the interwar period. Thus, forces capable of devising programs to address the problems discussed here and organizing Estonia's struggle for independence have long existed in the country, and any kind of Gorbachev-style reform in the 1950's, 1960's, or 1970's would have led to an Estonian resurgence similar to the one now taking place.

The best guideline for predicting the immediate future is the recent past, and that past provides reasons for an optimistic assessment of Estonia's chances for genuine autonomy and perhaps independence. From the vantage point of 1986, the developments that took place in Eastern Europe (including the USSR) in 1987 would have looked improbable, those of 1988 implausible, and those of 1989 impossible. If this trend continues at anything close to the same pace, the Soviet army will withdraw from the Baltic republics in the early 1990's.

But what if these recent trends do not continue? Can the popular forces for change base their expectations on three heady years rather than the preceding 30 years of post-Stalinist immobilism? The brief answer is that those long, outwardly uneventful years actually saw the deep, irreversible social changes alluded to above, combined with a deterioration in the economic and environmental circumstances of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Moscow-centered empire became an anachronism in a world where the British, the French, and finally even the Portuguese empires had declined and ultimately disintegrated. (Those who might object that Moscow's multinational holdings are contiguous and therefore not comparable to these overseas empires should take note of Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Turkey.)

Thus, from the perspective of the movement for

³Mare Taagepera, "Ecological Problems in Estonia," *Journal of Baltic Studies* (Mahwah/Hackettstown, NJ), Vol. 14, 1983, pp. 307-14; *Homeland* (Tallinn), July 19, 1989. For those who do not read Estonian, *Homeland*, an English-language supplement to the Soviet Estonian weekly *Kodumaa*, has become indispensable for following Estonian events. Whenever possible, this article will refer to *Homeland* rather than an equally valid Estonian-language source.

change in Estonia, the last three years have witnessed the Estonian people's attempts to correct the failed policies of the preceding 45 years. A reactionary coup in Moscow certainly could slow down this return to normalcy, but it would not eliminate the socio-economic and environmental crises. General Wojciech Jaruzelski attempted a similar "solution" in Poland, and the Polish crisis did not abate but rather intensified.

Perhaps Moscow has reached the psychological watershed that Britain reached in the late 1940's and France reached with the advent of Charles de Gaulle in 1958—the shift from the "self-evident" need to cling to the empire to the urge to let go. The Soviet military pull-out from Afghanistan and the "ideological" pull-out from Eastern Europe, which starkly contrast with the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956, of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and of Afghanistan in 1979, cannot be explained otherwise.

However, limits yet remain on change in the Baltic republics. Although Moscow appears to accept eventual independence for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, excessive haste toward that goal is unacceptable to the Kremlin. Leaders and masses require time for psychological adjustment to the decline of empire. Nevertheless, we can indeed observe some movement on this issue in Moscow. Not only is the subject of Baltic independence no longer unmentionable; neither are demands for independence met with a categorical "no." Rather, this summer Moscow greeted Baltic demands with a negative answer supported by one-sided arguments. The next stage will likely be a reasoned discussion of the pros and cons of the issue.

Some reformers in Moscow hope for a commonwealth-type solution whereby the various Soviet republics achieve independence without formally leaving the Union.⁴ In a Soviet economy beset by problems, where chances for improvement are dim at best, the Baltic republics stand the best chance of successfully carrying out reforms leading to autonomy and marketization. To encourage the work of the Baltic leaven on the Soviet dough, a reformist government in Moscow would have a particular interest in pressing for economic changes in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and in maintaining some sort of tie with them. In turn, the implementation of plans for economic autonomy and a market economy will strengthen the momentum toward reestablishing political independence in the Baltic republics. Ironically, lacking a ready market elsewhere for their goods, the newly independent Baltic states might turn to the huge Soviet market, so political independence might

actually reinforce economic ties with the Soviet Union. Moscow would release restive provinces and gain friendly neighbors in return, thus in some ways paralleling the Soviet experience with Finland.

If events in the Baltic republics in general and in Estonia in particular were not moving so fast, one would describe the past in order to "explain" how the present situation came about. In that case, the preceding comments about the future would be better suited to a conclusion. But the status quo of 1985 is irretrievably gone, and the present is in flux. Consequently, we need two anchors in time: a stable past and a presumably more stable future. We must examine not only how the present stage came about but also how it prepares the way for the future. Otherwise this article risks being dated by the time it reaches the reader. Although the future is, of course, contingent, the need for an anchor in the future requires that we make assumptions about how events will likely unfold. Pretending to avoid making assumptions about the future would merely mask a hidden assumption that the status quo would continue with few changes, and this assumption would be the most problematic. Having established our anchor in the future by positing the existence of independent Baltic states by the early 1990's, let us now establish our anchor in the past by starting from the beginning.

Background

Estonians and their Balto-Finnic ancestors have lived at their present location for at least 5,000 years, and the linguistic borders have changed very little since the 14th century. Estonian is a member of the Finno-Ugric language family, which also includes Finnish, Hungarian, and Komi. Russian is closer to English than it is to Estonian.

Estonia was ruled by Germans from the 12th century to the 16th century, by Sweden from 1561 to 1721, and thereafter by tsarist Russia until gaining its independence in 1918. Multicandidate elections were held throughout the 1920's and again in 1938. Interwar Estonia's cultural autonomy for national minorities still stands as a model for non-territorial federalism.⁵ An economic model suitable for a small Nordic country gradually evolved, and in the late 1930's, Estonia's economy was quite successful.

According to the secret protocols of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Estonia fell within the Soviet

⁴Rein Taagepera, "How Empires End: Is The Soviet Union to Become A Commonwealth?" *Homeland*, July 12–26, 1989.

⁵Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1984, p. 84.

sphere of influence.⁶ Under threat of armed invasion, on September 28, 1939, Estonia agreed to allow Soviet military bases on its territory. Soviet troops invaded the country on June 17, 1940, while world attention was focused on Hitler's conquest of France. After rigged elections on July 14, the Estonian People's Assembly—with Soviet troops present—proclaimed a socialist republic and applied for admission into the USSR on July 21. On August 6, the USSR Supreme Soviet formally admitted Estonia into the Soviet Union. The United States, among other countries, did not recognize the annexation, and consulates of independent Estonia continue to function in New York and Los Angeles.

By the time the Germans completely occupied Estonia in September 1941, the Soviet regime had murdered or sent to slow death in labor camps at least 50,000 out of a population of 1.1 million. The horrors of this period have again come alive now that people in Estonia have dared to speak up and reveal the truth about this period. These horrors also made the German occupation look relatively benign by comparison. More than 60,000 people fled to Sweden and Germany prior to the second Soviet occupation (September 1944), after which the murders and deportations resumed. Moreover, Moscow detached about 5 percent of the territory of the Republic of Estonia and joined it to the Russian republic.

Estonia lost between one-quarter and one-third of its original population between 1940 and 1955. In place of these people came a large Soviet military garrison (presently about 150,000 troops) and a continuous influx of Russian-speaking colonists, many of whom thought and acted like a "civilian garrison," refusing to learn Estonian and insisting that the native population use the immigrants' language in any interactions. To be sure, many immigrants stayed only for a short time; but their place was taken by other colonists. It is estimated that since 1945, 7.5 million people have come to Estonia but 7 million have left again. Presently the population consists of 1 million Estonians, about 100,000 Russians who were citizens of the prewar Republic of Estonia, and 500,000 post-World War II colonists.⁷

Although outright terror subsided after Stalin's death, relentless discrimination proceeded against Estonians,

their language, and their culture throughout the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods. At times, job openings in Estonia were advertised in Russian-speaking areas of the Soviet Union but not locally. Job discrimination was especially marked in railroads, aviation, the merchant navy, and in the militia, where Estonians have been gradually eliminated. At the other end of the spectrum, the flux of immigrant labor, with lower standards for living and work conditions, squeezed Estonians out of blue-collar jobs. Newly-built housing went to colonists fresh off the train rather than to local inhabitants who had sometimes been on the waiting list for decades. Housing discrimination contributed heavily to the low birth rate of Estonians. Immigrant physicians, who could not understand the complaints of Estonian children, all too often berated the parents for not raising their children in the language of the empire. In altercations with Estonians, the Russians frequently claimed special privileges because "they had liberated Estonia from the fascists" and in the same breath called Estonians fascists themselves. At times, language discrimination reached the point where Russian salespersons snarled "Speak a human language" to their Estonian-speaking customers.

Within the Soviet Union, Estonians enjoyed the highest standard of living, but they would gladly have exchanged it for the lowest in Western Europe. Almost on a par with Finland toward the end of the 1930's, Estonians watched themselves slip back in relative terms and, since 1975, in absolute terms as well. The gradually increasing contacts with Finland and reception of Finnish television in Estonia only rubbed in the difference.

From 1950 to the mid-1980's, all top administrative posts in the republic were occupied by Russified descendants of Estonians who had emigrated to Russia during the tsarist period. These people had little or no command of Estonian, lacked an understanding of Estonian culture, and were happy to oblige Moscow by promoting colonization and the ecologically reckless exploitation of Estonia's resources. In 1978, a native Estonian, Vaino Väljas, emerged as a likely candidate for the position of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia (CPE).⁸ Väljas's pro-Moscow stance made him look "more royalist than the king." However, the position went to Siberian-born Karl Vaino, whose chief distinction was his inability to learn his ancestral Estonian during a 40-year residence in the country.

⁶For details of the history of the Baltic republics from 1940 to 1980, see Misiunas and Taagepera, op. cit. The best comprehensive work on the entire history of Estonia is Toivo Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1987.

⁷According to the 1989 census (in *Rahva Hääli* [Tallinn], Sept. 19, 1989), the population of the Estonian SSR was 61.5 percent Estonian, 30.3 percent Russian, 3.1 percent Ukrainian, 1.8 percent Belorussian, and 3.3 percent various others. It is unclear to what extent Soviet military personnel and their dependents were counted in these figures and to what extent Estonian draftees were excluded.

⁸The customary form used in English, "Estonian Communist Party" could be interpreted as a territorial or an ethnic designation. The actual Estonian name, *Eestimaa Kommunistlik Partei* (Communist Party of Estonia), explicitly stresses its nature as a territorial and not an ethnic subdivision.



The ongoing environmental campaign in Estonia—a Narva rally in June 1989 displays the banner "Stop Damaging Land and Fields!"

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

A small organized dissident movement emerged in the late 1960's, but only after the Soviet Union signed the Helsinki Accords in 1975—which obligated the signatories to guarantee civil and political rights in their countries—did dissent in Estonia reach more significant proportions. Such groups as the Association of Concerned Estonians, the Estonian Democratic Movement, and the 40 prominent members of the intelligentsia who signed an open letter to *Pravda* in October 1980 protested Moscow's failure to observe the Helsinki Accords, expressed concern over the fate of the nation, and objected to the Russification of the republic. The regime responded indecisively. However, after the prison death of chemistry lecturer (and party member) Jüri Kukk in 1981, the regime managed to arrest nearly all open dissidents by 1983. Thereafter, protests became even more muted.⁹

⁹Misiunas and Taagepera, op. cit., pp. 253–58; Rein Taagepera, *Softening Without Liberalization in the Soviet Union: The Case of Jüri Kukk*, Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 1984. See also, Ludmilla Alexeyeva, *Soviet Dissent*, Middletown, CT, Wesleyan University Press, 1985, Ch. 3.

The Phosphate Spring

Leonid Brezhnev's death and the eventual accession to power by Gorbachev brought few visible changes in Estonia. However, after Brezhnev's death and in departure from past practice, a native Estonian, Arnold Rüütel, became the head of state in 1983, and another, Bruno Saul, became Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1984. Moreover, Estonian and central press coverage of Estonia's economic and social problems increased markedly in 1986; even the forcible dispatch of thousands of Estonians to Chernobyl¹⁰ was mentioned. But by and large, Tallinn trailed Moscow in political activity. It also trailed Riga, where major protests erupted over the state of the environment in November 1986. It was only in the spring of 1987 that environmental demonstrations were organized in Tallinn.

These demonstrations were prompted by the deci-

¹⁰Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, "The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1980–1986," *Journal of Baltic Studies*, Vol. 20, 1989, pp. 65–88.

sion of the Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production to initiate ecologically disastrous phosphate mining in north-east Estonia, and Gorbachev's visit to Estonia in February 1987 offered an opportunity to raise the issue directly with him, bypassing the republic's top administrators. Estonian youth organized numerous small protest demonstrations over this issue, and public discussion of it took place in the media. Although most protesters had expected few tangible results, the demonstrations did succeed in forcing the regime to shelve its mining plans.¹¹

This success prepared the ground for further protest actions because it bolstered the confidence of the protesters and showed those who had remained quiescent that a significant number of people were no longer afraid to speak out. The attitude that "They'll never permit us to do that" changed into "We'll do it anyway." Valuable organizing experience also had been obtained, and the regime's grip on the mass media was broken. History had begun to move.

On August 23, 1987—the anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact—Lagle Parek and other dissidents recently released from prison obtained grudging official permission to hold a demonstration at Tallinn's Hirvepark. The gathering protested the Pact and called for the publication of its secret protocols. About 2,000 people attended this demonstration, a smaller number than at a simultaneous meeting in Riga, but more than in a similar commemoration in Vilnius. Following this meeting, the Estonian Group for Publication of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (*Molotov-Ribbentropi Pakti Avalikus-tamise Eesti Grupp*—MRP-AEG) was formed.

At this point, closet reformers within the establishment, who had been cautiously testing the water, realized that they were losing initiative to forces that could provoke the very Stalinist backlash they wanted to avoid by going slowly. Therefore, the Hirvepark demonstration may also have speeded the drawing up of a plan for Estonia's economic autonomy embodied in the "Four-Man Proposal" published on September 26, 1987. This proposal called for such extensive economic changes in Estonia as granting the republic jurisdiction over its own economy, the introduction of complete self-financing throughout the republic, the establishment of a convertible Estonian ruble as the basis for all economic transactions, and complete enterprise autonomy in trade relations with other countries.¹²

The "Four-Man Proposal" was signed by Siim Kallas, a journalist; Edgar Savisaar, a former planning committee official; Tiit Made, a television commentator; and Mikk Titma, vice-president of the Soviet Sociology Association. (One year later Titma was to become the CPE secretary for ideology. The other three were elected to the all-Union Congress of People's Deputies in 1989, and Savisaar was also to become Estonia's vice-premier in charge of implementing the plan for economic autonomy.) Throughout late 1987, these four were subject to official criticism, but ironically, hoping to demonstrate that republic economic autonomy was impossible, those who attacked the "Four-Man Proposal" fell into the trap of documenting in great and often petty detail the extent to which Estonia's economy was run from Moscow. Savisaar managed to turn this argument on its head, using it as proof that overcentralization had reached absurd proportions.¹³

In the late fall of 1987, *glasnost'* began to take root in Estonia, and a number of changes were initiated in the cultural sphere. In November 1987, an article by historian Evald Laasi opened the public discussion of Stalin's crimes. It again became acceptable to celebrate Christmas. On December 12, a number of local organizations that had cooperated for more than a year to clear overgrown churchyards and to prepare for more extensive actions in the cultural sphere combined to form the Estonian Heritage Society (EHS). In January 1988, Stalinist CPE Ideology Secretary Rein Ristlaan was replaced by Indrek Toome, who established a dialogue with the reformists.

Regime hard-liners responded to these changes with force, thus catalyzing divisions within the opposition and, paradoxically, further liberalization. On February 2, 1988, a demonstration in Tartu, held in commemoration of the Estonian-Soviet peace treaty of 1920, was brutally attacked by the police. In retrospect, this police action was to be the last such act in Estonia, but at the time it brought a sharp disagreement over tactics between MRP-AEG, which planned more confrontational measures, including major demonstrations on Estonia's Independence Day (February 24), and the reformers, who, fearing a backlash, advocated more measured approaches.

To defuse discontent over the police action of February 2, the authorities allowed publication of an objective history of the events surrounding Estonia's independence in 1918 (official Soviet views had previously represented the newly independent Estonian government

¹¹Mare Taagepera, "Ecological and Political Implications of Phosphorite Mining in Estonia," *ibid.*, pp. 261–70.

¹²Toomas Ilves, "Conformist Communists Propose Turning Estonia into Closed Economic Zone," *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), Baltic Situation Report, No. 7, Oct. 28, 1987.

¹³Toivo Miljan, "The Proposal to Establish Economic Autonomy in Estonia," *Journal of Baltic Studies*, Vol. 20, 1989, pp. 245–60.

as a "bourgeois dictatorship"). From then on, open praise of Estonia's period of independence was sanctioned. Moreover, in Tallinn alone, about 10,000 people were able to participate in the February 24 demonstrations, without police interference.¹⁴

The Spring of the Flag

The public display of the prohibited national colors by the EHS (in Tartu on April 14–17) may not have been the most important event during the spring of 1988, but most Estonians will remember it anyway as the "Spring of the Blue-Black-White"—the spring when the displaying of the still-prohibited flag spread throughout the land, when tens of thousands of Estonians spent entire nights singing and waving flags. As a result of the

"singing revolution," which continued into September, the Presidium of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR) Supreme Soviet, on June 23, 1988, legalized the flag, and elderly Estonians declared that they could now die in peace.

Meanwhile, other major developments were taking place that represented a multifaceted breakthrough. At an April 1–2 meeting of the leaders of the creative unions (writers, artists, journalists, etc.), the mood was extremely defiant. For the first time, a member of the establishment—Rein Veidemann, editor of the monthly *Vikerkaar* (*Raduga* in the Russian-language edition)—mentioned publicly the possibility of Estonia leaving the Soviet Union: "If self-management cannot be implemented within the framework of the existing legislation of the federal state, then the constitutional right of self-determination must be exerted so as to shift to self-management through this means." The official press reported Veidemann's statement, along with radical proposals by representatives of the creative unions to the upcoming 19th Conference of the CPSU and a letter

¹⁴For more details and documentation, see Rein Taagepera, "Estonia in September 1988: Stalinists, Centrists, and Restorationists," *ibid.*, pp. 271–86.



An October 1, 1988, meeting, left to right, of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia Vaino Väljas, party Secretary for Ideology Indrek Toome, and Edgar Savisaar, a leader of the Popular Front of Estonia.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

expressing lack of confidence in the republic's top administrators.¹⁵

Then, on April 13, Edgar Savisaar proposed the creation of a "Popular Front for the Support of *Perestroyka*" (hereafter—Popular Front), and an initiative group to promote the new organization was quickly formed. A few days later, the EHS brought out the national flag. On April 28, a decision was made to create an Estonian Green Movement, the actual founding of which took place on May 23.

Increasingly out of touch with the burgeoning popular movement for reform, CPE First Secretary Vaino decided to appoint the Estonian delegation to the upcoming 19th Party Conference in Moscow without holding the multicandidate elections called for by the CPSU's central leadership. When the Popular Front called for a mass meeting on June 17 to meet with these delegates, Vaino asked Moscow for military support. But CPE Ideology Secretary Toome intervened and, on June 16, the Kremlin agreed to dismiss Vaino. The next day, 150,000 people came out to celebrate. The native Estonian over whom Vaino had been chosen in 1978, Vaino Väljas, now replaced him. At the Party Conference, Väljas defended the Popular Front's platform, which called for extensive republic economic autonomy.

By September, the CPE leadership had fully embraced the goal of Estonia's economic autonomy. Meanwhile, however, popular demands for change had outrun the party's willingness to push for incremental reforms. For example, the Popular Front had itself embraced a program calling for political changes, including a "transformation of the Soviet Union from a federal state into a confederation of states," with juridical guarantees and the establishment of a political mechanism for leaving the union.¹⁶

Many taboos on the discussion of blank spots in Estonia's recent history also disappeared. Thus, the Soviet takeover was called an occupation, and the republic's main daily, *Rahva Hääli*, published the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on August 11 and 12, 1988. The MRP-AEG, which thereby had achieved its short-term goal, folded, and reemerged on August 20 as the Estonian National Independence Party (ENIP). The Popular Front demonstrated its strength by calling a meeting on September 11 in which 250,000 people participated, and this organization was formally constituted on October 2.

But the forces of reaction were also mobilizing. Many Russian and Russified settlers in Estonia thought of themselves as representatives of the imperial power in the republic and hence feared the upsurge of national feeling associated with the popular forces for reform. On July 12, these Russian conservatives formed their

own popular movement—the Internationalist Front (later, Intermovement)—to resist the Estonian groups whose platforms embodied liberal nationalism.

When Prime Minister Saul resigned on November 16, 1988, the top leadership of the ESSR passed completely into the hands of the reformists, who included CPE First Secretary Väljas, head of state Arnold Rüütel (who has come to play a very active role in support of reform), Indrek Toome as the new prime minister, and Mikk Titma as the new ideology secretary. As of early December 1989, these officials were still in place.

The Winter of Sovereignty

The next major step on the road of reform did not come as a result of an Estonian initiative but was imposed by Moscow. Either by design or through insensitive wording, the changes in the Soviet Constitution that Gorbachev wanted to ram through the Supreme Soviet in November 1988 appeared to limit the rights of the union republics. Estonians raised a number of objections to the proposed changes. The alteration appeared to abolish the union republics' rights to leave the Union (although Article 72, which grants this right to republics, was not abolished) by granting to the new Congress of People's Deputies the power to "take decisions on questions of the composition of the USSR," which would include acting on demands for secession. Estonians also claimed that the proposed changes further centralized power in Moscow and that in the new Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet the representation of the union republics would fall in relation to that of the Russian republic.

The popular mood in Estonia favored invoking Article 72 while the right to secede was still unambiguous. On November 16, Väljas guided the ESSR Supreme Soviet through a tense meeting, which adopted a "Declaration About Sovereignty" ("about," not "of"!). This declaration stopped short of demanding Estonia's secession from the Soviet Union, yet interpreted the Soviet Constitution in the manner most favorable to gaining Estonia's sovereignty.¹⁷

¹⁵Veidemann was quoted in *Sirp ja Vasar* (Tallinn), Apr. 15, 1988. A full translation of proposals to Moscow can be found in *Homeland*, Apr. 20, 1988.

¹⁶*Sirp ja Vasar*, Aug. 5, 1988. *Sirp ja Vasar* (Hammer and Sickle) was renamed *Reede* (Friday) in July 1989.

¹⁷For the declaration to have legal validity by the time the USSR Supreme Soviet met, it had to have been published 10 days earlier. This deadline was met by printing a unique joint issue of *Rahva Hääli* and *Sovetskaya Estoniya* (Tallinn) on Nov. 18, 1989, with one page in Estonian and one in Russian. See the English text in *Homeland*, Nov. 23, 1989.

As a consequence of their actions, the Estonian leaders (and R  utel in particular) had to withstand a series of coarse verbal assaults from Gorbachev, other leaders in Moscow, and the central press. The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet declared the Estonian sovereignty legislation unconstitutional, but nevertheless on December 7, the ESSR Supreme Soviet affirmed its stance. The Estonian line was that the Soviet Constitution was itself contradictory, especially after the latest changes. A stalemate resulted, and a prolonged stalemate between a pawn and a queen works in the former's favor.

Other changes proceeded apace, and these moves attempted to draw a balance between the interests of the Estonian and Russian speakers of the republic's population. A language law passed by the ESSR Supreme Soviet on January 18, 1989, declared Estonian to be the state language. But the law also gave even stronger guarantees for the use of Russian, and consequently some Estonians protested its ratification. At the same time, a number of Russian colonists protested the requirement that within four years all officials and salespeople be able to give service both in Estonian and Russian. Previously, Russian was required while Estonian was optional, and the extremists among the colonists considered the new parity "discriminatory."

This disagreement reflected fundamental, perhaps irreconcilable, differences between the Estonians and the colonists. The basic premise of Estonians was that Estonia was a distinct country, although occupied. The colonialist premise was that Estonia was just another Russian province, in which the colonists still graciously allowed other languages to coexist with Russian. Arguments based on such divergent premises were hard to settle, and indicated the extent to which politics in the republic had become polarized along national lines.¹⁸

But as events occurred with such rapidity and the government acceded to some of the demands of the reform movement, Estonians themselves, although agreeing on objectives, found themselves in disagreement over the pace of change. Elections to the Congress of People's Deputies on March 26, 1989 (with some runoffs or repeats on April 9 and May 14), caused a dispute between the Popular Front, which chose to participate, and the ENIP and the EHS, which argued that it was absurd to send Estonian delegates "to the parliament of a neighboring country." At the same time, relations between the Popular Front and the CPE were becoming more tense, and the Popular Front was not

officially registered until February 2. The CPE itself was badly split along national lines. As a reflection of the polarization between the colonists and native Estonians, Intermovement, which was formally constituted on March 6, called for the resignation of the native Estonian leaders of the CPE. Ironically, this demand helped make the leaders of the Estonian party more popular with the Estonian people than the CPE as a whole.

About 95 percent of Estonians and 75 percent of non-Estonians voted in the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies. Nominations and vote-counting were basically fair. The candidates supported by the Popular Front (who included V  ljas, R  utel, and Toome) won 27 out of 36 seats. Intermovement and its allies won five seats. The second secretary of the CPE and the ESSR KGB chief—both non-Estonians—were shunned by both sides and lost badly. Of the 36 seats, 29 went to Estonians. Voting generally followed nationality lines; however, Leningrad-born economist Mikhail Bronshtein, who was endorsed by the Popular Front, won handily in a heavily Estonian district. Estonian nationals also received 11 of the 12 seats allocated to the ESSR through various all-Union organizations.¹⁹

Although the CPE and Popular Front leaders received a major boost from elections, they also faced a new challenge in the form of Citizens' Committees, organized by the EHS, ENIP, and the small Estonian Christian Union (ECU) to register citizens of the prewar Republic of Estonia and their offspring, as well as later immigrants wishing to be considered for citizenship in a newly independent republic. The underlying motives for this registration require some explanation.

In principle, Estonia's independence could be reestablished in two ways. One approach rests on the existence of the Estonian SSR and aims to work through the ESSR's present political institutions toward the republic's gradual emancipation. The outcome of this approach would be genuine autonomy within the USSR (the stated goal of the CPE up to the spring of 1989), a treaty of confederation between Estonia and the USSR (as proposed by the Popular Front in August 1988), or independent statehood outside the USSR, similar to Hungary or Finland (a goal increasingly voiced by the Popular Front since the spring of 1989).

A second approach presumes the continued legal existence of the interwar Republic of Estonia and, as outlined by EHS leader Trivimi Velliste on February 24, 1989, would be based on the Citizens' Committees. Once these committees succeeded in registering more

¹⁸For a perceptive description of the atmosphere and personalities in January 1989, see David K. Shieler, "A Reporter At Large: Symbols of Sovereignty," *The New Yorker* (New York), Sept. 18, 1989, pp. 52-99.

¹⁹For details of events associated with the elections, see Rein Taagepera, "Elections in Estonia, March 1989," unpublished manuscript.

Table 1: Political Preferences of Inhabitants of Estonia, April 13–16, 1989

Organizations	Estonians	Others	Total
Intermovement	0.0	10.9	4.0
Joint Council of Work Collectives	0.9	17.8	7.0
Communist Party of Estonia	7.2	32.2	16.2
Union of Work Collectives	0.2	5.9	2.3
Rural Union	7.5	4.1	6.3
No preference	3.4	6.8	4.7
Popular Front of Estonia	50.3	8.9	35.2
Estonian Green Movement	12.6	11.5	12.2
Estonian Heritage Society	6.0	0.3	3.9
Estonian Christian Union	2.4	0.6	1.7
Estonian National Independence Party	9.6	0.9	6.4

SOURCES: *Ilta-Sanomata* (Helsinki), May 2, 1989; also *Homeland* (Tallinn), May 17, 1989; and *Vaba Maa* (Tallinn), No. 6, May 1989, p. 3.

than 550,000 people (a majority of the population of the Republic of Estonia), an Estonian Congress could be called. That Congress would appoint delegates to enter into talks with Moscow regarding troop withdrawals. The Congress would have no legislative powers, but it would constitute an independent forum to discuss the future of Estonia. Its popular basis and independence from the established regime would lend it a great deal of legitimacy. Despite opposition by the leaders of the CPE and the Popular Front, local Citizens' Committees quickly emerged and began to collect signatures.²⁰

Some evidence of the relative popularity of these two approaches, as well as of the conservative and reactionary groups on the Estonian political scene, was ascertained for the first time in a survey commissioned by the Finnish newspaper *Ilta-Sanomata* and carried out by Mainor, a commercial enterprise associated with the Popular Front.²¹ Table 1 shows the first preferences of Estonians and non-Estonians. Political groups are listed according to their approximate location on a scale

²⁰At first glance, the Citizens' Committees' approach looks utopian: why would Moscow wish to deal with representatives of a "Republic of Estonia" rather than those of the Estonian SSR? However, Moscow may have good reasons to raise the issue of Estonia's independence with the Citizens' Committees when the republic's departure from the Soviet Union becomes a subject for discussion in Moscow. If the Estonian SSR were to use Article 72 of the Soviet Constitution to leave the Soviet Union, this action would establish a precedent for all the other union republics. By contrast, a Soviet troop-withdrawal from a Republic of Estonia unjustly occupied by Stalin would be analogous to the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and would create no legal precedent for the union republics that were part of the Soviet Union before 1940.

²¹*Ilta-Sanomata* (Helsinki), May 2, 1989; also *Homeland*, May 17, 1989; and *Vaba Maa* (Tallinn), No. 6, May 1989, p. 2. *Vaba Maa* is published by the Popular Front. The Union of Work Collectives, whose popularity was gauged in the survey, is a centrist counterweight to the reactionary Joint Council of Work Collectives, which is dominated by Russians.

moving from the most reactionary at the top to the most reform-minded at the bottom.

As the table shows, Intermovement and the allied Joint Council of Work Collectives had only 29 percent support even among the non-Estonians, a plurality of whom placed their trust in the CPE. The CPE, however, ranked a poor fifth among the Estonians, surpassed not only by the Popular Front but also by the Greens, the ENIP, and even the newly-formed Rural Union (an organization that is largely the creation of state and collective farm managers). The Popular Front won the support of an absolute majority of Estonians and even managed to make significant inroads among non-Estonians. The groups promoting the Citizens' Committees (EHS, ENIP, ECU) were the first preference of only 18 percent of Estonians.


The Summer of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

The debates in the Congress of People's Deputies (and later in the Supreme Soviet) in late spring and summer 1989 produced two major outcomes for the Baltic republics: Moscow's acceptance in principle of economic autonomy for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, on July 27; and the formation of a Supreme Soviet commission to investigate the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the 50th anniversary of which was imminent. Although the crucial enabling laws for implementation of autonomy remained to be haggled out in the fall, Savisaar became ESSR vice-premier in charge of economic reform and began preparations for the implementation of autonomy and the movement to a market economy, without waiting for approval from Moscow.²² But whatever the long-range impact of the autonomy decision, it was overshadowed in the short run by the commemoration of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

The formation of the commission to investigate the Pact occurred against the backdrop of further moves on the part of the CPE and the Popular Front toward independence. Thus, the CPE came out in support of the Popular Front's demand for a treaty of confederation between Estonia and the Soviet Union. Even CPE Ideology Secretary Titma publicly acknowledged that Soviet Estonia "was born as a result of a Stalin-Hitler deal."²³

²²On November 27, 1989, the USSR Supreme Soviet granted the Baltic republics economic autonomy, beginning on January 1, 1989. The new legislation grants these republics control over their local financial systems, banking, factories, and other state-run enterprises. Moscow will retain control over oil and gas lines, and other facilities that the legislation deems of all-Union importance. See *The Washington Post*, Nov. 28, 1989.

²³*Homeland*, July 5, 19, and 26, 1989.



During a break in the proceedings at the USSR Supreme Soviet in July 1989, Estonian Prime Minister Indrek Toome (right) and Communist Party of Lithuania First Secretary Algirdas Brazauskas (left) examine a draft law aimed at giving their republics greater financial independence from the Kremlin.

—Dominique Dudouble/REUTERS/BETTMANN NEWSPHOTOS.

At the same time, the Popular Front was moving further toward independence by asking that the ESSR Supreme Soviet declare Estonia's incorporation into the Soviet Union illegal and invalid.

The Supreme Soviet commission on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact contained both Russians and other non-Balts, many of whom wanted to minimize its historical significance, and Balts, who continued to discover further documentation on how the Pact had led to the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states. As the anniversary date of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact approached, the members of the Supreme Soviet commission investigating the Pact split, and on July 20, 14 of its 26 members signed an assessment to the effect that a secret protocol to the Pact had infringed on the rights of third countries, including the Baltic states. The 14 members of the commission recommended that the USSR Supreme Soviet condemn these protocols and declare them invalid. The Balts were disappointed and angry when Aleksandr Yakovlev, chairman of the commission, did not sign the assessment and maintained that the Pact had no connection with the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR.²⁴

Emotionally, the highlight of the summer was the Baltic Chain, organized by the three popular fronts in the Baltic republics on August 23. Throughout Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, 1–2 million people participated, peacefully joining hands and shouting "We demand freedom! Freedom! Freedom!"²⁵ "The Baltic Way," a joint statement of the three popular fronts, condemned the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the resulting occupation of the Baltic states, and called for restoration of Baltic statehood, but refrained from using the buzzword "independence":

We remind all nations that under international law treaties of this kind are criminal and unlawful from the very moment of signing. This knowledge, which the apologists of imperialism and red fascists have preferred to overlook, has supported and kept us alive despite the decades-long public terror and systematic genocide.

Stability on the shores of the Baltic must be built on a system of treaties such as was in force before the deal of 1939, and which stems from the peace treaties concluded between the Soviet Union and the Baltic states in 1920.

The BALTIC WAY is a parliamentary way for the peaceful restoration of our statehood.

*The BALTIC WAY will guarantee social security, civil rights, and economic progress to all peoples in the Baltic republics regardless of their nationality.*²⁶

The suspicions of Moscow and the non-Estonians within the republic had also been aroused by a law on local elections passed by the ESSR Supreme Soviet on August 8. This legislation stipulated that only citizens who had lived not less than the past two years on the territory of the district in which they were voting or for a total of five years in the Estonian SSR had the right to vote.²⁷ The goal of this part of the law was to prevent Soviet troops from being transported to cast a pre-marked

²⁴Text of assessment in *Homeland*, Aug. 23, 1989. By late September 1989, 21 out of the 26 members had signed the assessment, but Yakovlev had not. See *Homeland*, Oct. 4, 1989.

²⁵I was one of them. As the crucial moment approached, some Popular Front leaders and I joined the chain, whose "links" were joined densely side by side in a pine forest. The chain, standing on the western side of the road and facing east, repeated the slogan mentioned in the text. Properly spaced radios transmitted the incantation. We proceeded to a culminating meeting at the Latvian border. Upon departure, we got an idea of the size of the crowd when our car failed to move more than 10 feet in 90 minutes.

²⁶The full English text of "The Baltic Way" can be found in *Homeland*, Aug. 23, 1989.

²⁷Saulius Girnius, "Estonian Supreme Soviet Suspends Residency Requirements for Local Elections," *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR* (Munich), October 20, 1989, p. 19. See also, Vasil Bykov, "The Intolerance Syndrome," *Moscow News*, Sept. 17–24, 1989, p. 8.



Estonian demonstrators in traditional dress wave the Estonian flag as they take part in a human chain of protest from Tallinn to Vilnius through the three Baltic republics on the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, under which the Soviet Union annexed their countries.

—Dominique Dudouble/REUTERS/BETTMANN NEWSPHOTOS.

ballot in crucial districts.²⁸ A second clause in the legislation stated that the electoral law should conform to a law on citizenship that would be adopted later.

Intermovement then went on the offensive, with management-ordered work stoppages, staged ostensibly to protest the new electoral law. The strikers also demanded the removal of the CPE and government leaders. Up to 30,000 industrial and transportation workers—4 percent of the total workforce—stopped work (voluntarily or through managerial lockout) for up to six days, from August 11 to 16. By stopping all railroad transportation, the strike could have delivered a knockout blow to the republic's economy, but its effects were minimized by the Estonian authorities. They built a backup transport system using rural buses and trucks.

The demonstration on August 23 and the new election law in Estonia prepared the ground for a CPSU

Central Committee resolution "On the Situation in the Republics of the Soviet Baltic." The resolution condemned "the separatist line that certain forces in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have conducted with growing obstinacy and aggressiveness over the course of recent months." The resolution maintained that "here and there organizations recalling the political formations of the bourgeois period and the times of fascist occupation have appeared." With Estonia's recent election law and Lithuania's declaration of sovereignty in mind, the resolution castigated "anticonstitutional acts that contradict the federal principles of the state, that discriminate against the non-indigenous part of the population of these republics." The Central Committee statement then appeared to threaten military action:

Things have gone far. A serious danger threatens the fate of the Baltic nations. People must know toward what kind of abyss nationalist leaders are pushing them. If they succeed in achieving their goals, the consequences could be catastrophic for

²⁸This had happened in Tallinn in March 1989. See *Vaba Maa*, No. 4, April 1989, p. 3.

their peoples. Their very viability could be called into question.²⁹

The three Baltic popular fronts quickly used this threat to ask the United Nations to send a human rights commission to the Baltic republics and to debate the Baltic question at a UN General Assembly meeting.³⁰ On October 14, the three popular fronts criticized the response to Moscow by the Baltic communist parties, which, they said, indicated those parties' "inability or unwillingness to express and defend the interests of their people."³¹

Under pressure from Moscow, on October 5, the ESSR Supreme Soviet suspended the voter residence requirements for the coming elections, to be held on December 10. The suspension did not affect the election law's five-year residence requirement for candidates.

Pressure from Moscow also temporarily affected the Supreme Soviet's position on Estonia's annexation by the Soviet Union. Following Lithuania's lead, on September 25, a commission of the ESSR Supreme Soviet declared the incorporation of Estonia into the Soviet Union illegal, but although the Supreme Soviet accepted the report, it failed to endorse its conclusions. On

November 11, however, the Estonian Supreme Soviet reversed its position on the issue. By a vote of 188 to 1, the legislature declared that Estonia's annexation by the Soviet Union amounted to a "military occupation." (CPE chief Väljas did manage to introduce a clause into this legislation stipulating that this resolution did not denote Estonia's secession from the USSR.)³²

Platform of the Popular Front

By September, the Citizens' Committees had registered 300,000 people (one-tenth of them postwar immigrants applying for Republic of Estonia citizenship). It looked as if their goal of organizing an Estonian Congress might be within reach. Faced with this competition, plus the need to devise a program for the upcoming local elections (and the elections to the ESSR Supreme Soviet in early 1990), the Popular Front of Estonia came out with an electoral platform that unambiguously set independence as the final goal. The intermediate stages were to involve the following:


- instituting democratic elections;
- specifying the present status of Estonia as an occupied territory;
- renaming the ESSR Supreme Soviet a "Constituent Assembly," and thus formally abolishing the entity called "ESSR";
- convoking an Estonian Congress of all pro-inde-

²⁹*Pravda* (Moscow), Aug. 27, 1989. See also *Homeland*, Sept. 6, 1989.

³⁰Letter to United Nations' Secretary General Xavier Perez de Cuellar by the Baltic Council of the three popular fronts, Riga, Aug. 31, 1989.

³¹*Noorte Hääl*, Oct. 16, 1989.

³²*The Washington Post*, Nov. 14, 1989.



Strikers at the entrance to the Baltic ship-repair yard in Tallinn in the summer of 1989. The placard reads: "We Are on Strike for Equality of Nations—Without Priority."

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

Table 2: Some Major Milestones in National Self-Assertion of the Baltic Republics, 1986–89

	Estonia	Lithuania	Latvia
LATVIAN PHASE			
First major ecology protest	March 1987	June 1986	October 1986
First major history-oriented protest	August 1987	August 1987	June 1987
ESTONIAN PHASE			
First public discussion of economic autonomy	September 1987	May 1988	October 1988
Latest repression of a demonstration	February 1988	September 1988	March 1989
Birth of republic popular front	April 1988	May 1988	June 1988
Removal of old guard party chief	June 1988	October 1988	October 1988
Legalization of national flag	June 1988	October 1988	October 1988
National language declared state language	June 1988	November 1988	October 1988
Birth of local colonialist organization	July 1988	November 1988	October 1988
Founding congress of the popular front	October 1988	October 1988	October 1988
Formal declaration of republic sovereignty	November 1988	May 1989	July 1989
State language legislation adopted	January 1989	January 1989	May 1989
Legal registration of popular front	February 1989	March 1989	N.a.
LITHUANIAN PHASE			
Communist youth group becomes autonomous	N.a.	June 1989	N.a.
Republic Supreme Soviet commission declares annexation by USSR illegal	September 1989	August 1989	N.a.
Republic Supreme Soviet itself declares annexation by USSR illegal	November 1989	September 1989	N.a.
Average lag of other republics behind Estonia (September 1987 to February 1989) in months	N.a.	3.5	5

SOURCES: V. Stanley Vardys, "Lithuanian National Politics," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1989, pp. 53–76; Juris Dreifelds, "Latvian National Rebirth," *ibid.*, pp. 77–94; "National Renaissance of 1988," *Baltic Forum* (New York), Fall 1988, pp. 1–21; "On the Road to Sovereignty," *ibid.*, Spring 1989, pp. 38–51; Baltic Appeal to the United Nations, "Chronology of Events in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania," New York, 1989; and Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR*, (Munich), Sept. 15, 1989.

pendence forces;

- obtaining Moscow's approval for a referendum on independence and a treaty of confederation;
- calling an internationally supervised referendum on independence, with only citizens of the prewar Republic of Estonia, their descendants, and other Estonians taking part;
- concluding a temporary treaty of confederation with the Soviet Union that would fix a date for independence;
- establishing a separate Estonian citizenship (presumably to include many postwar settlers who wish to become citizens);
- developing economic autonomy and a balanced economic approach toward East and West;
- gradually demilitarizing Estonia;
- calling a referendum to approve the Constitution of independent Estonia;
- declaring an independent Republic of Estonia.³³

This program stole most of the thunder of the Citizens' Committees (including their desire to convoke an "Estonian Congress"). Nevertheless, the Citizens' Committees continued to deny the need for a referendum on independence, resting their case on a presumption of the continued legal existence of the prewar Republic of Estonia. On November 11, they elected a nation-wide 50-member General Committee to implement their program.

The Popular Front platform also intimated that the Popular Front would soon declare itself a Social Democratic Party on the model of those in the Scandinavian countries: "With the publication of the [Popular Front] electoral platform, the politics of the [Popular Front of Estonia] enters a new phase where the social democratic ideology of the Popular Front is given a firmer

³³Noorte Hääl, Oct. 17, 1989. For an overview of the Popular Front's program, see *Homeland*, Oct. 25, 1989.

framework, while at the same time leaving room, within the Popular Front, to Eurocommunist as well as liberal and centrist tendencies."³⁴ Thus, although in theory a one-party system remains in Estonia, in fact a multiparty system is about to emerge in the republic.

Inter-Baltic Comparisons

In his recent article on "Lithuanian National Politics," V. Stanley Vardys repeatedly mentions "the Estonian model." Juris Dreifelds in "Latvian National Rebirth" specifies that broadly speaking, among the Baltic republics Latvia led on the road to reform in 1987, Estonia in 1988, and Lithuania in 1989.³⁵ Table 2 confirms this pattern, but also makes it more precise. Estonia pulled decisively ahead of Latvia as early as September 1987, with the "Four-Man Proposal" for economic autonomy, and remained the reform leader until May 1989, when Lithuania's Supreme Soviet passed a resolution declaring the republic's sovereignty. Lithuania then pulled ahead of Estonia in the summer of 1989, when its Communist Youth League formally distanced itself from the all-Union Komsomol and a commission of its Supreme Soviet declared the Soviet annexation of Lithuania illegal. (The only earlier Lithuanian "first" occurred in November 1988, when Lithuania's Supreme Soviet made the national colors the republic's official flag. This move occurred as part of the Communist Party of Lithuania's efforts to stem criticism of the Supreme Soviet's refusal at the time to declare Lithuanian law sovereign in the republic.)³⁶

As shown by Table 2, from late 1987 to early 1989, the events in Lithuania lagged, on the average, 3.5 months behind comparable events in Estonia. In the case of Latvia this lag was about five months.

What caused the successive periods of Latvian, Estonian, and now Lithuanian leadership? It probably results from numerous factors, but the most important apparently being the indigenous nation's share of the population of its titular national republic. These figures are given in Table 3.

The national factor affects the Baltic republics, but in different ways. Because Lithuanians make up a much larger share of their republic's population than the titular nationalities of the other two Baltic republics, the

Table 3: Titular Nationality as Percent of Total Population in the Baltic Republics

	1979	1989	Change
Latvians in Latvia	53.7	52.0	-1.7
Estonians in Estonia	64.7	61.5	-3.2
Lithuanians in Lithuania	80.0	79.0 ?	-1.0 ?

SOURCES: Romuald Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, "The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1980-1986," *Journal of Baltic Studies* (Mahwah/Hackettstown, NJ), Vol. 20, 1989, p. 71; *Rahva Hää* (Tallinn), Sept. 19, 1989; and *Cīņa* (Riga), Oct. 12, 1989.

Lithuanians can afford to be more cautious, because they are not subject to the threat of minority status within their own republic, much less to the threat of demographic extinction.

By contrast, the need to resist is greatest in Latvia, because of the acute threat of national extinction through colonization by other Soviet nationalities, mainly Russians. In the early phase of national resurgence, when activities in Latvia centered around concern for the environment, despair over the fate of their nation compelled Latvians to act, because they believed they had nothing to lose. But as activities became more politicized, the Latvians' boldness diminished when confronted with threats of counteraction by non-Latvians and the center in Moscow.

Estonians saw their share in the country's population rapidly decreasing but they acted while they still had sufficient numbers to push for reform. With increasing autonomy, Estonians now have more to lose in case of a backlash, and this autonomy perhaps encourages caution (although the latest platform of the Popular Front is quite bold).

Prospects

The spectrum of political groupings in Estonia was rather stable from June 1988 to November 1989, but the range of political forces may change appreciably in 1990. The CPE faces profound factional strife because its membership is evenly divided between Estonians and non-Estonians. Many Estonians remain in the CPE only in order to prevent its takeover by the colonists. Imitating the recent transformation by the communist party in Hungary, the CPE may declare itself not only independent of the CPSU but also become the "Estonian Socialist Party," thus ridding itself of those colonists who could not accept such a label. Once the CPE is safely in Estonian hands, many Estonian members may leave it—especially when the Popular Front becomes a distinct party. The organizations promoting the Citi-

³⁴Noorte Hää, Oct. 17, 1989.

³⁵V. Stanley Vardys, "Lithuanian National Politics," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1989, pp. 53-76; Juris Dreifelds, "Latvian National Rebirth," *ibid.*, pp. 77-94. For some comparisons between the situations in Latvia and Lithuania, and the situation in Belorussia, see Jan Zaprudnik, "Belorussian Reawakening," *ibid.*, pp. 36-52.

³⁶See Vardys, *loc. cit.*, pp. 67-68.

zens' Committees would then feel some pressure to unite into a single party in order to combine their forces in the local and republic elections.

The local elections will be training grounds for the elections of the ESSR Supreme Soviet. Pro-independence forces are certain to win a majority in each case, but because the Russian population is strong in the northeast, Intermovement could win there and try to force the area to secede from Estonia.

The potential for economic reform will be endangered by the central ministries in Moscow, which could sabotage the republic's quest for autonomy and the building of a market economy. This potential threat will only reinforce the desire for political independence.

Next summer will mark the 50th anniversary of the Soviet occupation and annexation of the Baltic states. Certainly this anniversary will be the focus of concerted Baltic action. Faced with a deteriorating economy and various other problems, the Kremlin could well decide to reduce its overall burden by denouncing Stalin's annexations and announcing the withdrawal of Soviet garrisons from the Baltic republics within the next few

years.³⁷ Intervention by the empire is also possible, of course, especially if opponents of *perestroyka* assume power in Moscow.³⁸ In that event, the Balts might be held responsible for forcing the conservatives' hand.

The most likely scenario is continued progress toward independence. Granting formal independence to the Baltic republics would improve the Soviet image abroad, while existing all-Union economic links would ensure continued close Baltic cooperation with the Soviet Union. As important, Soviet security might well be enhanced if an extensive demilitarized zone—which would include the Baltic states—could be established in Northern Europe.

³⁷A potential scenario is given in Rein Taagepera's article in *Homeland*, May 31–June 21, 1989.

³⁸If Moscow chooses violent repression, it might appoint Jaak Allik, party secretary of the Viljandi district, to pick up the pieces the way János Kádár did in Hungary in 1956. Allik has positioned himself for that role with vocal support for radical reform, coupled with fanatical insistence that the communist party must retain its leading role. He ran against Popular Front leader Savisaar (who won with 73 percent of the vote) in the March 1989 elections, and he reacted submissively (in *Rahva Hääli*, Sept. 3, 1989) to the CPSU Central Committee's threat of a crackdown in the Baltic republics.

New Cooperatives in the USSR

Anthony Jones and William Moskoff

One of the cornerstones of the policy of *perestroyka* in the Soviet Union is the development of avenues for the functioning of private economic activity. As General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev told the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), "the top priority of the party and of the entire people is to decisively conquer the unfavorable tendencies in the development of the economy, to impart the proper dynamism to it, and to open scope for the initiative and creativity of the masses and for genuine revolutionary transformations."¹ The process is now sufficiently developed to allow us to make a preliminary evaluation of how well the policy of privatization of the Soviet economy is working in one potentially important sector—the new cooperatives. The evidence to date suggests a mixture of success and failure. There is concern in some quarters in the Soviet Union that the new cooperative movement is in danger of dying. At the very least, it is not certain that cooperatives will survive either in their current form or in the form desired by their most optimistic supporters.

Although the recent development of cooperatives—like the experiments in leasing state property to private individuals and establishing family production contracts in agriculture—is radical compared to the predominant central planning model, it reflects a long-term trend toward more diverse official and unofficial forms of Soviet economic activity. As Anders Åslund has recently reminded us, "the non-state economy has been

both larger and more complex than official Soviet publications have suggested."² Numerous unregistered groups of migrant workers (*shabashniki*) have performed various production and construction tasks, individuals have provided a variety of services, and peasants have raised significant quantities of meat and produce on their private plots.

Prior to *perestroyka*, "the relatively large cooperative sectors in agriculture, trade, and housing," Åslund argues, had increasingly "lost all independence and become almost as petrified as state enterprises . . ."³ The official cooperatives were a legal fiction under which property nominally was owned corporately, unlike state enterprises, which were allegedly the property of society as a whole. As typified by the collective farms (*kolkhozy*) and state farms (*soykhozy*) respectively, the two forms did not differ that dramatically—neither the cooperative nor state organizational forms offered avenues for individual initiative or profit. By contrast, the new cooperatives are literally the property of those who create them, making them much more like private enterprises in the capitalist sense.

Nevertheless, in the constricting system, where the old cooperatives did not offer avenues for individual initiative or profit, private enterprise did manage to emerge, but it lay outside the system, virtually unsupported by the state. The spontaneous growth of the underground economy since the 1960's was itself a kind of de facto privatization. In many cases, the new laws on cooperatives legalize activities that were formerly illegal or unsanctioned.

Anthony Jones is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Northeastern University (Boston) and a Fellow at the Harvard University Russian Research Center; William Moskoff is D. K. Pearsons Professor of Economics at Lake Forest College (Lake Forest, IL). The authors wish to thank Carol Gayle and John Tedstrom for their many helpful comments and suggestions.

¹From the text of Gorbachev's speech, as printed in *Pravda* (Moscow) and *Izvestiya* (Moscow) on Feb. 26, 1986, translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH—hereafter, *CDSP*), Mar. 26, 1986, p. 12.

²Anders Åslund, *Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 150.

³*Ibid.*

New Legal Framework

The current form of the new cooperatives has evolved gradually over the last three years. A variety of administrative decrees in 1985 tried to open up the range of non-state economic endeavors, but these measures were vague and little more than suggestions to officials to support and encourage cooperative activity.⁴ On November 19, 1986, a Law on Individual Labor Activity (*individual'naya trudovaya deyatel'nost'*) was adopted, providing the first firm foundation for new forms of cooperative activity by allowing family members who resided together to form a business. Yet, the law, which became operative on May 1, 1987, was full of restrictions on private enterprise. While Article 1 encouraged citizens "to unite in cooperatives, voluntary societies, and associations, in accordance with legislatively established procedures," the law contained no clear legal provision for a new form of cooperative activity. The law rejected in advance enterprises that would embody undesirable features of capitalism: "Individual enterprise that involves hired labor, is aimed at deriving unearned income, or is detrimental to other in-



On the "Riviera"—patrons at a new private restaurant on a boat on the Moscow River.

—F. Hibon/SYGMA.

terests of society is not permitted." Only pensioners, students, the disabled, housewives, and others not employed in the state economy were allowed to enter the private sector full-time; those employed in the state sector who wished to participate could do so, but only "in time they have free from their basic work."⁵

The 1986 law provided a fairly detailed list of permitted and forbidden business activities. This perceived need to define a standard of socially acceptable activities—what can be produced, who can be hired, and how much they can earn—has continued to plague the cooperatives right up to the present time. The restrictions imposed in 1986 reflected the leadership's reluctance to grant permanent status to private enterprise. Indeed, at that juncture, the maximum length of time for which a business could be registered was five years.⁶ It seems clear that in the first years of *perestroika*, the new forms of "individual labor activity" were seen as a way of temporarily meeting some of the needs left unmet by the state economy, and certainly not as a potential competitor for state resources—human or other.

In practice, the activities of cooperatives soon began to expand beyond the limits set out in the 1986 law. For example, the narrow restrictions on who could work in a cooperative were soon inoperative. By the end of 1987, 65 percent of those working in the cooperatives held a second job in existing state or cooperative enterprises, i.e., were not the pensioners, housewives, students, and pupils that the 1986 law had hoped to draw into the labor market.⁷ As we shall see, Soviet legislation gradually adapted to these changing realities.

Many of the first new cooperatives were successful, and the concept continued to blossom in the second half of 1987 and early 1988, with the encouragement of the party leadership. In November 1987, a resolution of the CPSU Central Committee noted that by October 1, 1987, some 8,000 cooperatives, employing more than 88,000 persons, had already been formed, and that these new entities had produced consumer goods and provided services to the public valued at 134 million rubles. The party resolution bemoaned the slow and uneven development of cooperatives, and the failure of state and party organs to cooperate in the establishment and operation of these new entities, which were

⁴See, for example, *Izvestiya*, July 18, 1985; and *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya* (Moscow), Apr. 14, 1985.

⁵See "The Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Individual Labor Activity," *Pravda*, and *Izvestiya*, Nov. 21, 1986, trans. in *CDSP*, Dec. 17, 1986, p. 6.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁷See L. Belopetravicius and V. Sukhachevskiy, " 'Nyanyushka' and Others—The Difficult Beginning of the Cooperative Movement," *Pravda*, Dec. 1, 1987, trans. in *CDSP*, Dec. 30, 1987, p. 10.

expected to help meet the needs of the public.⁸

At the same time, the party resolution noted the non-fulfillment of the "requirements that cooperatives be created mainly from among citizens not employed in social production, and also that cooperatives produce commodities and provide services by enlisting *additional* local production and material resources . . ."⁹ Indeed, this period saw the remarkable conversion of unprofitable state and consumer cooperative enterprises into new cooperative establishments, an unwelcome phenomenon reportedly not envisaged by the law on individual economic activity. In the words of one commentary, what was taking place was "not an expansion of the existing network but a change of signboards, which often infringes on the interests of the population."¹⁰

The high point in the formal recognition of the new cooperatives came on May 26, 1988, with the adoption of the Law on Cooperation in the USSR.¹¹ This law in a sense marked the emancipation of private enterprise in the USSR. It defined the two primary purposes of the cooperatives as producing goods and services for the population and improving the standard of living of cooperative members. In a remarkable departure from the past, the law specifically guaranteed that cooperatives could own private productive property. Moreover, it instructed government authorities not to interfere with the cooperatives and explicitly stated that local authorities had no power to "approve" (i.e., prohibit) registration of a cooperative. The law conspicuously placed no restrictions on the number of workers a cooperative might employ or the amount of its assets; and it granted cooperatives the right to pursue production in virtually every area of the economy, to issue shares to members in proportion to their contribution and grant members income in proportion to both their financial investment and the amount of their work, and to employ part-time workers on a contractual basis (a major departure from the strictures imposed by the Marxist abhorrence of "exploitation").

⁸In the CPSU Central Committee—On Experience in the Creation and Operation of Cooperatives in the Sphere of Public Catering and Consumer Services, the Production of Consumer Goods, and the Procurement and Processing of Secondary Raw Materials," *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, Nov. 25, 1987, trans. in *CDSP*, Dec. 30, 1987, pp. 9–10.

⁹*Ibid.*, emphasis added.

¹⁰Belopetravicius and Sukhachevskiy, loc. cit. In the RSFSR (the Russian Federation), a reported 80 percent of the new cooperatives have been formed this way; in Kazakhstan, 72 percent; and in Moldavia, 83 percent.

¹¹The text of the law was published in *Pravda*, June 8, 1988. For discussion of the law, see John Tedstrom, "The New Law on Cooperatives," *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty*, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 246/88, June 10, 1988; and Philip Hanson, "The Draft Law on Cooperatives: An Assessment," *ibid.*, RL 111/88, Mar. 15, 1988.

Table 1: Growth in Number of Soviet Cooperatives

Date	Number of operating cooperatives	Total employed in cooperatives
October 1, 1987	8,000	88,000
January 1, 1988	14,100	N.a.
January 1, 1989	77,500	1,392,000
April 1, 1989	99,300	1,951,000
July 1, 1989	133,000	2,900,000

SOURCES: *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Nov. 25, 1987; *Argumenty i Fakty* (Moscow), No. 18, 1989; *Izvestiya*, June 30, 1989; *Moscow News*, No. 28, 1989; *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 37, September 1989, p. 15.

The law also imposed restrictions on cooperatives. All cooperative members actually had to work in the business. Bonds could be sold only to cooperative members, to employees, to state enterprises, or to other cooperatives.

Growth of the New Cooperatives

Spurred by the new legislation and surmounting many difficulties, Soviet entrepreneurs have wrought a phenomenal growth in the number of cooperatives. From 8,000 in autumn 1987, the number of operating cooperatives soared to 133,000 in July 1989 (see Table 1); another 100,000 had been registered as of the latter date but were not yet operating.¹² The value of goods and services produced by the cooperatives has risen just as dramatically. Output, estimated at 350 million rubles for 1987, rose to more than 6 billion rubles in 1988, and in 1989 registered 4.3 billion rubles in the first quarter alone and a staggering 12.9 billion rubles by the end of June.¹³ The 1987 figure represented 0.1 percent of Soviet national product, while the mid-1989 estimate put cooperative production at 2–3 percent of all goods and services.¹⁴ What is striking here is that this increasing level of output is produced by only 1.5 percent of the 130 million people in the Soviet labor force.

Cooperatives engage in a wide range of activities, but most are in the service industry or produce consumer goods. Table 2, showing the types of businesses operating in the RSFSR at the end of June 1988, dem-

¹²*Moscow News*, No. 28, 1989.

¹³*Argumenty i Fakty* (Moscow), No. 18, 1989; *Sovetskaya Torgovlya* (Moscow), July 22, 1989; and *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 37, September 1989, p. 15. There is little doubt that a part of the increase in the ruble value of cooperative sales is due to higher prices, reflecting, among other things, higher taxes imposed on cooperative earnings (see below).

¹⁴*Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 18, 1989; and *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), May 4, 1989.

Table 2: Types of Cooperatives in the Russian Republic (RSFSR), Fall 1988

Type of cooperative	Number of cooperatives
Everyday repairs and other services	6,700
Production of consumer goods	3,400
Restaurant food service	2,400
Trade and purchasing	700
Scrap & waste purchasing and processing	700
Retail trade	200
Other	2,200

SOURCE: *FAKT Bulletin* (Moscow), circa October 1988, p. 2.

onstrates the concentration of cooperatives in small-scale activities. Some 30 percent provided services, another 20 percent produced consumer goods, and about 10 percent were in public catering.

Cooperatives are not spread evenly throughout the republics of the Soviet Union. Relatively speaking, the movement is much more active in the Baltic republics than in any other part of the country. As of October 1988, the number of people in cooperatives per 10,000 population was 94 in Estonia and 62 in Latvia. In striking contrast, in Tajikistan the figure was 16, in Azerbaijan it was 15, and in Turkmenistan it was a mere 10.¹⁵ Per capita output of cooperatives, which came to 21 rubles for the country as a whole, was 71 rubles in Latvia, 64 rubles in Estonia, 64 rubles in Armenia, 38 rubles in Georgia, but only 7 rubles in Tajikistan and 6 rubles in Turkmenistan.¹⁶

Difficulties Facing Cooperatives

Soviet cooperatives face a number of serious obstacles. To begin with, they do not receive sufficient financing from the state banking system. Cooperatives complain that loans are usually for small amounts and granted only for short terms, thereby making it difficult for cooperatives to buy needed equipment or to engage in remodeling.¹⁷ The State Bank (*Gosbank*) has been accused of being inconsistent in deciding who qualifies for loans,¹⁸ and one highly sarcastic article has accused the state of falsely pleading poverty.¹⁹ This credit crunch discourages entrepreneurs from entering more productive lines of enterprise, limits the scale of enterprises opened, and contributes to the phenomenon noted above of large numbers of registered cooperatives that have not begun operations.

Cooperatives have also found it extremely difficult to obtain reliable access to supplies. Restaurants and cafes complain about the absence of meat in the mar-

kets. This difficulty is aggravated by a dual pricing system, which often forces cooperatives to pay much higher prices than do state enterprises purchasing the same goods. The supply problem is not limited to consumer goods: for example, a KamAZ truck that usually sells for 17,000 rubles to state enterprises can cost a cooperative 70,000 rubles.²⁰ (Such costs tend to be passed along to the consumer, contributing to the high prices about which so many complain.) Moreover, many state enterprises refuse to sell or even lease their superfluous equipment to cooperatives.²¹

Acquiring physical premises on which to operate is also a problem. Many cooperatives (especially cafes and restaurants) are in fact operating on premises taken over from failed state operations,²² and although state enterprises are increasingly renting space and equipment to cooperatives, the number of cooperatives that can gain access to these premises is obviously limited.²³ Other cooperatives must rent space in unsuitable buildings and then bear the cost of converting and equipping them. An innovation that may ease the problem a little surfaced in late 1988 in Moscow, when 85 state stores were "auctioned" to those willing to bid on them.²⁴

The cooperative movement encountered official obstructionism almost from its inception. The press is full of horror stories documenting the many ways bureaucrats have prevented cooperatives from being formed and operating effectively. A cooperative can come into existence in two ways: either individuals propose to form a cooperative, or the local government (soviet) decides that it needs a certain kind of cooperative. In the latter case, the soviet's executive committee simply registers the cooperative, and it becomes a legal entity. But in the former case, individuals have to deal with

¹⁵"The Cooperative Boom: Roses and Thorns," *Politicheskoye Obrazovaniye* (Moscow), June 1989, pp. 103-06.

¹⁶*Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 18, 1989.

¹⁷See, for example, the article by a cooperative chairman, V. Yurchenko, "Notes of a Cooperative Member: Our First Difficulties," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 29, July 15, 1987, trans. in *CDSP*, Nov. 11, 1987, p. 5.

¹⁸*Moscow News*, No. 43, 1988.

¹⁹*Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, July 8, 1989.

²⁰*Moscow News*, No. 22, 1988.

²¹*Ibid.*, No. 47, 1987.

²²*Ibid.*

²³The cooperatives that are formally attached to a guarantor enterprise tend to be much better off than independent cooperatives because they can obtain cheap supplies and hence tend to have very high profits. See John Tedstrom, "The Status of Soviet Cooperatives," *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR* (Munich), Aug. 25, 1989, p. 12.

²⁴*Moscow News*, No. 45, 1988. The reporter noted that none of the staff members of these stores showed up at the auction, clearly having no interest in moving to the private sector. "The most important thing that the first auction has ensured," he said, "is that 85 shops will now be staffed by people who welcome customers instead of hating them like sworn enemies."

many layers of bureaucracy and fill out many forms before they even apply to the soviet for registration.²⁵ Recalcitrant officials may refuse to allow cooperatives to start either because they cannot find an analogue in the existing economy, or on the basis of sheer whim.²⁶

There have also been many instances of officials arbitrarily closing cooperatives. For example, in late 1988 in Yevpatoria in the Crimea, two cooperatives making large profits were closed down because the authorities said they were illegal. According to a press report, except for some minor technicalities, their operations were perfectly legal.²⁷ In Odessa, a cooperative installing natural gas service was closed by a purely arbitrary administrative decision, in spite of the fact that it could accomplish in a year what it took the state organization nine years to do! The director of the closed cooperative observed:

One gets the impression that not all skies are sunny on the cooperative horizon: Authorization today, prohibition tomorrow; an opening today, a shutdown tomorrow. . . . And there is particular eagerness to "take measures" against cooperatives in places

*where their enterprising spirit sheds a bright light on the sluggishness and the just plain poor performance of state enterprises.*²⁸

In a study of 800 readers of *Izvestiya* conducted by the Center for the Study of Public Opinion under the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociological Research, one-third of the those questioned who were members of cooperatives said that "distrust and excessive tutelage on the part of local authorities are the chief obstacles to the development of cooperatives." Thirty-seven percent of all those surveyed said that "the main reason for the reluctance of millions of people to legalize their individual or group enterprise is that they do

²⁵See Viktor Yasmann, "Obstacles in the Way of the Cooperative Movement," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 343/87, Aug. 28, 1987, p. 2.

²⁶See the account of difficulties encountered in creating cooperatives to employ former staffers of the abolished Ukraine republic Ministry of the Coal Industry, *Izvestiya*, Jan. 28, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, Feb. 24, 1988, pp. 6-7; also *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, May 4, 1989.

²⁷See "Other People's Money," *Izvestiya*, Dec. 12, 1987, trans. in *CDSP*, Jan. 20, 1988, p. 9.

²⁸"Life as It Is: Poor People," *Pravda*, Mar. 24, 1989, trans. in *CDSP*, Apr. 19, 1989, pp. 27-28.



An exercise room in the "Harmony" fitness center, a cooperatively-owned facility in the Kalinin District of Moscow.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

Table 3: Meat Prices in Collective Farm Markets and Public Catering Establishments

(in rubles and kopeks)

City	Price per 100 grams in collective farm markets		Approximate price per 100 grams entree meat dishes in:		
	Beef	Pork	Cooperative cafes	State cafes	State restaurants
Moscow	0.78	0.72	3.5-4.5	0.7-0.8	1.8-2.0
Riga	0.60	0.52	2.5-3.0	0.6-0.8	1.5-1.7
Tallinn	0.50	0.40	2.0-2.5	0.5-0.6	1.4-1.6
Tbilisi	0.70	0.70	2.0-3.0	0.6-0.7	1.6-1.8
Yerevan	0.59	0.59	2.0-3.0	0.6-0.7	1.5-1.7
Alma-Ata	0.42	0.38	2.0-2.5	0.5-0.6	1.3-1.5
Kishinev	0.60	0.70	2.5-3.0	0.6-0.7	1.4-1.6

SOURCE: *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Oct. 7, 1988.

not count on any support from the local authorities."²⁹

Relations between state enterprises and cooperative enterprises have been marked by a mixture of confusion, jealousy, and inherent limitations on respective actions. For example, in regard to financial operations, cooperatives have a considerable amount of freedom, but the state enterprises with which they are often connected are significantly constrained by their accountability to the state. As *Moscow News* put it, the "economically free cooperatives find themselves part of a fettered, state-run enterprise."³⁰ Even where state enterprises are well-intentioned and helpful, problems can occur, as in the case where the state obliged an enterprise under penalty of fines to hand over its scrap metal to the state rather than sell it to an efficient cooperative.³¹

Because of the problems involved in setting up a cooperative, these entities can often find themselves subject to the controls of agencies working at cross purposes. For example, cooperatives unable to find a physical location in their own district in Moscow, often set up their businesses in another district in the city, thereby ending up accountable to two different government offices in addition to a guarantor enterprise.³²

Cooperative competition with state enterprises has also generated considerable concern. In one recent case, a highly successful truck transport cooperative in Vitebsk was offered business by a major retail outlet in the city, which thereupon broke its contract with the less efficient state transport agency. The latter appealed to its superiors to intervene, and the store was

ordered to resume using state transport facilities.³³ The fear of competition on the part of state clinics and hospitals also had much to do with the restrictions imposed on private clinics in December 1988, following which hundreds have reportedly gone out of business.³⁴

Public Hostility Toward Cooperatives

Cooperatives have received a mixed reception from Soviet society. The rapidly increasing level of trade indicates that the goods and services that cooperatives provide are welcomed by many in an economy where state-produced goods are in short supply or are of poor quality. But cooperative activity has also engendered a great deal of hostility from two groups: the consuming public, which it is supposed to serve, and the bureaucracy, which it threatens.

A number of surveys have been conducted measuring popular attitudes toward the cooperatives. A poll of 5,500 citizens in Leningrad and Tallinn revealed striking differences in the attitudes of the two populations. In Leningrad, 53 percent of the people had "reservations about cooperatives and individual enterprises." By contrast, in Tallinn, only 31 percent had the same reservations. Overall, of those who had never used a cooperative, 77 percent were opposed to them, while 85 percent of those who had used a cooperative at least once were in favor of them. In the sample, 54 percent of the men as opposed to only 35 percent of the women supported the cooperatives. Since women do most of the shopping, this may reflect more direct experience and an associated antagonism toward the high prices

²⁹"Response: Other People's Money," *Izvestiya*, Dec. 22, 1987, trans. in *CDSP*, Jan 20, 1988, pp. 10, 24.

³⁰No. 28, 1989.

³¹*Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, June 23, 1989.

³²*Moscow News*, No. 19, 1988.

³³*Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, June 23, 1989. In a compromise, the store was later allowed to use both the state and coop transport facilities.

³⁴*The New York Times*, Mar. 5, 1989.

charged by cooperatives. There was also a correlation between people's age and their attitudes toward cooperatives. Three-fourths of students were for cooperatives, but only 25 percent of pensioners favored them.³⁵

What are the sources of hostility toward cooperatives? Foremost, it is widely believed that cooperatives are gouging the general public. Prices in cooperatives are, indeed, higher than those in subsidized state stores. For example, Table 3 gives the prices for meat in the collective farm markets in July 1988 and then the price of meat dishes in three different types of eating establishments. The data show that prices in cooperative cafes are anywhere from 3.5 to more than 5 times the price of meat dishes in state cafes, and from 1.3 to 2.1 times the prices in state restaurants. With worsening shortages, cooperative prices have risen even more. In spite of these high prices, many people feel that the quality of what they receive from cooperatives is no better, and sometimes even worse, than what they receive from state establishments.³⁶ (Although Soviet consumers complain vociferously about the explicit monetary costs imposed by high cooperative prices, they fail to recognize that the substantial time costs imposed by state shortages are significantly reduced by cooperatives.)

High prices often translate into unusually high incomes for cooperative members, which arouses great resentment among the population. The differential between the incomes of state workers and those of cooperative workers is substantial and widening. In 1988, the average monthly wage in the state sector was 217 rubles, and only 14 percent of workers and employees had an income over 300 rubles. But in the fourth quarter of 1988, the average monthly earnings of a cooperative worker was 406 rubles before distribution of profits.³⁷

This real disparity is intensified in the public mind by press accounts of cooperative members who earn 1,000 or even as much as 12,500 rubles a month.³⁸ Particular attention was focused on the cooperative Tekhnika, which allegedly made 250 million rubles in profits, in part by trading industrial raw materials with foreign countries for computer parts and then selling computers in the Soviet Union for 50,000 rubles or more. The two top people in the cooperative in December 1988 had paid themselves 690,000 and 510,000 rubles, respectively, and after the Central Committee passed a

resolution that month restricting certain cooperative activities (see below), Tekhnika distributed 8 million rubles to its members, with the two top people getting 3 million rubles each and the others in the cooperative receiving 350,000 rubles each.³⁹

The high profits of cooperatives are often painted as the result of very little or no effort on the part of manipulative middlemen. A May 28, 1989, article in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* described a "parasitic division of labor among cooperatives," giving as an example the case of one cooperative that bought extremely scarce soap for 15 kopeks, cosmetically added scent or color, and resold it a different cooperative in another area of the country for 65 kopeks, with the latter then selling the soap for one ruble (100 kopeks).⁴⁰ Another story described how a Leningrad cooperative obtained children's socks in short supply and marketed them with a flower design attached for twice the price of the unadorned socks. The factory from which the cooperative was buying directly went along with this arrangement because the increased prices figured in the factory's gross value of output. In the words of a reporter, this process is one in which "a state bun and state sausage becomes a somewhat different thing—a cooperative sandwich."⁴¹

This case was one of many in which cooperatives have been perceived as diverting scarce goods from the general population. Public catering establishments are accused of buying much of their food in state stores at prices that are subsidized for all customers.⁴² As a consequence, in several places restrictions have been placed on cooperatives, regarding which foods and in what amounts they can buy in state stores.⁴³ In Ukraine, the republic Council of Ministers shut down cooperatives breeding fur-bearing animals such as foxes and mink because the cooperatives were buying meat, fish, and dairy products from state stores to feed their animals.⁴⁴ Yet, most cooperatives have nowhere to go but state stores for needed supplies.

The psychological impact of such revelations can be explosive in a country where as much as 40 percent of the population lives below the poverty line.⁴⁵ USSR

³⁵See *Trud*, June 1 and 13, 1989; and "A Gold Mine where Aspiring Millionaires Seek Success," *Pravda*, Apr. 20, 1989, trans. in *CDSP*, May 17, 1989, p. 23.

⁴⁰On the country's soap shortage, see *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, May 18, 1989.

⁴¹*Sovetskaya Rossiya*, July 19, 1989. See also, "A Gold Mine . . .," loc. cit.

⁴²See, for example, "A Few Years Later: No Competition," *Izvestiya*, Sept. 20, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, Oct. 26, 1988, p. 13.

⁴³"Problems and Opinions: Should Coop Operators Be Allowed into the Store?" *Izvestiya*, Nov. 19, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, Dec. 14, 1988, p. 21.

⁴⁴"In the Republic Governments: Furs, Tickets, and Gas Supply," *Izvestiya*, May 3, 1989, trans. in *CDSP*, May 31, 1989, p. 27.

⁴⁵*Sovetskaya Torgovlya*, Special Edition, June 1989, p. 4.

³⁵*Moscow News*, No. 13, 1988. An earlier survey had also found strong support among younger people and hostility among pensioners, with those in middle-aged groups not having clearly formed opinions one way or the other. See *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, July 24, 1987.

³⁶*Moscow News*, No. 10, 1988.

³⁷*Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 18, 1989.

³⁸*Trud* (Moscow), July 13, 1989; and *Izvestiya*, Jan. 7 and Feb. 27, 1988.



In Sakhalin Oblast, Yelena Nazarova fashions coats and caps for women and children at the "Sivuch" cooperative, which makes useful consumer products out of rabbit skins rejected by a local animal-raising farm.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

Minister for Social Development Aleksandra Biryukova, a nonvoting member of the CPSU Politburo, made it clear in a news conference in January 1989 that she was in sympathy with those who resent the newly rich private entrepreneurs. This "unjustified income," she said, "is a social injustice."⁴⁶ One of the demands in the summer 1989 strike of Donbass coal miners was that the cooperatives be closed down.⁴⁷ In September 1989, at its founding congress, the United Front of Rus-

sian Workers expressed alarm at the introduction of private enterprise in Soviet society.⁴⁸

The most extreme expression of anti-cooperative sentiment has been the "pogroms" (as the Soviet press has characterized them) carried out against cooperatives in several parts of the country. One of the earliest was in the spring of 1986 in Brest oblast where people smashed the greenhouses of persons raising tomatoes as a private endeavor.⁴⁹ Pogroms against cooperatives have also been reported in Lviv and in Tallinn, where taxi drivers employed by the state "physically threatened" drivers in a thriving taxi cooperative.⁵⁰ Most dramatically, in May 1989, cooperatives in the Turkmen city of Nebit-Dag were set on fire, and operators were beaten up by crowds. One local unemployed 21-year-old said:

*I wasn't at the demonstration, but if I had known about it I would have gone. Why should the cooperators have everything, their pockets full of money, while I have nothing. Because of them, there is nothing to buy in the stores.*⁵¹

The unfavorable image of the cooperatives in the public mind is also due to the fact that some cooperatives are involved in criminal activity. Unquestionably, the cooperative movement includes persons who were previously involved in the underground economy, and even may include some persons with criminal records.⁵² A researcher at the USSR Ministry of the Interior claims that "according to random statistics, racketeers' incomes amount to 20–25 percent of co-operators' profits."⁵³

The precarious position of the cooperatives in the Soviet economy makes them extremely vulnerable to crime. Given the difficulties in dealing with authorities and obtaining reliable sources of supplies, it is very difficult for cooperatives to avoid bending or breaking the law if they are to stay in business. Often, to get anything done, they must offer bribes.⁵⁴ Bribery makes them vulnerable to blackmail by criminals, and given both the public hostility toward the cooperatives and these organizations' uncertain legal status, many cooperative operators would rather pay than go to the police for

⁴⁶*The New York Times*, Jan. 24, 1989.

⁴⁷*Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, July 28, 1989. On March 12, 1988, the same newspaper had carried a story of the cooperative Donbass in Donetsk whose members were making 5,000 rubles a month producing plastic junk jewelry.

⁴⁸*The Financial Times* (London), Sept. 14, 1989.

⁴⁹*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, No. 32, August 6, 1986, p. 10.

⁵⁰*Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, July 28, 1989; and Anton Gurevich, "Obstacles to Individual Labor," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 298/87, July 14, 1987, p. 3.

⁵¹*Sovetskaya Torgovlya*, Aug. 5, 1989.

⁵²*Sovetskaya Rossiya*, May 5, 1989.

⁵³*New Times* (Moscow), No. 26, 1989, p. 23.

⁵⁴*Moscow News*, No. 31, 1988.

help. Sometimes, criminals offer to work with the cooperatives in a kind of "sweetheart" arrangement to "ensure" access to supplies. In other cases, cooperators are physically intimidated by so-called "wild racketeers" (usually youths) sent by criminals, and are then offered protection against further harassment in return for a cut of the profits.⁵⁵

Lines of Defense

Cooperatives have taken various steps to lessen their vulnerability. They have made generous contributions to charitable activities in an attempt to offset bad feelings about the high prices and high profits of cooperatives. A single cooperative contributed 12,000 rubles of the 25,000 needed to begin the soup kitchen for poor pensioners that opened in the spring of 1988 in Leningrad.⁵⁶ The science and technology cooperative Sputnik in Moscow donated almost 300,000 rubles as New Year's gifts to children's homes and homes for senior citizens.⁵⁷ Gifts such as these have become routine for many cooperatives and, in fact, are recommended by consultants who help cooperatives set up their enterprises.⁵⁸

Cooperatives have recognized that their interests would be served by having umbrella organizations to fulfill a number of crucial functions. For example, the members of the cooperative association Rossiya, which numbered 3,500 as of mid-1989, united because, in the words of its chairman, together they have more resources "to survive." The association has formed a bank that lends money to association members, and a member cooperative provides legal assistance to all the other cooperatives in the association.⁵⁹ Similarly, the association of cooperatives operating in Naberezhnyye Chelny in the Tatar Autonomous Republic "helps the [member] cooperatives with patent and licensing work; provides consultation; solves problems involved in the supply, storage, and marketing of goods; provides financial assistance; and represents their interests before local government bodies."⁶⁰ There is even a private detective/security cooperative operating in Leningrad and Moscow (employing 20 full-time and 50 part-time operatives in Moscow alone) which, among other things, protects other cooperatives from those in the protection racket.⁶¹

Cooperatives throughout the Soviet Union have also combined to form a united organization. The USSR Union of Cooperatives held a founding congress in January 1989 and a follow-up congress in June. At the June gathering, Chairman Vladimir Tikhonov stated that the new organization was not a trade union, but had

been created to defend the social rights of cooperative workers and to protect the property of cooperatives from the bureaucracy, racketeers, and criminals.⁶²

Recent New Restrictions

Despite such defensive actions, the cooperative movement sustained two formidable blows in the past year. The first was the December 29, 1988, resolution "On Regulating Certain Types of Activity of Cooperatives in the USSR," which significantly undercut the liberal provisions of the May 1988 Law on Cooperation. The December resolution had two main articles, the first of which established that cooperatives do not have the right to engage at all in certain activities. It makes sense, of course, to prohibit some of these activities, such as making weapons, munitions, and narcotics. But the same article banned a large number of medical activities that had become important in the cooperative sector, such as obstetric services or treatment of patients with infectious diseases or drug addiction, and it also prohibited the manufacture of wine and vodka and the right to publish. Hence, for the first time, the state defined what areas of the economy it wanted to monopolize. The second article defined a number of areas in which cooperatives could legally operate only if under contract with state organizations. These include the buying and processing of secondary materials, and the provision of certain kinds of medical services not otherwise banned.⁶³

In attempting to justify this shift in policy, I. Prostya-kov, vice-chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers' Bureau for Social Development, said that the coopera-

⁵⁵See *New Times*, No. 26, 1989, pp. 22-25, where these problems are catalogued. In the same article, a department head of the Moscow criminal investigation service wrote that: "Recently, we arrested three racketeers who had pressed the chief of the Sokol cooperative to fork over [sic] 50,000 rubles. The bandits took their victim 'for a ride' out of town, tortured and abused him in every way. It was by some miracle that the man, more dead than alive, managed to make his getaway. Notably, two out of the three attackers were cooperative operators, too. Shots were fired on more than one occasion in Moscow of late. A recent gunfight near the Alst cooperative cafe, for instance, looked like part of a mob war."

⁵⁶*Sovetskaya Rossiya*, July 7, 1989.

⁵⁷*Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, May 21, 1989.

⁵⁸In May 1989, one of the authors saw a fast-food coop trailer on Gorky Street which advertised in large letters that 50 percent of its profits were being donated to the Veterans' Fund.

⁵⁹*Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, June 23, 1989.

⁶⁰"Cooperative Members Join Forces," *Pravda*, July 7, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, Aug. 3, 1988, p. 21.

⁶¹See *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Aug. 31, 1989.

⁶²*Sovetskaya Torgovlya*, May 16 and July 22, 1989.

⁶³The new law with its two appendices specifying prohibited activities and activities permitted on the basis of contracts with enterprises, organizations, and institutions was published in *Izvestiya*, Dec. 31, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, Feb. 1, 1989, p. 10.

tives were increasing at such a rapid rate that their activities "were bound to be at variance with the interests of society." He observed that because the Law on Cooperation states that those activities not prohibited are permitted, what is permissible had to be spelled out.⁶⁴

A second, and perhaps even more damaging, policy shift was the decision to increase the rate of taxation of cooperative income. Early attempts to set high tax rates for cooperatives had been staved off. In March 1988, it had been proposed to apply progressive tax rates, with a top marginal rate of 90 percent of monthly income.⁶⁵ But, on July 13 of the same year, after a heated debate, the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers rejected the draft for a system of taxation of the cooperative network and sent the matter back for redrafting to be done in consultation with specialists, scholars, and cooperative members.⁶⁶ Then on July 29, the Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers approved a very generous tax measure: during the first year of operation, a cooperative was to pay 2–3 percent of its income; during the second year, 3–5 percent; and in subsequent years, 10 percent, with the actual amounts to be determined by the local soviet executive committee responsible for initially registering a particular cooperative.⁶⁷

The conflict over the proper level of tax rates pitted reform-minded economists, who want lenient rates to stimulate cooperative development, against those who think it is antisocial for cooperatives to keep the enormous monies they are earning.⁶⁸ However, given the widespread popular perception that cooperative incomes are excessively high, it was perhaps inevitable that higher tax rates would be imposed. On February 23, 1989, the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a decree stipulating that cooperatives were to be taxed on their *income* (not profits) after deductions for costs of materials, transportation, depreciation, leasing charges for fixed capital, and interest payment on loans from Gosbank. Significantly, wages were not to be deducted prior to calculating taxable cooperative income. The actual tax rates were to be set by each republic, which could differentiate taxes by type of cooperative, using such criteria as how important the cooperative's product was in meeting consumer demand, whether the cooperative employed a large number of handicapped individuals, and whether it was using local and secondary raw materials.⁶⁹

In implementing these regulations, republics have expanded exemptions in various directions. For example, in Azerbaijan, those cooperatives engaged in ecological work and certain jobs in regions of high unemployment enjoy tax exemptions. Lithuania is one of several republics granting deductions for goods desig-

nated for export and therefore for the earning of hard currency.⁷⁰ Tajikistan's regulations provide for a reduction in taxes when cooperatives sell at least half their output to the state.

The most glaring fact about the new tax rates is that they are considerably higher than many Soviet economists believe prudent if cooperatives are to prosper. The conventional wisdom among economists is that tax rates over 25 percent bring "financial disadvantages," yet the chairman of the Kosmos cooperative in Moscow says that the income of intermediaries will be taxed at up to 85 percent. The state, he said, will become the "executioner" of the coops.⁷¹ A commentary in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* was sufficiently disturbed over the implications of the tax policy to raise the apocalyptic question: "Is this the end of cooperatives?" The article noted that since the taxes apply to cooperative *income* rather than to *profits*, it constitutes a system of double taxation, since individual income of cooperative workers is already taxed progressively, at rates ranging from 13 to 50 percent.⁷²

A sampling of tax rates on cooperatives from the various republics indicates significant variation in priorities and in the areas of the economy in which republic authorities prefer cooperatives to operate.⁷³ In general, the lowest taxes are levied on agricultural cooperatives: e.g., in Azerbaijan, it is 3 percent on livestock products and 10 percent on crop production; in Belorussia, it is 5 percent on agricultural output. For nonagricultural cooperatives, the lowest tax rates are in the Baltic republics. In Estonia, taxes are only 10–20 percent, except for production for export, and then the tax

⁶⁴See interview with Prostakov published in *Izvestiya*, Jan. 2, 1989, trans. in *CDSP*, Feb. 1, 1989, pp. 10–11.

⁶⁵See the interview with Yu. Zemskov, head of the General State Revenues and Taxes Department of the USSR Ministry of Finance, *Izvestiya*, Mar. 20, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, Apr. 20, 1988, p. 29.

⁶⁶"Look Before You Leap," *Izvestiya*, July 15, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, Aug. 10, 1988, pp. 23–24. Council of Ministers Chairman Nikolay Ryzhkov observed during this session that questions of taxation accounted for a "substantial portion" of the more than 200,000 reactions received regarding the draft law on cooperatives.

⁶⁷See "In the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers," *Izvestiya*, July 30, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, Aug. 24, 1988, p. 26.

⁶⁸For example, Nikolay Shmelev, one of the leading reform economists in the country, has argued against establishing a constrictive, income-based system of taxation that fails to exempt production expenses. See *Moscow News*, No. 21, 1989.

⁶⁹For the decree, see *Izvestiya*, Feb. 23, 1989, trans. in *CDSP*, Mar. 22, 1989, p. 11.

⁷⁰In spite of the hard-currency shortage in the country, there is some concern that goods sent abroad by cooperatives simply means fewer goods at home, where consumer goods shortages have become severe.

⁷¹*Moscow News*, No. 28, 1989.

⁷²See *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, No. 25, June 21, 1989, p. 2.

⁷³The data in this paragraph are drawn from *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, July 28, 1989.



Yevgeniy Zolotov, left, and Aleksandr Novichkov are among the taxi drivers in the city of Ulyanovsk who have availed themselves of the opportunity of going into private business, renting taxis from the city.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

rate is only 5 percent. In Latvia, taxes are 10–15 percent. Moreover, Latvia, Lithuania, and Belorussia are the only republics that allow cooperatives to deduct investment funds from income to determine net taxable income. In the RSFSR, taxes on cooperative income are as follows: agricultural production, 10 percent; production of goods, 30–50 percent; scientific-technical cooperatives, 35–40 percent; public catering, 40–50 percent; and trade and purchasing, 60 percent. In Kirgizia, taxes on cooperatives range from 10 percent on the production of construction materials to 80 percent for trade and purchasing cooperatives. In addition, there is the possibility in that republic that the tax will be raised arbitrarily by 50 percent of the basic rate if “prices don’t reflect socially necessary expenditures.” The highest tax rates by and large are imposed on public catering, entertainment, and middleman coopera-

tives. This is especially true in Kazakhstan, Moldavia, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, and the RSFSR.

Why have tax rates been set so high? Clearly, “speculation” (*spekulatsiya*) remains a bogey man in Soviet thinking. In an interview with *Izvestiya*, V. G. Panskov, first deputy minister of the USSR Ministry of Finance, essentially argued that the high rates were established in order to “create [more equitable] conditions for economic competition between cooperatives and state enterprises.” His argument was that while 52–53 percent of all state industrial profits usually go into the central state budget, the state had collected only some 40 million rubles in taxes—about 1 percent of total cooperative income—since the Law on Cooperation had been approved.⁷⁴ This argument ignores the fact that if, like the cooperatives, state enterprises paid taxes based on their *income*, rather than their *profits*, their effective tax rate would be only 20 percent, not 50 percent.⁷⁵ Thus, the new tax law has actually placed cooperatives at a disadvantage relative to state enterprises. In words

⁷⁴*Izvestiya*, Feb. 25, 1989, trans. in *CDSP*, Mar. 22, 1989, pp. 11–13.

⁷⁵*Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, May 25, 1989.

reminiscent of another era in Soviet economic history, a *Moscow News* reporter said: "There can only be two explanations for this tax—either a complete lack of economic know-how or the conscious desire to liquidate those involved in cooperatives 'as a class'."⁷⁶

More recently, in mid-October 1989, the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a number of revisions to the Law on Cooperation. There were two main changes. The first gives much more authority to the bureaucracy to regulate prices of goods and services sold by cooperatives to both consumers and state enterprises. The second imposes very tight restrictions on middleman activities. State retail trade outlets are now forbidden to sell cooperatives goods that are intended for resale without changing the product. Cooperatives have been given until January 1, 1990, to stop such activity. Moreover, local authorities have been given much more power to decide what constitutes proper cooperative activities. The one bright spot is that the same resolution reconfirms the commitment to giving cooperatives equal rights with state enterprises, and requires state organs to strictly observe the legal rights of cooperatives.⁷⁷

Local control of cooperatives may simply lead to an increase in interregional income disparities, because those areas already supporting cooperatives, like the Baltic republics, will continue to do so, and those opposing the cooperatives will take steps to throttle their activity. Hence, we disagree with Nikolay Shmelev, who argues that local control signals the beginning of the end of the cooperative movement.⁷⁸

Conclusion

This is a time of great uncertainty about the future course of the cooperative movement. The growth in the number of operating units can only be termed astonishing, given all of the problems that they face. This growth suggests an implicit faith that cooperatives will endure for a long time, although it is probably also true that many enter private business because there is a great deal of money to be made in the short term regardless of the long-term fortunes of cooperatives. We can already see the early stage of development of a new social stratum of entrepreneurs, joining the traditional strata of workers, peasants, and intelligentsia. Moreover, under growing outside pressures, cooperatives are forming what may be described as proto-professional organizations that look as if they will develop

mechanisms for self-regulation and the enforcement of business values and standards of conduct.

Unfortunately, would-be entrepreneurs only have incentives to enter areas of the economy that demand the least capital. Access to working capital is difficult, aspiring entrepreneurs are uncertain about the kinds of businesses that will be allowed to function in the future, and the current tax laws do not permit a deduction for expenditures made on capital equipment. Rather than expanding the horizons of potential Soviet entrepreneurs, current state policy thus serves to constrict the range of what it is profitable to do in the USSR.

High tax rates raise the cost of doing business for Soviet cooperatives and add an additional incentive to boost prices. In a situation of significant goods shortages, Soviet consumers will probably continue to pay these prices, but the hostility between producer and consumer will continue to flourish. To the extent that this continues, cooperatives will remain convenient scapegoats for more general economic problems. As *Moscow News* has said: "Thanks to concerted efforts, the enemy image of *perestroyka* is being shifted from the bureaucrat-apparatchik to cooperative members and scientist-economists."⁷⁹

Cooperatives face the problems that are daily confronted by state enterprises, such as uncertainty of supply and bureaucratic interference, without being armed with the mechanisms available to state enterprises to make these difficulties less damaging to their performance. Moreover, as long as most of the state sector's output is tied to state contracts, very limited goods and materials will be available for purchase by cooperatives. Such shortages will likely be a major constraint on the growth of the cooperative movement.

From the very beginning, the leadership went to great pains to assure people that private enterprise was not being introduced in the Soviet Union—for example, references have all along been to "individual labor activity" or to "cooperative labor activity." However, the distinction between private enterprise and individual/cooperative activity has substantially eroded. The distinction hinges on whether others are employed for one's own profit, an idea that has been anathema in the Soviet Union, certainly since the end of the 1920's. The recent evolution of cooperatives has involved greater and greater reliance on labor that is not part of the cooperative ownership, and although "hired labor" in a cooperative often earns considerably more than it can earn in the state sector, it is clearly producing more value than it is receiving, a case of exploitation to Marxists.

⁷⁶*Moscow News*, No. 28, 1989.

⁷⁷*Trud*, Oct. 21, 1989.

⁷⁸*Moscow News*, No. 41, 1989.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, No. 12, 1989.

What is the potential for the growth of the cooperative movement? Polls have indicated that nearly one-third of the labor force would like to earn a second income,⁸⁰ and a survey in December 1987 revealed that 20 percent of the respondents expressed an interest in participating in the new forms of individual labor.⁸¹

One can discern several stages (or waves) in the evolution of the cooperative movement. In the early period, many rushed into businesses as a way of getting rich quickly, and were unable to sustain a viable operation. Then, during a second wave, came those who got involved out of a vague and naïve wish to become "independent businessmen"—for a while, it seemed as if the dream of every Soviet citizen was to open a restaurant or cafe. It is only in the most recent period that we

have seen a third wave, the entry of people who are taking a much more "businesslike" approach and are planning their operations in a much more pragmatic way. Such entrepreneurs will provide the backbone for the new local associations and national union.⁸²

In the long run, the problems faced by the cooperative movement cannot be solved without two basic changes. The first is the emancipation of state enterprises from ministerial tutelage and a concomitant increase in the role of the market. As long as state enterprises remain tied to state contracts, the amount of production capacity available to the cooperative sector will remain limited. The second is a solution of the legal problems. Cooperatives are currently operating in a legal limbo—their rights and obligations, and the legal status of their property, are not yet settled issues.

Yet, one is led to a cautious optimism because of the enormous pool of latent energy and creativity tapped in the past three years. Although the forces of inertia and reaction still abide in the country, it may be that the momentum generated cannot be easily stopped.

⁸⁰Gurevich, loc. cit., p. 3.

⁸¹Ye. G. Antosenkov et al., "Public Opinion on Cooperation," *Sotsiologicheskoye Issledovaniye* (Moscow), November-December 1988, p. 8.

⁸²There are a number of versions of this notion that the new cooperatives have evolved through a series of waves or stages. See, for example, *Moscow News*, No. 22, 1988; and S. Shakhmayev, "Three Waves . . . Reflections on Cooperation," *Politicheskoye Obrazovaniye*, No. 5, 1989, pp. 63–69.

Glasnost' and Soviet Culture

Josephine Woll

In the past two years, the nature of cultural politics in the Soviet Union has changed dramatically. The uncomfortable intimacy of politics and culture, bedfellows for so many decades, continues, but the relationship is not what it once was. New institutions are functioning, and unexpected material is available in print and on the air waves. Certain trends emerging two years ago have become more pronounced, while others have diminished.¹ This essay attempts to discern and analyze some of the processes and patterns of cultural politics in the last two years—a tumultuous and exciting kaleidoscope of complicated and often contradictory trends, reflecting an altered cultural universe.

Mikhail Gorbachev, for political reasons adumbrated by many observers both within the Soviet Union and abroad, chose Soviet cultural life as the first arena in which to implement his policy of *glasnost'*. It quickly became apparent that, whatever its limitations, the policy of *glasnost'* meant a substantial expansion of artistic opportunities available to creative artists and their audiences. Books are being published, movies are being screened in theaters and aired on television, and paintings are being exhibited that even five years ago would never have reached their intended audiences.

The excitement generated by these possibilities is enormous. But it is accompanied by uncertainty, by a fear prompted by the reality of Soviet history. Personnel can always be replaced. What, if anything, guarantees the permanence of the new policy? What institutional safeguards ensure the continuity of *glasnost'* if Gorbachev loses power—or if he should have a change of

heart? Freedom by the fiat of an individual is tenuous at best; to be secure, it requires safeguards that would render the philosophy and intentions of any particular individual or group irrelevant.

People—both in the Soviet Union and watching from abroad—have been looking for signs that *glasnost'* is being institutionalized. One such sign is a draft law on the press. Approved by working groups of the parliamentary commission on *glasnost'*, legislation, and culture in the fall of 1989, it bans preliminary censorship and stipulates the right of public organizations to establish their own newspapers. According to the director of TASS, the law should go through the Supreme Soviet by the end of 1989. The creative unions, the organizations that oversee the arts, have become even more important now than they were in the past, because the traditional cultural authorities in the Soviet Union (such as the censorship offices, the Ministry of Culture, and the Culture Department of the CPSU Central Committee) have by and large withdrawn to the sidelines; direct and preemptive intervention in the cultural sphere is now reserved for matters having major political repercussions. Given the nature of the cultural establishment in the Soviet Union, the various creative unions exercise substantial influence and indeed control over artistic life in the country. Censorship does not depend on the unions in any direct way, but for the time being, only the unions possess the durable institutional structures that can force thoroughgoing changes in the ways and means by which artistic products are distributed to the audience they are meant to reach. Two of the unions—those of cinema workers and of theater workers—have changed radically; three others, those of artists, composers, and writers, have hardly altered

Josephine Woll is Associate Professor of Russian Language and Literature at Howard University (Washington, DC). She often writes about Soviet literature and culture and is completing a book on Soviet novelist Yuriy Trifonov.

¹See John Dunlop, "Soviet Cultural Politics," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1987, pp. 34–56.

in structure, although some personnel changes have taken place.² I shall concentrate on the two unions that have undergone restructuring and on the USSR Union of Writers, which has not.

The Creative Unions

What, then, has happened in the theater and cinema unions, from the start strong supporters of Gorbachev and *perestroika*? After forcing the retirement of their conservative old-guard leaderships at the earliest opportunity (in April–May 1986), both unions implemented a series of roughly parallel decisions to increase decentralization and to encourage democratization of decision-making. Most of the country's film studios and a number of theaters have become essentially self-financing.

Theater. Eighty-three theaters all over the country are participating in an experimental agreement with the state by which they have gained much greater artistic autonomy (for instance, in the choice of repertory) as well as financial responsibility. A variety of new organizational forms were introduced to support existing theaters and to encourage the creation of new theaters. To give one example, under the sponsorship of the Moscow City Executive Committee, several "theater-studios"—that is, less well-established or more experimental groups—signed two-year collective contracts entitling them to a public space and making them fully commercial. Formerly such theater groups had to mount their productions wherever they could, on makeshift and borrowed temporary stages; publicity spread by word-of-mouth, and well-informed friends comprised the audience. Now they have a place to work; if they lose money, they will have to close.

The director of one of the most prominent of these groups, Mark Rozovskiy, has explained that he receives no state subsidy and pays 5 percent of his profits into the state budget. He has full control over 80 percent of the profits his theater earns, as well as full control over the works he stages.³ The freedom he now enjoys compensates for a number of problems he did not have when his group was outside official control: maintaining, in his words, "ethical purity," because the absence of wage-leveling invites ambition and self-aggrandizement; tackling a mountain of daily bureaucratic paperwork, including restrictions on renovations within his theater; and having no right to set ticket prices, which obviously affects profits.⁴

A newly-created Agency of Amateur Theaters, sponsored by a variety of organizations (among them the

USSR Cultural Fund), underwrites amateur troupes. Independent local theaters are funded by party committees, the Komsomol, and other groups and are fueled by the enthusiasm of theater fans. The All-Russian Association of Artistic Workshops, created in the fall of 1987 by the RSFSR Theater Union, acts like a Western producer, funding directors to stage plays and organize troupes.

The "democratization" of theater has had mixed results. Theaters like Rozovskiy's have obviously benefited. By contrast, Georgiy Tovstonogov, artistic director of the Leningrad Bol'shoy Drama Theater, pointed to one of the pitfalls: the incompatibility of "democracy" and talent:

I'm for [democratization of the theater] in the sense of freeing the arts from the pressure brought to bear on them by bureaucracy. I'm all for the open appraisals of our work, for the joint discussion of the future of the contemporary Soviet theater, for the foundation of a creative union of theatrical workers. . . . [But] the majority principle doesn't work in the arts. The majority vote cannot decide the value and profundity of an artist's ideas. A director must be a dictator in his theater, but his rule must be willingly accepted by the actors. It should be a rule based on artistic authority, but never on the fear that he might sack everyone he doesn't like.⁵

Nor has there been an explosion of significant new work. Except for Mikhail Shatrov's plays, particularly "Further . . . Further . . . Further," few plays have stimulated much excitement. (Shatrov's play, in which he charges Stalin with ordering Sergey Kirov's murder and Trotsky's execution, was extremely controversial, elicit-

²The Composers' Union, *glasnost*' notwithstanding, has continued to be led by the redoubtable and seemingly immortal Tikhon Khrennikov (aged 76), whose career began ignominiously more than 40 years ago. On September 29, however, Radio Moscow announced that a plenum of the Board of the Union had dissolved the union and created a federation of independent composers' organizations. In February 1988, the Congress of Soviet Artists chose as the chairman of its union an artist, Andrey Vasnetsov, whose paintings had not been exhibited since the notorious 1962 Manezh exhibition that so offended Nikita Khrushchev. One of his goals as chairman is to "show everything there is to show," and though his own work is far from modernist in style, he speaks with tolerance of other schools of painting. See Nataliya Kraminova, "The Times of Andrei Vasnetsov," *Moscow News*, No. 6, 1989.

³Professional theaters in the USSR have always been heavily subsidized by the state, in part because of the traditional view of the theater as an educational and ideological institution. Whether that view will now be superseded by one that sees the theater as an enterprise—and hence as financially self-supporting—is moot. Given its importance for the future of Soviet theater, it is a subject hotly debated in the press.

⁴*Izvestiya* (Moscow), Aug. 12, 1988.

⁵"Democracy and Proficiency," *Moscow News*, No. 3, 1988. Interview with Oleg Kuprin

ing attacks in *Pravda* and elsewhere. In May 1988, the monthly journal *Znamya*, which had published Shatrov's play in its January issue, printed 30 [out of some 300] letters, most of them defending Shatrov.⁶

Soviet critics continually lament the state of Russian theater, and Yale Drama School's Richard Gilman, after a month's stay recently as part of a cultural exchange program sponsored by the American-Soviet Theater Initiative, concurs: "I went," he writes, "with high expectations stemming from the reputed new energy and openness that *glasnost'* has brought about in the theater, as elsewhere. . . . Those expectations were only partly fulfilled. There is energy and openness on the Soviet stage these days, but with few exceptions I found little imaginative vigor."⁷ Good politics, he was told by Soviets and saw for himself, but bad art.

Cinema. Like theaters, film studios now have virtual autonomy in all artistic matters—selection of scripts, casting, contractual hiring of directors and actors, freedom of expenditure, etc.—and are financially accountable. Those that fail to show a profit will, at least theoretically, have to shut down. The USSR Cinematographers' Union (which comprises all film workers, and not only cameramen) was the first to introduce these changes, beginning with its blackballing of the entire old-guard of the filmmaking industry at its May 1986 Congress. Elem Klimov, a director whose films released in the West include "Rasputin" and "Come and See," was chosen to lead the union in place of hard-liner Lev Kulidzhanov. In January 1988, Klimov resigned in order to work on a film and was replaced by Andrey Smirnov. (Klimov is slated to return as chair in January 1990.) Filip Yermash, the conservative head of Goskino (the official overseer of the film industry) was replaced in December 1986 by the more professional and open-minded Aleksandr Kamshalov.

To prevent the domination of purely commercial considerations—a sensitive issue vigorously debated at creative union conferences and in the press—the Cinematographers' Union has reserved 1 percent of all profits for films by beginners and for projects undertaken by established artists who wish to experiment with commercially risky films. Predictably, the ensuing competition for desirable contracts has been fierce. A commission of writers, directors, critics, and representatives of Goskino created in August 1986 by the union to handle disputes, and to investigate the fate of "repressed" movies, has succeeded in releasing some 80 of the

more than 100 films held back from distribution over a period of 20 years for all kinds of political reasons. They include several films by Aleksey German ("Road-check" and "My Friend Ivan Lapshin"); Gleb Panfilov's 1979 "Theme," once unacceptable because of its allusion to Jewish emigration and its portrayal of a successful literary hack; and Aleksandr Askoldov's 1968 "Commissar," in which a pregnant Red Army commissar during the Civil War lives out her confinement and bears her child in the home of a poor Jewish family, leaving the baby with them when she goes back to fight.⁸

Bureaucratic roadblocks continue to exist: a proposed filmmakers' newspaper was vetoed, as was a new film magazine. Student demands for a more creative approach to teaching and the replacement of certain individuals at the All-Union Institute of Cinematography were rejected by the Moscow Party Committee. And within the union, some members feel that those now in powerful positions, who tend to obtain the money and resources for making new movies, have become as hard to budge as their predecessors were.

Nevertheless, in several respects, the filmmaking industry looks much healthier than it did several years ago. The critical disdain for theater plays is not manifested by film-goers or film critics, in part because of the release of previously shelved films and in part because of an explosion of documentary films, often broadcast on all-Union television to enormous audiences. In such feature films as "Little Vera" and Nikolay Gubenko's "Restricted Zone," and in such documentaries as "Is It Easy to be Young?," "Are You Going to the Ball?," and "Solovetskiy Power," contemporary social and ecological problems and legacies from the Stalinist past are depicted with an honesty that was not possible even a few years ago. "Solovetskiy Power" (its Russian title, "*Solovetskaya vlast'*," is a pun on "Soviet power," [*Sovetskaya vlast'*]), is a documentary on the history of the Solovki labor camps. It includes interviews with seven former inmates of the Gulag, the most prominent among them being Academician Dmitriy Likhachev, as well as an interview with a former Chekist, who was a guard at Solovki between 1923 and 1925.¹⁰ Footage censored from earlier films has been restored, and in some instances reshot. And film distribution has

⁶For an illuminating discussion of Shatrov's work, see David Joravsky, "Glasnost Theater," *The New York Review of Books*, Nov. 10, 1988.

⁷*The New York Times*, June 4, 1989.

⁸See Anna Lawton, "Toward a New Openness," in Daniel J. Goulding, Ed., *Post New Wave Cinema in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1989, esp. pp. 36–46.

⁹See, for instance, Stanislav Govorukhin, "March of the Envious," *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* (Moscow), June 13, 1989.

¹⁰See Vera Tolz, "Soviet Film Describes Birth of Gulag System," *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR* (Munich), Apr. 21, 1989, pp. 9–13.

improved markedly: it now bears a reasonable correlation to viewer preferences as determined by, for instance, surveys and questionnaires. Somewhat surprisingly, there seems to be a hunger even for "avant-garde" films: when Riga's self-financing Video Center and the Union of Latvian Cinema Workers organized a six-day film forum in the autumn of 1988, almost 70,000 people paid high prices to see supposedly "non-commercial" films made both within the Soviet Union (early Dovzhenko and Kuleshov, recent work by Paradzhanov, Peleshyan, the brilliant animator Yuriy Norshteyn) and abroad (from classics like "The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari" and "Un chien andalou" to recent Czech, Hungarian, and "underground" American films).¹¹

Belles-lettres. The USSR Writers' Union, like the Composers' and Artists' Unions, presents a rather different picture. It remains largely unreconstructed, dominated by a coalition of *apparatchiks* and ideologues. The former comprise the majority of active members of the influential RSFSR branch of the Writers' Union. Many of them are relatively unknown provincial writers, and while their work rarely penetrates the pages of the large-circulation literary journals, it continues to appear in book form thanks to networks of patronage. These writers were badly frightened by the announcement, in late 1988, that publishing houses might introduce commercial criteria into their 1989 decisions—which might well signal the end of their careers. So, as one observer dryly explained, they took the high moral ground, rejecting such reforms as antithetical to "the sacred principle of 'social justice' and . . . to the true interests of culture."¹²

An enormous amount of power, and a formidable range of perquisites and privileges, are at stake.¹³ Natal'ya Il'ina, a writer (primarily of satire) well-placed in and extremely knowledgeable about the literary bureaucracy, caused a furor in early 1988 with an article she published in the weekly *Ogonek*. She ascribed the death-grip these *apparatchiks* have on the unions, and on the Soviet literary establishment in general, to human nature rather than to politics. Greed, she claimed, is responsible for much of their resistance to any changes that might threaten their positions.¹⁴ Indeed, the tangible rewards of power within the cultural estab-

lishment, which rarely correspond to talent or even genuine popularity, extend far beyond such relative—if desirable—trivia as rooms in exclusive sanatoria or vacation spots. Major financial benefits are involved. In book publishing, Il'ina explains, royalties are based not on the number of copies of a work sold, but on the number of copies of a work printed. Moreover, in the past at least, publishing houses were not responsible for their financial losses. Thus, the system steadily encouraged inflated lists having little to do with merit or the interest of the readers, in turn producing a large number of remaindered books while preventing those of real interest to readers from being printed.¹⁵ All this was going on against the backdrop of a serious paper shortage.

Il'ina illustrates her argument with specific examples. In one case of egregious corruption, the director of the publishing house Sovetskiy pisatel' compiled a volume of prose. It was his first book: before being appointed to that post, he had published only a few short articles. The volume came out under the imprint of 11 different publishing houses, with a print-run in Moscow alone of more than 1 million. By way of quid pro quo, his house published the work of fellow-directors of other publishing houses. (To no one's surprise, both Il'ina and her editor, Vitaliy Korotich, were vehemently attacked by the two main publications of the Writers' Union, in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* [Moscow], No. 3, 1988, and in *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, No. 3, 1988.)

I do not mean to suggest that ideological differences play no role in the Writers' Union disputes. But the bureaucratic resistance to *glasnost'*, and especially to translating *glasnost'* into structural and institutional change, is rooted as much in venality and vanity as in disagreement over matters of principle, and the power of such resistance should not be underestimated.

"Liberals" Versus "Conservatives"

What does it mean, in today's Soviet Union, to consider oneself or one's opponent "liberal" or "conservative"? What ideas and values does each rubric signify on the Soviet cultural scene? Do the terms correspond in any meaningful sense to the way they are used in the

¹¹As reported by Andrei Vasiliev in *Moscow News*, No. 44, 1988.

¹²Julia Wishnevsky, "Nash Sovremennik Provides Focus for 'Opposition Party'," *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR*, Jan. 20, 1989, p. 5.

¹³See Carol and John Garrard, *Inside the Soviet Writers' Union*, New York, Free Press, 1989.

¹⁴Natalya Il'ina, "Welcome, Young and Unknown Tribe . . .," *Ogonek* (Moscow), No. 2, 1988, pp. 23–26.

¹⁵Between 1976 and 1980, a reported 500 million out of 700 million new books received by Soviet libraries were removed from shelves for lack of a single borrower. See *Literaturnaya Rossiya* (Moscow—the weekly newspaper of the RSFSR Writers' Union), No. 19, 1986, p. 16. A comparable situation exists in the visual arts, according to one art historian. He claims that some 115,000 pieces of art, costing the state over 60 million rubles, are immured in closed depositories and have never been seen by the public. They are, he implied, artistically worthless, and were bought by the Artists' Union for reasons that had little if anything to do with aesthetic merit.

West? These questions are critical to understanding Soviet cultural politics, and they require careful answers. While I will inevitably simplify the issues, and thereby do some injustice to the "sides" in this cultural civil war, I will attempt to characterize them here.

The terms themselves must be used with extreme caution. The British political vocabulary from which they are derived is hardly relevant, either in theory or in practice, to Soviet reality. In the Soviet Russian cultural (and political) world, "conservative" does suggest the disposition to maintain existing institutions. It almost always encompasses a regard—and sometimes nostalgia—for traditional culture, architecture, life-styles, religious values and artifacts, and a profound concern with ecological devastation and cultural damage. In its extreme manifestations, at the far end of the "conservative" spectrum, Russian nationalism fulminates as chauvinism, with decidedly xenophobic tendencies. Its broad appeal, however, derives from its ability to articulate a genuine sense of Russian national grievance, and from its attempts to restore and rebuild destroyed churches, implement legislation to protect the autonomy of the Russian Orthodox Church, and reverse the increase in pollution that has rendered well water undrinkable and rivers and lakes lethal. But "nationalism" is not a synonym for "conservatism," nor is "conservatism" a prerequisite for concern about issues like ecological destruction. Dunlop correctly identified a subgroup, which he called "liberal nationalists," who share Gorbachev's agenda generally but whose priorities differ from those of the "liberals" because of their emphasis on environmental issues and the recovery of the prerevolutionary past.¹⁶ The medievalist Dmitriy Likhachev, an early and consistent supporter of Gorbachev's program who now heads the Cultural Fund, is the most prominent and most popular member of that group.

Similarly, not all economic "conservatives" who disagree with the tenets of *perestroyka* belong together with "nationalists" and "traditionalists." People genuinely disagree on the kind of economic reforms best suited to the Soviet Union, and how they should be implemented, although most people, whatever they think, feel obliged to offer at least token support to Gorbachev's reform package.¹⁷ But the theoretical resistance to the reforms—as distinguished from the obfuscation and obstructionism thrown up by tenacious bureaucrats and *apparatchiks* fearful for their positions and power—tends to come from those economists and social commentators who align themselves, explicitly or by association, with the political conservatives.

"Liberals" form an equally complicated and more fractious bloc. The liberals can fairly be said to favor

democratic reforms, although they are not necessarily in favor of abolishing privilege, at least if privilege is construed as earned reward for initiative in one's workplace, as an incentive toward privatization. In all the artistic organizations of Soviet society, the "liberals" have been in the vanguard of the support for *glasnost'*, Gorbachev, and *perestroyka*. They have tended to seek a loosening of the existing strictures on freedom of expression.

"Liberals" and "conservatives" may productively be distinguished from each other on the basis of their respective approaches to issues that have dominated public discussion and the press in the last two or three years. Thus, for example, the legacy of Stalinism is a matter of interest and concern to both groups.¹⁸ Liberals have generally wished to examine the entire Stalin period, while conservatives often try to exempt Stalin's war-time role, because of a reluctance to destroy people's memory, real or fictitious, of what was virtually the only unifying (rather than divisive) event in Soviet history. Liberals make no bones about blaming Stalin for the number of war casualties, especially in the first months after the Nazi invasion; conservatives prefer to emphasize his symbolic importance to the nation as *vozhd'*, ruler, and standard-bearer. As part of their efforts to find alternatives to Stalin within Soviet history, liberals have eagerly reclaimed Old Bolsheviks purged by Stalin (most notably Nikolay Bukharin). By contrast, conservatives have been at pains to show the responsibility such Old Bolsheviks bear for Stalin's rise to power, and how their own efforts created the system that ultimately devoured them. (Few liberal historians deny this complicity, despite what conservative critics like Anatoliy Salutskiy and Vadim Kozhinov imply.)

Inclusiveness as opposed to selectivity distinguishes the two groups on other issues as well. Liberals tend to support the fullest possible disclosures about the past, and the widest rehabilitation of both artistic

¹⁶Dunlop, "Soviet Cultural Politics," loc. cit., p. 36.

¹⁷Not all, however. Anatoliy Salutskiy, who dubs himself and those of his political cast "radicals," explicitly rejects the reforms. In many articles, he mounts a head-long attack on the "architects of *perestroyka*," especially Abel Aganbegyan and Tat'yana Zaslavskaya. His colleague Mikhail Antonov is equally outspoken, arguing for a "patriotic" rather than "efficient" economy. For an excellent analysis of this dispute, see Vishnevsky, "Nash Sovremennik . . ." loc. cit.; and idem, "Architects of Perestroika Defended," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR*, Mar. 17, 1989, pp. 4-6.

¹⁸Indeed, the first characteristic of the "liberals" that Dunlop identifies is their unfinished agenda, left over from the Khrushchev thaw, "to continue the interrupted process of de-Stalinization—the uncovering and publicizing of Stalin's crimes—and the publication of works suppressed under Stalin or in subsequent periods of 're-Stalinization.'" In confronting and attacking the specter of Stalin, the 'liberals' sought to ensure once and for all that a return to a Stalinist system would become impossible." See Dunlop, "Soviet Cultural Politics," loc. cit., p. 36.

and historical figures; conservatives tend to urge a more "balanced," that is, less negative analysis of Soviet history. They want more attention paid to the Russian victims of the Stalinist purges and to the Russian peasants who perished during collectivization, and less attention given to the ethnic minorities (Crimean Tatars, Meskhetians, etc.) deported during the war, the political victims of the Great Terror, and the victims of the postwar anti-cosmopolitan campaign.¹⁹

One example of this disagreement occurred in connection with a letter signed by many well-known writers endorsing the construction of a monument to the victims of the Great Terror. The prominent conservative Vladimir Soloukhin refused to sign. He explained that he refused because the letter mentioned none of the earlier victims of Stalin.²⁰ A liberal opponent, Benedikt Sarnov, commented: "I, like Soloukhin, also consider that the lawlessness began not in 1937, and that it is no less important to memorialize all the innocents who perished long before the bloody debauch of Stalinism. But I must honestly say that I don't consider this a sufficient basis for not signing a letter asking to memorialize those who died in the 1930's. Particularly since those who perished in the '30's were by no means exclusively residents of the 'House on the Embankment' [an apartment complex mostly occupied by high-level party and government families, including many Old Bolsheviks]."²¹

The same inclusiveness characterizes the liberals' approach to Russian émigré culture.²² They are willing to reclaim all of it—from post-revolutionary émigré writers like Georgiy Ivanov to recent exiles like Andrei Sinyavsky and Joseph Brodsky, from Marc Chagall to the contemporary painter Mikhail Shemyakin. The conservatives are more selective in their attitude toward émigré culture: Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn interests them far more than Sinyavsky, and Shemyakin interests them not at all.²³

Sinyavsky is a particular *bête-noir* because of his *Progulki s Pushkinym* (Strolls with Pushkin), a brilliant but iconoclastic appreciation of Pushkin. It was published abroad in 1975, and a small excerpt appeared in *Oktyabr'* in April 1989. *Oktyabr'*'s editor, Anatoliy Anan'yev, was raked over the coals by the Secretariat of the Writers' Union and by *Literaturnaya Rossiya*. Nearly apoplectic with rage over Sinyavsky's "desecration" of Russia's beloved Pushkin, the editors of *Literaturnaya Rossiya* reprinted an indignant review by Roman Gul', editor of the émigré magazine *Novyy Zhurnal*, and appended a comment:

The dubious work of Sinyavsky's was judged by the literary community long ago, and the work of our for-

*mer compatriot long ago sank into oblivion, like all the other spiteful pasquinades that followed the great Russian poet during his lifetime and after. That is why we were so surprised by the appearance of anti-Pushkin attacks on the pages of a Russian literary journal. . . . Though like the majority of White émigrés, [Gul's] political views are ambiguous, in his view of Pushkin as the genius of Russia he is decidedly nobler and on a higher level than Sinyavsky and his defenders.*²⁴

Indeed, because conservatives tend to idealize the Russian past at the expense of modernism and Western influences, they disapprove of virtually all manifestations of Western art and pop culture in Soviet life—abstract painting, the beauty contests introduced in Moscow last summer, the rock concerts now tolerated by the authorities, Soviet-style punk clothing. In his speech at the Congress of People's Deputies, the novelist Valentin Rasputin used some of the time allotted for his address to express his disdain for such manifestations of Western pop culture, and while his distaste for "beauty queens" competing with a minute of silence for the victims of the April 9, 1989, events in Georgia is understandable, his call for a law "to consolidate and protect morality," and to "ban the propaganda of evil, violence, and vice" is frighteningly normative.

The conservatives now dominate the Writers' Union. They did not always do so: at the eighth congress of the union, in July 1986, supporters of reform took the reins, and many of the liberal editors of journals were appointed in the aftermath of the congress. In the last two years, however, the more conservative writers have

¹⁹One peculiar contribution to the recent literature on collectivization (generally accepted by the conservatives as a national tragedy and trauma) came from the deputy chief editor of *Molodaya Gvardiya*, Vyacheslav Gorbachev. He wrote that collectivization had been "different in different parts of the country," and suggested that the dispossession and exile of kulaks was justified. See *Molodaya Gvardiya* (Moscow), No. 7, 1987, pp. 227–28. For *Molodaya Gvardiya*'s role in these polemics, see Julia Wishnevsky, "Molodaya Gvardiya: A Leading Voice of Opposition to Restructuring," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 1/88, Jan. 5, 1988.

²⁰"Why I Did Not Sign That Letter," *Nash Sovremennik*, No. 12, 1988.

²¹"On 'The Silent Ones' and 'The First Pupils,'" *Ogonek*, No. 16, 1989, p. 30.

²²See Nancy Condee and Vladimir Padunov, "The Outposts of Official Art: Recharting Soviet Cultural History," *Framework* (London), No. 34, 1987, pp. 61–71, for an analysis of what they call the "recuperation of the émigré heritage."

²³In 1987, for instance, *Molodaya Gvardiya* sharply condemned exhibits of work by Wassily Kandinsky and Marc Chagall. See Nos. 7 and 9.

²⁴See Anatoliy Anan'yev, "Criticism or Accusation?" *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, No. 35, Sept. 1, 1989; a response to the "Letter of the Secretariat of the Writers' Union of the RSFSR" (from Mikhail Antonov, V. Klykov, and Igor' Shafarevich), which had appeared in *Literaturnaya Rossiya* on Aug. 4, 1989; and the editors' reply to Anan'yev.

steadily managed to concentrate more power in their hands. Despite occasional intervention by Gorbachev himself, this wing of the Writers' Union, seemingly undaunted, continues to issue imprecations and threats against its liberal colleagues. At the March 1987 meeting of the Secretariat of the Board of the RSFSR Writers' Union, the floor was dominated by angry conservatives, as was the plenum the following month.²⁵ A year later, at the March 1988 plenum, the same pattern was repeated, with some of the speakers (Stanislav Kunyayev, Vladimir Krupin) defending *Pamyat'* against the (liberal) likes of poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, novelist Fazil Iskander, journalist Yelena Lesota, and economist Gavriil Popov. Yuriy Bondarev blamed the liberals, with their undifferentiated "mourning over" Russian history, for the loss of artistic direction in the country—and for sexual promiscuity among young people.²⁶

Conservative wrath surfaced at the meeting of the secretariat of the Board of the RSFSR Writers' Union, held in Ryazan' from September 28 to October 2, 1988, and at the plenum of the Board of the RSFSR Writers' Union, held in Moscow in December 1988. The former gave the floor almost exclusively to contributors to *Nash Sovremennik*, who voiced their disapproval of changes in the political and cultural spheres using language deliberately reminiscent of Andrey Zhdanov's 1946 tirades. "Cosmopolitan enemies of Russia," they said, were corrupting its youth and would ultimately destroy the country's independence.²⁷ The December meeting, supposedly devoted to nonfiction writing on social and economic themes, turned into an all-out attack on the most prominent spokesmen and theoreticians of *perestroika*: sociologist Tat'yana Zaslavskaya, economists Leonid Abalkin and Nikolay Shmelev, and journalist and deputy editor of *Kommunist* Otto Latsis. (*Kommunist* came in for a disproportionate share of abuse, probably because it had published an editorial in late November criticizing the Ryazan' speeches as anti-democratic, anti-Western, and, implicitly, anti-Semitic.²⁸) Novelist Vasilii Belov voiced his regret that the jamming of Western radio broadcasts had been stopped.²⁹

The "mobilization" of the conservatives continued in March 1989, with a conference of the Union for the Spiritual Rebirth of the Fatherland and the establishment of the Foundation for Slavic Writing and Slavic Culture to foster greater historical and cultural knowledge about and cohesion among Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians.³⁰ Though theoretically a common initiative among representatives of all these peoples, it is compromised by the participation of a large number of the most extreme Russian nationalists. (The same people formed, in November 1988, an Association of Russian

Artists in Moscow, in order to "awaken, illuminate, and strengthen the national self-awareness and spiritual powers of the Russian people."³¹) Their goals include encouraging Russian folksongs and folklore (rather than rock), preserving Russian library and archival materials, restoring Russian historical and cultural monuments, and improving "the education of the people in the spirit of respect for Russian history and the traditions of military duty." They sponsored a series of rallies under the rubric "The Voices and Colors of Russia," some of which took on a decidedly anti-Semitic tinge.³²

Political Debate in the Journals

The liberals' inability to wrest even a measure of control over the Writers' Union from the conservatives, the organization's relative stagnation, and its deeply-rooted resistance to reform of either itself or the publishing industry, has shifted the battleground of this aspect of the cultural war to the media, in particular to the journals.³³ Editors have traditionally had great power over Soviet literature, acting as first-line censors and in some instances slipping manuscripts into print through briefly-opened windows of opportunity. Now that prior censorship, especially of *belle-lettres*, has virtually ceased, editors have even more power than before. Conservatives continue to control three main journals,

²⁵For details of these two meetings, see Dunlop, "Soviet Cultural Politics," loc. cit., pp. 46–50; also Walter Laqueur, *The Long Road to Freedom*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989, pp. 78–90 and passim. Laqueur devotes a separate chapter of his book to the reemergent Russian Right.

²⁶The proceedings of the plenum were published in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, No. 10, 1988, pp. 2–10.

²⁷*Literaturnaya Rossiya*, No. 43, 1988, pp. 2–9.

²⁸See *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 17, 1988, pp. 22–26.

²⁹Julia Wishnevsky properly notes that the non-Russian writers present at the plenum strongly objected to the prevailing Russian nationalist tone. Also, a few days after the plenum, the Moscow Writers' Organization asked the USSR Writers' Union to grant it republican status, which would end its subordination to the RSFSR Writers' Union. See Wishnevsky, "Nash Sovremennik . . ." loc. cit., pp. 5–6.

³⁰"A Noble and Beneficial Task," *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Mar. 17, 1989, pp. 4–5. See Douglas Smith, "Formation of New Russian Nationalist Group Announced," *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR*, July 7, 1989, pp. 5–8; idem, Moscow's "Otechestvo": A Link between Russian Nationalism and Conservative Opposition to Reform," *ibid.*, July 28, 1989, pp. 6–9.

³¹*Moskovskiy Literaturny* (Moscow), Nos. 49–50, Dec. 16, 1988, p. 3. See John Dunlop's analysis of these two organizations in "Two Noteworthy Russian Nationalist Initiatives," *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR*, May 26, 1989, pp. 1–4; Julia Wishnevsky offers another view in "Ligachev, 'Pamyat', and Conservative Writers," *ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1989, p. 14.

³²For one version of these rallies, see *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Jan. 17, 1989, and *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Nos. 2–4, 1989. For another, see *Moscow News*, No. 6, 1989, p. 15, and *Ogonek*, No. 7, 1989, p. 11.

³³For a recent summary of changes in Soviet television, see Viktor Yasmann, "Zigzags of Glasnost' and Soviet Television," *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR*, Mar. 31, 1989, pp. 12–17.

Nash Sovremennik, *Molodaya Gvardiya*, and *Moskva*, as well as the newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (where the infamous Nina Andreyeva letter appeared on March 13, 1988) and the in-house paper of the Moscow chapter of the USSR Writers' Union, *Moskovskiy Literat'or*. Liberals run the flagship publications of *perestroyka* and *glasnost'*, the weeklies *Ogonek* and *Moscow News*, the monthlies *Novyy Mir*, *Druzhba Narodov*, *Znamya*, *Oktyabr'*, and *Neva*. (At the First Congress of People's Deputies, in June 1989, Vasilii Belov, whose recent novel *Vse vpered'* [Everything Lies Ahead] is markedly anti-Semitic, spoke of the concentration of real power in the hands "of those who control the media," who reflect the interests of "certain groups" from the capital.³⁴ This allegation is often repeated at meetings of extreme nationalists.)

Accusations of "elitism," regularly leveled against the editors of liberal journals who supposedly do not publish what "most people" want to read, are belied by the circulation figures: *Novyy Mir's* print-run for 1988 exceeded 1 million, more than twice that for 1987; *Ogonek's* print-run shot up past 3 million; *Druzhba Narodov* more than quintupled, from 150,000 in 1987 to 800,000 in 1988. *Znamya* and *Neva* both doubled their print-runs for 1988. These are hardly "elitist" magazines, particularly when one considers that (conservatively) three or four readers read every printed copy. This figure is certainly higher for the most popular issues of these journals, like those of *Druzhba Narodov* containing Anatoliy Rybakov's *Children of the Arbat*. *Molodaya Gvardiya's* circulation went up as well, although by a much smaller percentage (1987: 640,000; 1988: 700,000); so, marginally, did the figures for *Moskva* and *Nash Sovremennik*.

What has developed in the last two years is a process at once reassuring and distressing. Polarization has intensified. Attacks in the conservatives' periodicals on certain individuals identified with *glasnost'* and *perestroyka*, and on artistic works that symbolize them, have increased in frequency and venom. Tat'yana Zaslavskaya is a favorite target, especially of *Nash Sovremennik* economics writer Anatoliy Salutskiy. In a number of articles, Salutskiy distorts and on occasion blatantly falsifies Zaslavskaya's stated views; when challenged, he temporarily backs off but then resumes his disinformation campaign.³⁵ *Ogonek* and its editor Vitaliy Korotich are constant targets. An egregious example of an attack on Korotich was a letter of denuncia-

tion to *Pravda* published on January 18, 1989, and signed by seven prominent conservatives (Mikhail Alekseyev, editor of *Moskva*; Petr Proskurin, chairman of the RSFSR Cultural Foundation; Sergey Vikulov, editor of *Nash Sovremennik*; novelists Viktor Astaf'yev, Vasilii Belov, and Valentin Rasputin; and film director Sergey Bondarchuk). The signators object to *Ogonek's* criticism of the Ryazan' meeting referred to above, and to its publication of readers' letters criticizing Rasputin, Belov, and the others; such letters, they charged, besmirched "our spiritual values." Korotich is regularly accused of being an unscrupulous careerist who was ready to praise Leonid Brezhnev when that was useful and now supports Gorbachev out of expedience as well. Vasilii Grossman's novel *Life and Fate* is often lambasted for its "Russophobia" (Vikulov's indictment at the December 1988 plenum); his *Forever Flowing*, published in *Oktyabr'* last spring, is deemed even worse;³⁶ Anatoliy Rybakov's *Children of the Arbat* supposedly slanders Siberians as "wild, stupid, and promiscuous" (Rasputin, in print and on prime-time television³⁷), and falsifies history (A. Baygushev³⁸).

One reader of the monthly journal *Literaturnoye Obozreniye* described the journal war last summer:

*It turns out that to come out for democracy means to come out against something. Perestroyka has no open opponents, but it seems that it has supporters with whose help democracy can be turned into its very opposite. Nowadays they prefer to obstruct from a position of reactionary romanticism, advocating a patriarchal stance and isolation from the world at the end of the 20th century. Revealingly, some of the "neoslavophile" slogans—the struggle with the forces of foreigners and intellectuals—are close to the positions of the neo-Stalinists. The approach espoused today by Nash Sovremennik and Molodaya Gvardiya is a form of neo-slavophilism, nationalist utopianism behind which arrant bureaucratic conservatism finds it easy to hide.*³⁹

³⁶For the "conservatives," the publication of *Forever Flowing* was Anan'yev's chief transgression, worse than Sinyavsky and Alexander Yanov. See the exchange referred to in fn. 24. As of early December 1989, Anan'yev has reportedly been removed from his post as editor of *Oktyabr'* and has been replaced by a staunch nationalist.

³⁷*Knizhnoye Obozreniye* (Moscow), No. 22, 1988, p. 4. His TV remarks were part of an hour-long program featuring 14 *Nash Sovremennik* editors and regular contributors. See Julia Wishnevsky, "Nash Sovremennik Talks to Soviet TV Viewers," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 346/88, July 28, 1988.

³⁸Baygushev's piece appeared in *Moskva* (Moscow), No. 12, 1988. Rybakov's defenders include the critic Alla Latynina (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Dec. 14, 1988), and he himself replied in a letter to the editor of *Ogonek*, No. 5, 1989.

³⁹Gennadiy Kuznetsov, "From the Viewpoint of a 'Neophyte,'" *Literaturnoye Obozreniye*, No. 8, 1988, p. 93.

³⁴*Pravda* (Moscow), June 3, 1989.

³⁵For a review of Salutskiy's recently-published works, see Aleksandr Volkov, "At the Forefront of *Perestroyka*," *Literaturnoye Obozreniye* (Moscow), No. 8, 1988, pp. 72–75.

At the same time, what is reassuring is the fact that discussion, if at times on a primitive and personally offensive level, is open, public, and continuous. Statements do not go unanswered; prejudices are not allowed to stand unchallenged. Nothing is swept under the rug. Let Salutskiy defame Zaslavskaya in *Nash Sovremennik*; she is quickly defended in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*. Let Baygushev attack Anatoliy Rybakov in *Moskva*; Alla Latynina refutes him in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. A vibrant intellectual pluralism holds sway, and although the extreme conservatives, far from hospitable to the very notion of pluralism, would probably wish to curtail it, their moderate colleagues and their liberal opponents fully appreciate its value.⁴⁰ Again to quote the wise *Literaturnoye Obozreniye* reader, "As for journals of another [more conservative] cast . . . probably we can't do without them. If there are people who think that way, then let them express themselves." And he points out that when *Novyy Mir* prints, as it has done in the last two years, the work of "conservatives" such as Belov, Astaf'yev and Feliks Kuznetsov, it signals its tolerance of a variety of views—so long as its aesthetic criteria are maintained—and not a sudden conversion to the position of *Nash Sovremennik*.⁴¹

In this same spirit of pluralism, on November 22, 1988, Soviet television broadcast a documentary about the slander suit brought against the writer Ales' Adamovich and the newspaper *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* by Ivan Shekhovtsov. Shekhovtsov, an investigator in the Ukrainian republic prosecutor's office in the early 1950's, accused Adamovich and the paper of slandering post-1930 Soviet history, and "blackening and spurning" what patriotic Soviets hold dear. In response, Adamovich and other witnesses spoke of Stalin's genocidal policies as having cost more lives than Hitler's invasion. A documentary called "The Purification," like an earlier documentary called "The Trial," counterposed critics and defenders of Stalin; each justification of or apologia for Stalin was challenged, often by survivors of the purges. In "The Trial," Vladimir Tikhonov, a member of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences and a critic of collectivization, traced the tyranny of Stalinism to the prior ban on dissenting opinion and on the formation of factions.⁴²

Moreover, no longer can any decision in the cultural sphere be construed as irrevocable. The vicissitudes of publishing Solzhenitsyn are instructive in this regard.⁴³ In 1988, the debate was intense. Most editors, journalists, and readers clamored for publication; official spokesmen and a few liberal voices argued against Solzhenitsyn's "anti-Leninist" stance. In June 1988, *Moscow News* ran a piece on *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* and its significance for Russian literature

and Soviet society; two months later, in *Knizhnoye Obozreniye*, Yelena Chukovskaya urged the full rehabilitation of Solzhenitsyn, restoration of his citizenship, and publication of his books. However, the October issue of *Novyy Mir*, whose back cover promised the publication of Solzhenitsyn in 1989, was held back. When the magazine finally appeared, its future contents page made no such commitments. (It also was to have contained Sergey Kaledin's *Construction Brigade*. According to Vyacheslav Kondrat'yev, writing in *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, the military censors banned Kaledin's novella, which only came out in the April issue of *Novyy Mir*.) The opponents appeared to have the upper hand, especially when Ideology Secretary Vadim Medvedev explicitly rejected the possibility of publishing Solzhenitsyn, because of his views on Lenin and the October Revolution. Yet only a few days later, on December 11 and 12, Solzhenitsyn's 70th birthday was celebrated by large crowds. The festivities occurred in places like the House of Medical Workers and the House of Architects: in other words, they must have had official sanction, however tacit. At the House of Cinema more than 1,400 people applauded Vladimir Lakshin's call for Solzhenitsyn's return and his praise of Solzhenitsyn as the original trailblazer; the critic Yuriy Koryakin remarked, "Let him be an anti-Communist. So was Dostoevsky. Is he an enemy?"⁴⁴

⁴⁰Valentin Rasputin, at the Congress of People's Deputies: "Pluralism is possible as a variety and multiplicity of public and political opinion. You have imposed on the country a pluralism of morality. That is more dangerous than any bomb." *Izvestiya*, June 6, 1989.

⁴¹Natalya Ivanova, poetry editor of *Druzhba Narodov* and a significant force in the liberal camp, said much the same thing in "Journals in the Focus of Opinion," *Literaturnoye Obozreniye*, No. 4, 1988, p. 98. See also two "dialogues" between Alla Latynina and Sergey Chuprin, "Key to What?" *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Apr. 12, 1989, and "Left, Right: Which Side?" *ibid.*, Apr. 19, 1989. Other references can be found in John Dunlop, "Alla Latynina: A Self-Proclaimed Centrist Calls for Political Realignment," *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR*, June 23, 1989, pp. 8–10.

⁴²On "The Trial" (*Protess*), see Julia Wishnevsky, "Soviet Television Discusses Stalin's Legacy," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 205/88, May 17, 1988. On "The Cleansing" (*Ochishcheniye*), see *idem*, "A Stalinist's Lawsuit," *ibid.*, RL 524/88, Nov. 23, 1988. The actual hearing took place on September 20, 1988.

⁴³For a full description, see John B. Dunlop, "Solzhenitsyn Begins to Emerge from the Political Void," *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR*, Sept. 8, 1989, pp. 1–6. In the same issue, see also Douglas Smith, "Reappraisal of Solzhenitsyn in the USSR," pp. 6–9.

⁴⁴*The New York Times*, Dec. 13, 1988. Lakshin's comments were particularly significant for several reasons. First, he was Aleksandr Tvardovskiy's assistant editor in *Novyy Mir* when the latter won publication approval from Khrushchev for *A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* in 1963. Second, he sharply disputed Solzhenitsyn's portrait of Tvardovskiy (in *The Calf and the Oak*) in his own *samizdat* essay, "Tvardovskiy, Solzhenitsyn, and *Novyy Mir*." Third, he is one of the leading liberals today, in his own writing and as assistant editor of *Znaniya*, and as such disagrees with (and is disliked by) virtually all of the conservative critics who claim Solzhenitsyn as their own.

In 1989, the "Solzhenitsyn case" was happily resolved. After several "deep discussions" with Gorbachev himself,⁴⁵ Sergey Zalygin, *Novyy Mir's* editor, made good on his promise of the previous year. In the July issue he published Solzhenitsyn's "Nobel Lecture," and in issues 8, 9, and 10 substantial portions of *The Gulag Archipelago*. *The First Circle* and *Cancer Ward* will run (in *Novyy Mir*) in 1990, as will *March 1917* (in the Leningrad journal *Neva*), *August 1914* (in *Zvezda*), and *October 1916* (in *Nash Sovremennik*). The publishing house Sovetskiy pisatel' has announced a forthcoming seven-volume collection of Solzhenitsyn's works in a substantial print-run of 300,000.⁴⁶ Back in July, the chief Soviet censor told Bill Keller: "Regarding Solzhenitsyn, all debates are over";⁴⁷ the past few months have shown the truth of his words.

In his short prefatory note to the first installment of *Gulag*, Zalygin wrote: "Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, with his unyielding obduracy, is absolutely necessary to us now—we must know and listen to him, we have neither the moral nor the intellectual right to fail to know and listen to him."⁴⁸ Three months later, Igor Vinogradov echoed Zalygin's emphasis on the "up-to-date and . . . burning significance" of *Gulag*. Describing it as "the most complete, the most fundamental, truly encyclopedic description of the history and geography, of the laws and customs, of the state structure and population of the prisons, annihilating labour, penal-servitude camps and exile regions of this fantastic country," Vinogradov insisted on its importance for understanding the present and "not los[ing] our way in the future. . . . [Solzhenitsyn] offers his diagnosis not only to your reason but also to your conscience, to your behavior today, to your moral responsibility."⁴⁹

Products of *Glasnost*'

What have readers found in the "thick" journals of the last two years, apart from the always-engrossing letters to the editors? Broadly speaking, essays on social, historical, economic, and political issues; poetry and prose held back for years and sometimes for decades; new poetry and prose. I can only suggest the wide

range of works, with no attempt at offering a comprehensive list. 1988 began with two major publications, Grossman's *Life and Fate*⁵⁰ (which was one of the books even optimistic observers believed, as recently as two years ago, would not be published) and Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago*.⁵¹ *Druzhba Narodov* published a work widely accepted in the West as one of the masterpieces of Soviet literature, Andrey Platonov's *Chevergur*, in its third and fourth issues for 1988, and Boris Pilnyak's classic *Mahogany* in its second issue for 1989.

Pleasure in the reclamation of Russian literature is widespread but by no means universal. Dmitriy Urnov, the editor of the leading journal of literary scholarship *Voprosy Literatury*, finds books like *Doctor Zhivago*, Zamyatin's *We*, Platonov's *Chevergur*, and Grossman's *Life and Fate* overrated. "I had and still have the impression," he wrote in response to a *Literaturnoye Obozreniye* survey, "that nearly all these works are without exception weak from a literary point of view, and I think that if works like *We*, for example, were artistically stronger, they would have broken down the wall, overcome all obstacles in their way. . . . Precedent tells us that there is always some kind of internal obstacle in the 'unrecognized' work itself to prevent its reaching its readers."⁵² Urnov neglects to explain how KGB confiscation qualifies as an "internal obstacle," or for that matter what the aesthetic weakness of *We* had to do with the 60-year ban on its publication in the Soviet Union.

Poetry by writers who could not publish until two or three years ago—Semen Lipkin,⁵³ Aleksandr Kushner,⁵⁴ Inna Lisnyanskaya,⁵⁵ Yevgeniy Reyn,⁵⁶ and Boris Chichibabin⁵⁷—shares pages with once-taboo émigré poets of various eras, from the 1920's émigré Don Aminado⁵⁸ to émigrés of the 1970's like Naum

⁵⁰*Oktyabr'* (Moscow). Nos. 1–4, 1988, with an exemplary afterword by the literary critic Anatoliy Bocharov explaining, among other things, the KGB's confiscation of the manuscript in 1961. The poet Semen Lipkin goes into much greater detail in "The Life and Fate of Vasilii Grossman," *Literaturnoye Obozreniye*, No. 7, 1988, pp. 98–108.

⁵¹*Novyy Mir* (Moscow), Nos. 1–4, 1988, with a preface by Academician Dmitriy Likhachev. *Novyy Mir* followed up with another notable retrieval: Yuriy Dombrovskiy's *Fakul'tet nenuzhnykh veshchey* (The Faculty of the Superfluous), in Nos. 8–11, 1988.

⁵²In "Lessons for Tomorrow," *Literaturnoye Obozreniye*, No. 1, 1989, p. 16. For more on Urnov, see Julia Wishnevsky, "Dmitrii Urnov: A Learned Stalinist?" Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR*, Mar. 17, 1989, pp. 11–13.

⁵³In, for instance, *Oktyabr'*, No. 8, 1988, pp. 118–20.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, No. 6, 1988, pp. 82–85.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, No. 11, 1988, pp. 130–32; in *Novyy Mir*, No. 6, 1988, pp. 6–7; and *Druzhba Narodov* (Moscow), No. 2, 1989, pp. 108–13.

⁵⁶In *Novyy Mir*, No. 2, 1988, pp. 93–95;

⁵⁷In *Druzhba Narodov*, No. 4, 1988, pp. 197–219. Publication references for Chichibabin and the previously-mentioned poets are by no means exhaustive.

⁵⁸In *Oktyabr'*, No. 9, 1988, pp. 143–46.

⁴⁵Those were Zalygin's words in describing his meetings with Gorbachev. See *The Washington Post*, Apr. 21, 1989.

⁴⁶V. Yakimenko in *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* (Moscow), July 13, 1989.

⁴⁷*The New York Times*, July 18, 1989.

⁴⁸*Novyy Mir*, No. 8, 1989, p. 7.

⁴⁹Igor Vinogradov, "Do Not Trust, Do Not Be Afraid, Do Not Ask for Anything," *Moscow News*, No. 45, 1989, p. 12.

Korzavin⁵⁹ and Joseph Brodsky.⁶⁰ Readers' thirst for information and analysis of Soviet history is reflected in Dmitriy Volkogonov's biography of Stalin (serialized in *Oktyabr'*, Nos. 10–12, 1988) and Fedor Burlatskiy's controversial recollections of the Khrushchev era (in *Novyy Mir*, No. 10, 1988); in the correspondence of Boris Pasternak and Ol'ga Freydenberg (in *Druzhba Narodov*, Nos. 7–10, 1988); and in memoirs by both émigrés (Nina Berberova, Aleksandra Tolstoy) and Soviets (Anatoliy Nayman on Anna Akhmatova in *Novyy Mir*, Nos. 1–3, 1989, and Konstantin Simonov on Stalin, in *Znamya*, Nos. 3–5, 1988). All the thick journals have been running articles by Andrey Nuikin, Nikolay Shmelev (whose short stories are also now printed), Igor' Klyamkin, Vasiliy Selyunin, and a raft of other economists, historians, and social commentators.

It is true that unknown, younger, previously-unpublished writers face stiff competition in getting their work into journals crowded—some say overcrowded—with names from the past. As the critic Aleksey Zverev commented, "It's by no means simple for today's writers to

present themselves in such company. The impression made by their work is rather pallid. But this is hardly their fault: who indeed could survive comparisons—which are unavoidable—with the likes of Grossman, Pasternak, Zamyatin, and Nabokov! And that's who they are rubbing shoulders with in the journals!"⁶¹ (Also with George Orwell, Arthur Koestler, and Ken Kesey.) Zverev's point is important: more than 70 years' worth of the best literature written in Russian is being crammed into journals in the span of two to three years—tough competition indeed for even the best contemporary writers. Nevertheless, some new names have emerged: Sergey Kaledin, Tamara Nabatnikova, Sergey Alekseyev. Most notable, perhaps, are Mikhail Kurayev, whose first two novellas *Captain Dikshiteyn* and *Night-time Interrogation* (in *Novyy Mir*, No. 9, 1987, and No. 12, 1988, respectively) were warmly received, and Tat'yana Tolstaya, whose stories ran in several issues of *Novyy Mir* and are now available in English (*On the Golden Porch*, published in 1989).

In conclusion, Soviet writers, filmmakers, and intellectuals may occupy "two warring camps," their divisions more sharply etched than ever. At the same time, they maintain a dialogue with each other, sometimes civil, sometimes vicious, but ongoing. Those who profit most from that dialogue are Soviet readers, viewers, and listeners, who have themselves become participants in the dynamic process *glasnost'* signifies.

⁵⁹Ibid., No. 8, 1988, pp. 143–50; *Druzhba Narodov*, No. 12, 1988, pp. 186–89.

⁶⁰*Druzhba Narodov*, No. 8, 1988, pp. 226–36; *Novyy Mir*, No. 12, 1987; *Neva* (Leningrad), No. 3, 1988; *Raduga* (Tallinn), No. 2, 1988; *Literaturnoye Obozreniye*, No. 8, 1988.

⁶¹Zverev's comments are part of a survey of literary critics in "Lessons for Tomorrow," *Literaturnoye Obozreniye*, No. 1, 1989, p. 7.

Note

Electing the USSR Congress of People's Deputies

Max E. Mote

THE SPRING 1989 elections to the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union, which astonished Soviet citizens and the Western media and publics alike, occasioned much writing about Mikhail Gorbachev's restructuring of the Soviet political system. However, the subject has hardly been exhausted. The elections not only introduced an awareness of a possibility for change that took their importance far beyond that of the truly startling reports of free-wheeling meetings and articles in the daily press, they also established a baseline from which to evaluate future political change.

In the following pages, I would like to address two important issues raised by these elections. First, has the exercise altered to any degree the nature of power in the USSR? And second, what has the educational impact of the campaign been on Western observers and on Soviet citizens themselves?

Elections and Power

The first question can be divided into two parts: the first concerns the structure of power, and the second concerns the personal power of General Secretary and now President Gorbachev.

Structure of power. The elections did not shift power away from the party and the existing administrative apparatus. Indeed, the elections hardly affected the

structure of power in the Soviet Union at all. It should be noted that two types of elections took place. First of all, there were elections from all-Union public organizations (*obshchestvennyye organizatsii*). Out of a total of 750 seats in this category, 425 were reserved for candidates from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) itself; other major organizations—for example, women's, youth, and veterans' organizations, the trade unions, cooperatives (*kolkhozes*), scientific groups, and creative unions—were allotted 325 seats. "Elections" for these seats were carried out by the central bodies of the respective organizations, e.g., the CPSU Central Committee conducted elections for the party on March 16; the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, on March 18; and the Communist Youth League (Komsomol), on March 23. A second type of election was held for 1,500 deputies from territorial and national-territorial districts (*okrugs*) on March 26. These "district" elections, as they were termed in Soviet accounts, are the ones that received the most attention in the Western press. The seats were distributed on the following basis: 750 were assigned to territorial districts with 257,300 voters each, while 750 seats were divided between union republics (32 from each), autonomous republics (11 from each), autonomous oblasts (5 from each), and autonomous okrugs (1 from each).¹

The continuity between these recent elections and previous elections is strong. An examination of the chronology of the campaign and the provisions set

Max E. Mote is Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the University of Alberta, Edmonton. He has written on the Soviet electoral system and Soviet political economy.

¹Dawn Mann, Robert Monyak, and Elizabeth Teague, *The Supreme Soviet: A Biographical Directory*, Munich, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Washington, DC, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1989.

forth in the new Electoral Law,² confirms that in both cases electoral procedures were dominated by the party, the elections themselves were highly regulated, and the results were conservative. The salient events in the process were the following:

- October 23, 1988, *Pravda* published the draft law on elections; discussion and revisions followed.
- December 1, 1988, the new Electoral Law was promulgated.
- December 11, 1988, district election commissions were formed, three and one-half months before the election, for territorial districts and for public organizations.
- December 26, 1988, to January 24, 1989, election voting precincts (*uchastki*) were formed in accordance with Article (Art.) 15 of the Electoral Law, and candidates were nominated under the provisions of Arts. 37 and 39, which specified that the nomination process would begin three months prior to the elections and end two months before the election. Voting was to be conducted by either open or secret ballot as determined at each meeting. Note that nominations could only be made by organizations with all-Union status, and that a quorum of 500 persons was required at nomination meetings (Art. 37). These provisions ruled out any independent and spontaneous nominations. These developments ended the first stage of the selection process, which had already been limited by the stipulations discussed earlier.
- January 25 to February 23, 1989, the second stage of the selection process began with the registration of candidates nominated in electoral districts. In practice, election commissions exercised their right to reduce the number of nominees who would be registered as candidates, a right many voters regarded as a limitation on the right of choice. The Electoral Law required no minimum attendance at commission meetings. Once again, voting was either by open or by secret ballot, and the meeting itself had the right to decide which procedure it would utilize (Art. 38). If more than two persons were nominated, the nominees could, if they wished, appear at meetings and present their programs (Art. 38). Candidates had to be registered at the end of this period.
- January 29, 1989, candidates from public organizations were registered.
- February 8, 1989, polling precinct election commissions were formed (Art. 26).
- January 26, to March 23, 1989, meetings of candidates with electors were held in both the districts and in public organizations. Note that after February 23, district nominees who had not been approved for nomina-

tion were removed from the race. The last month was restricted to campaigning by candidates.

- March 10, 1989, lists of electors were submitted for public scrutiny.
- March 6–23, 1989, 750 deputies from public organizations were elected at congresses of their organizations, or in plenary meetings of their all-Union bodies (see above). Winners were required to get more than half of the votes (Art. 56). Art. 60 specified that if no one was elected because no candidate received more than 50 percent of the votes, repeat voting would be held within one day, and only a plurality of votes would be necessary to win. Eighteen seats in five public organizations were not filled.
- March 26, 1989 (Election Day). Art. 55 specified that a winner had to receive more than 50 percent of the vote in a district to win. Voting had to be secret (Art. 52). No winners emerged from the first ballot in 275 districts.³ One-quarter of the districts (384) had only one candidate.
- By April 5, 1989, election results were published (Art. 58).
- April 2–9, 1989, runoff elections took place in 64 districts where more than two candidates ran and none received a majority; Art. 60 set a time limit of two weeks for these elections; the two leading candidates were selected for the run-off, and the winner had to have more than 50 percent of the vote.
- May 14, 1989, repeat elections were held in 119 districts; Art. 61 stipulated such elections had to be held within two months in districts where one or two candidates ran and no one received a majority, and the winner had to receive more than 50 percent of the vote; these run-off elections were held well before the limit expired. Note that even in some single-member districts, less than 50 percent of the eligible voters voted for the candidate; notable were the cases where local party leaders failed to win a majority and thus were not elected. The Central Election Commission called for repeat elections in these districts and in the public organizations where the required number of seats was not filled.
- May 25, 1989, the Congress of People's Deputies convened in Moscow; a new Supreme Soviet of 542 members was elected by the deputies of the Congress. Gorbachev was elected chairman ("president").

²"Law of the USSR on Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR," *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR* (Moscow), Dec. 7, 1988, Item 729, pp. 831–57—hereafter referred to as "Electoral Law." An election chronology appeared in *Moscow News*, Jan. 1, 1989.

³On the election returns, see Dawn Mann, "The Congress of People's Deputies: The Election Marathon Ends," *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR* (Munich), June 2, 1989, pp. 3–5.

As this list of events indicates, the provisions of the new election law regulated the election, limited public choice, and in effect helped to secure the position of the party. In particular, the provisions of the law certainly limited the possibility of local "mavericks" appearing on a ballot—something that Soviet electoral laws have always prohibited. The provisions also stipulated that the nominees go through a dual selection process, once when being chosen as a candidate, and again when being registered by district election commissions. And finally, the law made voting a two-stage process, as it was in the Imperial Duma before the revolution, and as it is now within the CPSU. Thus, on May 25, after the elections were over, the Congress convened and elected the smaller legislative body, the Supreme Soviet. In short, the law itself laid down three hurdles to be crossed before a deputy could take a seat in the legislature.

Members of the party (and other public organizations) were favored under the law in that they actually voted three times for delegates. Like everyone else, they voted for two candidates from electoral districts, but before March 26, they (or their leading bodies) also voted for representatives from their public organization. These formal arrangements guaranteed the party a major voice in the new legislature. The CPSU was, as we have seen, assured 425 seats in the Congress, while the trade unions and the Komsomol were assured another 175.

There were also attempts to manage and control the elections by extra-legal means. These will be discussed below, under the section on old and new aspects of the election.

The General Secretary's power. Gorbachev's position appears to have been enhanced by the new electoral process, although it is difficult to know for certain how secure his position is.

The election campaign was used to stir up people about a visible enemy (the bureaucracy), to whip up enthusiasm for the current reform campaign (*perestroika*), and to remove opponents of *perestroika* and of Gorbachev.⁴ Such a campaign can strengthen a leader, and Gorbachev probably gained some support from the entire exercise. At any rate, in April 1989, he carried out a massive "purge" of the Central Committee, removing 110 members who were considered to

be conservative elements capable of voting him out of the leadership should crisis conditions (analogous to Nikita Khrushchev's problems in 1957 and 1964) arise.⁵ And, when a significant number of local party leaders failed to win their elections, Gorbachev intimated that local party organizations might remove these failed candidates, all of whom were presumably hostile to Gorbachev and opposed to *perestroika*.

It should be noted that the election campaign, with such democratic features as a choice of candidates in some districts, the right to speak out on issues, and access to the media by some groups, was taken as a sign of progress by the intelligentsia, a sector of the population whose support is critical to Gorbachev and to his plans for renewing the system. This is not to say that the intelligentsia did not have reservations and objections, but Gorbachev's introduction of democratic practices into the electoral process clearly enhanced his standing among this influential group.

The elections also increased Gorbachev's standing abroad. They were widely hailed, at least in Europe and North America, as a great move toward democracy. Indeed, the Western media's response to the elections was enthusiastic, perhaps more so than that of the Soviet media.

In sum, then, the elections can be said to have done little to alter the formal structure of power. They did, however, increase the power of the leader.

Instructional Aspects of the Elections

The main reasons for holding the elections are related to various aspects of reform, to changes in the structure and operations of the bureaucratic apparatus, to power moves, and in general to political categories. The elections were, however, also an attempt on the part of the leadership to reassure the citizenry that a new social policy, which reflected care for the workers and concern about living standards—the things that worry citizens most—was being adopted.

However, another important objective of the elections was clearly to teach citizens new ways of conducting their political business. In short, the campaign was a massive educational program for the people. Its message was that the "mind of the nation" had been hypno-

⁴This point is developed by Jeffrey W. Hahn, "Power to the Soviets?" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1989, esp. pp. 35, 44. Hahn expected significant change to come from the new nominating procedures (p. 35), whereas the present article points to a conscious process of nurturing new public attitudes in the course of the election campaign.

⁵See Dawn Mann, A. Rahr, and E. Teague, "Gorbachev Cleans Out Central Committee," *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR*, May 5, 1989, pp. 8–10; Dawn Mann, "Elections to the Congress of People's Deputies Nearly Over," *ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1989, p. 11. The list of those who lost their position is in "To the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the CPSU Central Inspection Commission," *Pravda and Izvestiya* (Moscow), Apr. 26, 1989, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), May 24, 1989, pp. 5–6.

tized by Stalinism and by Brezhnev's era of "stagnation," that the new thinking of *perestroyka* would unleash the great reserves of energy and talent that had been lying dormant in the USSR, and that these resources were the only means left to solve the crisis facing the country.

Critique of past electoral practices. In the process of politically re-educating the people, old ways had to be denigrated. The campaign of repudiating past elections provides a mass of instructional material, from an unimpeachable source, on how elections had been run in the past. This material confirms the view of outside observers that Soviet elections were totally corrupt and undemocratic—indeed, that they were so systematically and thoroughly rigged as to remove the voters from any influence on government.

Insider views of the electoral process in the Soviet Union first began to appear in print in the West in the 1970's as a result of the third wave of Soviet emigration. For example, Maksudov (a pseudonym) published a short piece discussing election data that is steeped in corrosive irony.⁶

In the 1989 election campaign, information from *Pravda* furnished a broad and candid picture of the old ways of running elections. A basic criticism of past elections is that the individual was debarred from a real exercise of power. This is clearly stated in the basic party document, the "Appeal" to the Soviet people, released at the beginning of the election campaign.⁷ According to this document, the entire administrative system was built on the higher organs' mistrust of the next lower organs—from the "center," to the oblast, down to the individual brigade member on a farm.⁸ It was taken for granted that the system of soviets would be managed by higher officials of the party; *obkom* (oblast party committee) officials selected the people to run in the soviet elections, and their approval was a signal that everyone followed, passively voting for the single candidate.⁹ A *Pravda* article mentions "pressure from above" as standard practice.¹⁰

Another *Pravda* article made it clear that the soviets were also dominated by male party officials.¹¹ Workers were included as tokens in the soviets, but typically they could be heard only once a year delivering a

pre-approved report to the party officials.¹² Today, the concept of perfect and complete unity (*polnoye yedynodushiye*), which so completely governed elections in the past, is widely criticized as both a fraudulent and a harmful feature of public meetings and pronouncements,¹³ especially when it is accompanied by ritual behavior¹⁴ on the part of all participants in the administrative game.

In more specific critiques of past election practices published in *Pravda*, the management by the bureaucracy of the soviets and of elections emerges as a major problem. The programs advanced by nominees in the recent elections frequently referred to the need for independence from the bureaucracy¹⁵ and for self-reliant thinking about issues as well as a principled defense of one's own "vision" or program.¹⁶ Yet another article roundly condemns the behavior of the old soviets. The author says that the new Supreme Soviet must not go back to the irresponsibility of former years, to the old forms:

Not long ago, to tell the truth, we were indifferent to it all. We were taught that the overwhelming majority of deputies vote "for" when and where it is necessary to vote "for." And do you mean to say it wasn't the same for the rest of us in our daily lives? The deputies were simply a reflection of the rest of us . . . I don't think you can blame our deputies [for] . . . political illiteracy, lack of experience, which isn't surprising after the mindless "unanimity" [bezdumnoye "yedinoglasie"] of former years.¹⁷

Similar details are given even more trenchantly in other publications, such as *Moscow News* and the major reformist weekly, *Ogonek*.

One of the more surprising aspects of this material is the extent and depth of both the awareness and the dissatisfaction about fraudulent politics among Soviet citizens.¹⁸ The great secret was, after all, not a secret—everyone knew but no one would talk. A brief clip from Moscow TV speaks volumes on the subject: a woman in Krasnoyarsk, when asked in a street interview for her

⁶Maksudov (pseudonym), "We All Are 'For' [Soviet Election Statistics]," trans. by M. Mote and T. Yedlin, *Political Methodology* (Los Altos, CA), Vol. 10, No. 3, 1984, pp. 293–300.

⁷*Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 13, 1989.

⁸*Ibid.*, Mar. 2, 1989.

⁹*Ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1989.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1989.

¹¹*Ibid.*, Feb. 2, 1989.

¹²*Ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1989.

¹³*Ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1989.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, Jan. 11, 1989.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1989.

¹⁶Gorbachev uses the term vision (*videniye*): see *ibid.*, Jan. 11, 1989.

¹⁷Vladimir Lyubitskiy, in *ibid.*, Jan. 12, 1989.

¹⁸This is one point on which one may disagree with the excellent study of Soviet elections by Rasma Karklins, "Soviet Elections Revisited: Voter Abstention in Noncompetitive Voting," *American Political Science Review* (Washington, DC), June 1986, pp. 449–69, esp. pp. 456 and 465; she argued that the dissent on political issues is largely confined to the Moscow and Leningrad intelligentsia, but it now appears to be more universal.

opinion of the candidates in the election, replied that she did not know anything about the nominees nor did she care because nothing would change anyway.¹⁹ Hers was not an isolated response; such attitudes were prevalent throughout the country.

Of course, despite the recent liberalization, the 1989 elections continued to manifest many of the negative features characteristic of the old system. Although in the many multicandidate districts, voters had to cross out the names of unwanted candidate(s), in the numerous districts where only a single candidate was listed on the ballot, one could vote as before by simply by dropping the ballot in the box without making a mark. Because of limitations on the right to nominate candidates, Soviet citizens still do not vote for their own nominees so much as they vote for or against a candidate put forth by all-Union organizations.

The Soviets do not expect the mistakes of the past to be overcome in three months, i.e., in only one election campaign. Time and again one hears that this election was a "school" for democracy, in which the people were students, not graduates.²⁰ This leads to the final topic under consideration, namely, an account of the schooling that has begun and the unexpected lessons that the students might be drawing from it.

Lessons for future behavior. One of the most interesting aspects of the entire election period was the obvious intention to teach the Soviet public new modes of behavior.²¹

Of course, as we have mentioned above, in many ways, the new elections continued to resemble the old—the party authorities set the "line" for the elections, insisting that the aims of *perestroika* were the aims of the campaign and of the entire Soviet people; the language of the law tends to protect the hegemony of the party; the party controlled the nominations so as to prevent usurpatory forces from entering the lists; and it managed registration through the electoral commissions. Nevertheless, a new approach to the entire process was evident in the speeches of the reformist leaders and in the media. Given that the assumption of this analysis is that ideas—in the broadest definition of the term, and as expressed in words—determine action, this is enormously significant.²² The view that ideas govern behavior is widely accepted among the Soviet intelligentsia.²³ Thus, one must pay close attention to what was being said and shown to the Soviet public during the campaign. The words, the new meanings, the ideas, were not empty symbols.

The teaching of the new meanings and behavior was undertaken in many ways. The excoriation of past practices described above was itself a "school" in the new

way of doing things. Soviet TV also provided, in its daily programs, many hours of instruction on "how to do it," that is, how to be, think, and act democratically. Soviet television gave extensive coverage to the entire campaign, and in this coverage we see a model of the new behavior considered by the leadership to be desirable. In addition to frequent reports on the regular evening news programs, officials dedicated a special series, "Toward the Elections," to the election campaign. Commentators summarized events, drew the lessons, and drove the points home to large audiences of viewers. These programs acted out for the viewers the ways in which politics at the popular level was to be conducted, and sometimes how it was not to be carried out. The programs were more than reporting; they were clearly didactic, as is so often the case with the Soviet media—one of whose assigned functions has always been to educate as much as to inform.²⁴

In program after program, Soviet media attempted to communicate to the citizens one or more of the following ideas:

- the people support change, new ways of doing things, the program of *perestroika*; reform is the route to better living standards, to a more progressive social policy;
- the word "election" now means conflict, discussion, and choice among alternative candidates;
- voting should be secret;
- the bureaucracy's power to make and execute policy should be accountable to citizens and deputies;
- democracy is not mindless unity, but "pluralism of views";
- correct policy emerges from a discussion of alter-

¹⁹Moscow TV, "Toward the Elections," Feb. 6, 1989.

²⁰The "school of democracy" idea was repeated frequently during the campaign, e.g., in Viktor Chebrikov's nomination speech in Kishinev; see *Pravda*, Feb. 11, 1989. Chebrikov, however, dwells on the negative things learned and used by demagogues.

²¹This is suggested in one of the election articles by Dawn Mann cited above, "Elections Are Nearly Over," p. 11.

²²It would be tidy at this point to cite a definitive work on a theory of action that makes the desired point about the importance of language, but there appears to be no such thing available. The subject of action is discussed by Sherry B. Ortner, "Theory of Anthropology in the Sixties," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (Cambridge), January 1984, pp. 126–66; on language and behavior, see Stephen Toulmin, "Concepts and the Explanation of Human Behavior," Theodore Mischel, Ed., *Human Action*, New York, Academic Press, 1969, pp. 71–104.

²³See, for example, Vyacheslav Kostikov, "The Time of Thawed Words," *Ogonek*, No. 22, May 1989, pp. 4–7; commenting on Russia's long history of censorship, Kostikov makes a telling point when he says that "you cannot bennumb the tongue without putting the whole organism to sleep."

²⁴See, for example, Ellen Mickiewicz, *Split Signals*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 56; Vladimir Shlapentokh, *Soviet Public Opinion and Ideology*, New York, Praeger, 1986, pp. 27–71.

natives, from the independent exercise of the mind by individuals (within the framework, of course, of the party program);

- individuals can find the correct way of conducting an election by studying the law; the written law is the guide, the solution, the source;
- individuals must have programs, policies, principles; they must defend their own vision of truth; the answers to problems cannot come from the "center";
- an individual must speak the truth, as he or she sees it, rather than mouth slogans and phrases. The TV screen showed dozens of images of honest faces, wrestling with the expression of their private convictions, questions, doubts, anger, and so on;
- when the party does not attend to the needs of the people, it loses authority—its members might even be voted out of power.

At times, the new doctrine of freedom got out of and, and the media stepped in to admonish people for inadmissible behavior. The negative lessons were also important warnings on how not to act.²⁵

- democracy and freedom do not provide a license for "egoistic" behavior; one must not use the media and public meetings simply to advance a personal cause;
- national minorities and their leaders must not utilize the rights granted in the electoral law to promote demagoguery, national exclusiveness, national hatred, or lack of respect for others;
- meetings must be conducted on the basis of firm ethical standards; one must not shout down opponents, disrupt meetings with demonstrations, falsify petitions, use mud-slinging slander against opponents, or engage in other dishonest or disrespectful acts.²⁶

It is my view that these instructions and admonishments constitute an attempt to redefine part of the political vocabulary in the USSR. Certain key words are acquiring new meaning, and these meanings may bring about different patterns of behavior. Some of the more obvious of the new meanings are:²⁷

- elections mean choice;
- political power should be in the hands of the people, not the apparatus;
- participation means discussion and voting where policy is made;
- patriotism does not mean unquestioning acceptance of instructions from above; policies may be criticized and should in fact be developed from below;

- socialism means a social policy that considers first the needs of ordinary citizens;
- honesty means speaking one's real thoughts, not those of the public half of a split personality.

We may wonder about the long-range effects of this schooling. But some of the results are already obvious. In spite of the fact that almost 90 percent of the deputies in the new Congress of People's Deputies were party members, stormy discussions developed immediately after the new Congress convened on May 25. Gorbachev himself was often under pressure from obstreperous deputies. Deputies from the Baltic republics demanded independence. The government, party, army, and police were castigated for their treatment of peaceful demonstrators in Georgia. Leaders appeared outside the framework of the traditional apparatus; one could see a symbol in the fact that Boris Yel'tsin was given a long, prime-time TV interview in the foyer of the Palace of Soviets where the Congress met.²⁸ Andrey Sakharov was a moral leader; Yel'tsin was a popular leader. Each had his own constituency beyond the power structure, and drew strength from publics that supported criticism of the regime.

The fascinating question is how far will all this go. A sanguine expectation is that the "genie is out of the bottle" and cannot be put back. Such a view has been advanced by a respected dean of Soviet studies, Walter Laqueur.²⁹ But as much as we might wish his view to be accurate, Soviet history shows cases of the opposite: the freedom of the revolutionary period was stifled in the 1920's and certainly under Stalin, and the thaw of Khrushchev was reversed in the 1960's. The final verdict is not in.

The elections have introduced another puzzle into the study of Soviet behavior. As we wait for the final resolution, we must focus our continuing analysis on the issues outlined above.

²⁵From the report of a meeting in Stavropol', Moscow TV, "Vremya," Jan. 23, 1989.

²⁶A long article on misbehavior appeared later in the campaign, after reports of riotous conduct began to circulate; see *Pravda*, Feb. 27, 1989.

²⁷This study is in a sense an exploration; it might be worthwhile to apply more precise techniques such as discourse analysis to the material.

²⁸Moscow TV, "Vremya," Mar. 29, 1989.

²⁹See Walter Laqueur, *The Long Road to Freedom: Russia and Glasnost*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989, p. xvii, where he cites Horace to the effect that "once a word has been allowed to escape it cannot be recalled." He does consider several possible scenarios for the USSR (see pp. 271–89; 307–10), but a move backwards appears to be one of the less likely.

Books

Ideology Is Dead! Long Live Ideology?

Cynthia Roberts and Elizabeth Wishnick

ALLEN LYNCH. *The Soviet Study of International Relations*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987.

STEPHEN SHENFIELD. *The Nuclear Predicament*. New York, Methuen, 1987.

MARGOT LIGHT. *The Soviet Theory of International Relations*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1988.

P. H. VIGOR. *The Soviet View of Disarmament*. Houndsmills, UK, MacMillan Press, 1986.

WHEN Mikhail Gorbachev wrote in 1987 that the Soviet leadership had "taken the steps necessary to rid our policy of ideological prejudice,"¹ he was referring to the selective modification of established doctrinal aspects of Marxist-Leninist ideol-

ogy to facilitate *perestroika* domestically and expanded cooperation between the Soviet Union and other states in the international system. Since then, the USSR has experienced not only an explosion of various kinds of political turmoil, a deepening economic crisis, and a dramatic erosion in the authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), but also unprecedented challenges to ideological orthodoxy from both domestic and external sources. In Eastern Europe, Gorbachev's flexible, if not supportive, stance toward change has accelerated the unraveling of the old orthodoxy and has contributed to the rapid demise of the leading role of communist parties first in Poland and Hungary, and then in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

At home, in increasingly more radical criticisms of the political and ideological roots of the Soviet system, several prominent intellectuals have linked Lenin to the suppression of nascent democracy in the early 1920's, Marx to the descent into Stalinism, and the decline of the "leading role of the party" to that institution's unaccountability and its infliction of false ideological goals and principles on Soviet society.² Reflecting growing divisions within the CPSU, some members of the Inter-Regional Group—a quasi-opposition group made up of radical

reformers elected to the Congress of People's Deputies—are even pressing for a parliamentary debate on repealing Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, which establishes "the leading role" of the CPSU in the Soviet polity, and for legalizing independent political and social organizations.³

Meanwhile, two of Gorbachev's allies in the Politburo, Aleksandr Yakovlev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, have also challenged key tenets of Marxism-Leninism. According to Shevardnadze, "the struggle between the two opposing systems can no longer be considered a leading (*vedu-*

¹Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, New York, Harper and Row, 1987, p. 250.

²See, in particular, Igor' Klyamkin, "Why It Is Difficult to Speak the Truth," *Novyy Mir* (Moscow), No. 2, 1989, pp. 204–38; Vasilii Selyunin, "Sources," *ibid.*, No. 5, 1988, pp. 162–89; and Aleksandr Tsipko, "The Sources of Stalinism," *Nauka i Zhizn'* (Moscow), Nos. 11 and 12, 1988, and Nos. 1 and 2, 1989. See also Vera Tolz, "Soviet Author Critically Evaluates Role of CPSU," *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR* (Munich), Mar. 31, 1989, pp. 6–8.

³*The New York Times*, Sept. 24 and Nov. 26, 1989; and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), July 28, 1989, pp. 77–79. Andrey Sakharov formally tabled the group's draft platform at the concluding session of the Congress, when he was grudgingly granted five minutes to make a rushed final statement. For the complete text, see Andrei Sakharov, "A Speech to the People's Congress," *New York Review of Books* (New York), Aug. 17, 1989, pp. 25–26.

Cynthia Roberts teaches Political Science at Hunter College (New York); during 1989–90, she holds a Research Fellowship at the Brookings Institution (Washington, DC). Elizabeth Wishnick is a Junior Fellow of the W. Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union, Columbia University (New York).

shchaya) tendency of the contemporary era."⁴ In a July 1989 speech, Yakovlev took this argument one step further by deploring both the "revolutionary romanticism" that left the promises of the Bolshevik Revolution unfulfilled, and the idealization of violent means, however noble the ends. Undeterred by the fact that some of his more trenchant comments had previously been censored in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*,⁵ Yakovlev reflected on the 1789 revolution in France and the 1917 revolution in Russia, asserting that "the idea of violence as the midwife of history has outlived itself, as has the idea of the power of dictatorship relying directly on violence."⁶ As such challenges to communist orthodoxy build, one may well ask: Whither ideology in Soviet domestic and foreign policy?

The four books under review in this essay provide a useful context for evaluating the evolving relationship between ideology and Soviet approaches to foreign and security policy, relatively neglected issues in the contemporary scholarly literature on the Soviet Union. Allen Lynch's excellent study focuses on the diminishing difference between the conceptual frameworks of Soviet and Western academics on the nature of the international system and on the interaction among states within it. In a new introduction to the paperback edition of his book (hereafter cited as 2nd ed.), Lynch also examines the link between the Soviet academic debates and Gorbachev's foreign policy approach. Stephen Shenfield's thinner but more readable analysis of the causes and policy implications of doctrinal changes in Gorbachev's foreign policy insightfully highlights the continuing contradictions between Marxist-Leninist philosophical assumptions and the Soviet leader's interest in promoting cooperation. Finally, Margot Light places

Soviet doctrinal concepts in a historical context, and P. H. Vigor explores the impact of doctrine and security interests on past Soviet disarmament proposals.

Apart from neglecting to develop systematic connections between Soviet domestic politics and changing foreign policy concepts, these studies define the roles of ideology and theory with varying degrees of success. The neglect of domestic factors is an important shortcoming, because the "de-ideologization of interstate relations," advocated by Gorbachev and others,⁷ is virtually impossible to grasp without understanding Soviet ideological terms of reference. In fact, the term "de-ideologization" is largely a misnomer. Rather than referring to an effort to remove ideological considerations from foreign policy, Gorbachev's efforts indicate a modification of the functions performed by ideology, modifications that have been prompted by changes in the international environment and by a reassessment of domestic priorities.

ACCORDING to Zbigniew Brzezinski, ideology denotes "a doctrine of political power, which simultaneously defines the ends, outlines the methods for their fulfillment, and mobilizes support for them." In Brzezinski's view, three components make up Marxist-Leninist ideology: philosophical assumptions, doctrinal concepts, and an action program, which derives from doctrine and is based on the philosophical assumptions.⁸ Assuming, as Richard Lowenthal has, that only some aspects of ideology are "operative" in the policy-making process,⁹ it is evident that at least two of the three components have significantly been affected by "new political thinking."

The philosophical assumptions of Marxism-Leninism continue to le-

gitimate the one-party system and act as the moral and spiritual guide to the ever more remote communist utopia. Yet the Gorbachev leadership is less inclined than past defenders of the faith to view the set of these assumptions as a monolithic and closed system of philosophical beliefs. Gone are the old pretensions to an exclusive monopoly on the truth and to possession of the only key to human progress. Thus, the original claims to infallibility and to the scientific nature of socialism are now being challenged.¹⁰ At the

⁴E. A. Shevardnadze, "Lecture," *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR* (Moscow—hereafter, *Vestnik MID*), Aug. 15, 1988, p. 34.

⁵Julia Vishnevsky, "Aleksandr Yakovlev to Regain the Ideological Portfolio?" *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR*, July 28, 1989, pp. 9–12.

⁶*Sovetskaya Kul'tura* (Moscow), July 15, 1989. See also *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), July 20, 1989.

⁷See, for example, Gorbachev's speech to the United Nations General Assembly, *Pravda* (Moscow), Dec. 7, 1989.

⁸Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, revised enlarged edition, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 489. Other scholars also regard ideology as consisting of different components, each performing a separate function. See, for example, Alfred G. Meyer, "The Functions of Ideology in the Soviet Political System," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), January 1966, pp. 273–85; Adam B. Ulam, "Soviet Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy," in Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron, Eds., *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed., New York, Aldine, 1980, pp. 136–53; and "Introduction: Communist Ideology, Belief Systems, and Soviet Foreign Policy," *ibid.*, pp. 93–94.

⁹Richard Lowenthal, "The Logic of One-Party Rule," in Hoffmann and Fleron, *op. cit.*, pp. 118–19.

¹⁰See Gorbachev's statement to a visiting Yugoslav delegation about how no Communist Party has a monopoly on the truth (TASS Report, Dec. 10, 1986). See also Gorbachev's June 1989 statement to the Congress of People's Deputies in which he refuted the idea that "there was a single socialist model" (*Pravda*, June 10, 1989). A month earlier, during his visit to China, Gorbachev made the same point (*Pravda*, May 16, 1989). See also, Vadim Medvedev, "Toward a Knowledge of Socialism," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 17, 1988, pp. 3–18; Medvedev's speech in *Pravda*, Apr. 22, 1989; Yevgeniy Primakov's article in *ibid.*, July 10, 1987; and Yakovlev's comments about using reason rather than quotations from Lenin to support policy, cited in Vishnevsky, *loc. cit.*

same time, key doctrinal concepts derived from the enduring philosophical assumptions have been reshaped or discarded in an effort to devise a different action program more suitable to current Soviet domestic and foreign policy needs. Such developments have called into question the core assumptions of Marxism-Leninism and hence its function as a legitimating force.

By breaking down Soviet ideology into its functional components, it is possible to avoid mistaking a part for the whole, as Light does when she confuses such doctrinal concepts as proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence (which she discusses in rich historical detail), with what she terms "the Soviet theory of international relations."¹¹ Although some Soviet commentators and scholars have written sophisticated analyses that have simultaneously diverged from key aspects of Marxist-Leninist ideology and broadened the scope of research on international relations, as Lynch points out, their work does not constitute theory by any accepted measure. Effectively using the criticisms of several East European scholars to develop his argument, Lynch concludes that Lenin, although wrong, was a better theorist—given his "clear assumptions, explicit links between variables, and bold predictive sweep"—than were Soviet analysts writing during the eras of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev (p. 147). Whatever

er Lenin's actual skills as a theorist, the point about the inability or unwillingness of Soviet analysts to engage in theory-building is important, because it demonstrates a principal limitation of Soviet scholarship. Nonetheless, what was "lost in analytical rigor," Lynch convincingly maintains, was "often made up by a keener sense of the actual moving forces of international relations" (p. 147).

Changing global realities have not only prompted greater realism in Soviet academic analyses; since the Bolshevik Revolution, they also have repeatedly stimulated revisions of Soviet doctrine, albeit not always concurrently, as readers of both Lynch and Light will be reminded. But this process of adapting to shifting international imperatives and opportunities did not mean, even in the post-Stalin era, that the Soviets were abandoning traditional assumptions about class conflict and the historic confrontation between capitalism and socialism.

Nevertheless, Western scholars have been searching for signs of convergence in Soviet and Western approaches to international relations since the late Stalin period. First, the Varga debates,¹² and then, more significantly, the doctrinal changes announced by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress

in 1956, such as the belief in the noninevitability of war, the recognition of diversity within the socialist camp, the positive role played by developing countries, and the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism, led to preliminary attempts to study changes in Soviet ideology.

In the 1960's, Western authors began to detect both a "deradicalization"¹³ and a "routinization"¹⁴ of doctrinal concepts, and envisaged a diminution of the role played by ideology as a guide to action.¹⁵ Subsequently, Franklyn Griffiths demonstrated the existence of divergent tendencies within the Soviet foreign policy elite, ranging from those that relied heavily on doctrinal concepts and Marxist-Leninist assumptions to inform their analysis of American politics, to those who favored a more empirical approach.¹⁶ Lynch and, to a lesser extent, Shenfield share this approach and discuss the ferment in the Soviet academic community that led to the new political thinking.

THE works under review are timely in that they provide the reader with a framework that can be used to explore Gorbachev's efforts to delimit the "operative" sphere of ideology. The Soviet leader's innovations stem from his belief that much of the prevailing ideological orthodoxy is neither conducive to achieving interstate cooperation in an increasingly interdependent world nor commensurate with accomplishing political and economic reform at home, tasks that affect the USSR's

¹¹Light uncritically follows some Soviet scholars in using the terms "ideology" and "doctrine" as synonymous with "theory." See Light, p. 8. Subsequently, she defines "a good theory" as "one that can be adapted or expanded to reflect new circumstances so that it explains the past, serves as a model of the present and has some predictive value for the future. . ." (p. 318), and ably shows that Soviet "theorists" have failed to meet this test. Shenfield's cursory discussion of definitions, although posing fewer problems than Light's, nevertheless neglects to make such important distinctions.

¹²In his *Changes in the Economies of Capitalism as a Result of World War II*, E. Varga argued that governments and political forces in capitalist societies could have considerable independence from the class structure of those societies, specifically from monopoly capital. In addition, Varga found that although governments in capitalist countries were ultimately answerable to monopoly capital, sometimes they defended the interests of the bourgeois class as a whole. Finally, in what was perhaps his most profound departure from the reigning views of his day, Varga suggested that mass influence on the state in capitalist societies could become so pronounced that the state could be used as a means to move peacefully from capitalism to socialism.

¹³Robert C. Tucker, *The Marxian Revolutionary Idea*, New York, Norton, 1969, p. 179.

¹⁴Meyer, loc. cit., p. 284.

¹⁵William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956–1967*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1969, p. 289.

¹⁶Franklyn Griffiths, "Images, Politics, and Learning in Soviet Behavior Toward the United States," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1972.

ability to play a central role in world politics. Striving to rid Soviet foreign policy of the siege mentality fostered by Stalin, the present leadership is now selectively rejecting key doctrinal concepts and redefining many of the philosophical assumptions on which they are based.

Suggesting that the past may no longer be a guide to the future, Light's examination of the ways Gorbachev's predecessors rationalized contradictions in doctrine reveals their strong tendency to make doctrine more elastic rather than to reject critical axioms. Indeed, Soviet policy-makers and scholars have often resorted to tortuous explanations for why they were infusing outmoded concepts with new meaning, bringing to mind the attempt by the phony doctor in Molière's *Le Médecin malgré lui* to justify his mistake about the relative positions of the heart and liver by claiming, "It was once that way, but we changed all that."

For example, the doctrinal concept of peaceful coexistence has, since Lenin, been portrayed as calling for varying degrees of conflict and collaboration with the Soviet Union's capitalist rivals, depending upon the prevailing assessment of the Soviet national interest. As Light asserts, Khrushchev gave this concept added weight by portraying its only alternative as "the most destructive war in history" (p. 47). Yet, the Soviet interest in avoiding a catastrophic nuclear war did not mean that Moscow was abandoning the class struggle and preparing itself to embrace the global political and social status quo. Even under the Brezhnev leadership, which, as Shenfield observes, "raised the formal status of the cooperative aspect" of peaceful coexistence, the ideological struggle was expected to continue until socialism was victorious (Shenfield, p. 23; also Light, pp. 53-63).

In fact, as Lynch contends, Brezhnev's strategy of détente (the process by which the West was compelled to embrace peaceful coexistence) assumed that the systemic competition between capitalism and socialism would intensify while the principal states cooperated to prevent war and ensure the safe transition to a new socialist world order (2nd ed., p. xxxi). During the early 1970's, Soviet policy-makers and theorists had few incentives to reconcile this basic contradiction, especially given the prevailing view in Moscow that the global correlation of forces—embracing the strength of the socialist camp and the overall balance of political, military, and economic power—was shifting to the Soviet Union's advantage.

Although other available Western studies more systematically explore the policy implications of the Brezhnev leadership's zero-sum approach to international politics,¹⁷ the books reviewed here lucidly explain the conceptual framework informing this approach and the dilemmas that emerged, as dogma came into increasing conflict with international realities. Of the four authors, Vigor attaches the greatest weight to the influence of zero-sum doctrinal assumptions, categorically asserting that the "Soviet concept of the 'correlation of forces' lies at the root of all their thinking on international affairs" (p. 11). However, readers should note that unlike the authors of the other books discussed here, Vigor does not set out to explore the parameters or development of Soviet thinking about

world politics; his analysis of the historical evolution of Moscow's approach to disarmament is deduced almost entirely from Soviet negotiating proposals and official leadership statements.

After examining a wider range of Soviet views on international relations, Lynch, Light, and Shenfield are more circumspect than Vigor about the centrality of the correlation-of-forces concept, particularly in recent years. Their reservations reflect not only a difference in focus and assumptions about the degree of doctrinal uniformity imposed from above, but also a difference in the time frame during which these works were prepared: Vigor's analysis was evidently completed before Gorbachev assumed power in 1985 and his book was published in 1986, before the other three.

For both reasons, it is hardly surprising that Light, Lynch, and Shenfield find evidence of ideological confusion among Soviet elites and growing reservations about the ability of established doctrine to explain the complexities and dynamics of international politics. All three agree that Moscow continues to care about maximizing its relative power and position vis-à-vis the West and that traditionally the concept of the correlation of forces has served as the "basic criterion" for evaluating the international standing of the Soviet Union (Lynch, p. 129).

However, both Shenfield and Lynch point to the evolution of Soviet views on global interdependence as evidence that Soviet scholars were searching for a supplementary or alternative concept to the correlation of forces well before Gorbachev became general secretary. By the early 1980's, Soviet analysts had found it increasingly difficult to reconcile the ostensibly positive shift in the correlation of forces, which stemmed largely from

¹⁷See Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1984; Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1987/88, pp. 93-131; and Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, Washington, DC, Brookings, 1987.

the earlier attainment of strategic parity, with the collapse of détente and the sustained confrontational posture of the Reagan administration. As Shenfield contends, "ideology was . . . in a state of crisis" (p. 31), and this crisis accelerated the process of conceptual innovation.

How Soviet analysts could have been so seriously mistaken in their forecasting of trends, even to the point of believing in the early 1970's that détente would be irreversible, can partly be explained by Light's analysis of the correlation of forces. After reviewing its historical applications and constituent elements, she finds no evidence of any scientific method in Soviet assessments but rather a heavy dose of impressionistic and subjective description disguised as analysis (pp. 275–76).

If ideological biases and erroneous expectations distorted Soviet analyses, their impact on policy was even more profound and enduring. As Light acknowledges, even as a "loose metaphor of the changing international system," such doctrinal tenets as the correlation of forces "can still serve as a guide to action" (pp. 289–90). Lynch meticulously documents how Soviet intellectuals eventually pushed the boundaries of ideological orthodoxy to capture the essence of international realities. However, the Brezhnev leadership (and its immediate successors) continued to define Soviet interests not only according to strategic imperatives but also according to traditional Marxist-Leninist philosophical assumptions about the international system, in which conflict between states with different social systems was deemed inherent, and the aggressive nature of "imperialism" was accepted as a given.

In his study of Soviet disarmament proposals from Lenin to Brezhnev, Vigor persuasively argues that strategic imperatives and

Marxist-Leninist philosophical assumptions led successive Soviet leaders to conclude that the militarist impulses engendered by imperialism could only be reliably deterred by Soviet forces at least as strong as those of all their adversaries together (p. 16). Paradoxically, the resulting positive tilt in the correlation of forces also opened the way to halting and possibly reversing the arms race. According to Vigor, the marked progress in disarmament negotiations from 1968 onward coincided with Soviet assessments that the correlation of forces was "indeed tipping firmly and irreversibly" in favor of the socialist camp (pp. 16–17).

However, because he does not integrate a discussion of the incremental changes in Soviet military doctrine into his analysis of this period, Vigor fails to see what even Shenfield's cursory treatment reveals: that the Soviet Union was gradually adjusting to the challenge of obtaining security in the nuclear age. In fact, Brezhnev's denial of the possibility of victory in a nuclear war, as well as his renunciation of the goal of superiority and of Soviet first use of nuclear weapons, signaled real changes in the Soviet approach to war. Such developments, in turn, improved the prospects for at least limited superpower cooperation in arms control, although, of course, they cannot be compared to the major transformation of Soviet political and security preferences that is evident today.¹⁸

Wedded to ideological orthodoxy, Brezhnev and his colleagues rationalized their preference for a foreign policy that stressed developing Soviet military power and extending Soviet influence in the Third World. Even in the late 1970's and early 1980's, when the Soviet Union was confronted by a series of foreign policy setbacks, including the steady deterioration of superpower

relations, Soviet leaders responded by clinging to their original assumptions instead of reexamining them. As a consequence, they resisted pressures to choose between competition and cooperation and failed to recognize that a strategy based on the traditional interpretation of peaceful coexistence was ultimately self-defeating.

THE radical reorientation of Soviet policy initiated by Gorbachev was in large part a response to the failures of Brezhnev's strategy and to the systemic crisis created by several decades of dogmatic and centralized Communist rule. What most distinguishes Gorbachev's program from past attempts at reform is his leadership's effort to delegitimize Stalinist command institutions and the conceptual basis of Stalin's foreign policy, both of which continued to have a detrimental impact on the policies of Stalin's successors.¹⁹ De-Stalinization has set in motion a broader process of redefining the content and role of ideology that, coupled with fundamental political and economic reform and the sweeping reappraisals of Soviet history, forms the core of Gorbachev's revolution.²⁰

¹⁸On these points, see Cynthia Roberts, "Limited Adversaries, Limited Arms Control: Changing Soviet Interests and Prospects for Enhanced Security Cooperation," in Michael Mandelbaum, Ed., *The Other Side of the Table: The Soviet Approach to Arms Control*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, forthcoming.

¹⁹Shevardnadze, "Lecture," loc. cit., p. 32; Medvedev, "Toward a Knowledge of Socialism," loc. cit., p. 9; V. Dashichev, "East-West: The Search for New Relations," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), May 18, 1988; N. Popov, "We Are All in the Same Boat," *ibid.*, Mar. 1, 1989, p. 14; and I. Malashenko, "Non-Military Aspects of Security," *International Affairs* (Moscow), January 1989, pp. 40–51.

²⁰In these areas, events are outpacing Western analysis. However, for thoughtful discussions, see Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, Eds., *Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy*, Boulder, CO, (fn. continued on p. 62)

In foreign policy, the leadership did not immediately move to reconcile contradictions in established doctrine, despite Gorbachev's early hints that he envisaged a different relationship with the West. As late as June 1986, Anatoliy Dobrynin, then head of the International Department of the Central Committee, still denied that the new political thinking implied "any abandonment of the class-oriented analysis of the problems of war and peace."²¹

However, as Gorbachev's own ideas developed, and as he forged a new coalition of political elites who were not bound either by shared generational experiences or intellectual predispositions to many past assumptions, important changes emerged in the definition of such important doctrinal concepts as peaceful coexistence.²² No longer is this doctrine interpreted as a specific form of class struggle or a temporary condition; in the new "Leninist" formulation, priority is squarely placed on the promotion of universal human values, particularly on the preservation of peace, and efforts in this direction are viewed as a fundamental process of indefinite duration.²³

Stephen Shenfield perceptively traces this shift to what he calls the

"all-human approach" (p. 62), in which the importance of peace is elevated above progress toward socialism. Clearly, Gorbachev has departed from past principles by recognizing that security in the nuclear age must be mutual rather than driven by zero-sum calculations. However, rejection of the quest for absolute security also serves the Soviet Union's obvious domestic need for a respite from the intense military build-up that the goal of absolute security required.

Shenfield further charts Soviet reappraisals of Lenin's thesis about the inherently aggressive nature of capitalism, observing that a reinterpretation of this aspect of doctrine is necessary to demonstrate "that a secure peace is attainable in advance of a further substantial improvement in the correlation of forces" (p. 48). Since the publication of Shenfield's book in 1987, Gorbachev has suggested that capitalism can develop dynamically without becoming militaristic (Lynch, 2nd ed., p. xxvii), while those referring to the correlation of forces have become voices in the wilderness. Prominent Soviet political observers are even beginning to dismiss Lenin's study of imperialism as outdated, asserting that the very nature of imperialism has changed.²⁴

Recent developments illustrate the interplay between the shifts in doctrine and innovations in policy. Thus, Lynch observes in the new introduction to his book that Gorba-

chev links the aspects of new political thinking mentioned above to his security policy agenda for nuclear and conventional arms reductions and to his proposals for strengthening the United Nations so that it will reflect "a balance of interests of all countries" (2nd ed., p. xxvi).

Given such radical departures from orthodoxy, it is important to emphasize that current Soviet leaders have not abandoned the goals of the Bolshevik Revolution or the principle of competition between socialism and capitalism. As Gorbachev told a gathering of intellectuals in January 1989: "We can see the depth of the differences between the two social systems, but that is not a reason for opposition by force and the confrontation of states."²⁵ What Soviet leaders envisage is an "active interrelationship" between the two systems in which global challenges are "tackled jointly," while socialism obtains an opportunity to borrow from other developmental experiences, thereby strengthening its position in the continuing competition between the two social systems and in the "reciprocal testing of values."²⁶

According to this new interpretation, class interests continue to exist but, contrary to the previously-held fundamental assumptions of Marxism-Leninism, they are now strictly subordinated to larger national and universal interests. Not surprisingly, Soviet officials deny that they are radically revising the definition of the term class interest. As a senior

Westview, 1988; Bialer, Ed., *Politics, Society, and Nationality. Inside Gorbachev's Russia*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1989; and Thomas Sherlock, "Politics and History Under Gorbachev," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-August 1988, pp. 16-42.

²¹A. Dobrynin, "For a Nonnuclear World, On the Approach of the 21st Century," *Kommunist*, No. 9, 1986, p. 31. Dobrynin did note that the contest between the two systems should take exclusively peaceful forms. See also the discussion in Shenfield, p. 43.

²²That many of Gorbachev's key advisors had previously advanced ideas central to the "new political thinking" testifies to the importance of personnel changes discussed by both Shenfield and Lynch. In fact, articles published around 1984 by such specialists as Primakov and Georgiy Shakhnazarov—who are now members of Gorbachev's brain trust—contain passages that read like current Gorbachev speeches.

²³See, in particular, Medvedev, "Toward a Knowledge of Socialism," loc. cit.; the interview with Ivan Frolov in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 8, 1989, pp. 79-80; and Shevardnadze's speech in *Pravda*, Oct. 24, 1989. See also, S. V. Pronin, "Ideology in an Interdependent World," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow—hereafter, *MEIMO*), October 1988, pp. 5-15, and the discussions in Lynch, pp. xxx-xxxi, and Shenfield, Chs. 8 and 9.

²⁴See the comments by Aleksandr Bovin, in "New Thinking in International Affairs," *Kommunist*, No. 8, 1989, p. 104.

²⁵*Pravda*, Jan. 7, 1989. See also the commentary by G. Mirskiy in *ibid.*, Jan. 25, 1989.

²⁶Medvedev, "Toward a Knowledge of Socialism," loc. cit., and his speech in *Pravda*, Apr. 22, 1989. For an insightful discussion on the changing role of ideology, see "Openness in Politics," *International Affairs*, August 1989, pp. 118-32; also A. I. Volkov, "Who We Are, Where We Are Going," *Rabochiy Klass i Sovremennyy Mir* (Moscow), No. 2, 1989, pp. 67-76.

official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained: "Our classics never imparted to it an absolute value and always stressed that the interests of the proletariat should not go against those of the majority of the population but merge with them."²⁷

Still, whether or not the current leaders will admit to rethinking some basic doctrinal concepts, their commitment to realism in solving complex policy problems and their willingness to adapt these concepts to new realities when the need arises cannot be mistaken. Such realism applies not only to the reappraisal of imperialism as a way of justifying revised threat assessments and unilateral concessions in arms reductions, but also to the re-examination of Soviet history as a means of improving the Soviet Union's image in the world and of co-opting the support of divergent groups within Soviet society. A revealing illustration of the latter point is that although Vyacheslav Molotov used the principle of peaceful coexistence to justify the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, 50 years later the Gorbachev leadership has both redefined peaceful coexistence and "unequivocally" condemned the 1939 agreement as departing from "Leninist principles of foreign policy."²⁸

Remarkably, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has even argued that national interests must be linked to legal, moral, and ethical norms.²⁹ Departing from a key Leninist tenet, Shevardnadze implies that the end does not justify the means. Meanwhile, Soviet analysts suggest that a Soviet foreign policy

driven by ideology has repeatedly led to contradictions between the national interest and universal legal and ethical values, as in the inter-war period and in Eastern Europe after World War II, with deleterious consequences for the USSR.³⁰ Some scholars have even criticized Gorbachev's foreign policy for claiming to stress moral values while failing to take a principled stand on such recent events as the brutal crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in China.³¹

EQUALLY radical changes, albeit incomplete ones, have occurred in Soviet thinking on the Third World and socialist states, areas where ideology has loomed large in past Soviet analyses. Both Light and Lynch examine Soviet views of relations among socialist states and the key impact of events in the socialist community on Soviet thinking regarding international relations (the topic is conspicuously absent in Shenfield's analysis).

Among the works under review, only Light's book examines Soviet views of the Third World per se, and in this section the author's analysis is at its best. Light effectively shows the gradual change in attitudes from Stalin to Khrushchev regarding the revolutionary promise of the colonies. She maintains that the refutation of Varga's views on evolutionary change in colonial areas encouraged the elaboration of Soviet thinking on the Third World, and specifically resulted in the adoption of more radical positions, namely,

rejection of moderate popular front alliances in favor of radical liberation movements (p. 100).

In her analysis of Soviet views of classes and economic development in Third World countries from the Khrushchev through the Brezhnev periods, Light calls attention to the limitations imposed by Marxist-Leninist ideology on understanding the complex processes of change in these countries. Although not approaching the depth and detail that Elizabeth Valkenier and Jerry Hough have brought to the subject,³² particularly for the Khrushchev period, Light has helpfully pinpointed the main contradictions in Moscow's approach that more recently have led Soviet foreign policy specialists to reassess their thinking on the Third World.

In fact, debate has enveloped Soviet studies of the Third World since Khrushchev's time, and Soviet scholars have recognized that in many cases the experiences of developing countries have not followed the course outlined by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Nonetheless, in her analysis of Soviet perspectives on the developing world, Light finds the same uncritical approach to Marxist-Leninist theory and thus an inability to explain prevailing trends in the Third World as was evident in Soviet discussions of the correlation of forces and other doctrinal concepts.

Since the reevaluation of Soviet foreign policy launched at the 27th Congress of the CPSU in 1986, a lively debate has developed in several journals on the appropriate course for Soviet studies of the

³⁰See the comments by Alexander Chubaryan, Vyacheslav Dashichev, Victor Sheinis, and Vladimir Stupishin in "Openness in Politics," loc. cit., pp. 125-31; and Yuri Levada, "A Reactive Recoil: Rethinking the Prague Spring," *Moscow News*, Aug. 27-Sept. 3, 1989, p. 7.

³¹Aleksey Izyumov and Andrey Kortunov, "Diplomacy and Morality of the Times of *Perestroika*," *Moskovskiy Novosti*, No. 32, 1989, p. 6.

³²See, in particular, Jerry F. Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World*, Washington, DC, Brookings, 1986; Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "Revolutionary Change in the Third World: Recent Soviet Assessments," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), April 1986, pp. 415-34; and idem, *The Soviet Union and the Third World*, New York, Praeger, 1983.

²⁷Anatoly Adamishin, "Doomed to Discord," *New Times* (Moscow), Mar. 28-Apr. 3, 1989, p. 9.

²⁸For the reference to Molotov, see Light, p. 35. For the strongest official Soviet condemnation of the Pact to date, see the interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev in *Pravda*, Aug. 18, 1989.

²⁹*Ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1989.

Third World.³³ Significantly, this debate has led some scholars to reject the constraints placed on the field by the Procrustean bed of Marxist-Leninist concepts and to rethink the categories of analysis, particularly such terms as "socialist orientation."³⁴

In 1988, Soviet academics and political figures began to address the contradictions between the requirements of Soviet policy toward Third World states and various national liberation movements (Light, p. 140). They explored this issue against the background of the relative importance of class interests and such "common human values" (*obshchechelovecheskiye tsennosti*) as the need to end regional conflicts and to resolve the problems of hunger and underdevelopment. Consequently, political figures have had to resort to verbal gymnastics (for example, Vadim Medvedev called class interests the highest form of common human values³⁵) to assuage the fears of revolutionaries worldwide, who see signs of weakening verbal support and dwindling material aid for their struggles in Moscow's new emphasis on East-West cooperation.³⁶

Some members of the foreign policy elite simply take a pragmatic approach to Third World development. For example, Andrey

Kozyrev, the deputy director of the International Organizations Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noted that many Third World countries were opting for the Western model of development and "suffering not so much from capitalism but from its shortage."³⁷

This is not to say that the ultimate aim of attaining the socialist millennium has been discarded. What has changed are the means to achieve this end. With class struggle seen as incompatible with the need for cooperation in interstate relations, the task of promoting socialist development in the Third World is increasingly becoming a matter of domestic policy. Some observers have even begun to examine Soviet aid to developing countries from an economic perspective and have cautioned against writing blank checks to regimes whose commitment to Marxist-Leninist socialism is open to question. As Alexei Izyumov and Andrei Kortunov assert, "in the final count the outcome of the competition between the two systems is decided not in Nicaragua or Afghanistan but in the main centers of socialism and capitalism."³⁸

FURTHERMORE, Soviet policy-makers today are loath to impose a model of socialism on the developing countries or even on fellow members of the socialist community, because the very concept of so-

cialism is now being redefined.³⁹ In Lynch's view, the Sino-Soviet split and the emergence of China as a security threat to the USSR catalyzed the reexamination of such fundamental aspects of doctrine as the predominance of class over national interests and, consequently, the impossibility of war between socialist states (p. 141).⁴⁰ Undoubtedly the Sino-Soviet conflict had a major impact on Soviet thinking on the nature of socialism and on inter-socialist relations, but events in Eastern Europe in the past three decades, especially the Prague Spring in 1968 and the Polish crisis in 1980–81, played an equally significant role.

Above all, the need to provide a theoretical rationale for *perestroika* has been a particularly important motivating factor in the Soviet effort to reassess the meaning of socialism. The prevailing consensus on "the modern concept of socialism" was recently elaborated in a series of articles that appeared in *Pravda* on July 14, 16, and 17, 1989. Prominent officials and academics stated that the purpose of *perestroika* was to enable socialism "to acquire a truly human face," words that recalled the Prague Spring. They also asserted that "the concept of socialism as a social system presupposes" that different models or variants of socialism will be adopted by socialist countries simultaneously or at various times. Gorbachev sub-

³³For an incisive early critique, see V. L. Sheynis, "The Developing Countries and New Political Thinking," *Rabochiy Klass i Sovremennyy Mir*, No. 4, 1987, pp. 77–90.

³⁴This term has been the subject of considerable discussion in the Soviet journal *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya* (Moscow). See the articles on "socialist orientation" in issues Nos. 8 and 10 in 1987, and Nos. 5, 6, 8, and 9 in 1988; the editorial in No. 10, 1988; and the discussion in *Kommunist*, No. 6, 1988.

³⁵Medvedev, "Toward a Knowledge of Socialism," loc. cit., p. 10.

³⁶See the reply by Yevgeniy Primakov, Vladlen Martynov, and German Dligenskiy to a critical letter from a Japanese leftist, "Some Problems of New Thinking," *MEIMO*, June 1986, pp. 5–18.

³⁷Andrei Kozyrev, "Confidence and the Balance of Interests," *International Affairs*, November 1988, p. 6. See also, Alexei Izyumov and Andrei Kortunov, "The Soviet Union and the Changing World," *ibid.*, August 1988, p. 52; and Aleksandr Bovin and Vladimir Lukin, "Dialogue: The Restructuring of International Affairs—Paths and Approaches," *MEIMO*, January 1989, pp. 67–68.

³⁸Izyumov and Kortunov, "The Soviet Union and the Changing World," loc. cit., p. 55. See also Shevardnadze's comments on limiting the costs of protecting foreign policy interests in "Lecture," loc. cit., p. 31.

³⁹For an early example, see Fedor Burlatskiy, "What Kind of Socialism Do the People Need?" *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Apr. 20, 1988.

⁴⁰Lynch highlights this point in *Gorbachev's International Outlook: Intellectual Origins and Political Consequences*, Occasional Paper No. 9, New York, Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1989, pp. 9 and 27–28; and in the introduction to the paperback edition of his book, p. xix. Although Light points out that balance has increasingly been achieved in the Soviet evaluation of the national and international interests of socialist states, she does not explain the reasons for this change (pp. 306–08).

sequently reiterated both points in a lengthy article that appeared in *Pravda* on November 26, 1989.⁴¹

Unlike Khrushchev's commitment to different roads to socialism, which was fatally tested by the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, current Soviet leaders have demonstrated (as of late 1989) that they will live up to their promise to tolerate diversity within the socialist community, whether this diversity means a non-communist government in Poland, movement toward a multiparty democracy and capitalist market in Hungary, the prospect of liberal reforms and competitive elections in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, repressive policies in Romania, or the brutal suppression of the pro-democracy movement in China. Soviet equanimity in the face of the dramatic end to the Berlin Wall as the symbol of a divided Europe testifies to the seriousness of Gorbachev's recent statements that the Soviet Union has no moral or political right to interfere in the affairs of its East European neighbors.⁴²

Just six months ago, in his speech to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Gorbachev had been quick to remind the international community that the process of reform occurring in socialist countries leads not to the overthrow of socialism but to its renewal. It is because states enjoy freedom of choice, he argued, that the differences between capitalist and socialist states cannot be eliminated.⁴³ However, Soviet recognition that each country is free to choose its own path has not deterred Moscow from lobbying East European leaders to follow the example of *perestroika* or from admonishing the Hungarians, Poles, and East Germans that talk of leaving the Warsaw Pact is premature.

Soviet leaders evidently hope that the old orthodoxy binding the socialist community can be replaced by a loosely defined com-

mitment to the reform of socialism. It is becoming increasingly apparent, however, that the reform of socialism in countries where it was imposed by force in the postwar period leads not to its renewal but to its withering away and transformation, in all likelihood, into a form of social democracy.

Reflecting the remarkable flexibility in current Soviet thinking about ideology, even this seemingly unfavorable trend has now been cast in a positive light. Soviet observers such as Yevgeniy Ambartsumov insist that even noncommunist regimes, such as the government led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki in Poland, do not cease to be socialist, because they are not rejecting "basic socialist ideas as fundamental values." As Ambartsumov notes, Shevardnadze has made basically the same point. Moreover, Ambartsumov contends that even when new East European regimes "disown socialism," what they really mean is the "Stalinist administrative model of socialism."⁴⁴ Yet, while embracing "principles of social justice" and "ideas of socialism," Prime Minister Mazowiecki has made it clear that Poland seeks "to create a market economy."⁴⁵

The upheavals sweeping across Eastern Europe also threaten to erode the institutional ties that bind the Soviet Union to its unraveling East European empire. In particular, these dramatic changes raise important questions about the future of the Warsaw Pact, the re-emergence of old national rivalries in Central Europe, and the potential place of reforming East European states in Europe's political and economic life. Although Moscow is on record as favoring the abolition of both alliance systems and the creation of a "common European home," the Soviet Union is presently attempting to transform the role and structure of the Warsaw Pact,

partly as a means to deter destabilizing near-term defections. From Gorbachev's perspective, the more immediate challenge of alliance management has undoubtedly loomed larger since the extraordinary events in East Germany, where the prospect of a multiparty system calls into question the rationale for a separate East German state.

GROWING demands in several East European states for radical reforms, including the introduction of multiparty systems, also add a new dimension to the challenges facing Gorbachev at home, where reform has taken a more measured course. Suddenly, developments in Eastern Europe have begun to outpace *perestroika* and exert a reverse demonstration effect, which may strengthen Soviet proponents of more radical and rapid reforms.

In the Soviet Union, Gorbachev's own policies have already led to a decentralization of political power and a restructuring of the relationship between state and society. Originally, these policies were de-

⁴¹Although the contributors to the July series included such notable figures as Leonid Abalkin, Oleg Bogomolov, Aleksey Butenko, and Tat'yana Zaslavskaya, the articles reflected the group's compromise positions and failed to refer to the role of the CPSU in Soviet society. By comparison, Gorbachev's article emphasized the CPSU's role as "political vanguard" and the "advisability of keeping the one-party system."

⁴²*The New York Times*, Oct. 26, 1989.

⁴³Gorbachev's speech to the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg, in *Pravda*, July 7, 1989; see also, Gorbachev's speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 2, 1989, p. 44; an interview with Eduard Shevardnadze in which the Foreign Minister expresses the continuing need to preserve "the gains of the socialist system," *New Times* (Moscow), July 11-17, 1989, p. 10; and an interview with Karen Brutents, deputy chief of the Central Committee's International Department, in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 28, 1989, p. 5.

⁴⁴Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, "Not Agony but Turn to Life. Reforms in East Europe and the Destiny of Socialism," *Moskovskiy Novosti*, No. 45, Nov. 5, 1989, p. 7.

⁴⁵Interviews with Tadeusz Mazowiecki in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 1, 1989, pp. 20-21; and *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Oct. 11, 1989.

signed to unleash individual initiative and enlist the broad support of the people in the effort to circumvent bureaucratic opposition to economic reform. Increasingly, democratization has come to be seen as essential in its own right, although there are as many views on what form democratization should take as there are on how best to make the transition.⁴⁶

Many Soviet intellectuals assert that the development of real civil society requires a government based on the rule of law and the de-ideologization or "secularization" of political and social life. In their view, progress toward democracy and secularization is impossible without the elimination of "all ideological and political myth- and legend-making."⁴⁷ Others maintain that creating a civil society must be preceded by building the material basis for freedom, including the development of a market and the decentralization of state property, although these objectives may take decades to accomplish.⁴⁸ Even some senior officials in the CPSU apparatus recognize that the clash of ideas and interests within society, the transfer of certain powers to the soviets, and the development of pluralism (at least in the press and within the party) are positive developments that enhance the prospects for *perestroika*.⁴⁹

For the leadership, democratization has become, as Yakovlev puts it, "the backbone of *perestroika*." Although rejecting the wholesale application of Western models, Yakovlev maintains that democracy should include "the individual's participation in all affairs" and the establishment of "effective feedback in society" in order to solve social problems. Acknowledging that Soviet leaders "cannot inculcate convictions from above," he emphasizes that people need information or *glasnost'* in order to make choices, particularly about issues

that affect their daily lives.⁵⁰ Gorbachev, who has also advocated such views, stated in his November 26, 1989, article in *Pravda* that "the party will promote the development of pluralism."

Of course, the Soviet Union is just beginning to establish genuine democratic norms, and has yet to institutionalize effective means for holding the party-state accountable to the popular will. But the Congress of People's Deputies and the reconstituted Supreme Soviet demonstrated in their 1989 sessions that candidates for ministerial appointments were not guaranteed confirmation, and that deputies intend to advance bold new legislation defining such basic principles as freedom of the press, democratic electoral procedures, and property rights.⁵¹ The increasingly independent Soviet legislature has even voted to remove the constitutional provision that allocates one-third of the 2,250 deputies' seats in the People's Congress to official "pub-

lic organizations," including the CPSU, and, defying Gorbachev's wishes, approved an amendment permitting republics to decide for themselves whether presidents of their soviets should be elected by direct popular vote.

Having assumed much of the power and authority of the CPSU, the Supreme Soviet is struggling to balance competing societal interests, and is forcing Gorbachev to engage in coalition-building. Ironically, these and other developments, such as the actions of popular fronts in the Baltic republics and widespread strikes, threaten to outpace theoretical discussions on the nature of democracy in the new socialist order.

Forward-thinking political elites and intellectuals, however, have recognized that the development of a democratic social structure requires not "more socialism" but a qualitatively different kind of socialism—what Oleg Bogomolov calls "a changing of the model of socialism."⁵² Despite a wide spectrum of

⁴⁶In addition to the references below, compare the roundtable discussion, "The 20th Century: Alternative Developments," *Rabochiy Klass i Sovremennyy Mir*, No. 1, 1989, pp. 60–71; "Conclusion," *ibid.*, No. 2, 1989, pp. 77–96; the roundtable discussion, "Western Democracy and Problems of Contemporary Social Development," *MEiMO*, November 1988, pp. 5–18; "The Democratic Alternative: Problems of the Democratization of Contemporary Societies," *ibid.*, May 1989, pp. 5–18; and "The Ideology of Revolutionary Thought and Action," *Kommunist*, No. 5, 1988, pp. 3–11.

⁴⁷Elgiz Pozdnyakov, "The National and the International in Foreign Policy," *International Affairs*, June 1989, pp. 10–11; *idem*, "National, State, and Class Interests in International Relations," *MEiMO*, May 1988, pp. 3–17; Yuriy Levada, "The Dynamics of Social Change: Possibilities of Analysis," *Kommunist*, No. 2, 1989, pp. 34–45; A. A. Lebedev, "The Last Religion," *Voprosy Filosofii* (Moscow), January 1989, p. 54; Igor Yanin, "Returning to Simple Truths," *International Affairs*, March 1989, pp. 113–16; and Chingiz Aitmatov in *Pravda*, Feb. 14, 1987. See also, S. Y. Andreyev, "The Structure of Power and The Tasks of Society," *Neva* (Leningrad), January 1989, pp. 144–73.

⁴⁸See, for example, Andranik Migranyan, "Is It Easy to Become Europe?" *XX Century and Peace* (Moscow), December 1988, pp. 22–25;

the interview with Igor' Klyamkin and Andranik Migranyan, "Is an 'Iron Hand' Necessary?" *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Aug. 16, 1989; V. Shubkin, "A Difficult Farewell," *Novyy Mir*, April 1989, pp. 165–84; and A. P. Butenko in *Pravda*, Aug. 8, 1989.

⁴⁹Interview with Georgiy Pryakhin in *FBIS-SOV*, July 28, 1989, pp. 92–93; *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Aug. 5, 1989.

⁵⁰Aleksandr Yakovlev interviewed by Seweryn Bialer, "Redefining Socialism at Home and Abroad," *Journal of International Affairs* (New York), Spring 1989, pp. 334–36.

⁵¹Dawn Mann, "First Session of USSR Supreme Soviet Ends," *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR*, Aug. 18, 1989, pp. 1–3; *idem*, "The Challenges Facing Gorbachev," *ibid.*, Sept. 1, 1989, pp. 15–19. See also the interview with N. I. Ryzhkov in *Argumenty i Fakty* (Moscow), No. 33, 1989, pp. 1–3.

⁵²Compare the references in fns. 26 and 46 with O. Bogomolov, "The Changing Face of Socialism," *Kommunist*, No. 11, 1989, pp. 33–42; Yevgeniy Ambartsumov's article in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, Sept. 19, 1989; the interview with I. T. Frolov in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 24, 1989, pp. 90–91; interview with Frolov in *ibid.*, Apr. 19, 1989, pp. 83–85; and A. S. Panarin, "The Dialectics of Humanism," *Kommunist*, No. 5, 1989, pp. 40–51.

views on what socialism means today, a common point of departure among progressive reformers, Gorbachev included, is the need to dismantle much of the old economic and political structure that suppressed individual initiative and societal interests in favor of state control.⁵³ Such reformers are even willing to draw on elements of the West European social democratic experience for guidance in reconceptualizing socialism.⁵⁴ Mikhail Gorbachev's own vision of socialist renewal in the USSR still contains limits and contradictions, but this consideration is perhaps less significant than his steady adoption of progressive ideas and his remarkable skill in redefining what may be considered acceptable centrist positions.

To be sure, Gorbachev persistently maintains that "any weakening of the party or diminution of its progressive activity [such as providing ideological support for policy] . . . would deal an irreparable blow to socialism." As recently as the summer of 1989, he was also insisting that *perestroyka* is "not the capitalist regeneration of Soviet society" and that it embraces the idea of "socialist ownership" but not "private ownership" of the means of production.⁵⁵ By comparison,

some of his more radical subordinates and influential supporters were already defining *perestroyka* not only as "the rehabilitation of the individual," but also as "the 'restoration' of the civilized achievements of capitalism" and as a "process of convergence."⁵⁶

By November, Gorbachev had narrowed the gap, suggesting not only that the Soviet Union should adopt some of the "achievements" of capitalism, but also that he did not exclude the possibility that private property "will appear" in the future.⁵⁷ According to Yakovlev, "the ideology of the owner must be paramount" for when a person "has a stake in something, he will move mountains; if he does not, he will be indifferent."⁵⁸ Given the pragmatic stance of many officials, including the new Deputy Premier, Leonid Abalkin—who has stated that "an enterprise is socialist if it makes money"⁵⁹—it is likely that Gorba-

chev's present position on such matters will continue to evolve. Evidently, the Soviet leader is prepared to risk the further alienation of hard-core conservatives who view moderate and radical reformers alike as apostates from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy.⁶⁰

Moreover, just as the diminishing role of ideology in international relations paves the way for all states to have greater freedom of choice in their foreign and domestic policies, so the changing nature and place of ideology in Soviet domestic politics opens up the possibility of an end to the monopoly of power by the CPSU and the creation of a multiparty system. In fact, some would argue that popular fronts and the opposition movement within the Congress of People's Deputies are the embryos of future parties.⁶¹

Although this observation continues to make some party stalwarts like Vadim Medvedev squirm with

⁵⁶The first quotation is from the interview with Georgiy Pryakhin, loc. cit., p. 93; and the latter ones are from L. Karpinskiy, "The Common Sense of *Perestroyka*," *Vek XX i Mir*, January 1989, p. 16. Pryakhin further maintains that "ideology must not interfere in economic affairs," and that "pluralism must also be developed in the sphere of ownership." He claims that "we must recognize private ownership, cooperative ownership, and mixed ownership, along with state ownership" (p. 2). See also the discussion of Aleksandr Tsipko's 1989 article in *Politicheskoye Obrazovaniye* by Elizabeth Teague in "Soviet Theoreticians Debate 'The Human Factor,'" *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR*, Aug. 25, 1989, pp. 10–12. Tsipko, who is now a consultant in the Central Committee's International Department, traces the Soviet misinterpretation of human nature and the unrestricted power of the party-state to Marx, and emphasizes the importance of individual conscience and personal responsibility in developing private over collective interests.

⁵⁷*Pravda*, Nov. 26, 1989; and the text of Gorbachev's response to questions from students in *Pravda*, Nov. 17, 1989.

⁵⁸*Pravda*, Aug. 11, 1988. See also his statements in *ibid.*, June 23, 1989, and in "Redefining Socialism at Home and Abroad," loc. cit., pp. 333–35.

⁵⁹As cited in: A Conversation with Nikolai Shmelev and Ed A. Hewett, "A Pragmatist's Approach to the Soviet Economy," *Brookings*

Review (Washington, DC), Winter 1988/89, p. 4. See also, Ed A. Hewett, "*Perestroyka* and the Congress of People's Deputies," *Soviet Economy* (Silver Spring, MD), January–March 1989, pp. 47–69.

⁶⁰Gorbachev himself recognized in 1988 that "people are confused, wondering whether we are backsliding from socialist positions . . . and whether we are not revising Marxist-Leninist teaching itself." He added, "It is no wonder that 'defenders' of Marxism-Leninism have already appeared along with the mourners of socialism, who believe that both Marxism-Leninism and socialism are under threat" (*Pravda*, Feb. 19, 1988). By the fall of 1989, the ideological education of Soviet students was sharply diminished, a move that undoubtedly further alienated conservatives. For a representative sample of conservative thinking that attacks radical intellectuals, popular fronts, and Gorbachev's reforms as counterproductive and antisocialist, see Nina Andreyeva's latest statements in an interview in *The Washington Post*, June 28, 1989; and in her letter published in *Molodaya Gvardiya* (Moscow), July 1989, pp. 272–77. See also Ambartsumov in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, loc. cit.

⁶¹See Roy Medvedev's interview with Gioletto Chiesa in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 61; the interview with Yuriy Afanas'yev in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 22, 1989, p. 73; and the interview with Pryakhin, loc. cit., p. 92.

⁵³For an important discussion of the costs to society of "statism," see G. Arbatov and E. Batalov, "Political Reform and the Evolution of the Soviet State," *Kommunist*, No. 4, 1989, pp. 35–64.

⁵⁴See, for example, the interview with Karen Brutents in *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 30, 1989, pp. 4–5; Vadim Medvedev's interview with Bernard Guetta in *FBIS-SOV*, June 2, 1989, p. 29; the report of the Socialist International Congress in *Pravda*, July 20, 1989; and the report of a meeting between Gorbachev and Willy Brandt in *ibid.*, Oct. 18, 1989. See also, A. Galkin and Yu. Krasin, "Communists and Social Democrats in the Contemporary World," *MEIMO*, February 1989, pp. 87–92.

⁵⁵See Gorbachev's speech to the Supreme Soviet in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 2, 1989, p. 43; and the account of his conversation with workers in Leningrad on July 11, 1989, in *Pravda*, Aug. 20, 1989.

discomfort,⁶² many other party members, including Georgiy Pryakhin, a deputy chief of the Central Committee's Ideology Department, suggest that pluralism within the party may be a positive development. Pryakhin believes that intra-party tendencies will likely lead to the "emergence of parties within the party," and does not rule out the possibility of a multiparty system, although, in his view, such a development may be destabilizing.⁶³

Why do many communist party members favor political pluralism? The influential scholar Yevgeniy Ambartsumov's recent thoughts on the "gratifying" moves toward pluralism in Eastern Europe apply equally well to the Soviet Union: "the communist party's political monopoly," he maintained, "has frequently resulted in its own degeneration."⁶⁴ Among other factors, lack of institutionalized competition has led to such a sharp decline in the CPSU's prestige and effectiveness that a saddened collective farmer, in a recent letter to *Pravda*, felt compelled to describe the party's present role as simply that of "a windbag, a doleful preacher of decrepit dogmas."⁶⁵

Nevertheless, Gorbachev continues to insist that democracy is possible within the framework of a one-party system, although this view has not prevented him from ap-

pointing key advisors like Georgiy Shakhnazarov and Vyacheslav Dashichev who support political pluralism, or from appointing Abalkin, who is also on record as favoring a multiparty system, to the position of deputy premier.⁶⁶ Given support for political pluralism among members of the Inter-Regional Group in the Supreme Soviet and others, Gorbachev may be pulled willy-nilly on this issue, as he has on others, by the momentum of the changes he himself has unleashed.⁶⁷ Significantly, despite Gorbachev's strong opposition, a parliamentary motion in November to debate the removal of Article 6 from the constitution was only defeated by a few votes. The same week, in a televised exchange with students, the General Secretary stated that he "did not now see another political force" capable of leading the country, but he also reminded his audience that any article of the constitution, including Article 6, can be modified or eliminated.⁶⁸ Adding to the pressure on Gorbachev, in early December, Lithuania became the first republic to repeal the same phrase from its constitution.

PERHAPS the devolution of party control is already a foregone conclusion, the inevitable result of the growing consciousness among the Soviet people that they can exercise their freedom of choice. The remaining question, then, centers on the pace of change. Although historian Roy Medvedev supports the gradual development of a multiparty system, he warns that an opposition group at this time could endanger the emerging fragile de-

mocracy.⁶⁹ Other advocates of Western democratic values argue that as yet no institutions can absorb the explosion of political participation and contend that anarchy may result if Gorbachev does not strengthen his personal power at the expense of democratization.⁷⁰ However, an alternative argument holds that the increase in political mobilization militates against a reversal of reform or a coup against Gorbachev.⁷¹

The pace of change within socialist countries is also a critical issue, in part because it reverberates in unpredictable ways. For example, the symbolism of Chinese tanks crushing the pro-democracy movement in Beijing on the same day that Solidarity attained an electoral triumph in the unprecedented parliamentary elections in Poland was not lost on the Polish reformers.⁷² Similarly, both Chinese and Romanian leaders are concerned about the burgeoning trend toward democracy and capitalism in Eastern Europe. The alternatives—democracy, repression, or anarchy—appear

⁶²See Medvedev's comments in "April 1989—Perestroika Continues," *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 17, 1989, pp. 1–3; and his interview in *FBIS-SOV*, June 2, 1989, pp. 27–28. See also, the editorial in *Pravda*, Nov. 12, 1989.

⁶³Interview with Pryakhin, loc. cit., p. 92. See also, Andreyev, "The Structure of Power and the Tasks of Society," loc. cit. Andreyev argues that the party has become fused with the bureaucracy and that its hold on power can only be broken by subordinating it to the public as well as to its membership. He recognizes, however, that attaining this objective will require a fierce struggle.

⁶⁴Ambartsumov, "Not Agony but Turn to Life," loc. cit.

⁶⁵Tat'yana Samolis in *Pravda*, Sept. 18, 1989.

⁶⁶Interview with Roy Medvedev, loc. cit., p. 61.

⁶⁷Gorbachev already speaks more about democratization than democratic centralism, and he has loosely embraced the idea of checks and balances. See *Pravda*, Nov. 30, 1988.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, Nov. 17, 1989.

⁶⁹Roy A. Medvedev, *Let History Judge*, 2nd ed., New York, Columbia University Press, 1989, pp. 648–69 and 711; and Thomas Sherlock, "The Second Edition of Roy Medvedev's *Let History Judge*," *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR*, Aug. 4, 1989, pp. 17–19.

⁷⁰Interview with Klyamkin and Migranyan, loc. cit., p. 10. See also, Leonid Gatkin "The Dead Seize the Living," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Sept. 20, 1989; and Peter Reddaway, "Is the Soviet Union Drifting Towards Anarchy," *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR*, Aug. 25, 1989, pp. 1–5.

⁷¹N. Mikhaylov in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 23, 1989, pp. 35–36; and Yuriy Levada in *ibid.*, Nov. 1, 1989, pp. 75–78. Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov has also maintained that a turn from democratization to dictatorship was impossible because "the people would never agree to it." See his interview in *Argumenty i Fakty*, loc. cit. See also Viktor Yasmann's discussion of the factors mitigating against a coup in "The Internal Security Situation in the USSR and the Defense Council," *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR*, Sept. 1, 1989, pp. 8–14.

⁷²Timothy Garton Ash, "Revolutions [sic] in Hungary and Poland," *New York Review of Books*, Aug. 17, 1989, p. 10.

more starkly in societies that are still learning their own role vis-à-vis the state.

It is still premature to consider the fundamental revision of Soviet doctrine as heralding "the end of ideology." Indeed, *perestroyka* in domestic and foreign policy reveals the considerable elasticity of Marxist-Leninist ideology and "conceptual stretching" as a means of paring over contradictions between Soviet reality and the socialist utopia.

Nonetheless, Soviet leaders may wind up redefining the meaning of socialism and its place in the international system so thoroughly that its meaning bears little resemblance to original Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. The radical reinterpretation of such doctrinal concepts as peaceful coexistence and internationalism, and such ideas as market socialism, could ultimately lead to the transformation of the ideology's philosophical assumptions. If these assumptions lose their sacred

status—despite Gorbachev's attempts to salvage the essence of ideology—it follows that the monopoly of party control may be the next victim of a self-generating process of social change. It is no wonder, then, that party functionaries, who remember well what Marx and Engels said about the bourgeoisie producing its own gravediggers, are reluctant to address the consequences for their own power of the revolution that is *perestroyka*.

Evolving Center-Periphery Relations in the Soviet Polity

John P. Willerton, Jr.

DONNA BAHRY. *Outside Moscow: Power, Politics, and Budgetary Policy in the Soviet Republics*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1987.

JAN AKE DELLENBRANT. *The Soviet Regional Dilemma: Planning, People, and Natural Resources*. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1986.

CAMERON ROSS. *Local Government in the Soviet Union*. London, Croom Helm, 1987.

JEFFREY W. HAHN. *Soviet Grassroots: Citizen Participation in Local Soviet Government*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1988.

AS the "totalitarian," "administered-society," and similar models have given way to more complex understandings of an evolving Soviet system, many Western scholars have

John P. Willerton, Jr. is Assistant Professor of Political Science at The University of Arizona (Tucson). Among his numerous writings on Soviet domestic politics is the forthcoming book Patronage and Politics in the USSR.

abandoned the view that meaningful political actions deserving of our attention only occur in Moscow. The new interest in Soviet politics at the republic level and below has generated numerous monographs, articles, and chapters on political activity at the Soviet periphery—some focusing on particular regions and others taking a comparative view of the entire country.¹

The emergent literature on politics at the periphery, typified by the four studies reviewed here, demonstrates that we are in an improved position when it comes to examining political life at the regional and local levels. Increasing amounts of previously inaccessible data have come to light, particularly since the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost*.² Moreover, more systematic and social scientific research techniques have enabled resourceful and creative researchers to mine both new and older information, identifying the patterns and subtleties of complex subnational politics. Longitudinal studies permit researchers to assess continuity and change under various national leaders. More sophisticated cross-regional studies make it possible to consider the relevance of nationality and developmental differences to center-periphery relations. As a result, researchers are now also better able to place fo-

cused case studies in an appropriate perspective.³

This new exploration of center-periphery relations, of the functioning of the policy process, and of the participation of numerous institutional and noninstitutional actors has forced us to rethink a number of basic assumptions about the Soviet system. In some cases, these assumptions need to be modified,

¹Other works in this vein in addition to those reviewed here are: Gregory Gleason, *National Federalism in the USSR*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1988; Everett M. Jacobs, Ed., *Soviet Local Politics and Government*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1983; Michael Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge*, Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1982; and Ottorino Cappelli, "Changing Leadership Perspectives on Centre-Periphery Relations," in David Lane, Ed., *Elites and Political Power in the USSR*, Hampshire, Edward Elgar, 1988, pp. 245-66.

A few earlier works also made substantive contributions to our understanding in this area: e.g., David Cattell, *Leningrad: A Case Study of Soviet Urban Government*, NY, Praeger, 1968; Ronald J. Hill, *Soviet Political Elites: The Case of Tiraspol*, London, Martin Robertson, 1977; and William Taubman, *Governing Soviet Cities: Bureaucratic Politics and Urban Development in the USSR*, NY, Praeger, 1973.

²An example of the potential scholarly fruits of the *glasnost* period is Viktor Kozlov, *The Peoples of the Soviet Union*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1988, which presents considerable new Soviet demographic and census data.

³Examples of such studies are Timothy J. Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979; and Thane Gustafson, *Reform in Soviet Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981.

and in other cases, they are substantiated.

Foremost among these perspectives is the view that all-Union authorities are overwhelmingly dominant in directing the political life of Soviet society—setting the agenda for and regulating the behavior of all subordinate units and the society at large through a large and complex set of party and state institutions. In this setting, the actions of all actors at the republic level and below are seen as highly circumscribed. At best, they can in very limited ways adapt central directives to local conditions. Although the options open to local actors may have increased since 1953, their lobbying efforts are thought still to have only a marginal impact on policy-making. Tight organizational controls and a political culture at the center stressing hierarchy and deference are seen as reinforcing this system.

A second perspective assumes that rival institutional and political interests do exist within the Soviet polity, extending from the central regime down to the local governments. Although the totalitarian model and its variants depict a relatively unified set of party/state bureaucracies guided by a discernible policy program, even they, at least implicitly, acknowledge the existence of divergent interests within the polity. These interests are associated with different sectoral, regional, and institutional actors. While subordinate to the all-Union regime as a whole, certain sectors within this regime (the military-industrial complex), regions (the Russian republic), and institutions (the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU]) are believed to be favored in the ongoing rivalries.

With regard to regional and ethnic rivalries, the all-Union authorities are compelled by potential centrifugal tendencies to espouse an egalitarian policy program. Howev-

er, the stated commitment to regional and ethnic equality is viewed as highly suspect and largely cosmetic. Regional differences, for instance in per capita income, are seen to reflect deliberate political decisions—and not just differences in development. Strong political associations between Moscow and particular regions and ethnic groups are believed to provide much of the explanation for the disparities in conditions and treatment.

Third, it has been assumed that in politics at the periphery, the communist party has played a primary role legitimated by a full set of rules and norms. Western assessments of the Soviet policy process have directed little attention to non-party actors. Lower-level state and mass organizations have been seen as performing at best tertiary political roles. The system of local soviets existed to implement central policy and to buttress system legitimacy, but was of very little use in advancing local interests. Average citizens, and their elected representatives, were regarded as having little involvement in decisions affecting community life.⁴ In the same vein, it has been generally assumed that mass participatory activities were symbolic, meriting minimal scholarly attention.⁵ Participation appeared to be severely limited and to be channeled largely in directions desired by the political authorities.

THESE assumptions are closely scrutinized in Donna Bahry's broad examination of center-periphery relations as manifested in the politics of Soviet budgets. Employing data drawn from all republics in the post Stalin period, Bahry demonstrates that the political relationship between all-Union officials and actors on the periphery is complex and dynamic, not susceptible to simple generalization. Although Bahry confirms that all-Union authorities

have been the more decisive actors, she also demonstrates that lower-level officials possess some means by which they can advance regional interests. We find here persuasive evidence of an elaborate, Byzantine bargaining process that favors incremental outcomes.

Bahry's careful examination of different budgetary sectors highlights the difficulty of generalizing about the influence of republic, regional, and local interests. In certain areas, where institutional prerogatives have continued to reside with all-Union agencies (e.g., the manufacturing industries), lower-level officials have consistently had little or no influence; about all they can do is to monitor the activities of the central ministries and their local subunits. And the data reveal that this has been true regardless of who has been in charge in Moscow. In areas of joint Union/republic jurisdiction (e.g., agriculture, construction, light industry, and the food industry), lower-level officials are found to have experienced growing policy latitude since the early 1950's.

What has this increased decision-making latitude in selected areas brought officials at the republic level and below? In the post-Stalin period, the budgets of republic, regional, and local units have grown faster than those of all-Union actors, but not fast enough to cope with an even more rapidly expand-

⁴The distinction drawn by Seweryn Bialer between "high" and "low" politics was meant to suggest, among other things, that lower-level actors could have some influence in regard to less important, generally local, issues. However, even in the domain of local politics, the general view was that citizens had little real influence or input. See Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 166–67.

⁵One of the few substantial works to explore these issues is Theodore H. Friedgut, *Political Participation in the USSR*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979.

ing range of tasks and responsibilities. Although by the mid-1980's, republic, regional, and local agencies accounted for nearly half of the Soviet budget, they still lacked adequate resources to address their full set of needs. As a consequence, the dependence of local officials on all-Union agencies has remained unchanged or even increased.

Bahry's analysis reconfirms the critical importance of the political structure and its manner of distributing power. Primary authority for making decisions and allocating resources in all areas is seen to have remained with all-Union authorities throughout the post-Stalin period. Lower-level actors have taken on a larger set of responsibilities, but those responsibilities have been specified and assigned by all-Union agencies, and are generally of a policy-implementing nature. Although more funds have been distributed among subordinate units, the decisions of these units must accord with central plans.

Only in the case of Nikita Khrushchev's *sovnarkhoz* reforms did the all-Union regime go beyond the allocation of new responsibilities and actually devolve some decision-making authority to actors at the periphery. And the results were not encouraging from Moscow's standpoint: regional officials exhibited their independence by redirecting resources to their own projects, ignoring or downplaying the goals of the center. Moscow's new leaders rather quickly undid these reforms, reasserting the center's dominant institutional position.

The Bahry study provides some insight into the elusive issue of how republic, regional, and local officials seek to advance their interests in the system. We have long been aware that political connections and other informal means are used by officials to advance their interests,⁶ and we also know that offi-

cials at the periphery are increasingly able to articulate their concerns to all-Union authorities in important public forums.⁷ But Bahry's systematic analysis of longitudinal and cross-regional data does not find these informal and formal mechanisms to have had a major impact on investment and expenditure decisions. In her view, an incrementalist explanation—i.e., basing this year's allocation to a given region on the prior year's allocation—is much more appropriate for explaining investment and expenditure results. Although the complex, multi-layered, bureaucratic process does provide most regional officials with many connections to particular higher-level institutions or politicians, these numerous connections often cancel one another out, so that no one appears to be particularly well-favored. The multiple checkpoints and controls of the immense Soviet system tend to promote compromise and relatively even-handed treatment of the competing regions (pp. 95–96).

The size and diversity of interests found within the party/state bureaucracy can also work to confound the political intentions of the center. As Bahry and Jan Dellenbrant note, Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev both promoted policies aimed at some redistribution of resources across regions. Yet with so many competing goals and rival institutions directing investment decisions, their efforts at cross-regional equalization were severely handicapped: major regional inequalities remained, or even worsened (see Bahry, pp. 164–65; Dellenbrant, pp. 109–12).

Beyond its substantive arguments, Bahry's volume reveals the payoffs of a more systematic, multi-dimensional approach to the study of the political processes linking Moscow with the locales. Bahry teases much out of limited plan-

ning, budgetary, and investment information.⁸ She augments analysis of these data with a careful examination of public discussions of issues by officials on the periphery. Bahry is able to identify commonalities and differences among regional officials, as well as illuminate the broad contours of debate among competing interests. Analysis of CPSU Congress stenographic records and materials from Supreme Soviet budgetary sessions permits us to trace the evolving post-Stalinist issue-agenda.

DELLENBRANT's study of regional development, regional inequality, and the efforts of the Russian Slavic regimes at the center to achieve cross-regional equality leads to the conclusion, similar to Bahry's, that the Soviet political system is characterized by bureaucratic incrementalism and inertia. The persistent disparities in development and resources across republics Dellenbrant attributes to the behavior of numerous political actors with competing interests and differing competence and not just to indifferent and cynical all-Union regimes. Though central bureaucracies are said to exhibit little initiative in coping with ongoing inequalities, re-

⁶See, for example, T. H. Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw, Eds., *Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1983.

⁷See George W. Breslauer, "Is There A Generation Gap in the Soviet Political Establishment? Demand Articulation by RSFSR Provincial Party First Secretaries," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), January 1984, pp. 1–25; and Peter Hauslohner, "Prefects as Senators: Soviet Regional Politicians Look to Foreign Policy," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), October 1980, pp. 197–233.

⁸This information has received little serious attention from students of Soviet politics, even though it has been published by the Soviets since the mid-1950's. An important exception to this general pattern of neglect is Valerie Bunce, *Do New Leaders Make A Difference?*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1981.

gional officials are also seen as frustrating central intent through indifference or their inability either to effectively utilize resources or to spur greater productivity in their bailiwicks.

The extensive Soviet economic and investment data Dellenbrant presents remind us that Soviet statistical sources are potentially rich sources of necessary information. Yet, this monograph also reminds us that the application of appropriate measures and statistics is essential if those data are to be effectively mined. This is no easy matter when studying nondemocratic societies. It is particularly difficult when exploring a politically sensitive issue such as regional and ethnic inequality, where even less information than usual is available, and where the information that is provided by official sources is carefully sanitized.

Dellenbrant's examination of Soviet statistics on regional income, economic growth, and investment over several two decades tells us a good deal about capital investment trends, the degree of plan fulfillment, and the national income of the Soviet republics. We learn how individual republics have been performing, and the degree to which Moscow has been forthcoming with resources for them. Dellenbrant also quotes from directives of the all-Union regime apparently addressed to the trade-offs between nation-wide development and regional equality, and from appeals of regional officials for preferential allocation of resources. As a consequence, we are able to examine the activities of both all-Union and local actors involved in the conduct of Soviet center-periphery relations.

However, the author fails to bring these disparate data and analytical insights together to provide causal explanations for performance proclivities and inequality. Suggestive

insights, not substantiated conclusions, can be gleaned from Dellenbrant's findings—for example, the observation that predominantly non-Russian regions appear to be at a disadvantage in the political center's allocation of resources. Dellenbrant suggests that "the evidence is not that Russian areas are especially favored by economic development but that Russians migrate to economically favored regions, where they gradually become the dominant population" (p. 171). Yet, this explanation is no more convincing than the argument that investment goes where Russians live: either hypothesis might be inferred from, but neither is proved by, the correlation of concentrations of Russian population and of economic favors.

Regarding center-periphery relations, Dellenbrant posits four broad conclusions. None of them represent departures from our common wisdom, but they bear repeating. First, he argues that there are differences in the socio-economic development of various republics, and we can be fairly precise in documenting them. Second, the center has not made the hard political decisions necessary to actually reverse these persistent inequalities; some all-Union authorities may genuinely have desired an equalizing of conditions across republics, but such desires were not translated into investment decisions, at least not during the Brezhnev and Andropov periods, the temporal focus of this study. Third, throughout the 1960's, the 1970's, and the early 1980's, there was a "continuous tug of war for funds" involving different regions and their officials, but the struggle failed to bring about any major reordering of investment priorities.⁹ And fourth, regional policy measures during this period were implemented in such a way that they failed to improve the relative

position of poorer republics such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; indeed, regional policy decisions tended to sharpen economic differences across the republics.

Throughout his analysis, Dellenbrant treats the central leadership as a single purposive agent in the conduct of relations with the periphery. This approach varies from that of Bahry, which emphasizes a complex set of different and often competing bureaucracies that, she argues, are primarily responsible for policy outcomes.

In differentiating the power and impact of central and regional authorities, Dellenbrant distinguishes between policy-making and policy-implementation. It is in the latter area, he argues, that regional actors are able to work around Moscow's decisions. Given the limitations of his data, this contention can only be partially substantiated. The informal correlation of regional interests, all-Union policies, and regional performance he presents is suggestive but not definitive.

CAMERON Ross's study of Soviet local governments provides more direct and convincing evidence that lower-level officials can affect the political process, not in the origination of policies, but in the local implementation of them, especially in such areas as finance, planning, and housing. He attributes their ability to do so to the very structure and norms of the political system, which impede central control over implementation. Decision-making power is excessively centralized, meaning that despite the many resources at their disposal, all-Union

⁹Dellenbrant also dealt with these budgetary struggles in an earlier monograph, *Soviet Regional Policy: A Quantitative Inquiry into the Social and Political Development of the Soviet Republics*, Atlantic Highlands, NJ, Humanities Press, 1980.

actors are limited in their ability to monitor subordinate institutions—institutions that are often both organizationally and geographically distant. Moreover, the center has not, Ross contends, developed a set of standardized institutional structures and operating norms that link the diverse regional and local agencies into a more coherent and effective whole.

In this complex and often confused bureaucratic setting, seemingly all institutions have the ability and opportunity to safeguard—if not expand—their niches in the political process. In the finance area, for example, lower-level officials have powerful incentives to hide existent local income sources from all-Union authorities and to overstate resource needs so as to maximize the amount of funding they get from Moscow (all-Union officials determine federal revenue allocations as a differential between planned local expenditures and available local income). Thus, the very system of centralized planning and resource allocation—designed to strengthen the power of central authorities—encourages decentralized political processes.

The problems of excessive centralization go beyond the issue of resource allocation to the nature of centralized planning. Ross's case studies provide evidence that Moscow has great difficulty in developing appropriate norms for the more than 50,000 lower-level administrative units that operate in the modern Soviet polity. Norms based on all-Union averages or central planners' best estimates, by not taking into account specific communities' distinctive features, will undermine local officials' efforts at expanding local housing or providing necessary facilities and services. Similarly, problems in lower-level implementation of central directives could reflect a number of different circum-

stances and not simply conscious local resistance. As Ross concludes, the difficulty of implementing central policies locally often simply reflects "bureaucratic defects, problems of processing and coordinating information, and other *universal* bureaucratic distortions, which are magnified in the Soviet setting" (p. 182, emphasis in original).

What of institutional rivalries and their impact on policy implementation in local settings? Both Bahry and Dellenbrant addressed issues of regional competition. While acknowledging conflicting interests, Bahry's analysis did not reveal major long-term advantages or disadvantages to specific participants in the annual budget negotiations. Indeed, using aggregate data over a 30-year period, she found that even Politburo members were unsuccessful in attempts to bring advantages to their bailiwicks in the budgetary struggles. Dellenbrant's analysis did point to winners and losers in these struggles, although the causal explanation provided was not convincing. Ross's examination of issue-areas directly reveals the impact of institutional rivalry on the implementation of policy.

An example is housing. Living quarters have traditionally been connected to local enterprises under the jurisdiction of all-Union or Union-republic ministries. Since Stalin's death, the Soviet leadership has attempted to transfer housing to local control. Local officials looked forward to expanding their responsibilities, so long as they were provided adequate resources to repair and maintain the transferred housing. In practice, the necessary funds, staff, and repair facilities were rarely forthcoming, as ministerial officials who chose to relinquish control over housing often abandoned all concern for housing conditions. In other cases, however, ministries and their local enter-

prise directors resisted transferring control of housing to local soviets, fearing among other things that they would thereby lose control over a powerful means of attracting manpower. Their footdragging proved effective even in the face of pressures from Moscow: as of 1981, they still controlled nearly 60 percent of all Soviet housing. In this field, then, a complex set of interests motivated the many responsible central and local actors, and policy change proved to be difficult, with very different housing transfer outcomes to be found in the various regions.

Ross's exploration of party-state relations in local governance confirms the decisive power enjoyed by party organs at every authority level, and the resulting potential for "*podmena*," the party's supplanting of governmental prerogatives. Yet, his case studies also reveal that state actors have certain resources of their own that can at least complicate party control. We have already noted the ability of central ministries, while themselves formally operating under party guidance, to ignore major initiatives endorsed by the central party leadership. Party officials at lower levels also find themselves vulnerable to the actions and interests of the Moscow ministries and their local agents. Local party leaders must live with the budgetary and planning decisions of ministries, even while ostensibly charged with controlling the activities of these ministries in the local setting.

Ross notes that lower-level party organs are much stronger in the setting of policy than in the implementation of that policy. The obstacles to party control over policy implementation are profound and basic to the Leninist system: they stem from the realities of an elaborate, centralized, and bureaucratized political system, and not from

the political might of rival agencies. On this point, Ross's findings are compatible with those of Bahry and Dellenbrant: the Leninist political structure is most conducive to an incrementalism that favors long-established and well-ensconced bureaucratic interests.

THE first three books, and the broader literature they reflect, depict a Soviet political process dominated by institutional actors and interests. While revealing a politics at the republic level and below that is more intricate and dynamic than we often assume, they show that the substance of policy still reflects the basic interests and will of the political center, even if the latter is to a considerable degree itself the product of divergent and conflicting interests. But beyond these interests and those of dominant lower-level executive actors (e.g., party organizations, the executive committees of soviets, and other administrative agencies), what, if any, political role do the masses and their elected representatives have?

Our traditional understanding of the Soviet system has led us to discount the role of popular interests. The channels available for popular participation were commonly understood to assume socializing and legitimating roles in the Soviet system. There was a presumed need for some popular feedback, but "participation" meant something very different from what we are accustomed to in Western liberal democracies.¹⁰ Therefore, Jeffrey Hahn's finding that there are very real possibilities for political participation in Soviet local government, even if relatively few Soviet citizens

choose to avail themselves of them, is an important one.

Examining and evaluating mass political participation in the Soviet system is a challenging task, especially when that society is closed and authoritarian. Beyond identifying and illuminating the formal structures permitting participation, one must consider the political meaning of given participatory actions, their role in linking the citizenry to the governing elite, and their relationship to political change. Hahn's volume is one of the very few works that successfully explores these issues in the Soviet setting.

Hahn's careful and thorough research strategy enabled him to assimilate a wide range of information bearing on the effectiveness of mechanisms said to permit citizen involvement in local government. During a series of prolonged stays in the USSR, he interviewed a wide range of relevant officials, specialists, and voters. He consulted a broad array of documents and records of soviets and deputies. In addition, he was able to observe up close the workings of a single district, the Lenin district of Moscow. His case study of this district provided much contextual information for understanding the interests and behavioral proclivities of Soviet electors and their deputies. Potential concerns over the representativeness of the Lenin district are alleviated by Hahn's consideration of published and unpublished Soviet statistical data for numerous other regions and for the country overall.

Hahn's findings—reflecting data and information from the 1970's to the mid-1980's—bring some qualification to our basic understanding of the system of soviets, mass participation, and mass-elite relations. His study confirms that at the local level, as at the regional and all-Union levels, a small and powerful political elite dominates the policy

process. This elite, however, is surrounded by a sizable group of interested lower-level officials, specialists, and ordinary citizens who choose for various reasons to involve themselves in the political life of their communities, in the process often advancing their own interests.

Drawing upon the logic of what he terms the "gored-ox" theory of politics, Hahn demonstrates that while most Soviet citizens are not active in the political process, they can become involved when their vital interests are at stake.¹¹ The local executive committee, which is the locus of governmental policy-making and which is dominated by the political elite, can be influenced by community interests through the local soviet that "elects" it. Although the formal means of influence open to the public and its representatives are circumscribed by higher-level interests, and are flawed, Hahn documents that they can be used in politically significant ways.

Do Soviet citizens come to elected representatives with their local concerns? Yes, we learn, although the number of actively involved citizens may be limited (perhaps 15 percent of the total population). The issues they raise are of a local nature (e.g., housing, services, transportation), but they are critical concerns to those affected. How do citizens make their concerns known? Various formal mechanisms exist, including voter mandates (*nakaz izbirateley*—proposals from constituents, see Hahn, pp. 135–36) to candidates, soviet deputy report meetings, consulting-hours for deputies and their constituents, and citizen submissions of proposals, dec-

¹⁰Jerry Hough has differed with this common view, finding participation in the Soviet Union more meaningful. See "Political Participation in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Studies*, January 1976, pp. 3–20.

¹¹See Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1961, for a discussion of the different levels of participation that characterize types of American citizens and politicians. Dahl's framework provides the theoretical underpinnings of Hahn's study.

larations, and complaints.¹² While each of these means has limitations, not the least of which is public pessimism about their efficacy, many citizens choose to use them. Hahn's work demonstrates that at least some elements in the general population do view their elected deputies as "ombudsmen" who can at least communicate citizen concerns to the political establishment.

But can these ombudsmen really do much for the citizens who elected them? We have traditionally assumed they cannot. Acting individually, they have little real political power. They certainly cannot set the local agendas, and they cannot get around the elaborate local and higher-level bureaucracies that implement policy. The information provided them by executive and administrative agencies is also limited. And as informal ombudsmen, the issues they may potentially deal with are limited to matters of what Seweryn Bialer called "low politics"—such as road repair needs, problems with health services, housing shortages, and requests for more schools.

However, as Hahn demonstrates—whether relying upon aggregate all-Union data on deputies' activities or his own observations of a soviet standing committee's session—deputies can raise telling questions for local authorities, they can make formal statements about a particular issue requiring an official agency response, and they can introduce proposals to pressure agencies to alter their behavior. Through the system of soviet standing committees, they can shape draft legislation, review the work of

specific local organizations, and make executives more aware of particular constituent concerns. In short, the peoples' elected representatives have a number of means by which they can champion their constituents' interests and influence the political process.

Clearly, many of these processes entail interminable formalities and direct pressure from above to conform. The relatively high turnover of deputies, combined with the observable tendency for a small element to dominate the life of a soviet, further limit the potential for serious challenge. However, the legal mechanisms for popular influence are in place, they are used by citizens and their deputies, and policies are affected, even if these first steps do not yet constitute a "civic culture" in Hahn's estimation.

WHAT broad picture of the Soviet political system and regional and local politics emerges from these works? Hahn's study reveals that considerable participation exists at the grassroots level and that it often does have political significance. Bahry, Dellenbrant, and Ross illuminate regional and local settings where political life is equally dynamic and is characterized by elaborate practices through which interests are articulated and pursued. In the main, however, the image of a strong political center is reconfirmed, even though the center itself is composed of a diversity of competing interests complicating its exercise of power, and is also vulnerable to numerous lower-level pressures, especially in the critical process of policy-implementation.

All these studies show the unwieldiness and complexity of the interlocking set of party/state hierarchies, which favor incrementalist policies that safeguard established interests. However, the immensity of this set of hierarchies and the magnitude of the tasks to be performed also favor the

sharing of more responsibilities with lower-level institutions and actors. As a result, the latter find themselves with more opportunities to influence the political process.

These volumes also demonstrate that republic, regional, and local governments now have increased resources with which to address problems; they generate more of their own funds than in the past, and they have more flexibility in determining how those funds are to be used. Yet, in the absence of any fundamental redistribution of political power, governments at the periphery are still heavily dependent on the center for many needed resources, and still operate within generally strict guidelines set out by all-Union authorities. Regional and local executive committees and finance departments may now be able to work out their own budgets, but their decisions are restricted by central planners and ministries.

All of these works reveal very strong interconnections binding the various all-Union, regional, and local actors into a more coherent whole. Each work also demonstrates that any single entity, even at the highest authority level, has real difficulties in initiating change. Bahry underscores this reality when she notes that the massive and elaborate Soviet system simultaneously safeguards, perpetuates, and obstructs interests. If regional officials, for instance, are not successful in advancing their causes, they can simply direct their pleas to alternative institutions and actors. They can—and have—raised issues again and again, contacting the long list of potential higher-level allies over succeeding years. The system halts a subordinate official's initiative, but leaves that official numerous other openings for further pursuing a given end. It is hardly surprising that the issue-agenda changes little from year to year.

¹²Proposals and declarations provide suggestions by a constituent on how the work of local government might be improved. Declarations, however, are more narrow in their scope and likely entail the more specific needs of a given constituent. Complaints generally involve the possible violation of the legal rights of a constituent. See Hahn, pp. 158–61.

Any complex policy question is bound to involve the interests of numerous rival agencies and therefore requires much time for final resolution. Ross demonstrates in the important area of housing how all-Union directives, central ministerial needs, local enterprise interests, and local governmental desires all compete with each other, making any change in the status quo very slow. Even at the local level, the associations among the political elite, relevant administrative agencies, elected deputies, and the interested public all serve to make political change a torturous and unlikely prospect. Hahn's study reveals local participation as being as much a corrective to as a stimulus for change—at least for the pre-Gorbachev period.

Given these circumstances, it is not difficult to understand why most Soviet politicians and citizens make use of informal, extralegal means to promote their interests. These means, which include the reliance on *blat* (the use of connections) and the cultivation of extended networks, are not explored in these works. Both the elite and the masses are aware of the critical role of these informal arrangements in lubricating an often inflexible and status quo-oriented political system.

Wayne DiFranceisco and Zvi Gitelman have characterized the Soviet Union as manifesting what they term a "covert-participant political culture," in which individuals promote their self-interest through favors, manipulation, personal influence, and even money.¹³ In this system, most persons outside of the top po-

litical elite are skeptical about their ability to influence policy-making, but they believe they can influence the way policies are implemented and thereby advance their interests. The notion of a covert-participant political culture helps to explain why so many Soviet citizens choose not to use the formal means of influence legally available to them. It also explains the expectations and resilience of lower-level officials. Those possessing a sense of political efficacy—whether they are of the elite or of the masses—are adept at using informal means to promote their interests.

THE FINDINGS in these volumes reveal the need for profound systemic change if the Soviet polity is to become more efficient and more effective. They also indicate that the impetus for systemic reform must come from both the top and the bottom of the political system. The authority to institute profound change can only be found in Moscow, but the willingness to reform the system must characterize many lower-level institutions and actors, down to and including those operating in the rural settlements.

Gorbachev-era efforts at addressing these problems and reforming the political system indicate that while the political center is taking the lead in initiating changes, the periphery is very much involved in the process. At the top, we see the stream-

lining of party and state bureaucracies. Moscow is making new efforts to better tap interests and perspectives on the republic level and below, and to balance branch and territorial concerns. At the lower levels, there is a new reliance upon the soviets to pressure bureaucracies. A reinvigorated system of soviets and elections helps, among other things, to enhance popular participation, raise expectations, and build up momentum for reform. Hahn's volume fully anticipated these reforms by noting that certain necessary preconditions for establishment of a civic culture in the Soviet Union were already in place before the Gorbachev period. For instance, the millions of soviet deputies who served in a monitoring capacity as members of standing committees have already been socialized to participate in the political life of the country.

However, these four books also point to an evolved and delicate balance of institutional, sectoral, regional, and other interests comprising the political system—a balance that surely favors some over others, but one that seemingly enables all established interests to safeguard their basic positions. Alteration of the elaborate institutional arrangements and practices identified by these authors will result in highly unpredictable consequences. Only the most far-reaching reforms—encompassing institutions, attitudes, and behavior—could significantly transform the identified Soviet proclivity toward policy rigidity and incrementalism.

¹³Wayne DiFranceisco and Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Political Culture and 'Covert Participation' in Policy Implementation," *American Political Science Review* (Menasha, WI), September 1984, pp. 603–21.

Soviet Society under the Old Regime

Thomas F. Remington

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MERVYN MATTHEWS. *Poverty in the Soviet Union: The Life-Styles of the Underprivileged in Recent Years*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987.

ILYA ZEMTSOV. *The Private Life of the Soviet Elite*. New York, Crane Russak, 1985.

WHAT did Western scholars know about Soviet society on the eve of *perestroika*, and how did they know it? The books under review represent a fair sampling of the

state of Western thinking about the dynamics of social relations in the USSR on the basis of the sources available before *glasnost* opened the floodgates of new information. Did scholars foresee Mikhail Gorbachev's radical reform program? Did we think Soviet society was fundamentally stable, or in a state of impending collapse? As demonstrated by the books discussed here, the mirrors our scholars and journalists hold up to the Soviet world also reflect the state of our own knowledge and the aims and interests we bring to Soviet studies.

These volumes fall into three methodological genres. Journalistic accounts offering first-hand experiences, stories about acquaintances ("Vanya wanted to write poetry, and to dream, and to read books," David Willis tells us at the beginning of his chapter on Soviet housing allocation), and morsels from the Soviet press have for years had a steady market among scholars, policy-makers, and the interested public.

A second genre relies on Soviet scholarly and press publications, combing them systematically in an attempt to reveal the typical and the anomalous in patterns of social behavior in a particular domain over a particular time span. Susan Bridger's careful examination of the structure of women's roles in rural society, which draws both on Soviet

social science research and on Soviet newspapers, is exemplary in its use of this standard approach. Similarly, most of the contributions to Horst Herlemann's edited collection, based on an April 1984 conference at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies (Washington, DC), draw mainly on Soviet publications.

Finally, we have a substantial body of research based on émigré surveys. The Soviet Interview Project (SIP), funded by the United States government and conducted by a team of eminent scholars, is the most comprehensive of the many studies drawing on surveys of émigrés who came out during the great wave of outmigration in the 1970's. The first volume of papers published from the SIP project, *Politics, Work, and Daily Life in the USSR*, edited by the project director, James R. Millar, appeared in 1987 and employs the most advanced Western survey research techniques. Most of the authors of

Thomas F. Remington is Professor of Political Science at Emory University (Atlanta, GA). Among his publications are *The Truth of Authority: Ideology and Communications in the Soviet Union* (1988) and *Politics and the Soviet System: Essays in Honour of Frederick C. Barghoorn* (1989).

the SIP studies also draw upon Soviet data as a means to cross-check the validity and representativeness of the survey findings. Similarly, Mervyn Matthews's study of poverty complements Soviet data with an émigré survey, using each kind of source, in effect, to correct or validate the other.

NONE of the books under review here analyzes events or revelations from the Gorbachev period, although some were completed just after Gorbachev came to power. None, it is fair to say, anticipated the extraordinary public discussion or political liberalization that Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost* initiated, nor did any envisage the adoption of a radical program of economic reform. Indeed, the authors generally avoided speculating about the future. Willis does argue that the yearning of ordinary Soviet citizens to enjoy various status-confirming privileges and benefits represents a long-term but slow-acting force for change. Writing in 1985, Willis saw no revolutionary movement developing in the near-term, however; and, as he notes, much of the widespread desire for better living standards is a conservative force. Still, if Willis failed to anticipate the explosion of new associational activity or the outbursts of popular violence occurring in the country's southern rim, he is hardly as easily faulted as Ilya Zemtsov who predicted that "no essential changes will occur in the tenor of Soviet life" because the new leaders will be just as "cautious, as indecisive, and as conservative as their predecessors" (p. 76).

It is also clear that before *glasnost*, scholars and journalists alike were impelled to get inside Soviet reality, to penetrate the veil of secrecy, obfuscation, and propaganda. Thus, Willis's subtitle is "how Russians really live." Zemtsov wants to reveal "the private life of

the Soviet elite" (emphasis added). The cover of the Millar volume depicts a man peering under a curtain, a picture first used in the *New York Times Magazine* in 1984.

What an almost inconceivable difference *glasnost* has made in our use of Soviet sources! Insights on such subjects as the severity of the state budget deficit, inflation, alcohol and drug abuse, the crime rate, nationality tensions, elite corruption, and the appalling state of the health care system—won through enormous effort before *glasnost*—have become commonplace since. Indeed, in numerous instances, pre-*glasnost* Western assessments of these problems that were considered controversial (and even manifestations of "cold war scholarship") turn out to have

¹The assumption that the post-Stalin system was basically stable underlies much of the literature of the Brezhnev era, although a shift seems to have occurred in scholars' theoretical premises between the early and late stages of Brezhnev's rule. To be sure, Western scholars relying on official sources published in the Brezhnev era were handicapped in their assessments by the same barrier that prevented open discussion of problems in the Soviet Union—the systematic suppression or whitewashing of any information that might have revealed the true severity of the social crisis.

A number of studies published in the late 1960's and early 1970's expressed a cautious optimism about the ability of the Soviet system to rationalize its Stalinist economic and political structures and thus cope more or less successfully with pressures to modernize. See, for example, Alexander Dallin and George M. Breslauer, "Political Terror in the Post-Mobilization Stage," in Chalmers Johnson, Ed., *Change in Communist Systems*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1970, p. 214; and Samuel P. Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, Eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems*, New York and London, Basic Books, 1970, pp. 40, 44.

A forceful case against the idea that the Soviet system had slipped into a morass of mediocrity and immobilism was made by Jerry Hough in "The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism?," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1972, pp. 25–45. Hough argued that the evidence for change

been too mild in view of the shocking revelations appearing in official Soviet publications.

Moreover, the perspective of much of the Western literature that was based on Brezhnev-era data now appears somewhat outdated, because it tended to assume that the society was in or near a state of equilibrium.¹ Now it appears more likely that (much as Stephen Cohen argued²) Soviet society was passing through a period of decay brought about by the stifling of impulses for development. If Western scholars tended to underestimate the system's need for change, still more did we underestimate its capacity for radical response.

All three genres, then, ultimately depend on the quality and content of information provided by their

was at least as strong as the evidence for paralysis.

By the late 1970's and early 1980's, most scholars avoided optimistic prognoses and pointed to mounting pressure for reform. Yet, some expressed varying degrees of confidence that the Brezhnev leadership's acceptance of the imperatives of modern scientific and technical change, and of the corresponding need for a more dynamic and comprehensive system of policy-making, would enable Brezhnev's successors to rationalize the political system. See, for example, Erik P. Hoffmann, "Changing Soviet Perspectives on Leadership and Administration," in Stephen F. Cohen, Alexander Rabinowitch, and Robert Sharlet, Eds., *The Soviet Union Since Stalin*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1980, esp. pp. 88–89.

Others conjectured that the future would bring, at best, incremental change, forecasting that the likeliest of several scenarios was a continuation of the Soviet Union's inefficient, stagnant, but noncatastrophic present. See, for example, Blair Ruble, "Muddling Through," *The Wilson Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Winter 1981, pp. 126–38; and Paul K. Cook, "The Political Setting," in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States *Soviet Economy in the 1980's: Problems and Prospects*, Part 1, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1983, p. 28.

²See, in particular, his "The Friends and Foes of Change: Reformism and Conservatism in the Soviet Union," in Cohen, Rabinowitch, and Sharlet, Eds., op. cit., pp. 11–31; *Rethinking the Soviet Experience*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985; and *Sovieticus. American Myths and Soviet Realities*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986.

sources. In volume and quality, our opportunities are vastly greater in the period of *glasnost* than they were previously, and the powerful division between "for inside" and "for outside" that cut through Soviet information is greatly diminished. Nevertheless, we still need to take account of the controls and biases affecting published information—e. g., the Gorbachev leadership's political need to discredit the previous regime.

In addition, when drawing general conclusions about the "system," we need to consider the factors that confine the value of our observations to certain places or periods of time. We must also be careful to avoid either allowing the subject to impose its own ideological concepts on the study or importing analytical categories that fit the reality poorly or not at all. For example, some of the conceptual tools employed in the volumes discussed here, such as gender roles, are unambiguous, while others, such as "middle class," sometimes obscure rather than clarify the major fault lines in Soviet society.

IN Susan Bridger's study of rural women, the analysis of social differentiation is put into a developmental perspective. Her starting point is the contemporary view that rural economic development frequently entails disadvantages for women by providing opportunities for male laborers to enter a cash economy while leaving women and children in worse subsistence conditions. To solve this problem, some radical writers reject market-oriented development schemes in favor of more comprehensive redistribution of rural land and income.³

Bridger closely examines Soviet historical experience to determine the effect of both the collectivization and the mechanization of agriculture on women's roles. She pin-

points a particular factor associated with the low status of Soviet rural women: the exclusion of women from mechanized jobs on farms, a process particularly marked in the 1950's. By the end of that decade, women made up fewer than 1 percent of all drivers, while 80 percent of all farm women had no specialty at all and performed mostly gang labor in the fields.

Bridger relates a number of aspects of rural women's lives to this rigid sex-role distinction in the division of farm labor, and she shows that these distinctions are breaking down at a glacial pace. Official regime policy is somewhat contradictory, because despite the concern with maximizing the effectiveness of the productivity of labor and defending the equality of the sexes in the labor force, a strong sense of "natural" gender role differences pervades society. Indeed, Bridger writes that "biological determinism has been granted academic respectability by Soviet educational theory" (p. 224). Women tend to respond with private solutions, leading to rising rural divorce rates, lower fertility, and increasing outmigration from the countryside. The last, in turn, has created what Soviet sources term the "bride problem" for young rural men, exacerbating the difficulty of keeping young and able-bodied male workers on the farms.

³Bridger observes that for some feminist writers, "the problem is not simply that policy makers fail to recognise the current productivity of rural women, or that drawing women into the market economy through home industries may lead to greater exploitation. Nor would the solution simply be greater female involvement in planning, they maintain. The question untouched by much of the literature is seen as far more fundamental and concerns the nature of the development process itself. These writers question whether women really have a great deal to gain from a model of development which involves integrating developing countries into the international market system" (p. 4).

ANOTHER glimpse of the "downstairs" of Soviet society is offered by Mervyn Matthews's book on poverty. Like his earlier studies of Soviet society, this volume reflects a careful attempt to draw general conclusions based on fragmentary data published in Soviet sources and supplemented by his own émigré interviews. The work concentrates less on the variation in the incidence of poverty across regions or over time than on the structure of household revenues and expenditures. Thus, although Matthews discusses the differential impact of poverty on various groups, he tends to treat poverty more as an economic than as a social phenomenon.

One question that Matthews could well have treated in greater detail is the degree of mobility into and out of poverty within and across generations. No doubt, on this—as on other points that merited more attention than they received (such as homelessness and vagrancy, or inter-nationality differences in the incidence of poverty)—Matthews was at a severe disadvantage because of the secretiveness with which the subject of poverty was treated in the Soviet media until recently.

Under *glasnost*, the Soviet media have begun to shed a good deal more light on the subject of poverty. Matthews's figures hold up well, the crucial point in discussions of poverty being the average monthly per capita income taken as the poverty line. However, if the level of "minimum material security" is 75 rubles per month, as Soviet economists now assert,⁴ more than 43 million people live in poverty. Whether the 75-ruble level remains appropriate in view of the acuteness of short-

⁴*The New York Times*, Jan. 29, 1989; William Moskoff, "The Aged in the USSR," *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR* (Munich), Sept. 15, 1989, pp. 7–9.

ages and the acceleration of inflation is another matter.

THE contributions in the Herlemann collection offer brief sketches of various aspects of Soviet society, leaving it to the reader to draw from them a broader assessment of the "quality of life." Although Herlemann in his introductory essay and Robert Belknap in a short, shrewd opening comment acknowledge the difficulty of using the term "quality of life" without establishing first the subjective or objective criteria used by members of a given society to assess it, the volume regrettably lacks either a historical or a comparative perspective for judging the meaning of the data presented in the individual articles. With the benefit of hindsight, it is also clear that the volume should have devoted some attention to environmental pollution, which has emerged as one of the strongest sources of political protest since Gorbachev's accession to power.

Above all—and it is the fundamental question we must pose in considering all the books under review here—what shapes Soviet citizens' assessments of their quality of life? Which is the more salient: the relative superiority of living standards today as compared with 1953, or the felt decline since the late 1960's? Belknap asserts that solidarity and heroism have declined since Stalin's time, while the quality of life has improved. But he poses a crucial question when he asks whether citizens now have hope that the future will be better.

Quality of life is a composite measure built both of the material circumstances in which members of a society live and the yardsticks by which they evaluate those circumstances. Again and again we find confirmation of Ted Robert Gurr's theory that it is not deprivation or despair that drives people to rebel,

but a rise in their expectations occurring faster than an improvement in their circumstances.⁵ It is therefore of crucial importance to those who study Soviet society to understand the interaction of the material and perceptual aspects of the Soviet social reality, a task whose importance is underscored in a period of rapid change.

Although it is a good deal less insightful than, say, Hedrick Smith's⁶ or Elizabeth Pond's⁷ books, Willis's volume comes closest of the books under review here to meeting this challenge. For Willis, the strivings of Soviet citizens of all strata to enjoy the perks that come with influence, privilege, and other marks of status can be subsumed under the master concept of "klass."

Willis employs this term very broadly and loosely. It seems to mean any form of conspicuous consumption that distinguishes one person's means from another's. Willis also focuses upon a group that he calls the "rising class," apparently comprising anyone, from World War II invalids to the golden children of party bosses, who can claim any sort of exclusive privilege or benefit. What members of the "rising class" have in common, Willis says, is that they harbor "middle class" aspirations—meaning, evidently, that they want comforts, security, prestige, self-esteem, but not necessarily political freedom. Nevertheless, these aspirations, Willis argues, are exerting an inexorable pressure on the political rulers to expand the number of those entitled to a share of the good life.

Zemtsov also works with a conception of a potentially competitive relationship between the rulers and

the larger class who enjoy the perquisites that come with proximity to power. But his book does not attempt to develop or demonstrate this point; it offers lurid exposés of old scandals, tidbits taken from journalistic accounts, and tables of undocumented data. In view of the numerous well-publicized scandals over the past several years, Zemtsov's point that the Brezhnev-era ruling elite was deeply corrupt is clearly valid, but the author's careless and superficial approach subverts the book's credibility.

IS Soviet society characterized by class divisions, and can the concept of class be the crucial conceptual link between the material conditions of Soviet life and the aspirations of the population? Many writers have seized on the notion of a new "middle class" as a base of support for Gorbachev's reforms, because the reforms hold out the promise of a better life in return for higher productivity.⁸ Most who speak of the middle class treat it as a group defined by its interest in the consumption of social goods rather

⁸Seweryn Bialer, for example, describes Soviet society as one "socially dominated by a large new middle class, which may be politically fragmented and powerless but which sets the lifestyle for the society at large." See "Gorbachev's Program of Change: Sources, Significance, Prospects," in Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, Eds., *Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy*, Boulder, CO, and London, Westview, 1988, p. 236. Gail Lapidus argues that the past decades have brought about an "embryonic civil society" increasingly capable of self-regulation and have transformed the Soviet Union into a society "with a highly differentiated social structure and an increasingly articulate and assertive middle class." See "State and Society: Toward the Emergence of Civil Society in the Soviet Union," in Seweryn Bialer, Ed., *Politics, Society, and Nationality Inside Gorbachev's Russia*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1989, pp. 124, 125–26. For related interpretations, see Jerry Hough, *Opening the Soviet System*, Washington, DC, Brookings, 1988; and Moshe Lewin, *The Gorbachev Phenomenon*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1988.

⁵Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1970.

⁶*The Russians*, New York, Ballantine, 1977.

⁷*From the Yaroslavl Station*, rev. ed., New York, Universe, 1984.

than as a class of property owners whose political interests stem from their desire for security and market freedom in the economy. But very few Soviet citizens do not wish for better material conditions. The ambiguity of the term "middle class" reflects the amorphous quality of the Soviet social structure, tempting us to use it as a label for anyone who is neither a manual worker nor a political functionary.

However, thus far in the polyphony of Gorbachev's socialist pluralism no middle class interest seems to be speaking "for itself." The absence of a common stake in property rights means that groups mobilize around other interests, such as alarm over environmental destruction and the defense of primordial ethnic and national loyalties. Yet despite Joseph Berliner's conjecture, in his foreword to the Millar volume, that sophisticated multivariate statistical techniques have made the concept of class anachronistic in contemporary social science (p. xi), few are willing to dispense with the concept altogether.

The SIP study greatly deepens our knowledge of the relative weight of a variety of factors bearing on popular attitudes. James R. Millar and Elizabeth Clayton, in their essay in the Millar volume, note that housing is the strongest of the factors associated with respondents' sense of satisfaction (p. 39). In particular, those respondents (one-third of the total) who owned their own living units were more likely than others to express overall satisfaction with their living standard. From this observation, Miller and Clayton propose that as more Soviet citizens possess private apartments, dachas, and houses, the greater will be the reservoir of "middle-class stability" for the political regime. But because Soviet housing is a consumption benefit rather than a productive asset, members of the

middle class are defined here less by what they produce than by what they consume.

By contrast, Brian Silver's analysis of the structures of political belief (in the Millar volume) demonstrates that higher levels of education (and, independently, lower age) are associated with lower levels of acceptance of traditional statist and collectivist ideological norms; here the term "middle class" is used to mean those with higher education. As Silver observes, this group's political disaffection is of considerable importance. How should it be explained? Perhaps the survey is picking up the alienating effects of the widening gap between expected and actual status as the Soviet economy did a progressively worse job over the post-Khrushchev era of finding appropriate employment for specialists and intellectuals.

This hypothesis would be supported by Millar's and Clayton's conclusion that higher levels of education are correlated with lower satisfaction overall. But the SIP study does not tell us much about how respondents formed their expectations. The relationships it reveals may well be contingent on respondents' estimates of what was possible for them and their children in the "era of stagnation." If so, *perestroika* has surely wrought enormous changes in subjective satisfaction, both by raising hopes and reinforcing discontent.⁹

The Millar volume tends to stress values and beliefs over behavior and social structure. In addition to

the chapters on levels of satisfaction and political beliefs, the book contains several chapters on perceptions, including perceptions of science, of social status, of the reasons for low productivity in the economy, and of the differential treatment of nationalities (but none on the treatment of Soviet Jews, despite the fact that most respondents were Jewish). Donna Bahry's and William Zimmerman's essays are exceptions in that they deal with patterns of political activism, as are the chapters by Aaron Vinokur and Gur Ofer on inequality in income and wealth, and by Barbara Anderson on the life-courses of Soviet women.

Although the Millar volume does not discuss the point, the findings both on attitudes and behavior are weakened by the fact that the variable of party membership, which other Soviet and non-Soviet surveys have found to be strongly correlated with patterns of opinion and behavior, was not investigated. Evidently émigré respondents could not be trusted to say truthfully whether they had belonged to the party, for the understandable reason that they feared the repercussions of admitting to having been a party member. Given the stress on the perceptual, moreover, it is surprising that so little attention was paid to the question of how core values and beliefs are formed and shared—to socialization, communication, and public opinion—or to the effect of life experiences on expectations and aspirations. Finally, despite the importance of primary-level ties in ordering Soviet society, no attention was given to patterns of friendship and marriage.

JUDGED according to how well our pre-*perestroika* scholarship identified the social forces that have become visible under the impact of Gorbachev's program of reform, the six works reviewed here earn

⁹Interesting confirmation of the "sociotropic" character of Soviet public attitudes about *perestroika* comes in the results of a poll conducted by Tat'yana Zaslavskaya's survey research center. Whereas only 28 percent of the respondents reported that their family's material well-being had declined in the last two or three years, more than 90 percent viewed the economic situation as bad or critical. See *The New York Times*, Nov. 5, 1989.

mixed grades. The SIP study's finding that the more highly educated and the younger are more likely to have been dissatisfied with their life in the USSR is important, although the observation that higher education is also associated with higher levels of regime-supportive activism contradicts this point to some extent. The existence of widespread poverty and the rigid sex-role differentiation in the Soviet countryside suggest the magnitude of the social problems that a reforming leadership must confront. The widespread aspiration for material betterment does indeed present Gorbachev with both a challenge and an opportunity: if this quest can be harnessed to behavioral

changes that increase productivity and output, it can help revitalize the economy. Left unsatisfied, the desire for higher living standards will fuel serious popular discontent.

But when we try to explain the interaction of the social and the political, or grasp the forces that lend coherence to collective action, our knowledge remains limited. For example, the 1989 elections to the Congress of People's Deputies revealed a powerful common impulse in many regions of the country to defeat candidates viewed as representatives of the political establishment. Most outside observers probably underestimated the intensity of populist resentment of the ruling elite, a sentiment that could support

both liberal and reactionary movements. We need studies of the intelligentsia, which has forcefully reasserted its traditional role as the mind and conscience of the society, as well as of the environmental movement and of national movements, both of which cut across class divisions. If real change comes about in property relations, so that private property gains legal equality with state property, then surely we will indeed see the rise of something like a bourgeoisie. Through his "wager on the strong" Gorbachev is betting that this class will be loyal to the state and to socialism while giving society a needed impetus to *perestroyka*.

Understanding the Sino-Vietnamese War

William J. Duiker

ROBERT S. ROSS. *The Indochina Tangle*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1988.

EUGENE K. LAWSON. *The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict*. New York, Praeger, 1984.

KING C. CHEN. *China's War With Vietnam, 1979*. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1987.

THE Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979, together with the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia that preceded it, drastically changed the political landscape of Southeast Asia. The war brought to an end the cold war rivalry between the Western states and the Soviet Union and China, which had dominated the politics of the region since the end of World War II, and divided Southeast Asia anew on the basis of the primordial forces of nationalism and historic distrust.

Given the crucial importance of the Sino-Vietnamese war for an understanding of future developments in Southeast Asia, it is hardly surprising that this conflict has aroused considerable interest among scholars and foreign policy observers of the region. Speculation has centered around a number of key issues. What were the origins of the war? How, when, and why did

Chinese leaders decide to launch their invasion of Vietnam? How should the results of the war be evaluated? Did China realize its overall objectives or, as many observers have contended, was Beijing's attempt to teach Hanoi a lesson a failure? Finally, what are the future prospects? Is the present-day conflict between China and Vietnam based on concrete issues that are subject to resolution, or is it the product of deep-seated historic differences that transcend the concerns of the moment?

The three books under review here are among the latest in a spate of recent studies that seek to answer such questions and enhance our understanding of the dynamics at work in the region today. Each author has chosen to address a different issue connected with the war. Together, they provide new insight on the nature of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict and its implications for the future of Southeast Asia.

The subject of the origins of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict has developed into a heavily debated issue, despite the fact that many initially saw its causes as uncomplicated and straightforward. As tensions between Beijing and Hanoi heightened during the spring and summer of 1978, the official press in both countries focused on territorial disputes and the treatment of Chinese residents inside

Vietnam as the main causes of those tensions. Beijing encouraged the view that these issues were determinative in provoking China's decision to "administer a lesson" to the Vietnamese.

From the outset, however, there were a few observers who were convinced that more important issues were at stake. Some saw the war as the product of historic rivalries—between China and Vietnam and between Vietnam and its own smaller neighbor, Cambodia. In their view, these rivalries, which had been submerged during the colonial era and the bitter cold war conflict that followed it, resurfaced with the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 and the removal of a Western presence from Indochina. The three new revolutionary states in the region inexorably began to refocus their attention and their energies on the unresolved historical claims left over from the precolonial era.

Other observers found the ultimate cause of the conflict not in the legacy of the past but in the superpower competition among China, the Soviet Union, and the United

William J. Duiker is Professor of East Asian History at The Pennsylvania State University (University Park). He is author of numerous works, including China and Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict (1986).

States that had shaped so much of the world since the end of World War II. To Zbigniew Brzezinski, US national security adviser under President Jimmy Carter, the Sino-Vietnamese conflict was less a recreation of historical disputes than a "proxy war" in which smaller countries like Vietnam and Pol Pot's Cambodia served as surrogates for external powers like the Soviet Union and China.

TWO of the books under review here tackle head-on the issue of what caused the Sino-Vietnamese war. Robert S. Ross, author of *The Indochina Tangle*, undertakes an exhaustive analysis of the various issues involved in the dispute between China and Vietnam and concludes that the most fundamental cause of the war was Beijing's fear of encirclement by the Soviet Union. Taking as the basis of his analysis the theme put forward in 1971 by Peter Van Ness in *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy*, namely, that the most fundamental element in Beijing's foreign policy is China's relationship with the two superpowers, Ross contends that Chinese anxiety over the growing intimacy between Vietnam and the USSR, which was solidified by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in November 1978, was the critical issue that drove the Chinese to war with Vietnam early the following year. Beijing's objectives, according to Ross, were manyfold: to teach Vietnam a lesson, to force Hanoi to redeploy its armed forces along the Chinese border, and to protect China's credibility as a major power in Asia (p. 224).

Ross does not ignore the significant role played by factors other than China's anxiety over Soviet-Vietnamese relations in provoking the war. But it is his view that such issues as the territorial dispute and Hanoi's policy toward the Chinese

in Vietnam were essentially derivative rather than primary causes of the conflict. He convincingly demonstrates that in its relations with other countries in the region, Beijing has consistently been able to resolve such problems through negotiations. China has also demonstrated its ability to overlook brutal mistreatment of the local ethnic Chinese population in the interests of Realpolitik, as in the case of Pol Pot's regime in Cambodia.

The issue of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, which took place in late December 1978, is a more difficult challenge, not least because the invasion appeared to represent such a direct threat to Chinese national security. Yet even here, Ross contends that Hanoi's overthrow of the Pol Pot regime was in itself not a sufficient reason for the Chinese attack. Those who consider Cambodia a crucial factor must explain why it was so important. The answer, he says, lies in Beijing's fear that Vietnamese domination of Cambodia would contribute to Moscow's strategy of the encirclement of China. It was Hanoi's ties with the USSR, and not simply its desire to create a "special relationship" with neighboring Laos and Cambodia, that provoked Chinese action.

Overall, Ross makes a fairly convincing case for his thesis that fear of the Soviet Union was the driving force behind China's decision to launch its border attack in February 1979. His argument that the border dispute and the issue of the Chinese in Vietnam were essentially pretexts for action rather than a direct cause of the decision is especially well documented. Still, Ross's argument is not entirely satisfying. He does not effectively explain why, if preventing Hanoi from adopting a policy of "lean to one side" toward Moscow was so important, Chinese leaders did not make a greater effort to resolve other issues through

peaceful means, nor why they did not adopt a more generous posture toward Hanoi's request for additional economic assistance shortly after the end of the Vietnam War. Beijing must have known that the Vietnamese would turn toward the Soviet Union, and that Moscow would respond with alacrity. His explanation that China's failure to prevent the Vietnamese tilt toward the Soviet Union after the Vietnam War can be ascribed to Hua Guofeng's inexperience and lack of a firm political base is plausible but speculative.

Ross also does not directly refute the views of those who contend that historical animosities within the region are at the root of the conflict. By adopting the "primary enemy" thesis and neglecting to investigate the complicated historical relationship between China and Vietnam, he leaves the impression that had there been no Soviet threat, Beijing would have had little interest in competing with Hanoi for influence in mainland Southeast Asia. In fact, there is considerable circumstantial evidence that Chinese leaders were concerned about Hanoi's penetration of its two neighboring Indochinese states long before Phnom Penh had become, in Beijing's eyes, Moscow's "junior partner" in Southeast Asia (p. 209). In sum, while Ross's essential thesis may be valid, there is no clear evidence that China would have acted differently even if the USSR had not been a factor in the equation.

In *The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict*, Eugene K. Lawson admirably fills the historical gap left unexplored by Robert Ross. Although the title suggests that the theme of the book is centered on the 1979 border war, it actually focuses on the complex relationship between the two countries during the Vietnam War, when China and North Vietnam were allies in the common struggle against the "imperialist forces" led by the

United States. Lawson shows that under the apparently smooth surface of fraternal amity, unresolved disputes over territory, war strategy, and global view festered, making a mockery of the public image of ideological comrades-in-arms engaged in a joint struggle against the forces of global reaction. He concludes that by 1975, signs of the bitter disagreements that would lead to violent conflict four years later were already apparent.

Yet Lawson rejects what he calls the "conventional wisdom" that the two allies would inevitably clash as a result of their age-old rivalry. In fact, Lawson reaches essentially the same conclusion as Ross. Although much of the book is devoted to a painstaking analysis of the various issues that plagued the Sino-Vietnamese relationship prior to 1975, he contends that the most basic point of dispute in the late 1970's was the relationship that each had with the United States and the Soviet Union. In Lawson's view, the animosity that currently characterizes the relationship "is not the product of age-old rivalries but of the strategic choices made by each as to how to maximize its security and where—Moscow or Washington—each could obtain greater strategic benefits in an uncertain world" (p. 7). He does, however, admit that although the vital concern impelling Chinese leaders to action was Hanoi's relationship with the USSR, this relationship would not have been so developed, nor would Hanoi have felt so compelled to seek Moscow's protection—had the dispute between China and Vietnam not already reached a point of high tension and distrust as a result of other issues, many of them linked to the legacy of the past.

Through his detailed investigation of the dynamics of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship prior to the end of the Vietnam War, Lawson

provides the reader with a vivid sense of the legacy of bitterness and frustration that made the Chinese unwilling to cater to Hanoi's concerns after the fall of Saigon—and eventually provoked Beijing into its angry determination to "punish" the Vietnamese for their perfidy. In his reference to the role of the superpowers in "overwhelming" the bilateral relationship, Lawson recognizes the crucial linkage between historical factors and contemporary security concerns that fueled the dispute and brought it to the point of open conflict in 1979.

A SECOND issue related to the Sino-Vietnamese conflict that has inspired considerable speculation among students of East Asian politics is the way in which China reached its decision to go to war. How and when did Chinese leaders decide to launch the attack? Were domestic factors involved, or was the decision based solely on foreign policy considerations? What role did the inner-party struggle that followed the death of Mao Zedong play in the process? Finally, what were China's objectives in planning the operation?

These issues form the central core of King C. Chen's *China's War With Vietnam*, 1979. Using fragmentary evidence culled from available documents as well as interviews with individual sources close to the Beijing leadership, Chen attempts to piece together the process by which China made the decision to launch its punitive invasion of Vietnam. Chen places the decision to go to war within the framework of the power struggle that engulfed the Chinese leadership after the death of Mao in September 1976. Like Ross, he concludes that Beijing was hampered in foreign policy decision-making by the power vacuum during the brief reign of Hua Guofeng. He sees no evidence

of clearcut differences between Hua and Deng Xiaoping on foreign policy issues but, again like Ross, he portrays the emergence of Deng as a key factor in the Chinese decision to use force against the Vietnamese.

In Chen's account, the Cambodian issue played a central role in impelling China toward war. Until June 1978, most Chinese leaders still hoped for a peaceful resolution of the dispute with Vietnam and rejected calls for forceful action against Hanoi. They tried to rein in Pol Pot, calling on the Phnom Penh regime to opt for more moderate internal policies, and sought to mediate Cambodia's border dispute with Vietnam.

But China's reluctance to move against Vietnam began to dissipate in mid-summer when officials in Beijing learned that Hanoi had reached a decision to overthrow the Pol Pot regime. Now Chinese leaders began to consider various options to punish the Vietnamese. According to Chen, the problem acquired a sense of urgency following the collapse of negotiations over the treatment of Chinese nationals in Vietnam and the signing by Moscow and Hanoi of the Soviet-Vietnamese security treaty in November (p. 27).

The final decision to act took place during the series of high-level meetings that led up to the momentous Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party in mid-December. Civilian and military officials differed over the nature of the most appropriate response, and the result appears to have represented a compromise. Like Ross, Chen sees the goals of the move against Vietnam as both psychological and concrete: to demonstrate China's credibility as a military force in Asia as well as to break Moscow's strategy of encirclement. In Chen's view, Deng appreciated the risks involved, but discounted them in advance. In high-level policy sessions, he report-

edly argued that an attack would neither cause serious damage to China's modernization program nor have an unfavorable impact on world public opinion. Most important, he contended that a large-scale Soviet military response was unlikely in view of the limited number of Soviet troops on China's northern frontier.

According to Chen, Deng was also aware of the possibility that China might not achieve all of its military objectives but reportedly maintained that a military failure might serve the purpose of demonstrating to skeptics the need for modernization of China's weaponry and military tactics.

In Chen's view, the decision to go to war with Vietnam was also directly related to Beijing's contemporary decision to push toward normalization of relations with the United States. Deng moved up the date for his visit to the United States in order to accommodate military plans for the border attack and linked a final decision on the operation to the reaction of the Carter administration. According to Chen, Beijing did not require Washington's open approval for the operation, just its understanding. As it turned out, the Carter administration played into China's hands. Although Washington was concerned that the invasion could cause an adverse global reaction and advised against it, US sources did not publicly criticize the attack when it took place. Chen has also provided readers with a convincing reconstruction of the deliberations that took place in Beijing prior to the border offensive in mid-February. Much of his evidence is based on unverifiable sources, but it parallels and in some cases builds on many previous accounts and has the ring of truth. His portrayal of Deng's rationale for the attack and the recognition the results might be limited, is especially persuasive.

WAS war inevitable? Two of the authors, Lawson and Ross, argue that it was not. As stated above, Lawson concludes that the animosity was based less on historical rivalry than on strategic choices made on both sides. Ross agrees, and points out that Beijing had other options that might have reversed the drift toward war: Chinese leaders might have induced Hanoi to maintain its traditional policy of equidistance in the Sino-Soviet dispute by means of a generous aid program after the end of the Vietnam War, and they also might have tried harder to moderate the policies of the Pol Pot regime. Ross does, however, admit that these alternatives, while they existed in theory, were not particularly workable; the Chinese lacked the carrot required to persuade the Vietnamese to rethink their decision—taken long before the end of the Vietnam War—to lean toward Moscow.

After the withdrawal of Chinese military forces from Vietnam in March 1979, it was generally recognized—and conceded in private by official sources in China—that Beijing had not achieved all of its objectives in the border offensive. Chinese military performance on the battlefield had been disappointing, and Vietnamese resistance had been, in King Chen's words, "amazingly strong" (p. 107). Some observers went so far as to say that the Vietnamese, by their success in blunting the Chinese attack, had administered a lesson to the Chinese. Certainly China did not deter Hanoi from consolidating its hold on Cambodia and strengthening its existing ties with the USSR.

Nevertheless, two of the authors whose books are under review here contend that Beijing's failure was not as clear-cut as it seems. Chen, for example, argues that Hanoi was not the real winner in the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, for in the process

of fending off the Chinese challenge it was forced to abandon the balanced foreign policy originally crafted by Ho Chi Minh and accept a relationship of dependency on Moscow that puts Vietnam at the mercy of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Chen is also critical of Hanoi's decision to seek a dominant position in Indochina at the expense of friendship with China. The stronger Hanoi's "special relationship" with Laos and Cambodia, he asserts, the more it will suffer (p. 161). Clearly, in his view, the benefits that might derive from such a relationship are not worth the cost.

While less specific, Ross appears to agree with Chen. He concedes that China suffered high casualties during the war and did not achieve its primary goal of forcing Hanoi to abandon its intimate relationship with the Soviet Union. But he points out that had China not made known its extreme displeasure, the outcome would have been much the same. Vietnam would have attacked Cambodia in any case, thus contributing to Moscow's strategy of encirclement. In other respects, Ross argues that Beijing's anti-Vietnam strategy has succeeded. The border war demonstrated China's ability to adopt an aggressive foreign policy stance without seriously damaging its economic modernization program, and its diplomatic stance since the end of the war has led to the forging of an alliance with noncommunist states in Southeast Asia that has effectively isolated Vietnam from its neighbors in the region.

Like Chen, Ross is somewhat pessimistic about Hanoi's future prospects. He believes that China's ultimate goal is the total domination of Vietnam and, beyond that, hegemony in all of Indochina, and that Beijing is prepared to bleed Vietnam white in order to achieve this objective. Chen's unspoken as-

sumption appears to be that the Vietnamese will eventually be compelled to accept the terms of their powerful neighbor.

NOT everyone will agree with the conclusions of these two authors. In fact, in the view of many observers of the regional scene, Hanoi's strategy has paid off handsomely. So far, the Chinese have been unable to dislodge the Vietnamese from Cambodia and, if present trends continue, Beijing may be forced to accept a negotiated settlement in Cambodia that provides international legitimacy to the present pro-Vietnamese government in Phnom Penh. In recent months, the anti-Hanoi alliance linking China, the ASEAN states, and several Western countries, has been badly split over the prospects of a return to power of the Khmer Rouge. Failure to achieve an agreement on this issue was a central factor in the collapse of the conference on Cambodia held in Paris last August.

China, however, is not without options of its own. Should Hanoi insist on the maintenance of its militant alliance with Phnom Penh as a condition of a settlement, fears of Vietnamese expansionism could revive among the ASEAN states, enabling Beijing to reinvigorate the anti-Vietnamese alliance and return to the policy of isolating Vietnam within the region. But even without the support of other states in the alliance, China remains capable of applying various forms of pressure on the Vietnamese, who are in desperate need of an interval of peace in order to turn their attention to the requirements of economic development. And, as King Chen has pointed out, Vietnamese leaders cannot afford to ignore the ominous possibility of a deal made at their expense by Moscow and Beijing.

Such problems pose excruciating choices for Hanoi. If one can argue, as Ross and Lawson do, that Chinese policy toward Vietnam is a consequence of its fear of the Soviet Union, one can also argue that Vietnam's strategy is based, above all, on its own fear of a resurgent and expansionist China. Although Vietnam's concern has undoubtedly been sharpened by the events of recent years, its roots lie in the past; history still powerfully influences the thinking of Hanoi's leaders.

After the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, Vietnamese leaders felt that in order to guarantee Vietnam's survival against an arrogant and imperious China, they had no choice but to build a foreign policy on the twin pillars of a special relationship with Laos and Cambodia and close ties with Moscow. This strategy incurred high costs in terms of international isolation and economic stagnation, but officials in Hanoi insisted that national security interests were not negotiable, and expressed confidence that they could wait out the Chinese, as they had outwaited other adversaries during the Vietnam War. In recent years, however, signs of an impending reassessment have been appearing in Hanoi. The new leadership under General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh that was installed at the Sixth National Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party in December 1986 has indicated that economic construction is at the top of its priority list. As part of this new policy, official sources in Hanoi have hinted at the possibility of "new thinking" in the arena of foreign affairs. One sign of movement has been Vietnam's apparent willingness to accept a compromise settlement in the Cambodian dispute. A second sign has appeared in subtle hints that Hanoi is willing to make con-

cessions in an effort to resolve its multifaceted dispute with China.

Hanoi has ample reason to seek a reduction in tensions with Beijing. Not only would it destroy the anti-Vietnamese alliance and release scarce resources for the program of economic modernization, it would also reduce Vietnamese dependence on Moscow and restore an element of balance to Hanoi's foreign policy. But a true reconciliation seems highly unlikely at this time. If the primary source of China's concern is Hanoi's relationship with Moscow, then an end to the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty would go a long way toward bringing about a stable and equitable relationship between China and Vietnam. But to the Vietnamese, the roots of Chinese behavior lie deep in history, and can only be influenced if Beijing is convinced that Hanoi has a powerful foreign friend. To the Vietnamese, the treaty with the Soviet Union is not the source of the problem, but the consequence.

IF THIS perspective is correct, a long-term solution to the Sino-Vietnamese dispute is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Both countries are now locked into an adversarial relationship that feeds as much on historical animosity and distrust as on contemporary disagreements. To Hanoi, a tributary relationship to China would be both humiliating and politically unacceptable. To Beijing, an independent and often fractious Vietnam is an affront to Chinese pride as well as a threat to its vulnerable southern flank. While a *modus vivendi* that sets aside such issues in the interest of better state-to-state relations should not be ruled out, it will take time for these often uneasy neighbors to reach an amicable and lasting solution to their differences.

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Corrections

Two items in the September-October 1989 issue of *Problems of Communism* require correction.

On page 84, footnote 4 should read:

⁴See Holland Hunter, 'The Overambitious First Soviet Five-Year Plan,' *Slavic Review* (Seattle, WA), June 1973; James R. Millar, "Mass Collectivization and the Contribution of Agriculture to the First Five-Year Plan," *ibid.*, December 1974.

On page 105, Professor Chao Kang's surname was inadvertently given as Kang.

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